Xenophon: Ethical Principles and Historical Enquiry

Edited by

FIONA HOBDEN

CHRISTOPHER TUPLIN

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In memoriam Michael Stokes (1933–2012)

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PREFACE

The chapters in this volume go back to a conference held at the University of Liverpool on 8–11 July 2009 under the title *Xenophon: Ethical Principle and Historical Enquiry*, at which a total of some fifty precirculated papers were discussed in two-and-a-half days of concentrated engagement with the life and *oeuvre* of Xenophon. The format and the occasion itself took their model from *The World of Xenophon*, a conference held at the same institution almost precisely ten years earlier (7–10 July 1999) and represented in print by C.J. Tuplin (ed.), *Xenophon and his World* (Stuttgart 2004).

We should like to take this opportunity to offer our thanks to various individuals and institutions for the contribution they made to making the conference possible and ensuring that it ran smoothly and, we believe, to the great enjoyment of those who took part. Subventions from the British Academy and the Hellenic Foundation greatly improved the finances of the venture: we are very grateful to Robin Osborne for his help in formulating the British Academy application and to George Lemos and his colleagues at the Hellenic Foundation for their kind response to our request for help. The logistics of the conference, as an event in real time and space, were managed by the University of Liverpool Conference Office: we thank Caroline Griffiths and her team for their professional skill in these matters. A substantial contribution was made by two of our postgraduate students, Wendy Healey and Sarah Platt, who were permanently on hand to deal with the practicalities (small, large and unpredictable) that are inevitably entailed by an academic event involving seventy-five participants. Special thanks are due to our colleague and co-organiser Graham Oliver. Other commitments kept him from being involved in the editing of this volume, but the considerable role that he played in the planning and execution of the conference must be put on record. We are most grateful to him.

In preparing the present book we have incurred further debts. We thank Brill (and specifically Irene van Rossum) for accepting it for publication. We also thank our contributors—without whom none of it would be possible—for their readiness to meet our deadlines and to respond to editorial suggestions. We are very pleased that the English translation of two papers originally written in French was done by Bill Higgins. He has thus added

to the debt we owe him for his participation in both of the Liverpool conferences and for the contribution of his *Xenophon the Athenian* (Albany 1977) to modern Xenophontic scholarship.

Fiona Hobden
Christopher Tuplin

ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations for ancient authors and works follow those of *OCD*[3], those for journals *Année Philologique*, with usual English/American variations.

INTRODUCTION*

Fiona Hobden and Christopher Tuplin

Reading Xenophon

Xenophon presents a unique opportunity. As the author of Hellenic history, campaign record, biography, encomium, Socratic dialogues, constitutional analysis, economic treatise and training manuals, his repertoire is diverse in its interests and forms. His personal history places him successively at Athens (where he grew to early adulthood through the twenty-seven years of the Peloponnesian War and became part of the circle around the charismatic figure of Socrates), in various parts of Anatolia, the Levant and Mesopotamia (serving as a mercenary and commander in Persian and Spartan service), at the small town of Scillus in the Peloponnese (where he lived just across the river from Olympia on an estate given to him by the Spartans), and finally (perhaps) back in Athens, when the long years of exile were over and he was eventually able to go home.[1] Here is a man who lived in the world, observed it, contemplated it, and then wrote about it, all the while tapping into, experimenting with, and contributing to new developments in prose. His prolific output embraces people and events past and present, recast into narratives of political conflict, military endeavour, educational journey, conversational encounter and constitutional development. Along with the more explicitly didactic treatises on hunting, cavalry command, and the mustering of Athenian revenues, his texts also reach out to their contemporary audiences, offering snippets of a Xenophontic world-view. So often ancient historians are constrained to understand the past at a societal level, analysing the actions and ideas of whole communities or, at best, their leading individuals. Or they are limited by the range of an author

* We thank Bruce Gibson for his comments on an early draft of this Introduction.

[1] Resumption of residence in Athens is consistent with, but not strictly speaking required by, the lifting of the decree of exile, his sons' service in the Athenian cavalry and the care for Athenian economic and moral well-being displayed in the *Poroi*. On this see e.g. Badian 2004, Dreher 2004.

to exploring, for example, a 'Sophoclean' or, at best, a 'tragic' perspective; we can understand the experiences and principles of Herodotus or Thucydides only through their singular histories. But the breadth and scope of Xenophon's extant corpus promises much more: repeat access, over a lifetime, to the thoughts and ideas of one ancient Athenian, to his experiences within and his vibrantly creative responses to the disrupted, disputatious and intellectually animate world of late fifth- and early/mid fourth-century Greece.[2] It is the purpose of this edited volume to realize the opportunity Xenophon offers: to understand the author and his works, his methods and thinking, and the world that he wrote in, about and for.[3]

However, accessing Xenophon is not so easy. It is not merely for the prosaic reason that a large volume of work is inevitably difficult to navigate. Rather in the twenty-first century Xenophon is 'always already' in reception. The chain of thought that informs our basic understanding of his personality, methods and ideas stretches back from the modern period through the Renaissance and into antiquity. And with each link, Xenophon is tweaked anew, reflecting the contexts of his readings and especially the relationships built between the ancient author and his later reader. This started early on.[4]

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[2] Ion of Chios and Critias of Athens might have offered similar opportunities for the fifth century, had their *oeuvres* survived intact; attempts have been made on Ion's world-view by Jennings & Katsaros 2007.

[3] Thus our collection continues the project of Tuplin 2004 in its interrogation of Xenophon as 'a distinctive voice on the history, society and thought-world of the later classical era'. Since the start of 2004 much new work has appeared on Xenophon: *Année Philologique* already lists over 350 items for the years 2004–2009. Just confining one's attention to monographs one may, for example, note the following: *General* Azoulay 2004, L'Allier 2004, Mueller-Goldingen 2007, Gish & Ambler 2009, Gray 2009, Gray 2011. *Anabasis* Lane Fox 2004, Lee 2007, Waterfield 2006. (Note also Brennan 2005.) *Hellenica* Bearzot 2004. *Sparta and the Peloponnese* Daverio Rocchi & Cavalli 2004, Richer 2007. *Socratica* Dorion & Brisson 2004, Pontier 2006, Mazzara 2007, Narcy & Tordesillas 2008. *Grammar* Buijs 2005. *Reception* Rood 2004, Rasmussen 2009, Rood 2010. There are significant discussions of *Cyropaedia* in Faulkner 2007 and of *Oeconomicus* in Kronenberg 2009 and Danzig 2010. There have also been various new (or revised) annotated editions and/or translations. *Agesilaus* Casevitz & Azoulay 2008. *Anabasis* Waterfield & Rood 2005, Müri & Zimmerman 2011. *Apology* Baer 2007, Pinheiro 2008, MacLeod 2008. *Cavalry Commander* Keller 2010. *Cyropaedia* Albafull 2007. *Hellenica* Jackson & Doty 2006, Strassler & Marincola 2009. *Hiero* Gray 2007, Casevitz & Azoulay 2008. *Horsemanship* Sestili 2006, Keller 2010. *Memorabilia* Macleod 2008, Pinheiro 2009, Bandini & Dorion 2011a, 2011b. *Oeconomicus* Linnér 2004, Audring & Brodersen 2008, Chantraine & Mossé 2008. *Poroi* Audring & Brodersen 2008. *Spartan Constitution* Jackson 2006, Gray 2007, Casevitz & Azoulay 2008. *Symposium* Pinheiro 2008. The pseudo-Xenophontic *Athenian Constitution* has appeared in Ramirez Vidal 2005, Marr & Rhodes 2007, Gray 2007, Casevitz & Azoulay 2008, Weber 2010. The papyrus fragments of Xenophon have been re-edited by Pellé 2009.

[4] The classic account of the early reception of Xenophon's work is Münscher 1920.

As Philip Stadter (chapter 1) demonstrates, Plutarch's *Moralia* are marked by direct engagement with Xenophon's work, adopting some of its stylistic and formal features and incorporating quotations from, discussion of, and allusions to it. On the one hand this is a utilitarian approach: Xenophon is a selectively and sometimes idiosyncratically used source of sentiments or information or ideas, not a theorist to be analysed or critiqued. Yet, it is also an approach that shapes the reader's reception of Xenophon as 'a man of breadth and sensibility, a philosopher of life, not abstractions, a narrator who filled his texts with examples of what to imitate and what to avoid' (p. 59, below). Plutarch's Xenophon is not so different from Plutarch himself. Since the two of them stand out among the authors of antiquity as practitioners of both history and philosophy, this is perhaps only to be expected. A different sort of elision might be recognized in representations of Xenophon's residency at Scillus during the long nineteenth century. While William Mitford (author of a ground-breaking *History of Greece*) never styled himself as Xenophon, his understanding of his subject at leisure on his rural estate mimicked his own escape from political life; in the same way those who visited the site (or, at least, came closer to doing so than Mitford ever did) would imagine him 'hunting, feasting and writing' or enjoying a life of piety and contemplation in a rural idyll. The 'ideal of gentlemanly leisure' imagined for Xenophon became a tool of self-orientation and self-justification for members of the British elite who occupied themselves in similar ways—and was equally available to members of that elite whose own political outlooks (Whig or Tory) or personal predilections (hunting, gardening, religion, philosophical reflection, the Romantic response to nature) were by no means identical. Tim Rood's examination of this phenomenon (chapter 3) also reminds us that the image of 'Xenophon the English country squire', which found its origin in the reception of his 'delightful retreat', is one that continues to haunt modern responses to the author. There is an element of nostalgia here that needs to be resisted.

The Plutarchan and eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century texts sketch two alternative ways of responding to Xenophon which nonetheless equally align the 'modern' reader with their ancient subject through practice: doing philosophy with and like Xenophon for Plutarch; making Xenophon act like 'one of us' for his British interlocutors. In the process Xenophon himself is newly defined, and the latter version survived into the late twentieth century to inform scholarly interpretation. However, the roots of some interpretations can be traced back to an earlier period of post-mediaeval engagement. Humanists abstained from colouring Xenophon in a Renaissance hue, but their preoccupations have equally determined

modern analyses of his work. The *Spartan Constitution* supplies a case in point. Although there are those who favour an ironic reading of this brief treatise,[5] the dominant response is to see it as a largely uncomplicated eulogy of Spartan laws and customs. By examining the notes, dedications and letters written by fifteenth- and sixteenth-century translators of and commentators on the *Spartan Constitution*, Noreen Humble (chapter 2) traces the dominant encomiastic reading of the work back to their diverse circumstances and/or agendas: Francesco Filelfo sought new patronage from Cardinal Niccolò Albergati and sycophantically presented Xenophon's Lycurgus to him as a model of excellence which the cardinal surpassed; Lilius Tifernas acknowledged the existing patronage of Federico da Montefeltro and was led by Federico's interest in Aristotle to associate Xenophon's work with the *Politics*; and Franciscus Portus identified a primarily encomiastic tenor in the *Spartan Constitution*, partly because he read it alongside the criticism of Athens in the *Athenian Constitution* and partly under the influence of the Calvinist appropriation of Spartan principles. Renaissance scholars were thus already situating Xenophon's work in relation to Plutarch, Aristotle and the *Athenian Constitution*, and treating it as an educational political treatise that was capable of illuminating political debate.

For a shift towards ironic readings of the *Spartan Constitution* Humble credits Leo Strauss; she also notes the influence of his political perspectives on his approach to the text. If earlier treatments of Xenophon shaped the author's purposes and identities in diverse ways, Strauss's invitation to 'read between the lines' made his writings even more contested.[6] Of course, Strauss was pretty sure what should be found between those lines. In his dissection of Strauss's reading of *Memorabilia* 4.4, David Johnson (chapter 4) explains how the political philosopher formed his theories regarding Xenophon's ideas about law and justice as conveyed through the staged encounter between Socrates and Hippias. Ultimately, the theories postulated for Xenophon by Strauss are dependent upon Strauss's modernist preconceptions about 'intelligent design' and 'natural law': 'Strauss found, between the lines, his own scepticism about natural law'. Yet from the rubble of deconstructed Straussian analysis, Johnson builds a new theory for Xenophon, demonstrating the utility of reading *like* Strauss,[7] and even

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5 Strauss 1939, Higgins 1977: 65–75, Proietti 1987: 44–79, Humble 2004.

6 For the hermeneutic principle of 'reading between the lines' see e.g. Strauss 1941.

7 One can read between the lines of a literary text—that is, assume that it is not a discourse in which everything is exactly as it seems and stands at exactly the same distance from

claiming Strauss's relationship with his 'special *Liebling*' for himself. Liberated from Strauss, Johnson's Xenophon still remains defined and in some measure illuminated by him: one studies the reception of an ancient author not just to acquire historical perspective on other people's reactions to that author but also as a heuristic tool for informing and improving one's *own* reactions, and Strauss's capacity for acute observation makes him a useful tool.[8]

Xenophon is thus intimately tied to his reception by our predecessors, each of whom responded to and imagined the man and his works anew. This makes him not merely a fluid and malleable figure, but a contested one. This has striking implications: 'we' are instrumental in determining how we think about Xenophon in the first place. How then are we to realize the potential outlined above? One way to evade the existential *aporia* attendant upon this post-modern appraisal might be to consider Xenophon from within—from within his society, from within his writings—reading through the lines, rather than between them. Yet, even as a spectator of and commentator upon the contemporary political world, Xenophon is contestable. Two episodes from the *Hellenica* exemplify this: the Arginusae trial (1.7.1–35) and Timocrates' mission to Greece (3.5.1–2).

In the first instance the attack comes from modern historians unsatisfied with Xenophon's explanation of the trial of a group of generals who abandoned Athenian seamen to death by drowning after the rout of a Spartan fleet in 406. The condemnation of the generals to death has been regarded as an appalling error of judgement, one symptomatic of a *dēmos* out of control, a democracy gone mad.[9] But the close examination by Dustin Gish (chapter 5) of the terms of prosecution and the process of the trial, set within the context of late fifth-century political uncertainty, suggests that this is not Xenophon's conclusion. Rather, Xenophon shows democracy in

the reader's view—without believing in 'persecution [giving] rise to a peculiar technique of writing, and therewith to a peculiar type of literature, in which the truth about all crucial things is presented exclusively between the lines' (Strauss 1941: 491). We do not need esotericism or extreme doses of irony, just the perspective expressed by Cawkwell (1972: 26): 'The study of Xenophon is a slippery business. He will stand when his critics have fallen … though plain, he is never transparent.'

[8] There are, for example, good observations about the presence of biographical details in *Mem.* 4.4.1–4, the interconnection between doctrine in 4.4 and Hippias' association with hostility to *nomos*, the non-reversibility of the argument that the lawful is just (i.e. the failure to prove that the just is lawful), and the role of benefaction in the topic.

[9] This goes back at least as far as Mitford, who doubtless saw such an event as symptomatic of the sort of world from which Xenophon did well to retire to Scillus.

action: the *dēmos* doing what one should expect it to do, namely protecting itself from threats to its regime at a time of weakness and potential *stasis*. (There is some resonance here with the eventual reaction of the *dēmos* to Socrates.) Those who seek to view Xenophon's account of the trial as an indication of anti-democratic sentiment are (once again) apt to be influenced by current conceptions, in this case current conceptions of what 'bad democracy' should be (whimsical, inconsistent, pernicious mob rule). Assessment should instead start from a recognition that the story we are told by Xenophon is one of reasoned and orderly behaviour by public bodies duly invested with political and judicial authority. Of course, following due process does not of itself guarantee achievement of justice or successful identification of self-interest, but Gish's analysis reminds us that Xenophon occupied a privileged position as a direct observer of Athenian democracy in his youth and that, although he ended up in a Spartan mercenary army and subsequently suffered exile from Athens, unthinking antagonism to democracy was not necessarily an ingrained default attitude.

However, Guido Schepens (chapter 6) also reminds us that privilege does not guarantee infallibility, unassailable authority or impartiality. The arrival in Greece of a Rhodian called Timocrates bringing Persian money for the leaders of states hostile to Sparta is one of the most hotly debated events of the fourth century—fittingly so, since the outbreak of the Corinthian War (in which it played a part) is a watershed moment in the history of that century. The primary sources are Xenophon's *Hellenica* and the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, and they disagree on how and why the war broke out, and especially on the role of Timocrates and his fifty talents of silver. Whatever the respective dating of the two histories, Xenophon's is not the only voice to survive and his analysis can be challenged by the alternative theorizing of his contemporaries. By scrutinizing their respective accounts, Schepens articulates the relationship between the *Hellenicas*. Two things stand out. First, the difference in opinion goes together with a difference in historiographical practice. P's approach to dealing with this contentious topic includes explicit analytical comment and direct (and robust) response to what other people have to say about it. Xenophon, by contrast, confines himself to narrative and marks the importance of the matter not by offering his own ruminations but (rather obliquely) by assigning two pages of text to the Theban speech that persuaded Athens to join the anti-Spartan coalition. Second, although Xenophon's understanding of the whole issue was influenced by the Spartan version of events, this did not preclude subtle critique—or at least some careful distancing. This is Xenophon as situated author, his perspectives on historical events influenced by his rela-

tionships and personal history.[10] But he was also an 'artful reporter'[11] who exerted control over the history he presents, setting out his opinions—not always straightforwardly—amidst other circulating interpretations. It is a great pity that we cannot know for sure whether he simply ignored the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (as Schepens supposes) or was influenced by it in reaching his own carefully judged presentation of the data. But it is in some respects implicit in Xenophon's way of doing things, and particularly in his way of writing history, that such questions are next to impossible to answer.

If, then, we are unreliable witnesses to Xenophon (as consideration of his reception suggests), he too is partial is his presentation of historical events and people. His opinions do not exist in a vacuum, however, but form part of an on-going evaluation of recent events that we can glimpse through alternative accounts. The line between Xenophon as prime witness (Gish) and artful reporter (Schepens) is particularly blurred in the case of what is perhaps the most contested event in Athenian history and arguably the most pivotal in Xenophon's life: the execution of Socrates in 399. The level of contestation is witnessed in the proliferation of speeches masquerading as prosecution and defence delivered at the controversial philosopher's trial. Michael Stokes (chapter 7) returns to a favourite conundrum: the relationship between Plato's *Apology* (*PA*), Xenophon's *Apology* (*XA*), Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (*XM*) and Polycrates' *Accusation of Socrates*. Whilst arguing in favour of the chronological order *PA*, *XA*, Polycrates, *XM*, Stokes reveals the thematic interrelationships between the texts. Once again Xenophon emerges as a 'creative writer', adapting episodes alluded to by Socrates in Plato's *Apology*, countering the arguments mouthed by his accusers, and developing his initial ideas in the *Memorabilia*'s extended *apologia*—though also (Stokes contends) displaying a certain degree of carelessness in the process. Nobody today would argue that Xenophon or Plato reproduced Socratic conversations *verbatim*.[12] But the contention that, for example, in sending Socrates to the Delphic oracle Xenophon expanded upon a fictional story first introduced by Plato is unsettling. We might happily agree that Socrates in the *Apology* conforms to Xenophon's vision of his former teacher

[10] There may even be an element of patronage here—it is not only Renaissance humanists who are affected by such things.

[11] 'Artful reporter' is a term borrowed for Xenophon by Schepens from Hunter's 1973 description of Thucydides.

[12] Exemplified in the approach of, e.g., contributors to Narcy & Tordesillas 2008; Danzig 2010.

and trace out the author's 'Socratic' philosophy from there.[13] (We might even think that this was in many ways determinative for *all* of his literary output.) But, from a historical perspective, what should we make of Xenophon's 'recollection' of Socrates' final thoughts and the implied events of 399 more broadly?

For Stokes the apparently dry issue of the chronological order of the four texts has a more substantive pay-off because the result seems to downgrade the political component in Socrates' trial: if Alcibiades only entered the story with Polycrates' pamphlet, then the entire issue of Socrates' political 'unreliability' must have been missing from the original real-world trial. The burden of complaint was rather about *kaina daimonia* ('new divinities') and their alleged substitution for the recognized deities of the city—an affront to tradition but also a potential danger to civic well-being, since offence to the (proper) gods could have unwelcome effects. But with this most contested of contested events we can hardly venture to expect a final settlement of all the arguments, and we get a quite different account from Robin Waterfield (chapter 8). The starting point here is Socrates' alleged adoption of a boastful tone (*megalēgoria*) in court because 'he had already concluded that for him death was preferable to life' (*Apology* 1). With whom did this interpretation of his behaviour originate? Waterfield argues that it was not a *post eventum* gloss produced by his apologists but came from Socrates himself. Moreover, by reading the 'defence' and 'prosecution' arguments within the context of bubbling dissent about democracy at Athens in the late fifth century and revisiting his teachings on moral leadership filtered through Plato and Xenophon, Waterfield paints a picture of Socrates as a political visionary. The philosopher chose to accept his fate as a scapegoat (and hence spoke provocatively at his trial) because of the failure of his 'political mission' and indeed its bastardisation under the regime of the Thirty. This new reading of Socrates as charismatic crusader for a polity ruled by the morally superior explains not only the reason for his prosecution in 399, but also, perhaps, the devotion that he evoked from Socratics like Xenophon, who were inspired to re-animate the philosopher and his conversations in their written dialogues. When Xenophon says Socrates chose to die, something he claims (not wholly fairly) that other apologists had not observed, he is perspicacious as well as self-promotional. And when he associates Socratic principles with the exercise of leadership in politico-military contexts he is not doing something that is simply false to his teacher's project.

13 See Waterfield 2004 on Socrates more broadly.

Xenophon, then, is an insightful and crafty chronicler of historical events, especially those in which he had a personal investment. This does not necessarily make him deceitful or deliberately misleading. Shane Brennan (chapter 9) illustrates this nicely with his re-evaluation of an alleged omission: the so-called 'snow lacuna' in *Anabasis*. Partly under the influence of a nineteenth-century view about the dating of the march of Xenophon's mercenary force from Sardis to Babylonia and back to the Aegean, scholars have been puzzled by the apparent absence from the record of several months in the winter of 401–400, attributing it to shoddy memory or wilful elision of an embarrassing event. Through a detailed examination of Xenophon's account of the march from Babylonia to the Black Sea against the climatic and topographical record for the regions crossed, Brennan closes the gap and provides a new chronology for the expedition. In the process, he makes a simple but striking claim for Xenophon's integrity as the author of his most personal historical work. Not that integrity precludes selection or productive manipulation. Brennan himself suspects that there was more to the story of the army's dealings with Tiribazus than appears in the pages of the *Anabasis*; and he is prepared to envisage that the rather precise framework of distances and times that characterizes *Anabasis* I–IV is the product of *post eventum* research, calculation and guesswork—making the diary-like exactitude of the text not only a literary feature but also something of an imposture. Sarah Ferarrio (chapter 10) broadens the focus from *Anabasis* to include *Hellenica* and addresses a wider authorial issue by interrogating the construction of historical agency. Events might unfold according to the proclaimed will of individuals such as Agesilaus, Alcibiades, Lysander and 'Xenophon' (the character encountered in the pages of the *Anabasis*), and such people might boast of their achievements to intratextual audiences, giving them shape and meaning. However, by writing his histories—setting their ambitions and outcomes side by side, sometimes to parodic effect—the author Xenophon is the ultimate architect of events. Where the *Apology* claims special knowledge for its author amidst a range of competing voices, the *Anabasis* and *Hellenica* confirm Xenophon's mastery over his subjects' attempts to control the historical record, *viz.* the production of memory. One may add that the situation is not radically different in the *Socratica* or in *Cyropaedia*, though these works plainly sit at different places from one another and from *Anabasis* and *Hellenica* on the spectrum between reportage and fiction.[14]

[14] There is also some resonance with Harman's remarks about *Agesilaus* in chapter 12. The encomiast too (explicitly) has control of the subject's reputation.

By controlling history, Xenophon can also lend it meaning. So encounters between Greeks and barbarians in the *Anabasis* afford reflections on the theme of Spartan friendship. Repeatedly, Spartans form relationships of *philia* or *xenia* that are detrimental to the Greek mercenaries. The Ten Thousand are betrayed to the Persian satrap Tissaphernes by the Spartan exile Clearchus, and their return home is hindered further by the Spartan naval commander Anaxibius, who forces them to disband under threat of slavery and does so in the hope of gratifying another satrap, Pharnabazus. In this way of telling the story of the Ten Thousand, Ellen Millender (chapter 11) identifies a warning for the Greeks at large that chimes with concerns expressed in Isocrates' *Panegyricus*. The conclusion that Xenophon is here 'in conversation' with contemporary political debates about Spartan-Persian relations reinforces the developing picture of an author whose historical writings compete with alternative interpretations of historical causation, seek to dominate other claims to historical agency and trump alternative rememberings of Socrates. Xenophon's history is plugged into the discourses of the present. Moreover, this Xenophon is no straightforward Laconophile.[15] Just as his presentation of Timocrates' mission rather subtly critiques the Spartan story regarding the cause of the Corinthian War, the presentation of detrimental Spartan-barbarian friendships counters what remain widespread assumptions about Xenophon's loyalties based on his personal association with Agesilaus and his long-term residency in the Peloponnese.[16] This way of seeing things is further supported by Rosie Harman's reading of the encomiastic *Agesilaus* (chapter 12). Here the tone of praise is compromised by a narrative that draws its audience into viewing Agesilaus on display and stages scenes of seeing. For when the king himself is shown to stage scenes of 'display' that coerce watchers into contrived appraisals, the reader's viewing of him is in turn disturbed. There is perhaps a special piquancy in the use of what is *seen* to problematize the surface message of

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15 There is even perhaps a distinctively Athenian angle here. Although the mercenaries' relations with Seuthes go through a rocky patch (not helped by the intervention of other *Greeks*—Heraclides of Maroneia and the Spartan emissaries from Thibron), things are rectified in the end because the *Athenian* Xenophon, trading in part on a history of Atheno-Thracian *xenia*, succeeds in creating and managing a relationship with barbarians that is *not* to the mercenaries' detriment—an appropriate achievement for man denounced by Spartans as *philostratiotēs*.

16 The general importance of friendship in Xenophon's view of the world (noted variously in this volume by Baragwanath, Danzig, Jansen, Johnson, L'Allier and Schorn) gives the Spartan failure in this matter a special force.

a text whose genre is so quintessentially verbal: by nature the encomium manipulates with words (and Xenophon takes care to remind the reader that encomium is what we are dealing with), but in this case what you get is what you see—and what you see is unsettling. Again, contemporary anxieties emerge. Agesilaus' self-staged spectacles are particularly problematic for the encomium's identification of the Spartan king as a philhellene. Like the Persian king he manipulates the way others view him (if to the opposite extreme of full exposure), and he puts on an arrogantly autocratic spectacle to celebrate his victory over the Thebans: the effects of his conquest of Greeks are thus as available to view as any spectacle of Greeks suffering at the hands of Persians. In the disjunction Agesilaus' extra-textual viewers—Xenophon's readers—are invited to revise their understanding not only of Agesilaus' commitment to the Greeks, but also of what it means to be Greek. Xenophon's works encourage their reader to look at the world, and themselves, anew.

In the presentation of Spartan friendships and the critique of Agesilaus' moral paradigm, Xenophon responds to the dilemmas of the day; his reminiscences of the *Anabasis* journey and of Agesilaus are cut through with political critique and ethical inquisition. This combination is indeed symptomatic of his *oeuvre*. It is most visible in Xenophon's Socratic writings—a fact that is perhaps unsurprising in the light of Waterfield's Socrates (see above)—where virtue is not an abstract moral aspiration but a practical skill for succeeding in any and all spheres of life, from household management to the *polis*. This practical component emerges clearly from Louis-André Dorion's analysis of Xenophon's conception of *sophia* or wisdom (chapter 13). The conversation between Socrates and Euthydemus in *Memorabilia* IV introduces *sophia* as a technical ability, the mastery of a particular skill that may have a purely material scope (as with the craftsman Daedalus) or may facilitate the acquisition and practice of particular virtues, including the specially important ones: *enkrateia* (self-mastery), *sōphrosunē* (temperance) and *autarkeia* (self-sufficiency). It is an understanding that even extends to divine wisdom, inasmuch as the young Persian king-to-be Cyrus can be advised in *Cyropaedia* to use divination to access it as a source of practical knowledge. With this treatment of wisdom Xenophon displays his independence of mind, constructing an alternative to the Platonic understanding of *sophia* as a virtue-unifying knowledge of the good and of divine *sophia* as something entirely superior to and qualitatively distinct from the human variety: for, whereas Xenophon regards divine wisdom as something that men can occasionally access, for Plato it is something to which the human philosopher can only aspire. It is thus entirely symptomatic

that, whereas Plato's version of the Delphic Oracle story (*Apology* 21A) has Socrates declared the wisest of men (because, as it turns out, he most fully knows his own ignorance), Xenophon's version has him declared outstanding only in liberality, justice and temperance. Irrespective of our views about the essential historicity of the Oracle story or the chronological relationship between the two versions, the contrast is very telling. 'Rememberings' of Socrates thus enable Xenophon to position himself within the thrust of intellectual debate and even to suggest an alternative way to be a philosopher or lover of wisdom.[17]

Yet, projecting himself into intellectual circles brought certain hazards. It is not just that scholars two thousand years hence will dismiss Xenophon as a poor man's Plato, but that contemporaries might misunderstand Xenophon's work as 'sophistic'. This is an interpretation that Xenophon preemptively dismisses in the final chapters of his handbook on hunting, the *Cynegeticus*. As Louis L'Allier (chapter 14) shows, his defensive attack on the sophists (or at least the sophists of his own day as distinct from putatively more respectable figures from an earlier generation such as Prodicus) challenges any conflation readers might make between this technical treatise (with its occasional purple passages, its promotion of individualistic hunting, its assumptions about how to teach *technai*, and its celebration of an art that involved traps and deception) and the rhetorically flashy but empty works of low-grade fee-earning sophists. In doing so, Xenophon contrives not only to provide useful guidance for the young hunter but also to invest the activity with a moral dimension and make a provocative statement about the nature and status of his own literary and pedagogic activity as a former associate of Socrates.

In Xenophon's pursuit of his intellectual ambitions the political and the ethical repeatedly coalesce around the issue of leadership, as Harman's dissection of king Agesilaus as leader of the Greeks already implies. Vivienne Gray's recent monograph (Gray 2011) rightly makes this a pervasive Xenophontic concern, and she traces the literary techniques by which 'images of power' across the corpus come to constitute a 'theory of leadership'. The relationship between a leader and his followers, the limitations on government and the importance of charisma all possess an ethical dimension: *eudaimonia* requires the improvement of the skills and virtue of all par-

[17] Indeed the very word *philosophia* (and its cognates) seem to lack special *cachet* in the language of Xenophon's Socrates. Things are *prima facie* different in the non-Socratic *Cynegeticus* (e.g. 13.9), though less so on L'Allier's reading of the situation in chapter 14.

ties, while governing requires wisdom—a practical understanding of how to rule—and recognition of the leaders' virtue by their subjects, as well as a desire to benefit one's friends. This final aspect seems particularly crucial to Xenophon's universal project, if we consider the *Anabasis*' implied criticism of Spartan friendship as non-beneficial to the Greeks or the view (expressed in *Memorabilia* 1.6.13 and implicit in *Cynegeticus* 13) that the teacher's relationship to a pupil—itself a form of leadership—must be based on friendship not pay. It is an issue also in the *Cyropaedia*, where scholars have been apt to identify Cyrus as a problematic ruler on the grounds that he pursues his interests at the expense of friends. Gabriel Danzig (chapter 15) counters this ironic reading by arguing that Cyrus's self-interested actions are largely advantageous to his subjects too. One reason why this is so can be seen by comparing the 'big boys and little boys' episode (*Cyropaedia* 1.3.17), in which Cyrus takes the outsize cloak belonging to a smaller boy and exchanges it with the small garment belonging to a larger boy, and the relationship between Cyrus and his uncle Cyaxares, in which much of the latter's army is given (or gives itself) to the former. In each scenario the exchange benefits both parties (each of the boys gets a cloaks that fits; Cyrus gets his uncle's troops and Cyaxares' position as Median king is strengthened by Cyrus' consequent military successes), and this is because a principle of appropriateness is being applied: the two boys deserve the coats they get because they fit them and Cyrus deserves to have greater power because its suits his much greater skills in the art of leadership. It is not a principle that everyone finds easy: the young Cyrus' teacher had him flogged for authorizing the cloak-swap and Cyaxares initially reacts badly to being, as he sees it, demeaned. But it is a fair and beneficial principle, and Cyaxares' churlish response is, after all, simply indicative of why it is Cyrus, and not he, that is going to rule the newly established Persian empire. We may still feel some sympathy for Cyaxares (and it is an important fact that Xenophon has constructed a story that can have this effect), but there is no irony here. Gray, who rejects what she calls 'darker' readings of Xenophon, those that permit a more flexible reader response by identifying 'flaws in the glass' of Xenophon's 'mirror of princes',[18] would presumably be happy with this reading.[19]

Yet, for all that Cyrus' behaviour in this instance can be described as reasonable and transparent, the narrative of *Cyropaedia* as a whole still opens up alternative perspectives on Cyrus. Danzig himself allows that the deserts

[18] See Gray 2011: 5–69.

[19] See also pp. 37–38, below.

of an exceptional leader apply no further than his continuing capacity to exert exceptional leadership: they cannot, for example, guarantee that an imperial system once created and perfected will continue thus in perpetuity after the leader's death.[20] Both Lisa Hau (chapter 17) and Melina Tamiolaki (chapter 18) detect at least some flaws (by Xenophontic standards) in Cyrus' conduct—vulnerability to arrogance; a failure to match the perfect virtue of Socrates—while John Henderson (chapter 16) draws attention to episodes involving Pheraulas that focalize, and may invite us to interrogate, the relationship between leader and subject (here again centred on reciprocal utility and benefit). Pheraulas is the Persian commoner who early in the story encouraged the reward of merit based on service and is then, in the closing sections of the *Cyropaedia*, shown to have benefited from Cyrus' recognition of him as a 'good man' (a man so dedicated to service that he fails to stop his horse when struck on the face by a randomly thrown clod of earth). He thus becomes a double for Cyrus, who himself learned that good service merits reward as a child at his grandfather Astyages' court, where he usurped a servant's role and followed a similar upwards trajectory to court life. This is a serio-comic turn that collapses leader into subject and subject into leader, a 'riddling narration' that '*deepens*' (in Henderson's vocabulary) rather than 'darkens' (Gray's terminology) a presentation of Cyrus' achievements that fits a primary theme: the challenge of creating good government and, as evidenced in the book's closing chapter, the difficulty of securing its long continuance.[21] What we see here is Xenophon at play, a masterly narrator stimulating audience inquisition through spoudaiogelastic dissonance in an elaborately worked-out and tightly controlled piece of 'history'. More bluntly, the punning title to Henderson's chapter is spot on. One does not read *Cyropaedia* in order to turn into Cyrus: in truth, 'you cannot be Cyrus'.

Working with a broader range of texts, Melina Tamiolaki (chapter 17) also acknowledges complexity in Xenophon's presentation of 'ideal leaders'. It derives not from irony, however, but from the 'ambiguity of virtue' in Xenophontic thought. If Xenophon's Socratic definition of virtue (*aretē*) is applied to leaders one would expect to find bravery (*andreia*), justice (*dikaiosunē*), self-control (*enkrateia*), piety (*eusebeia*), moderation (*sōphro-*

[20] It is, of course, a lesson encountered elsewhere in Xenophon that, in the real world, display of good leadership on one occasion is no guarantee of its display on all occasions. Cyrus is truly exceptional both in always doing things right and (particularly) in the results that it may be right for *him* to achieve, i.e. the sort of personal monarchy established in *Cyropaedia* VIII.

[21] So irony does not 'close down' readings, as Gray 2009: 5 fears elsewhere, but opens up readings of Cyrus' leadership.

sunē), beauty and goodness (*kalokagathia*) and love of humanity (*philanthrōpia*). In practice, leaders display these qualities to a lesser or greater degree. Socrates alone possesses a virtue that is 'uncontested and unambiguous'. But, tellingly, virtue is not always aligned with success, and even 'good' leaders remain imperfect. The benevolent king Cyrus twists justice, takes an unsettlingly utilitarian approach to benevolence and uses his virtue to maintain the subordination of his people; Hiero's potential for justice is thwarted by his despotic compulsion to behave unjustly;[22] Ischomachus' leadership of his household is explained, but his *kalokagathia* is never confirmed; and by avoiding a political career and raising the hellcats Alcibiades and Critias, Socrates fails to translate his virtue into successful leadership and hence to bring his own theories to fruition.[23] Good leadership and virtue are equally difficult to attain. For Xenophon leadership is a challenge.

Lisa Hau (chapter 18) and Pierre Pontier (chapter 19) provide further illustration of this, as Xenophon positions his leaders precariously at the edge of virtuous conduct.

Hau focuses on the moral disposition ('pride' or 'arrogance') denoted by *mega phronein* and its *phron-* cognates. This is a negative attribute (even, contrary to first impressions, in *Symposium*) and yet it manifests itself in the conduct of both Agesilaus and Cyrus when they set out to instil contempt for the enemy in their own troops. The immediate effect, Hau asserts, is 'to puzzle the reader and raise questions not just about the behaviour of this particular commander at this particular moment, but about the wisdom in any circumstances of this, probably common, military behaviour' (p. 607, below). But, on a wider front, the way that Agesilaus' action here is in line with the capacity for arrogant display that is seen on other occasions (notably the soon-to-be-punctured self-congratulation in *Hellenica* 4.5.7, a scene that in Ferrario's view, p. 350, almost constructs Agesilaus as an oriental despot) does make one wonder whether some of Cyrus' other behaviour (not just things like his interaction with Cyaxares but also his eventual construction of an entirely self-focused autocracy) might legitimately be seen in a similar light: even justified *megalophrosunē* may be a troubling spectacle.

22 The leaders of mid-fourth century Athens are pictured as suffering from a similar difficulty: the poverty of the city compels them to be unjust, and it is not only they but their fellow-citizens who are corrupted (*Por.*1.1; see Schorn pp. 693–695).

23 A slightly different, but not incompatible, angle on Waterfield's political visionary. Note that Tamiolaki is not inclined to let Socrates off the hook over Alcibiades and Critias on the ground that even a good leader can only lead people who want to be led—i.e. share some common goal which outweighs the inclination to independence.

Pontier's discussion of the motif of the Persian kiss offers a different sort of spectacle, *viz.* Agesilaus negotiating the demands of foreign policy and his own appetite for self-mastery (*enkrateia*) in a barbarian environment. For Cyrus kissing is an originally social custom that becomes associated with the distribution of honour at his court; for Agesilaus the promise of a kiss from a beautiful Persian youth is a threat to his own virtue. By rejecting Megabates' kiss Agesilaus in fact follows Socrates' recommendations in *Memorabilia* and *Symposium*, but he is preferring ostentatious demonstration of virtue to the pursuit of presumably legitimate political goals. Is that good leadership? It is plainly debatable, with the answer depending in large measure on how self-indulgent one thinks Agesilaus was actually being. (If he was getting off on virtue, that is a failing of *enkrateia* too.) The incident also exemplifies the interconnection between Xenophon's historical observations and ethical theorizing. The historical components are knowledge of the status of the kiss as a sign of honour in Persian circles, an incident involving Agesilaus and a young high-status Persian, and the experience of a Socratic moral education which highlighted self-mastery. The textual upshot comprises (i) a stern view of the dangers of kissing, (ii) the account in *Cyropaedia* of the origin of the kiss-of-honour, a process that involves redefinition of a privileged group and suppression of erotic content (with the implicit suggestion that the Socratic view of kissing is extreme), and (iii) a moral dilemma for Agesilaus. But did the Megabates incident play out more or less exactly as Xenophon eventually narrated it and thus provide a powerful inspiration for the discussion of the de-sexualized kiss-of-honour in *Cyropaedia* and for severe (written) Socratic advice in favour of abstention from kissing? Or did the tension between an actual alarm Socrates expressed about kissing and Xenophon's knowledge of (sexually innocent) Persian customs prompt a heightened version of the Megabates incident (turning an ethno-cultural misunderstanding into a moral issue for the benefit of encomium) and what is actually for the most part a rather playful exploitation of the issue in *Cyropaedia*? We can hardly tell—and perhaps even Xenophon would not have been sure.

Leadership is thus a theme that pervades Xenophon's corpus, but—not least because it so often fails—its individual articulations are dialogic and interrogative. They interact with one another, building upon, confirming or questioning other visions of leadership. And they invite the reader to question what they are shown, to appreciate the difficulties of providing consistent and successful leadership in a context of moral probity—but also never to give up a belief that the topic and the aspiration are important. It is perhaps not too fanciful to view a reader's process of continual

re-evaluation with each encounter as mimicking Xenophon's many returns to the topic and reconsiderations of his ideas over time. We might now hesitate to imagine Xenophon in a book-lined study, hunting dog at foot and pen in hand, looking out on the past and present from an idyllic Scillus, but his texts certainly position their author as a perpetual spectator upon and evaluator of the world. Indeed, the position of inspired observer is articulated in the *Symposium*, where not only are entertainments on display for the symposiasts and their extra-textual viewers, but the responses of those symposiasts are on display too. As Emily Baragwanath (chapter 20) remarks, Xenophon goes a stage beyond Herodotus by not only describing wonders, but staging them. There are echoes of the *Agesilaus* in this prioritization of the visual as a mode of scrutiny, and perhaps even some deeper influence from what has been judged the highly visual culture of Spartan social manipulation. However, in the *Symposium* the primary focus of the symposiast's gaze is not on a king or a society of putative *homoioi* ('peers') but on slaves. Baragwanath links this to Xenophon's broader relational economy, wherein slaves are not only capable of stimulating moral conduct in their observers, but are also part of the chain of human relationships that fit into the utility/benefit scheme implicit in proper leadership. In the *Oeconomicus* Ischomachus actually sets them to 'govern' (*archein*) their domains, which means (one might infer) that they acquire the *sophia* to undertake their duties; and he even treats his slaves like 'free men' (*eleutherois*) and—if anything, more remarkably—honours them as 'beautiful and good', *kalous kagathous*. The *Oeconomicus* is another playful text and the question mark over Ischomachus' possession of leadership qualities has been noted above. But Socrates' comments on the slavishness of free people suggests that Xenophon is proposing a serious (serio-comic?) twist on 'Greek popular morality' as he revisits issues of perennial concern. At the very least gentleman-slaves, like king/queen bee wives, are an interesting thought-experiment and one that is entirely logical in the light of Xenophon's basic ethical posture and pragmatically utilitarian (not to say relativistic)[24] conception of the good.

Xenophon's self-appointment as observer and critic of contemporary society is most firmly displayed in the *Poroi*, a treatise on how Athens might organize and exploit its resources to best effect. In whatever manner this was circulated or delivered, orally or as a pamphlet, it presents a

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24 See Dorion, at p. 460.

coherent (if not necessarily realizable) programme for reform. One perspective on the text is provided by Thomas Figueira (chapter 21), for whom it serves, along with *Oeconomicus* and passages in *Cyropaedia* VIII and *Memorabilia*, as proof that Xenophon could consciously speak in terms that are recognizable to the modern economist: he encourages craft-specialization, estate improvement and investment, intensive exploitation of resources, the pursuit of commercial advantage and the manipulation of supply and demand—and all on the assumption that there is such a thing as entrepreneurial initiative. This rebukes the conclusion (even dogma) of earlier historians like Moses Finley—not entirely shaken off in more recent settings such as *Cambridge Economic History* (2007)—that Classical Athenians were insensitive to economic phenomena.[25] Xenophon writes as a trouble-shooting management consultant, offering practical measures to improve Athens' well-being, and this practical component recalls the emphasis placed on practical wisdom by Xenophon's Socrates and his unrelenting pursuit of a theme—leadership—of direct relevance to a literate audience of elite Greeks. Xenophon's texts peddle a practical pedagogy, albeit one tied up in notions of morality.[26] *Poroi* fits snugly into this model, and indeed for Stefan Schorn (chapter 22) it exemplifies rather impressively the interplay between Xenophon's political and moral philosophy. Comparing his recommendations with statements on leadership in other works, especially the *Memorabilia* and *Oeconomicus*, Schorn traces the relationships and responsibilities laid out for members of the *polis* alongside the text's 'economic' recommendations. Justice and *enkrateia* are central to the project, and Athens must take a leadership role. Within this utopia, the city will even become a Panhellenic leader—and Xenophon, as its key adviser, a leader at Athens.[27] Joseph Jansen (chapter 23) is less convinced of the *Poroi*'s

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25 Economic history is perhaps peculiarly vulnerable to the historian's contemporary location, and Finley was perhaps as much a part of the reception (as opposed to study) of Xenophon as was Strauss.

26 This is one reason for the 'interveining' of material of which Figueira speaks (p. 668).

27 The notion of Xenophon as the leader Athens needed (if only in the virtual world of *Poroi*) recalls Gish's speculation (pp. 200–204) about Xenophon's view that democracy would work better if the city were under the sort of leader he himself might have been. Danzig (pp. 533–534) contends that, despite his own death, the Armenian sophist saves the King's life by educating Tigranes in such a way that *his* arguments can persuade Cyrus not to punish him. A direct Socratic analogy would imply that Socratic pupils are the potential saviours of Athens after Socrates' death. Is there an implicit claim here too that mid-fourth century Athens could benefit from what Xenophon has to offer? One would not wish to assign an undue *folie de grandeur* to Xenophon (it would, of course, be nice to know just how serious a

moralizing tone, but his examination of Xenophon's plan for outsiders at Athens emphasizes not only the sharpness of Xenophon's vision but also (again) the author's deviation from 'traditional Greek morality'. His radical plans regarding slaves, foreigners and metics upset normal patterns of social mobility by offering opportunities for these groups to become personally and financially invested in the city. The decision to formulate such plans did, of course, proceed (as Figueira notes) from a rational judgement that outsiders were—precisely because of their outsider status—the most readily available levers for reform. Xenophon is not a real proponent of social egalitarianism as such, any more than he is an abolitionist or a proponent of women's rights, and the appearance of philanthropy is entirely consistent with the pursuit of self-interest, as Danzig observes in the context of *Cyropaedia*. But genuine mutual benefit as between leaders (the city) and dependents (its inhabitants—all of them) remains the key to success in a project such as that presented in *Poroi* just as much as in other collective endeavours, and that does mean that the text has an irreducible ethical dimension. Nor can one entirely rid oneself of the feeling that Xenophon's own experience as mercenary, exile and resident alien gave him a degree of sympathy for the outsider which had a bearing on the ease with which he uses them as something to think with and guaranteed a degree of benevolence in the resulting ideas.[28]

In the present collection, Xenophon starts out as an unsettled and unsettling figure: the product of a post-Classical tradition, defined from Plutarch through to Strauss by 'our' ambitions for him.[29] He is a chronicler of his times, a witness to political turbulence at Athens and beyond in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, but only one of a number of voices pressing their understanding orally or in writing. Whether showing the cause of the Corinthian War or explaining the death of Socrates, Xenophon is caught up in a battle for the control of memory production. His work demonstrates the methods by which he jockeyed for position amongst contemporary thinkers, whilst pursuing distinct intellectual agendas. Writing in a

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thwarted aspiration to colony-leadership, even autocratic rule, is really concealed in *Anabasis* V–VII; Waterfield, p. 297, and Ferrario, p. 368, seem inclined to think quite a lot, but we are less sure), but the written word can provide beneficial leadership too.

28 Blinkered benevolence, perhaps, in some cases: it is hard to see that the lot of the mining slaves of *Poroi* could as a matter of fact be that pleasant, but for the purposes of the utopian thought-experiment Xenophon chooses to think otherwise (Schorn, p. 711).

29 As Baragwanath (p. 659) observes, he anticipates on-going debates about how to read him.

range of genres (even inventing some), he produces myriad scenarios of past and (near-)present as practical tools to explore contemporary issues from ethical perspectives. These scenarios encourage contemplation and interrogation, requiring a mind as playful as Xenophon's to tease out the possible meanings of what is seen. Their writing is Xenophon's *sophia*. Through them this rather distinctive leader brings benefits to his followers.

Socrates, 'Socratic History' and the Problem of Irony

Readers who have got this far have travelled from Xenophon's reception to his final work *via* much (if not quite all)[30] of his corpus and been offered an introduction to, and abbreviated first experience of, the material that constitutes the bulk of this book. Various themes have emerged—and some themes have not been as prominent as might be expected: Xenophon has a reputation for religiosity, but this has not been a major thread in the discussion above, though it is not absent in our contributors' chapters.[31] But at a higher level of generality one might identify three things: ethics, history and (though not always put in these terms) the issue of whether Xenophon should be read as an 'ironic' author. The most recently published English monograph on Xenophon, Vivienne Gray's *Xenophon's Mirror of Princes*, rightly identifies leadership as an abiding Xenophontic concern—and articulates a sceptical reaction to the search for dark irony in his pursuit of that concern. There is a plain overlap here. Since history is (for Xenophon) the recollection of the behaviour of states or state-like entities or individuals with political agendas (one that can only be delivered by leading not following) and since ethical benchmarks are, perhaps inevitably and certainly for Xenophon, a necessary part of any assessment of such behaviour, ethics,

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30 The equestrian works have barely figured.

31 Stokes (pp. 261–266) on the importance of *kaina daimonia* in the prosecution of Socrates is perhaps the most notable item. But note also Waterfield on Socrates as scapegoat (pp. 298–301), Johnson (pp. 131, 134, 143, 146–155) and Schorn (p. 698) on gods and unwritten laws, Dorion on gods and *sophia* (pp. 468–474), Baragwanath (pp. 644, 649) on the god-like leader (the relevant *Oeconomicus* passage is also mentioned in Tamiolaki, p. 578, but not dwelled upon from this perspective), Ferrario (pp. 361–362) on Xenophon and divination in *Anabasis* (and cf. Schorn, p. 716, on the *Poroi* 'intertext'), Hau (pp. 594–595) on the avoidance of arrogance being in line with traditional piety (which Xenophon favours: p. 604) and on the alignment of success and piety (p. 607), Rood (p. 112) on Bishop Wordsworth's view of Xenophon as a model pagan.

history and leadership are closely intertwined. Meanwhile the shared concern with assessing Xenophon's tone is obvious.

Xenophon is not, of course, the first Greek author who wrote about the past or who invited assessment of that past, not always explicitly. *Mutatis mutandis* one could, indeed would have to, say this of Herodotus or Thucydides. But no one would confuse Xenophon with either of them. There are various lights in which one could see that fact, and in the past some of them have been quite unkind to our author. Second-rate by the standards of Plato, he also been adjudged second-rate by the standards of Herodotus and Thucydides. But, leaving aside the accusation of inadequacy (heavily compromised in both cases by the fallacy of not comparing like with like), one thing that stands out is the very fact that he is being compared with two quite distinct categories of author. Whatever else one may say about Xenophon, he was, as antiquity observed, a philosopher and a historian, and this is certainly one light in which to see the impossibility of confusing him with Herodotus or Thucydides. And why was he both of things? The simple answer is: because of his association with Socrates. Before all else (chronologically and logically) Xenophon was a Socratic, and it is perhaps worth pursuing this point a little bit further.

The Socratic experience gave Xenophon three things: (1) interest in a moral (or politico-moral) agenda; (2) interest in the ability of a particularly able or charismatic figure to influence and benefit his associates, both by personal example and by discourse; and (3) the desire to encapsulate a version of the past in written form that accounts for the existence of *Apology, Memorabilia, Oeconomicus* and *Symposium*. There are direct connections between this and the rest of his output. (a) Everyone would recognize that the general ethical standpoint from which Socrates operates is one that is encountered throughout the Xenophontic *oeuvre*. It is persistently represented as a source of good action in the real world. (b) The general interest in leadership certainly corresponds to the experience of the charismatic Socrates, for all that his own experience of leadership is plainly relevant as well—indeed represents the other principal strand in his personal history. (c) Much of the other written output is about the past.

There is also another important aspect of the Socratic experience to be considered: failure. Failure dominates *Apology* and encircles *Memorabilia*—at least if being tried and executed counts as failure. Socratic virtue, it appears, cannot protect against such an outcome. At the same time the sense of failure can be challenged, reduced or diverted.

First, the claim in both *Memorabilia* and *Apology* is that Socrates' apparently bad end was unjustified—in that the charges were not true—and

neutralized by his calm and undemeaning deportment in confronting the trial and its result.

Second, was it an entire failure? Socrates' project, as represented by Xenophon, had been to benefit his associates and make them better. It is true that his death put an end to that project. On the other hand it is at least hinted that the project would end anyway with his declining powers, so all that happened was an anticipation of the end. From Socrates' point of view this anticipation of the natural termination of the project is apparently no big deal, and certainly no reason to adopt a different response to the trial or his conviction. He had been brilliant and, as a consequence, able to assist his associates towards *eudaimonia* (as a good leader should), but he is not required to compromise that brilliance (e.g. by toadying to a jury) in order to go on giving that help. The requirement to help one's friends as best one can is not more pressing than the requirement to behave as well as possible oneself. Indeed without fulfilling the latter requirement one cannot fulfil the former one anyway. So from Socrates' point of view dying is *not* a failure. The project lasts just as long as he is alive and able to be appropriately superior to his prospective beneficiaries. What happens to those beneficiaries after his death is simply not an object of comment.

Or nearly so. One element that makes death seem acceptable is that he knows his subsequent reputation will be better than that of his accusers. More specifically he is made to say (*Memorabilia* 4.8.10): 'I know that I shall always have testimony (*marturēsesthai*) that I never wronged anyone or made anyone a worse person, but always tried to make my associates better'. What testimony? Well presumably (*inter alia*) the testimony of works such as Xenophon's. We cannot venture to speculate about whether Socrates actually said this; but, encountered in Xenophon's text, the statement credits Socrates with an expectation that there will be future Socratic discourse that takes the form of the one we actually have. And, of course, the purpose of that discourse is not just a historical one but a paradigmatic one: readers of the text become new associates of Socrates inasmuch as they can contemplate examples of his helpfulness.

So perhaps there is a near-explicit sense of the *post mortem* continuation of Socratic benefaction, and, if so, one could say that the project of helping associates carries on and has therefore not failed. The only real failure is that an insufficient number of jurors were impressed by whatever it was Socrates actually said to them; but as a matter of fact the discursive relationship between Socrates and jurors was not one in which his particular claims to *sophia* were likely to be specially effective (this was not a context for setting out to help or improve the listeners, and of course not an environment

for the conversational approach)[32] and as a matter of constructed history (perhaps also of fact if Waterfield's argument in chapter 8 is right) he chose—for good reasons—not to seek to succeed. Making that choice is affirming control and obviates the accusation of failure.

The written record therefore has to exist to combat the idea that Socrates' life ended in failure and to extend his capacity to exert a good influence, and a desire for a perpetuated paradigm leads to a species of history-writing.

But Socratic history-writing is a rather distinctive thing. It is, for example, a genre in which it is acceptable (for both Plato and Xenophon) to construct an *Apology* that simply excludes Alcibiades and Critias: the concern *is* with a particular event (the trial), and even in some degree with what actually happened at the trial (the outcome is, after all, a given), but it is also with lessons to be drawn from the event that are not just about what Socrates actually said or how he deported himself but about the principles that animated him—principles worthy of reflection in their own right. The principles do claim some of their authority from his identity, but not from the fact of his having said precisely such-and-such a thing on this occasion. The situation is not much different from Aeschylus' *Persians*: the play exists because of an actual event, but the series of episodes at the Persian court that constitute its text, though representative of something that must have happened (there must have been *some* reaction in Persia to the news of Salamis), is in detail fictitious. Performance of the play invites reflection on various principles affecting individual and collective human behaviour. They derive authority from their discursive association with an iconic event but not from any claim that the conversations in which the principles are articulated actually happened.

Of course there are distinctions to be drawn.

First, a precise analogy would require *Persians* to represent the Battle of Salamis itself, not geographically distant people's responses to it, and the trial of Socrates to be an iconic national achievement that virtually everyone assessed in the same way. But the basic principle is unaffected: an event that happened in the real world is the occasion for, but does not constrain the detailed content of, an event that is staged in the literary world.

Next, there is a genre issue. Aeschylus already had a generic environment into which to place the staged fictional event. All that was needed was the

[32] A niggling feeling will always remain that, if Xenophon could write out some decent defences in *Memorabilia* 1.1–2, Socrates could have done so just as well. But good defence need not equate with acquittal—as indeed the constructed historical text is careful to say.

realization that the real-world event was so extraordinary (and a subject of such unanimous assessment) as to elevate it to the mythological status that normally characterized the genre's subject matter. For the Socratic authors there was no genre in the same sense, and the impetus to go for re-imagined, even fictive, history came from the fact that the event was not only extremely contentious but also looked like a failure on the part of the figure who was to be made paradigmatic: if benefit was to be derived from what they saw as the tragi-heroic end to an extraordinary life, others saw as the overdue punishment of an enemy of civic order and yet others did not know *how* to assess, the strictly historical mode was perhaps best avoided.

Thirdly, and importantly, there is a big difference between Plato's and Xenophon's *Apology*. The former is entirely staged: Socrates speaks throughout, with no narrative setting, not even between the three separate speeches that constitute the text—an odd arrangement which means that, even if one seeks a generic congener in the published versions of forensic speeches, what we have here does not really conform. In Xenophon, on the other hand, we have a statement of the intention to provide a better explanation of what happened, a narrative setting involving the citation of a source (Hermogenes) for events around the trial, and an avowed selection from those events to demonstrate a particular point. If Plato is supplying a dramatic libretto, Xenophon is writing history: it is almost as though a scholar is producing a brief article on the correct interpretation of a historical event. Of course the tone (not least the concluding *makarismos*) gives the lie to such a scenario. This is partisan analysis, and the words in Socrates' mouth are, in their detail, as fictive as those in the mouths of speakers in Herodotean or Thucydidean historiography. Still, it says something about Xenophon that this is his chosen mode of response to pre-existing trial literature. And it remains his chosen mode.

Memorabilia 1.1–2 sits somewhere between historical analysis (inasmuch as it starts from a historical question about why something happened) and forensic defence (inasmuch as the discussion is couched as a refutation of the charges brought against Socrates, not a balanced consideration of *pros* and *cons*). The scale of the further exemplification of Socrates' services to his associates by example and discussion (1.3.1) that follows in the rest of the work puts the totality of *Memorabilia* well out of the way of mere forensic defence—the weight here and in Socratica as a whole (and not only Xenophontic ones) was on evoking Socrates at work, not fighting and refighting a court-room battle that he himself had been scarcely interested in fighting—but it does not conflict with the historiographical claim. 1.1.1 wonders what arguments could have justified execution and identifies the

two charges. 1.1.2–20 discusses the first (religious unorthodoxy), 1.2.1–64 discusses the second (corruption of the young). The puzzle as to what justified the result remains as strong in 1.2.64 as at the outset, and the remainder of *Memorabilia* is then introduced in 1.3.1 as a body of evidence providing a further gloss on the response to the second charge. Moreover the conversational vignettes staging Socrates' interaction with associates that constitute this body of evidence are consistently contextualized by narrative or theme, so the claim to be selecting and presenting material in order to justify historical analysis remains visible. The same goes for *Oeconomicus* 1.1 (rather baldly, but with a claim by the author to primary source status) and *Symposium* 1.1 (more interestingly, but again with the claim to autopsy). In these cases, of course, where the vignette has grown to the size of a free-standing work, the impact of the total text entirely transcends the notional setting; and even in *Memorabilia* it may be the vignettes themselves that stick in the mind, leaving one with a feeling that the work is primarily a series of dramatic scenes. They are nonetheless scenes from the past intended to illuminate (ethical) thought and behaviour in the present.

They are also scenes from a past that is marked by relative chronological non-specificity: *Apology* and *Memorabilia* 1.1–2 and 4.8 relate to 399 (though 1.1–2 also refers to other contexts), but the number of conversations given a specific location in time is modest,[33] there is (of course) *no* construction of a diachronic narrative of Socrates' life, and even the number of precise references within the conversations to historical events or more generally to the world outside the Socratic circle is quite limited.[34] The world of Socratic

[33] *Memorabilia* 1.2.32–38: Socrates with Critias and (mostly) Charicles; 2.7: Civil War setting; 2.8: specific post-war setting; 3.5: conversation with the younger Pericles in 407. *Symposium* is set in a Great Panathenaic year, when Autolycus won the *pancratium*; that was in principle identifiable to readers, and a reference to Callippides *might* imply a supposed date after his known Lenaea victory of 418. *Oeconomicus* is implicitly located after death of Cyrus the Younger (4.19).

[34] (a) References by the narrator. *Mem.* 1.1.18 and 4.4.1 (Socrates at Arginusae trial), 1.2.12 (the bad character of Critias and Alcibiades, as stated by 'accuser'), 1.2.24 (Critias in Thessaly), 1.2.24 (Alcibiades courted by women etc.), 1.2.40–46 (Alcibiades conversing with Pericles), 1.2.61 (Lichas and Gymnopaedia), 4.2.2 (Themistocles mentioned by some undentified person). (b) References by an interlocutor. *Symp.* 3.13 (Callippides the actor and the wealth of the Great King). (b) References by Socrates. *Ap.* 14 (siege of Athens), 15 (Lycurgus and Delphic oracle); *Mem.* 2.1.10 (rulers and ruled in barbarian Asia, Europe and Africa), 2.1.21 (Prodicus), 2.6.13 (Pericles won city's affection with incantations, Themistocles with benefits), 2.6.36 (Aspasia on matchmakers' truthfulness), 2.7.6 (various slave-owning manufacturers), 3.5.4,11,15,26–27 (Tolmides, Hipocrates; Persian wars; exemplary Spartans; exemplary

practice ends up as a rather timeless place, book-ended in *Memorabilia* between treatments of the trial and free-standing in *Symposium* (though that does have a datable occasion) and *Oeconomicus*. Such timelessness is one of the things that makes possible what has been called the Socratic 'Golden Age', a place where Charmides (one of the Thirty) is charming, Socrates' accuser Lycon calls him a real *kaloskagathos*, and the Callias-Autolycus relationship, which contemporary comedians treated as sordid, turns out to be uplifting.[35]

The Socratica are not, of course, the only part of Xenophon's *oeuvre* that engage with the past as a guide for the present or future. The idea of using the past in that fashion was not unavailable elsewhere (whether in historiography or tragic drama or forensic, political and epideictic oratory), but there is no impediment to believing that the Socratic issue was its prime source in Xenophon's intellectual biography. It is certainly a perspective from which one can view some of his other historical works.

This is very clear with *Cyropaedia*, which starts with a puzzle (like *Memorabilia*), is centred round a charismatic individual and is a historical discourse dominated by conversation. Nor is that all. As already observed, a fundamental fact about Socrates was that he was tried and executed on charges that imputed moral failings. All Socratic works entail a tension between the claim of moral virtue and intelligent beneficence and, by contrast, Socrates' eventual fate. They exist to re-validate a superficially discredited figure by taking us back to the world as it was before things went wrong (the Socratic 'Golden Age') and lodging the paradigm in that world. Similarly right from the outset, whatever the reasonableness of the argument for inspecting Cyrus' history as a way of understanding leadership qualities and the evident relative 'distance' of the object of study, Greek readers could see that they were being invited to assign positive value to a Persian. There was perhaps some history of doing this in the case of Cyrus, which would make it

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Mysians and Pisidians; relationship with Boeotia), 3.6.2 (Themistocles and the barbarians), 4.2.10 (Theodorus of Cyrene, the geometer), 4.2.34 (people taken to the King of Persia), 4.4.15 (Lycurgus as lawgiver), 4.7.7 (Anaxagoras—part-historical example of the stupidity of doing astronomy); *Symp.* 1.5 (Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus as teachers of Callias), 3.7 (Stesimbrotus, Anaximander as teachers of Niceratus), 4.62 (Prodicus, Hippias, Zeuxippus, Aeschylus of Phlius: people Antisthenes introduced to Callias), 8.33 (military pairing of lovers in Thebes/Elis), 8.39 (Themistocles, Pericles, Solon, and Spartans as models); *Oec.* 4.4–18 (Great King and Persian agriculture), 4.18–25 (Cyrus/Lysander and death of Cyrus), 11.4 (the horse of Nicias the foreigner), 12.20 (the Persian king and the horse), 14.4–7 (the laws of Draco, Solon and the King).

[35] Cf. Huss 1999: 38–49 (*aurea aetas Socratica*).

easier,[36] but *Cyropaedia* was surely unprecedented in size and biographical construction; and the persistent *eti kai nun* passages serve *inter alia* to keep the sense of slight unease alive by asserting a direct connection with the later real world.[37] The almost shocking suddenness with which it emerges that Cyrus' achievement, model and death-bed exhortation have no effect upon his children, immediately underlined by the satirical denunciation of his long-term inheritance, do not destroy Cyrus' claims to exemplify intelligent and successful leadership, but they *do* confine those claims to the special version of reality that Xenophon has created as a space in which to display them.[38] *Cyropaedia* as a fictive paradigmatic universe has the twin advantage of being arrestingly improbable (you *cannot* learn from Persians, surely?) and yet historically grounded (Cyrus *did* create a remarkable empire). Something analogous could be said about Socratica—and there is even a remarkable nod in *Cyropaedia* towards the problematic character of Socrates in the passage about the sophist whose execution by the Armenian king was, in Cyrus' view, at least humanly understandable (3.1.38–40). *Cyropaedia* would hardly have come into existence without Xenophon's Persian experiences—experiences that both sensitized him to the Persian environment and forced him to investigate military and political leadership for real and from the inside. But it is hard to see him transmuting these experiences in the sort of form we find in *Cyropaedia* without the Socratic background.

Spartan Constitution also begins with a puzzle and shares with *Cyropaedia* the use of a palinode chapter to mark off the ideal and paradigmatic past from the inadequate present,[39] but it has a more etiolated biographical character than even the Socratica, notwithstanding the omnipresence

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36 Antisthenes liked to quote Heracles and Cyrus as good exemplars (Dio Chrys. 5.109, Diog.L. 6.2) and wrote four works with Cyrus' name in the title (6.16–18). Compare also Isoc. 9.37, Plat. *Ep.* 311a, 320d.

37 There are over forty occurrences in the main body of the text: 1.2.1,16,3.2, 4.27; 2.4.20; 3.2.24,26; 4.2.1,8, 3.2,23; 6.1.27,30, 2.11; 7.1.4,33,45–47, 5.70; 8.1.6,7,20,24,37, 2.4,7, 3.9,10,13,34, 4.5,28, 5.21,27,28, 6.5,914,16. It recurs, generally with a satiric twist, in the palinode chapter (8.8.8,9,10,11,13).

38 A space that is, moreover, doubly displaced in time from the present day: cf. Tuplin 1997: 103–105. There are three chronological horizons in *Cyropaedia*: that of the main story, that of the palinode chapter and a third (less well-defined) representing a time at which customs established by Cyrus were still in place and the degeneration described in the palinode had not set in.

39 The literary trick of ending a work (for *RL* 14 surely did originally end the work) with a section that comments on the rest of the work recurs (in L'Allier's reading) in *Cynegeticus*, though the relationship is more complicated.

of the name Lycurgus. The purpose of that feature is simply to ensure that the reader never entirely loses a sense that the Spartan customs under discussion are in a sense located in the past (indeed the very distant past), even when present tense verbs are being used to describe them. Lycurgus is said to have been responsible for Sparta's *eudaimonia*, but there is lack of specificity about the continued existence of that *eudaimonia*.[40] But in fact the paradigmatic force of the picture of the intelligent pursuit of morally acceptable *eudaimonia* (or *epimeleia aretēs: Memorabilia* 4.8.11) is (paradoxically) reinforced by the acknowledged tension between the paradigm and aspects of reality. This effect is stronger in *Spartan Constitution* inasmuch as chapter 14 is a much larger proportion of the whole text than is the final chapter of *Cyropaedia*. But in both cases a sharp distinction is being drawn between the world that is praised and the current world, and the idea of locating paradigmatic material presented for beneficial reflection in a bounded past is of a piece with the construction of the Socratic past.

Hiero does not so plainly present anyone as an admirable or paradigm figure in the manner of Socrates, Cyrus or Lycurgus, but it is at least quasi-Socratic: the spectacle of Simonides calmly proving to Hiero that he is wrong about tyranny, or at any rate that he does not have to be right if he is prepared to change his approach, has a plain Socratic flavour. But Simonides, though certainly a wise-man figure, is not of Socratic status. This time there is no framing narrative (not even the tiny bit implicit in *ēkousa*—'I heard'—at the start of *Oeconomicus*) and no palinode. Perhaps Xenophon decided it was not necessary. He was not bestowing praise on a figure or institution that contemporary figures would be inclined to regard with hostility (as with Cyrus and the Spartan state). We are only being told what such a figure (Hiero) might do *to change*. A concluding chapter pointing out that he did not change would have been possible, but unnecessary. Xenophon assumes that readers will bring external knowledge to bear, but in this case (unlike *Cyropaedia* and *Spartan Constitution*) he does not need to head them off. The thought-experiment of a 'reformed' Hiero remains just that,[41] and we draw what conclusions we will from it on that basis. (We shall return to *Hiero*, as also to *Cyropaedia*, a little later.)

The other historical works—*Agesilaus, Anabasis, Hellenica*—depart further from the immediate model of Socratic historiography.

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[40] There is an *eti kai nun* passage in *RL* 10.8—but it is about how even now Lycurgan laws seem *kainotatoi* to other people, not about how they still apply.

[41] The remarkable lack of specific historical detail within the text is to be noted here.

Agesilaus does start with a puzzle, but it is not formally a puzzle that can be solved by "historical" investigation. Rather Xenophon confronts the difficulty (indeed, impossibility) of adequately praising someone who was *teleōs anēr agathos*. The willingness to believe there might be such a person is surely in part a legacy of Socratic experience; and the text that follows *could* be viewed as an extended attempt to prove the correctness of that assessment of Agesilaus' character. But the specific motivation for writing the work—the obligation to praise his dead benefactor—does seem to make it a special case. Formally speaking, the work is not analysis, not even partisan analysis, but *enkōmion* (10.3), and the choice of Agesilaus as a subject was not a free one in the same way that the choice of the Elder Cyrus, Lycurgus or Hiero. On the other hand, if one is tempted to say that *Agesilaus* is something Xenophon would have had to write in any case, one then realizes that that depends on Xenophon being a writer in the first place—and *that* is due to Socrates.[42] Encomium of a Spartan king cannot wholly escape an origin in reconstruction of the activity of an Athenian sage. In fact, encomium shares with Socratic historiography the characteristic of constructing the past as a bounded historical space to be contemplated, for the lessons it has to teach, in some detachment from reality. And such a perspective is of some importance for how we read the work. In the Socratica, *Cyropaedia*, *Spartan Constitution* and *Hiero* we are invited to look at and learn from a bit of the past that is, one way or another, in tension with (current) reality. Sometimes the tension is highlighted through a palinode, sometimes it is more or less implicit. In *Agesilaus* there can be no palinodes and no failures on the part of the honorand. But those readers who are inclined to detect a tension between the insistently positive discourse or the explicit denials of failure and the (at best) more complicated reality that was as familiar to the original consumers as it is to modern historians can claim justification not just from those passages where Xenophon acknowledges the possibility of criticism (if only to deflect it) but more generally from the character of other works in the corpus. Presented with the task of writing an encomium, Xenophon is likely to have come at it as someone who was used to (indeed had a taste for) making ethical literary discourse out of potentially problematic historical topics.

[42] Actually *all* of Xenophon's non-Socratic *oeuvre* is Socratic in origin at least to that degree. Even *Horsemanship, Cavalry Commander*, *Cynegeticus* and *Poroi* do represent the author's attempt to benefit his associates (readers)—in some cases explicitly young ones—and, although their content may in the first instance be technical, there is a general ethical dimension in the latter two cases (see the chapters of L'Allier and Schorn in this volume). Such works are also the legacy of admiration for morally informed practical wisdom.

Agesilaus starts with an explicit indication of purpose. *Anabasis* and *Hellenica* notoriously do not, and, while *Hellenica* does contain a number of authorial interventions that draw attention to the lessons one might learn from specific historical episodes, *Anabasis* generally speaking lacks even that much of guidance. But the confirmation in *Hellenica* that the text is not being offered as some sort of neutral chronicle is one we hardly need, and readers' doubts about *Anabasis* are only about the balance of importance between the various issues we are being asked to reflect about. The examples of *Hiero* and *Oeconomicus* shows that Xenophon has no problem with presenting an entirely unglossed text to his readers, and they provide a parallel for the unprefaced nature of Xenophon's histories of Greece and of his own remarkable experiences in 401–399. And, if it be objected that this is to compare texts of radically different size and character, the answer is that the whole point of the present argument is that such an objection is misconceived. There is a fundamental unity to the corpus and its deployment of the past that is unaffected by scale or precise topic. Anyone writing about the past in some sense marks it off from the present while, implicitly or explicitly, asserting the connection between the two. The contention here is that the Socratic element in Xenophon's intellectual *ego-histoire* produced a particular version of this phenomenon in his case. When we read *Anabasis* and *Hellenica* we should not forget that the author's starting point for writing history was at the fictive end of the scale. This is not an invitation to the cheap conclusion that everything in *Anabasis* and *Hellenica* is lies but simply to a realization that for Xenophon, more than averagely, the past is consciously an object of construction. The historical material of both works may be non-Socratic (though Socrates does make an appearance in both, and in one case, at least, in what can be seen as a programmatically significant fashion)[43] and may not be wholly focused around one individual (though it comes close in parts of *Anabasis*), but the sense of being invited to look through a window at a self-contained past environment is comparably strong, at least in the case of *Anabasis*. The author's appearance as a third-person actor (and talker)[44] in a text formally attributed to someone else is, incidentally, part and parcel of this positioning of the narrative: autobiography is not a natural form for Socratic history.

[43] Xenophon's marking of himself as a Socratic at the point at which he emerges as the army's potential saviour (*Anab*.3.1.5–7) is surely significant.

[44] See Tuplin (forthcoming).

With *Hellenica*, admittedly, we do have something that looks rather different. Here Xenophon seems furthest away from Socratic roots and closest to an externally provided generic model. Reaction to this is made more difficult by the work's less than straightforward compositional history: there are two linguistically distinguishable sections, and the date of composition of the one that comes first in the text is hard to establish, but probably relatively early. Perhaps we should simply allow that being drawn to presentation of the past by the fate of Socrates did not preclude a response to other historiographical models: the model, and stimulus, provided by the incomplete Thucydidean text could evidently be quite powerful, and the subject matter—Athens' defeat by Sparta and Persia—was in its own way as close to Xenophon's heart as the model and fate of Socrates. (That second strand in his life-experience—an Athenian's mercenary employment in Persian and Spartan service—comes in here.) At the same time it was not his highest priority to continue the story beyond 404. That was something he came back only much later, when the consequences of that supposed 'first day of Greek freedom' (*Hellenica* 2.2.23) had proved to be *akrisia kai tarakhē* (7.5.27). Here was another story of failure—real and unalloyed failure—from which there were things to learn.

Despite these clear hints from the ends of its two sections (in Xenophon it is not only prefaces that tell one what a work is about), *Hellenica* remains an enigmatic work—less read than the rest of the corpus in antiquity, because it seemed out of place and did not even provide a sufficiently or systematically detailed account of its period,[45] and dispraised in modern times for what are, in some respects, not very different reasons. But for some modern readers *all* of Xenophon's works are enigmatic inasmuch as their intent is (allegedly) not immediately apparent. The perceptive reader will have noticed that we have already been drifting towards the issue of so-called 'ironic' readings of Xenophon, and it is time to say something more about this.

Such readings have been fashionable during the revival of serious Xenophontic studies, but have also been resisted. It is not surprising that there is a slight disinclination to detect the ironic or sardonic mode in Xenophon. Xenophon (or the figures who speak for Xenophon in his texts) suffer from a double problem in the secular modern world: they express themselves in what can seem a sententious and preachy fashion; and their ethical position highlights old-fashioned qualities such as self-control. (The inferences

[45] Cf. Tuplin 1993: 18–29.

to be drawn from Aristotle about how one should live one's life are not that remote from the morality of Xenophon, but modern readers tolerate that better because of the complex analytical environment of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.) But the judgement that Xenophon cannot be other than entirely straightforward because he is (seen as) morally sententious and serious begs the question, especially as Xenophon's Socrates is a bit of a joker and the social setting for Socratic intercourse can be light-hearted (*Symposium*). There is a sufficient resonance between this and aspects of the Platonic Socrates to suggest that there is a historical truth here. There is no ground, therefore, to think that Xenophon's Socratic education had to leave him humourless. It is true that the Xenophon-figure of *Anabasis* is not particularly given to jokes, but that is perhaps a function of the context in which we see him operating. Xenophon the author certainly approves of Theramenes' *bon mots* in *Hellenica* 2.4.56 or Socrates' rejoinder in *Apology* 27–28, and this does suggest that he is not the sort of solemn moralist who thinks one should always be serious, especially in serious circumstances.

Sardonic humour may or may not be the same thing as irony, of course; but in truth it does not matter much because we should probably try to avoid the word. It is certainly overused, and sometimes oddly used.[46] One thing that is certainly *not* a reason to use it is the concept of 'Socratic irony'. Understood as a pretence of lack of knowledge, it is *not* a particular trait of Xenophon's Socrates. On the whole he has opinions, and he reveals and asserts them. Confirmed Straussian esotericists, at the extreme wing of 'ironic' reading, would doubtless say that apparent certainty of this sort is the perfect cover. Such a claim is in a sense unanswerable; but why would one wish to make it in the first place? Leaving aside reasons based on the idiosyncratic intellectual life-history of the interpreter, there are a couple of things that have made Xenophon vulnerable. One is the perception of ingenuous sententiousness already mentioned: one reaction to that may be to wonder if the author has any sense of humour, but the reader who notices any signs that he *did* have such a thing can then be tempted to the opposite extreme. Another is what we have already seen in *Cyropaedia* and *Spartan Constitution*. In both of these works there is (eventually) an explicit

46 For example, Gray (who, of course, disapproves of ironic readings) describes the teaching of estate-management to Critobulus *via* a report on Ischomachus teaching it to Socrates (rather than a direct statement of its principles by Socrates)—an arrangement that allows him to display the learning-teaching process as well as the content—as an example of irony (2011: 371). It is a distinctive literary choice, but it is not obvious that 'irony' is natural way of categorizing it.

contrast between what seemed to be the presuppositions and the thrust of the work for most of the text and a perspective that is suddenly presented to the reader at the end. There is no actual contradiction, because the new perspective is about a different moment in time: change is explicitly part of the issue. But the sense that Xenophon has spent fourteen chapters or eight books convincing us that he inhabits a particular world only for it then to turn out that it is not quite that simple may tempt one to think he is an author who persistently does not mean what at first sight he appears to say.

But there is no basis for serious esotericism here. In these two cases the author issues an explicit invitation to reappraise what has already been said in the light of (long term) change. The invitation is an open one—we can draw what conclusions we will—but it is simply an invitation to interpretation of a literary text. There is no call to esotericism, unless the eventual esoteric view is nothing more remote or devious than what can be attained by a decently careful, enquiring and historically informed reading of the text—which is to say barely esoteric at all. Moreover it does not authorize us to do anything to texts that do *not* have explicit palinodes other than to expose them to the same sort of careful, enquiring and historically informed reading. It also bears stressing that the palinode chapters articulate thoughts that would already have occurred to this sort of reader. There was nothing outlandish in the fourth century about the idea that Sparta did not live up to the Lycurgan hype or that Persia represented values rather different from those of much of *Cyropaedia*'s main text. A reader who was not bothered by such thoughts while reading *Cyropaedia* or *Spartan Constitution* (even for the first time) was being unduly passive.

So the issue is not in the first instance about irony or 'dark' readings. It is about remaining conscious of the inter-relation between the said and the unsaid, between what is said in one place and what is said elsewhere, between appearance and reality or action and consequence. We must be prepared to read Xenophontic texts with the same willingness to consider unspoken implications and to see things from more than one perspective that we find natural when reading a tragic text—or indeed other historiographical texts—and we must acknowledge the author's wish to make the reader uneasy. Xenophon's literary activity stemmed from a project to counteract apparent failure, and he was perpetually conscious of the difficulty of doing things right and the possibility of unintended consequences.[47]

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[47] Compare *Mem.* 2.8.5–6: Socrates comments to Eutherus on the difficulty of doing anything faultlessly—and of avoiding criticism even if you do.

In an *oeuvre* full of the presentation of paradigms, this background always needs to be kept in mind.

In her discussion of the 'ironic' Xenophon Vivienne Gray lays some stress on the fact that there are places where our author draws attention to the presence of irony or wry humour and invites the inference that where such telegraphing is absent nothing unstraightforward is going on. But there is an element of false equivocation here—legitimate reading between or behind the lines is not just about jokiness—and a dangerous assumption that Xenophon is an author who always telegraphs what is going on *as it is going on*. This is not necessarily true, even at the level of the sort of humour Gray is talking about. By the time Glaucon is made to complain that Socrates is making fun of him in *Memorabilia* 3.6.12 Socrates has been doing so for a little while. And, when Socrates says in 3.1.11 that Dionysodorus (the teacher of generalship) will be ashamed to send the unnamed interlocutor away unsatisfied when he returns to him demanding answers on all the topics on which, as Socrates has revealed, he has been given no instruction, it is surely impossible to take this at face value: but the passage has no *explicit* indication of irony. Nor, at an even simpler level, does Xenophon draw attention to his decision to give the grumpy enemy of laughter in *Cyropaedia* 2.2.11–16 the name Aglaitadas. The bright splendour of *aglaia* is not just a matter of laughter, for sure, but the choice of name is hardly arbitrary. What we make of it is up to us: but one view of the passage would be that we are not meant simply to regard Aglaitadas as a bad lot or someone who is wholly in the wrong, and his name, connotative of the glory of success, is in line with such a view.

The same goes with more complicated cases involving tension between what a text says and the external knowledge that a reader will bring to it. We have already noted in passing some of the oddities of the Socratic 'Golden Age' (above p. 26). Here are some more examples. (1) Xenophon is not averse to intertextuality (as Gray notes), and Clearchus' adaptation of Andromache's words to Hector in *Anabasis* 1.3.6 is a noteworthy example. The full paradox will only strike the reader later as Clearchus' hard side becomes evident, but no one should fail to be struck from the start by a manipulative mercenary leader constructing his relationship to his troops as analogous to Andromache's to her husband. Perhaps Clearchus is right (in everyone's interests) to do whatever it takes to defuse the Tarsus mutiny; but in any event the detail contributes significantly to the complex picture of Clearchus that emerges in *Anabasis* I–II. (2) There might also be precise intertextualities between *Hiero* and Simonidean poetry that now elude us, but the spectacle of Simonides telling Hiero how to be a good tyrant will

certainly make readers revisit what they know about the two historical figures. They will think Simonides (the epinician poet-*sophos*) a reasonably appropriate person to be lecturing Hiero,[48] but they certainly will not think that Simonides actually induced him to behave like a perfect ruler. The reading of the entire work is necessarily coloured by these external facts. Simonides' failure does not invalidate what he says, but it makes the important point that what is reasonable and beneficial is not necessarily easy. (3) In *Memorabilia* 3.6.2 Socrates holds up to Glaucon as a model for emulation Themistocles' fame among the barbarians. The narrator says that this appealed to Glaucon's vanity and kept him listening to Socrates long enough to discover his own shortcomings: that is presumably a good result, but the Themistoclean comparison, dropped into the conversation without comment, is unsettling, in view of Themistocles' ultimate relationship with the barbarians. Perhaps this is another invitation to see that merit can be found in odd places. Or perhaps it is a sharp comment on the self-importance of ambitious but ill-prepared politicians. (4) In the previous chapter Socrates talks to Pericles about his prospects as general. This Pericles was son of the great Pericles and his career as general ended in execution after the Arginusae debacle. So what do we make of the fact that 3.5.6 adduces the orderliness of a crew *when afraid of a storm or the enemy* as a ground for assuming that the citizen body will be more amenable to good leadership (e.g. by Pericles), while 3.5.14 advises Athenians to model themselves on Spartan *epitēdeumata*—not the line found in the Periclean Funeral Speech (Thucydides 2.35–46), a text that comes to mind all the more easily because we have just had a series of Funeral Speech *topoi* (3.5.10)? (5) And then there is the case of Ischomachus and his wife. Whether or not the scabrous stories told of the family life of Ischomachus[49] were actually true hardly matters. Nobody made Xenophon pick him as a teacher of household management, let alone dwell on his relationship with his wife in a vignette of apparent domestic harmony and economic co-operation, and the decision to do so is plainly deliberate and provocative. It may not be easy to articulate the point of cases such as these—though we seem again to be confronting the tension between good advice or principles and contexts of failure—but, unless we are prepared to postulate *total inadvertence* on Xenophon's part and/or total passivity on his readers' part, we have to concede that there *is* a point to be found.

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48 There is a nice moment of dislocation between reality and text when Simonides tells Hiero he should not compete in games at all.

49 Andoc. 1.124–127.

None of this needs to be anything to do with 'irony'; it is just a matter of active and informed readership. And that also applies when external data are not the (only) prompt to careful reflection. If an author writing in rhetorically eulogistic mode—as, for example, Xenophon in *Agesilaus*—praises someone for *inter alia* being good at publicly constructing himself as good, that author is either stupid or he is inviting us to think. The conclusion we come to is not necessarily that the *laudandus* was a hypocrite. It may very well rather be that leadership has complex implications: if the best way for a leader to ensure that his subordinates know that he is good (and is better than them) is to be *seen* to be good,[50] then the publicly displayed construction of virtue is something of a necessity; but that it might be an unsettling necessity, and even sometimes a practically self-defeating one,[51] is a lesson (or a observation) deserving of reflection.

'Seeming' and being cause trouble elsewhere too. When something is said to 'seem to be the case', it certainly does not necessarily follow that it is not the case; it may rather be 'seen to *be* the case'. Context will have to determine. The curt description of Thrasybulus at the moment of his death as μάλα δοκῶν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι (*Hellenica* 4.8.31) has been variously interpreted as casting doubt upon or affirming his virtue.[52] A comparison with similar phraseology elsewhere in *Hellenica* draws attention to the fact that this is the one case in which the context precisely does *not* establish that the meaning is positive. Since, on the contrary, the statement follows the report that he was killed in his tent by Aspendians who had been provoked by the unjust behaviour of his troops (4.8.30), one has to say that the context points in the opposite direction—and so does external knowledge, because we know independently (and cannot assume that Xenophon assumed his readers did *not* know) that the circumstances of Thrasybulus' death and of other parts of his final campaign occasioned huge political and forensic fallout in Athens. The fact that Thrasybulus may be a positive figure elsewhere in *Hellenica* does not determine how we read the present passage. If Theramenes can get better at the moment of death,[53] Thrasybulus can get worse. Like investments, all Xenophontic leaders can go down as well as up. (In fact, in the long run, they are probably more likely to go down than up.)

50 Leadership *is* a display activity. Compare *Memorabilia* 1.3.1: Socrates improved his associates τὰ μὲν ἔργῳ δεικνύων ἑαυτὸν οἷος ἦν, τὰ δὲ καὶ διαλεγόμενος.

51 Cf. above p. 16 on Pontier.

52 Tuplin 1993: 81; Gray 2011: 105.

53 Gray 2011: 117.

Another problem of appearances is the acquittal of Sphodrias. This 'seemed to many to be the most unjustly judged case in Spartan history' (5.4.24). The comment cries out for interpretation. But how do we read it? Here the problem is not 'seeming' and 'being', but the authority of the *polloi*. Did Xenophon definitely not agree with them? Or is he avoiding saying whether he agrees, while ensuring that the existence of a negative judgment is made clear to readers? The lengthy account that follows certainly supplies an explanation (Sphodrias cannot be executed because 'Sparta needs soldiers such as him')—perhaps even, from one point of view, a cogent explanation, given Sparta's need of soldiers of any sort. But it is hard to feel that this simply eliminates the force of the assessment of the trial quoted at the outset. It would take something to prove that it was just to acquit a man who is acknowledged to have done wrong and who fled rather than stand trial. What the story definitely proves is something about expediency, not about justice. And sometimes expediency matters enough to trump justice, as we perhaps see in the acquittal of the Armenian King in *Cyropaedia* III. So we cannot assume that Xenophon uncomplicatedly agrees with the *polloi*. On the other hand the wider setting for the Armenian case within *Cyropaedia* and the case of Sphodrias within *Hellenica* are not entirely the same (because the histories of Cyrus and of Sparta do not have the same trajectory), and we cannot assume he wholeheartedly disagrees either. But that he flags the issue so prominently does mean we can be sure that we are supposed to reflect on the matter.

One of the many splendid effects of the resurgence in Xenophontic scholarship in the last thirty to forty years has been the recovery of serious interest in *Cyropaedia* and it is appropriate to end with this most perfectly Socratic of non-Socratic works. Here, as much as anywhere in the corpus, the inclination to question superficial appearances has been strong. Since this is Xenophon's longest discourse on his favourite topic and the one in which he has the most total control of what constitutes the discourse,[54] it is an acid test for ways of reading our author. We have already noted Gabriel Danzig's demonstration that Cyrus' pursuit of self-interest is not nearly as vulnerable to moral criticism as some commentators have argued and many readers may have been tempted to think. That temptation comes in part from an inclination to feel some sympathy for Cyaxares. That it can be demonstrated that such sympathy is not really deserved does not detract

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[54] In *Anabasis* there were at least some external constraints imposed by actual events.

from our inclination to feel it in the first place; and the presence of that inclination is as important a fact about the way Xenophon has set the whole story up as the fact that he makes clear to the careful and reflective reader that Cyrus is in the right. Reasonable and perfect leadership can have its harsh side: people who have suffered no injustice may still feel bruised. That is something the leader has to learn and learn to deal with—and Cyrus does this satisfactorily because Cyaxares is actually reconciled. But Xenophon's revelation that good leadership can be uncomfortable to its beneficiaries has further implications, notably for our reactions to *Cyropaedia* VIII, the account of the autocratic imperial state that is the *telos* of Cyrus' progress. Everything about it is reasonable and logical, and because it is Cyrus in charge the outcome is acceptable. But the lesson that what is logical is not necessarily comfortable applies here too. It is to the benefit of the world to be ruled by Cyrus as it was to the benefit of Cyaxares; and the world may be reconciled to it. But one might be sympathetic if there were bits of the world that did not like it, certainly at first, and one should be certain that the situation is no necessary justification for someone other than Cyrus to rule the world. From the reader's perspective the effortless logic by which the scion of a republic ends up as a quasi-Median autocrat and 'living law' is (to say the least) quite challenging, especially if the reader is a fourth century Greek. The more perfectly rational Cyrus' progress is, the greater the paradox—and (just because of the faultlessness of his progress) the less the end-result can be assumed to be institutionally paradigmatic. That perfect individual leadership issues in untrammelled autocracy is, on reflection, entirely reasonable (shades of Aristotelian *pambasileia*?).[55] But this tells one something about the dangers of leadership as well as about its merits—and, since dangers would arise if the leader were less than absolutely perfect, the lesson is of practical importance. In the ordinary Xenophontic-Socratic world obedience to the law, conceived as something external to the simple will of a single individual, is the norm: this is what Agesilaus exemplifies and Socrates argues for; and the young Alcibiades' attempt to persuade Pericles that democratic law is simply class violence (*Memorabilia* 1.2.40–47) is not intended to redound to his credit. In the world of *Cyropaedia*, on the other hand, man and law can eventually coalesce. But this is simply an extraordinary sign of a quite exceptional world—a thought experiment about perfect leadership prompted by history, fed by imagination and driven by logic.

[55] See *Pol.* 3.15–17 (1285b33–1288a30).

There is no dark irony here and nothing significantly hidden from view. But we *do* have to be clear exactly what it is that has been displayed to us and, therefore, what sort of positive and negative lessons we can appropriately learn both from the totality of the picture and from its individual constituent parts.

En envoi

Among classical authors Xenophon's personal history was exceptional for its combination of Socratic education and the exercise of military leadership in a time of crisis.[56] His output (the work of philosopher, historian and man of action) is uniquely marked by the intertwined effect of such experiences and by the range and diversity of its encounter with the important historical themes of his era: indeed it plays a special role in defining our sense of the post-Athenian-Empire world. His formative experiences and comparative deracination gave him an outlook not limited by the mental boundaries of the classic Greek *polis*. The result was a distinctive but intellectually and morally consistent response to the circumstances of his times and to the underlying issue of ethical but effective leadership, and an *oeuvre* that is a remarkable witness to the intellectual and cultural environment of mid- to late-Classical Greece. The last four decades of Xenophontic scholarship have, we think, established the general truth of these claims. We hope that the current volume will not only reinforce them but also contribute to greater understanding of a voice that is neither simply ironic nor simply ingenuous and of a view of the world that is informed by an engagement with history. Xenophon was persistently concerned with effective action in the here-and-now (and persistently conscious of the difficulties attendant upon such action: there is both pessimism and optimism in that elusive voice), but his characteristic investigative and expository strategy was discourse about the past. The fictive character of some of the history encountered in this discourse no doubt sits awkwardly for modern taste between truth and falsehood; but Xenophon was driven by a basic belief that understanding how the world is and should be involves contemplating how it has been, and that is a principle from which those who devote themselves to study of the distant world of classical Greece can hardly dissent.

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[56] Dio of Prusa (*Oration* 18) duly identified him out as the perfect object of attention for the ambitious young man, singling out his Socratic pedigree and the *Anabasis*.

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CHAPTER ONE

'STAYING UP LATE': PLUTARCH'S READING OF XENOPHON[*]

Philip Stadter

Among the great classical authors, Xenophon was especially similar to Plutarch. Both men were philosophers, historians, and essayists, civically involved, but outside active government. Xenophon's exile cut him off from Athenian political life, as Plutarch's provincial Greek background did from a Roman career. Both made friends with those in power and both wrote at length about foreign cultures, Xenophon on Sparta and Persia, Plutarch on Rome. Both wrote history with an essentially didactic and ethical purpose, and found in historical exempla a pleasing device to reach a wider non-philosophical audience.

The manner in which Plutarch appropriated Xenophon's works as he was writing his own is a particularly significant example of how imperial Greek authors related to their classical past. Close study of his citations of or allusions to Xenophon reveals how the classical Athenian's works were received and understood under the Flavians and Trajan. At the same time we can learn how Plutarch and his cultured readers, both Roman and Greek, redefined their heritage in asserting their own identity and their new position in a Greco-Roman empire.

Xenophon was much admired in the second-century Greek revival.[1] Arrian took his works as the models for many of his own, and became known as the new Xenophon, using Xenophon as his own name in some of his works. In the Atticist revival Xenophon was an important stylistic canon, although never as highly regarded as Demosthenes or Plato. However, Dio Chrysostom presents his works as those most useful for the politician: 'I think he alone of the ancients can satisfy all the requirements of a πολιτικὸς ἀνήρ' (18.14). His works, Dio asserts, offer models for every sort of speech, whether military or political, and his persuasive simplicity seems almost

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[*] I am grateful for the comments of Roberto Nicolai, Robin Waterfield, and Guido Schepens on the oral version of this paper, and for the stimulating atmosphere of the Liverpool conference.

[1] See Münscher 1920, Tuplin 1993: 22–29, 189–192, and Swain 1996, index s.v. Xenophon.

enchantment (γοητεία). The treatise *On plain speech* (περὶ ἀφελοῦς λόγου) attributed to Aelius Aristides considers Xenophon the paragon of the plain style, and cites him over 130 times, referring to six works.[2]

There is no doubt that Plutarch also appreciated Xenophon's style, for he includes him among those who write history with force and charm (δύναμις καὶ χάρις) along with Herodotus and Homer and celebrates the joy of reading their accounts. He likes to quote particularly striking phrases, such as that describing Ephesus as 'war's workshop' (πολέμου ἐργαστήριον), and will occasionally refer to the stylistic effectiveness of Xenophon's presentation.[3] Plutarch's stylistic debt to Xenophon is a topic better suited for another occasion. However, one can observe that while Plutarch did not believe in the somewhat mindless imitation urged in *On plain speech*,[4] he sought and achieved charm and delight in narrative reminiscent of Xenophon. Although his sentences are generally longer and contain more subordinate clauses,[5] his artistry and delight in anecdotes, character portrayal, vivid narrative, and unusual word choice recall Xenophon's.

Plutarch's numerous quotations and allusions indicate his thorough familiarity with Xenophon's works. He cites or refers to Xenophon by name on some fifty occasions, thirty-one of which are in the *Moral Essays*, fourteen in the *Parallel Lives* (including nine in the *Agesilaus* and the accompanying syncrisis), and five in *Artaxerxes*. Within the *Moral Essays*, *Table Talk* employs Xenophon most extensively, with eight named references. The range of titles referred to includes all the major works (*Hellenica*, *Anabasis*, *Cyropaedia*, and *Memorabilia*) and many of the shorter ones (*Agesilaus*, *Symposium*, *Oeconomicus*, *Cynegeticus*, and *Spartan Constitution*). Memorable quotes from Xenophon, drawn from four different works, ornament the first few sentences of no fewer than five of Plutarch's *Moral Essays*,

[2] That is, *Anabasis*, *Memorabilia*, *Cyropaedia*, *Agesilaus*, *Symposium*, and *Cynegeticus*. The same passages may be cited repeatedly for different purposes. Most of the examples are drawn from the beginnings of works—*Ages.* 1, *Symp.* 1, 2, *Cyr.* 1.1, *Mem.* 1.1, 1.2, *An.* 1.1, 1.2—although occasionally other passages are referred to. The work never refers to the *Hellenica* or to other minor works, except, surprisingly, the *Cynegeticus*, which is cited four times, three from the first chapter. Rutherford 1998: 124–153, offers a translation of Schmid's 1926 Teubner text. He discusses Xenophon as a canon for the plain style (64–79).

[3] Herodotus and Homer: *Non posse suaviter* 1093B. War's workshop: *Marc.* 21.3, from *Hell.* 3.4.17. Stylistic effectiveness: *Artax.* 8.1, referring to *An.* 1.8.

[4] *De prof. in virt.* 79D criticizes those interested only in 'Attic purity' (τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ Ἀττικὸν) in Plato and Xenophon.

[5] Yaginuma 1992, 4728, notes that in samples of either author, Plutarch's sentences average 22 words, Xenophon's 15. Occasional sentences in Plutarch can be very long, 90 words or more.

setting the issues to be addressed.[6] Plutarch undoubtedly had read, admired, and made notes on Xenophon's works.

It has long been recognized that Plutarch drew extensively upon both the *Hellenica* and the *Agesilaus* for his own biography of *Agesilaus*.[7] Although these works often overlap, he appreciated their different genres and drew selectively from both, so that together they provide the foundation for his narrative.[8] He also used the *Hellenica* to a lesser degree as a historical source in the *Alcibiades*, *Lysander*, *Pelopidas*, and no doubt the lost *Epaminondas*, alongside Ephorus and Theopompus.[9] As with other historians, he felt free to modify or reject Xenophon's account on occasion, and he recognized authorial bias.[10] In addition, the first book of the *Anabasis* plays a major role at the beginning of the *Artaxerxes*. Its intertextual presence is strongly felt from the second sentence, which repeats Xenophon's first words—and corrects them—stating: 'Darius and Parysatis had four children, the eldest Artaxerxes, after him Cyrus, and younger than these, Otanes and Oxathres'.[11] Thereafter, he refers five times to the *Anabasis*, praising Xenophon's vivid description of the battle of Cunaxa and comparing his brief narrative of Cyrus' death favourably with those of Ctesias and Dinon.[12]

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6 That is, *De cap. ex inim.* 86C, E (*Oec.* 1.15), *De gloria Ath.* 345E (*Hell.* 3.1.2), *De tran. animi* 465B (*Cyr.* 1.6.3), *De cur.* 515E (*Oec.* 8.18–19), and *De laude ipsius* 539D (*Mem.* 2.1.31).

7 See Shipley 1997: 46–51 and *passim*, Bresson 2002.

8 There is a sure citation of *Hell.* 7.5.10 at *Ages.* 34.4, as well as of 3.1.2 at *De glor. Ath.* 345E; and sure citations of Xenophon *Ages.* 6.4 and 8.7 at *Ages.* 4.2 and 19.5–6, as well as of 11.5 and 11.15 at *Adult. et am.* 55D and *An seni* 784E. The reference at *Ages.* 18.1 (cf. *Ap. Lac.* 212A) could be either to *Hell.* 4.3.16 or *Ages.* 2.9, as that at *Marc.* 21.3 could refer either to *Hell.* 3.4.17 or *Ages.* 1.26.

9 See in general Münscher 1920, Tuplin 1993: 20–29. The statement at *Alc.* 32.2 of what Xenophon (as well as Ephorus and Theopompus) does not include must refer to *Hellenica*. For treatment of the sources of these lives, see the introductions in Flacelière et al. 1964–1983; for *Alcibiades*, Pelling 1996: xxxvii–lviii; Verdegem 2004/2005, 2010: 328–329, 347–349, 394–395 and *passim*; for Lysander, Piccirilli 1997: xviii–xxi and Canfora 2001: 93–97; for *Pelopidas*, Georgiadou 1997: 15–28. Xenophon's narrative of the overthrow of the Theban tyrants (*Hell.* 5.4.1–12) may have influenced *On the Sign of Socrates*, but Plutarch's approach is different: see Pelling 2005 and 2008: 549–552. Compare also Beck 1999 and Stadter (forthcoming) on the use of Xenophontean anecdotes in *Agesilaus*. Plutarch also occasionally refers to the *Agesilaus* and *Hellenica* in the *Moral Essays*. Some of these cases will be treated below.

10 *Comp. Ages.-Pomp.* 3.1, where he notes Xenophon's generally laudatory portrait of Agesilaus.

11 *Artax.* 1.2. Xenophon *An.* 1.1.1 begins 'Darius and Parysatis had two sons, the elder Artaxerxes, the younger Cyrus'.

12 *Artax.* 4.2, 8.1, 9.4, 13.3, 13.6. At 9.4, Plutarch notes that Xen. (cf. *An.* 1.8.26–27) described the death of Cyrus ἁπλῶς καὶ συντόμως. Later he mocks Ctesias' drawn-out account (*Artax.* 11.11: τοιοῦτος μὲν ὁ Κτησίου λόγος, ᾧ καθάπερ ἀμβλεῖ ξιφιδίῳ μόλις ἀναιρῶν τὸν ἄνθρωπον

There is no doubt that Plutarch both found these works a pleasure to read and used them as historical sources.[13]

The present paper will investigate how Plutarch appropriates Xenophon in other contexts, where he is not a direct historical source. The works which seem more philosophical, the *Symposium*, the *Cyropaedia*, the *Oeconomicus*, and the *Memorabilia*, will be of special interest, but attention will be given as well to the *Spartan Constitution*, the *Anabasis*, and the *Cynegeticus*.[14] Xenophon's *Symposium* furnishes the first and perhaps most surprising example of his engagement with his predecessor.

Symposium

Plutarch's *Table Talk* has an obvious intertextual relationship to Xenophon's and Plato's *Symposia*, along with those of other philosophers now lost, as is signalled in the general prologue (612DE) and at the beginning of the first conversation (1.1, 613D). Plutarch always has these two authors in the back of his mind as he writes and expects his reader to recall them also. The speakers in *Table Talk* attempt to create in a modern setting something of the learning and fellowship of their classical literary models, Xenophon and Plato first among them. In the prologue to the second book (629C), Plutarch casually introduces 'some Philip the jester at Callias' house', recalling the often cited appearance of this γελωτοποιός in Xenophon's *Symposium* (1.11ff.).[15] Philip returns at *Table Talk* 7.7 (710C) in another context. Plutarch continues to use Xenophon as a model and reference point in the long discussion

ἀνήρηκεν; cf. his similar expression concerning Nicias' unpersuasive oratory: καθάπερ ἀμβλεῖ χαλινῷ τῷ λόγῳ πειρώμενος ἀποστρέφειν τὸν δῆμον, *Praec. ger. reip.* 802D).

[13] He used them for inspiration as well: note his ten-line verbatim quotation from *Ages.* 11.15 at *An seni* 784E on Agesilaus' prowess as an old man, and the quote from *An.* 3.1.4 at *Praec. ger. reip.* 817E on stepping forward when necessary, even with no legal support. Tuplin 1993 argues that *Hellenica* was not privileged as a historical source for the fourth century by later authors, including Plutarch. This does not necessarily contradict Nicolai's 1992: 250–339 observation that later educators placed Xenophon in the first triad of historical writers, together with Herodotus and Thucydides, since *Anabasis* and *Cyropaedia* were also considered *historiai.*

[14] Plutarch never seems to refer to the *Apology*, *Horsemanship*, *Cavalry Commander*, *Poroi* or *Hiero*, or to the *Athenian Constitution* ascribed to Xenophon.

[15] There is a similar unannounced reference to Xenophon's *Symposium* at *Non posse suav.* 1103B, where Plutarch quotes Hermogenes' statement on the gods (*Symp.* 4.48), and an explicit reference at *Lys.* 15.7, to 'Autolycus the athlete, for whom Xenophon made the *Symposium*' (cf. *Symp.* 1.2–4).

which follows (2.1) on suitable topics for symposia. The heading of this chapter asks directly, 'What topics does Xenophon say people rather like to be asked or teased about while drinking than not?' The chapter begins (629E), 'The first question ... is one which Xenophon the Socratic has in a way set before us', and goes on to report Gobryas' observation in the *Cyropaedia* (5.2.18), that the Persians knew how to make their questions and jokes agreeable to the other symposiasts.[16] The discussion which follows pursues this question, following Gobyras' division of questions and jokes. The exchange is introduced, however, by the character Plutarch's assertion that 'Xenophon himself, in the Socratic symposium and in his Persian symposia has exemplified suitable topics' (630A). Thus the author Plutarch expands his horizon from the Xenophontic *Symposium* to the dinners of the *Cyropaedia*. There are no further specific allusions to Xenophon, however, until Plutarch the speaker takes up the subject of jokes (630C–634F). He cites examples of playful teasing from the *Cyropaedia* (2.2.28–29 at 632A), the *Symposium* (4.9 at 632B), Plato's *Symposium* (213c at 632B), and the *Cyropaedia* once more (1.4.4 at 632C). Shortly after he offers another example from Xenophon's *Symposium* (4.61–62 at 632E), then returns to the *Cyropaedia* for two more (8.4.21 at 633C, 3.1.36 at 634F). For none of these teasing jokes after the first does Plutarch name the author or title; the references to Socrates and Cyrus are presumed sufficient to allow the reader to appreciate the use of the classical author in this contemporary context. Plutarch has culled the two texts for instances of this sort of joke, and distributed them according to his own argument, disregarding their original order. They are interlarded with cases drawn from other sources, few of which can be identified. One suspects that he had collected over the years items relevant to symposia, as he had those for so many other subjects, and that Xenophon was especially strongly represented in his notebooks. Nevertheless, however much he found Xenophon's *Symposium* and *Cyropaedia* useful, he chose to end the chapter with two citations of Plato, first warning of the dangers of malicious jokes, then praising those which are tasteful and charming (*Laws* 935a, cf. 717cd, 654b).

The prologue to the sixth book of *Table Talk* ends with another programmatic reference to the *Symposia* of Xenophon and Plato (686C–D). Good dinner discussions, it asserts, are worth preserving, since written texts allow

[16] Plutarch appears to copy Xenophon's precise expression, 'they asked what is pleasanter to be asked than not, and they joked what is pleasanter to joke than not', although the text is lacunose.

current readers to enjoy the discussions of earlier times. The real pleasure of a good dinner is not the food, or otherwise Xenophon and Plato would have recorded the carefully prepared delicacies eaten at their symposia. Instead, they committed to paper only the intellectual conversations, serious but mixed with fun, and thus left a precedent not only for gathering for good conversation over wine, but for recalling the conversations afterwards. Xenophon and Plato, in other words, supply the model for Plutarch's project of recording conversations which combine the playful and the serious. The allusion to the blend of σπουδή and παιδιαί recalls especially the introduction to Xenophon's *Symposium*, but the blend is a major feature of both authors' dinner parties, as was well recognized in antiquity.[17]

In introducing the topic of the proper time for coition to one of his conversations (3.6), Plutarch clearly recognizes that he might seem to be violating philosophical decorum, for that is exactly the point raised by the less knowledgeable young men against Epicurus' *Symposium*. As a partial defence, therefore, he mentions the ending of Xenophon's *Symposium* (9.7), in which, 'so to speak, after the dinner he led off his partiers—not walking, but on horseback—to their wives for some love-making' (653C). Thus protected by classical precedent, he then proceeds to discuss at length both the correct interpretation of Epicurus, and the philosophical reasons for consideration of this subject. It is noticeable that he discreetly suppresses the scene of passionate love-making staged by mimes which had led to the testosterone-driven dispersal of Xenophon's party. His readers, no doubt, would remember it well.

Three conversations in book 7, chapters 6–8, offer a final occasion for a number of allusions to Xenophon's *Symposium*, occasionally combined with references to Plato. The first, on 'shadows' or uninvited hangers-on, early in the discussion notes that Socrates invited a friend to Agathon's celebration in Plato (707A), and ends with a reference to Philip the jester, from Xenophon (1.13), as a self-invited guest (709F). The second, on whether flute-girls are proper entertainment, begins (710B) with Plato's criticism that bringing in such diversions demonstrates an inability to converse well (*Symposium* 176e, cf. *Prt.* 347c). Another speaker replies that Xenophon had brought in Philip the jester (1.11, etc.), and that Plato had inserted Aristophanes' comic speech and Alcibiades' drunken behaviour and argument with Socrates over Agathon into his *Symposium*, so that there was no rea-

[17] Xenophon *Symp.* 1.1, and cf. 1.13, 4.29, *Cyr.* 2.3.1, *Mem.* 4.1. Plutarch cites *Symp.* 1.1 with approval at *Ages.* 29.2 to praise by contrast the Spartans' admirable response to their defeat.

son not to enjoy entertainment (710CD). Despite their disagreement, both speakers conceive the classical symposia as normative models for contemporary behaviour. The third conversation continues the issue of the most appropriate dinner party entertainment. One speaker accepts that some dance is acceptable, out of respect for Socrates' praise of dancing. The allusion is to Xenophon, although he is not cited: Socrates speaks of the virtues of dancing at *Symposium* 2.15–20. Finally, the character Plutarch argues that any music at a party should be accompanied by words, whether the group is serious or playful. In support he cites Socrates' rejection of useless and superfluous perfume, which he parallels to an unaccompanied lyre or flute. In Xenophon (*Symposium* 2.3–4) the setting of Socrates' comment is precisely as the Syracusan impresario introduces a flute-girl, and two dancers, one of whom played the cithara. Socrates compliments Callias, his host, on the fine entertainment, and Callias offers to bring in perfume as well. 'No', Socrates replies, 'one odour is proper to men, and another to women', and neither need perfume. The conversation soon turns to virtue, and how to acquire its fine 'odour'. Plutarch here distorts somewhat Socrates' statement on perfume to fit it into his own argument, but more importantly he suppresses Socrates' praise of the wordless music performances which had just preceded. For the sake of a striking comparison and the authority of Xenophon's Socrates, he shunts aside Xenophon's own presentation of a proper symposium. Returning to the initial position of 7.6, where Plato was cited as banning such music, Plutarch refuses to permit other entertainment when men are capable of entertaining themselves with philosophic discussion (διὰ λόγου καὶ φιλοσοφίας). Only if quarrelling and squabbling begin should music be introduced as a soothing balm until conversation can begin again.[18]

Xenophon's *Symposium* and *Cyropaedia* are cited or alluded to very selectively in *Table Talk*, almost exclusively to illustrate sympotic topics: what subjects to discuss, how to joke and tease inoffensively, what sorts of entertainment are suitable. Xenophon, along with Plato, establishes a standard of behaviour which Plutarch accepts as valid. But Plutarch avoids discussing the larger issues of virtue or leadership which may have concerned Xenophon.[19] In this sense he seems a bit like Athenaeus,[20] or the author of περὶ

[18] He will return to this theme later in *Table Talk*. Cf. García López 2002 and Stadter 1999a.

[19] The theme of friendship, central to the *Table Talk* (Frazier 1996, Stadter 2009), is also a major theme of Xenophon's works (cf. Gray 2011: 291–329), but Plutarch does not make explicit the connection.

[20] Cf. Maisonneuve 2007.

ἀφελοῦς λόγου: the classical author is a given, an essential part of the cultural legacy of Greece, which is available to put to whatever use one may desire. Plutarch knows Xenophon's works thoroughly, and loves and respects them, but they are there to be used in the present, not revered and kept sacrosanct.

Cyropaedia

An important argument supporting Plutarch's attack on Epicureanism in his dialogue *A pleasant life is impossible for Epicurus* extols the pleasures of the mind, including narratives, both historical and fictional. It is notable that he begins the section by referring to the force and charm of Herodotus' and Xenophon's accounts (ὡς τὸν [λόγον] Ἡροδότου τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ τὰ Περσικὰ τὸν Ξενοφῶντος: 1093B), before going on to Homer and the historical narratives of Eudoxus, Aristotle, and Aristoxenus. A few lines later he closes this paragraph by stating the enormous pleasure of reading Xenophon's story of Panthea from the *Cyropaedia* (1093C) as well as other stories of noble women from Aristobulus and Theopompus—a pleasure greater even than sleeping with the most beautiful woman. Pursuing his attack, Plutarch praises the joys of mathematical works, literary critics, and music, before concluding his treatment of intellectual pleasures with a new comparison between intellectual pleasure and erotic passion by quoting a striking phrase from Xenophon's *Cynegeticus* 5.33. He asserts that these pleasures 'in Xenophon's words, would make the lover forget his love' (1096C). In the short space 1093B–1096C in this dialogue against Epicurean anti-intellectualism Plutarch refers to Xenophon three times in support of the delight to be gained from mental activity, and compares his narratives, in particular the *Cyropaedia*, with Herodotus and Homer.[21]

No part of the *Cyropaedia* delighted Plutarch more than the story of Panthea, as is evident from this passage. Elsewhere he recalls several times the example of Cyrus' refusal even to see Panthea, for fear her beauty might overwhelm him, since, in Xenophon's words, love is ignited by sight.[22] He discovers also a somewhat paradoxical model for admiring men in adversity in Araspes' admiration for Panthea in her wretched state as a captive. Discreetly, he passes over the fact that Araspes was particularly moved when she revealed her lovely neck and arms in tearing her clothes (*Progress in*

[21] A few pages later (1100B), Plutarch recalls Callicratidas' striking expression from *Hell.* 1.6.15, that Conon 'was fornicating with the sea', μοιχῶντα τὴν θάλατταν.

[22] *De aud.* 31C, *De cur.* 521C, *Qu. Conv.* 681C, περὶ ἔρωτος frag. 138, cf. *Cyr.* 5.1.8, 16, 18.

Virtue 84F = *Cyropaedia* 5.1.6). He gives many other cases of right behaviour from the *Cyropaedia*, sometimes citing Xenophon by name, more often simply alluding to Cyrus or other famous characters. So Cyrus restrained his natural competitiveness in childhood sports (*Talkativeness* 514B, *Table Talk*. 632C = *Cyropaedia* 1.4.4); believed in honouring the gods even in good times, so they will remember us in bad (*Tranquility of Mind* 465B = *Cyropaedia* 1.6.3); was frank in dealing with Cyaxares' jealousy (*Flatterer and Friend* 69F = *Cyropaedia* 5.5.5 ff.); and praised himself in danger and battle (to build readiness for the fight), but generally was not boastful (*Inoffensive Self-praise* 545B = *Cyropaedia* 7.1.17). Tigranes did not keep secrets from his wife (*Table Talk* 634B = *Cyropaedia* 3.1.43), and Chrysantas responded immediately to Cyrus' call to pull back.[23] Finally, a bit of lore about the palm tree, which may derive from *Cyropaedia* 7.5.11, but is found in other authors as well, is cited by a speaker at *Table Talk* 724E.[24]

Memorabilia

Surprisingly, the four books of the *Memorabilia* are only cited twice with Xenophon's name, both for the same distinctive phrase: 'the pleasantest thing to hear of all, praise of yourself' (τοῦ δὲ πάντων ἡδίστου ἀκούσματος, ἐπαίνου σεαυτῆς: 2.1.31) from the famous scene of Hercules choosing between virtue and vice. The pithy expression has caught Plutarch's attention. In *Old Men in Politics* (786E) Xenophon's words provide the springboard for a more extensive evocation of satisfaction in noble political action: 'there is no sight, memory, or thought of things which brings as much pleasure as the contemplation, as if in shining public places, of one's own acts in office or political activity'. In *Inoffensive Self-Praise* (539D), Plutarch uses Xenophon's expression as part of his proem, making the point that it refers to praise from others, not oneself, and reminding the reader that self-praise is quite unpleasant to others.[25] Elsewhere he cites or alludes to other memorable phrases or images from *Memorabilia* without naming the author. At *Dialogue on Love* 757E, 'for a man trying to catch the finest prey (θήραμα), friendship', rephrases *Memorabilia* 3.11.7, 'to hunt the most worthwhile prey

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23 *Comp. Pel.-Marc.* 3.2, *Rom. Qu.* 273F = *Cyr.* 4.1.3. In both passages, Plutarch refers to a general trumpet call, although Xenophon speaks of Cyrus calling Chrysantas by name. In *Ap. Lac.* 236E, the story is connected with a Spartan.

24 Plutarch apparently referred to it in his *Quaestiones naturales* 32. Gellius *NA* 3.6 cites it from Aristotle fr. 229 Rose. Compare also Theophrastus *Hist. plant.* 5.6.1 and Pliny *NH* 16.223.

25 There seems to be another allusion to the choice of Heracles at *De fort. Rom.* 317C.

(ἄγρευμα), friends'.[26] Xenophon's observation (4.3.14) that the sun allows himself to be seen by all, but punishes those who try to observe him without respect (ἀναιδῶς) with blindness, becomes in *Curiosity* 517B a warning not to search out the vices of the powerful.[27] A favourite passage from Xenophon on Socrates' advice to avoid those foods or drinks which lead you to eat or drink more, as a way to practice abstemiousness as he did, finds its way into four different works, in different contexts, and with varying degrees of freedom.[28] Only one item from the *Memorabilia* concerns a historical point, Xenophon's remark that Lichas became famous as a benefactor for hosting visitors at the Gymnopaedia in Sparta. *Memorabilia* 1.2.61 apparently was the only source for the story, which Plutarch recalls at *Advice to Politicians* 823E (unfavourably contrasting him to Epaminondas, Aristides, and Lysander as benefactors) and *Cimon* 10.6 (where Cimon's generosity is greater).

Oeconomicus

In reading the *Oeconomicus*, Plutarch was attracted to another statement of Socrates on friendship, in this case that every man of sense should profit not only from his friends, but also from his enemies (1.14–15). The proem of his essay *How to profit from your enemies* starts from the proposition that public service naturally involves not only helping friends but creating enemies, and immediately commends to his friend Cornelius Pulcher Xenophon's advice, 'to derive profit even from his enemies' (86C). Plutarch draws a parallel with primitive man's progress from merely battling with animals to taming them and using them to advantage. This parallel, he asserts, indicates that Xenophon's advice must be seriously considered and not be rejected out of hand. We should seek out the method and skill to win some good from those who differ with us (86E).[29] The essay which follows elaborates on the skills

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26 Plato *Leg.* 823b, sometimes cited, is much less close.

27 Other parallels may be distant echoes rather than allusions, such as *De cap. ex inim.* 91E and *Mem.* 1.4.6, *Sept. Sap. Conv.* 158C with 1.6.10 (needing least), and *De fort. Alex.* 331C and 3.2.2 (Alexander's favourite Homeric verse).

28 *De tuen. san.* 124D: straightforward health advice; *De garr.* 513CD: curbing garrulousness by avoiding topics on which one is eager to talk; *De cur.* 521F: curbing curiosity by avoiding sights and sounds which attract us; *Qu. conv.* 661F: Socrates' good advice against variety and mixing of foods.

29 At 86E, Plutarch speaks of profit ἀπὸ τῶν διαφερομένων ('from those who differ'): this word for opponents is not found in *Oec.* 1.15, but occurs in *Mem.* 2.3.1, where Socrates speaks

needed to do this. The same Xenophontic passage is paraphrased in a quite different context in the essay *On Listening to Lectures* (40C). In this case the student should apply the same principle toward listening to speakers, recognizing and admiring when some part of a speech is well done, and learning from the mistakes when it is not. Here, as often, Plutarch asks the reader to consider a particular example not as a direct parallel to his own action, but as a model of the sort of steps one should take.

Two other passages cited from the *Oeconomicus* reveal this associative mode of thinking. In *Why are Delphic Oracles no longer given in Verse?*, Plutarch notes that the women who deliver the oracle, the Pythias, are usually completely uneducated, since they come from poor farming families. The Pythia is 'like Xenophon thinks a bride should come to her husband, a girl who has seen as little as possible and heard as little as possible' (405C). Although the relevant words are almost exactly the same as Xenophon's, Plutarch wrongly suggests that Xenophon approved of the practice: rather it is his character Ischomachus who presents this situation as a simple fact of Athenian life, and is eager to improve his ignorant wife—to make her more useful (*Oeconomicus* 7.5). As we know from his *Advice on Marriage* and *Dialogue on Love*, Plutarch himself wished wives to be educated, and to read and enjoy authors such as Plato and Xenophon.[30] However, he never refers explicitly to Xenophon's own interest in women's education, seen in both the *Oeconomicus* and the *Memorabilia*.

The second citation takes the reader even further from Xenophon's original context. At *Oeconomicus* 8.17–19, Socrates and Ischomachus discuss how a householder and his wife should organize the equipment and furnishings of the household so that everything has its proper place. In the introduction to his essay *Curiosity* Plutarch compares the mind of a habitual busybody to a house filled with faults: the busybody pokes into others' affairs when he needs to look at his own (515E). And so Xenophon's call for organization is pertinent: the busybody should close the windows to the outside and reorganize his own interior household, cleaning out his faults. Xenophon's organized household becomes a model for the virtuous soul.

Both these last notices appear to derive from Plutarch's notebooks of his reading or later *hupomnēmata* assembled from them. Overall, Plutarch

to two brothers who were διαφερομένω and suggests that this is a most unprofitable as well as unsuitable situation.

30 *Conj. praec.* 145C. For Plutarch's ideas on the education of women, see Pomeroy 1999 and Stadter 1999b: esp. 173–175. Note that he wrote a lost essay *That a women should be educated* (FF128–133 Sandbach).

exploits his reading of the *Oeconomicus* in several ways: first, as authority for moral living, as in learning to profit from enemies rather than fighting with them; second, as a source of good images, such as the well-ordered (mental) house, third, to provide a suggestive parallel, as in considering the bad orator as an enemy from whom to profit, and fourth, as a pithy statement of a particular situation, in the description of the absolute ignorance of a young farm girl.

Constitution of the Lacedaemonians

The preface to Plutarch's *Lycurgus* employs Xenophon's comments on the era of the Spartan lawgiver's life to set the tone for his biography. Xenophon, in the *Spartan Constitution* 10.8, had made an argument for the antiquity of the Lycurgan laws, stating, 'It is clear that these laws are quite old, since Lycurgus is said to have lived in the time of the Heracleidae'. For Plutarch, however, things are not so simple. As he begins the life, he writes,

> It is impossible to say anything undisputed about Lycurgus the legislator, for the accounts of his family, travels, death, and especially his activity regarding the laws and the constitution, conflict with each other. What is agreed least is the era in which the man lived. (*Lycurgus* 1.1)

After citing various dates (when the Olympic games were established, or some years earlier than this, or in Homer's time) and their proponents (Aristotle, Eratosthenes and Apollodorus, Timaeus), he arrives at Xenophon. 'Xenophon also suggests an early date, where he says the man lived "in the time of the Heracleidae"'. This would give the earliest date suggested, shortly after the Trojan war.[31] Plutarch examines the statement, noting that even more recent Spartan kings were Heracleidae, but rejects the idea that Xenophon might have meant some later time, rightly thinking that he meant those close to Heracles. Then he draws the conclusion which shapes his history: 'Even though the story is in such a fluid state (οὕτω πεπλανημένης τῆς ἱστορίας), we will try to give a narrative of Lycurgus' life, following the accounts which are least contested or have the most respected testimony'. Xenophon's exaggerated and unconvincingly early date caps and confirms Plutarch's argument for the lack of agreement and the indeterminacy of Lycurgus' life. At the same time this and the other citations testify to his seriousness in attempting the biography and his familiarity with major and

[31] The Heracleidae on their return, killed the son of Agamemnon's son Orestes.

minor sources. Besides Aristotle and Xenophon, in the course of his life he will mention other authors on Sparta: Critias, Dioscurides, and Sphaerus.[32] Although, as is to be expected, there are a number of parallels in content between Xenophon's essay and the *Lycurgus*, we cannot be sure that it is the sole source for any one item. However, the fact that Plutarch drew his citation of Xenophon from the middle of that work, where Xenophon is addressing a wholly different issue, indicates that he was quite familiar with the *Constitution*, and here as elsewhere chose to use a particular passage to fit his own needs.

Anabasis

Xenophon's role as both actor and author in the *Anabasis* receive special credit in the introduction to *Glory of Athens*, 345C–E. There Plutarch asserts that the most famous Athenian historians, beginning from Thucydides and Cratippus, would not exist without the sterling deeds of Pericles, Alcibiades, Thrasybulus and others. Only Xenophon is excepted, since he wrote up his own accomplishments, though he ascribed his account to Themistogenes to enhance their credibility (cf. *Hellenica* 3.1.2). Here not only is Xenophon placed in the first rank of historians, but his actions as a commander of the Ten Thousand are made comparable to those of the greatest Athenian commanders.[33] The *Anabasis* appears in several other works beyond the significant references in the life of Artaxerxes dealing chiefly with Cyrus' gathering of Greek mercenaries and the battle of Cunaxa that have already been listed. Plutarch recalls Xenophon's exile in Scillus, the subject of a famous chapter of the *Anabasis* (5.3.7–13), in a list of famous literary exiles, along with Thucydides, Philistus, Timaeus, Androtion, and Bacchylides (*Exile* 605C).[34] Mark Antony, watching his men dying about him in the retreat from Parthia, cries out, ὦ μύριοι, marvelling at the Ten Thousand who fought their way out

32 Flacelière 1964: I.112–113. He cites five passages that seem to derive from Xenophon, at 9.2, 12.14 and 15, 22.4, and 26.2.

33 I am grateful to an anonymous reader for this observation. Note how Plutarch combines references to both the *Anabasis* and the *Hellenica* in this passage, and that he is the only ancient author to identify Themistogenes as a pseudonym for Xenophon. Plutarch might have also referred to the *Hellenica* here, including Xenophon with Cratippus as a continuator of Thucydides, but it would have hurt his rhetorical point, which emphasized the importance of personal action.

34 Although coupled here with other historians, the *Anabasis* is more likely to have been in Plutarch's mind than the *Hellenica*, as at *De glor. Athen.* 345C–E.

from even deeper in Mesopotamia (*Antony* 45.12). In his *Advice to Politicians*, Plutarch quotes Xenophon's famous self-introduction, 'There was a certain Xenophon in the army, neither a general nor a captain …'.[35] to demonstrate that the law always gives precedence to the man who acts justly and recognizes what is best for the moment. Xenophon went on to assume co-leadership of the Ten Thousand. Here the well-known example encourages the reader to step forward and assume responsibility at a time of crisis.

On two occasions Plutarch's eye for character picked out for use the central element of Xenophon's sketch of Clearchus. Clearchus was generally harsh and ill-tempered, but in battle his men found that his face, previously scowling, appeared radiant, and his harshness a saving barrier against their enemies (*Anabasis* 2.6.11). In *Flatterer and Friend* 69A the passage is cited in support of the proposition that harsh criticism from a friend is inappropriate when fortune casts a man down: rather one should encourage a friend, as Clearchus did his soldiers when in battle and danger. Plutarch here while paraphrasing Xenophon's words distorts his meaning, which seems to be that Clearchus continued harsh, but the troops found his toughness reassuring in battle, rather than that he put on a smiling face. In *Table Talk* (1.4, 620 DE), he stays closer to Xenophon's sense, but places it in an extraordinarily different context. Clearchus' change of appearance in battle is compared to someone 'not by nature harsh, but dignified and reserved', who relaxes when drinking and becomes more pleasant and friendly.[36] As with poetry, Plutarch freely interprets his citations to fit smoothly into the context in his own work.[37]

CYNEGETICUS

As has already been mentioned, Plutarch found a distinctive expression in the *Cynegeticus* (5.33). Speaking of the delights to be found in intellectual activity (in his treatise on the impossibility of living pleasantly according to

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[35] *Praec. ger. reip.* 817D, citing *An.* 3.1.4. The quotation is verbatim, but differs slightly from our text of Xenophon, reading στρατεύματι for στρατιᾷ, and deleting ᾽Αθηναῖος and ὅς.

[36] Plutarch here names Xenophon and Clearchus, but varies the words used: στυγνόν becomes σκυθρωπὸν καὶ ἄγροικον, φαιδρόν becomes ἡδὺ καὶ φαιδρόν, and ἐρρωμένον becomes διὰ τὸ θαρραλέον. In making the comparison, he tones down the words, using πικρὸς, σεμνὸς, αὐστηρός, and adapts them to the context (ἡδὶων, προσφιλέστερος).

[37] There is a possible echo of *An.* 4.5.9, 'when the men ate, they stood up', in the discussion of *boulimia* in *Qu. Conv.* 6.8 (694D), but Plutarch may equally be drawing upon another source for this detail. Other passages listed by Helmbold & O'Neil (1959) show no close connection to Xenophon.

Epicurean precepts), he asserts that 'in Xenophon's words, they would make a lover forget his love', using the words that Xenophon had used to describe the pleasure in watching a good dog hunt.[38] Despite the changed context, the citation effectively conveys the intensity of mental pleasure.

Conclusion

The investigation demonstrates that Xenophon was much more than a stylistic model or a historical source for Plutarch. Through his frequent non-historical citations, borrowings, and allusions Plutarch transforms Xenophon, and with him classical Greek culture, into a new/old blend, incorporating the classical author into a contemporary imperial setting. As we have seen, this process functions in several ways.

(1) Intertextual reconstruction and creation. *Table Talk* re-imagines and redefines the classical *Symposia*, combining stories, allusions and echoes to establish for contemporary Greeks and Romans a new way to manifest table fellowship among educated men. Plutarch's symposiasts make jokes and tease each other as Xenophon's (and Plato's) did, and similarly they discuss topics drawn from the Greek tradition of literature and philosophy, but all is placed in a contemporary context. This same process is apparent in the *Lives*, where Plutarch re-conceives, e.g., the Themistocles of Herodotus and the Pericles of Thucydides. In particular, he reworks Xenophon's dual portrait of Agesilaus in *Hellenica* and *Agesilaus* in a new and contemporary mode, employing the classical author as resource for both information and interpretation, along with Ephorus and other classical writers. Shipley (1997) gives extensive evidence of this reworking of Xenophon in Plutarch's biography.[39] The new portrait is distinctively Plutarch's own.

(2) Selection of examples of virtuous behaviour, as with Cyrus' refusal to see Panthea, Chrysantas' immediate response to an order, or Xenophon's stepping forward to lead the Ten Thousand. Similar *exempla*, drawn from a variety of sources, play a major role in the *Lives*.

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38 *Non posse suaviter* 1096C.

39 Arrian's *Cynegeticus* is another striking example of this process of deconstructing and reconstructing an ancient text: see Stadter 1976.

(3) Appropriation of wise sayings, such as Socrates' statements on profiting from enemies or not eating enticing foods.

(4) Selection of isolated bits of information to put into a new context. Many cases given above exemplify the technique, e.g. the Spartan Lichas' hospitality to guests at the Gymnopaedia (*Memorabilia* 1.2.61), cited in *Advice to Politicians* 823E (unfavourably contrasting him to Epaminondas, Aristides, and Lysander as benefactors) and *Cimon* 10.6. Another passage from the former work, 809A–B, recalls Xenophon's praise of Agesilaus for enriching his friends, though himself uninterested in wealth (*Agesilaus* 4).

(5) Recollection of a striking word, phrase or image to add emphasis to his own argument. Some examples: beautiful people enkindle love even at a distance; something can be so delightful that it would make one forget one's beloved.[40]

(6) Rapid allusion to well-known anecdotes. Anecdotes are often presented extremely succinctly, more as an aid to the reader's memory of the original than a substitute for it. Examples are his references to Chrysantas' withdrawal from battle at *Comparison of Pelopoidas and Marcellus* 3.2 and *Roman Questions* 273F, the joke on Sambaulas at *Table Talk* 2.1 (632A), and Abradatas falling in love with Panthea at *Progress in Virtue* 84F.[41]

Underlying Plutarch's relationship with Xenophon we can recognize a practice which must go back to his earliest schoolboy reading: compilation of noteworthy expressions, passages, or *exempla* from the author at hand.[42] These excerpts, compiled into collections under various headings, would have been invaluable in his early rhetorical studies. Many, of course, he would have committed to memory, initially, or in later years. These would be then available as he sought the kind of material just enumerated: examples of virtuous behaviour, wise sayings, striking phrases, and famous anecdotes. As he broadened his interests and grew into an extraordinarily pro-

[40] περὶ ἔρωτος frag. 138 = *Cyropaedia* 5.1.16, *Non posse suaviter* 1096C = *Cynegeticus* 5.33.

[41] In *Agesilaus* and other *Lives*, anecdotes are more often retold at length: cf. Shipley 1997, Beck 1999, Stadter (forthcoming).

[42] The *locus classicus* for this practice is the younger Pliny, age seventeen, diligently excerpting Livy during the eruption of Vesuvius (Plin. *Ep.* 6.20.5; and note his uncle's mature diligence, leading to 160 collections of citations: *Ep.* 3.5). More discussion will be found in Dorandi 2000 and Stadter (forthcoming).

lific essayist and biographer, they would serve as a rich storehouse which he could renew, expand, and constantly draw upon for his own writing. Although his innumerable quotations from the poets are the most obvious indications of his reading practice, this review of his references to Xenophon confirms his excerpting of prose writers as well, as do his innumerable references to other historians and antiquarians. The classical writers, including Xenophon, were only a part of his reading, but they supplied the basis on which his erudition was founded.

It is noteworthy that Plutarch gives little attention to Xenophon's philosophical works as philosophy, apart from his use of Socrates' sayings.[43] The themes of leadership and friendship, so central to Xenophon's thinking, were of central interest to Plutarch as well, but he does not usually refer to Xenophon for them.[44] The major exception is his *Agesilaus*, which is an extended restatement and critique of Xenophon's presentation of the Spartan king as leader and friend. Plutarch's *Table Talk* does draw on the *Symposium* to portray conversation intended to promote friendship, but the *Memorabilia* is cited only for the idea that praise is delightful to hear (*Inoffensive Self-praise* 539D and *Old Men in Politics* 786E) and *Hiero* and *Apology of Socrates* not at all.[45] He is silent as well on the practical works on horsemanship, cavalry, and revenues.

Instead, Xenophon comes to life in Plutarch's appropriation of him as a man of breadth and sensibility, a philosopher of life, not abstractions, a narrator who filled his texts with examples of what to imitate and what to avoid. For Plutarch, the body of Xenophon's works offered a model to imitate and a source for stories, moral examples, and striking expressions, many of which would have been familiar to his educated audience as well. He admired and

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[43] Although Xenophon is mentioned together with other philosophers at *Conj. praec.* 145C and *Qu. Conv.* 612D, he is explicitly identified as 'the Socratic' only once, at *Qu. Conv.* 629E. He is mentioned as a historical figure and identified as the wise Xenophon (ὁ σοφός) at *Ages.* 20.2 (= *Ap. Lac.* 212B, Agesilaus advising him to send his sons to Sparta for a proper education). Plutarch frequently uses the epithet ὁ σοφός as a marker of the seven sages, philosophers, and Hesiod, though only here of Xenophon. Cf. Tuplin 1993: 28, nn. 56–57 (note that his list of Xenophon as Socratic in Plutarch includes references to *De lib. educ.* 11E, *Cons. ad Apoll.* 118F, and *X Orat.* 845E, usually considered spurious). On Plutarch's use of sayings, or *chreiai*, a standard feature of ancient rhetoric, see Hock & O'Neil 1986 and 2002, Beck 1999 and 2005, Pelling 2002, and Bellu 2005 and 2007.

[44] On Xenophon's ideas of leadership, see most recently Gray 2011.

[45] In contrast to Plutarch's many works on Plato and on other philosophers, both extant and lost, there are none devoted to Xenophon.

enjoyed the moral and stylistic beauty of his narratives, especially in the *Cyropaedia*, and relied heavily on the *Hellenica* and *Agesilaus* for his portrait of the Spartan king. Nevertheless, he is not overwhelmed by Xenophon's prestige as a classical author, nor does he treat his works as definitive historical accounts or philosophical statements, as is apparent from his confident reworking and integration of the classical author's works in his own *Table Talk* and *Parallel Lives*. Plutarch appropriated Xenophon's works as an integral part of his own identity as a man of culture, a speaker and writer of refined Greek, a historian, a symposiast, an active citizen, and a friend to influential Romans. In doing so, he showed himself to be an outstanding representative of the Greek renaissance of the first and second century.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE RENAISSANCE RECEPTION OF XENOPHON'S *SPARTAN CONSTITUTION*: PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS*

Noreen Humble

Introduction

The majority view in current scholarship on Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution* is that it is an encomium of (or apology for, or defence of, or paradigm for imitation provided by) Sparta, and the four most recent commentaries on the work do not deviate in any substantive way from this belief (Luppino Manes 1988, Rebenich 1998, Lipka 2002, Gray 2007). There are a few who hold a completely opposite opinion about the work. Leo Strauss (1939) was the first to put forward the idea that the work is actually disguised satire and he has found some followers (e.g. Proietti 1987, and to some degree Higgins 1977).[1] We might well ask from where two such opposing views of the

* An earlier version of this paper was given at a conference on Renaissance Greek at Trinity College Dublin in September 2005. I am grateful to audiences at both conferences, as well as to the editors and the anonymous reader for their insightful comments which have much improved the paper. Thanks are also due to Jeroen De Keyser for access to his unpublished PhD dissertation and to stimulating conversations on Filelfo, to Jason Harris for bibliographical help on the Reformation period and to Keith Sidwell for keeping me from going too far astray on humanistic matters. None are to be held responsible for the views presented herein. A generous University of Calgary Starter Grant provided funding so that I could travel to Europe to carry out research crucial for this paper.

[1] Most recently Laurence Nee in responding to my paper on how to read the *Spartan Constitution* at the NPSA conference in Boston November 15, 2008, took as given Strauss's interpretation of the *Spartan Constitution*. Chrimes 1948: 25 took a third approach and argued that the work was not by Xenophon at all because he actually criticises the Spartans in that work but does not in the *Hellenica*. She is not the earliest to try to argue for the correctness of Demetrius of Magnesia's assertion (Diog. Laert. 2.57) that neither the *Spartan* nor the *Athenian Constitutions* are from Xenophon's hand. See, e.g., Watson 1857: 202 who actually thinks the *Athenian Constitution* is much more in line with Xenophon's style than the *Spartan Constitution*, and whose comments prefigure those of Talbert 1988 with regard to what he sees as the poor quality of the writing in the latter.

same text spring. To complicate matters, I prefer to take a sort of middle ground, viewing the *Spartan Constitution* as an analytic work presenting both praise and criticism of Sparta, showing at one and the same time how Sparta became so powerful and how she compromised, and so lost, that power.[2] Ironically, or so it seems to me, a frequent question directed towards me from *both* of the other two camps is 'how has no one been able to see this before now?'[3]

This paper is a preliminary attempt towards understanding how there can be such diverse views on the same text. I believe the answer lies in examining the individual and cultural contexts within which commentators read the work. Factored into this also must be the weight of received tradition and the context within which it was established. These issues are complex and what follows only addresses them superficially but I hope sufficiently to make my point.

Such an approach is both easier (more source material) and harder (not enough intellectual and emotional distance) when examining contemporary scholarship. Yet I would contend, for example, that those who hold that the *Spartan Constitution* is encomiastic (other than where criticism is explicitly present, as in chapter 14), though they come from geographically, chronologically and ideologically diverse backgrounds, are all influenced by the long-standing (c. 200 years) view of Xenophon as a second-rate thinker and naively pro-Spartan. Though they present variations on the encomiastic theme, they still work within this general framework. Further, though these two broad contentions have been successfully challenged in a number of important works over the last forty years or so, little sign can be seen that this general view of Xenophon has been dislodged, or even questioned, outside the specialist field of Xenophontic studies.[4] The knock-on effect can be seen in this rather striking statement from a Renaissance scholar:

> Plutarch and Xenophon, the two Greek historians most popular with the fifteenth-century Italians, need not be discussed here for their influence could not be very profound. The more weighty historians, Herodotus, Thucydides and Polybius ... [5]

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[2] Humble 2004.

[3] This question is directed with even more frequency at those who hold the Straussian view.

[4] As was clear at a conference entitled 'Xenophon et Sparte' in Lyon 2006 where most participants were primarily scholars on Sparta. Consider, too, these comments from one of the most recent publications on Xenophon, MacLeod 2008: 1: 'Thucydides was, of course, the better historian ... Xenophon lacked the literary charm and acute philosophical mind of Plato ... A home-spun philosopher, prone to excessive hero-worshipping.'

[5] Fryde 1983: 24. For a good overview of the relative popularity of Plutarch and Xenophon in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries see Burke 1966.

A more succinct encapsulation of the influence of received tradition overriding common sense and scholarly observation would be hard to find. Long held views are confident in their correctness, but long held is not a synonym for correctness. Received traditions must be subject to the same critical analysis as divergent approaches, but the problem is that often they are extremely difficult to become detached from.[6]

Strauss, to his credit, was one of very few tackling the majority view in the first half of the twentieth century.[7] Although I am one of a handful of classicists who engage with Strauss's scholarship on Xenophon and who believe that there are positive aspects to his approach,[8] I am inclined to agree more with Louis-André Dorion (2001–2002) than with David Johnson (this volume, pp. 123–159) in believing that Strauss allowed his broader philosophical concerns to determine his reading of Xenophon, particularly with regard to his work on the *Spartan Constitution*. Strauss's objective may have been 'to understand the texts as their authors understood them', but his ahistorical approach to Xenophon completely undermines this aim.[9] His argument that in the *Spartan Constitution* Xenophon was hiding his true message because it would be dangerous to reveal it,[10] is, in fact, based on the acceptance of two notions: a) that the work indeed does read as an encomium (thus his view is less a break from other twentieth-century readings than a modification which incorporates the majority view) and b) that all ancient philosophers followed a tradition of writing both exoterically and esoterically, a more fundamental belief, taken directly from the influential German

6 One need only look at how Plutarch's image of an egalitarian Spartan society still holds sway despite significant scholarly studies, most particularly Hodkinson 2000, showing that it simply does not reflect the reality of Classical Sparta.

7 Strauss 1939. Because Strauss has been so influential, particularly in political science circles (both in academia and in government), he has been the subject of a number of scholarly works (e.g. see Murley 2005 for a listing of works by scholars influenced by Strauss, and on Strauss and the neo-conservatives see the rather polemical Drury 1997), and so we have available various different analyses of how his personal, educational, and cultural experiences shaped his thought.

8 It is interesting, for example, that in his magisterial monograph *Wealth and Property in Classical Sparta* Hodkinson 2000, who does not engage with Strauss 1939, takes on board some of my arguments about the *Spartan Constitution* (Humble 2004) which are derived from Strauss 1939.

9 Johnson (this volume) (p. 156), in opposition to Dorion 2001–2002: 94.

10 So, e.g., we get such statements as: 'By writing his censure of Sparta in such a way that the superficial and uncritical reader could not help taking it as praise of Sparta, Xenophon certainly prevented the uncritical admirer of Athens from being confirmed in his prejudices': Strauss 1939: 530.

scholar of the Enlightenment, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781).[11] The article Strauss was writing on this latter topic, which was only published posthumously in 1986, was in fact being written at the same time, 1939, as his article on the *Spartan Constitution*.[12] To broaden the context further we must take into account Strauss's own existential struggle with being an exile and his general antipathy towards liberalism (based on his experience of the Weimar Republic) which broadly govern his approaches to many topics.[13] All these issues impinge upon how he reads Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution* and can help to explain how he comes to view the work as he does.

Received tradition is harder to unpick than the idiosyncrasies of individual views, but in order to support my contention that it is a real factor in the way we read ancient authors, rather than deal with individual circumstances of other twentieth-century commentators (whose personal lives are not on display in the way Strauss's is) I want to move back to a period when Xenophon was viewed generally in a different, more positive light to see if the *Spartan Constitution* was read differently then.

Renaissance Translators of the *Spartan Constitution*

It is frequently noted by modern scholars that the high regard in which Xenophon was held in antiquity was passed on to and accepted—generally—in the Renaissance and that it was not until the early nineteenth century that the still dominant, more negative overall view took hold.[14] The Renaissance, of course, like the current era, is not a uniform cultural space, and though for the most part assessment of Xenophon is highly positive, dissenting voices can be found. The following view of Xenophon, for example, has a very twentieth-century feel to it:[15]

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[11] Strauss 1986: 54; cf. Strauss 1941: 494 and Sheppard 2006: 99.

[12] Dorion 2001–2002 has already pointed out the connection between Strauss 1939 and Strauss 1941, which clearly also follows from the article on exoteric writing.

[13] Sheppard 2006 is particularly interesting on these issues.

[14] E.g., Anderson 1974: 1–8; Nadon 2001: 3. The modern view is not uniformly negative of course, as one can see from Rood's chapter in this volume (pp. 89–121), but there is a distinctive shift from admiration of the moralist or philosopher Xenophon to admiration of the general Xenophon who enjoys an enviable retirement in the country. Rood's chapter illustrates very well the point being developed here, i.e. how much readers of Xenophon bring of themselves to their interpretation.

[15] See De Smet 2001: 235–236 on the replication of scholarly debates in the twentieth century which had already taken place in the fifteenth and sixteenth.

> There follows thirdly Xenophon, a charming man, and endowed with eloquence, but lacking knowledge of all the good arts, a perpetual soldier, rapacious, and one who although he was victor in no battle, nevertheless left the military having scraped together a large slush-fund. He was also almost a traitor to his country, and consequently was driven into exile. For when the Spartans were most bitterly opposed to the Athenians, he took the Spartans' side, praising them and putting the Athenians in second place.[16]

Yet the author, Giralomo Cardano, is to be situated firmly in the sixteenth century (1501–1576), and is what we would term a true Renaissance man, known variously as a mathematician, doctor, astrologer, and philosopher.[17] It is difficult to say precisely what is behind his view—he has left vast amounts of writings on all sorts of subjects, most of which still await modern editions; however, unlike those who hold a similar view today, he seems to have been in the minority.

Investigating the ways in which views of Xenophon shifted and developed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is complex, to say the least, and an examination concentrating simply on the *Spartan Constitution* is deficient most obviously in that it does not, for the most part, take into account much discussion of other works of Xenophon.[18] Factors affecting translation history in these early years of the Renaissance are myriad, and include the availability of Greek manuscripts, the length and ease of the work to be translated,[19] the potential benefit of the work for rhetorical or moral instruction,[20] the interests of the patrons the humanists were trying

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16 Cardano *De Socratis studio = Opera omnia*, vol. 1.157, col. 1: Subsequitur tertius Xenophon vir blandus, & ornatus eloquio, verum omnium bonarum artium expers, perpetuus miles, rapax, & qui ex militia cum nullo in praelio victor fuerit tamen grande peculium corrasit. Patriae etiam pene proditor. Unde in exilium actus est. Cum enim Lacedemonii acerbissimas inimicitias cum Atheniensibus gererent, Lacedemoniis adhaesit, illos laudavit, Atheniensibus posthabitis aut postpositis. I owe knowledge of this reference to Lipka 2002: 42 who highlights Cardano in his brief survey of the reception of Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution* for two reasons: a) because of the last comment in the quotation above which supports Lipka's view of Xenophon, and b) because he believes Cardano echoes the *Spartan Constitution* in another work (see his nn. 204–205).

17 See most recently Grafton 2001, though the focus here is on the way Cardano's astrological interests inform his writings.

18 See Burke 1966 for a look at the popularity of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and *Anabasis* from 1450 to 1700. He does not examine Xenophon in detail but his observations about general, long-term shifts in the popularity of Greek historians based on shifting broad cultural trends are instructive.

19 Botley 2004: 11 quotes from a letter of Leonardo Bruni to Niccolò Niccoli in which Bruni shows reluctance to tackle a translation of Thucydides because of the time it would take.

20 This is important generally but for a specific case see, e.g., Marsh 1998: 2 on Lucian.

to attract, the desire to fill in gaps in ancient history not covered by standard Latin authors,[21] whether or not the works were used in an educational context,[22] and the private agendas of teachers.[23] It is, however, still possible to see from examining the translations and commentaries on the work from this period, along with the dedication letters which accompany these, and, where available and relevant, comments in letters between humanists that, though there is complete agreement on viewing Xenophon generally in a positive light (i.e. there is no hint of Cardano's view in any of this material), there is differentiation in views about the *Spartan Constitution*. We are also able to see that such differentiation is allied closely to the context within which the work is read and influenced strongly by the more general personal circumstances of the reader/translator and wider cultural influences (i.e. just as can be seen in the case of Strauss). The results of the following investigation, I think, therefore, reinforce for us how much we ourselves and our cultural background bring to our readings of the texts and why, in many ways, it is unsurprising that we are able to find opposing readings of the same texts.

Greek manuscripts of Xenophon's works appear in the libraries of many prominent humanists in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries.[24] For example, Palla Strozzi and Guarino Veronese both owned some. Interestingly the latter, though a prolific translator, produced no Latin translation of any of Xenophon's works. The earliest translations were, rather, done by Leonardo Bruni (1369–1444), who translated the *Hiero* in 1403 and the *Apology* in 1407, and seems also to have had knowledge of the *Anabasis* at this time.[25] Later on in his career, 1439, Bruni clearly paraphrases and extracts portions of Xenophon's *Hellenica* in writing his *Commentarium rerum graecarum*.[26] A full Latin translation of the *Hellenica*, however, did not appear until the sixteenth century (when three other works *Art of Horsemanship*, *Symposium*, and *On Revenues* were also translated for the

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21 Both factors of considerable importance, e.g., for the translation history of Plutarch's *Lives* as Pade 1998 and 2007 show.

22 Works of Lucian, e.g., were frequently used in an educational context because of the relative ease of his Greek (see Berti 1987 on Chrysoloras' use of Lucian in this context). See Botley 2010: 91–93 on Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and *Hiero* in educational contexts.

23 See Humble 2010 for the suggestion that Chrysoloras' political agenda influenced how some of his pupils regarded and translated Plutarch's *Lives*.

24 See generally Woodward 1943 and Burke 1966 on the diffusion of manuscripts and translations of the Greek historians in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

25 Botley 2004: 9–10, and n. 22.

26 Cochrane 1981: 18; Botley 2004: 39–41.

first time). By comparison, for example, all of Plutarch's *Lives* and much of the *Moralia* were already translated by 1470.

By contrast with the fate of the *Hellenica*, three Latin translations of the *Spartan Constitution* were made in the fifteenth century. The first was produced by Francesco Filelfo (1398–1481) in 1430.[27] He dedicated it to Cardinal Niccolò Albergati, bishop of Bologna, along with translations of Xenophon's encomium of *Agesilaus* and Plutarch's *Lives of Numa and Lycurgus*.[28] Filelfo had escaped poverty through education, unusually going to Constantinople to learn his Greek. He spent most of his life moving from place to place in search of patronage at one of the many Italian courts of the period, ending up primarily in Milan from 1439 to the end of his life. The years just prior to this set of translations were particularly unsettling for him. In 1427, upon return from Constantinople, he tried to set up a school in Venice. Lack of support prompted a move to Bologna in 1428, and political unrest there sent him to Florence in 1429. Florence was no peaceful haven. A war with Lucca divided the nobility and he soon found himself on the wrong side of a political struggle involving the Medici. Though he escaped being deported in 1431 and survived a politically motivated physical assault in 1433, he was turfed out in 1434.[29] The translations sent to Albergati in Bologna are thus completed at a time when Filelfo's personal situation is not entirely secure.

The first half of the dedication letter is wholly concerned with comparing Lycurgus and Albergati to the advantage of the latter despite the godlike status of the former and draws on information about Lycurgus found in other ancient authors.[30] The second half is as follows:[31]

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27 For this date see Pade 2007 1.262–263 and De Keyser 2007: 188. Earlier scholarship dates it to 1432 (e.g., Resta 1986, Robin 1991: 247 and Marsh 1992: 158). Lipka 2002: 42 briefly deals with the reception of the work, noting that it did not make much of an impact on the humanists. He singles out only Filelfo's translation noting simply that Filelfo emphasised the pedagogic aspect of the work in his preface, and suggests that it was this which made the work attractive to readers in the Quattrocento and beyond.

28 Marsh 1992: 158–159.

29 See Robin 1991: 3–10 for a brief overview of his life, 17–21 on the case of physical assault, 28 on the implications of the war with Lucca for Filelfo's situation, and 247–250 for a timeline contextualising significant events in his life within wider affairs. See also Robin 1983: 206–216.

30 Most notably Herodotus 1.65–66 and possibly also Justin 3.3. Herodotus had not by this time been translated into Latin (Lorenzo Valla undertook the task in 1453; see Wilson 1992: 72), but it is known that Filelfo had a Greek manuscript of Herodotus by 1427 (see Calderini 1913: 321).

31 The Latin text comes from De Keyser 2008: 5–6. Marsh 1992: 159 has this portion of the text also, with a few minor differences.

> Nunc ad Lycurgum illum revertamur. Permagnum illius hominis atque perillustre apud veteres nomen fuit. Omnes eum non ut mortalem sed ut numen aliquod venerati sunt. Perpulchrum est mediusfidius vitam honestam vivere, sed longe et pulchrius et divinius posse alios suae virtutis suaeque praestantiae quamsimillimos reddere. Id praeter absolutissima sapientia virum praestare posse crediderim neminem. Huiusmodi vero fuisse Lycurgum legimus, qui non modo sese ad probitatem, ad decus, ad gloriam compararit, quinetiam omnem curam, studium, industriam accommodarit, ut talis redderet cives suos qualem per id temporis totus prope terrarum orbis eum esse opinabatur. Ergo in legibus ferendis civitatem condidit, rempublicam statuit: imperium illud stabilivit quod et barbari formidarent et omnis Graecia vereretur. Hasce autem leges Socraticus Xenophon et eleganter, ut solet, et perdocte apud Graecos scripserat. Nos ut potuimus ad Latinos traduximus, tuoque nomini eo dedicavimus, ut et quantum Christi instituta gentilium praestent legibus facile cognoscas, et quantum Lycurgo ipse antecellas caeteri intelligant.

> Now let us return to the famous Lycurgus. The name of that man was very great and very illustrious among the ancients; all revered him not as a mortal but as some sort of god. By my truth it is a very fine thing to live an honourable life, but by far finer and more divine to be able to render others most like to one's own virtue and one's own excellence: I would have believed nobody able to achieve this but a man of the most complete wisdom. In truth we read that Lycurgus was of such a kind, who brought himself to uprightness and dignity and honour but who also fitted all his care, endeavour and industry so as to render his own citizens such as at that time almost the whole world considered him to be. Therefore in making laws he founded a state, he established a constitution, he made firm that rule so that barbarians would be fearful of it and all Greece reverent. These laws, however, the Socratic Xenophon wrote both elegantly, as he was accustomed, and very learnedly in Greek. We, in accordance with our abilities, have translated it into Latin and dedicated it to your name so that you may know how much the teachings of Christ surpass those of the gentiles and others may easily know how much you yourself excel Lycurgus.

One of the striking things about the letter, and about this part of it in particular, is how little it refers to the contents of the work it prefaces. The only certain connection is the phrase *absolutissima sapientia virum* ('a man of the most complete wisdom') which, though not the exact words Filelfo uses to translate εἰς τὰ ἔσχατα σοφὸν ἡγοῦμαι (*Spartan Constitution* 1.2),[32] surely must be echoing the thought. Indeed the content matches much more closely what Plutarch says in his *Life of Lycurgus* (in which

[32] Filelfo translates this phrase as *ad summum usque sapientissimum duco*: see De Keyser 2008: 6.

Lycurgus is presented as a model of virtue), than what Xenophon says in the *Spartan Constitution* (in which the focus is on Lycurgus' institutions not on the man himself).[33] The reason for concentrating on the character of Lycurgus in the dedication letter is not difficult to detect. The content and tone of the letter are driven by Filelfo's uncertain personal circumstances. He is newly arrived in a Florence where he does have support, notably from Leonardo Bruni, but the political situation is unstable. Patronage was precarious as Filelfo had already found out to his cost in Venice,[34] and so having a wide network of potential patrons to draw upon in difficult times was important. Likening Albergati (whom he had met during his brief stay in Bologna) to the legendary Spartan lawgiver Lycurgus in the various dedication letters is a form of flattery,[35] paid to a potential future patron.[36] Indeed by 1432 he is writing to Albergati to ask for aid and advice on how to escape the situation in Florence.[37] Concern for patronage thus dominates the tenor of the dedicatory letter. What Filelfo really thought was going on in the *Spartan Constitution* is, therefore, difficult to recover.[38]

33 In the dedication letter to Plutarch's *Life of Lycurgus* Filelfo says that he translated the *Spartan Constitution* first. If this is true—and it need not be anything more than expedient rhetoric for that letter—it does not necessarily follow that he also wrote the dedication letter to the *Spartan Constitution* before he had read the *Life of Lycurgus*.

34 See Robin 1991: 22–30 on Filelfo's relationship with Leonardo Giustiniani, for example.

35 Resta 1986: 20–21 and n. 36. On Lycurgus as a figure humanists used to flatter princes see Marsh 1991: 91.

36 It has been suggested to me by Jeroen De Keyser that Filelfo may also be writing to Albergati because one of his own Florentine patrons, Leonardo Bruni, holds Albergati in high esteem, having dedicated his translation of *Life of Aristotle* to him in 1430.

37 See Resta 1986: 20. See also Robin 1991: 28–29 on Filelfo's letters around the same time period, written 'to tighten his earlier ties with certain influential friends at the Milanese court'.

38 This set of translations is mentioned in a number of Filelfo's letters but without further elaboration on what he thought about the *Spartan Constitution*. For example: Ut autem revertar ad me, quattuor ipse ex Plutarcho vitas feci latinas, Lycurgi ac Numae Pompilii primo, cum Florentiae agerem, quas quidem dono misi, una cum Lacedaemoniorum republica et laudatione regis Agesilai, quam utranque sum ex illo suavissimo Xenophonte socratico interpretatus, cardinali sanctae crucis, Nicolao Bononiensi, viro sancto et sapienti ('… to return to myself I have translated into Latin four lives of Plutarch. First of all Lycurgus and Numa Pompilius together with the Spartan Constitution and the encomium of king Agesilaus both of which I translated, when I lived in Florence, from that most sweet follower of Socrates, Xenophon, which I sent as a gift to the cardinal of Santa Croce, Nicolas of Bologna, a holy and wise man'; see Pade 1998: 112 n. 37 for the Latin text). Filelfo rightly calls the *Agesilaus* an encomium both here and in the dedicatory letter to his translation of that work (for the Latin text of that letter see Marsh 1992: 91–92)—Xenophon himself makes the generic affiliations of that work clear (*Ages*. 1.1, 10.3, 11.1)—but Filelfo does not show any indication that he regards the *Spartan Constitution* in that way.

What is clear, however, is that he is presenting Lycurgus as a wholly positive model and is reading Xenophon's work in the shadow of Plutarch's *Life of Lycurgus*.[39] At what point in time this way of reading the two works becomes standard practice, I am not yet sure, but it is still common to find Plutarch's biography overshadowing Xenophon's treatise with regard to certain aspects of Spartan life.[40]

The work was translated a second time c. 1470 by Lilius Tifernas (1417–1486) and dedicated to Federico da Montefeltro (1422–1482) of Urbino, along with some pseudo-Aristotelian letters to Alexander and a translation of Philo Judaeus' *De migratione Abrahami*.[41] Tifernas at the time of translating was in a much more secure personal situation than was Filelfo: he was in the employ of Federico da Montefeltro as a tutor to his son. He writes the following in his dedication letter:

> Divo (*sic*) F⟨r⟩ederico Urbinatium principi in traductione epistularum Alexandri et Aristotelis Lilii Tifernatis prologus feliciter: Principum gloriosissime, quas Alexandri atque Aristotelis epistulas facere latinas mandavit mihi dignitas tua, eas ego Politicorum librorum mentionem habere cognovi quo tempore celeberrima in bibliotheca Lacedaemoniorum quoque Politi[c]am a Xenophonte pictam comper[u]i. Quae causa fuit ut editionem utramque tibi susciperem atque duorum summorum auctorum scripta simul mitterem, si forte praeceptis politicis ab Aristotele tradita rebus quoque modo per Lacedaemonios impleta docente Xenophonte deprehenderemus.
>
> To the divine Federico duke of Urbino, felicitously addressed is the prologue of Lilius Tifernas to the translation of the letters of Alexander and Aristotle. Most glorious of princes, I knew that those letters of Alexander and Aristotle, which your excellency ordered me to translate into Latin, made mention of the books of Politics, at the time when in your well-stocked library also I obtained knowledge of the Constitution of the Lacedaemonians drawn by Xenophon. And this was the reason for undertaking an edition of both for you and of my sending together the works of two of the greatest authors, to see if by chance we might discern the things handed down by Aristotle in his political precepts actually implemented by the Spartans in each and every way, as Xenophon tells us.

We know (from a letter of 1472) that Federico da Montefeltro had asked Donato Acciaiuoli to provide a translation and commentary of the *Politics*

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[39] Xenophon clearly had some effect on him, though, as he named the son born to him in 1433 Xenophon: Robin 1991: 247.

[40] For examples of this phenomenon see Hodkinson 2000: 19–64 and Humble 2002. See also Lipka 2002: 43 for a seventeenth-century example.

[41] See Marsh 1992: 160–161 for the text of the letter. See also Marsh 1991.

for him.[42] Clearly the letters Tifernas speaks of were part of the Duke's overall interest in Aristotle. Tifernas claims to have made the connection between Aristotle and Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution* himself, saying that he found the latter in the Duke's library; he may, however, also have been familiar with it from another source, i.e. Filelfo, since it is probable that Tifernas studied under Filelfo in Siena between 1435 and 1438,[43] which is only shortly after Filelfo made his own translation of the work. Tifernas, however, unlike Filelfo, does not compare his dedicatee to Lycurgus. He has taken an entirely different line and makes a connection between Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution* and Aristotle's *Politics* in the sense that the former is an actual illustration of what is laid out in the latter. The tone is thus somewhat different from that found in Filelfo's letter of dedication: because Tifernas already has a patron, his focus centres instead on his patron's interests.

Two factors, therefore, at the very least, influence the different interpretations taken by these two humanists:[44] a) the concerns of their patrons and b) their own personal situations. It is worth noting too that reading the *Spartan Constitution* in the light of Aristotle's *Politics* is bound to produce a different result from reading it in the light of Plutarch's *Life of Lycurgus*. Even if we cannot tell precisely what either of the translators or their dedicatees thought of the *Spartan Constitution*, the contexts in which these two early translations were done suggest two potential strands of interpretation, which bear some resemblance to a broad division found in modern thought, i.e. the *Spartan Constitution* as praise (corresponding to Plutarch's *Life of Lycurgus*) or as political philosophy (corresponding to Aristotle's *Politics*).[45]

The next period of interest in the *Spartan Constitution* is removed from the first both geographically (from Italy to more Northern areas of Europe), chronologically (to the mid and second half of the sixteenth century) and

42 Marsh 1992: 160.

43 Dapelo & Zoppelli 1998: 12 n. 9.

44 There exists a third fifteenth-century translation which, like Tifernas' translation, is known only from one codex, but it is prefaceless and its author unknown so little can be said about it. See Marsh 1992: 161.

45 Filelfo's translation became the established version used in the earliest composite editions of Xenophon's works, the first of which dates from 1501–1502. It is not until the middle of the century that there can be found an attempt to improve upon it and hence dislodge it. For a list of composite editions see Marsh 1992: 87–91; see also Rhodes 1981. The dedication letter sometimes precedes the translation in these early editions and thus might have influenced how the *Spartan Constitution* was read. It is difficult, however, to know how often any attention would be paid to these letters by readers of the composite editions. Consider, by way of comparison, modern reading patterns of introductions to Penguin translations.

ideologically (from Catholicism to, in almost all cases, the Reformation). First in this second wave is Joachim Camerarius (1500–1574), who studied Latin and Greek at Leipzig and Erfurt (1513–1521) and then spent time in Wittenberg (1521–1526) where he became a close friend to Melanchthon,[46] Luther's right-hand man, who was professor of Greek in Wittenberg from 1518.[47] He subsequently held teaching posts in Nuremburg (whose Academy he helped found in 1526 with Melanchthon),[48] Tübingen and Leipzig.[49] It was while he held his final posting in Leipzig (1541–1574) that he translated and commented on the *Spartan Constitution*, in an edition of Xenophon's minor works dedicated in 1543 to Prince Heinrich of Mecklenburg (1479–1552). In the dedication letter Camerarius writes:[50]

> … De argumento autem quid dicam? Non enim hoc in quadam fatali confusione temporum horum tanti fieri potest quanti meretur. Quotocuique enim iam ratio civilis et gubernandi veluti ars cordi est? Aut apud quos populos, quasve gentes ac nationes, sapienti rectori et ei viro qui Politici nomen mereatur locus esse possit? Verum haec tamen tam praecepta quam exempla prudentes et magni viri cupidissimis animis complecti solent, vel ad voluptatem cognitionis pulcerrimarum rerum, vel ad aliquam etiam instructionem sui, ut reipublicae tanquam corpus, si in pessima et alienissima diaeta, unde abduci nolit, percurari nequeat, ipsi tamen et de sua intelligentia, et de veterum sapientium subiectionibus quasdam tanquam ἐμπειρικοὶ medici θηραπείας παραμυθητικάς, partibus ac membris illius adhibeant, ne omnia simul prorsus deficiant et penitus intereant. Quam ob causam, magne princeps, et prudentiae et eruditioni et pietati tuae haec Xenophontea de forma duarum potentissimarum et quodam tempore virtute ac gloria tam ingenii quam rerum gestarum imprimis florentium civitatum scripta (quae tibi transmittenda hoc tempore putassem) gratissima iucundissimaque futura esse existimavi, inque his cognoscendis requisiturum etiam te expositionem longiorem et magnopere desideraturum, ea quae et hic et alii ex Socratica Platonicaque familia in hoc genere de statu, mutatione, legibus, institutisque ac moribus civitatum perscripsisse traduntur, cum omnium rerum publicarum formas ac, ut ita dicam, opera et extructiones persequerentur disputationibus suis.
>
> … About the subject matter, however, what am I to say? For this cannot be worth as much as it merits at a time of confusion like this. For at present how few are the men who care about civic thinking and, as it were, the art of governing? Or among which people, which tribes and nations could there be a

46 Indeed he was Melanchthon's first biographer; see Kolb 1980: 52.
47 Mack 1993: 320.
48 Keen 1988: 59.
49 Baron 1978: 7–9; see also McMahon 1947: 86–88 for a slightly fuller picture.
50 Latin text as found in Marsh 1992: 161.

> place for a wise ruler and that man who deserves the name *politicus*? In truth, however, these precepts and exempla wise and great men are accustomed to embrace with very desirous minds, either for the pleasure of learning about very beautiful things or for self-instruction. As a result, as it were, the body of the state, if it cannot be cured while in the worst and most alien condition from which it cannot be weaned, they nevertheless both through their own intelligence and from the subject matter of the ancient wise men may, like experienced doctors, apply certain persuasive therapies to its parts and limbs so that they should not all give way at once and die completely. It is for this reason, great lord, that I thought that these works of Xenophon (which I had thought should be sent to you at this time) about the form of the two most powerful states, which particularly flourished at a certain time because of the virtue and glory both of their intellect and their deeds, would be most pleasing and delightful to your prudence, erudition, and piety. And I thought that in getting to know these you would require and very much desire also a longer exposition of those things which both Xenophon and others from the Socratic and Platonic family are said to have written in this genre about the establishment, change, laws, institutions, and customs of states, since in their disputations they pursued the forms of all states and, so to speak, all their deeds and structures.

Like Filelfo, Camerarius explicitly refers to Xenophon as a Socratic,[51] and the letter implies that Camerarius, like Tifernas, is viewing the work as a political treatise, though in this case in conjunction with the *Athenian Constitution*, which he believes is also from Xenophon's pen. He argues that these treatises are worth reading by wise men, like the Prince, because they might learn from accounts of former great states at their peak. Though he makes no mention of it in the dedicatory letter, the opening portion of his commentary reveals more about the broader framework in which he places these works. He read them as part of contemporary constitutional debate about the relative merits of monarchy, oligarchy or democracy, or some mix thereof (citing Aristotle on Sparta's mixed constitution in *Politics* II).[52] When he comes to comment on individual features of the work he does remark that Spartan drinking habits are *laudabilis* ('praiseworthy'),[53] and also notes that Xenophon praises Lycurgus at *Spartan Constitution* 1.1.[54]

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51 Though a glance at the dedication letters which Marsh 1992 reproduces shows such explicit labelling is not always the case, in general it was common in the Renaissance to call Xenophon a philosopher.

52 Camerarius 1543: 105–106.

53 Camerarius 1543: 113.

54 Camerarius 1543: 108: Hoc complectitur laudationem singularis sapientiae Lycurgi, propria quadam ac peculiari, neque communi cum ulla alia ratione constituendae reip. ('This

This is the first time that what we refer to as the pseudo-Xenophontic *Athenian Constitution* emerges as part of the context of reading the *Spartan Constitution*. Camerarius was, indeed, the first to translate the work into Latin and included commentaries on both works (along with a translation of and commentary on the *Hipparchicus*) in this 1543 edition. What is strikingly consistent in the Renaissance is that everyone regards both works as being by Xenophon.[55] They also consistently defend this view explicitly in direct response to the comment that Diogenes Laertius makes in his *Life of Xenophon* that Demetrius of Magnesia denied that Xenophon wrote the *Athenian* and *Spartan Constitutions* (2.57).[56] Indeed, Camerarius opens his commentary on the *Spartan Constitution* by defending the authenticity of the work.[57]

Despite Camerarius' skill and reputation, his translation did not replace Filelfo's in the composite editions (though his translation of the *Art of Horsemanship* is consistently included).[58] Nor did his friend Henricus (Estienne) Stephanus (c. 1528–1598) use Camerarius' translation in his composite edition of 1561. Stephanus is perhaps better known as a printer, indeed one of the most important of the age, but he was also an extremely accomplished philologist, and creator of the *TLG*.[59] Though born in France and widely

[exordium] embraces praise of the unique wisdom of Lycurgus, in his own peculiar manner of establishing a constitution not shared by any other').

55 Marsh 1992: 192.

56 Diogenes Laertius' *Lives of Philosophers* were translated early on by the influential Ambrogio Traversari (1386–1439) for Cosimo de'Medici in 1433: see Wilson 1992: 32–33. Cardinal Bessarion, who is the first to translate Xenophon's *Memorabilia* fully in 1442, had a copy which he annotated (ibid., 64). We know too that Guarino had a manuscript in his possession and though he did not translate it, his biography of Plato is indebted to that of Diogenes (ibid., 45), as is Camerarius' 1543: 1–20 biography of Xenophon; Hankins' 2008 analysis of Manetti's use of Diogenes for his (c. 1440) *Life of Socrates* is instructive. This raises further issues, of course, about how fifteenth- and sixteenth-century scholars read Diogenes. Hicks 1966: x suggests that by 1500 Diogenes Laertius had become 'fashionable and usurped more authority than was his due'. Though I am tempted to immediately jump on this statement as reflecting modern scepticism about Diogenes and his methods, as far as I can tell so far Diogenes does not seem to have been read particularly critically.

57 Camerarius 1543: 104–105: Hunc libellum Laertius scribit Demetrium Magnetem negasse composuisse Xenophontem. Ego neque in argumento neque elocutione quicquam reperio, non dico indignum, hoc autore, sed alienum rationibus ac voluntati illius ('This small book, Laertius writes, Demetrius of Magnesia denied was composed by Xenophon. I do not find anything either in the argument or style—I will not say unworthy of but rather alien to his ways of thinking and his desires').

58 See the list of composite editions in Marsh 1992: 87–91.

59 Pfeiffer 1976: 109–110.

travelled, he settled in Geneva in 1556, his father having relocated his printing business there in 1551.[60] Stephanus, in fact, dedicated his 1561 edition of Xenophon's complete works to Camerarius and in the dedication letter, as Marsh points out, notes that he is revising Filelfo's translation of the *Spartan Constitution* … and that he is rather grumpy about the fact that Camerarius will not help him:[61]

> Ab ea ad Agesilaum, a quo ad libellum de Lacedaemoniorum republica veni; in quorum utroque iterum mihi negotium cum Philelpho fuit, quem interpretem ubique nimium sui similem esse comperi … cum igitur frustra Xenophontem auxilium a te expectare animadverterem …
>
> From this [i.e. the *Anabasis*] to the *Agesilaus* from which I came to the book about the constitution of the Spartans; in both of them I found myself again having business with Filelfo, whom I have discovered to be a translator always too similar to himself … so when I noticed that Xenophon was awaiting your help in vain … [62]

There is no indication, however, about what he thought about the content of the work, nor does his revised translation gain popularity.

The translation that finally dislodged Filelfo's in composite editions was the one published by Johannes Levvenklaius in 1569.[63] Levvenklaius (1533–1593) was born in Westphalia. He spent many years in Turkey in the service of Baron Karl von Zerotin of Moravia (1564–1636), who was himself of notable learning and of the protestant persuasion.[64] Levvenklaius was Greek professor in Heidelberg (1562–1565) and then, from 1567, in Basel.[65] Unfortunately, again, as was the case with Stephanus, the dedication letters and Levvenklaius' own proem for the 1569 printing[66] provide no real clue about

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[60] *CTC* 3.48–49 and Pfeiffer 1976: 108. See Armstrong 1954: 207 and 260–267 on Robert Estienne's religious faith. He does not seem to have been persecuted as a reformer in France but he certainly died an adherent of the protestant faith in Geneva. On the importance of the arrival in Geneva of Robert Estienne and another French printer, Jean Crespin, for the dissemination of Calvin's thought, see Pettegree 2005: 143–144.

[61] For the text of the dedication letter for this composite edition see Marsh 1992: 95–96. The second comment precedes the first in the actual letter.

[62] He does however manage to get aid from Camerarius for his 1581 edition. See Marsh 1992: 96–97 for that dedication letter.

[63] From 1594 to 1745, on the basis of the list provided by Marsh 1992: 90–91 which ends at this date.

[64] To whom the revised complete edition of Xenophon's works with Levvenklaius' Greek text and Latin translations and commentaries were dedicated in 1594 by Fridericus Sylburgius; see Marsh 1992: 99. On Zerotin see Odlozilik 1937 and 1939: 347–351.

[65] *CTC* 2.89.

[66] Marsh 1992: 107 gives the proem, dedicated to Johannes Casimirus, and a partial quotation of the dedication letter at 98.

what he thought Xenophon was doing in the *Spartan Constitution*. Nor is there any illumination in his notes on the translation, which were published posthumously in the 1594–1596 complete Frankfurt edition of Xenophon's works.[67] What the notes do address are primarily issues about the Greek text and quibbles with earlier translations (those of Filelfo, Camerarius and Stephanus),[68] not interpretative or historical issues (such as can be found in Camerarius' and, later, Portus' commentaries).[69]

One other sixteenth century translation exists, by a French scholar named Gulielmus de Bailly, though only in a single codex (as was the case for Tifernas' version) which can be dated to 1562. The dedication letter, to the translator's father, has nothing of note regarding the content of the work translated other than expressing general admiration for Xenophon as an author.[70]

This brings us to Franciscus Portus (1511–1581) and the other important early commentary on the work, which was published posthumously in 1586 by his son Aemilius.[71] His background is complicated. He was born in Crete of Italian heritage, and seems to have been educated under Arsenios Apostolios in Greece (Monemvasia, ?1524–1527) and in Venice.[72] His first posting was in Modena teaching Greek in 1536.[73] It is here in Modena that it is

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[67] Levvenklaius 1594–1596: 657–690 (translation) and 1095–1097 (notes).

[68] Though he does comment, as Camerarius had, on his belief that the work does belong to Xenophon contrary to what Demetrius of Magnesia thinks: Levvenklaius 1594–1596: 1095. Also appended at the very end of this edition (1187–1189) are notes by Aemilius Portus, the son of Franciscus Portus (see below). His notes are a mixture of his own and his father's issues with the text and translation (for example he takes exception to Levvenklaius translating *tois hoplomachois* as 'gladiatores', but does not explain why). Levvenklaius clearly had not seen Portus' translation and commentary which likewise were published posthumously.

[69] Marsh 1992: 82 notes that Camerarius' and Portus' commentaries are unusual in this sense.

[70] Marsh 1992: 163 thinks this translator is otherwise unknown but he is perhaps Guillaume de Baille (1538–1616)—also known as Gulielmus Ballonius—a prominent Parisian physician. He is known to have been exceptionally good at the ancient languages and indeed taught '*litterae humaniores* at the Collège de Montaigue' for a few years before turning from a scholarly to a medical career: Goodall 1935: 412–413. Since we can date his becoming a qualified doctor to 1570 (ibid. 414), the date of 1562 for the translation is consonant with his years as a student scholar. On Baille see Lonie 1985.

[71] It is interesting that there are strong connections between all the major sixteenth-century translators and commentators on Xenophon. A glance at Schrieber 1982 shows that Camerarius, Levvenklaius, Franciscus and Aemilius Portus all published with the Estienne (Stephanus) publishing house and crossed one another's paths at various times.

[72] Legrande 1962: vii and Manoussakas 1982: 300 both follow M. Crusii *Turcograecia* (Bale 1584): 207, 522. The tentative dates are from Manoussakas.

[73] Church 1932: 296; Manoussakas 1982: 300–301 places him here from 1536 to 1545.

assumed that he embraced Reformation ideology.[74] In 1542–1543 the Modenese Academy was investigated by the Pope who suspected it of following Calvinist ideas and Portus was implicated, eventually signing a confession and continuing his classes.[75] He was hired in 1546 by Duke Ercole II of Ferrara to teach in the university there, while the Duke's wife, Duchess Renée, also engaged him to teach Latin and Greek to her children.[76] The Duchess was an avowed Calvinist,[77] but her husband was not. Eventually in 1554 Portus found himself turfed out by the Duke, who was purging his court of Calvinists, and wandered in search of employment for a while (Friuli, Venice, Basel).[78] The inquisition caught up with him again in 1558 in Venice and during the ensuing hearings he argued, among other things, that the presence of heretical works in his home (e.g. Melanchthon's *De anima*) was strictly for academic not theological purposes.[79] He was convicted on a minor charge and, though told to remain in Venice and prove himself a good Catholic, he escaped to Chiavenna c. 1560,[80] and finally ended up being hired by Calvin as Greek professor at the Academy in Geneva in 1561.[81]

He wrote commentaries on eight of Xenophon's works and these were published posthumously by his son in 1586.[82] Given the profusion of source material for this period, compared with antiquity, it is frustrating that we cannot date precisely when he wrote most of his commentaries on Xenophon. The one exception is his commentary on the *Hellenica* which Stephanus mentions in the dedicatory letter to his 1561 composite edition,[83] the

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74 Sturm 1903: 15 and Baud-Bovy 1949: 22. Though there was enough dissemination of protestant ideology in Venice in the 1530s to postulate earlier exposure; see Martin 1988: 206 and Gordon 2000: 279.

75 Church 1932: 296 and Manoussakas 1982: 302–303 give slightly different versions of what happens here.

76 Church 1932: 296, Manoussakas 1982: 303.

77 See Caponetto 1999: 234–251 on the Duchess. She was introduced to protestant ideas in the French court of her brother-in-law Francis I, and Calvin spent some time at her court in Ferrara in 1536.

78 On Duke Ercole II's opposition to his wife's Calvinism see Church 1932: 297, Manoussakas 1982: 303–304 and Caponetto 1999: 235–236.

79 Manoussakas 1982: 299 refers to an article (*non vidi*) written jointly with Panagiotakis in modern Greek in which the details of the case involving Portus are set out (*Thesaurismata* 18 [1981], 7–118).

80 Church 1932: 302.

81 Baud-Bovy 1949: 22.

82 Marsh 1992: 115, 163–164. The other seven works are *The Athenian Constitution*, *Cynegeticus*, *Hellenica*, *Hiero*, *Memorabilia*, *Oeconomicus* and *On Revenues*.

83 From Marsh 1992: 96: Quod si nullam a te spem mihi ostendi videro, ut saltem collatitiae quaedam annotationes edi possint, symbola a quibus par est exigere, et Francisci Porti annotationes in Hellenica … ('But if I see you offering no hope to me, so that at least some

year Portus was hired by Calvin. So although Xenophon was certainly on the curriculum in Geneva prior to Portus' arrival,[84] Portus' interest in Xenophon was clearly piqued before his arrival there.[85]

Portus' preface to the *Spartan Constitution* reads as follows:[86]

> Initia, & ortum Reipublicae, progressus, varia eius genera, & quae laudem, quaeve vituperationem habent: de rerum publicarum mutationibus, & causis mutationum: quae denique res eas conservent, quaeve interimant, Aristoteles doctissime libris octo explicavit. Sed Xenophon in his duobus libellis non hoc sibi proposuit, ut de rerum publicarum initiis, de variis earum generibus, & aliis id genus rebus disputet, aut praecepta tradat, sed illud meo quidem iudicio spectat potissimum, ut Rempublicam Lacedaemoniorum laudet, & eam optime institutam fuisse demonstret, Atheniensium in universum vituperet …
>
> Aristotle in his eight books most learnedly explained the beginnings and origin of the state, its progress, its various types, and which receive praise and which censure, then he set forth the changes in states and the causes of changes and what factors finally preserve or destroy them. But Xenophon in his two little books does not set forth this goal for himself, to dispute about the beginnings of Republics, about their various types and other things of this kind or to deliver maxims, but in my judgment in fact he aims most at praising the Spartan constitution and showing that it was instituted in the best way, and censuring the Athenian constitution completely …

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comparative notes may be published, by those from whom it is reasonable to demand contributions, and Franciscus Portus' annotations on the *Hellenica* …'). Stephanus notes in the same letter that he asked Portus to revise an earlier translation of the *Hellenica* by Bilibaldus Pirckheimerus. Further Portus provided translations of 27 speeches from the *Hellenica* for Stephanus' publication entitled *Conciones* in 1570 (on both of which see Marsh 1992: 147–148).

[84] See Bouwsma 1988: 14 and Lewis 1994: 41, who both summarise to different degrees the founding document of the Genevan Academy, *L'Ordre estably en l'Escole de Geneve par noz magnifficques et tres honnorez Seigneurs Syndiques et Conseil de ceste cité de Geneve, veu et passé en Conseil le Lundy vingt neufz de May 1559* ('The Order established in the School of Geneva by our magnificent and most honoured Sirs, the Syndics and Council of this city of Geneva, seen and passed in Council, Monday 29 May 1559'), which can be found in Stelling-Michaud 1959: 67–77. The passage in question concerning Xenophon runs as follows: 'Les Loix de la seconde classe: Qu'on y enseigne l'histoire en latin, prenant Tite Live pour autheur; l'histoire en grec, prenant Xenophon ou Polybe ou Herodien …' ('Rules for the 2nd class: History in Latin should be taught here, taking Titus Livius as authority; history in Greek, taking Xenophon or Polybius or Herodian …').

[85] We also know that one of two sons born while he was in Modena (1536–1545) was named Xenophon (Manoussakas 1982: 302). This Xenophon surfaces in court proceedings in Venice in 1558 (cf. Church 1932: 302) and later as a shopkeeper in Geneva (Fatio & Labarthe 1969: 57 on a disturbance in which he is implicated in 1572).

[86] There is no dedicatory letter as the work was unpublished at his death. The text of the preface is only partially transcribed by Marsh 1992: 163–164 but can be found in Portus 1586.

Like Tifernas, and Camerarius in his commentary, Portus reads the *Spartan Constitution* in the light of Aristotle's *Politics*, though he regards Xenophon as less analytical than Aristotle (and not complementary to him as Tifernas had suggested). Like Camerarius he pairs this work with the *Athenian Constitution*,[87] but unlike him, he is adamant that the *Spartan Constitution* is a work of praise and sees a strong contrast between the two works in the way the internal narrator appears to approve of the one state (Sparta) and not of the other (Athens). Portus heightens his observation of the contrast in his prefatory comments with repeated, rhetorically charged language (*laudet … vituperet*). Further, the very way in which Portus begins his commentary suggests that he is conscious that he is suggesting something new about the work: Ἐγκώμιον *ausim dicere* Σπάρτης *hoc opusculum* ('I would dare to say that this work is an encomium of Sparta'). The use of the subjunctive *ausim* is not, I think, an accident, given that none of the other previous translators or commentators seem to refer to the work in quite this way.[88] Filelfo certainly seemed to be presenting the text to Albergati as an example of the greatness of Lycurgus, but his praise for Lycurgus was, for the most part, drawn from elsewhere, primarily Herodotus and Plutarch; and while Camerarius drew attention to Xenophon's words of praise for Lycurgus at *Spartan Constitution* 1.1, his general comments about the work show that he regarded it as political theorising rather than as encomiastic.

We could leave it at that in terms of setting the context for Portus' reading but I think there is more going on and that his spiritual and intellectual affiliations need also to be considered. If they were not impinging directly, I feel certain that they were doing so indirectly. There is much about Calvinist doctrine that would suggest that the Spartan way of life would be more agreeably received by Calvinists than, for example, it would be by Catholics. Obedience and discipline were cornerstones of Calvin's thought.[89] Calvinists enforced discipline through Consistories, bodies of elders which met frequently and who, Kingdon argues, had three main tasks: as an educatory body, as a counselling service and as a court.[90] There is no doubt but that these bodies intruded heavily into private life to make sure their

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[87] There is no indication in his work that he consulted Camerarius' translation and commentary, which may suggest that his commentary belongs quite early in his career. The only other translator/commentator he refers to is Filelfo (in order to correct his translation).

[88] Note, too, the phrase 'in my judgement' (*meo … iudicio*) in the prefatory comments above.

[89] Rawson 1969: 158.

[90] Kingdon 1994.

followers were conducting themselves as they thought they should.[91] Public enforcement of state standards was much more pervasive in Sparta but the general principle is similar.[92] Ephors attract the interest of the reformers too. Though it is unlikely to be Calvin's own observation,[93] he does note with approval the power ephors had in Sparta over the kings (*Institutes* 4.31). Quentin Skinner argues that Calvin's take on the role of the ephors is actually quite radical in political terms since he understands that ephors are appointed by the people as their representatives, not ordained by god (as others suggested),[94] and that other Huguenot reformers made more subversive use of these ideas, grounding them firmly in terms of contemporary political reality.[95] Further Calvin also comments that the type of discipline displayed by the Spartans under Lycurgus was not even as strict as that in early monasteries (*Institutes* 2.13.8), the discipline of which he approves (by comparison to present-day monasteries). These are small individual points to be sure but the overall affinity between general tenets of Calvinism and Lycurgus' Sparta is clear.

Conclusion and Prospect

The lines of interpretation need to be followed from Portus across the next few centuries, but it will be interesting to see if Portus is indeed the trigger for what will turn out to be the current majority view or whether there is another period of greater diversity of interpretation first.[96] It would indeed

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91 Kingdon 1994: 34 puts a positive spin on the institution.

92 Other similarities make themselves felt though no direct comparison is drawn. For example, changes to the institution of marriage under Calvin and other reformers included increasing the legal age for marriage from 14 to 20 for men and 12 to 18 for women: see Watt 1994: 31–32; cf. Xen. *Lac.* 1.6.

93 Rawson 1969: 158–160 notes that Zwingli, the main reformer in Zurich, is the likely source of the comparison: cf. Skinner 1978: 131.

94 Skinner 1978: 232–234.

95 For example, the French lawyer and Calvinist François Hotman in his *Francogallia* of 1574 offers 'as orthodox Calvinist teaching his own conclusion that it is indeed within the power of the [assembly of the] Estates [in France] to "restrain the ferocious licence of kings" as Calvin had originally implied': see Skinner 1978: 312–316, esp. 314. Calvin's successor as head of the Academy, Theodore Beza, also highlights the ephors' power over kings, the mutual oath sworn by kings and ephors in Sparta, and the ephors' power to depose the king who broke it (ibid., 315). Rawson 1969: 158–161 also notes these two examples.

96 Portus is not, for example, mentioned by Haase 1833: 40–44, who shows knowledge of Camerarius' commentary and earlier printings of the work, though Haase is quite firmly in the 'praise' camp. This need not imply that Portus' influence had not made itself felt through some other route over the intervening 150 years.

be intriguing if Calvinism, through Portus, does at least partially lie behind how we read the text.[97] What the above survey shows, however, is that there are some immediately obvious factors affecting how the work was read in the Renaissance. In the first instance the prime concerns are the interests of patrons and the circumstances of the humanists themselves, but also influential in determining how the *Spartan Constitution* is interpreted is what it is read with. Those who lean more or less towards praise either are reading the work under the shadow of Plutarch's *Life of Lycurgus* (e.g. Filelfo)—something that is still frequently done—or in opposition to the *Athenian Constitution* (e.g. Portus) which was at that time considered part of Xenophon's oeuvre.[98]

To this picture must be added the consideration that modern concerns with source criticism are generally not yet manifest (particularly regarding Plutarch, whose texts were already widely disseminated and hugely influential in the fifteenth century,[99] and Diogenes Laertius). Further it is certain, for example, that it took some time for sophisticated interpretation and historical understanding to arise after the restoration of the learning of Greek in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries—a critical mass of texts and their translations was necessary first. Collections of texts and the invention of printing allowed for greater dissemination of material and

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[97] It would be interesting too to know if Portus felt any kinship with Xenophon also as a fellow exile (this may show up somewhere in an as yet untapped letter), as can be seen in the case of Giovani Michele Bruto (1517–1592), an Italian historian who fled the inquisition in Venice and ended up, among other places, in Hungary as court historian to Stefano Bàthory (who became King of Poland in 1576). Bruto compares himself favourably to Xenophon on two fronts: for overcoming the particularism of his own native background and because both were exiles and thus wrote better histories than natives; see Cochrane 1981: 352–354. Xenophon's exile, or rather one of its causes, may be a contributing factor to the opposite opinion taken by the extremely patriotic Prussian statesman and scholar, B.G. Niebuhr 1827. Tuplin 1993: 13 summarises his view thus: 'the second [Books 3–7], dating from the 350s is dominated by the despicable laconism of a man who had been quite justifiably exiled from Athens for his unpatriotic behaviour in fighting for the Spartans at the battle of Coronea in 394'. Compare Reeve 2001: 248: '… we can see why Mommsen took against Cicero if we read about Mommsen's life …'.

[98] It is noteworthy too, in view of a particularly contentious point about the text which has exercised modern scholars, that none of these early translators or commentators seems to have had any issue with the position of the chapter of outright censure (*Lac.* 14). It is always in the penultimate position where it is found in the manuscripts. The 1756 edition of Levvenklaius' Greek text with Latin translation (Glasgow: Robertus Andreas Foulis) still has the manuscript order intact. Recent attempts to suggest a different order (e.g. Lipka 2002) tend not to mention the view of Haase 1833 who orders the last four chapters as follows: 11, 15, 13, 14.

[99] See Pade 2007.

more sophisticated debate on historical and textual/philological issues.[100] The first complete editions of Latin translations of Xenophon's works, for example, were published in 1534 and the first Greek edition in 1540, and it was not until Stephanus' edition of 1561 that we get what we would consider more modern and rigorous textual criticism.[101] Vernacular translations are to be dated, too, primarily to the sixteenth century.[102] This is why we do not see commentaries on Xenophon's works until the second half of the sixteenth century. It is clear too from the above survey that the early humanists, in particular, are working within an entirely different framework for interpretation. They are competing for patronage and engage in intense personal battles with fellow humanists in which truth was often sacrificed. As Anthony Grafton has put it 'philology was very literally the handmaiden of rhetoric, and it served not so much to promote the advancement of knowledge as to discredit particular humanists in the eyes of a circumscribed audience of patrons and other humanists'.[103] If we consider that Filelfo's translation of the *Spartan Constitution* remained the standard version for a long time, and was, moreover, used as the source text for the first Italian version by Ludovico Domenichi in the mid-sixteenth century,[104] then we must also consider the possible implications for assessment of the work of the dissemination of his particular version—a dissemination that included the general comments about Lycurgus in his prefatory letter, which was often copied out and printed with the translation.

So there is much still to be investigated in searching for the origins of our received traditions about Xenophon, and in particular about his *Spartan Constitution*. Such an examination of the differences in opinions and what may be behind them, however, is an essential part of understanding our own approach to the texts.[105]

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100 Grafton 1983: 9–44 and 1988 (which, although it focuses upon philosophical works in the Renaissance, makes pertinent observations which certainly apply more widely); see also Brockliss 1996: 574. Critical mass appeared earlier for Latin authors.

101 Marsh 1992: 82. And proper palaeography does not really become established until the end of the seventeenth century: on this see Reynolds & Wilson 1991: 189–192.

102 Marsh 1992: 83–85.

103 Grafton 1983: 12; see also Woodward 1943: 6–8 on the battle for patronage and accompanying vitriol. Marsh 1992: 82 discusses the battle between Stephanus and Levvenklaius over whose texts of Xenophon were definitive.

104 See *L'opere morali di Xenophonte*, tradotte per M. Lodovico Domenichi, Vinegia: 1547.

105 See generally Reeve 2001 and De Smet 2001 on this type of contextualization.

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crepantia: latine tertia nunc cura ita elucubrata, vt nova pene toga prodeant: nova insuper adpendice sic illustrata, ut quamplanissima deinceps eorum lectio sit futura / opera Ioannis Leunclavii Amelburni; accesserunt Æmilij Porti, Fr. Porti C. Fil. notæ, & index græcus verborum phrasiumque obseruatu dignatum; additus item in calce alius index rerum & verborum memorabilium, a fronte, tomi utriusque & novæ adpendicis leunclavianæ catalogus (Frankfurt).

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CHAPTER THREE

A DELIGHTFUL RETREAT: XENOPHON AND THE PICTURESQUE

Tim Rood

> Serious and ambitious designs often have a purple patch or two sewn on to them just to make a good show at a distance—a description of a grove and altar of Diana, the meanderings of a stream running through pleasant meads … but the trouble is, it's not the place for them.
>
> Horace, *Ars Poetica*[1]

Things were not going well for the ancient republics of Greece as William Mitford (1744–1827) neared the end of the third volume of his *History*. Mitford, an English landowner and MP, was attempting a history that would be more scholarly than the works of his predecessors and that would also undermine the appeal that the Greek idea of liberty had to some of his contemporaries. His first volume had closed in 446 with Pericles at the height of his power in Athens—'a power that could only be maintained by still cultivating the democratical interest', with a result that was 'ultimately most pernicious to the commonwealth'. The second volume, published a year after the French Revolution, had brought the story down to Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War in 404, when 'the aristocratical, or rather the oligarchical, triumphed over the democratical interest, in almost every commonwealth of the nation'. Now, seven years later, Mitford had reached the Battle of Mantinea in 362—the battle that led to 'the depression together of the aristocratical and democratical interests, and the dissolution of the antient system of Grecian confederacy'.[2]

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[1] Hor. *Ars P.* 14–17, 19; translated by D. Russell in Russell & Winterbottom 1989: 98 (*inceptis gravibus plerumque et magna professis / purpureus, late qui splendeat, unus et alter / adsuitur pannus, cum lucus et ara Dianae / et properantis aquae per amoenos ambitus agros / … sed nunc non erat his locus*). For comments that helped to improve this paper I would like to thank the editors, the participants in the Liverpool conference, colleagues at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study in 2007–2008 (especially Giorgio Bertellini and Carla Mazzio), audiences at Yale, Harvard, and Oxford, and (not least) Andrea Capovilla.

[2] Mitford 1789–1818: i. 590, ii. 695, iii. 429. The publication history of Mitford's work is

As Mitford pondered the state of Greece, he could not but quote with sympathy the gloomy assessment given by Xenophon at the end of his *Hellenica*: 'indecision, and trouble, and confusion, more than even before that battle, pervaded Greece'. While Xenophon made the Battle of Mantinea the end of his work ('thus far suffice it for me to have related: following events perhaps will interest some other writer': 7.5.27), Mitford continued for a few years, and then ended his third volume by pausing to digress on the 'memorials of Xenophon': 'it is impossible', he wrote, 'for the compiler of Grecian history not to feel a particular interest in ... the soldier-philosopher-author, who has been his conductor, now through a period of nearly half a century'—and so 'the supposition will naturally follow, that the reader will not be wholly unimpressed with a similar sentiment'.[3]

Looking back over the evidence for Xenophon's life, Mitford quoted in full the long passage where Xenophon described the rustic estate he bought for Diana of Ephesus (*Anabasis* 5.3.8–13; like Mitford, I will here use Roman Diana rather than Greek Artemis). This is the passage that has been most instrumental in promoting the once popular image of Xenophon as a (quasi-English) country gentleman living an idyllic life in Scillus—an image that still has a lingering hold on some readings of Xenophon's thought. Mitford himself showed both through his decision to quote the Scillus passage in full and through his broader description of Xenophon's life there that he found it hard to resist the attractions of the estate. But, as we shall see, his idealised image of the estate stood in tension with the critical stance he took towards many aspects of Greek culture and with the overt political aims of his historical project.

This chapter will start by exploring through the lens of the eighteenth-century vogue for the picturesque the underpinnings of Mitford's fascination with Xenophon's Scillus and the ideological complications that this fascination introduced into his work. The discussion of Mitford's picture of Xenophon's estate will then be enriched by comparison with the accounts of a number of early nineteenth-century travellers who (unlike Mitford) had ventured close to Scillus itself and who left equally striking recreations of

complicated (the data in the *ODNB* are wrong). The first volume, originally published in 1784 with 479 BC as its end, was extended to 446 BC in a second edition published in 1789, before the second volume was published in 1790. In 1797, the year in which the third volume was published, the material contained in the new volume was published as volumes five and six of a new octavo edition, the first four volumes of which (covering volumes one and two of the original edition) are dated 1795. The most detailed treatment of Mitford is by Taylor 1984, with 167–168 on Mitford's affinity with Xenophon.

[3] Mitford 1789–1818: iii. 503 (indecision), 518–539 (memorials), 518 (conductor).

the kind of setting they thought appropriate for Xenophon's physical and intellectual activities. By analysing this sample of responses to Scillus, I hope to shed light on the ideological implications of the image of Xenophon as English gentleman—and of all attempts to recreate the figure of Xenophon.[4]

Retreat from Political Disorder

William Mitford justified his lengthy quotation of the Scillus passage by imagining Xenophon writing most of his works there 'while he meditated on the past, or viewed in secure distance the passing storms'. He imagined, too, some pleasing distractions for the author: 'the immediate circumstances of his own happy situation would at intervals lead to the lighter; those on his amusements, field-sports; the management of horses and agriculture.' All told, he found Xenophon's happy situation almost unique, in the world of ancient Greece at least: 'far removed from the great seats of contention of oligarchy and democracy, perhaps no man of his time in Greece injoyed great fortune with so many of the advantages of independency.'[5]

As well as rhapsodizing on Xenophon's happiness, Mitford created for his readers a striking picture of the 'delightful retreat' where Xenophon passed his days. Xenophon himself provided a few details of the landscape of the estate—the stream, the temple, the grove—to show that it was modelled on the goddess' own sanctuary at Ephesus and to stress its plentiful produce (*Anabasis* 5.3.8–13). Mitford seized on these precious details and supplemented them with what he could gather from ancient geographical writers (Strabo, Pausanias). But his main resource was his own imagination:

> According to antient accounts, (modern are yet wanting) all the various beauties of landscape appear to have met in the neighbourhood of Scillus. Immediately above the town and the adjacent temple, with their little river Selenus, inclosed between the hilly woodlands, Diana's property and the barren crags of Typæum, … we may conceive the finest classical compositions of the Poussins. Up the course of the Alpheius and its tributary streams, toward Erymanthos and the other loftier Arcadian mountains, the sublimest wildness of Titian and Salvator could not fail to abound; while the Olympian hill, with its splendid buildings among its sacred groves, the course of the Alpheius downward, the sandy plain, stretching toward Pylus, Nestor's antient seat,

[4] For the idea of Xenophon as English, cf. e.g. Smith 1930 (quoted in Rood 2005: p. xvii); Irwin 1974: 409–410.

[5] Mitford 1789–1818: iii. 534–535.

> diversified with its pinasters, the sea in distance one way, and all the Arcadian mountains the other, would offer the various beauty, the rich grandeur, and the mind-filling expanse of Claud.[6]

Mitford's language was typical of his age. Scillus itself had already been called a 'delightful retreat' by two earlier writers—and many other places had had the same phrase applied to them: in his *Tour through the Whole Island of Great Britain*, for instance, Daniel Defoe had described Richmond as 'lately the delightful Retreat of his Majesty and his Royal Consort the Queen, who took great Delight therein' and made 'vast Improvements and Alterations'; while Thomas Mortimer, author of the six-volume *British Plutarch*, sketched the statesman Lord Bolingbroke's way of life at his 'delightful retreat' near Uxbridge in Middlesex, where 'he settled with his lady, and indulged the pleasure of gratifying his elegant taste, by improving it into a most charming villa'. The very conventionality of the phrase was itself a sign of the growing idealization of rural life: Mitford implicitly aligns Xenophon with modern aristocrats creating country seats for themselves amidst the peace brought by the constitutional settlement of 1688 (the 'Glorious Revolution')—a world that the historian J.H. Plumb has called a 'paradise for gentlemen'.[7]

Mitford's language was even more strongly shaped by one of the dominant aesthetic tastes of his age—the taste for the picturesque. This taste was marked by a preference for irregular vistas rather than formal gardens and by a tendency to define natural landscapes through the works of painters. Mitford follows these trends as he imagines the landscape around Scillus as a series of pictures and brings out gradations within the landscape by alluding to their different styles. The qualities he attributes to the painters he names are drawn from a famous couplet by the most renowned of the picturesque poets, James Thomson: 'Whate'er Lorrain light-touched with softening Hue, / Or savage Rosa dashed, or learned Poussin drew.' In keeping with Thomson's vision, the site of Xenophon's estate, with its nicely framed valley, retains a classical decorum appropriate for the Poussins (the famous Nicolas as well as his brother-in-law Gaspard Dughet, who also used the

6 Mitford 1789–1818: iii. 534.

7 Scillus as delightful retreat: Gillies 1790: iii. 260; Lemprière 1788: n.p.; the same phrase is later used of Scillus by Thirlwall 1845: i. 551; Mahaffy 1883: ii. 255; Mountain 1845: ix. 578, reprinted in id. 1869 and also (abridged) in e.g. Spelman 1834 and Hickie 1849. Other delightful retreats: Defoe 1991: 64; Mortimer 1776: vi. 87, 86. Paradise: Plumb 1967: 187; quoted by Fulford 1996: 2. Compare how the poet and scholar Peter Levi 1979: 211 n. 48, pictures Xenophon as a 'very religious squire' making 'improvements' to his property.

name). Titian and Salvator Rosa, similarly, are taken to be exponents of the aesthetic of the sublime developed by Edmund Burke: there was among the English a mania for Rosa's savage landscapes, which were often contrasted with Claude's idyllic serenity. And Claude himself represents for Mitford the picturesque at its most beguiling: his beauty is 'various', and the Claudian landscape stretches to Pylos, where it is 'diversified' by pine trees. Indeed, it was in connection with these trees that Mitford introduced his one direct hint of the aesthetic underlying his account of Scillus: he wrote in a note that their 'picturesk beauty' deserves 'the attention of our planters'.[8]

Mitford's attempt to create a suitable setting for Xenophon draws in particular on the fashion for picturesque travel. The picturesque aesthetic led to the 'discovery' in the second half of the eighteenth century of the Lake District, the Welsh mountains, and the Scottish Highlands, and the perspective adopted in Mitford's depiction of Scillus is anticipated in early travellers to those areas ('The paintings of Pousin describe the nobleness of Uls-water;—the works of Salvator Rosa express the romantic and rocky scene of Keswick;—and the tender and elegant touches of Claude Loraine ... pencil forth the rich variety of Windermere'). So when Mitford reports that 'the Arcadian mountains, and especially their western steps' remained 'still finely wooded', while 'the rest of Greece, where Herodotus and Thucydides mention extensive woods, have been laid nearly bare, like the once wooded borders of England and Scotland', he seems to be imagining Arcadia as a land beyond—a land beyond the borders, an equivalent of the Scottish Highlands (at the time being made even more picturesque by planting). Perhaps, then, it is the location of Xenophon's estate, not far from fabled Arcadia itself, that drives Mitford to such a descriptive frenzy.[9]

While the taste for the picturesque was widespread in the eighteenth century, Mitford himself had particular reason to be in sympathy with it. He created his picture of Xenophon in a setting no less delightful than Xenophon's own Scillus. He had inherited his father's estate at Exbury, near the New Forest, at the age of seventeen. An idle student at Oxford,

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8 Couplet: Thomson 1986: 186 (*The Castle of Indolence* i. 341–342), with Hussey 1967: 35, who notes that this couplet 'for the remainder of the century provided the stock epithets for the three painters in question'. Hussey's whole work offers a sensitive introduction to the aesthetic; see also Hunt 1992, esp. 105–136. For the eighteenth-century English reception of Claude and Rosa, see Manwaring 1925; on Rosa, Sunderland 1973; Scott 1995: 223–231. Pine-trees: Mitford 1789–1818: iii. 534 n. 65.

9 Picturesque travel: quoted from W. Hutchinson, *Excursion to the Lakes* (1774), by Manwaring 1925: 193; cf. in general Andrews 1989. Arcadia: Mitford 1829: iii. 301 n. 74 (this passage was added to a new four-volume edition in 1808). Highlands planting: see Hussey 1967: 92–93.

he abandoned the prospect of a career at the bar, married young, and (as his brother, who became Lord Redesdale, wrote) 'retired to his paternal property'. It was there that he applied himself to the study of ancient history. He also joined the South Hampshire Militia, and it was another member of the militia, Edward Gibbon, who suggested to him the idea of the first large-scale history of Greece, to match Gibbon's own history of Rome. Mitford also set himself to improve the estate he had inherited: he built a new house, planned a model village at Upper Exbury, with a new church, and, on sandy soil near the sea, followed his 'favourite pursuit of landscape gardening', laying out grounds that commanded 'delightful views' with 'great taste and judgment', and creating what one of his descendants regarded as an 'earthly paradise'. Mitford was also well acquainted with one of the most influential writers on the picturesque, William Gilpin: he had been under him at Cheam School, and later he placed his old teacher in a parish in the New Forest. Gilpin repaid him by dedicating to him his *Remarks on Forest Scenery* and by writing in his *Observations on the River Wye* that his 'ingenuous friend, Col. Mitford' was 'well-versed in the theory of the picturesque'.[10]

William Mitford's imaginative creation of an idyllic Scillus offers a privileged insight into the world where the figure of Xenophon the English country squire was created—and into the image of the countryside that created it. But this image of the countryside was itself varied and contested. For many aristocrats, what was offered by a 'delightful retreat' in the country was temporary withdrawal from the city: drawing ultimately on the ideology of the villa expressed by wealthy Romans like Cicero and Pliny, they viewed land and a house in the country as tokens of liberty and authority, markers of a gentlemanly status that bolstered their position in civic life. Lord Bolingbroke, by contrast, a Tory in a time of Whig domination, had been forced to withdraw to Uxbridge (which counted as country in the eighteenth

[10] Exbury: Lord Redesdale (J. Mitford), 'A Short Account of the Author and of His Pursuits in Life, With an Apology for Some Parts of His Work', in Mitford 1829: i. p. ix; Redesdale 1915: 16 (gardening; cf. 15 on Mitford's skill at drawing), 30 ('earthly paradise'); Bullar 1799: 100 ('delightful views'). For the idea of the eighteenth-century landscape garden as a paradise, see Schulz 1985: 9–37. Compare William Gilpin's account (1879: 134–135) of Mitford in a memoir written in 1801: he 'might most probably, if he had chosen it, have obtained a post in the new administration: but he entered no farther into public affairs, than as a member of parliament. He retired to his estate, where he made himself greatly esteemed as a country-gentleman.' Theory: Gilpin 1782: 93; 1791: i. p. i ('Dear Sir, When your friendship fixed me in this pleasing retreat …'); The Exbury estate is now owned by one of the Rothschilds and is famous for its rhododendrons.

century at least)—where he could at least console himself with the precedent of Xenophon 'in his little farm at Scillus'.[11]

Mitford's Xenophon has gone even further than Bolingbroke. Xenophon's rural retreat has offered him a total break with political life—or at least a break with the way political life was conducted in the corrupt democracies and oligarchies of ancient Greece. Mitford is subscribing to the sort of vision briefly entertained by a future President of the United States, John Adams: in a letter to the *Boston Gazette* in 1763, Adams wrote that 'if engagements to a *party*, are necessary to make a fortune, I had rather make none at all, and spend the remainder of my days like my favourite author, that ancient and immortal husbandsman, philosopher, politician and general, *Xenophon*, in his retreat'.[12]

What is at stake in this rural vision that Mitford fashions? Writing from his own idyllic estate, Mitford seems to have sought refuge from the political turmoil of ancient Greece by locating Xenophon in an earthly paradise. His aesthetic re-creation of Xenophon's landscape itself enacts the distancing he claims for the site of Scillus. Earlier he had used a different sort of pictorial imagery to characterize the grim topics covered in the main body of his work: 'as in landscape stormy skies, and rugged mountains, and pathless rocks, and wasteful torrents, every work of nature rude, and every work of man in ruin, most engage the notice of the painter … so in the political world war, and sedition, and revolution, destruction of armies, massacre of citizens, and wreck of governments force themselves upon the attention of the annalist.' Mitford's bright picture of Scillus balances the dark colours of the earlier narrative, compensating in small part for the distressing failures of the Greek cities. His exploitation of the picturesque distances Xenophon from that political turmoil while aligning Xenophon's retreat with the type of landscape that many English landowners were seeking to recreate on their own estates.[13]

The politics of the picturesque extend beyond the function of Mitford's description within his *History*. Mitford's preference for variety at a local level can be seen as a way of controlling disorder by placing it within an overarching order—a 'discors concordia' with roots in both theology and aesthetics. At the same time, an aesthetic appreciation of the eighteenth-century estate

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[11] Little farm: Bolingbroke 1752: ii. 282. There is a wide literature on English perceptions of the countryside: Williams 1973 was seminal and is still unsurpassed in its range.

[12] Adams: Taylor 1977: 77 (letter of 29 August 1763, published under the pseudonym 'U').

[13] Mitford 1789–1818: iii. 514 (landscape).

was a way of displacing attention from the land as a place of agricultural production (particularly after the increase in enclosures during the century had led to higher yields). A purely visual approach to an estate stripped it of the sentimental value it might hold for those who worked on it. It also obscured external sources of landed wealth, for instance profit derived from slaves working on sugar plantations in the West Indies. Indeed, Mitford's idealistic picture of Xenophon's Scillus is especially striking because, far more than with, say, Sir Thomas Bertram's property in *Mansfield Park*, the fact that Xenophon's estate is derived from slavery is laid bare in Xenophon's own account: Xenophon openly reveals that it was bought with money gained from selling prisoners of war taken during the course of the retreat.[14]

The political ramifications of the picturesque are also revealed by the contrast between Mitford's willingness to idealize an estate bought with the spoils of the Ten Thousand's retreat and his attitude towards the soldiers elsewhere in his *History*. He is highly critical of their rapaciousness, calling them 'robbers' and comparing them with 'smuglers', and even rebuking Xenophon himself: while admiring 'the candor with which he often declares the crimes of his fellow-countrymen, even those in which … he was compelled to take a leading part', Mitford also exposes how Xenophon enriched himself by leading an unprovoked 'privateering or pirating expedition' against the castle of a Persian grandee. Mitford's condemnation is especially strong when he deals with the Greeks' slaving expeditions from Trapezus, the first Greek city they reached on the Black Sea coast: 'It seems to have been a principal object of the traffic of these distant settlements, on barbarian shores, to supply Greece with slaves; and there seems too much reason to fear that, opportunity exciting cupidity, cattle and corn were not alone sought in the various excursions from Trapezus, but the wretched barbarians, when they could be caught, were themselves taken, and exposed in the Trapezuntine market.' Later in his account of the march along the Black Sea coast, when some Arcadians break away from the main army and seize more slaves in the territory of the Bithynians, Mitford even overturns the Greeks' negative image of the barbaric Bithynians—by suggesting that the image arose from the Greeks' even worse behaviour: 'Such being the ordi-

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14 Controlling disorder: Fulford 1996, esp. Chs. 1, 3. Sentiment, labourers: Barrell 1972; 1980; 1992: 104. Naturalizing enclosure: Bermingham 1986 (with chapter 2 on the picturesque); for Mitford's own interest in agricultural improvement, see his 1791 treatise on the corn laws (arguing that Britain could be a self-sufficient producer of corn). *Mansfield Park*: Said 1994: 80–96. Slaves: *An.* 5.3.4.

nary Grecian practice, we shall little wonder if the Bithynians earned the character which report gave them, of singular cruelty to any Greeks, who by shipwreck, or other accident, fell into their hands.'[15]

Mitford's condemnation of the Greek soldiers stems from his general hostility to the institution of ancient slavery. For Mitford, the threat posed by slavery to the liberty of the individual undermined the Greeks' claim to be seen as models of political liberty of any sort: in discussing the Athenian constitution, for instance, he took pains to note the 'proportion of freemen to slaves, in a commonwealth so boastful of liberty as its darling passion'. Indeed, while he was prepared to explain the presence of slavery by a general model of how 'warlike' societies develop from a 'savage state', he also argued that democracy itself (in its Greek form) would have been impossible without the leisure afforded by slavery—and that the same was true of the Greeks' famed achievements in science and philosophy.[16]

Mitford's stress on slavery was in line with his broader ambition of undercutting the appeal of ancient liberty. As the nineteenth-century Tory historian Sir Archibald Alison noted, Mitford's whole work was 'mainly intended to counteract the visionary ideas, in regard to the blessings of Grecian democracy, which had spread so far in the world from the magic of Athenian genius'. This ambition itself was a response to the frequent invocation of ancient ideas of liberty in both the American and the French revolutions. As a royalist, Mitford was opposed to both revolutions, but he viewed the French revolution with particular alarm for much the same reason that he opposed slavery: he thought mob rule threatened individual liberty. Mitford's strong political views had already created controversy when the second volume was published in 1790: a reviewer in the *Monthly Review*, noting 'the present arduous struggle for liberty in France', commented that 'we do not perceive that [Mitford's work] breathes that ardent spirit of liberty which might have been expected in a history of Greece'. By the time of the third volume in 1797, the same journal was more comfortable with Mitford's tone: the reviewer quoted Mitford's account of the depredations at Athens under the Thirty Tyrants ('lands and country-houses were seized for the benefit of the Thirty and their adherents'), and then his long footnote where

15 Mitford 1789–1818: iii. 165 (robbers), 174 (smuglers: 'the comparison appears degrading, but it is apposite'), 159 (candor), 526 (privateering), 167 (Trapezus), 179 (Bithynians).

16 Mitford 1789–1818: i. 255 ('a mode of government not so absolutely absurd and impracticable among the Greeks, as it would be where no slavery is'), iii. 85 (science). On Mitford's view of the Athenian people as an idle mob, see Wood 1988: 10–16.

he pointed to 'the many points of resemblance between the proceedings of the Thirty in Athens, with its council of Judicature, and of the committee of public welfare, in Paris, with its revolutionary tribunal'. Mitford even argued that the terror in France restored 'probability to the accounts of enormities which, however well attested, the desuetude of modern times ... had rendered ... almost incredible'. The threat to property in ancient Greece and modern France contrasted with the settled state of Britain: 'In Greece, as Xenophon informs us,' Mitford lamented, 'land was not esteemed, as with us, the surest foundation of private income'. That 'as with us' (which of course meant 'as with us British') was the sort of intrusive comment that led the scholar Peter Dobree to write in the margins of his copy that the book was 'a *perpetual* commentary ... on the sagacious discovery ... that the Greeks were totally ignorant of the British constitution'.[17]

Mitford even offered reflections on the political circumstances in which his *History* was being produced. In a long footnote in his final volume, he recalled that he had been entertained twice in the 1770s by the Baron de Sainte Croix (who had won a prize offered by the Royal Academy in Paris for an essay on Alexander the Great), and that recollection of those conversations had been among his stimulants as he laboured for forty years at his *History*. He then added that de Sainte Croix 'had had an idea of undertaking such a work himself, which I endevored to incourage; but he said, adverting to the restrictions upon the press in France, and the advantage which familiar acquaintance with a free constitution, through association in its energies, offered in England: "Only an Englishman could write a history of Greece"'. Needless to say, Mitford did not think that the French revolution had altered that truth.[18]

Mitford's comments on slavery and liberty make the recourse to the language of the picturesque that we saw in his account of Scillus rather paradoxical. His whole work aimed to undermine the allure of ancient Greece, but he still made a small corner of the western Peloponnese uncannily similar to the type of estate that eighteenth-century gentlemen were trying to create in England. He did stress that the security Xenophon enjoyed on that estate was exceptional for the times—but he also saw the slave-trading that

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[17] Alison: quoted by Allan 2001: 404. Reviews: Anon. 1790: 387; Anon. 1797; partly quoted by Clarke 1945: 109. France: Mitford 1789–1818: iii. 38 and n. 20 (tribunal). Land: Mitford 1789–1818: iii. 531. See further Demetriou 1996; Rapple 2001. Sagacious: Dobree 1833: i. 145 (cf. 147, where he calls Mitford 'our Hoplite').

[18] Englishman: Mitford 1789–1818: v. 48–13 n. 2.

had funded the estate as all too typical of the depravity of ancient Greece. His use of the familiar language of the picturesque could, then, be taken as a calculated attempt to smooth over the gap between his theoretical hostility to slavery and his idealization of a way of life made possible by economic exploitation. While that reading might be too cynical, it remains true that, for a landowner-historian like Mitford, a way of life was at stake in his account of Xenophon's estate—a life of prosperity and security unthreatened by the rapacity of the democratic mob. And an explanation of why so much was at stake lies readily at hand—the threat posed by the French Revolution to the safety of the aristocracy. Indeed, we can trace how Mitford's fears developed over time in the increasing urgency of his references to France and in the allusions he added to reprints of earlier volumes of his *History*.[19]

Mitford's idealization of Scillus will come to seem even more paradoxical when we consider how he tries to read through Xenophon's account of how he came to buy that estate. To understand fully what is at stake in Mitford's recreation of Scillus, however, it will be helpful first to compare some different perceptions of Xenophon's estate—to explore the preconceptions that others brought to that estate, the preconceptions that enabled them to fashion different Xenophons. For what is at stake for *us* in modern recreations of Scillus is ultimately the threat posed by stereotypes to our appreciations of Xenophon's writings and of Xenophon himself. The different Xenophons we will now explore have themselves contributed powerfully to the image of Xenophon as country gentleman—the image we need to confront if we are to move beyond cliché and extract Xenophon from the seemingly timeless pleasures of his delightful retreat. We can pursue these Xenophons best by following some more adventurous readers of Xenophon—readers who did not simply conjure up fantasy pictures of Xenophon's estate, but who journeyed themselves to Greece, to the surroundings of Scillus itself. We will focus on three such travellers: Colonel William Leake, perhaps the greatest topographer of the Greek world; William Haygarth, a philhellene poet and painter who, like Leake, travelled in Greece in the early years of the nineteenth century; and Christopher Wordsworth, nephew of the poet William, who travelled there a generation later.

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19 Additions: Mitford 1829: i. 364 n. 9.

A Place to Hunt

Late in May 1805, William Leake was journeying through Arcadia and at a loss for a place to stay the night. Eventually he lodged under a fig tree at the hamlet of Platianá and then moved on the next day to ground that was, he wrote in his journal, 'broken into little abrupt precipices, where the white argillaceous soil forms a striking contrast with the verdure of the turf and forests'. A ridge then separated 'this irregular vale' from the lower valley of the Alpheius—the start of an expanse of 'woody and diversified country'.[20]

A Colonel in the British army at a time when his nation was at war, Leake was in the Peloponnese on a delicate mission. He was to try to ensure that the Ottoman governors were ready to defend themselves against all possible threats from the French. As well as making military surveys, however, Leake was busy locating ancient sites with the help of classical sources and any coins and other remains that came to light. And as he moved on from his fig tree at Platianá, close to the coast of Greece most exposed to French attack, he was aware that he was near an ancient site: 'It was in the midst of this sylvan region, so well adapted to a sportsman, that Scillus, the residence of Xenophon, was situated.'[21]

When William Mitford drew on painters to create a setting for Xenophon, the only modern travellers he knew who had been close to Scillus were two travellers who had visited Olympia—but Richard Chandler had done so 'in haste and in fear', at an unhealthy season, and Hawkins had not written an account. A posthumous edition of Mitford's *History* published in 1829 was able to add that the ancient accounts of the Scillus region had been 'confirmed, since the first publication of this volume, by modern'. Colonel Leake's Morea journal was not in fact one of those accounts: he published it only in 1830. And even then this great topographer's journal left Xenophon's residence a vague spot: Leake had not attempted to track down its precise location amidst the wooded valleys surrounding Olympia.[22]

Leake's journal did in one way confirm William Mitford's perception of the landscape of Xenophon's estate. Further acquaintance with the environs of Scillus did not displace the picturesque: Leake himself had recourse to its language as he observed a landscape of contrast, irregularity, and diversity. Indeed, the varied landscape Leake saw around Scillus in May confirmed

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[20] Leake 1830: ii. 86.

[21] Leake 1830: ii. 86.

[22] Mitford 1829: v. 300.

the potential he had seen in Olympia when he visited the site in February soon after arriving in the Peloponnese: 'At a much more advanced season of the year ... the valley must be one of the most beautiful of this picturesque country', with hills 'of the wildest forms ... shaded with the pine, wild olive, and a variety of shrub' and 'accidental clusters of pines dispersed on the sides and summits of these hills' that 'might serve as studies to the artist in landscape gardening' (Mitford's favourite hobby).[23]

While Mitford was concerned with Xenophon's ability to enjoy his prosperity undisturbed in his delightful retreat, Leake's picturesque vision offers different pleasures. Leake does offer a brief hint to the gentleman gardener. But he also presents a fitting setting for a more active and sporting Xenophon than Mitford's. If it was in the midst of a sylvan region that Xenophon's residence was situated, the precise location matters little: Xenophon the sportsman is defined by the broader region in which he hunts, not by the narrow setting of his actual home. And this broader region still bears the traces of Xenophon's presence: Leake observes that 'wild boars, one of the great objects of the ancient chace, are common in this woody district'.[24]

While Mitford paid scarcely any attention to this sporting Xenophon, many others apart from Leake relished the passionate delight in hunting that emerges so clearly from Xenophon's account of his festival at Scillus and from many of his other works—including the *Cynegeticus*, his treatise on hunting. The Reverend N.S. Smith, a nineteenth-century translator of the *Anabasis*, annotated the Scillus passage with the comment that '*religion apart*—this was acting like country squires of old—giving their tenantry a day's hunt, *and a feast after*'. Smith was here evoking an image of the country squire that had been fostered by country-house poems, most famously Ben Jonson's 'To Penhurst'. These poems typically focused not on the house itself but on the estate attached to it—and on details strikingly similar to those found in Xenophon's account of his estate. Jonson's Penhurst, for instance, has plentiful 'orchard fruit' as well as game:

> Thy copse, too, nam'd of Gamage, thou has there,
> That never fails to serve thee season'd deer,
> When thou would'st feast, or exercise thy friends.

And like Scillus it affords hospitality to a whole neighbourhood:

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23 Leake 1830: i. 32.
24 Leake 1830: ii. 87.

> And thou thy walls be of the country stone,
> They're rear'd with no mans ruin, no mans groan,
> There's none, that dwell about them, wish them down;
> But all come in, the farmer and the clown.

The similarities with Scillus extend even to the presence of fish:

> And if the high-swoll'n Medway fail thy dish,
> Thou has thy ponds, that pay thee tribute fish,
> Fat, aged carps, that run into thy net.

The difference is that Xenophon does not mention eating the fish in the stream at Scillus: fishing was a less aristocratic pursuit than hunting, even when the fish asked to be caught.[25]

This hospitable life of hunting and feasting was familiar to N.S. Smith's eighteenth-century predecessor Edward Spelman. Spelman published his translation of the *Anabasis* in 1740 with a dedication to the recently ennobled Whig politician Lord Lovell (better known as Thomas Coke of Holkham) in which he recalled former 'Seasons of Delight': 'I remember, when we were Fox-hunters, and a long Day's sport had rather tir'd, than satisfied us, we often pass'd the Evening in reading the ancient Authors; when the Beauty of the Language, the Strength and Justness of their Thoughts for ever glowing with a noble Spirit of Liberty, made us forget not only the Pains, but the Pleasures of the Day.' Spelman's delight in hunting becomes particularly clear in the fulsome notes he appended to his translation. When he reaches Xenophon's account of the festival at Scillus ('the Sons of *Xenophon*, and those of the rest of the Inhabitants, always made a general Hunting against the Feast'), he refers for discussion of the word *dorkades* ('roe-deer') back to one of his long notes on the game Xenophon hunted in crossing the 'Arabian' desert. At that point of the narrative, Spelman's translation is crowded out by notes on all manner of hunting details: wild asses (one of Spelman's Norfolk neighbours possessed a skin, 'compos'd of white and chesnut Stripes'), ostriches ('I remember to have seen two that were shewn at *London*; we were informed they came from *Buenos Ayres*'), bustards ('very well known to Sportsmen: we have great Numbers of them in Norfolk'), and also the *dorkades* themselves (not to be found in South of England—but Spelman had often seen them hunted in France).[26]

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[25] Squire: Smith 1824: 321 n. 3. Penhurst: in Fowler 1994: 53, 55. This volume has a useful introduction to the genre; Kelsall 1993 also offers a good broad overview of the theme.

[26] Holkham: Spelman 1740–1742: i. pp. v, 51–53. The original 1897 *DNB* entry on Spelman says that he 'added an assiduous study of classical literature to the ordinary pursuits of a

Spelman's admiration for Xenophon went well beyond their shared interest in hunting. He thought that Xenophon's various works showed that he was 'a compleat General', 'an entertaining, an instructive, and a faithful Historian', 'an Orator', 'a Sportsman', 'a Friend and a Philosopher'—and 'all of them, that he was a good Man'. This image of Xenophon as a 'universal man' (a notion inspired by Renaissance ideas) implies that Xenophon had qualities that the average country gentleman did not have to aspire to. Nonetheless, Spelman's depiction of homely evenings at Holkham (one of the grandest eighteenth-century country houses) suggests a particular pleasure in Xenophon the sportsman that looks ahead to the image of Xenophon the Englishman—a pleasure that William Leake also felt as he conveyed the picturesque charms of wooded Scillus, a pleasure in associating with Xenophon that seems free from the political anxieties and doublethink expressed by the Tory William Mitford. For the Whig Edward Spelman, hunting with Xenophon is indeed a pleasure with positive political implications: when he invokes the 'noble Spirit of Liberty' found in ancient authors like Xenophon, he implies that that spirit has been reawakened in modern England. This is the liberty of the Whig aristocrat, living in the paradise ushered in by the Glorious Revolution—a paradise which in fact surpassed ancient liberty: for in his improvements at Holkham Thomas Coke showed an 'exquisite taste' in painting and architecture that made Holkham 'an *Athenian* Country-House in every thing,' (and here at least William Mitford would have approved) 'but the Danger of being eminent'—for 'in *England*, though as free as *Athens*,' Spelman explained, 'Eminence may be universally acknowledged, without being expos'd'.[27]

In the eighteenth century and the early decades of the nineteenth, then, an image of Xenophon hunting, feasting and writing at his estate at Scillus was highly palatable to historians, travellers, and translators, including both Whigs like Spelman and Tories like Mitford. For all the differences between Spelman and Mitford, between the outlooks and anxieties of the first and second halves of the eighteenth century, the image of Xenophon offered a fixed point of agreement. And the very fact that that image proved uncontroversial is itself politically charged: it shows how those two competing ideologies shared the aim of preserving the privileges of landed gentlemen.

country gentleman'—a sentence dropped in the revised *ODNB*, which reveals the existence of a diary recording 'in salacious Latin' his 'Boswell-like adventures among the prostitutes and drinking-dens of London'.

[27] Spelman 1740–1742: pp. xxii–xxiii, vi.

But, as we shall now see, that momentary convergence would soon start to falter when challenged by new political and ideological pressures, by different philosophical priorities.

A Place to Think and Write

Xenophon is again found hunting at Scillus in the long poem *Greece* published in 1814 by William Haygarth—philhellene traveller and later author of a political critique of Mitford's *History*. Haygarth was among the travellers drawn to Greece at a time when the traditional route of the Grand Tour had been closed by the war with France, but he did not cast his poem—which appeared two years after Byron stole the field with *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*—in the form of a personal narrative or adopt a persona like Childe Harold. As it traces a path from northern Greece through Athens to the Peloponnese, Haygarth's poem does still share many of the concerns of Byron's less conventional work, above all the contrast between ancient and modern Greece. It is after a conventional lament for the passing of the ancient glory of Olympia ('Mourn for Olympia—o'er her prostrate fanes / Tread lightly ...') that Haygarth breaks off to give an account of Xenophon's estate:

> Here where Selinus winds his murm'ring stream,
> Midst swelling hills with fur and olive rob'd,
> The Philosophic Warrior sought repose;
> Here his life's day, long overcast with storms,
> Sunk tranquil to its even amidst the groves
> Of Scilluns ...
> ... At the blush of morn,
> To rouse the roe or wild-boar from their lairs,
> To till the ground, and train the golden fruit,
> To hang in richer clusters, to lead forth
> The village festival, with song and dance,
> To Dian's temple, were his daily tasks;
> Save when with brow sever he studious bent
> O'er the long roll of history, and drew
> The precepts which a life's experience taught.

As in Leake's journal, Scillus is here anchored only by its proximity to a stream and to the sanctuary at Olympia: its exact location amidst the hills seems unimportant. Haygarth even states in one of his numerous notes that he had taken his description of 'Xenophon's retirement' from his writings—though Xenophon's account makes clear that organising the festival was an annual, not a daily, task. As much as William Mitford's, this

is a Scillus of the imagination—a Scillus moulded by the aesthetic of the picturesque.[28]

Haygarth does depart from Mitford's vision by including a description of Xenophon's house:

> … His lowly dwelling rose
> Within a valley, on a verdant lawn,
> And as the sage beneath his aged vine
> Sat 'midst his children, his delighted eye
> Rang'd over a beauteous scene of wood and dale.

For Mitford, the sort of home Xenophon lived in was not important: what he was celebrating was Xenophon's material security amidst the picturesque landscape at Scillus. Haygarth, by contrast, endows Xenophon's house with a moral significance. A 'lowly dwelling' in 'a beauteous scene of wood and dale' fits the life that he wants Xenophon to have led at Scillus, contrasting with the world of political ambition that he is thought to have left behind:

> … here he found that happiness,
> Which in the busy world's tumultuous throng,
> In courts of monarchs, and in battle's din,
> He sought in vain. …

Yet this 'Philosophic Warrior' content with a simple life in the countryside is as much a product of fantasy as the 'lowly dwelling': Xenophon's own account is as unforthcoming about his state of mind as about the house where he lived.[29]

In projecting on to Xenophon an outright rejection of the world of politics, Haygarth returns to one of the main preoccupations of his poem: the superiority of artistic skill to material power. In the evocation of Olympia that immediately precedes the account of Xenophon's retirement, Haygarth strikingly devotes his attention not to the Greeks' athletic prowess but to the sanctuary as a site for sculptures and paintings and for the performance of poetry and historical narrative. He contrasts the neglect of the arts in commercial, imperial Britain:

> Thrice happy Britain, if such taste were thine;
> But thou, enwrapp'd in airy dreams of pow'r,

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[28] Review of Mitford: Haygarth 1821 (the article is attributed to Haygarth by Shine & Shine 1949: 74, on the basis of John Murray III's register; the online archive (http://www.rc.umd.edu/reference/qr/index/49.html) lists the attribution as possible but not certain). Scillus: Haygarth 1814: 108, 110–111 (iii. 548–549, 590–595, 603–611).

[29] Haygarth 1814: 110 (iii. 598–602, 595–598).

> Or grov'lling in the base pursuit of wealth,
> Hear'st not the charmer's voice, or turn'st away
> Thine eye from beauties which thou can'st not feel.

Inspired by the ruins of Olympia to adopt a more distant historical perspective, he anticipates a 'day of triumph' for the 'neglected Muse'—a time when the vanity of empire is revealed and 'the babbling swarm' of legislators heard no more, a time when artistic excellence alone will bear Britain's name 'to the remotest age'. Haygarth's loving depiction of Xenophon's tranquillity confirms the superiority of the works of the mind over the worldly tumult of politics.[30]

Haygarth's Xenophon bears a striking resemblance to the rural thinker portrayed by the Straussian Christopher Bruell. Bruell gives a positive philosophical spin to the conventional idea of Xenophon as a country gentleman: living in the countryside enabled Xenophon to deepen his experiences through a 'contemplative reliving' of them. So too Haygarth portrays a Xenophon who achieves tranquillity in retirement, drawing on his experiences as he composes his philosophical works. It is not that Bruell was himself influenced by Haygarth. Rather, both Bruell and Haygarth are drawing on a deep (and suspect) stereotype—a stereotype so deep that the loquacious translator N.S. Smith even wondered whether Voltaire had Xenophon in his eye when he retired to Ferney.[31]

The same stereotype of rural life is found in other travellers' recreations of Xenophon's life at Scillus. The French medic F.-C.-H.-L. Pouqueville, for instance, who first visited Greece when taken prisoner on his way back from Napoleon's Egyptian adventure and was later prominent in the philhellenic movement, described how he saw 'the wood of Altis [at Olympia], consecrated to the chaste Diana ... enveloped in a deep and melancholy gloom'—not as it was in ancient times, when the wood was 'honoured by its borders being the chosen asylum of the immortal Xenophon'. The climate symbolizes the gap between the present gloomy state of Greece and the brilliance of antiquity, and Pouqueville himself gets no closer to Scillus than its borders. He goes on all the same to reflect that 'it was under

30 Haygarth 1814: 109–110 (iii. 574–578, 579–580, 584, 589); cf. the note on p. 271. The poem does, however, end on a more martial note as Haygarth entreats his country to take part when the battle for Greek independence comes: 'O my country! let thy voice be heard / Amidst the din of battle ... / ... and thy hardy sons / Be foremost in the fight which Britons love, / The fight for liberty' (pp. 113–114: iii. 662–663, 667–669).

31 Bruell 1987: 114. Voltaire: Smith 1824: p. x n. 1 ('the two pictures have a great resemblance'); cf. also Levi 1996: 174.

this humble roof that he wrote those works … which will serve for ever as a model to historians, and a lesson to all who engage in a military career'. A similar description is offered by the classical and Shakespearean scholar W.G. Clark in a Peloponnesian travel journal published in 1858. Exploiting the same tension between proximity and distance found in Pouqueville and other travellers, Clark described how he came down to the banks of the Alpheus, and 'on the other side are a succession of sandy hills, thick with pines, and narrow well-watered valleys between. Somewhere among those recesses was Skillos, where Xenophon passed the quiet years of his life, writing, farming, hunting, offering sacrifice to Artemis and all the other gods, and training his boys to be virtuous, brave, and pious like himself'. Once more Scillus remains a place beyond, its proximity to Olympia offering the traveller the opportunity to endow Xenophon's retreat with an appropriate aura—and to claim that Xenophon was a 'happy man' amidst the rolling valleys beyond the Alpheus. Unlike Haygarth, however, Clark does at least support his reading of Xenophon's state of mind—if only by appealing to the 'easy grace and serenity' of his style: 'When I read him I think of Addison'—the early eighteenth-century poet and essayist best known for his graceful conversational pieces on ethical issues in the *Spectator*.[32]

The happy Xenophon presented by Haygarth and Clark has achieved a different sort of retirement from Mitford's Xenophon. While Mitford rejoiced in Xenophon's relative security from threats to his property, Haygarth and Clark find in Xenophon's rural estate a fitting setting for philosophical enquiry. This positive view of the countryside has classical precedents—notably Cicero's *On the Laws*, a dialogue set at Cicero's villa at Arpinum; and those precedents were in turn influential in the eighteenth century, both in the visual arts (the setting of Cicero's dialogue was painted by the landscape painter Richard Wilson) and in ethical works such as Shaftesbury's *The Moralists*, another philosophical dialogue set in the countryside: 'Ye Fields and Woods, my Refuge from the toilsom World of Business, receive me in your quiet Sanctuarys, and favour my Retreat and thoughtful Solitudes.'[33]

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[32] Gloom: Pouqueville 1813: 67–68; on Pouqueville's work and its reception (including contemporary doubts that he had actually seen all the places he professed), see Augustinos 1994: 251–281. 'Skillos': Clark 1858: 265. The analogy with Addison is also drawn by Saintsbury 1926: 478.

[33] Wilson: Solkin 1982: 235–236; the painting was copied by Turner, who saw in it the artist's aspiration for 'the pleasures of peaceful retirement' (Ziff 1963: 147). *Moralists*: Ayres 1999: ii. 79.

This contemplative rural Xenophon has even stronger roots in the world of poetry. The little house imagined by Haygarth would be at home in the false modesty of the English country-house poetry ('Thou art not, Penhurst, built to envious show')—and still more at home in the Latin poets. Vergil and Horace were the two poets who gave classic expression to the ideal of the countryside as a place of retreat—an ideal fostered by Augustus' settlement at Rome after the turbulence of the Civil Wars. And eighteenth-century Englishmen like Joseph Addison—living in what was consciously seen as a new Augustan era—were entranced by the vision of the countryside presented in poems like Horace's second *Epode* ('beatus ille') or the famous satire in which Horace developed the fable of the town and country mouse, picturing (in Jonathan Swift's free imitation, at least) his wish as

> A handsome house to lodge a friend,
> A river at my garden's end,
> A terrace-walk, and half a rood
> Of land, set out to plant a wood.

Addison himself translated Vergil's *Georgics* as a young man and would later mine Horace's poems for epitaphs—in particular the *Odes* in which Horace expressed the ideal of contentment at the Sabine estate given him by Augustus' cultural minister Maecenas. And that estate itself had a great charm for English visitors to Italy: one nineteenth-century traveller joked that so many Englishmen came on a 'pilgrimage' to the villa that 'it is commonly believed by the peasantry, that Horace was our countryman'.[34]

The appeal of the Roman poets was felt by William Mitford too. After giving his description of Xenophon's 'delightful retreat', he cited some famous lines from Vergil's *Georgics* ('O fortunatos nimium') illustrating 'the fair lot of the countryman, the loved subject of faithful eulogy for the fortunate poet, under the wide shelter of the Roman empire'. Mitford took at face value the poet's picture of the countryman's 'fair lot'—both because it had been achieved under an Emperor and for contrast with Greece, where such prosperity was 'hardly a matter even for imagination amid the insecurity of

[34] Envious show: Jonson, 'To Penhurst', in Fowler 1994: 53; this opening is itself Horatian: see Martindale 1993: 62–63. Horace: Williams 1937: i. 194. 'Handsome' is literally 'not too big': 'modus agri non ita magnus, / hortus ubi et tecto vicinus iugis aquae fons / et paulum silvae super his foret' (*Sat.* 2.6.1–3); on Swift's version and Pope's later additions to it, see Kupersmith 2007: 42–52, 122–125. For the influence of Horace, see e.g. Burgevin 1936: 47–80; Røstvig 1954, index s.v. 'Horace'; Hunt 1976: 49–54. On Addison and Horace, see Goad 1967: 26–65, 297–334. On Horace's villa, see Frischer & Brown 2001. Countryman: quoted by Brown 2001: 21. The image of Horace the Englishman was widespread: cf. e.g. Fowler 1993: 269.

the Grecian republic'. With some ingenuity, Mitford went on to illustrate the travails of the husbandman's life in Greece (though 'not indeed at Scillus') with a passage from the *Anabasis*—the account of a 'harvest' dance performed by some soldiers after a banquet at the court of the Paphlagonian ruler Corylas: one dancer would imitate a farmer sowing and driving oxen, looking around all the time as though in fear; then a robber would approach, fight the farmer, tie him up, and steal the oxen—though sometimes the dancers would pretend that the farmer won.[35]

Our search for Xenophon has taken us far beyond William Mitford's concern with the security of land. We saw in the last section that the picturesque landscape of Scillus was easily able to accommodate Xenophon the hunter. It took a stranger twist for Xenophon to become Horace the rural philosopher. An ideology of country life that had received classic expression in the Roman poets was applied to Xenophon's account of his estate, and an attempt was made to integrate his life at Scillus more fully with the devotion to philosophical pursuits suggested by his other writings. This depiction of Xenophon again took its place within a wider vision based on contrasts between ancient Greece and modern Britain—but while Mitford had stressed the superior protection given to property in modern Britain, Haygarth expressed a preference for the intellectual and artistic pursuits fostered in ancient Greece. In other ways the isolated image of Xenophon contemplating at Scillus may seem less overtly political—but, no less than Mitford's account, it still indirectly justified the ideal of gentlemanly leisure. Indeed, the lack of attention to the material basis for Xenophon's prosperity (the selling of captives as slaves on the distant shores of the Black Sea) removed the tensions found in Mitford's account, and so presented an unsullied image of Scillus as a site for philosophical pursuit. The same idealized landscape, we shall now see, could also serve as a stage for evoking Xenophon's piety—or even, in William Mitford's case, questioning it.

The Religious Perspective

In 1839, Christopher Wordsworth, Headmaster during a turbulent period at Harrow School, and later Bishop of Lincoln, produced an account of *Greece: Pictorial, Descriptive, and Historical* based on his own travels there in 1832–1833. Like Haygarth's poem, the book was not in the form of a travel journal

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[35] Mitford 1789–1818: iii. 535, citing Verg. *G.* 2. 458–460, Xen. *An.* 6.1.7–9.

(no mention of the wintry day he was attacked by brigands on the heights of Mount Parnes), but rather composed as a continuous narrative guide to the sites of Greece, offering along the way some landscape description. One striking feature of the book was the importance of the pictorial element: the book was beautifully illustrated with more than 350 engravings on wood and with twenty-eight on steel, offering picturesque views of Greek costumes as well as temples and valleys. Equally striking was the way Wordsworth promoted his pictorial guide by comparing it in his preface with (of all things) Hadrian's villa at Tivoli: just as the Emperor 'attempted to perpetuate his own Recollections of Greece' with imitation buildings and groves, so too the traveller to Greece constructs a villa in his own mind—and Wordsworth himself was attempting 'to give a permanence to his own reminiscences by constructing a humbler Tivoli'.[36]

Like earlier travel accounts, Wordsworth's guide drew readers' attention to the spot where Xenophon passed his days. On one particularly dramatic page, an engraving of the course of the Alpheius through the mountains of Arcadia loomed over an account of that tranquil spot: 'On the opposite side of the Alpheius, at a little more than two miles distant to the south of Olympia, is the site of the small village of SCILLUS. It stood in a woody valley, watered by the river SELINUS.' Wordsworth here follows earlier travellers by anchoring Xenophon's estate by reference to the river and the sanctuary: the shift from the present tense ('is the site') to the past ('It stood') marks the point where he begins to rely on Xenophon's account rather than on what the current traveller could observe. It marks, too, Wordsworth's retreat into fantasy, as he proceeds to imagine Xenophon spending the latter part of his days 'in this picturesque and solitary spot':

> By the side of this stream and among these woods he composed the greater part of his works. In one of them he has left a description ... of this peaceful place and of his own occupations here. Perhaps no more agreeable specimen of simple and unaffected piety in a heathen can be found, than in his account of the small temple of Diana erected here by himself, of its cypress statue, of its sacred grove of beautiful shrubs planted by his own hand, and of the annual tithe set apart by him for its maintenance from his estate.

The picturesque effect is augmented by the image of Xenophon as landscape gardener, planting with his own hands (a detail not found in Xenophon's own account of Scillus—though it does echo the scene in the *Oeconomicus* where the younger Cyrus tells an astonished Lysander that he planted some

[36] Tivoli: Wordsworth 1839: p. v.

of the trees in his paradise at Sardis himself). The description of Xenophon writing in the woods and by a stream is another romantic invention—and its inspiration seems all too clear: the example of the writer's uncle composing his poems on his walks across the hills of the Lake District.[37]

Like William Mitford, Wordsworth produces a description of Scillus that is profoundly shaped by the tastes of his age. Wordsworth's own artistic and literary preferences emerge clearly from a memoir co-written after his death by his daughter Elizabeth (founder of St Hugh's College, Oxford) and one of the Canons of Wordsworth's diocese. The memoir included a final chapter of 'personal reminiscences' in which other family members recalled his excessive fondness for Claude; his proverbial memory for Vergil—with a preference for the bucolic *Georgics*; his even greater love for Horace ('there was scarcely an incident in life that did not get capped with a Horatian quotation'); his increasing delight in Cicero's philosophic writings; and, not least, his sensitivity towards Greek authors: 'Of Xenophon, especially his beautiful picture of family life, he spoke with great admiration.' A footnote reference to 'Anab. v. 3' made clear that the description of Scillus was meant—though the only family detail there is mention of Xenophon's sons hunting.[38]

Wordsworth returned towards the end of his life to Xenophon's account of his estate in a remarkable passage in his four-volume *Church History*. As he came to describe the Christian emperor Theodosius' edicts against paganism, Wordsworth expressed sympathy for 'those devout heathens' who were suddenly deprived of 'beautiful objects, hallowed by religious rites and ceremonies, and by sacred associations reaching back for many centuries'. He then turned to Xenophon for an example of those hallowed traditions: 'No one can read without delight the beautiful description which one of the best of heathens, a brave soldier, a wise philosopher, and a favourite pupil of Socrates, and, if we may so speak, a pattern of a Greek country gentleman, Xenophon, has given of his own farm at Scillus.' There follow various picturesque details suggested by Xenophon's own account—the stream stocked with fish; the 'variegated woodland abounding in game', the temple and altar of Artemis 'reared by his hand', 'the joyful gatherings of his peasantry', 'the regular offering of tithes from the produce of the estate for pious and charitable purposes'. And then a surprisingly strong conclusion for a

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37 Brigands: Overton & Wordsworth 1888: 78. Scillus: Wordsworth 1839: 316–317; this passage is copied in Murray 1854: 291. Sardis: *Oec*. 4.22.

38 Overton & Wordsworth 1888: 497, 508–509, 512.

Bishop in the Church of England: ‘no one can have contemplated in imagination such scenes as these, without pangs of sorrow for the wrench made in the best feelings of devout heathens by the promiscuous and ruthless demolition encouraged by the laws of Theodosius.’[39]

For Christopher Wordsworth a picture of Xenophon in this ‘solitary and picturesque’ setting seems to remove the threat of paganism and enable him to express his admiration for Xenophon’s ‘unaffected piety’. Or is there even a hint of nostalgia for the world of Xenophon, a lost world of plenitude, with no clerical affectation? Wordsworth seems to be using the picturesque to conjure up an aura of lost simplicity and express regret at its passing. He was much more on his guard amidst the famed sights of Athens. In one of his book’s purplest passages, he distances himself from the ‘religious reverence’ that would be required to describe Athens properly, preferring instead the ‘sublimer emotions’ raised by contemplation of the ruins of its temples—ruins that can themselves be read as ‘a refutation of paganism’. The fragile material remains of Athens’ glory succumb to the immortal spirit of the genius that produced them: ‘Not at Athens alone are we to look for Athens.’ In remote Scillus, by contrast, the specific delights of locality are allowed to trump the strict and universal claims of religious loyalty.[40]

Christopher Wordsworth’s feeling for the piety Xenophon displayed at Scillus has been shared by many readers: one of the leading modern scholars of Greek religion has written that ‘it would be hard to find a passage more instinct with Greek religious feeling than Xenophon’s warm and graceful description’. It is this piety, indeed, that explains the profusion of apparently picturesque details in Xenophon’s account at Scillus: Xenophon mentions the stream Selinus because there is a river with the same name at Ephesus (with fish in it, too); he mentions the design of the temple to bring out the link between the sanctuaries at Scillus and Ephesus; and he describes the surrounding grove because it supplies produce for the goddess’ festival. Wordsworth, however, goes much further than the modern scholar: he even makes it seem generous of Xenophon to give the goddess a tithe from his estate ‘for pious and charitable purposes’—though he does not elaborate on the nature of Xenophon’s charity.[41]

Wordsworth here falls into the same trap as many other readers—and even translators—of Xenophon’s idyllic account of Scillus. He describes the estate as if it were Xenophon’s own—but Xenophon does not say a word

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39 Wordsworth 1881–1883: iii. 10–11.
40 Wordsworth 1839: 130–131.
41 Graceful: Parker 1996: 78 n. 41.

about his own property at Scillus. The estate he describes is the one he bought for the goddess from the tithe set aside by the Ten Thousand from the sale of slaves. So Xenophon was not being generous when he gave Diana a tithe. It is in fact more likely that he appropriated for himself whatever profit remained from the goddess' estate after he had dedicated the tithe and paid for the estate's upkeep.[42]

The details of how Xenophon bought the estate did not escape the careful eye of William Mitford. Mitford relished the fullness of Xenophon's account of how he had come to set up the estate—but he also subjected it to careful scrutiny: 'In this very curious detail, evidently, with much said, the direct mention of much implied, has been prudentially omitted.' His conclusions? Xenophon emerges from Mitford's narrative as a master of cunning. In his own account, Xenophon does not say who proposed that the soldiers should offer a double dedication to Apollo and Diana of Ephesus. Mitford suggests that Xenophon himself made the proposal—so that he should have access, in case of need, to funds in both Asia and Europe. If Sparta's military intervention in Asia had fared better, Xenophon would probably have stayed there—and exported Pythian Apollo to Asia rather than importing Ephesian Diana to Greece. The 'commission for the dedication' also opened for Xenophon a 'favorable introduction' to the priesthood at Ephesus and Delphi, enabling him to divide 'his wealth'—in fact the gods' tithe—between Asia and Europe: in effect Xenophon was using the treasuries of the two deities 'as banks'. Xenophon then secured for himself and his descendants 'a permanence of landed property, such as, under the civil law alone, was perhaps hardly anywhere in Greece to be hoped for' by making them 'nominally trustees for the goddess, of what was very effectually their own estate, burdened only by a certain quitrent and certain services'. The 'superstition' exploited by Xenophon, Mitford concludes, was 'more beneficial' than that of the Middle Ages: 'Xenophon's chapel diffused a mystical protection over his castle and his whole estate.'[43]

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42 Translators: in his excellent translation, Robin Waterfield has 'his estate' where the Greek just has a definite article (*tou agrou*—'the estate'); I should add that I read through Waterfield's translation carefully before it was published and did not notice the incorrect 'his'. Compare Parker 2004: 138, on the 'puzzling' arrangements at Scillus; and also two excellent and detailed recent treatments of the historical issues involved in the foundation of the cult: Purvis 2003: 65–120; Tuplin 2004. Tuplin ends his article by quoting Parker on the 'warm and graceful description'—and adding 'Xenophon would have been delighted' (p. 270).

43 Mitford 1789–1818: iii. 531–533. Note that Mitford recognizes that the Greeks sometimes talked about the possibility of removing dedications from sanctuaries, but he does not

Mitford's analysis of how Xenophon exploited Greek religious convention is a classic example of the rationalizing approach to ancient history that came into fashion in the second half of the eighteenth century. Mitford even seems to feel a certain admiration for the way Xenophon used the profits of the expedition to secure the estate for his own use. Just as he thinks it did credit to Xenophon, 'the scholar of Socrates', that he had recurred during the retreat to 'his usual resource, the power of superstition over Grecian minds' (that is, divination), so too he praises the way Xenophon exploited 'superstition' to establish the Scillus estate 'in the deficiency of civil establishments among the Grecian republics, for giving security to private property'. This, Mitford implies, is how one has to act—if one does not have the good fortune to be born an Englishman.[44]

Mitford's Xenophon, then, rises above and manipulates the customs of his age, first for the safety of the army, later for the security of himself and his family; and he creates at picturesque Scillus a home for himself worthy of an English gentleman, at a safe distance from the overly censorious regime of Sparta. Yet he is also tainted by Greek customs—as when he enriches himself by an unprovoked attack on the fortified retreat of a Persian nobleman. The Scillus he inhabits is an immensely appealing work of art—fit for the brush of the learned Poussins, surrounded by scenes drawn by Claude and Rosa—a Scillus that may still today exert a certain fascination. But the value of following Mitford's depiction of Xenophon derives, too, from the fact that it forces us to confront some—not all, of course—of the social realities that underlie Xenophon's delightful retreat—social realities that have been all too easily occluded in some later idealizations of the pious and philosophical Xenophon; and to confront, too, by its very bluntness the fact that all rewritings of Xenophon place our 'soldier-philosopher-author' within a wider vision of Greece, of democracy, of morality, and so necessarily (even if not overtly) make an ethical and political statement. Mitford the anti-democratic and anti-republican makes Xenophon an exception to the misery that was Greece by locating him in the paradisal delights of Scillus—but it is a piously self-aggrandizing Xenophon who has his home there.

explain how an individual could have removed a dedication from the treasury of the Athenians at Delphi, where Xenophon made his offering to Apollo.

[44] Mitford 1789–1818: iii. 169 (scholar), 181 (usual resource), 531 (property).

A Delightful Retreat?

This chapter has explored a number of portrayals of Xenophon living an idyllic life in picturesque Scillus. There have been some common strands in the writers discussed—in particular, a stress on the value of the physical and emotional security Xenophon was able to enjoy. Yet we have also seen that perceptions of Xenophon have been shaped in subtle ways by the particular interests of individual authors. William Mitford was the only one of our writers who did live on a substantial estate himself, and it is no surprise that he paid most attention to the security of Xenophon's property. Other writers preferred a humbler image of Xenophon's philosophical retirement. Again, it is striking that, while other writers portrayed Xenophon writing in a romantic setting, Mitford dealt only in passing with Xenophon's intellectual activity at Scillus. Perhaps ancient Greece did not allow for the union of secure property and a public intellectual role that Mitford (as a politically engaged historian and Member of Parliament) saw himself as enjoying.

One question this chapter raises is whether studying the reception of Xenophon's Scillus adds anything to our understanding of Xenophon himself. Is there a danger that following the fortunes of Xenophon's Scillus is itself a delightful retreat? Have we been following the alluring voice of Pleasure rather than the hard and steep path of the Virtue of reading Xenophon's Scillus historically, in its contemporary context, recreating an original range of meanings in the Greece of Xenophon's day—the Athens of Plato and Isocrates, the Sparta of Agesilaus? The very idea of Scillus as a retreat ignores, as Vivienne Gray has noted, its proximity to Olympia, a site for intellectual as well as athletic display. Another scholar has suggested that Xenophon's 'paradisal haven' was directly modelled on the Persian paradises Xenophon had experienced in his eastern adventure. On this interpretation, Xenophon was establishing himself as the 'satrap of Scillus' rather than as a proleptic imitation of the English country squire.[45]

The Persian paradise might also provide a model for the type of reception study attempted in this chapter. Have I been positioning myself in the position of a Persian prince hunting in a paradise—confronting a series of carefully prepared moments of reception in an enclosed interpretative space and lancing them as they are let loose, in a nicely prepared demonstration of scholarly authority? Or have I been like Cyrus, showing off the

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[45] Olympia: Gray 1998: 5. 'Paradisal haven': phrase taken from Cartledge 1987: 61. Paradise: L'Allier 1998; see Tuplin 2004: 268–269 for criticism. Satrap: Georges 1994: 207.

paradise at Sardis that he had arranged and planted himself? Texts about Scillus have been grouped and arranged so as to tell a story (or make up a plot) about the reception of Xenophon's estate. But there is always room to arrange those texts—and others—in different ways so as to tell different stories.

And yet studying the reception of Scillus is also significant, as I suggested earlier, for understanding any attempt to place Xenophon's writings in the context of his biography. Reception may be a form of narrative, of story-telling—but so too are other modes of scholarship. In discussing the compositional date of the *Anabasis*, for instance, many scholars have presented the account of Scillus as nostalgic and so suggested that it was written after Xenophon was forced to leave the estate following Sparta's defeat at Leuctra. A view of the account as nostalgia, however, runs the risk of ignoring the fact that all the landscape details that Xenophon offers are part of a careful religious discourse that links the estate with the sanctuary of Artemis at Ephesus. The claim that Xenophon was nostalgic may be nothing more than a projection of scholars' own yearnings for the world of Scillus.[46]

Studying the reception of Scillus has also involved engagement with the politics of historical interpretation. William Mitford, as we saw, combined an idealizing vision of the estate with a political critique of its origins from profits derived from selling slaves. He also commented on the political sensitivity of the region where Xenophon's delightful retreat was situated: noting that the Spartans had recently restored to a 'nominal independency' communities that had been controlled by Elis, he suggested that Scillus was 'given to Xenophon as a kind of lordship, to hold under Lacedæmonian sovereinty'. Mitford was alert, then, to the historical background to Xenophon's land-grant. But other writers have chosen to use much more politically loaded terms to describe his position. A century earlier, the classical scholar Richard Bentley had referred to the estate as a 'plantation'—a word with strong colonial associations, used of settlements in conquered lands, particularly in Ireland, the Caribbean, and North America. More recently, Robin Waterfield has likened Xenophon to an Israeli settler in disputed Palestinian land.[47]

William Mitford's discussion of Scillus was historical in another sense too. Whereas travellers to Greece such as Leake, Haygarth, and Wordsworth presented frozen descriptions of Xenophon's peaceful life at Scillus, Mit-

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46 Nostalgic: e.g. Rood 2005: p. xvi.

47 Lordship: Mitford 1789–1818: iii. 529. Plantation: Bentley 1777: 406. Settler: Waterfield 2006: 181.

ford's account of Xenophon's life took in the disturbances in the Peloponnese in the aftermath of Leuctra. Confronted by conflicting ancient sources about Xenophon's movements after Sparta's defeat, Mitford made choices that strongly reveal his ideological disposition. He thought that, when Scillus became too dangerous, Xenophon would not have been eager to return to Athens, which was too unstable a residence 'for eminent and wealthy men'. He portrayed instead Xenophon closing his days at Corinth—a residence preferable 'in his declining age', and also 'commodiously situated for communication with his property at Scillus' (which, Mitford inferred, he had been able to recover after a time). No longer the apparently timeless figure presented by our other writers, Mitford's Xenophon has become all too similar to the British aristocrat moving between a home in the city and his country house. His reconstruction met with the approval of one of his reviewers: 'who will not with real pleasure see [Xenophon] conducted, with great comfort and dignity, to the close of life?' But other historians have been able to point to different evidence that suggests a Xenophon who returned towards the end of his life to participate in civic life in democratic Athens. Amidst the continuing uncertainty over Xenophon's final years, there remains the need to acknowledge that the stories modern scholars tell about Xenophon's oscillation between the city and the country are themselves partly shaped by the manifold ways in which readings of Xenophon (whether picturesque or not) interact with our own negotiations of the boundaries of the political.[48]

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[48] Corinth: Mitford 1789–1818: iii. 537. Review: Anon. 1797: 159.

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CHAPTER FOUR

STRAUSS ON XENOPHON

David M. Johnson

Introductory

Irony in Xenophon has become acute enough of a problem for a leading Xenophon scholar, Vivienne J. Gray, to find that her book on Xenophon's theory of leadership was 'ambushed' by the need to address how to read Xenophon, and how not to (Gray 2011: 69). Gray finds considerable irony in Xenophon, but it is a remarkably transparent version of irony that is 'almost painfully explicit' (Gray 2011: 335). The problematic version of irony in Xenophon, for Gray, is a darker sort, the sort that undercuts the apparent meaning of the text. Gray notes that we moderns are fond, indeed unduly fond, of irony; suggests that we are complacently contemptuous of those too blind to see it; and points out that we are sceptical of the sorts of strong leaders she believes Xenophon admires (Gray 2011: 1–2). I will add that contemporary distaste for Sparta may tempt readers fond of Xenophon to question how fond Xenophon could really have been of Sparta. All these factors are warning signs that readers may bring irony to Xenophon rather than finding it in his text.

To make matters worse, far worse, we have the case of Leo Strauss (1899–1973), one of the most influential and controversial conservative thinkers of the twentieth century, who developed a mid-life crush on Xenophon and subsequently spent a good deal of his considerable scholarly energies writing increasingly obscure works on an author most contemporaries regarded as second rate.[1] It is of course entirely possible to consider Xenophon a writer with a deep, complex, and sometimes ironical voice without being a Straussian. And Gray for her part spends rather little time attacking Strauss himself or Straussian readers of Xenophon: there are plenty of others who read Xenophon in a way she rejects without having suffered from any major

[1] For recent attempts to sum up Strauss's thought, see Zuckert & Zuckert 2006, Smith 2008. For a more critical account of Strauss's influence, see Norton 2004.

Straussian influence.[2] But without Strauss we probably would not be talking as much about irony in Xenophon; some of us would see more of it than others, of course, but it would not be one of those issues one cannot avoid taking a stand on. Nor would 'reading between the lines' be a phrase requiring scare quotes and raised eyebrows—as it was at the Liverpool conference on Xenophon in 2009.

This is not the place for a general appraisal of Gray's attempt to stamp out ironic readings of Xenophon.[3] Instead I will examine and to some extent defend Strauss's interpretation of one key Xenophontic passage. I begin with an account of Strauss's approach to Xenophon, starting with Strauss's declaration of his fondness for Xenophon in the recently published letters he wrote to Jacob Klein. I then will turn to my case study, *Memorabilia* 4.4, which has been the object of considerable study of late,[4] and discusses issues of particular concern to Strauss. What I hope to demonstrate is not that Strauss is right about that passage—he is, by my measure, at most half right—but rather that we can learn something about Xenophon from reading Strauss on Xenophon and from reading Xenophon for ourselves with certain Straussian tools, among them the keen ear for irony that Strauss brought to Xenophon's text. I also hope to provide readers with some insight into what might otherwise remain puzzling features of Strauss's approach, thus enabling them to better understand Strauss and those working in his wake.

Memorabilia 4.4 poses two problems for Strauss. The first is that it seems to commit Xenophon's Socrates to a rather naïve form of legal positivism. One of Strauss's grand themes is the conflict between philosophy and the city, a conflict whose *locus classicus* is the trial of Socrates. Hence it is no surprise that Strauss does not want Xenophon's Socrates to be a legal positivist who identifies justice with the laws of the city. I shall argue that Strauss raises genuine problems with the apparent legal positivism of this part of the passage. The second problem for Strauss is that the passage also outlines an ambitious account of unwritten law, which Strauss characterizes, rightly in my view, as natural law. Strauss famously defended classical natural right against modern historicism; but his natural *right* is a far remove from natural *law*. In Strauss's view it is the questions that we face that are perennial, together with the broad outlines of the competing answers that have been sketched to them. There is no timeless account of the whole that is accessi-

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2 Gray's non-Straussian targets include Tatum 1989, Tuplin 1993, and Azoulay 2004.
3 For one such appraisal, see Johnson (forthcoming).
4 Morrison 1995, Johnson 2003 and 2004, Gray 2004, Stavru 2008.

ble to man. Natural law theory posits precisely such a timeless set of answers to the deepest problems.[5] Strauss therefore had a powerful motive to dismiss Xenophon's early account of natural law. Here I shall argue that Strauss is on rather weaker ground, likely because he mistakenly took Xenophon's reticence about natural law theory to be due to esoteric rather than apologetic ends. Natural law was controversial in Xenophon's day, and this adequately explains why Xenophon's Socrates reveals his view of natural law only in a sort of appendix to a discussion of law and justice in which written law plays a far larger role.

My choice of a test case was originally made in culpable ignorance of a fine 2001 article by Louis-André Dorion which uses this very passage as his *entrée* to Strauss. I have now benefitted vastly from Dorion's engagement with Strauss, though I remain more positive in my evaluation of the latter.[6] Dorion argues that Strauss's larger philosophical concerns dictate his reading of Xenophon, that Strauss's procedure is essentially circular. It is true that by his ironising reading Strauss renders innocuous a passage that appears to undermine his reading of Xenophon, and indeed of the classical tradition of political philosophy. This makes Dorion's thesis of circularity impossible to disprove, and indeed makes it appear quite plausible. But I hope to show that in this case Strauss reads Xenophon with considerable insight, though hardly without misreading him, sometimes, as Dorion argues, thanks to his larger concerns.

Strauss on the Taste of Xenophon

Strauss published more, or at least more prominently, on Xenophon than on any other classical author.[7] Xenophon's prominence began early; Strauss's first publication on a classical author, his 1939 essay on the *Spartan Constitution*, was devoted to Xenophon. Strauss explains his fondness for Xenophon in a letter written to his friend Jacob Klein in February 1939, part of a series

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[5] For Strauss's distinction between natural law and natural right see, for example, Strauss's revised 1971 preface to *Natural Right and History* (Strauss 1950).

[6] Dorion 2001, now in a revised and enlarged English version, Dorion 2010, which I will cite below.

[7] If one restricts oneself to book titles, 'Xenophon' appears in three, 'Plato' in but one; there is then the 'Platonic' from the collection of essays Strauss sketched out and titled but did not live to complete himself (Strauss 1983). The use of the phrase 'Platonic Political Philosophy' to refer to that set of essays, which cover pretty much the full range of Strauss's interests, shows the deeper influence of Plato. Among the 'Platonic' essays is one on the *Anabasis* that Strauss was working on as he died.

of fascinating letters that have now been published by H. and W. Meier (Strauss 2001).[8] The letters mix Strauss's worries about his perilous financial situation and lack of a permanent academic position with excitement over his new discoveries. Strauss noted that he had much to do, including his article on Xenophon:

> Dabei noch einen Aufsatz über Xenophons *Respubl. Lacedaem.* zu schreiben, in dem ich zu beweisen gedenke, dass dieses scheinbare Lob Spartas in Wahrheit eine Satire auf Sparta, bzw. auf den athenischen Lakonismus ist. Xenophon ist mein spezieller Liebling, weil er den Mut gehabt hat, sich als Idioten zu verkleiden und so durch die Jahrtausende zu gehen—er ist der grösste Gauner, den ich kenne—ich glaube, dass er in seinen Schriften genau das tut, was Sokrates in seinem Leben getan hat. Jedenfalls ist die Moral auch bei ihm rein exoterisch, und ungefähr jedes zweite Wort zweideutig. Καλοκαγαθια war im Sokratischen 'Kreis' ein Schimpfwort, so wie 'Philister' oder 'Bourgeois' im 19. Jhdt. Und σωφροσύνη ist wesentlich die Selbstbeherrschung in der Äusserung der Meinungen—kurz, es gibt ein ganzes System von Geheimworten hier genau so wie bei Maimonides,[9] also ein gefundenes Fressen für mich. (Strauss 2001: 567)

> And also to write an essay on Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution*, in which I propose to show that this apparent praise of Sparta is in truth a satire on Sparta, or rather on Athenian laconism. Xenophon is my special darling, since he had the courage to disguise himself as an idiot and go through the millennia like that—he is the greatest con artist I know—I think that in his writings he did exactly what Socrates did in his life. At any rate, for him, too, morality is purely exoteric, and just about every other word is equivocal. *Kalokagathia* was in the Socratic 'circle' a curse word, like 'Philistine' or 'bourgeois' in the 19th century. And *sōphrosunē* is essentially self-control in expressing one's views; in short, there is a whole system of code words here as in Maimonides—so it was handed to me on a plate.

Strauss's language about Xenophon's humble disguise resembles that at the end of his published article, where he would similarly praise Xenophon's humility, if not reveal that Xenophon was his special *Liebling*, or attribute to him a system of code words (Strauss 1939: 536). Strauss asserts here and

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8 My quotations from these letters follow Meier's edition slavishly, so abbreviations are original, Greek terms are given in Latin letters if they so appear in Meier, italics are original, Greek accents present or missing, etc. The translations are my own. For a good discussion of this correspondence, see Lampert 2008.

9 In *Persecution and the Art of Writing*, Strauss notes that he came to understand the problematic relationship between philosophy and politics while studying medieval Jewish and Islamic philosophy (Strauss 1952: 5), and a study of Maimonides' *Guide for the Perplexed* (Strauss 1952: 38–94) is the first large-scale example Strauss presents of his approach.

elsewhere (see Strauss 2001: 569, 580) that Xenophon did with his writings what Socrates must have done during his life: hide deep thoughts beneath a banal exterior. In this respect, Xenophon is truer to Socrates than Plato, perhaps one reason for Xenophon's *Liebling* status. But Strauss fails to explain here why, if Socrates was really dressed this way, he ended up drinking the hemlock. He will elsewhere suggest that Aristophanes' attacks on Socrates had some basis, meaning that Socrates was not a successful esotericist, at least in his Presocratic phase.[10] While a stubborn opponent of developmentalism when it comes to Socratic (or Platonic) doctrine, Strauss seems to have had a developmentalist view of Socrates' mode of communicating his views, with Socrates becoming less transparent over time. Much like Strauss himself.[11]

In a letter from July of the same year, Strauss, now completing the Xenophon article, stresses the similarity between Xenophon and Plato:

> Was Xenophon angeht, so habe ich, bei der Hera,[12] nicht übertrieben: er ist ein ganz grosser Mann, Thukydides und selbst Herodot nicht unterlegen. Die sog. Mängel seiner Historien sind ausschliesslich Folgen seiner souveränen Verachtung der lächerlichen erga der kaloikagathoi. Ausserdem sagt er das alles, wenn man sich nur die Mühe nimmt, die Augen aufzutun, oder wie er es nennt, wenn man sich nicht mit dem akouein begnügt, sondern willens ist zu *sehen*.[13] Die Identität des Xenoph. und des Platon. Sokrates steht ausser Zweifel: es ist derselbe Sokrates-Odysseus[14] bei beiden, auch die *Lehre*. Das Problem der Memorabl. ist identisch mit dem der Politeia: das problematische Verhältnis von dikaiosyne and aletheia, oder von praktischem und theoretischem Leben. Die Technik Platos und Xenophons ist weitgehend identisch: keiner schreibt in seinem eigenen Namen: der Verf. der Memor. ebenso wie der Anabasis ist *nicht* Xenophon, sondern ein anonymes ego; in den Memor. ist Xenophon der einzige synōn, den Sokrates als 'Tor' bezeichnet.[15] Was nē kúna angeht, so macht das Xen. folgendermassen: er lässt

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[10] Strauss 1989: 104–105, citing *Phd.* 96aff., *Oec.* 6.13–17, 11.1–6, *Symp.* 6.6–8.

[11] For a good account of Strauss's various motives for esotericism, see Zuckert & Zuckert 2006: 115–154.

[12] Strauss is clearly playing around with Socratic oaths in this passage; probably he uses 'by Hera' here to show that he himself recognizes a certain exaggeration in putting Xenophon on the same level as Thucydides and Herodotus. (Compare his remarks noting that Xenophon is less formidable in Clay 1991, 264 n. 7). Later in this passage Strauss perhaps implies that by putting 'By Zeus', normally a more serious oath, into the mouth of a dog, Xenophon shows himself willing to play around even with the mightiest god in the pantheon.

[13] I cannot identify the passage in Xenophon Strauss is alluding to: the closest would perhaps be *Ages.* 6.2; cf. *Hell.* 6.5.45, *Mem.* 3.11.1, *Cyr.* 3.1.43, Hdt. 1.8.

[14] An apparent reference to *Mem.* 4.6.15.

[15] *Mem.* 1.3.13.

> Sokrates eine Fabel erzählen, innerhalb deren ein Hund Beim Zeus schwört![16] Dieses Beispiel zeigt wohl am deutlichsten was für ein Hund Xenophon ist. Kurz, er ist ganz wunderbar und nunmehr mein unbestrittener Liebling.
> (Strauss 2001: 574)

> As far as Xenophon goes, I have not, by Hera, exaggerated: he is a very great man, not at all inferior to Thucydides or to Herodotus himself. The so-called faults in his history are solely the result of his sovereign contempt for the ridiculous deeds of the *kaloikagathoi* ['gentlemen']. What's more, he says it all, so long as one takes the trouble to open one's eyes, or, as he puts it, if one doesn't content oneself with listening, but is willing to *see*. There is no doubt that the Xenophontic and Platonic Socrates are one and the same: it's the same Socrates-Odysseus in both, and the same *teaching*. The problem of the *Memorabilia* is the same as that of the *Republic*: the problematic relationship between justice and truth, i.e., between the practical and theoretical life. Plato's and Xenophon's techniques are to a great extent the same. Neither writes in his own name: the author of the *Memorabilia*, just like the author of the *Anabasis*, is *not* Xenophon, but an anonymous 'I'; in the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon is the only companion whom Socrates calls a 'fool'. When it comes to [the oath] 'by the dog,' Xenophon does the following: he allows Socrates to tell a story in which a dog swears by Zeus! This example surely shows most clearly what kind of a dog Xenophon is. In short, he is completely wonderful and more than ever my indisputable darling.

Strauss's Xenophon is a joker and trickster who nevertheless hints at one of the deepest (Straussian) concerns, the 'problematic relationship between justice and truth, i.e., between the practical and theoretical life'. In light of the philosopher's quest for truth, the deeds of gentlemen are laughable; but had Xenophon laughed too loudly, he would have undermined society. Strauss loved comedy, and considered it more important than tragedy (1989: 105–106), though his later writings, including his book *Socrates and Aristophanes*, will not strike most readers as particularly funny.

One last quotation before we leave these fascinating letters behind. Just a couple of weeks after this letter describing what sort of dog Xenophon was, Strauss revealed what he took to be the central thought of the *Memorabilia*, which he had discovered despite the summer heat.

> Trotzdem habe ich angefangen, einiges über die Memorabilien zu notieren. Das grosse Problem ist, in welchem Sinne der Satz, dass Sokrates sich nur um die ethika gekümmert habe,[17]—in welchem Sinne dieser durchaus falsche Satz nun doch auch wieder richtig ist. Die allgemeinste Antwort ist klar:

16 *Mem.* 2.7.14.
17 Presumably *Mem.* 1.1.16.

> anthropos—logos—on. Von besonderer Bedeutung ist das Problem der philia, insofern das Verständnis dessen, was philia ist, die Theologie des Mythos zerstört: das Höhere kann nicht 'Freund' des Niederen sein;[18] ergo: Leugnung der Providenz. Dieses ist, glaube ich, der zentrale Gedanke der Memor.
>
> (Strauss 2001, 575–576)

> Despite this, I have begun to make some notes on the *Memorabilia.* The great problem is in what sense the sentence that says Socrates only concerned himself with ethics—in what sense this thoroughly false sentence is actually also correct. In the most general terms the answer is clear: *man—reason—being.* The problem of *philia* [friendship] is of particular importance, inasmuch as understanding what *philia* is destroys the theology of myth: the higher cannot be a 'friend' of the lower: hence the denial of providence. This is, I think, the central thought of the *Memorabilia.*

This central thought takes us to the heart of Strauss's reading of the *Memorabilia,* in which Xenophon's apparent optimism about the divine order is shown to be merely exoteric. We will see below how Strauss's view of such matters played out in his reading of *Memorabilia* 4.4.

Strauss knew that his reading of Xenophon would meet with scepticism from the philologists, whom he once labels 'unbeschreibliche Idioten' because of their misreading of Xenophon ('indescribable idiots': Strauss 2001: 569). True enough, some of his views strike this philological idiot as rather unpromising, including the *Zahlenmystik* (numerology) Strauss finds in Xenophon, and Strauss's allegorical reading of Xenophon's *Symposium.* In this reading Antisthenes is, aptly enough, described as a caricature of Socrates, but Philippus' equine name means he is a caricature of Xenophon, and the Syracusan is a caricature of Plato thanks to their shared interest in Dionys(i)us (Strauss 2001: 580, cf. 585). Strauss notes that his reading of the Socratic writings was characterized by one of his colleagues as 'Talmudic', 'was ja nicht *völlig* falsch ist' ('which is not *completely* false': Strauss 2001: 586). But letters to a friend are fine places to sketch provocative ideas that one does not attempt to justify (and perhaps will never be able to justify). So let us turn to Strauss's published writings, which do provide some grounds for believing what Strauss has to say, although those grounds will not include the sorts of direct argument and explicit use of secondary scholarship that classical philologists are used to.

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18 For the difficulties of friendship between the good and the bad, see *Mem.* 2.6 (and Plato's *Lysis*). For providence in Xenophon, see *Mem.* 1.4, 4.3.

Strauss was particularly fond of something Xenophon said when defending himself against the charge that he had unjustifiably beaten some of the 10,000. Xenophon has defended his actions in bad times, but wants to close on an up note.

> It is noble and just and pious and more pleasant to remember the good things rather than the bad ones. (*Anabasis* 5.8.26)

Strauss elevates this to a general principle of Xenophontic style. This does not mean that Strauss's Xenophon is an optimist. Rather, it means that to hear the bad things, which are there in abundance, we must read between the lines. Hence when Xenophon describes the march up-country and says that one town is 'large, inhabited, and well-off' and says that another is merely 'large', we are to conclude that the second town is deserted and poor (Strauss 1989: 128–129, 134–135). And not only does Xenophon say things between the lines: he emphasizes things by putting them between the lines. Near the beginning of the *Spartan Constitution*, Xenophon says that the other Greeks did not feed their girls adequately and allowed them to drink only a little watered-down wine. He does not explicitly tell us how Lycurgus arranged such things, but some non-Straussian readers have read between the lines enough to conclude that Lycurgus allowed Spartan girls to eat enough and drink enough, including some decent quantity of wine.[19] Strauss goes one step farther, arguing that by omitting to say as much Xenophon meant to allude to the commonplace that Spartan women were licentious drunks (Strauss 1939: 503–505.). It is this sort of thing that leads Strauss to claim in his letters to Klein that Xenophon was more obscene than Plato (Strauss 2001: 569).

Similar principles apply on a larger scale. The title of the *Anabasis* is an ironical euphemism (Strauss 1989: 129). The title *Cyropaedia* is similarly strange, and calls attention to the importance of the first few chapters, Cyrus' charming education at the court of his doting and despotic grandfather Astyages (Strauss 2000: 181). And then there are those problematic chapters in the *Spartan Constitution* and the *Cyropaedia*. For Strauss, the placement of the negative chapter on Sparta in the penultimate and therefore less prominent position shows Xenophon ineptly hiding something, the

[19] Those non-Straussian readers include Hodkinson 2000: 228, a reference provided to me by Noreen Humble who, though more open to Straussian readings of the *Spartan Constitution* than most, rejects this argument by Strauss. Humble argues that here, as at 2.1–7, Xenophon only discusses areas where Spartans differs from other Greeks, implying that in other areas they did not differ; thus we are to understand that the Spartans did not allow their women more food or wine.

better to call it to our attention (Strauss 1939: 502–503). The chapter in the *Cyropaedia* is less cunningly placed, but similarly shows that 'if Xenophon was not a fool, he did not intend to present Cyrus' regime as a model', for stability and continuity are necessary features of a good society (Strauss 2000: 181). In Strauss's view, the *Oeconomicus* is not an outlier among the Socratic works but the Socratic discourse *par excellence*, ironically and comically pairing Socrates with his gentleman farmer antipode. 'The *Oeconomicus* is then in a properly subdued manner a comical reply to Aristophanes' comical attack on Socrates' (Strauss 1970, 164).

Now most conventional scholars will reject such Straussian claims as baseless or at least exaggerated. But it is probably also fair to say that scholarship on Xenophon has shifted considerably in the ironic direction since Strauss's day, with many a conventional scholar noting tensions, if not necessarily contradiction or disguise, in these works—hence Gray's need to combat them. Thus the time is ripe to reconsider Strauss's own approach to Xenophon.

Strauss's Reading of *Memorabilia* 4.4

Before I go farther, a quick summary of *Memorabilia* 4.4 may be in order:

> Socrates revealed his views about justice in deeds and in words. He never did anything unjust at home or while on campaign. He once discussed justice with the sophist Hippias. When Hippias insisted that Socrates reveal his own view for a change, rather than simply asking questions, Socrates said first that his deeds showed what he thought of justice. When Hippias was not satisfied with this, Socrates said that what is lawful is just, and indeed that 'just and lawful are the same' (τὸ αὐτὸ … νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι). Cities determine what is legal by passing written laws; justice, then, consists of obeying the laws of the city. When Hippias objects that the laws are often changed, Socrates replies that cities make peace with their enemies, but that this does not make the commands of generals any less obligatory. And Socrates praises the many benefits brought to cities and individuals when the law is obeyed.
>
> (4.4.2–18)

> Hippias seems agreeable, but Socrates asks him about unwritten laws. Has he heard of them? Yes: they are the things that people everywhere agree upon, and they were established by the gods. Hippias seems to assume that such laws are never broken, but Socrates corrects this: rather, whenever they are broken, punishment inevitably follows. They discuss four such laws. The first mandates that we honour the gods, the second that we honour our parents; a third forbids incest between parents and children and the last unwritten law prohibits ingratitude toward those who treat us well. Laws that enforce themselves must be the work of the gods, who therefore agree in saying that the just and the lawful are the same. (4.4.19–25)

Strauss provides, to the best of my knowledge, three major discussions of this passage. His view of the passage does not substantially change over time, as far as I can gather,[20] so I will discuss his arguments together. But the contexts in which he discusses the passage do differ. One comes where we would expect it, in *Xenophon's Socrates*, his 1972 commentary on the Socratic works other than the *Oeconomicus*. This is the only discussion of the passage to say much about the second half of the passage, the account of natural law.

The other two discussions of 4.4 came decades earlier in Strauss's career, and in some ways are more revealing, for Strauss's decision to discuss our passage in works dedicated to other writings of Xenophon reveals its importance to him. They are also far clearer presentations, not only because this is the less obscure early Strauss, but because in each case Strauss is advancing an argument rather than commenting on Xenophon for his own sake. He therefore draws conclusions that he only hints at in his later book on Xenophon. Strauss discusses our passage in his first article on Xenophon, 'The spirit of Sparta or the taste of Xenophon', from 1939; unlike so many of his articles, this one has never been reprinted either by Strauss or any of his editors, presumably because it is too revelatory. He addressed 4.4 again in his first book on Xenophon, *On Tyranny*, first published in 1948 (though I shall cite the edition of 2000).

In his account of Xenophon's *Constitution of Sparta*, Strauss discusses 4.4 because it complicates his attempt to undermine the Lycurgan regime. Strauss makes much of the absence of justice from the virtues promoted by Lycurgus, contrasting this with the major role justice plays in the idealized Persia of *Cyropaedia* 1.2. Lycurgus did, however, promote obedience to the laws, and if justice can be identified with obeying the laws, then the lack of any explicit teaching on justice becomes far less important. In his book on the *Hiero*, Strauss discusses the passage because it complicates his effort to defend the startling teaching that 'the rule of an excellent tyrant is superior to, or more just than, rule of laws' (2000: 74). Strauss quickly makes it clear, I hasten to add, that such a regime is very rare indeed, which renders this teaching 'purely theoretical' and 'no more than a most forceful expression of the problem of law and legitimacy' (2000: 76); the best of achievable regimes is in fact a moderate democracy under the rule of law (cf. 1950: 140–143).

[20] Dorion 2010: 318 identifies one change in Strauss's view from 1939 to 1972, but the change is relatively minor, especially given the thirty-three years that separate the two publications.

But a legalistic understanding of justice, while beneficial in practical terms, is incoherent in theory, in Strauss's view. For it amounts to an endorsement of conventionalism, the view that there is no natural right because opinions on right and wrong differ from society to society. If justice means obeying the laws of one's own society, and different societies have different laws (as they do), there is no transcendent justice. Thus the stakes raised by *Memorabilia* 4.4 are very high indeed—and this only to mention those raised by the first half of the chapter. The questions raised by the natural law teaching are, if anything, even greater.

I will now go on to attempt to articulate and evaluate Strauss's arguments about 4.4. The structure of the first part of my discussion, as will become clear, is modelled on that of Dorion 2010, though I will all too regularly disagree with his analysis.

Strauss's First Claim: Socrates Does Not Equate Justice with Obeying the Laws of Athens

Words and Deeds (*Strauss 1939: 518–519; cf. Dorion 2010: 296–302*)

At 4.4.10, Socrates and Hippias agree that deeds provide better evidence than words. Strauss argues this contradicts the principle that words are superior to deeds, the principle which, Strauss claims, motivates the structure of the *Memorabilia*. Strauss takes this contradiction to undermine the surface teaching of 4.4.

Strauss supports his tendentious claim about the structuring principle of the *Memorabilia* only with a footnote (1939: 519 n. 2), which consists mainly of references to passages that Strauss, in accordance with his normal practice, does not deign to discuss, leaving evaluation of them to his readers. The most important reference is to *Mem.* 1.3.1, where Xenophon outlines what Strauss implies is the plan for the whole *Memorabilia*: showing Socrates' beneficial deeds and words. Strauss takes 1.3.1 to indicate that Xenophon will first discuss deeds, then words, and argues that only the next three chapters, at most, cover deeds. As Dorion rightly notes, this is a rather dubious reading of 1.3.1, though it is not one unique to Strauss.

Dorion takes Strauss to be making a larger point, that Socrates believes that discourse is superior to action. Dorion then provides a devastating critique of that claim. It is indeed absurd to claim that Xenophon or Socrates thought words superior to deeds in all situations. But this is not what Strauss says. Strauss says that the structure of the *Memorabilia* is based on this

principle. And the *Memorabilia*, as an esoteric work, is not intended to reveal Socrates' deepest views.

Here is how Strauss describes the views we do find in the *Memorabilia*.

> Their not quite serious nature is indicated between the lines, i.e. by occasional remarks which are in flagrant contradiction to his public views and which, therefore, are apt to be deleted by modern editors, as well as by the well known and so to speak famous deficiencies of the plan of both the whole work and a number of individual chapters. (Strauss 1939: 519)

In fact the principle governing the structure of the *Memorabilia*, that words are more credible than deeds, is false. It would be truer to put things the other way around. Elsewhere, comparing Plato to Shakespeare, Strauss says that no one mistakes Macbeth's views for those of Shakespeare.

> Perhaps the action of the play refutes Macbeth's utterances. Perhaps the dramatic poet reveals his thought exclusively by the play as a whole, by the action, and not by speech, that is to say, the speeches of his characters. This much we can say safely, that the distinction between speeches and deeds, and the implication that the deeds are more trustworthy than the speeches, is basic for the understanding of works like the Platonic dialogues. The deeds are the clue to the meaning of the speeches. (Strauss 1989: 152)

So if deeds are ultimately more trustworthy than words, how are we to read the *Memorabilia*, which is structured around a false principle, the inferiority of deeds to speeches? Or, to restrict ourselves to the matter at hand, how are we to read 4.4? We would need to understand how Strauss reads the deeds of 4.4. This would consist not so much of the account of Socrates' deeds in that chapter (which, after, is really just another set of words), as of the plot of the chapter itself. The plot of the chapter consists of Socrates' refutation of Hippias. In his last remarks on this chapter, Strauss notes that Xenophon closed the chapter by saying that Socrates made those who approached him more just. Strauss thinks it important that Xenophon omits to say that Socrates made them more law-abiding. Strauss must therefore suggest an alternative understanding of how Socrates made Hippias more just. Socrates did so by refuting him. 'Being made aware of the superiority of a man whom one regards as one's inferior or equal means however being made more just' (1972: 114). Perhaps Strauss means something like this: The action of the chapter does not prove that justice is the same thing as abiding by the laws of the city (or the laws of the gods), but rather that it is imprudent and hence unjust to openly question the congruence of justice and the laws, as Hippias had done. The lesson of the chapter is thus a practical one. 'While the identification of the just with the legal is theoretically wrong, it is practically as a rule correct' (1972: 114). That is, while what Socrates *says*

may be, strictly speaking, false, what he *does* by saying it—convincing most readers to equate justice with legality—is wise. And Hippias, by *saying* what is true (that the positive law is not infallible) *acts* in a way that is inferior, and less just.

Considering the action of the whole chapter has gotten me ahead of myself, and gotten us into some rather murky Straussian territory. What support Strauss provides for this view of the chapter, if indeed it is his view, will only emerge as we consider more of his arguments. But before we leave the antithesis between words and deeds, we should note a humbler observation by Strauss that may be more immediately convincing. Strauss notes (1972: 105–106) that 4.4 opens with an unusually lengthy bit of Socratic biography, a list of his just deeds. This led many editors to regard 4.4.1–5 as an interpolation, as Strauss will have known.[21] Their suspicions confirm, for Strauss, the importance of those remarks. As we will see below, Strauss will argue that 4.4.1–5 do not in fact support the positivist overt teaching of the chapter.

Can we salvage anything from Strauss's observations about words and deeds, then? I do not find Strauss's claim about the structuring principle of the *Memorabilia* terribly convincing: this is more a matter of Strauss's pre-existing belief that Socrates does not speak his mind than an observation drawn from the text. But it does strike me as well worth pointing out that the beginning of 4.4 is unusually biographical, and that it is curious that Socrates insists that his deeds are the best guide to his view of justice and has to be goaded by Hippias into revealing his own view. Socrates does not say this when asked about self-control or piety, for example. These observations do suggest that something more than meets the eye may be going on. Of course, given that Strauss routinely believes that something more (or less) than meets the eye is going on, it is difficult to know what he would have us make of such hints. Probably he would say that extra hints were needed given that Socrates here puts forward rather more substantive philosophical claims than he routinely does elsewhere in the *Memorabilia*. As these substantive philosophical claims do not represent Socrates' innermost thinking, in Strauss's view, Xenophon felt he had to provide us with some extra hints to that effect.

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21 Marchant's note in the OCT ad loc.: 'cap. IV. §§1–5 usque ad πολλάκις aut spurias aut interpolatas putant fere omnes' ('just about all editors believe 4.1–5 up to πολλάκις is either spurious or an interpolation').

Alcibiades and Pericles (*Strauss 1939: 519–520, 2000: 73; cf. 1972:15. Dorion 2010: 302–306*)

Strauss's second point is that Xenophon knew full well how to critique a positivistic account of law because he had Alcibiades do so in his conversation with Pericles early in the *Memorabilia* (1.2.40–46). Alcibiades there shreds Pericles' attempt to define the law, starting with democratic law, in positivistic terms. Alcibiades claims that when a regime resorts to force instead of persuasion it acts illegally. Alcibiades argues that even in a democracy, some, the rich, are not persuaded of the rightness of the laws; thus laws passed to their disadvantage are illegitimate. Strauss emphasizes the Socratic nature of Alcibiades' method and thought, and notes that Alcibiades was still a student of Socrates at the time of this conversation.

Alcibiades' refutation of Pericles is usually taken to be an example of the malicious use of the elenchus. It is, I dare say, one of oddest passages in the *Memorabilia*, and one of the best diagnostic tests for whether one is going to be open to the view that there is much beneath the surface in Xenophon.[22] While Dorion grants that Alcibiades' questioning is more philosophical and more profound than the legal positivism of 4.4, he argues that we must reject what Alcibiades has to say. He couches our choice here as follows:

> It is one or the other: either Xenophon does not approve of this kind of insolence and wishes to show that Alcibiades' disrespectful attitude owes nothing to the teaching of Socrates; or Xenophon approves of Alcibiades' questioning, but this approbation is disastrous for Socrates, since the latter appears therefore as an inspirer of the question that Alcibiades puts to Pericles.
>
> (Dorion 2010: 304–305)

As the second alternative would show Xenophon to be most inept, he must have meant us to reject Alcibiades' argumentation as unSocratic, though Xenophon failed to make this very clear. This is not quite right, it seems to me; we do not need to make Alcibiades either an unSocratic devil or a stand-in for Socrates. Obviously Xenophon condemns something about

[22] Gabriel Danzig 2005 has called it 'the biggest challenge to any coherent reading of the *Memorabilia*.' Kirk Sanders 2011 presents an important new reading of the passage, in which he argues that Alcibiades' approach is sophistic rather than Socratic and his conversation with Pericles took place before he had become Socrates' student. His reading would save the appearances by clearly disassociating Alcibiades from Socrates, but it strikes me as a less natural interpretation of the passage itself.

Alcibiades' behaviour, and that condemnation is readily enough apparent in Straussian terms, though Strauss does not fully address this. Alcibiades, as Strauss notes, is 'young and rash' (2000: 73); Xenophon introduced him as hubristic. His goal is to win the argument, not to discover the truth or benefit anyone; this is eristic, not dialectic. Alcibiades poses, *à la* Socrates, as one who does not understand the subject, but he knows enough about the law to raise profound and unsettling questions about it. By attributing these questions to Alcibiades rather than to Socrates, Xenophon cunningly puts them on the table without directly crediting Socrates with them. Most readers, presumably, are to notice only that Alcibiades did not owe his disastrous political ambition to Socrates, given that he went after Pericles while still quite young; there were other such anecdotes in circulation (Plutarch *Alcibiades* 7.2). But those with ears to hear could learn something from how Alcibiades went after Pericles. His argument suggests that consent of the ruled is an important criterion for evaluating laws, reasonably enough. But he pushes this criterion too far, for if we demand that everyone consent to the laws, no one would ever break them, and we would not need laws in the first place. Along the way Alcibiades suggests what Strauss will take to be a better account of justice: laws are designed to require us to do what is good (1.2.42). Alcibiades' argument is as it were a miniature of the early Platonic dialogues: it reaches a negative conclusion but includes positive lessons along the way.

Xenophon's approach was risky, as some readers will have noticed the subversiveness of Alcibiades' arguments and blamed Socrates for this. But at least on the Straussian reading the risk comes along with a possible reward: the instruction offered to readers who were not simply offended by Alcibiades' arguments. On the conventional reading, there is no such possible reward, and Xenophon's approach appears singularly maladroit, as Dorion shows elsewhere (2000: clxvii). Xenophon could simply have left it at saying that Alcibiades abused the elenchus by refuting his elders; or he could have given some illustration of Alcibiades doing so, but made it clear why Alcibiades' abuse of the elenchus was unsound and unSocratic. He could have had Alcibiades use obviously faulty argumentation (say of the sort employed by the sophists of Plato's *Euthydemus*). Or he could have refuted him directly, either doing so in his own voice or, better yet, having Socrates do so. Instead he leaves Alcibiades' subversive arguments standing. Xenophon thus provides powerful evidence to those hostile to Socrates, and gains nothing. The logical conclusion would be that Xenophon is that familiar second-rate author of yore, the dupe of his sources. Hence I prefer the Straussian Xenophon, an author working on two levels at once, though

I would characterize Xenophon's approach here and elsewhere as more apologetic than esoteric.[23]

Teachers of Justice (*Strauss 1939: 520; Dorion 2010: 306–307*)

Socrates opens his conversation with Hippias by noting how odd it is that people can find someone to teach carpentry, bronze working, and horsemanship, but do not know where to go to learn about justice (4.4.5). Strauss points out that if the just were the same as the legal, 'every legal expert, nay, every member of the popular assembly would be a teacher of justice'. Strauss clearly alludes (without an explicit citation) to Socrates' discussion with Meletus in Plato's *Apology* (24d–25b; cf. also *Protagoras* 320d–328d), where Socrates claims that it is absurd to suggest that he is the only Athenian who cannot improve the youth. Dorion argues that Socrates is astounded that people do not know that he, Socrates, is the relevant expert, as he alone can explain why the just is the same as the lawful.[24] This seems to me to attribute an astounding degree of effrontery to Socrates, particularly given that Hippias will have to goad Socrates into revealing his view on justice. While Xenophon's Socrates is far less hesitant to position himself as a teacher than Plato's Socrates is, he never claims to teach justice. Rather, Socrates' point here (as in Plato's *Apology*) is simply that teachers of justice are hard to find.

Strauss's observation strikes me as having some force, then, but it is hardly conclusive. Disagreements about justice do not themselves make legal positivism untenable; certainly citizens, not to mention legal experts, often disagree about the meaning of the law, so even if we all agreed that the laws defined justice, we would still debate the meaning of the laws. But despite the absence of legal professionals in Socrates' day, surely it would be easier to find a teacher of justice if the just were the same as the legal. That, after all, is one of the better reasons to suggest such a theory of justice.

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[23] One of the reviewers of this essay pointed out, rightly, that the subtlety here is modest by Straussian standards; but Strauss is perfectly open to tensions in the text that appear not only between the lines but right before our eyes, as in the case of the palinode of the *Cyropaedia* or penultimate chapter of the *Spartan Constitution*. Just because Xenophon is sometimes subtle does not mean he is always or only subtle.

[24] Dorion 2001: 201–202 gives a rather different explanation.

Socrates' Just Actions (*Strauss 2000: 73–74; Dorion 2001: 105–107*)

Strauss argues that Socrates broke the law against teaching the art of words imposed by the Thirty Tyrants, thus showing that he recognized that some laws are unjust (cf. *Memorabilia* 1.2.31–33 with 4.4.3). Dorion counters, rightly, that the language in 4.4 is not entirely clear. Xenophon says that the Thirty ordered Socrates not to converse with the young, rather than saying that they made it illegal to do so, and it is also not absolutely clear that Socrates disobeyed the Thirty on this matter, in addition to refusing to participate in the judicial murder of Leon of Salamis. We might add that Xenophon twice attributes Socrates' refusal to obey the Thirty (at least regarding Leon of Salamis) to the fact that what they were commanding was contrary to the laws. Dorion is right that if there is any contradiction here it is not to be found in 4.4, which stresses the legality of Socrates' resistance.

If we consider the earlier passage on this matter, however, things do become more delicate, as Dorion grants. In 1.2.31 the prohibition on teaching the art of words (which turns out to forbid Socrates from speaking with the young) is explicitly said to be a law composed by Critias in his capacity as legislator (νομοθέτης). The original mandate of the Thirty, after all, was to revise the law-code of Athens. But Xenophon at once makes clear that the law was really intended to attack Socrates with the common slander against philosophers: Socrates was being charged with being a sophist. Socrates opens his conversation with Critias and Charicles by saying that he is prepared to obey 'the laws'; Dorion wonders whether this may be ironic, as what Socrates means is that he will obey the customary laws of Athens, laws which may contradict a new law passed by the Thirty. But we hear nothing that would lead us to think that the problem with the new law was a conflict with the pre-existing laws of Athens. Rather, Socrates goes on to interrogate Critias and Charicles about the meaning of that new law, as if he meant to obey it, if only he could understand what it meant. It becomes clear that the law is an *ad hoc* measure adopted by the Thirty in order to stifle Socrates, and is inspired by their hatred for him and his attacks on the regime. Socrates' promise to obey is ironic all right, but his refusal to obey is not based on the laws of Athens but on the evident baseness of this particular law. Socrates does not show that the law against teaching the art of words is unconstitutional, but rather that it is a personal attack on him. We are presented with a paradigmatic case of an unjust law, hardly a good argument for legal positivism.

Strauss similarly attempts to show that the two other just deeds of Socrates discussed in 4.4, Socrates' resistance to the illegal trial of the Arginusae

generals, and his refusal to stoop to the customary tricks used by people on trial for their lives, are also not simply a matter of Socrates refusing to act contrary to the laws. Dorion discusses neither passage, probably because Strauss's own discussion is so brief. Strauss simply notes that Socrates' actions regarding the Arginusae generals were earlier chalked up to his pious unwillingness to contravene the oath he had taken as a member of the Council (*Memorabilia* 1.1.17–18). Thus Socrates acted out of piety rather than to defend the law. But Socrates' oath enjoined him to act in accordance with the laws, as Xenophon himself tells us. Strauss is fascinated by the relationship between the virtues of piety and justice in a way I frankly do not fully understand, though no doubt this is part of the larger theologico-political problem that was one of the central strands in his thought. At any rate, it is hard to see how Socrates' resistance to the illegal process employed against the Arginusae generals could be seen as anything other than a defence of the rule of law; as Xenophon tells us in the *Hellenica* (1.7.15), Socrates says that he will do nothing contrary to the law, despite public pressure.

As for Socrates' trial, Strauss notes that elsewhere in Xenophon Socrates' decision to forego making a traditional defence was motivated by his divine sign (*Memorabilia* 4.8.5–8; *Apology* 4–5), which, Socrates concluded, opposed his making a defence because it was time for him to die. This is indeed a rather different sort of motivation, and here it may well be the case that Socrates' actions were not primarily motivated by his respect for the rule of law.[25]

I would thus render a mixed verdict. On at least one occasion, the illegal trial of the Arginusae generals, it would appear that Socrates acted out of a concern for the rule of law. But on the other two occasions it appears that while Socrates' actions can be described as defences of the rule of law, concern for the law was not his primary motivation. They thus do not support the claim that Socrates held that justice consists simply of obeying the law.

Thus far, then, Strauss has provided four reasons to suggest that we ought not simply adopt the surface meaning of our passage, by pointing to the unusually biographical nature of this chapter of the *Memorabilia*; noting that we have a rival account of the nature of law from a putatively Socratic source, Alcibiades; wondering why experts on justice are rare if all one

[25] Vander Waerdt 1993: 45–46 also suggests that Socrates' actions required consideration of 'translegal' issues. See further Waterfield (this volume, pp. 269–305).

needs to do to understand justice is to understand the law; and questioning whether Socrates' just acts were undertaken purely out of a concern for the rule of law. Some of his other suggestions, however, are less valuable, and certainly the arguments we have seen so far do not demonstrate that the passage should be read ironically: they are at most suggestive. We turn now to more direct attention to the logic and substance of the argument, although we will do so, in characteristically Straussian fashion, via the character of the interlocutor.

Hippias and the Logic of the Argument
(*Strauss 1972: 108–110; Dorion 2010: 315–319*)

In 4.4, Hippias replaces Euthydemus, who is otherwise Socrates' interlocutor for 4.2–4.6. Strauss explains why as follows:

> Hippias was famous or notorious as a despiser of the laws; proving to Hippias that the just is the legal is a much greater feat and has a much more persuasive power than proving it to Euthydemus. (Strauss 1972: 108)

Dorion notes that our evidence outside of this passage for Hippias' view of law is rather meagre, at least outside of *Protagoras* 337c–e. There Hippias pompously says that the assembled intellectuals from throughout the Greek world should regard themselves as naturally akin, and put aside the differences imposed by the different *nomoi* of their native cities. He does thus seem to back *physis* over *nomos*. More importantly, within our passage itself Hippias speaks contemptuously of the laws:

> 'How,' he said, 'Socrates, could anyone consider it a serious matter to obey them, when often the same people who established them reject them and replace them?' (4.4.14)

Strauss's claim, then, is that the presence of a man who despises the law leads Socrates to be more respectful of it than he is elsewhere. Certainly the presence of Hippias here does require some explanation, given that otherwise 4.2–6 portray the education of Euthydemus, and Hippias' scepticism about the law must be at least part of that explanation. Strauss is on to something.

Strauss also makes much of Socrates' hopes for the happy results to come from Hippias' irrefutable account of justice (4.4.8):

> Socrates is greatly pleased by the prospect that henceforth jurymen will cease to give conflicting votes, citizens will cease to contradict one another regarding the just things, to litigate, and to start revolts, and cities will cease to disagree about the just things and go to war. In the context of the chapter this means that, even if the just is the same as the legal, the confusion referred to

> will not cease, and we still would have to wish for men who know not merely the legal but the just as well. (Strauss 1972: 109)

Strauss's decision to paraphrase Socrates closely, which brings out the amazing promise of Hippias' teaching, together with his noting that Socrates was 'greatly pleased' by the likely results of Hippian justice, shows that he recognizes that Socrates' praise of Hippias is ironic. But Strauss nonetheless claims that we are to take Socrates at his word. As legal positivism only equates justice and the law, rather than revealing the substance of justice (as Hippias' grand teaching would apparently do), it will not help prevent conflict. Thus rather than simply mocking Hippias' pretensions, in Strauss's view Socrates' language raises the bar for any account of justice, and legal positivism fails to clear that bar.

This strikes me as a pretty clear example of Straussian overreach. For no account of justice, even one that cannot be refuted, would put an end to conflict over justice. A philosopher's (or sophist's) discovery of the truth about justice would hardly lead the immediate acceptance of that truth, and there would of course also be ample room for dispute about the facts in a legal dispute (or diplomatic dispute), even if the disputants agree about the principles of justice. Socrates' sarcastic little dream about a potential *nirvana* in which justice reigns is meant to poke fun at Hippias' grand claims, rather than to undermine any attempt to define justice (which is what Strauss's argument would amount to) or the teaching that does appear in the chapter—a teaching which isn't Hippias' teaching at all.

Or is it? Rather paradoxically, Strauss attributes the argument for legal positivism to Hippias, the doubter of the laws; while Hippias' promised speech on justice surely would not have equated justice with legality, Hippias here, in Strauss's view, is only too willing to equate the two—presumably because Hippias quickly recognizes that it is imprudent to question the status of the law:

> Socrates proves to Hippias now that the legal (lawful, law-abiding) is just; Hippias understands this to mean that the legal and the just are the same, and Socrates accepts this interpretation. Socrates might have meant that everything legal is just but not everything just is legal (prescribed by law). (Cf. the distinction between the legal and the useful in IV.4.1 with the definition of justice implied in IV.8.11.) (Strauss 1972: 110)

Here is the key passage:

> φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τὸ νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι.
> Ἆρα τὸ αὐτὸ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι;
> Ἔγωγε, ἔφη.

> 'For I maintain that the lawful is just.'
> 'Are you saying, Socrates, that the lawful and the just are the same?'
> 'I am,' he said. (4.4.12)

Strauss here comes rather closer to the sorts of logical distinctions dear to analytical students of Socrates than he usually does, but as usual he does not fully investigate the logic of the argument. And Socrates himself goes on to endorse this same position, that 'the lawful and the just are the same', on two occasions, once emphatically in his own voice (4.4.18) and once, at the close of this chapter, as a view held by the gods (4.4.25). And he does provide some argument to connect justice and legality, argumentation missed by Strauss and others.[26] Thus this is clearly Socrates' own position, not something we can fob off as Hippias' interpretation of Socrates' position.

Socrates' argument, however, shows only that what is legal is also just, in keeping with his initial formulation of his position. Thus in the few lines of the text that follow the passage quoted above we find the following argument:

1. One who obeys the laws agreed to by the citizens is lawful.
2. By obeying these laws one does what is just.
3. One who does what is just is himself just.
4. Therefore the lawful person is just. (4.4.13)

The lawful person is thereby proven to be just—if only in formal terms, as the argument provides no backing for the crucial second step. But the argument does not show, even formally, that *only* the lawful person is just. Similarly, at the end of the chapter, Socrates argues that the laws enacted by the gods are just—for who else would make a just law, if not the gods? But once again, strictly speaking Socrates has only argued that the laws of the gods are just, not that everything just is also legal because it has been legislated by the gods or man.

The disconnect between Socrates' position that 'the just and the lawful are the same' and his arguments that show only that the lawful is just, leaving open the possibility that there are just things that are not ordained by law, could be due simply to the fact that Xenophon was not, or did not care to be, a logician. Few non-analytical readers, after all, will have noticed the fairly subtle point that arguing that the lawful is just does not also show that the just is lawful. But Xenophon elsewhere uses the same

[26] As noted by Dorion 2010: 307 n. 67; the others include Johnson 2003.

language—X and Y are 'the same' (τὸ αὐτό)—in a rather loose way. He here has Socrates describe Anaxagoras' foolish and impious views on the nature of the sun:

> For that man, in saying that fire and sun are the same (ἐκεῖνος γὰρ λέγων μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι πῦρ τε καὶ ἥλιον), failed to recognize that people can easily look upon fire, but cannot look at the sun ... And when he would say that the sun is a fiery stone (λίθον διάπυρον), here too he failed to recognize something, that a stone when it is in fire does not shine or endure for long, but that the sun remains most brilliant for all time. (4.7.7)

When Anaxagoras said that 'fire and sun are the same' or perhaps 'fire and sun are the same *thing*' he meant not that all sun is fire and all fire is sun, but that the sun is one example of fire, a fiery stone (or a stone on fire). Saying two things are 'the same' can mean that one is an example of the other. The logical possibilities here are rather more complicated than we can go into here, but suffice it to say that Xenophon's language gives him more wiggle room than one might have thought.[27] In this case, Xenophon may not have meant or expected readers to jump to the conclusion that justice and legality were one and the same, any more than he expected readers to equate fire and sun.

Concluding this laboured section, then, I tend to agree with Strauss that the choice of Hippias as interlocutor is related to Hippias' cynicism about the law, and I have argued, in a Straussian fashion if not following explicit guidance from Strauss, that the absence of any clear argument equating justice and legality may be significant. I have also suggested that Xenophon's language leaves room for a less rigorous claim than one identifying justice with legality. On the other hand, I do not think that Strauss provides us with any good reason to credit Hippias rather than Socrates with the argument that the lawful is just, or that Socrates' sarcasm about Hippias' irrefutable account of justice, an account we never get, is somehow meant to undermine the account of justice we do get. As is no doubt his intention, Strauss's observations are suggestive rather than conclusive; he provides the reader with insights to follow up on rather than attempting to demonstrate that his interpretation is correct.

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[27] Among other things, 'fire' and 'sun' are not the same sorts of things as 'the just' and 'the legal', and while in the first case Anaxagoras was clearly saying that the sun was a fire, I find it unlikely that Socrates is saying that the just is an example of what is legal—i.e., that there are things enjoined by law that are not just. But as 'the just' is the matter to be defined here, as 'the sun' was the item to be explained above, this is what the logic of the parallel would imply.

Justice as Benefaction (*Strauss 2000: 74; cf. 1989: 135–145*)

I have yet to comment on the little parenthetical remark Strauss appended to his claim that Socrates may only have meant to say that what is legal is just, and not that all that is just is legal:

> (Cf. the distinction between the legal and the useful in IV.4.1 with the definition of justice implied in IV.8.11.) (Strauss 1972: 110)

We have here the characteristic Straussian ploy of requiring readers to reconstruct Strauss's position out of citations—though he does give us a bit of help here. 4.4.1 does not explicitly distinguish the legal and the useful; it says rather that Socrates treated all those he dealt with in private life both lawfully and beneficially (ὠφελίμως). But Strauss routinely assumes that when an author uses two words they are not mere synonyms, so 'legally' cannot mean the same thing as 'helpfully'. In *Memorabilia* 4.8.11 Xenophon reports that 'Socrates was so just that he never harmed anyone at all, but was of the greatest benefit (ὠφελιμώτατον) to those who dealt with him' (cf. 4.8.10). So the 'definition of justice implied in IV.8.11' is that justice consists of benefaction, something Strauss makes clearer in his book on the *Hiero*.[28] This contradicts and trumps the apparent teaching of 4.4. Perhaps the clearest argument for Strauss's claim that Socratic justice is benefaction is that it makes sense of the structure of the *Memorabilia*. The *Memorabilia* begins with a proof of Socrates' justice before the law, but then turns to a much longer proof of how beneficial he was. If being beneficial means being just, then the whole of the *Memorabilia* shows Socrates' justice.

Laws, too, will not be just simply *qua* laws, but only inasmuch as they are beneficial, as Alcibiades' argument with Pericles hints. There Alcibiades asks Pericles whether or not those who make laws do so in the belief that they enjoin citizens to do what is good and not what is bad, and Pericles readily agrees (*Memorabilia* 1.2.42). This agreement plays no further role in the rest of the argument, which shows that it is a central part of the argument, to the Straussian way of thinking—though I cannot trace this exact observation to Strauss: read enough Strauss and you will have this experience, even if you are not a card-carrying member.

This same understanding of justice is at work in our chapter, where Socrates argues at some length that abiding by the law is beneficial (4.4.14–17), and the central argument of the section on unwritten laws is that

[28] Strauss 2000, 74.

violation of such laws is always punished (4.4.21–24): hence is it always beneficial to obey them. Legality is connected with justice mainly through benefaction, and so it may well be the case that benefaction, not legality, is what defines justice. This is not the place to evaluate the validity of the view that Xenophon's Socrates understands justice as benefaction, which would require, among other things, tackling other passages that seem to attribute to Socrates, or to another Xenophontic hero, some version of the view that the just is the lawful.[29] But it is certainly worth pausing to note that Strauss does have a positive alternative account of Socratic justice, and that this account of Socratic justice makes good sense of most of the argument of 4.4.

It thus appears to me that Strauss at least points us toward a way of understanding the passage that does not credit Socrates with the version of legal positivism he is usually taken to promote here, the belief that to be just all one need do is obey the laws of the city. Strauss notes that the argument proves rather less than this, as it shows only that the lawful is just, not that all that is just is lawful, and it does so mainly by showing that the lawful is beneficial. It is thus arguably the case that justice is better defined by what is beneficial than by what is lawful, as Strauss suggests. I have added a linguistic argument (based on the ambiguity of 'the same') and will here add, in keeping with a comment from Strauss, the obvious appeal of an argument that praises obedience to the laws by comparing it to obedience to commands in wartime. 'However much of a wandering sophist he may be, Hippias cannot resist this appeal to his civic or patriotic feeling' (Strauss 1972:11). The appeal of legal positivism to an author defending Socrates is clear enough. The question is whether Xenophon's defence of Socrates has room for a more controversial doctrine beneath the surface.

The Laws of the City vs. Natural Law (*Strauss 1972: 111, 1939: 520; Dorion 2010: 307–310*)

In his 1972 book Strauss marks the *segue* to the account of unwritten laws at 4.4.19 as follows:

> Needless to say that by having pointed out the great virtue of law-abidingness Socrates has not proved that the legal and the just are the same. This explains why he now abruptly turns to the unwritten laws. (Strauss 1972: 111)

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29 Dorion 2011: 320 briefly discusses passages appearing to identify the just with the legal; Vander Waerdt 1993: 46–47 argues that for Xenophon's Socrates justice is benefaction.

How, for Strauss, does Socrates' failure to prove that justice and legality coincide explain why he abruptly introduces unwritten laws? Strauss explains why, but only in 1939:

> And finally, after having 'proved' his point, Socrates suddenly turns from the laws of the city to the unwritten (or natural) laws, and he thus, and only thus, indicates the crucial question, the question of the possible divergence and opposition of the laws of the city and the natural laws. (1939: 520)

For Strauss, the lack of any clear transition between written and unwritten laws is not an oversight but an intentional flaw in the surface rhetoric of the passage, and is meant to show careful readers that the relationship between written and unwritten law is problematic. Given the rather episodic nature of *Memorabilia*, this argument does not strike me as particularly compelling. But I have argued elsewhere, following Donald Morrison's lead, that there is indeed an implicit tension between the divine laws and the laws of the city; Sophocles' *Antigone* is the most famous case of such conflict. In my view (which here diverges starkly from Morrison's), Xenophon's Socrates believes that the divine law trumps the positive law of the city, but leaves this unclear because this was a controversial position in his day: unwritten divine law was held to be a refuge of aristocrats who wished to reject the written, democratic laws of Athens.[30]

My reading has been attacked for being too ironic.[31] It is indeed true that Xenophon's Socrates does not here or elsewhere give an example of conflict between written and unwritten laws. But neither does he rule out such conflict; hence it is also going too far to claim, as Dorion does, that Xenophon 'tries to show that far from involving controversial relations, the positive and unwritten laws are in accord, complement and reinforce each other mutually' (2010: 309). In any conceivable theory, the unwritten laws discussed here will not often come into conflict with written law, as written laws are indeed going to favour honouring the gods and one's parents and condemning incest, and are certainly not going to condemn gratitude in any direct manner. Conflict will be the exception, not the rule, so the presence of a number of occasions in which unwritten and written laws mesh does not tell us very much. And it is more reasonable to ask whether Socrates' unwritten and written laws can conflict, and, if so, how he would handle such conflict, than to ask what Hamlet was doing

[30] Johnson 2003, Morrison 1995.
[31] Gray 2004, Dorion 2010: 307–309.

between acts. For if we aim to uncover Socratic philosophy we will often find ourselves asking such questions in order to flesh out Socrates' views. Given the presence of famous conflicts between divine and human law elsewhere in Greek thought, it does not seem to me unduly speculative to wonder what Xenophon's Socrates would have made of such conflict. Moreover, we can readily provide a convincing reason for why Xenophon did not call this conflict to our attention. Not only was it dangerous to question the positive law of Athens; promotion of unwritten laws was also controversial. So a theory that would regard unwritten laws as trumping written ones where the two types of law conflict would be very controversial indeed.

But even my reading, which finds an implicit conflict between written and unwritten laws, would not be ironic enough for Strauss. For Strauss does not think that the unwritten laws provide a reliable guide to justice either. This brings us to Strauss's second large claim about the passage, that the unwritten laws of the gods are no better a guide to justice than are the written laws of men.

Strauss's Second Claim: Socrates Does Not Identify Justice with the Unwritten Laws of the Gods (Strauss 1972: 111–112)

The Argument Belongs to Hippias, Not Socrates

As we have seen, despite his view that the first part of the argument was designed to counter Hippias' known cynicism about positive law, Strauss still implied that the argument belonged more to Hippias than Socrates. Hippias was as much an esotericist as Socrates, in Strauss's view, and thus he very quickly followed Socrates' lead in praising the laws of the land, and even pushed the argument further in his own right. Strauss will imply that the account of unwritten laws also belongs to Hippias. This is a somewhat more plausible claim, as Hippias expresses less scepticism about divine law and does make some positive contributions to the argument, but Strauss is still clearly exaggerating Hippias' role. While it is Socrates who introduces the topic of unwritten laws, Strauss attributes the first two features of unwritten law to Hippias: 'According to Hippias the unwritten laws obtain in every country in the same sense and have been laid down by gods' (1972: 111, paraphrasing 4.4.19). We have here a nice example of interpretation couched as paraphrase. It is true enough that when Socrates asks Hippias if he knows of any unwritten laws, it is Hippias who volunteers the claim that unwritten laws are those recognized everywhere in the same sense.

Socrates, however, does not challenge this view now or later, though elsewhere he shows himself perfectly willing to correct Hippias. It is also Hippias who draws the conclusion that the gods have set up the unwritten laws, but only as the result of several leading questions from Socrates:

> *Socrates*: Would you say that humans established them (the unwritten laws)?
> *Hippias*: And how could they, when they couldn't all meet and don't speak the same language?
> *Socrates*: Well, who do you think has set up these laws?
> *Hippias*: I believe the gods set up these laws for men. (4.4.19)

Socrates' first question pretty clearly implies a negative answer and the wording of his second rules out any impersonal source. Hence we can attribute the divine origin to Hippias only in the sense that we may always attribute an argument developed by question and answer to the answerer, even when the questioner is asking blatantly leading questions, as Socrates has been known to do on occasion.

Hippias does go on to volunteer his own reason for believing that the gods are the source of unwritten laws: 'among all men the first thing considered lawful is to reverence the gods' (4.4.19). This does at least show him making a positive contribution to the argument. But it is Socrates who now asks about two additional unwritten laws—as Strauss admits, while still trying to promote Hippias' role: 'Hippias replies in the affirmative to Socrates' question whether honouring one's parents is also regarded everywhere as a law.' But Hippias objects to Socrates' suggestion that incest between parents and children is another such unwritten law. As Strauss notes, this implies that Hippias thought that divine laws are never broken, and in particular that he thought that the laws about honouring gods and parents were never broken. Strauss wittily questions Hippias' motivation: 'whether he thinks so from innocence or from the lack of it, we are in no position to tell' (1972: 112). But the key point here is that Socrates goes on at once to correct Hippias' view, replacing universal obedience to unwritten laws with his view that such laws, while sometimes broken, always result in the offender being punished.

Thus it is Socrates who is responsible for raising the topic of unwritten laws, for suggesting two out of the three laws under consideration, and for replacing Hippias' mistaken belief that divine laws are never broken with his own view that they are never broken without consequences. Socrates is perfectly willing to correct Hippias when need be. Hippias will in fact express some scepticism about Socrates' interpretation of divine law, twice asking Socrates to show how it is that the law against incest cannot be

broken without punishment following. We cannot conclude, therefore, that the doctrine of unwritten laws belongs to Hippias rather than to Socrates.

The Absence of an Argument to Justify the First Two Unwritten Laws

Let us take a look at Strauss's summary of the next part of the argument, Socrates' response when Hippias observes that the law against incest is sometimes broken:

> Socrates however holds that a law is unwritten or divine, not because it is never transgressed, but because its transgressors cannot possibly escape punishment, as one can escape punishment for transgressing any human law. According to this view, men who transgress the two laws which Hippias declared to be divine—honouring gods and parents—would not escape punishment even if they escaped human justice. But this is not what Socrates says about these two laws; he does not assert that, nor show how, not worshipping the gods carries with it its own punishment; perhaps he thought that in these cases punishment does not automatically follow the transgression but is inflicted on the transgressor by men or gods. (Strauss 1972: 112)

Thus Strauss makes a good deal of the absence of any argument to show that punishment always strikes those who break the first two divine laws (that we honour gods and parents). He suggests that Socrates believed that these laws were instead punished by human or divine authorities (or at least that the law enjoining that we worship the gods was enforced in this way, as Strauss strangely drops that about honouring parents). This would mean that Socrates did not really view such laws as divine in the sense he has given that term. Strauss takes the absence of an argument justifying the first two divine laws to be Xenophon's pointer that we are to read between the lines and drop the first two divine laws.

Is Strauss right to do so? One way to answer this question is to consider whether what Socrates says in defence of the other divine laws can be applied to those enjoining us to honour parents and the gods. The argument about incest does not apply. But there is one final divine law in this chapter, one that Socrates explains and defends but that Strauss says almost nothing about. After spending some time calling Socrates' account of incest into question, Strauss simply adds this:

> Socrates finally shows that the law forbidding ingratitude is likewise divine in his sense. (1972: 113)

Strauss says nothing about how Socrates showed this, and gives no hint that he believed Socrates failed to explain how ingratitude is always punished, unless 'likewise' suffices as a hint, and means that he did just as poor

a job defending this law as he did that against incest, which Strauss does indeed attack, as we shall see. Elsewhere Strauss cites ingratitude as an example of something that is unjust but not illegal (Strauss 2000: 73). But here Socrates captures gratitude in a legal framework, albeit one of unwritten law.

Socrates argues that those who fail to show gratitude when they are well treated will end up deprived of friends. For men do not wish to help men who will not help them in return. Both friendship and reciprocity are central elements in the ethics of Xenophon's Socrates, and indeed in ancient Greek ethical thinking in general. And this, the most general divine law Socrates discusses, would appear to encompass the earlier laws about honouring parents and gods, as both are our benefactors, the gods for arranging the world to our benefit, our parents for bringing us into being. As such they deserve our gratitude, and if we fail to reciprocate for their good deeds, they will likely disown us, costing us their valuable support, and we will likely have trouble winning the friendship of others who could help us. Xenophon confirms as much in a passage early in the *Cyropaedia* (1.2.7), in which he notes that the Persians are wise to punish ingratitude among children, as ingratitude, though punished by no legal process, is a fault likely to lead men to neglect their parents, country, and friends and indeed results in all sorts of vice.[32]

If this is right, the absence of an explicit argument showing that those who violate the laws mandating respect for gods and parents are always punished is not a Straussian hint but precisely what we would expect in the natural course of the conversation. Socrates did not need to justify these laws when they were first introduced, as the question of their violation had not yet become topical. And once Hippias raised the problem of the violation of divine laws, Socrates did not need to go back and justify those on parents and the gods because his argument about ingratitude had already covered this ground.

I thus come down differently on this argument, or rather absence of an argument, than I did in the case of the missing argument to show the identity of justice and legality, where I argued, with some hesitation, in support of Strauss's view that we are meant to notice the missing argument. In my view Strauss's technique of questioning propositions that are not backed up by explicit arguments is valuable, but needs to be applied more sensitively than he does here. I cannot but observe, however, that this

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[32] Dorion 2010: 309 cites this passage; see also Johnson 2003: 269.

particular interpretive tool is a very curious one to find in the hands of an author who so rarely provides explicit argumentation himself.

The Flawed Argument about Incest

Strauss does discuss Socrates' attempt to show how the law against incest is automatically enforced:

> In the case of incest between parents and children however the automatic punishment consists in the defective character of the offspring, for good offspring can only come from parents who are both in their prime. Socrates suggests in other words that divine punishment (and reward) is the same as the natural consequences of a human action. Hippias agrees to what Socrates says. This does not mean that he is wise in agreeing. It is unnecessary to mention that the Socratic argument is silent about incest between brother and sister. The Socratic argument implies that the punishment for incest between parents and children does not differ from the 'punishment' that is visited on any oldish husband who married a young wife. (113)

There are three points here:

(1) Divine punishment is nothing more than the natural consequence of a human action.
(2) Sibling incest is not covered.
(3) The punishment for parent-child incest is nothing more than that for any May–December couple.

Strauss's first objection seems to miss the point. Having just noted Socrates' *failure* to show that those who do not honour the gods or their parents are automatically punished, Strauss now implies that there is something wrong with his apparent *success* in showing that those who commit incest are automatically punished. This is an objection not to this particular part of the argument but to natural law as Xenophon's Socrates has defined it. Or, rather, it is the point that calling such laws 'divine' adds nothing, logically speaking.

To incest. Strauss, in his most irritating matter, calls our attention to sibling incest by saying it need not be mentioned, then fails to explain why it matters. Presumably Strauss's point is that a doctrine of divine law that fails to rule out sibling incest is too narrow. But there is nothing incoherent here, for Socrates and Hippias agreed earlier only that intergenerational incest was universally taboo; they said nothing about sibling incest.[33]

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[33] For Strauss on Socrates and incest, see Strauss 1989: 122–123, Strauss 1966: 39–53.

Strauss's last objection is related to his first. For if by divine law we mean nothing other than the natural consequences of our actions, marriage between any old husband and young wife should be as much a violation of divine law as that between father and daughter. This would make the divine laws too wide in their application, for there is no universal taboo against marriages between people of differing ages.

So Strauss claims that this so-called account of divine law is not divine, and is both too wide and too narrow. In my view his attack on the passage is unduly harsh. Probably Strauss is guilty of assimilating this first account of natural laws with later efforts to come up with a more all-inclusive code. Xenophon's Socrates is arguing that the gods have arranged things so that the views all human beings share are in our best interest. But Xenophon's Socrates does not argue that there is a natural law which, properly understood, will give us all the guidance we need to live just lives. His divine laws must not only be self-enforcing but also be universally recognized, and by universal recognition Socrates appears to mean actual, conscious recognition by every human society, not some abstract principle of rationality. Thus actions that always lead to negative consequences will be outlawed by divine law only if they are also condemned by all human societies. And while all transgressions of divine laws lead automatically to negative consequences, not all actions which automatically lead to such consequences will be transgressions of divine law. All couples of disparate ages will pay the price in defective offspring, but only incestuous May–December couples break divine law.

The gods' beneficence toward us here would be no surprise, given the teaching of the previous chapter of the *Memorabilia* (4.3). This passage, together with *Memorabilia* 1.4, preserves the first extant version of the argument from design. Both the natural world and our own bodies and souls were built by the gods for our benefit. Strauss is, of course, sceptical of this argument, too, but let us leave that for another time.

Hippias' Final Words

Strauss summarizes the end of our chapter as follows:

> In conclusion he [Socrates] asks Hippias whether he thinks that the gods legislate the just things or other things. Hippias replies that if a god does not legislate the just things, hardly anyone else would. Socrates infers from this that it pleases the gods too that the same is just as well as legal. Hippias does not contradict him. We on our part conclude that Hippias' final statement implies a recognition of the fact that the just things are as such different from the legal. (Strauss 1972: 113)

Do Hippias' final words—that if the gods do not legislate what is just, no one does—imply a recognition of 'the fact' that what is just is different from what is legal? We here have to do a bit to unpack the argument implied by Hippias' final two remarks—with no help from Strauss, of course. I would understand the implied argument in 4.4.24–25 as follows:

(1) Self-enforcing laws are beyond the power of a human lawgiver [and are hence divine in origin]
(2) [At least some laws are just]
(3) [The gods are very just]
(4) Therefore the laws passed by the gods are just

The first step covers a rather important part of the passage that Strauss neglects to mention. The middle two steps I have had to supply. The second step does indeed not demand that all laws are just (much less that justice and legality are one and the same), but neither does it imply anything to the contrary, as far as I can see. Strauss is, as often, both literally wrong but also on to something, as there is no good argument in the concluding lines of the passage to show that the gods legislate what is just. The argument instead relies on the premise that at least some laws are just; all it proves is that the divine laws are just if any laws are.

Overall, however, Strauss's attempts to undermine the argument of the second half of this chapter fail, by my reckoning. It is not legitimate to distance Socrates from this argument by crediting it to Hippias. The arguments showing that one always pays the price for incest and ingratitude are sound enough, and that on ingratitude covers the other unwritten laws. And while the final exchange with Hippias does not add much to the argument, neither does it undermine it. I thus conclude that Xenophon's Socrates not only argues but believes that the unwritten, divine laws are always just. Socrates provides very little direct argument to this effect, but there is plenty of argument to show that the unwritten laws are always beneficial. If justice is benefaction, then showing that the divine laws are always beneficial also shows that they are always just. I see no reason to doubt that this argument was meant seriously, and indeed it strikes me as a philosophically interesting account of natural law that we should be happy to credit Xenophon's Socrates with holding.

The argument on unwritten law does not, however, show that everything that is beneficial and just is dictated by divine law. The unwritten laws give us one slice of justice; they do not fully encompass the whole of justice. I thus agree with Strauss in arguing that both parts of the chapter prove less than they appear to prove, as they do not show that justice is identical with

legality. But I do think that both parts contain a positive teaching. As far as I can gather, while Strauss grants that the first part of the chapter does show that obedience to the written law is (usually) beneficial and hence just, Strauss finds no positive teaching in the second half of the chapter. As he discusses this part of the passage only in his least intelligible discussion of Xenophon (Strauss 1972), though, it is hard to be sure.

Finally, while Strauss notes the possibility of conflict between the written and unwritten laws, he makes no effort to discuss how Xenophon's Socrates would resolve such conflicts. But it is not terribly difficult to see how the two sorts of law would relate to one another. While Socrates shows that abiding by the written laws is, in general, beneficial, he does not argue that disobedience to them is *always* disadvantageous, nor does he prove that the written laws are coextensive with justice. So while obedience to the written law is normally just ('practically as a rule correct' Strauss 1972: 114), there are other things that are just and hence a possibility for conflict between different sorts of justice. One possibility for such an occasion would be when the law of the city conflicts with an unwritten law. In that case the unwritten law, which is always beneficial, trumps the written law, and obeying the law of the city would be neither just nor beneficial.

This potential conflict between types of laws is one complication to the surface teaching of the chapter. Another comes from the fact that Socrates provides no reason to believe that everything that is unjust must be contrary to the written laws, unwritten laws, or both.[34] If justice is understood as benefaction, one would need to have a very wide view of law to match it. On a common sense view, surely it is possible to harm someone without breaking the law, even if by 'the law' we include the divine laws, at least one of which, that enjoining reciprocity, is very wide in scope, and leaves considerable room for interpretation. For example, all May–December marriages are disadvantageous, at least if they result in offspring; and inasmuch as they are harmful, they are unjust (at least if we identify justice with benefaction and injustice with doing harm). But only some such marriages, incestuous ones, are contrary to the unwritten law. I thus salvage a positive teaching from this chapter, unlike Strauss, but still deliver rather less than a full defence of the claim that justice and the law are identical. I agree with Strauss in arguing that the chapter proves less than it appears to prove—it is just that I do think it proves something, and in particular that the second half of the chapter lays out impressive elements of a natural law theory.

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[34] I hereby rescind my hasty statement that 'the just and the lawful are one' in Johnson 2004.

Wrapping Up

Why, assuming I am right, as I like to do, did Strauss go wrong? I believe that Strauss's reading of Xenophon is ahistorical in that Strauss fails to note the controversy surrounding natural law (and intelligent design) in Xenophon's day. This explains why 4.4 appears to endorse the law of the city and does not explicitly show any conflict between positive law and divine law. By Strauss's day, intelligent design and natural law had come to be viewed as the last refuge of conservatives; he could thus view them as ideal exoteric teachings for thinkers whose actual views, like those of Strauss himself, were more unsettling. But in Xenophon's day it was intelligent design that was heretical, as it robbed the gods of the power to intervene wilfully on behalf of their favourites. And natural law was a dodge used by aristocrats hoping to escape the democratic positive law of contemporary Athens. These controversies adequately explain the reticence Xenophon shows in promoting these two doctrines. And they also show that Strauss was wrong to argue that the teachings on natural law and providence offered here were merely exoteric. It would not have been prudent for Xenophon to defend Socrates by saddling him with a heretical view of divine law.[35]

Needless to say, Strauss may not have been disheartened at hearing that his reading was ahistorical, for his reading of Xenophon was aimed at raising the perennial questions that humans face, not at putting Xenophon in the proper historical context. But Strauss also recognized that humans raise these perennial questions in distinct historical circumstances that pose different sets of challenges. If I am right, Strauss failed to consider whether Xenophon's historical context adequately explained why his account of natural law was so discreet. And Strauss found, between the lines, his own scepticism about natural law.

There are different ways of reading between the lines. Reading between the lines means filling in the gaps between them. In addition to sometimes following in the footsteps of Strauss, I have used what might be called *logical charity* to fill the gaps: I have tried to come up with a coherent philosophical position that would bridge them. This is in keeping, at least in broad terms, with the way that contemporary analytical philosophers read Plato. Strauss reads with *literary charity* rather than logical charity. That is, every last detail in the text, down to the last oath, is part of a coherent literary agenda.

[35] A particularly pointed view of the religious controversy surrounding Socrates can be found in Janko 2006.

Every flaw in the argumentation is intentional. But for Strauss such logical gaps are not meant to be filled: they point to the irremediable gaps in our understanding of things. There is no comprehensive rational account of the world to be found in the text of Xenophon, or anywhere else; too direct a revelation of this unsettling fact could however have deleterious consequences, so the job of the great writer is to allude to such gaps in a manner subtle enough to escape the notice of the unwashed multitude, but clear enough to aid wise readers in their efforts to understand things for themselves.

I see no reason to attribute this motive for esotericism to Xenophon. But we need not endorse the whole of Strauss's outlook in order to learn from his own interpretation of Xenophon, or to make use of Straussian tools to non-Straussian ends. And there are other, more plausible motivations for an author to be less than transparent, or even ironic: in Xenophon's case, the most obvious such motivation is his desire to both defend Socrates against the charges against him and to expand his defence to credit Socrates with being the most just and most beneficial of men. Proving Socrates' unique insight into matters like natural law risks undermining the defence of Socrates; hence, in my view, Xenophon's reticence to raise the possible conflict between written and unwritten (natural) law.

The alternative to reading between the lines is to allow any gaps we find in a text to stand, or even to trumpet them to the skies as evidence of our superiority over the text. The latter is not a bad characterization of the dominant attitude toward Xenophon during much of the twentieth century. Strauss shows us a way of reading that can help us to find a serious, principled and rational thinker rather than a simpleton with lots of gaps. Adding Straussian interpretive tools to your kit does not require you to end up with the same view of Xenophon that Strauss had, much less (heaven forbid) make you a Straussian. You may still employ the analytical tools of philosophical readers of Socratic texts, and employ a far greater degree of historical sensitivity than Strauss cared to. Reading Strauss can be hard; Strauss is an acquired taste, and I would not argue that reading Strauss on Xenophon is the most efficient means of uncovering Xenophon's meaning. Reading Strauss, given the tremendous range of his interests and the frequent obscurity of his writings, is a full time job. But reading *like* Strauss is easier, once you give it a try. And if we give it a try, even we philological idiots may end up with fewer gaps in our understanding of an author some of us also consider our special *Liebling*.

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CHAPTER FIVE

DEFENDING *DĒMOKRATIA*: ATHENIAN JUSTICE AND THE TRIAL OF THE ARGINUSAE GENERALS IN XENOPHON'S *HELLENICA*[*]

Dustin Gish

> In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passion never fails to wrest the scepter from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates; every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.
>
> – 'Publius', 1788[1]

The standard account of direct democracy (*dēmokratia*) as majority faction or mob rule—that is, rule by a *dēmos turannos*, prone to irrational excess and violence—originated in antiquity and held sway over the history of political thought for millennia. Even after the rehabilitation of democracy in the decades following the American and French revolutions, this anti-democratic sentiment has continued to cast its shadow over intellectual and political critiques of democracy, and especially Athenian democracy. Critics of direct democracy who cite 'the lessons of history' to support this account turn our attention to two defining events in the history of ancient Athens: first, the trial by jury and execution of Socrates by his fellow Athenians on charges of corruption and impiety; second, the trial and execution of Athenian generals, following the stunning victory by their fleet over the Spartan-led armada near the Arginusae islands, the greatest sea battle of the Peloponnesian War. References to both trials invariably appear in ancient and early modern, as well as contemporary, histories critical of Athenian direct democracy.

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[1] On anti-democratic rhetoric at the time of the American founding, see the serial publications of 'Publius' (Alexander Hamilton and James Madison) in Scigliano 2000: esp. Papers 6, 9, 10, 14, 49, 55, and 63 (from which the epigraph is taken). See also Gish 2012.

While the trial of Socrates and his death by hemlock in 399 have influenced the history of western tradition of political philosophy, it is the fate of the Arginusae generals who were tried, condemned, and sentenced to death in 406 by the Athenian Assembly that is most often cited as the example *par excellence* of the impassioned, unjust, and self-destructive character of radical Athenian democracy in the late fifth-century.[2] Despite efforts to liberate Athenian democracy from the taint of anti-democratic sentiment by scholars who study Athenian democracy and its institutions in detail,[3] the standard account of *dēmokratia* remains entrenched—and it continues to distort interpretations of the trial and execution of the generals as one of the darkest moment in the history of democratic Athens.[4]

What is most striking about the standard account of the trial of the Arginusae generals is how it is cited, in the absence of any extended textual analysis of the event itself, as self-evident proof that Athenian democracy was an inherently corrupt regime. In order to understand what happened on that occasion, the trial and its proceedings must be reconstructed with particular attention to its historical and political context. Our one primary source and *locus classicus* for the trial of the generals is Xenophon's *Hel-*

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2 References and allusions to the trial of the generals as *the* example of democratic injustice have been commonplace in the western political tradition: Roberts 1994: esp. 106–107, 170, 245, 251, 312. Our best primary sources for the trial of Socrates are Xenophon's *Apology* and *Memorabilia* (1.1, 4.8), and Plato's *Apology*. See also the chapters by Stokes and Waterfield in this volume (pp. 243–305).

3 See esp. Hansen 1998; Saxonhouse 2006; Ober 2008a, 2008b.

4 See Hanson 2003 and 2005: 5. Andrewes 1974, Roberts 1977, Due 1983, and Lang 1990, 1992 all accept the standard account. Lavelle 1988 explicitly denounces the anger, madness, destructive emotionalism, and irrationality of the *dēmos* during the trial as 'mob rule' and the 'moral nadir' of democracy. Yunis 1996: 43–46 declares that at the trial the Assembly 'engaged in what can only be described as mob terrorism', for 'the *dēmos* got entirely out of hand … legal procedures were ignored … informed protests were trampled down' and 'in a fit of fury the *dēmos* [acted] illegally'. Robinson 2004: 145 cites it as 'the most infamous Athenian example' of a rash demotic act, paradigmatic of democratic violence against their own leaders. This summary judgment was pronounced by the very influential nineteenth-century historian, William Mitford 1835: 4.282: the Athenian *dēmos* acted 'like a weak and fickle tyrant, whose passion is his only law', committing at the trial 'one of the most extraordinary, most disgraceful, and most fatal strokes of faction recorded in history'. One or two have seen the trial as an anomaly that should not be used to condemn democracy itself: Finley 1983: 140; Kagan 2004: 466. Even Ober 2008b: 41 n. 4, who otherwise argues that Athenian direct democracy aggregated and distributed knowledge through well-designed participatory institutions of deliberative decision-making, perpetuates the standard view by including the trial of the generals, and of Socrates, among the very few examples of 'Athenian failures' under democracy. Irreparable harm was done to the reputation of Athens and democracy through the centuries by these two 'exceptional' cases (Raaflaub 2004: 234 n. 150) which obscured the admirable success of Athenian *dēmokratia* as a regime.

lenica (1.7.1–35). Critics of Athenian democracy refer to this account, but only in passing; few have sought to study it in detail. Even then, most readers of *Hellenica* have taken for granted that Xenophon is hostile to democracy, a presupposition that inevitably taints their reading of his account of the trial with a distinct anti-democratic prejudice not evident in the account itself. Contrary to supporting accusations of unjust mob rule, a reading of that account untainted by such a presupposition or prejudice shows that Xenophon's narrative of the trial displays the capacity of Athenians under direct democracy to engage in reasonable, if at times contentious, political deliberations aimed at establishing and preserving justice in terms of the foundational principle of the regime: popular sovereignty. The account of the trial of the Arginusae generals by Xenophon, I argue, highlights the abiding attachment to and spirited defence of the democratic character of the Athenian regime in response to perceived threats to that regime from within Athens, at a time when recent memories of factional strife and political conspiracy compelled the *dēmos* to act decisively to defend *dēmokratia*.[5]

Athenian *Dēmokratia*: A Thucydidean Prologue

The decisive backdrop to Xenophon's account of the trial of the generals, which is the dramatic peak of the first book of *Hellenica*, appears in Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War—an 'unfinished' work commonly thought to be completed by Xenophon.[6] While later events in Thucydides' history prepare the way for Xenophon's first book and cannot be forgotten—the disastrous Sicilian campaign of 415–413 and oligarchic revolution of 411–410 (both of which are discussed below)—an early example of Athenian deliberation in that history can be read as an introduction to Xenophon's account of the trial of the generals.

At an important juncture in the first phase of the Peloponnesian War after Pericles' death, an oligarchic faction among the Mytileneans, a strategic ally of the Athenians, conspired with the Spartans and persuaded the people of Mytilene to revolt against Athens—for a second time (Thuc. 3.2–6, 8–15; cf. 3.25–31). Sensing the urgency for a display of strength to preserve

[5] Such a reading contributes to the recent rehabilitation of Xenophon and his Socrates as friendly critics of Athenian democracy, and helps liberate Xenophon's political thought from prejudicial assumptions that he was an oligarchic laconophile: Gish 2009; Kroeker 2009; Gray 2011.

[6] On the continuation of Thucydides' concerns in Xenophon: Rood 2004: esp. 374–380.

control of their empire, the Athenians threw themselves into a great effort to reassert and project their power. It was on this occasion that the Athenians first commanded all able-bodied citizens, including wealthy cavalrymen and metics (foreign residents), to man the new fleet of triremes. To pay the salaries of the sailors during this Ionian campaign (in addition to almost five thousand hoplites in action at Potidaea and elsewhere), the Athenians were compelled, also for the first time, to tax themselves in order to raise sufficient revenue to augment the collection of tribute from their allies. Their extraordinary effort proved successful: the Athenian navy reached its greatest strength (two hundred and fifty fully-manned triremes) and finest condition of the entire war (3.17).

The rebellion of Mytilene was quickly crushed, and the Ionian revolt, which the Spartans had anticipated would cripple the Athenian war effort, by cutting off a critical source of revenue, was pre-empted. The commander of the Athenian forces at Mytilene captured and sent back to Athens for trial all those who had orchestrated the revolt. In the ensuing debates at Athens over what must be done (3.35–50),[7] the *dēmos* voted out of 'anger' (*orgē*)[8] to execute the Mytilenean men then present in Athens, and to order that all the men at Mytilene be put to death, and that the women and children be sold into slavery. What contributed most of all to their anger, we are told, was the thought that their own allies had conspired with the Spartans against them. The next day however, many if not most of the Athenians had second thoughts about this ruthless decision and convened another Assembly to reconsider it. Cleon, one of several speakers to address the Assembly, and the one who the previous day had persuaded the Athenians to vote as they had, chastised the *dēmos* for inconstancy, reminding them that rule over others demands strength and a willingness—once it has been acquired—to do whatever is necessary to preserve and maintain that rule and empire (*archē*) (3.37–40, emphasis added):

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[7] This debate is the first of three cases in Thucydides' history when deliberative speeches before a democratic Assembly are directly reported. The other two are the debates regarding the Sicilian campaign at Athens (6.8–26) and at Syracuse (6.32–41)—both of which are discussed below.

[8] Thuc. 3.36.1, 38.1, 44.4. This Greek word refers to a natural impulse in human beings variously translated to express a broad range of meaning: from a general reference to a person's temper, temperament, disposition, or nature (with rather neutral connotations), to a more peculiar passion that vexes or provokes irritation (mild), anger (strong), or rage and wrath (*in extremis*). The noun appears frequently in Thucydides, over forty times and in every book of his history, usually in its stronger senses: see, e.g., 1.31.1; 2.8.5, 22.1, 60.1, 65.1; 3.82.2; 8.56.5; cf. 3.84–85.1.

> Many times before now I have thought *dēmokratia* incompetent to rule others ... For *because you live free from the fear of conspiracies among ourselves, and believe the same with respect to your allies*, you fail to see that when speeches persuade you or kindness tempts you into error, you do not win the gratitude of your allies but endanger yourselves through weakness, for you do not bear in mind that you hold your rule as a tyranny—and that *those ruled by you, unwilling and conspiring against you*, do not obey you on account of the costly favours you bestow on them, but rather because you prove superior on account of strength ... Do not hold out hope [to those who conspire] that speeches will persuade you or gifts bribe you to excuse what has been done on the grounds that to err is human. For ... you must not rethink what has been resolved or fall prey to the three errors most detrimental to your own rule: compassion, pleasing speeches, and equity ... Follow this advice and you will do *what is just and expedient at the same time*, but decide otherwise and you will not oblige [those who conspired] but condemn yourselves. For if they revolted rightly, then you were ruling without right. But if indeed, regardless of right, you think it is fitting for you to rule, then you must punish them expediently—or else let go of ruling, and become good men beyond danger. *Resolve to defend yourselves* with the same penalty, and do not let it seem that you, the survivors, are less aware of what might have befallen you, than those who conspired against you; *be spirited* (*enthumēthentes*) in doing that which would have been done to you if they had prevailed ... Do not betray yourselves ... Punish them as they rightly deserve, and thus *lay down clearly the precedent, that whoever revolts against you must pay for it with death. For only when they grasp this, will you no longer be distracted from waging war on your enemies because you are fighting with your friends.*

Cleon's argument, though harsh, is compelling. He appeals to the Athenian *dēmos* to do what is fitting in punishing those who conspire and revolt against their rule, against *dēmokratia*. To act expediently as well as justly, the *dēmos* must resolve to punish in such a way as to deter others, especially allies and apparent friends, from conspiring. As we will see, this argument anticipates the dilemma confronting the Athenian Assembly in deliberating about what must be done in the case of the Arginusae generals, who could be accused of turning from friends into enemies, and hence of conspiring against *dēmokratia*.

This speech of Cleon must have resembled in many ways his argument on the preceding day. Diodotus, we are told, had spoken against Cleon the day before and had failed to persuade the Athenians to follow his advice. (Thucydides does not record these earlier speeches.) But now Diodotus, revising his earlier argument, advises the Athenians to act not in accord with the better angels of their nature, but in a strictly expedient way, coldly calculating the prospects of ruling rebellious allies as harshly as Cleon suggests, especially given the unreasonable nature of human emotions such as

hope and fear, as well as the tendency of human beings not to think about the consequences of their actions, particularly when acting under necessity (3.44):

> [T]he debate, if we are moderate, must not be about their injustice but our own good counsel. No matter how guilty I argue they are, I will not, on that account, urge you to execute them—unless it is expedient; nor urge you to pardon them—unless it seems good for us for them to keep their *polis*. I think we must deliberate about the future more than the present … Whereas you might find this argument [to execute them] appealing because it is more just to do so, especially given your present anger (*orgē*) against the Mytileneans; for we are not judging them for the sake of justice, but deliberating with respect to ourselves about what is useful.

Rather than punish the Mytileneans so severely for conspiring and revolting, in a heavy-handed effort to deter other allies from doing the same, Diodotus proposes that the Athenians should be more vigilant about taking precautions before-hand, so that they do not even consider conspiring to resist Athenian rule. To this end, he argues, a prudent calculation of what is expedient, without concern for what is just, would be more far more effective in the long-term.

Having listened to the arguments of both Cleon and Diodotus, the Athenians continued to debate even more amongst themselves as to what must be done. When the vote was finally taken, it was nearly a draw, but the proposal of Diodotus prevailed. In the willingness of the *dēmos* first to entertain and accept the harsh measures urged by Cleon, then to reconsider their decision in light of Diodotus' expedient calculations, we can recognize the Athenians praised by Pericles for their capacity to 'philosophize without softness' and to exercise their *imperium* with a sense of justice as well as daring (2.40–41). The thrust of Diodotus' argument for expediency and Cleon's advice to the *dēmos* to remain vigilant in preserving their rule should be recalled in assessing the trial of the Arginusae generals. Cleon's critical portrait of democracy as lacking sufficient spirit to rule others or to defend itself, a flaw exposed here by a professed leader rather than an opponent of the *dēmos*, reflects the contempt with which democratic regimes were usually viewed by oligarchic partisans and regimes devoted to martial virtue. The openness of democratic decision-making to public debate and deliberation was arguably a source of weakness. Second, by calling the punishment of the entire population at Mytilene just, both Cleon and Diodotus seem to agree that the Mytilenean *dēmos* was complicit in committing injustice because of its failure to resist its own oligarchic faction and abandoning their *dēmokratia* by acquiescing in an alliance with the Spartans. Third,

both speakers also agree that the Athenian *dēmos* must take care to know who the enemies of *dēmokratia* are, lest they be deceived by speeches of false friends—both outside and from within the *polis*—and bring harm upon themselves. Spirited resistance must be mustered in order to defend *dēmokratia* against the assault of open as well as disguised enemies attempting to strip them of their rule.[9]

Democracy—perhaps more than other regimes, on account of its freedom of speech and toleration of diversity among its citizens, as well as its open process for public deliberation and decision-making—is especially vulnerable to attack from within by an oligarchic faction. This weakness had already been revealed by Thucydides in his account of the brutal and devastating *stasis* at Corcyra (3.69–85, 4.46–48). Later in his history, Thucydides describes how the Athenian Assembly acquiesced in silence as oligarchic partisans manipulated democratic institutions and procedures to overthrow democracy in 411. Still gripped by fear and necessity precipitated by the Sicilian disaster, the *dēmos* was persuaded that to maintain its imperial rule it had to let go of *dēmokratia* (8.47–54, 63–70). This ominous precedent, set only a few years before the trial of the Arginusae generals, continued to haunt the *dēmos* after the restoration of democracy.[10]

Xenophon's Introduction to the Trial of the Generals

Xenophon's own prologue, or introduction, to his account of the trial of the Arginusae generals centres on the resurgence of the democratic Athenian navy and the rise and fall (for the second and last time) of Alcibiades. In the first book of *Hellenica*, Alcibiades' contentious recall from exile culminates in his election in 407 by vote of the Athenian *dēmos* as the sole and supreme commander (*autokratōr*) of the fleet (*Hellenica* 1.4.10–23). For the first and perhaps only time in the history of democracy, the fate of Athens had been placed formally into the hands of a single Athenian—a feat never achieved even by Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles. Rather than sharing collegial duties and honours as one of three elected commanders (with Thrasybulus and Conon) on the annual board of generals, a democratic honour he had

9 On justice as helping friends and harming enemies see Pl. *Resp*. 332d–335a.

10 Thucydides breaks off the final book of his history in 411 after his 'best regime' (8.97) falters, democracy is restored at Athens after an un-hoped for naval victory (8.104–106), and Alcibiades presents himself as an ally to the staunchly democratic navy at Samos (8.108).

held only once or twice before (see Thucydides 6.8; cf. 5.84), Alcibiades would bear full responsibility for prosecuting the war on behalf of the Athenian *dēmos*.

In a series of events set in motion by Alcibiades' imprudence in leaving a junior officer in charge during his absence, a part of the Athenian fleet was drawn into an engagement with the enemy without its commander, suffering a defeat that did more damage to Alcibiades' reputation than to the naval war effort: while the Athenians lost fifteen triremes, most of the crews escaped. When he could not bait Lysander into another battle upon his return (1.5.12–14), Alcibiades' fate in the eyes of the *dēmos* was sealed. Suspicious of his complicity in the defeat, the Athenians 'dealt harshly' with him, perhaps under renewed accusations by his enemies of blatant disregard for democratic custom, if not outright collusion with the Spartans (see Thucydides 6.28–29). He was judged to have acted carelessly, and so the Athenians deposed him. Alcibiades, once again, amid charges of scandal and anti-democratic motives, decided not to risk a defence before the *dēmos*. He went into a voluntary exile rather than return to Athens (1.5.16–17). Having learned a lesson, the Athenians quickly elected a board of ten new generals into whose hands the prosecution of war was entrusted. With the exception of two (Conon and Leon), who happened to be detained elsewhere and thus missed the battle, these eight generals together commanded the full Athenian fleet at Arginusae (1.5.16, 7.1).

Conon sailed to Samos with twenty ships to take command of the discouraged Athenian fleet there (1.5.18–20). On the Spartan side, Lysander ended his annual term as admiral, handing over his fleet to Callicratidas and remarking that he did so as 'master of the sea' (*thalattokratōr*) and recent victor in battle. The new admiral quickly made his mark by breaking with Lysander's ally, the Persian prince Cyrus, and pressing his advantage against Conon whose much smaller force he pursued and blockaded at Mytilene with an armada of 170 ships (1.6.1–23).[11] Once the news reached Athens, the Athenians resolved to build and man a relief force of 110 ships to send to Conon's rescue. Having depleted its man-power in sending out Alcibiades and then Conon, the Athenians were compelled to order that all able-bodied citizens join crews, hoplites as well as cavalrymen, in addition to thousands of *thētes*, citizens from the lower class, who usually filled up the ranks on the ships. Still unable to fully man the ships that the

[11] A fleet of 100 ships under Alcibiades had been reduced to 40: 1.4.20, 5.14, 5.20, 6.15–18.

Athenians had prepared in an unprecedented ship-building effort, and recognizing the gravity of the situation, the Athenians decreed that metics and slaves who volunteered for crews as sailors would be granted citizenship in exchange for their service—an equally extraordinary political act.[12]

The extraordinary battle, which involved more ships and men than any prior naval battle in Greek history,[13] was decisively won by the Athenians. Their newly-built fleet, manned by free citizens of every rank as well as former slaves, all unified by necessity (1.6.24), proved superior to the larger fleet commanded (but not rowed) by the Spartans—in large part due to an innovative democratic strategy. Without a supreme commander among them, and being ordered to engage in actions within the same theatre, the generals were operating in uncharted waters. With a numerically inferior force, the Athenian generals quickly conceived a plan of attack that rested on versatile, disciplined, highly skilled crews, and the coordinated but independent action of their captains; it required competent democratic leaders and citizens for its timely execution.[14] The Athenian fleet defeated and routed the armada led by the Spartans, winning a great victory for democratic Athens.

Xenophon's account of the sea battle is concise, but laconic (1.6.26–35) when compared to his lengthy account of the political consequences of the sea battle. As a member of the cavalry, Xenophon himself may have been ordered into special naval service by the *dēmos* and present on one of the ships that joined in battle. We are encouraged by his detailed account of the sea battle and the proceedings in its aftermath to think that he witnessed both first-hand, and that his report reflects direct knowledge of the events he describes.[15] His interest in democratic political affairs at Athens, more so than in the military action itself, seems indicative of Xenophon's own

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[12] On slaves in Athenian naval battles and their emancipation and enrolment as citizens on this occasion: Ar., *Ran.* 33, 190, 693–702 (with *scholia*, including Hellanicus 323a F25); Ostwald 1986: 433; Hunt 1998: 83–101; Hunt 2001; cf. Worthington 1989b.

[13] In his universal history (*Bibliotheca Historica*), written in the first century BC, Diodorus Siculus claims that it was, up until that point, 'the greatest naval battle ever fought by Greeks against Greeks in memory' (13.98.5, 102.4; cf. Thuc. 1.1, 21, 23; 6.31; 7.85.5–6).

[14] Kagan 1987, 339–353; 2004, 452–458; cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 7.1 (*passim*). Grote, contrary to the overwhelming anti-democratic prejudice of his time, argued that the victory at Arginusae gave 'the most striking proof of how much the democratical energy of Athens could yet accomplish, in spite of so many years of exhausting war' (1861: 173).

[15] Delebecque 1957: 24, 44, 57–61; Lang 1992: 274 n. 20; Munn 2000: 167, 180, 402 n. 16, 404 n. 32, 188, 302–303; cf. Krentz 1989: 1.

natural inclinations.[16] It is also worth noting that Xenophon, as we will see, presents the *dēmos* acting at home and abroad in terms rather more moderate than one would expect when compared to the theoretical critiques of Athenian democracy articulated by Plato and his Socrates.

When news of the battle first made its way back to Athens, the Athenians were jubilant. But as first-hand accounts and rumours of casualties began to trickle into Athens, the celebratory mood soured: twenty-five ships, 'crews and all—except for a few who made it to shore'—that is, thousands of Athenian citizens had been lost in the victory (1.6.34).[17] Questions and accusations started to circulate which would have to be answered by the generals. In the wake of Alcibiades' impeachment, given his excuse for failure—that he had delegated authority to a subordinate who had not implemented his orders—the *dēmos* may have wanted to scrutinize the conduct of the generals to discover who to hold responsible for the loss of so many sailors after the battle ended. The eight generals involved in the battle were deposed by the Assembly (*apocheirotonia*) and recalled to Athens (excluding Conon, who was still blockaded at Mytilene, and Leon, who had been captured: 1.6.19). Two of the generals (Protomachus, Aristogenes) fled rather than answer to the *dēmos*, leaving only six to stand trial in person (Pericles, Diomedus, Lysias, Aristocrates, Thrasyllus, Erasinides); one (Erasinides) faced charges of financial misconduct in proceedings initiated prior to the collective trial of the generals (1.7.1–2).

At this stage, there is no suggestion in Xenophon's account (apart from the fact of the generals' removal from office) that the Athenians were angered or that serious charges were being contemplated. We are left to infer from the proceedings that follow what precise charges the generals faced. To judge from later references to the trial, the generals were under suspicion for treason. In a famous speech prosecuting Eratosthenes, a former member of the Thirty, after the restoration of democracy in 403, the metic Lysias explicitly reminds the Athenian jurors about the trial of the Arginusae generals a few years earlier. By comparing and contrasting the (as yet) unsettled judicial fate of Eratosthenes with the execution of the Arginusae generals, Lysias seems to assimilate the crimes of the two groups; and,

[16] On the political thought of Xenophon: Strauss 1939; Higgins 1977: xii, 126–127, 140–143; Bruell 1987: esp. 90–92, 111–114; Gish and Ambler 2009.

[17] The battle involved 50–60,000 men on 270–300 ships; at least 12,000 of 22,000 crewmen on the Athenian side were from Athens: Strauss 2004: 41; Hunt 2001: 369. The Spartans lost nine of their ten ships present, as well as their admiral, but 60 ships and crews supplied by their allies.

since the former are seen as tyrants explicitly intent on subverting *dēmokratia,* the crime in question is naturally assumed to be treason (12.35–36).

Nor is this all that is to be learned from this passage. As with Cleon in response to the Mytilenean rebellion, Lysias argues that the *dēmos* must take harsh measures to preserve itself, and his argument is buttressed by a direct and approving reference to the precedent set in the case of the Arginusae generals (12.36):

> Is it not outrageous that you imposed the penalty of death on those very generals who had won the sea battle, when they claimed that a storm prevented them from rescuing the sailors stranded in the sea—because you thought it essential to exact revenge on them as recompense for the bravery of those who died? But the Thirty by contrast did their best as private citizens to ensure your defeat in naval battle, and once in power, even they admit, deliberately executed many citizens without trial. Should you not also punish them … with the heaviest penalties available?

From this statement we gather that there is no indelible mark of error or injustice on the hands of the *dēmos* for its actions on that previous occasion. No taint of illegality with respect to the trial and execution, no sense of regret, attends his remarks. On the contrary, with his reference to the trial of the generals, Lysias intends to remind the *dēmos* of its vigorous and decisive action on that prior occasion in defence of *dēmokratia* against the men who they believed had conspired to overthrow the rule of the *dēmos*. Death alone is fitting for such men. Moreover, Lysias argues, these same men had been conspiring for some time against the *dēmos*. He draws a straight line from the oligarchic conspiracy of 411 to the actual overthrow of democracy in 404, through the trial of the generals in 406. With the final defeat of the Athenian fleet by Lysander in 405, and with Spartan support, oligarchic partisans at Athens had finally accomplished their aim. Many of the partisans who had orchestrated the revolution in 411 later sought as private citizens to ensure the defeat of democracy in 406, and had now become defendants in the case against the Thirty being prosecuted by Lysias (12.41–45; see 13.5–8, 12, 17, 20, 73–74).

What is perhaps most disturbing about the oligarchic revolt in 411, more than the one that followed hard on the heels of the victorious Spartans in 404, was that the oligarchic faction had made use of democratic institutions and procedures to accomplish its overthrow of the regime. The manipulation of democratic processes in 411 included the calling of an extraordinary session of the Assembly, convened in an unusual location outside the walls of Athens; the acceptance of a technical change in Assembly procedures, by those citizens who had assembled, allowing any proposal to be introduced,

even of the sort previously prohibited; and the passage of a vote which instituted reforms effectively altering the fundamental character of the regime (Thuc. 8.63–70).[18]

The bloodless oligarchic revolution at Athens in 411 persisted well beyond the restoration of *dēmokratia* in 410, breaking into open violence and civil war (*stasis*) between oligarchic and democratic factions after defeat in 404 until the amnesty of 401.[19] It would be naïve to assume that tension between the factions ceased to exist in the interim. Any attempt to reconstruct and understand what happened during the trial of the generals in 406 must take into consideration *both* the recent civic memory of the oligarchic coup *and* the complicated technical procedures by which the generals were accused and being put on trial—which Xenophon provides in detail for his readers. The vulnerability of an open democratic process to oligarchic capture, especially in a time of demographic crisis (after losing a significant proportion of its citizens) and under duress, is crucial to understanding Xenophon's account of the trial. For the *dēmos* must have been acutely aware of this weakness as well as the on-going internal threat to its rule, a threat made more difficult to guard against by the fact that oligarchic elements within the *polis* had split into rival factions, with only a few being more openly hostile to *dēmokratia* and democratic partisans than others (*Hellenica* 2.3.11–4.1).

Democratic Accountability and the Charges against the Generals

Contrary to the impression created by most accounts of the trial, there was not a frenzied rush to judgment by the *dēmos*. What is rarely pointed out in summary treatments of the affair is that the trial was heard by the Athenian Assembly at large (*eisangelia*) rather than the law courts (*dikastēria*)—which was the usual procedure for hearing a review of conduct at the end of a magistrate's term (*euthunai*); that it was unusually lengthy and complicated, involving speeches for and against the generals; and that it was punctuated by debates over procedure as well as the guilt or innocence of the accused.[20] The indisputable fact that the trial took place over the course

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18 See Samons 2004: 91.

19 See Krentz 1982: 102–124; Wolpert 2002: 15–35.

20 For summaries of the trial: Nails 2002: 79–82; Kagan 2004: 459–466. The best summary of its complexity is supplied by Munn 2000: 175–187; see Roberts 1977. It is the political

of several meetings of the Assembly should refute any claims about mob rule and haste; indeed, it is the *only* known example of a trial proceeding at Athens that extended beyond a single day.[21] In the case of the generals, the Athenians proceeded deliberately, in accordance with democratic procedures for scrutiny, deposition, and impeachment, procedures specifically instituted to insure political accountability in the case of all elected magistrates.

The trial proceedings occupied three (perhaps four) Assembly sessions, with several days intervening between two of those meetings, and involved two (or more) sessions of the Council (*boulē*). The Council prepared the agenda for Assembly meetings, and was tasked with organizing its administrative affairs—for example, by holding protracted hearings related to the case, receiving formal indictments, taking depositions, staging preliminary non-binding votes regarding evidence, and researching, preparing, and presenting motions to be taken under consideration by the Assembly. The generals, therefore, had more than one opportunity to speak in their own defence—before the Council as well as the Assembly. At the second session of the Assembly in which their case was deliberated, each of the generals had an opportunity to speak in response to the charges. The number of speeches extended the time of the meeting so long that the session had to be adjourned, and reconvened, due to the fact that it was too dark to judge the outcome of any vote by show of hands. Finally, the deliberate and methodical character of the proceedings is further evidenced by the fact that the Athenians voted (at least) seven times in Assembly or in the Council on various aspects of the generals' case.

Whatever one thinks of the outcome in terms of justice, the proceedings were handled in a manner that reflects the complex decision-making process of procedural democracy. Nothing about the charges, voting methods, or debates associated with the trial suggests that any statutory law or decree of the Athenian democracy was violated. Indeed, the outcome of the trial, the fate of the generals, was itself not especially unusual. Generals under democracy were reviewed, censured, impeached, prosecuted, condemned, and punished, either in person or *in absentia*, by the Athenian Assembly. By such means the *dēmos* proceeded prudently in delegating power and

character of the trial, more so than its historical reconstruction, that is most of interest here; cf. Hunt 2001, 371. On legal aspects of the trial and its consequences: Ostwald 1986: 431–445, 509–511.

21 On the duration of Assembly sessions and jury trials: Hansen 1979; MacDowell 1985; Hansen 1987: 32–34; Hansen 1991: 187; MacDowell 2000; cf. Worthington 1989a, 2003.

securing obedience to its will, particularly through the enforcement of harsh, and even ruthless, penalties—fines, exile, *atimia*, confiscation of private property (also from descendants), denial of burial, and death.[22] The list of generals in the fifth century subjected to democratic review is long and includes statesmen of renowned military and political talent: Miltiades, Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles (death sentence commuted to a fine), Thucydides, and Alcibiades (twice). The trial of the Arginusae generals therefore was unusual not in outcome, but in its complexity; rather than an example of 'mob rule', it was an exceptional and revealing example of Athenian democratic deliberation in practice.

The fact that the generals were put on trial before the full Assembly of Athenian citizens indicates the gravity of the charges against them. The impeachment of generals (*eisangelia*) was undertaken by the Assembly convened in a judicial mode because it thus represented the highest and most authoritative tribunal available among the democratic political and judicial institutions at Athens. While the impeachment of other magistrates could be carried out in various ways and in other venues, the power to decide cases in which alleged crimes against the democratic regime could lead to capital punishment was reserved to the Assembly. Judgment in such cases was a prerogative reserved for the body politic at large, and could not be delegated to a smaller number of citizen-jurors convened in the law courts. The annual board of generals, as the highest elected magistrates under Athenian democracy, ultimately answered to the *dēmos* for their acts. Because the formal deposition and impeachment of the generals carried with it the possibility of the gravest penalty, the charges against them—in letter or spirit—were tantamount to an accusation of treason, the most serious of political crimes: conspiracy to 'overthrow the *dēmos*' (*katalusis tou dēmou*) and therewith to dissolve the democratic regime.

Before we turn to the proceedings as described by Xenophon, we must ask: What charges exactly were brought against the victorious generals? At the first Assembly meeting described by Xenophon (which, again, is not the first Assembly meeting in the proceedings, since the decision to depose and recall the generals would itself have required the Assembly to meet and vote), Theramenes came forward to accuse the generals publicly, saying that in reviewing their conduct the generals must answer 'for their failure to rescue the shipwrecked men' after the battle (1.7.4). Diodorus Siculus, in his account of the trial, differs from Xenophon in assuming that the generals

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22 On democratic accountability for generals: Hansen 1975; Roberts 1982; Elster 1999.

were charged with impiety because of their failure to recover dead bodies from the water and to transport home the corpses of Athenian citizens for sacred burial. Diodorus goes on to argue that the proceedings were driven by the irrational 'anger' of the Athenians whose religious fervour led them to punish the generals as scapegoats in order to avert divine retribution.[23] Xenophon, in his account, says nothing about impiety and never uses the word 'anger' to describe the character of the *dēmos* at any time in the whole affair.[24] His report of the charges raised before the Council as well as the Assembly instead stresses the generals' failure to make use of their victory to *rescue the living*—the thousands of crewmen from Athenian ships who were stranded on sinking vessels or floating in the sea on debris after the battle.[25] Whatever pious indignation or righteous anger may have been aroused in the *dēmos* against the generals by their failure to recover corpses must have paled in comparison to the tragic thought of the vast numbers of Athenians who lost their lives not in battle, but on account of negligence: thousands of men who drowned in the sea after the battle was over and with the victory securely in hand.[26] (See Appendix I.)

But the failure to rescue survivors does not itself appear to be a crime or violation of law; though perhaps an actionable offence leading to censure or a fine, it is not immediately clear why that would amount to a charge of treason against the *dēmos*. The nature of the offence must have been understood to have graver connotations for the Council first, and eventually the Assembly, to accept a motion that stipulated the execution of the generals, if convicted. Only three charges would seem to warrant this kind of motion, which thrust the trial into the hands of the Assembly at large, rather than leaving it with the law courts: treason or treachery (*prodosia*),

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[23] Diodorus refers repeatedly to the blinding 'anger' of the *dēmos* against the innocent generals, who he declares deserved praise, not condemnation (see 13.101.4–5, 102.5; cf. 15.35.1).

[24] Xenophon rarely uses the noun (*orgē*) in *Hellenica* (one exception: 5.3.5–7; cf. Thuc. 3.42.1). The related verbs 'to anger' or 'to become angry' (*orgizō*, *orgizomai*) are used sparingly by both Xenophon and Thucydides, but Xenophon's usages are almost exclusively reserved for Spartans, individually (Callicratidas, Dercylidas, Agesilaus, Teleutias) or collectively. The only time that the Athenians in Xenophon's *Hellenica* are said to have become angry, it is on account of acts of manifest injustice committed by a Spartan governor and by the Spartans themselves in acquitting that governor—a verdict which seemed to many 'to be the most unjust ever rendered at Sparta'. See 5.4.63, with 4.20–34. On Spartan injustice: Gish 2009.

[25] See Pl. *Ap.* 32b1–7; Lys. 12.36; Andrewes 1974: 115; Roberts 1982: 179; Strauss 2000: 319. See also Grote 1861: 175–176, who remarks that their failure to rescue the living would have 'inflamed' the sense of impiety and that 'misinterpretation' regarding this issue is of great import because it 'alters completely the criticisms on the proceedings'.

[26] On the expected rescue of stranded crews by victors after a battle at sea: Thuc. 1.49–50.

taking bribes or corruption, and conspiracy to overthrow *dēmokratia*.[27] The gravity of the case of the generals must have been heightened, or intensified, by other circumstances in order to be perceived by the *dēmos* as an assault upon *dēmokratia* at Athens.

Threats to the rule of the *dēmos* from within Athens, as we have already seen, reflect the factional quarrel between democratic and oligarchic partisans evident just beneath the surface of the regime. This quarrel escalated into conspiracy when a crisis, or some necessity, presented the oligarchic faction with an occasion to pursue fundamental changes to the *politeia*. Such internal threats were especially dangerous at a time when the *polis* was also engaged in an exhausting foreign war.[28] Such factional disputes had erupted into outright *stasis* and revolution in the recent past at Athens and under similar circumstances—an experience that could not have been far from the minds of Athenians debating the conduct of their generals at Arginusae. Most of the Athenian *dēmos* must have been aware that the oligarchic faction had been emboldened on that earlier occasion by the severe depletion of the *dēmos*, and in particular the ranks of *thētes*, as a result of the massive losses suffered during and after the disastrous Sicilian campaign.

Demographics and the prospects for direct democracy were intimately related. While the political implications of a large-scale destruction of citizens would have reverberated throughout any Greek *polis*, it could be especially damaging in a democratic regime where the rule of the *dēmos* relied, in part, upon a certain strength in numbers. A sudden loss of democratic citizens could undermine *dēmokratia* to such a degree that a numerically inferior oligarchic faction might be encouraged to actively pursue regime change, through external or internal means. The fear of the Athenians after news arrived from Sicily of the destruction of the navy was that the Spartans, prompted by pro-Spartan elements among the Athenians, would march immediately on Athens (Thuc. 8.1). While the expected invasion never materialized, the oligarchic faction used the state of emergency to persuade the weakened *dēmos* to vote itself out of power. Thus, in the wake of the Sicilian disaster, the vulnerability of democracy to an internal *coup d'état*, orchestrated from within by an oligarchic faction through the

27 See Hansen 1975: 12–20.

28 On the pendulum swings of constitutional strife between democratic and oligarchic factions in Athens between 411 and 401: Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*] 34; Hansen 1987: 72–86; Raaflaub 2006: 401–404. It is not surprising to expect a spirited reaction from the *dēmos* against perceived incompetence, injustice, or treason when at war, and with the democratic constitution threatened with subversion as well as defeat. See Dover 1994: 159–160, 238, 288–295.

manipulation of democratic institutions and speeches delivered before an assembled *dēmos* in the grip of necessity, had been exposed.[29]

A deep sense of anxiety over the vulnerability of democracy to such attempts prompted the *dēmos* soon after the democracy was restored in 410 to launch a pre-emptive strike against future oligarchic acts of treason. A law was passed and promulgated explicitly prohibiting, and thus inviting prosecutions of, any action by a citizen or foreigner that aimed openly or covertly to subvert or to overthrow democracy (*kataluein tēn dēmokratian*).[30] Following the decimation of the ranks of *thētes* in the aftermath of the battle at Arginusae, the Athenian *dēmos* must have suspected that oligarchic elements within the *polis* would look to the precedent of 411 and conspire once again to overthrow the *politeia*. Whether the decision to depose the generals and review their conduct had been initiated under such suspicions, the intense scrutiny of the generals eventually came to focus on their refusal to accept responsibility for the loss of thousands of democratic citizens of the *dēmos* who were left stranded in the sea and drowned. The misconduct of the generals, then, especially if they were thought to have wilfully neglected the rescue effort, could be interpreted not merely as incompetence or dereliction of duty, but as contempt for the *dēmos* and collusion against *dēmokratia*.

The Trial of the Generals: Procedural Democracy

With the preceding considerations in mind, let us turn now to Xenophon's account of the trial of the generals. We learn from his account that, at the *first* meeting of the Assembly, which is treated cursorily by Xenophon, the Athenians deposed the generals and voted a new board of generals in their

[29] See Thuc. 8.45–98. Financial distress (due to the loss of imperial tribute and revenue from silver mines in Attica) as well as rumour, rhetoric, and political intrigue, in addition to panic and harsh necessity conspired in accomplishing this 'great deed' (8.68.4). See also Lys. 12.43–45, 71–76. On necessity's role in bringing about Thucydides' 'best regime' at Athens: Dobski 2009.

[30] Andrewes argues that 'restored democrats' moved quickly 'to safeguard themselves against another revolution' after the victory at Cyzicus, with particular suspicions regarding the loyalty of the generals to the *dēmos* (1953, 4–5). Lavelle (1988) traces the 'Decree of Cannonus' cited by Euryptolemus to fear of sedition against democracy following the oligarchic revolution in 411. An archaic law against tyranny was revived at this same time as the 'Decree of Demophantus' and accompanied by oaths obliging—and indemnifying—Athenian citizens to oppose with force attempts to overthrow the democracy: Andocides 1.96–98; Lavell 1988.

place, except Conon (1.7.1). Nothing is said by Xenophon at this stage about the reason for their removal from office. Two of the eight recalled generals thought it best to go into exile rather than return to Athens to face scrutiny. Once the other six generals returned to Athens, one of them was arraigned and tried on separate charges involving financial misconduct (1.7.2); still nothing is said regarding the specific charges for which the generals had to answer. After the generals appeared before the Council to report in person on the battle and its aftermath, as well as on 'the magnitude of the storm' (1.6.35, 7.3) which had apparently prevented the rescue effort, the Council voted to hold the generals in custody until such time as they could be brought before the *dēmos*. After an initial review, therefore, at least a majority of the Council was unwilling to accept their report and release the generals (if, that is, the Council even had authority to do so). The seriousness of the charges, perhaps together with the flight risk, was judged sufficient to warrant detaining all the generals until the next meeting of the Assembly.

At the *second* meeting of the Assembly regarding the proceedings against the generals (the first narrated directly in Xenophon's account), no formal charges were brought forward by the Council; instead, Theramenes and others publicly 'accused' (*katēgoroun*) the generals, on the grounds that an audit of their conduct should be undertaken with respect to their failure to rescue the men shipwrecked after the battle (1.7.4). Theramenes, one of the captains reportedly assigned the task of rescuing the men, produced a letter written by the generals to the Council blaming the storm—and nothing, or no one else—for the failure. Presumably, he was responding to counter-accusations made by the generals before the Council blaming the captains to whom the rescue effort had been delegated (1.6.35). Xenophon reports that here each of the generals spoke and defended himself briefly (*bracheōs apelogēsato*)—doing so 'in accordance with the law' (*kata ton nomon*) which did not allow them to speak at length (as they might have done in law court).[31] Their several arguments added up, according to Xenophon, to the same defence: a sudden storm was to blame for the failure to execute the order for a rescue effort. Even if they wanted to blame the captains to whom the task had been delegated (the ones who had in

[31] Krentz (1989) translates the clause this way, following Ostwald (1986: 438), and arguing that the alternative preferred by those who want to see the trial as a miscarriage of justice is simply not a justified interpretation of its meaning, which is intended to give a reason for the brevity of speeches (cf., earlier, 1.1.27: *para ton nomon* used to indicate an injustice, *adikia*).

turn accused them), the generals say that they will not do so. Witnesses and even the pilots of some of the ships involved were brought forward to testify. According to Xenophon, these speeches had almost persuaded the *dēmos* (1.7.5–6). But a vote on the matter could not be taken, however, because the meeting had lasted the entire day, and it was now too dark to count a show of hands (1.7.7).

By all accounts, there is no reason to think that on this day the Assembly considered any other business or that the session opened later than usual (early morning). Since the date was late October or early November (during the second half of Pyanopsion, at the time of the Apaturia festival), it is possible to calculate on the basis of available day light that the meeting at which the full Assembly deliberated over the case of the generals had lasted ten or eleven hours.[32] The extraordinary length of this meeting may strike readers as surprising. But three aspects of Xenophon's narrative lead to this impression: (1) The narrative of this second meeting of the Assembly lacks any direct speeches, apart from a summary of the generals' arguments, and is highly compressed (1.7.4–7). (2) The narrative of the third meeting of the Assembly is more detailed and, by comparison, seems much longer (1.7.9–34). (3) The only complete speech in Xenophon's account of the trial, by Euryptolemus, in defence of the generals, is given at the third meeting (1.7.16–33). To judge from inferred events, this third Assembly meeting must have been nearly as long as the previous one. It was also characterized by a greater degree of tension and included a series of technical or procedural motions, heard and rejected or adopted, involving the order of business and whether to proceed with a vote. While not illegal *per se*, from the perspective of the *dēmos* these interventions were clearly intended to frustrate the capacity of the assembled Athenians to render a judgment in the case.

At the end of this second meeting, the Assembly adjourned without a vote, but explicitly instructed the Council to 'problematize' the matter and return after formulating a precise motion regarding how the generals were to be judged in the next Assembly. The *probouleuma* that the Council was instructed by the Assembly to prepare and bring forward was put into the form of an opinion or a motion (*gnōmēn*) that reflected a formal accusation

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32 Hansen 1979: 43–44. Hansen points to passages in Aristophanes' plays, like *Assemblywomen*, describing early morning meetings of the Assembly as a statutory requirement and indicating that many citizens had to set out before dawn to arrive in time; cf. Ar. *Ach.* 19–22. The agenda for an Assembly meeting usually contained a minimum of nine items: [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 43.3–6. On the usual business conducted by the Assembly: Hansen 1979.

(*katēgoria*) against the generals, introduced by Callixinus, a member of the Council, during one of its inter-Assembly sessions.[33] There may have been several of these sessions, since the intervening holiday festival meant that the Assembly could not meet, whereas the Council would have continued to do so.

From the second to third meetings of the Assembly, the composition of the citizen-body in attendance to conduct public business must have changed to some degree. This fact alone did not call into question the capacity of an Assembly to act in the name of the *dēmos*. Each occasion on which (at least) a quorum of eligible citizens gathered in Assembly constituted in practice the Athenian *dēmos* for the purposes of democratic deliberation and decision-making. (It would have been practically impossible and democratically dubious to restrict attendance at a second meeting only to citizens who had been present at the first meeting—perhaps one reason why trials in the law courts, and every known *eisangelia*, were limited to a day.)[34] The arrival and participation of a strong contingent of mourners, in Athens for the festival, likely had an impact on the composition of the Assembly. Insofar as mourners were male citizens, and thus members of the *dēmos*, they could not be excluded. But even if the body of eligible citizens (at least six thousand needed for a quorum) had been slightly altered by events or activities in the interim, there is no reason to suppose the Athenians themselves thought this an obstacle to the Assembly delivering a legitimate verdict in the case of the generals. It is worth noting, in this respect, that with the return of the generals, and their respective contingent of ships and citizen-crews, the composition of the first and second meeting might have been affected by the presence of sailors who had been present at the battle and were (presumably) supporters of the generals. Their numbers might have

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33 There has been much speculation about the relationship between Callixinus and Theramenes. Callixinus, as a member of the Council or as a citizen who put the proposal before the Council, could not have brought his motion before the Assembly without persuading at least a majority of the Council. While proportionally representative of the Athenian *dēmos*, its powers were strictly probouleutic and administrative, with no capacity to make final decisions, particularly not in the reviews of magistrates (*euthunai*, *eisangeliai*). See Ostwald 1986: 24–25, 62–66.

34 Worthington (2003) contends that political trials need not be heard in a day, but this was likely the rule; and that when a case extended beyond a day, 'the system for precluding bribery was at its most vulnerable' (371), citing the trial of the generals as an example (370). He mentions 'the night in between' the Assembly meetings, but the break probably lasted several days. There is no reason however to think that such a break compromised the integrity of the trial and proceedings, or that corruption was 'rampant' or endemic: Worthington 1989a: 206; cf. MacDowell 2003.

been offset at the third meeting by the presence of those mourning relatives who had not lived to return to Athens.

At the *third* meeting of the Assembly, the motion of Callixinus approved by the Council was duly reported back by the Council as a formal recommendation for how to proceed, and so the motion was put before the whole Assembly (1.7.9, emphasis added):

> Since those with accusations against the generals, and their defence speeches, were heard at the last Assembly, let the Athenians cast their vote by tribes; let two jars be set up to receive each tribe's vote; let the herald announce that those who believe *the generals committed injustice* (*adikein*) *by not rescuing the victors in the naval battle* should cast their vote into the first jar, whereas those who do not should cast their votes in the second; if they are found to have committed injustice (*adikein*), let their punishment be death, under authority of the Eleven, and their property confiscated, with a one-tenth tribute reserved for the goddess.

Speeches in defence of the generals having already been heard, all that remained now was for the assembled Athenians to cast their votes, according to the proposed motion. Before the Assembly voted on whether or not it wished to proceed under the motion set forth by the Council (since it could reject the motion, if it was deemed insufficient, returning it to the Council for revision with instructions for reformulation), Xenophon records a speech made before the Assembly by one of the survivors from the battle. This man—who was not rescued, but who was fortunate enough to have been carried to safety on a piece of flotsam—reports that while floating in the sea his dying comrades bade him promise (if he happened to survive) to tell the Athenians what had happened: that the generals had failed to rescue those who had proven 'the best in service to the fatherland' (1.7.11: *tous aristous huper tēs patridos*)—a strikingly emotional appeal, the rhetorical echoes of which can be heard elsewhere (see Lysias 13.92; Plato *Menexenus* 246c–248e).

Here, Euryptolemus stepped forward to forestall a vote on the motion, denouncing it as contrary to established practice (*paranomon*) and so inadmissible; some others issued a summons against Callixinus for introducing it. He does not specify the grounds on which this claim was based. The intended effect of the summons, however, was perfectly clear: Euryptolemus and some unnamed others had contrived to introduce this legal manoeuvre to delay the proceedings, until the propriety or legality of the motion itself could be reviewed. Based on his later speech, it has been assumed that his objection derived from a violation of some existing law (*nomos*) that would have prohibited the fate of the generals from being

decided either by the Assembly, rather than a law court, in which case a full *apologia* by each general would have been heard (cf. 1.7.5), or collectively by a single vote for all the accused. No precise legal grounds to support this view are mentioned by Xenophon or other ancient sources commenting on the trial.

Even if Euryptolemus had a specific legal statute in mind, there is no reason to believe that such a law or legal precedent would—or should—have been viewed by the *dēmos* as a strict limit on the power of the Assembly at that time to conduct public business as it pleased. When convened in Assembly under *dēmokratia*, the *dēmos* was constitutionally superior to the laws or decrees passed earlier. Its capacity to act or judge was not constrained by precedent.[35] Contrary to our modern sensibilities, it is clear from an examination of the alternatives proposed later by Euryptolemus (1.7.20–22), that the harshness of the penalty (death), if the generals were judged to be guilty, was not sufficient to oppose the motion. Whatever his grounds for intervening, Euryptolemus and his unnamed supporters are apparently assuming that a vote, if taken, would have condemned the generals with a guilty verdict, despite the fact that the *dēmos*, according to Xenophon, had been on the verge of being persuaded at the end of the previous meeting (1.7.6). Rather than trust in the judgment of the assembled Athenians, the counter-motion is introduced to stay the hand of the *dēmos*, and further delay the already protracted proceedings.

The use and abuse of democratic legal procedures was not restricted to demagogues, or to orators who pandered to the *dēmos*. There is evidence that technical manoeuvres meant to redirect or mislead the attention of the Assembly or law court in some way were used not only by *rhētores* who supported the *dēmos* and its rule at Athens, but also by those hostile to democracy. Lysias, for example, accuses the Thirty of being criminals and 'sycophants' who had established themselves in—and dominated—Athenian offices by pretending to be servants of the whole *polis* (not the *dēmos*) which was (to them) in need of being cleansed, and in service to all the citizens who were (again, to them) in need of being educated about justice (12.5).[36] Events

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[35] On the preservation of democratic sovereignty, even with the use of self-binding entrenchment clauses or regulatory mandates (assigned to *nomothetai*, *probouloi*, *sungrapheis*, or *anagrapheis*), the authority of which was usurped by the Thirty: Ostwald 1986: 405–411; Schwartzberg 2004.

[36] See Todd 2000: 117 n. 3. Reference here to the 'whole' *polis* does not point to the 'whole of the people' of Athens but only to 'citizens' narrowly defined: Hansen 1989: 28. The oligarchic claim to act for the good of the *polis* presumes a qualified definition of 'citizen'

surrounding the overthrow of *dēmokratia* in the wake of the Sicilian disaster, and later during the reign of the Thirty Tyrants, suggest that oligarchic leaders at Athens understood how to exploit vulnerability and to use democratic procedures to their advantage.

The Sovereign Will of the *Dēmos*

After what seems a blatant effort to frustrate the proceedings through a procedural manoeuvre to block a vote of the Assembly or transfer the proceedings to the law courts, a move which 'some' applauded, a 'greater number shouted out' (*to plēthos eboa*) that indeed it would be 'terrible' (*deinon*) if 'someone' (*tis*) were able to prevent the *dēmos* from 'doing what it wanted' (*prattein ho an boulētai*) (1.7.12). This aspect of the trial has most often been cited and denounced by critics as the ravings of an enraged mob. Read in context, it comes to light rather as an explicit affirmation by the *dēmos* of its right to act and judge as it sees fit—an articulation of the principle of popular sovereignty which in essence defines *dēmokratia*.

This principle or claim to rule is held in contempt by oligarchs, as well as by those who prefer the absolute rule of law, or rule by experts in possession of strictly rational knowledge. But it is sacrosanct for democratic partisans at Athens. Euryptolemus' accusation of *paranomon* was rightly perceived by the assembled *dēmos* as a technical manoeuvre that struck at the heart of the regime itself, precisely because it was intended to obstruct the Assembly—the supreme body of Athens and sovereign power in democracy[37]—from going forward with a vote according to the motion formally placed before it by the Council. The shouts against Euryptolemus' manoeuvre made it perfectly clear that the *dēmos* refused to yield its right to decide the case of the generals by an immediate democratic vote.

(*politēs*) that largely excludes 'the people' (*dēmos*) who would qualify for citizenship under *dēmokratia*. Those who are judged unworthy by the oligarchs could be excluded from rights of citizenship and purged. Andocides (1.99) argues that his accusers are ambivalent sycophants who serve no regime—only themselves. On sycophants and demagoguery: Isoc. 15.312–319.

[37] Prior to the introduction of moderating reforms and the codification of laws begun after the restoration of the democracy in 403, which placed the democratic conception of sovereignty on a shared foundation with the rule of law, the Athenian *dēmos* exercised its supreme power in and through their deliberations and decisions in Assembly. See Hansen 1987: 94–107. On the right of the *dēmos*, in Assembly or courts, to do as it pleased: Arist. *Pol.* 1310a29–35, 1317a40–1318a10; see Roisman 2004: 261–264. On the contested use of the word sovereignty to describe the power of the *dēmos*: Saxonhouse 1996: 1–7, 22–35.

Following the vocal lead of the *dēmos*, Lyciscus proposed that those who had served the summons against Callixinus' motion should be judged in the very same vote—and suffer the same penalty if found guilty—together with the generals. According to Xenophon, there was an overwhelming 'outburst' of approval from 'the crowd' (*ho ochlos epethorubēse*); the *paranomon* charge was accordingly withdrawn (1.7.13). Here again, the desire of the *dēmos* was articulated in no uncertain terms: the assembled *dēmos* wanted to vote on the motion as it had been prepared by the Council. But the vote was now prevented by members of the *prytaneis* who refused to call the vote on the grounds that it was 'against the law' (*para ton nomon*), although the *prytaneis* in fact possessed no explicit authorization for doing so. In response to the refusal of the presiding officers to perform their duty, Callixinus rose to repeat 'the same' charges against the generals (*katēgorei ta auta*), thus calling again for a vote on whether the generals had 'committed injustice by not recovering the victors in the sea-battle' (1.7.14; cf. 7.4, 9).[38] With the motion once more before the Assembly, the *dēmos* 'shouted out' (*eboōn*) that those *prytaneis* who continued to refuse to call for the vote should be judged together with the generals (1.7.14).

Some of the *prytaneis*, we are told, were sufficiently 'fearful' of these outbursts that they finally moved to put the motion of the Council to a vote before the full Assembly. The effect of this exchange of proposal and counter-proposal is to highlight the climactic moment within the dramatic tension of the trial. At that moment, Xenophon reports that it was Socrates who, alone of the members of the *prytaneis*, still refused to call the vote of the Assembly—by implication, making himself the one member of the *prytaneis* willing to stand trial and be judged together with the generals by holding his ground: 'he said that he would not do anything unless according to the law' (1.7.15). Of course it must be noted, although it is often overlooked, that despite his stubborn refusal to yield, Socrates suffered no repercussions—physically or legally—for contradicting the desire of the *dēmos*.[39] Socrates' reference to a certain *nomos*, a written or unwritten cus-

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38 It is unclear if Callixinus spoke in the Assembly to introduce the motion of the Council, or if the Council (through an appointed speaker) introduced the motion in his name. Thus we cannot be certain if Callixinus is rising in the Assembly for the second time to charge the generals, or for the first time (having first charged them before the Council). It is also unclear if the charges said here to be 'the same' refer back to Callixinus' accusation in the Council (1.7.8), leading to the motion in his name (1.7.9); or to the charges first brought forward by Theramenes and others in the preceding Assembly (1.7.4).

39 On the contrary: see Pl. *Grg*. 473e–474a, where Socrates says that he so lacked knowledge of practical politics that he was 'mocked with laughter' by the Assembly for 'not knowing

tom or law, which he will not transgress, has been interpreted as a reiteration of the preceding remark that some of the *prytaneis* had refused to put forward a vote 'contrary to law' (1.7.14: *para ton nomon*; cf. the phrase *ou … kata ton nomon* at 1.7.5). Socrates alone, it seems, would not budge on this point—whatever in the world this *nomos* happened to be.

Again, the precise statute ostensibly violated by Callixinus' motion is never mentioned by the opponents of the motion among the *prytaneis*, or by Euryptolemus either in his first objection or in his later speech. There is some reason to think that the *prytaneis* had actually acted out of order in asserting its authority in such a manner, with some of its members taking it upon themselves to usurp the formal capacity of the Council or the Assembly at large to decide when, in what way, and on what matters, the *dēmos* could (or could not) vote. In the end, at any rate, Socrates' resistance to the will of the *dēmos* resulted in no further outcries. Socrates 'the son of Sophroniscus' (rather than 'the philosopher') now exits from the trial and Xenophon's history as quietly as he had entered it. While we are left with an impression of courage, over against the other members of the *prytaneis* who first resisted and then yielded to popular sovereignty, we are nevertheless without a full account of Socrates' reasons for resistance. Xenophon's Socrates does not explain his action or statement; he makes no effort to persuade the *dēmos* of his reasons for thinking the vote unjust.[40] The proceedings advance over his quiet, but firm objection.

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how to put a question to the vote' properly. Xenophon, elsewhere, stresses the heroism of Socrates as *epistatēs* for remaining steadfast in resisting an unjust act of the 'impulsive' *dēmos* (*Mem.* 1.1.18, 4.4.2). But resistance to a 'shouting' *dēmos* need not be viewed as an act of exceptional courage or self-sacrifice, since such outbursts—a form of vocal rather than physical coercion—could yet be ignored, even if doing so marked the speaker as undemocratic and shameless (Dem. 19.23–24, *Ex.* 56; Aeschin. 1.34). Both Demosthenes and Plato, like Socrates, had been 'shouted down' by the Assembly under similar circumstances, without any fear for their lives: Aeschin. 2.84–85; Dem. 19.113; Diog. Laert. 2.41; see Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.1. Socrates was more than willing on occasion to arouse the Athenian *dēmos* on purpose by means of provocative speeches: Xen. *Ap.* 1, 9, 14, 15; Pl. *Ap.* 17d, 20e, 21a, 27b, 30c. On the Athenian perspective at the trial of Socrates: Hansen 1995; Wallace 2004: 228–231.

40 See Pl. *Ap.* 37a2–b4. A full examination of Socrates' role in, and view of, the trial is beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it to say that his appearance in Xenophon's account is muted. In a work meant for serious gentlemen, Socrates' deed here, as an Athenian citizen, must stand alone in place of the speeches that we hear in the Socratic writings of Xenophon. If we also note that a tragic parody of Socratic dialogue and of Socrates' trial occur at a crucial juncture in the work (3.1.20–28, 3.4–11), a Socratic or philosophic perspective on Athenian justice and the *Hellenica* as a whole begins to emerge—a pattern that reappears in Xenophon's other major 'non-Socratic' works (*An.* 3.1.4–8; *Cyr.* 3.1.38–40). See Gish 2009: 339 n. 3, 359–363, 368–369.

The impression left by Xenophon's account is that the resistance of Socrates to the *dēmos* created a lull in the proceeding, an opening or breach (*meta de tauta*, 'after this') which Euryptolemus exploited to pre-empt the vote and defend the generals one last time (1.7.16).[41] In his speech, he proposes several alternative methods for proceeding, all of which rely upon precedent and some of which entail moving the proceedings out of the Assembly to the law courts.[42] He also shifts the ground of the accusation against the generals by moving from the serious charges of 'conspiracy to overthrow the *dēmos*' (*katalusis tou dēmou*), 'betraying' (*prodidō*) the *polis*, and 'treason' or 'betrayal' (*prodosia*) of those who drowned after the battle, to the more general accusations of 'doing injustice' (*adikē*) to the Athenian *dēmos* and 'stealing sacred property' which carry penalties less than death (1.7.17–23). He warns the *dēmos* as well about rendering a guilty verdict against all the generals ('the victorious men') equally, since one or more of them may be (in some sense) innocent; to condemn them all would be an act they might later regret (1.7.24–29). Finally, Euryptolemus offers a summary of the generals' defence—that the storm was to blame—seeking to absolve the generals due to 'helplessness' (1.7.29–33). (See Appendix II.)

After his speech, Euryptolemus proposed a motion that the generals be judged separately in opposition to the motion of the Council currently before the Assembly. When the Assembly voted between the two proposals, it seemed at first that the vote (by show of hands) was judged to be in favour of Euryptolemus. Prompted by an objection to the assessment lodged under oath by Menecleus, a second vote and assessment occurred; this time it was determined to be in favour of the Council's proposal.[43] No further objections were raised, and the proceedings continued. For after this (*meta tauta*), the Assembly finally voted—as the *dēmos* desired—on the charges as proposed against the generals. They were found guilty; the sentence was

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[41] On Euryptolemus' argument for rule of law to restrain the will of the *dēmos* as a nascent form of judicial review: Carawan 2007. The tactical manoeuvres of Euryptolemus and Socrates may be taken as a coordinated effort, just as Theramenes and Callixinus were said to have collaborated in bringing charges against the generals before the Assembly and Council. However, this would implicate Socrates in the kind of political activity, which he expressly claimed to have avoided: Pl. *Ap.* 31d6–33a2.

[42] Hansen 1987: 180 n. 685: '… the reference of a case from the *ekklesia* to a *dikasterion* is taken to be an attack on the powers of the *demos*'.

[43] On the method of voting and Menecles' objection: Hansen 1987: 41–46, esp. 44: 'The most likely interpretation of the sworn objection is that the enemies of the generals, because of the *prytaneis*' earlier attempt to stop the trial, were suspicious of the assessment of the majority and, quite constitutionally, demanded a second *cheirotonia*, in which the majority changed (or was differently assessed)'.

carried out immediately for the six who were present in Athens (1.7.34).[44] Xenophon ends his account with the report that 'not much time later' the Athenians came to regret what had happened and charged Callixinus and a few others with 'deceiving the *dēmos*' (1.7.35). The indicted men were never brought to trial; they escaped in the *stasis* that plagued Athens after the surrender to Lysander (2.2.3–4). It is not clear whether the charges were brought forward by desperate partisans of the besieged democracy, or when the pro-Spartan and oligarchic factions at Athens were ascendant (2.2.10–23). At any rate, we are told that when Callixinus returned to Athens in 403, after the victory of the democratic partisans, 'everyone' despised him, but he was not prosecuted. Thus, the first book of Xenophon's *Hellenica* ends with a glimpse of the civil strife that still loomed ahead.

Democratic *thorubos*

To better understand the entire affair associated with the trial of the Arginusae generals, and what Xenophon intended to convey to his readers about *dēmokratia* through his account, it is imperative to examine the 'uproar' or clamour raised by the *dēmos* when its will was opposed or frustrated. What precipitated these outbursts and shouts by the Athenian *dēmos*? What was it that the *dēmos* feared would be lost, if obstacles to their will were permitted to stand?[45]

The political and legal phenomenon of popular exclamation in Athenian democracy must be properly understood. *Thorubos* represents an important and legitimate form of democratic political participation, consistent with the democratic principles of political equality (*isonomia*) and free speech (*isēgoria*) upon which the Athenian regime was founded.[46] Despite a concerted effort by Diodorus to create the misimpression of a 'mad' democracy

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[44] Among other reasons for insisting the generals be tried together, not the least of which would be the impossibility of ascertaining or assigning responsibility for commands issued jointly, was the risk of flight (see 1.7.1; Dem. *Ep.* 2.17). The greater likelihood of acquittal for those tried separately on the same charges but at a later time, either through judicial manoeuvring, distance from the occasion, or intervening events, posed additional concerns: Dem. *Ep.* 2.14; Lys. 19.6; Worthington 2006: 110 n. 31; cf. Hansen 1991: 237–238.

[45] Euryptolemus, in defending the generals, raises this question ironically, asking the Assembly: 'What do you fear … that urges you on so excessively' in this case? (1.7.25).

[46] On democratic *thorubos*: Bers 1985; Lanni 1997; Tacon 2001: esp. 178–181, 185, 188–189; Wallace 2004; Worthington 2007: 263–267; Werhan 2009: esp. 335–339; Schwartzberg 2010: 448–450, 462–466; Gish 2012.

on this occasion,[47] we must reject the unwarranted temptation to interpret the 'shouting' and 'outbursts' of the Athenians at the trial as proof of mob irrationality or violence. In a political context,[48] *thorubos* has a rather wide range of meaning associated with making noise—from a murmur or groan, to an outburst, uproar, or shout; in general, any clamour, like cheers, applause, cat-calling, or jeering. Audience outbursts thus can communicate either approbation or disapproval, and exclamations were neither uncommon nor unexpected at Athenian Assembly meetings and trials.[49]

By raising its collective voice, so to speak, through such outbursts, the assembled *dēmos* conveyed in a direct and palpable way its agreement or disagreement with a speech or proposal. In the context of direct participatory democracy, *thorubos* reflects the foundational concepts of citizen equality and freedom of speech enjoyed by all Athenian citizens. Athenian democracy did not require the participation of all citizens on every deliberative occasion, although all citizens were entitled not only to hear, but also to speak and vote on any matter before the Assembly. Some minority, of course, took the lead in initiative, discussion, and office-holding; but this did not reduce Athenian democracy to spectator politics, with accountability to the *dēmos* limited to *ex post facto* scrutiny or censure of magistrates, as is true in modern representative democracies. Deliberative and judicial proceedings of Athenian democracy were designed to follow guidelines and protocols promoting efficiency and transparency, while yet encouraging citizen participation. Rules of procedure were intended to facilitate not frustrate the expression of democratic will.

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47 Diodorus employs descriptive language to drive home his argument about democratic madness with heavy-handed pathos (13.102.1–3) by creating an impression of the assembled Athenians as an angry mob: 13.101.1, 101.4 (*tēn orgēn*), 101.6 (*sunthoruboundes*), 102.5 (*adikōs, tēn orgēn*). This characterization, imitated by other commentators, is absent from Xenophon's account.

48 On *thorubos* in Xenophon's writings, outside of a political context, none of which imply anger or hostility: *An.* 1.8.16; *Symp.* 7.1; *Cyr.* 4.5.8. See Pl. *Grg.* 458c; *Phdr.* 248a–b.

49 Dem. *Ex.* 4, 5, 10, 17, 18, 21, 26, 28, 29, 33, 34, 36, 44, 46, 47, 49, 56 reiterated that *rhētores* had to anticipate interruptions from the audience. Socrates was unperturbed by the dicastic *thorubos* that he aroused at his own trial: Xen. *Ap.* 14–15. Socrates, like Demosthenes, considered such interruptions detrimental to a rational deliberative process (see Pl. *Resp.* 492b–c; *Leg.* 876b; see *Prt.* 319b–c, 339d–e; *Ph.* 66d), but these outbursts were an undeniable and legitimate part of Athenian democratic politics: Thuc. 4.28.1; Ar. *Vesp.* 277–280, 619–627, 979–981; *Ach.* 37–39; *Eccl.* 430–432; Dem. 8.31, 77. On proto-democratic *thorubos*: Hom. *Il.* 1.22–23, 2.270–277, 7.403–404, 9.50–51, 18.497–502; *Od.*14.237–239; Lanni 1997: 189; Schwartzberg 2010: 450–455.

Athenian democracy was not characterized by retreating passivity or a conservative sense of shame. Unlike citizens in monarchic or oligarchic regimes, the Athenians refused to sit quietly or listen in silence as elites, speaking and acting ostensibly on behalf of the *dēmos* as a whole, conducted public business. The collective corollary in Athenian democracy to the political right of each individual citizen to free speech—even or especially unbridled speech, or *parrhēsia*—was *thorubos*, the frank outspokenness and collective *parrhēsia* of the Athenians. The right of a citizen in the democracy to speak his mind freely did not preclude the assembled Athenians from expressing its collective opinion regarding the speaker's arguments. Widespread grumbling or shouting may have amounted to a kind of heckling on occasion, but also signalled to speakers that their proposal or advice was effectively being set aside, or rejected outright, by an informal and audible vote of no confidence. Democratic *thorubos*, therefore, performed several important functions related to direct popular participation in debate, aside from voting: it facilitated debate and deliberation; it acted as an informal, mini-referendum on key issues; it alternately restrained or encouraged individual *rhētores* by communicating the support or disagreement of the *dēmos*; and thus it helped to move forward the decision-making process of the Assembly.[50]

Outbursts or shouts in the Assembly, as well as in the law courts, constituted one means by which the *dēmos* sought to preserve its sovereignty over individual speakers or magistrates entrusted with restricted political authority. Together with the other, more formal methods and procedures designed for the purpose (e.g., sortition, term limits, collegiality, scrutiny, ostracism), *thorubos* helped the *dēmos* maintain ultimate control over the deliberative and decision-making process, as well as over the implementation of its decisions. These measures supported rather than undermined the practice of democracy. In an extreme situation, *thorubos* could reveal deep-seated political opinions, or reflexive attachments to principle. We know from Lysias' oration, for example, that at a critical moment in 404, *thorubos* vocalized the abiding attachment of the Athenians to *dēmokratia* itself in opposition to a proposal that would have delivered Athens into the hands of oligarchs and tyrants—although the *dēmos* was reduced to silence and

[50] On the positive contribution of *parrhēsia* and *thorubos* to Athenian democracy: Bers 1985: 13 ('there are no instances ... of *thorubos* meant to intimidate a witness'); Wallace 2004: 223–227, 227 ('Thucydides mentions no case where *thorubos* improperly ended an Assembly debate'); Tacon 2001; Saxonhouse 2006: 6–9, 28–30, 85–99, 146–151, 209–211; Werhan 2009: 36–46; cf. Balot 2004: 244–246; Roisman 2004: 264–266.

later proved powerless to stop such a coup from taking place by force (12.73–75). One wonders what might have happened if the assembled *dēmos*, a decade earlier, had been less moderate and more spirited in speaking out in defence of democratic principles, rather than tacitly consenting to such revolutionary innovations by their silence in Assembly (see Thucydides 8.54, 66; cf. 2.65, 6.24).[51]

Returning to Xenophon's account of the trial of the generals, commentators who follow Diodorus and interpret the animated *dēmos* here as a reckless, impassioned lynch-mob ignore the vital and legitimate role played by *thorubos* in the political and judicial institutions of Athenian democracy. Such critics base their arguments for mob rule (that is, when arguments are provided at all) almost entirely on the presence of a few words that appear in an isolated set of lines in Xenophon's account; words which, as we have seen, can be interpreted in various ways: 'shouting' (*boaō*: 1.7.12, 14) and 'making a commotion' (*thorubeō*: 1.7.13).[52] On all three of the occasions when an audience is reported by Xenophon in *Hellenica* to have 'shouted' or 'caused a commotion' (*epithorubeō*) in a deliberative or judicial forum, the outburst signalled the support or acclamation by the audience for one speaker's speech or argument; none of these occasions, it is worth noting, occurred during an actual vote or resulted in violent actions being taken, and the narrative context makes clear that members of the audience—while obviously engaged as active listeners in the debate—were neither 'angry' nor 'mad' (1.7.13; 2.3.50; 6.5.37).[53]

In the case of the trial of the generals, outbursts reflected a kind of spiritedness which, to be understood, must be distinguished from the impas-

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51 On democratic courage and free speech as means to defend against 'subtle forms of tyranny' and 'threats from within': Balot 2004: 250–251, 253, 256. On the unquiet silence of the Athenian *dēmos* under the rule of few or one: Zumbrunnen 2008. The near destruction of Mytilene and the actual destruction of Melos may be partly attributed to the unwillingness of democratic partisans in those *poleis* to insist that their voice be heard (Thuc. 3.2; 5.84–85). On the unintended effects of habitual deference, especially in democratic regimes: Popper 1962: vii ('by our reluctance to criticize … we may help to destroy'). On the moderation, if not courage, exhibited by the *dēmos*, under these circumstances: Munn 2000: 134–141; cf. Dobski 2009.

52 Xenophon also uses here the word 'crowd' (*ochlos*: 1.7.13), although it is usually mistranslated as 'mob'—with implied derogatory connotations. Of the ten uses of this word in *Hellenica*, none refer to a violent or angry 'mob'; on the contrary, it generally is used to refer to an indiscriminate mass of people crowded together (e.g., 1.3.22; 1.4.13; 2.2.21; 3.4.7, 8; 3.3.7; 6.2.23).

53 The most famous 'shouting' men in Xenophon's writings were hardly angry: *An.* 4.7.21–25.

sioned anger or blinding rage that distorts the capacity for reflection and reason. The spiritedness displayed by the *dēmos* at a key moment in the trial did not lead to violence or cause the proceedings to collapse into chaos or anarchy. Rather, it manifestly vocalized a motion in the soul appropriate to, and required for, the defence of any regime. Free, frank, and contentious public speech is a hallmark of democracy, precisely the kind of spirited speech that tyrants or tyrannical forms of government always seek to suppress; silencing citizen discourse, by force or by law, is the trademark of tyranny (2.3.15–4.1; see *Memorabilia* 1.2.31–38; *Cyropaedia* 5.3.55). Contrary to those who point to democratic *thorubos* as proof of irrational anger and mob rule, this expression of spiritedness reflected the partisan spirit that is expected of good citizens of any regime, including democracy.

Democatic *thumos*

Spiritedness, or *thumos*, is a natural motion in the human soul that cannot simply be dismissed as irrational because its arousal is predicated on the natural attachment of human beings to what is held dear or esteemed. It is not merely a passion which is rooted in involuntary bodily needs or wants. *Thumos* springs from attachments which are not strictly speaking rational, but reasonable, and such attachments when threatened prompt an urge to defend. Spirited or thumotic anger over a violation of political or civic rights, for example, has a fitting place in democracy—as it does in every political order of which we have experience. Injustice rightly arouses in us indignation and anger. Justice, or rather the pursuit of justice, may not be possible in its absence.[54]

To be sure, *thumos* is not a human phenomenon associated with cold political calculation or free from complexity. It mingles and may become confused with passion. Since its arousal in us depends upon a preceding act of reason which lays claim to what is our own or which assigns worth to what we esteem or love, *thumos* is reasonable; but because spirited anger in response to a violation of or threat to what is our own or what we hold dear also involves some assessment of or judgment about particulars or circumstances, which may be incomplete, mistaken, or flawed, we cannot

54 Aristotle cites anger as a paradigmatic emotion, a warranted response to (the perception of) an injustice or an unjustified slight, a motion of the soul to which *rhētores* often appeal in order to arouse jurors to action: *Rh.* 2.1.8–9, 2.1–2. On the role of anger in the Athenian law courts: Aeschin. 3.197; Lys. 12.79–80, 90, 96; Lanni 1999; Ober 2008a: 75–76.

say with certainty that every arousal of *thumos* is or will be justified. A thumotic act, then, is explicable in terms of reason, although it is not in itself an act of reasoning (for example, about justice, or benefit, or probable outcomes). *Thumos*, in other words, in attempting to defend what is (held to be) good from harm or loss, can potentially be self-destructive or even harmful to that good which it seeks to preserve, especially if its presence in the soul overwhelms other moral and rational capacities.

To admit this much about its limitations is not to say that *thumos* cannot be distinguished from other passions that can hold sway over a human soul. For *thumos* cannot simply be equated with an animalistic desire to defend the body itself, a natural instinct of self-preservation. Rather, it seems intimately associated with a deep sense or conception of what is good or right or noble, a sense of something higher than (but not exclusive of) ourselves to which we can be devoted—and for which we may be willing to risk harm to ourselves in its defence. Spiritedness, therefore, is distinctively human; it underwrites displays of courage (not merely recklessness or acts of self-preservation) and ultimately entails some implicit or explicit understanding of right and wrong, and of justice, moral virtues which are necessary for political life.[55]

Thumos also works as the guarantee of a bond in us between what is lower—our visceral desires for survival and the satisfaction of bodily needs or wants—and what is higher—longings which look beyond the body to the desires of the soul or mind. While the lower is sublimated and transcended through thumotic action aiming to pursue or defend what is higher (what is deemed or held to be good or noble), and perhaps even sacrificed along the way, the higher cannot ignore the fact that it remains rooted in or grounded upon the lower. Resistance to the higher by the lower thus takes its bearings from partiality, what is particular, what is distinctively one's own. In the case of the Athenian *dēmos*, its spiritedness to defend *dēmokratia* is aroused not simply by the ambition or desire for honour that might have led some, if not all of the generals to act as they did, particularly if their reason for neglecting the rescue effort was not motivated by contempt for the lives of sailors but a prudential decision to husband resources in anticipation of a future, perhaps even decisive confrontation with what remained of the Spartan fleet.[56] The Athenian *dēmos* was not unaware of the necessary con-

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[55] On *thumos* and political spiritedness: Lewis 1947; Zuckert 1988; Fukuyama 1992: 162–234; Mansfield 2006; Gish 2012.

[56] See Xen. *Mem.* 3.5 (Pericles the Younger); see also, Munn 2000: 181–183, 225–229.

ditions for winning the war and maintaining their empire. But it was not willing to countenance the sacrifice of so many lives of citizens unnecessarily or without demanding accountability, especially when such great losses demographically might again lead to an internal threat to its rule.

From the perspective of the *dēmos*, the actions or inaction of the generals after the victory at Arginusae—failing *either* to destroy the Spartan fleet (an inexpedient fact which no doubt played a role in the charges being brought against the generals) *or* to exert themselves in rescue operations for the thousands of sailors stranded in the sea—must have called into question their loyalty to the democratic regime itself. Only men contemptuous of the lives of the lower classes could have debated protocol and tactics safely on shore, while a storm gathered and vast numbers of the *dēmos* drowned (1.6.35). In effect abandoning the sailors to their fate, the inaction or slow action of the generals could be interpreted by the *dēmos* as dereliction of duty and disregard for the lives of so many citizens—or worse. Disdain for 'the masses' (*hoi polloi*) as worthless, and so expendable, and a view of the members of the *dēmos* in general as indistinguishable from slaves, were axioms of oligarchic opinion.[57] Notwithstanding the rational arguments of Euryptolemus, or perhaps even of Socrates (if he had made any effort to articulate his reasons for not yielding to the will of the *dēmos*), the Athenian *dēmos* insisted on resisting encroachments on its authority—a thumotic response to perceived assaults on its rule over the *polis* and democratic way of life.[58]

In other words, democratic *thumos* would seem to demand that, once the *dēmos* perceived its *dēmokratia* to be under attack from elements within the *polis* prone to self-serving ambition and acting in a reckless or haughty manner, the *dēmos* had to push back against those who would strive for honour at the expense of justice, which is a function of the regime. It is not, then, simply moral indignation (over the impiety of the generals in failing to recover the corpses of those who died in battle and to repatriate them for burial) which caused the spiritedness of the *dēmos* to rise against the generals.[59] The natural love of one's own, in this case, was transmuted into a public-spirited attachment to what is held in common by the *dēmos*. A profound sense of injustice and political indignation appears to be at

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57 Democracy as a regime of slaves: Xen., [*Ath. pol.*], esp. 1.10–12, 3.10; cf. 1.8–9, 2.20, 3.12–13. See Raaflaub 1983.

58 See Strauss 1989: 164–168; Bloom 1969: 348–350, 372–379.

59 See Bloom 1969: 377.

work in the trial. For in failing to expend every resource and energy in mounting rescue operations on behalf of the thousands of citizens, the elected leaders of the *dēmos* were guilty of committing a grave injustice against the *dēmos*, a political offence tantamount to rebellion or conspiring to overthrow *dēmokratia*.

Just as the harsh rule of the Athenian *dēmos* over an empire of allies was an expression of its political freedom abroad and the preservation of its own liberty from external attack, so too, the *dēmos* had learned to rule over its leaders at home with an iron fist in order to insulate itself from internal attacks and *stasis*—scrutinizing, judging, and punishing in strict accord with its own partisan views of what is just, honourable, and useful.[60] The Athenians' love (*erōs*) for and spirited attachment (*thumos*) to the core principles of the regime—political equality, free speech, and popular sovereignty—are arguably the crowning achievements of democracy.[61] If the *dēmos* was guilty on this occasion of allowing its love for democratic rule (cf. Thucydides 6.43) to obscure or preclude a reasonable assessment of the threat posed to that rule by a faction within its own body of citizens, the cause of that misjudgement should be blamed not on excessive *thumos*, as much as on immoderate *erōs* (see *Hellenica* 5.4.24–25 for erotic desire and injustice). Only in a hyper-rationalized regime, such as Socrates describes in Plato's *Republic*, can these intertwined motions of the soul, *thumos* and *erōs*, be disentangled and separated from one another in such a way as to ensure that spiritedness is always aligned with reason and perfect knowledge of justice.

Democratic political life at Athens, no more or less than any other regime, did not admit such a separation. Athenian generals, honour-lovers *par excellence* in the *polis*, unlike the warrior class (from which the rulers are drawn) in Plato's *Republic*, do not always exhibit an affinity with or sympathy for the citizens over whom they rule. The Athenian *dēmos*, for its part, under *dēmokratia*, did not turn itself over to the rulers—but instead compelled them to serve the *polis* by acting within political institutions and procedures that harnessed and governed their ambition. Contrary to the war-like Spartans or the just regime-in-speech of Plato's Socrates, the possession of power solely belonged to the *dēmos*: *dēmokratia*. This authority the *dēmos* jealously guarded, by reserving to itself the prerogative of reviewing and scrutinizing all of the magistrates, elected or otherwise—commending them for

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60 See Isoc. 7.26–27, 12.146–147; Ar. *Pol.* 2.12.1273b35–1274a18; but cf. Xen. *Mem.* 4.6.12.

61 See Arist. *Pol.* 6.2.1317a40–b17; Forde 1989: 38–40.

successes, and deposing, impeaching, or punishing them for failures—all by vote of the *dēmos*.[62] Wary of being bitten by their own magistrates, the *dēmos* at Athens ruled and kept its leaders on a tight leash—most of all, the generals, the only aristocratic or timocratic presence tolerated by the democratic regime.[63] Every perceived breach of democratic trust by a commanding general aggravated popular suspicions and threatened the constitutional order as a challenge to the regime.

Even if there is reason to believe the generals acted expediently in deciding not to devote all of their resources immediately to the rescue of the Athenians stranded in the water, the *dēmos* demanded that they take responsibility for accounting satisfactorily for the massive number of lives lost after the battle was over—a disaster that, with the exception of losses sustained in the Sicilian expedition (in which the generals perished also), amounted to the greatest sacrifice of citizens' lives suffered by the *dēmos* in the course of the Peloponnesian wars (not counting the vast number of Athenians destroyed by the plague: cf. Thucydides 3.52, 3.87.3).[64] The desire to punish the generals, from the perspective of the *dēmos*, can be seen as natural, patriotic, and justified—all the more so, if the generals, or their defenders before the Assembly, seemed to be guided in their actions by oligarchic inclinations.[65] Indeed, the aftermath of the Arginusae trial represents something

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[62] See [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 9 ('when the *dēmos* masters voting-power, it masters the constitution').

[63] Democratic distrust of generals: Hansen 1975: catalogue nos. 1–68; Roberts 1982; Asmonti 2006. See Krentz 1989: 169: 'Demosthenes claimed that the Athenians put every general on trial for his life two or three times (4.47). The strict control the Athenians exercised over their commanders had one great salutary effect: It kept commanders following the assembly's policies and desires, thereby safeguarding the democracy.' Hansen 1975: 59 (the threat of impeachment by *eisangelia* hung like 'the sword of Damocles' over the heads of generals). Even successful generals under the democracy were not immune to democratic scrutiny, and had to show that they were loyal to the *dēmos* and *dēmokratia*: Thuc. 2.21–22, 59–65; 6.15–16.

[64] Strauss (1986: 71, 82 n. 7) argues that 'the percentage of citizen rowers on Athenian ships was high' and that Xenophon takes care to report that Athens lost twenty-five ships 'crews and all'—although 'it was assumed that there would be survivors of damaged ships, and that the generals were to rescue them'. See Appendix I.

[65] Grote 1861: 178–179, 208–210: 'It is so much the custom … to presume the Athenian people to be a set of children or madmen … that I have been obliged to state these circumstances somewhat at length, in order to show that the mixed sentiment excited at Athens by the news of the battle of Arginusae was perfectly natural and justifiable. Along with joy for the victory, there was blended horror and remorse at the fact that so many of the brave men who had helped to gain it had been left to perish unheeded'. To think that grieving Athenians could have ignored 'such a desertion of perishing warriors, and such an omission of sympathetic duty, is, in my judgment, altogether preposterous'. See Roberts 1982: 179–180.

of a breaking point in the distrustful and potentially adversarial relationship between the sovereign Athenian *dēmos* and the aristocratic leaders of its military.[66] Long after the end of the war and the restoration of the democracy, this stern message of accountability, sent to future magistrates by the *dēmos* through the trial of the generals, continued to have the desired effect.[67]

In thinking about the relation between democratic *thumos* and democratic *thorubos*, we should recall, finally, that outbursts in the Assembly, the expressions of public-spirited anger, were not directed at the generals themselves and did not occur either during the defence speeches or the ensuing debate over their innocence or guilt. Instead, the assembled *dēmos* raises its voice only in response to the attempt to circumvent or, by means of a technicality, to pre-empt the democratic process of deliberation and voting on the case at hand. Certainly the proceedings as a whole, once reviewed in detail, cannot be characterized as motivated by the passion or anger of an irrational mob, as anti-democratic critics assume. The entire proceedings of the trial of the Arginusae generals, in fact, must be characterized rather as a sustained example of democratic deliberation, punctuated at a key moment by a thumotic defence of the regime.

Stasis and the Preservation of the Regime

Much weight is given to the concluding passage in Xenophon's account (1.7.35), in which the *dēmos* is reported to have regretted what had happened in the trial of the Arginusae generals. They decided that those who had misled the *dēmos* should be charged and put on trial, including Callixinus, author of the motion by which the generals were tried and condemned *en masse* in the Assembly. This passage is often interpreted as a confession of collective regret and guilt on the part of the *dēmos*, once their anger gave way to second thoughts (cf. Thucydides 3.35–36; 8.1). It is also assumed that in calling for punishment of those who had deceived them, the *dēmos* merely sought to escape the stain of injustice by scapegoating a handful of citizens. Xenophon, however, does not indicate in what respect the *dēmos* thought it had been deceived, what was regretted, or who brought forward

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[66] Asmonti 2006: 7.

[67] See Diod. 13.35.1; Roberts 1982: 179–180 ('the conduct of Chabrias ... was precisely the kind of behaviour which the Athenians wished to promote by their vote of condemnation in 406').

the charges. At any rate, Callixinus went into exile; when he eventually returned to Athens he was despised by all but never put on trial.

Aside from the merely academic question of the legality of the trial, and the reflections on its possible illegality implied by a certain reading of the indictment of Callixinus, it is not at all clear what might have happened if the trial had ended differently. As we know from the many other impeachment trials leading to execution, there is no evidence that such punishments left the Athenians bereft of competent military leadership.[68] Even if the generals had been acquitted and returned to their offices, a candid assessment of the prospects of a final Athenian victory in the Peloponnesian war, even after the astonishing victory at Arginusae, cannot be optimistic. Once the Spartans elevated Lysander to commander, his talents as a general and his collaboration with the Persian prince Cyrus ensured the supremacy of the Peloponnesian fleet. Whatever the costs of producing new ships and paying sailors, Sparta was assured that it could rebuild its fleet at will, regardless of losses in battle and reward crews with wages that would exceed whatever Athens could offer. The Athenians had exhausted their treasury and their manpower on the fleet which won the victory at Arginusae. Any losses in the future, even in victory, would inevitably reduce the Athenian capacity to continue fighting; eventually the Spartans' Persian-financed fleet would wear down and defeat the Athenians. The success of the Athenians at Arginusae had exceeded the most fervent hopes and expectations of the desperate *dēmos*, but it was to prove a pyrrhic victory—and not because of the execution of the generals. The writing on the wall would not have been erased or altered, even if the Arginusae generals had not been executed.

While the loss of the generals might later be regretted as the war drew to a disastrous end for the Athenians, there is a sense in which the *dēmos* learned from the harsh lessons of war the necessity of resolving the problem of *stasis* at home, without having to suffer the devastation and permanent rupture noted by Thucydides in other *poleis*. Plato's Socrates, in his Funeral Oration, offers an enigmatic yet revealing account of the battle at Arginusae, and what might be seen as its unexpected consequences for Athens (*Menexenus* 243c–d):

> Then, indeed, did the strength and virtue of our *polis* become manifest. For though she was thought to be already worn down by war and although her ships were besieged at Mytilene, men came to the rescue in sixty ships; these men, who embarked of their own accord, came to be acknowledged as best

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[68] See Roberts 1982: 177–180.

> since they conquered their enemies and freed their friends, although, having obtained an unworthy fortune as they were not rescued from the sea, they now lie there. It is right and fitting always to remember and praise them, for by their virtue we won that battle … as well as the rest of the war. For indeed, because of them our *polis* gained the reputation that it would never be overcome in war, not even by all humanity. And this proved true—we were overcome by our own dissension, not by others. For we are still undefeated, at least by them, but we won a victory over ourselves and were overcome. After that, when there was calm and peace in our relations with others, our own war at home was waged in this way—but in such a manner that, if indeed it is fated for human beings to endure civil strife (*stasis*), then no *polis* would pray to suffer this disease any differently.

If the first part of this passage can be reconciled with the account of the victory at Arginusae, what about the second part? It seems a fanciful idea, and serious revision of a history known to all, simply to proclaim that Athens won the war. But this passage becomes intelligible, if we begin to see that 'the rest of the war' is a reference to the on-going *stasis* that had vexed the Athenians since the Sicilian campaign. Having been reduced to 'peace with everyone else' (a euphemism for the humiliating surrender and loss of empire to Sparta), Socrates turns to speak of the war that Athenians fought against Athenians, and which ended, not with the overthrow of the *dēmos* and *dēmokratia* in 403 during the reign of the Thirty Tyrants, but with the restoration of democracy in 403 and the decree of amnesty reconciling and reuniting the disparate elements of the citizen body. The ultimate success of the Athenians was in winning the war with themselves on such terms, without the body politic being so completely ravaged by the disease of *stasis* as to become a disfigured corpse.

In short, it would be unjust to accuse the *dēmos* of acting inappropriately in defending *dēmokratia* to the best of its ability in the wake of the battle at Arginusae, especially in the midst of a gathering storm at home caused by *stasis*. But we may still wonder—as Xenophon seems to want us to do by his highlighting the intervention of Socrates and his recording the speech of Euryptolemus—whether the *dēmos*, on this particular occasion, ought to have judged the case of the generals from a perspective of expediency rather than justice. Taking a Diodotean approach, perhaps it would have been best for the *dēmos* to forego its spirited defence of the *dēmokratia* against the perceived injustice of the generals, in order to successfully prosecute the war against the Spartans and preserve the empire. This is the advice of Diodotus (Thucydides 3.47):

> Even if they are guilty, you have to pretend they were not, so that the one who remains your ally does not become your enemy. And this more than

> anything else will be more expedient to the preservation of your rule, namely, submitting to an injustice willingly, rather than justly destroying those you should not. In this way the punishment in which justice and expediency are the same is discovered to be an impossible combination.

In opposition to this advice to temporize expediently for the sake of maintaining their imperial rule, we should take note of another speech recorded by Thucydides which seems to speak directly to the Athenian Assembly convened to hear the case of the Arginusae generals—a speech delivered by one of three otherwise unknown *rhētores* in that work.

As news raced to Sicily of the impending invasion by the daring Athenian fleet, launched with high hopes for conquest, Syracuse, the greatest Sicilian *polis* and also a democracy, debated in its Assembly how best to prepare for the Athenian invasion—if rumours of it were true (6.31–32). Against the advice of Hermocrates, a prominent general at Syracuse, who exhorted the citizens to be bold, to seize the advantage, to make allies of Sparta and Carthage, and to act in an unexpectedly daring manner by sailing against the Athenian fleet before it even arrived on their shores, Athenagoras, 'the leader of the *dēmos*', rose to suggest a more cautious approach. His reasons for resisting the call to arms trumpeted by Hermocrates, based on his assessment of the domestic political situation, are compelling (6.35–40, esp. 38–40):

> Some men here at home are making speeches, those who not for the first time, but always, have wished to cause panic among us, whether by stories like these, and even worse, or by deeds, in order to rule over the *polis*. I fear that, one day, by repeated attempts, they may succeed; for we are bad at taking precautions before we come to be harmed, and also at dealing with conspirators when they are discovered. This, then, is the reason why our *polis* is seldom calm, but is wracked as much by civil strife (*stasis*) and rivalries as by its enemies ... However, if you follow my lead, I'll try to prevent this from happening in our time, persuading the mass of you but punishing the authors of all such schemes, not only when they are exposed (a difficult task), but also when they wish to act though they lack the means to accomplish their desire (for it is not enough to fight the acts, but we ought to frustrate the intentions of an enemy as well); thus with respect to oligarchs, exposing some and teaching others ... It will be said that *dēmokratia* is neither wise nor fair, and that those with means are the better ones to rule best. But I say, first of all, that *dēmos* refers to [the rule of] everyone together; whereas *oligarchia* [rules] only for a portion; and further, that while the rich are the best at guarding wealth, and the wise offer the best counsel, it is the many who—hearing cases—are able to judge what is best, and that all the other parts [of the *polis*], collectively and separately, have an equal share in *dēmokratia*. *Oligarchia*, on the other hand, apportions to the many a share in the dangers, while not only grasping at but also seizing all the benefits. This is what ... a great *polis* cannot permit.

Athenagoras concludes that such a great *polis*, especially one in a state of latent or near-*stasis*, ought not to impose slavery upon itself in a fit of panic by thrusting itself into the hands of a few ambitious men longing for war. Democratic deliberation requires that the *dēmos* choose whoever it pleases as its leaders and then, only after hearing their advice as if they were their deeds, judging what must be done. But this must never be done in such a way that causes the *dēmos* to be deprived—or to deprive itself willingly—of its freedom (*eleutheria*); rather the *dēmos* must seek to preserve the democratic regime by being vigilant in resisting the enemies *within* as well as outside the *polis*, who would strip it from them (6.40).[69]

Something along the lines of this advice must have been what the Athenian *dēmos* sought to follow, in holding up their generals after the Arginusae victory to an unyielding democratic standard. Indeed, this may have been the most prudent course of action available to them in the absence of a prominent statesman endowed with an extraordinary capacity for persuasion and a strong presence of mind buttressed by prudence—that is, in the absence of a man like Diodotus ('Gift of Zeus') or the 'Olympian' Pericles;[70] or perhaps like Xenophon, whose education in the company of Socrates had prepared him not only to examine and discover what must be done, but also to see the limits of human nature and the circumstances under which it might be possible to persuade a *dēmos*, guiding its deliberations toward a more just, moderate, or expedient decision (see *Anabasis* 7.1.18–32).

What I have argued here should also lead to a re-assessment of events surrounding the Hermae desecration and profanation of the Mysteries, and especially the spirited response of the *dēmos* in the Assembly and law courts on that occasion. Despite the destruction of the Athenian forces sent to Sicily, the *dēmos* as well as empire of the Athenians remained intact, if weakened; perhaps the oligarchic purge of 415–413 had been somewhat useful in warding off *stasis*, and the overthrow of *dēmokratia*, at least for a few years. Conversely, the moderate or prudent reaction of the *dēmos* to the radical changes to the constitution proposed by the oligarchs and adopted by vote of the Assembly, only emboldened elements within the *polis* already hostile

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[69] See Thuc. 8.47–48.3, 49, 63.3–70, esp. 54.1–3. Hermocrates' effort to force himself on Syracuse as *turannos* confirms the danger posed to the *dēmos* by men of great ambition: Diod. 13.75; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.27–31. His intentions for Sicily and Syracusan democracy are illuminated by his speeches and deeds, both before and after the Athenian invasion: Thuc. 4.58–65, 7.21, 73; 8.85. On the rhetorical mirror of Athenian *stasis* at Syracuse: Andrews 2009.

[70] On Diodotus: Saxonhouse 2006: 156–163. On Pericles: Thuc. 2.59–65; cf. 2.21.3–22.1.

toward the democratic regime, thus leading to the revolutionary events of 411. That revolution may be seen as precisely caused by an absence of sufficient *thumos* on the part of the beleaguered and exhausted *dēmos* to defend its liberty, thereby acquiescing through subtle steps and without voicing opposition to a settled design to overthrow *dēmokratia* at Athens: indeed, 'it was a great work, nearly a century after the tyrants were overthrown, to deprive the Athenian *dēmos* of its liberty, who were not only not subjects, but for over more than half of that time had themselves been accustomed to rule over others' (Thucydides 8.68.4).

The argument of Diodotus in the debate over the fate of the Mytileneans, twenty years earlier, represents a similar case, I would argue, in which the spiritedness of the *dēmos* initially compelled them to impose a harsh, but justified sentence of retaliation and vengeance. Due to the time and distance involved in delivering and executing the verdict on the rest of the population at Mytilene, however, there was the possibility of reconsidering the verdict on the following day, and to stay or alter their order, on the basis of expediency. The men from Mytilene, it should be noted, who had been captured and transported to Athens, were nonetheless executed immediately after the vote in favour of Diodotus' proposal not to punish the Mytileneans indiscriminately, on the motion of Cleon (3.50.1). The spirited anger of the Athenians had not dissipated in regret, but its deliberations had been focused by Diodotus on a principle of expediency (cf. 5.116.2–4) within which he conceals justice. Here, we begin to see how the Mytilenean debate becomes, through Diodotus' leadership, Athenian democracy's finest hour.[71] The trial of the Arginusae generals might have proved another such hour, if someone like Diodotus (rather than Euryptolemus) had been present and spoken up in the Assembly following the intervention of Socrates. Still, it is not evident that the outcome of the war would have been changed in any way.

[71] Diodotus explicitly separates justice from expediency in his speech, but his reasoning is far from indifferent to justice; he succeeds, almost surreptitiously, in getting the Athenians to apply their sophisticated sense of politics equitably or 'even-handedly' toward their rebellious allies (*contra* Cleon's claim that this is one of three vices that will ruin their empire: 3.40.2; cf. 48.1), as well as toward themselves. See Forde 1989: 44–45; Saxonhouse 2006: 160–162, 210–211.

Defending *Dēmokratia*: Public-Spirited Democratic Deliberation

In the absence of a deliberative and persuasive *rhētōr* capable of presenting the Assembly with a course of action consistent with its desire to preserve the regime, that is, with a sense of enlightened self-interest regarded from an expedient perspective, the proceedings of the Athenian Assembly might vary in quality. This is only to say that the *dēmos* is open to being persuaded by skilled speakers—like Themistocles, Pericles, or Diodotus, who chastened them, as much as like Cleon or Alcibiades, who inflamed them with their rhetoric of empire—and so its policies might seem erratic. However, there is no reason to think that the *dēmos* was incapable of deliberating on its own, apart from such influences. The general approach of the Athenians to foreign policy throughout the *History* of Thucydides, the Sicilian expedition notwithstanding, bears the marks of being determined by measures fairly reasonable and expedient, attained through the process of democratic deliberation, rather than driven irrationally by the winds of passion. The trial of the Arginusae generals in Xenophon was no exception.[72]

But what is *more* surprising than the capacity of the Athenians to act on occasion with cold-hearted, seemingly inhumane violence, particularly in war and foreign affairs, is that they did not wield their imperial power with harsh severity *more frequently*—an observation worthy of reflection, even more so when seen in the cold light cast by the barbaric actions of *other poleis* recorded by Xenophon and Thucydides.[73] The Athenians often reserved their most severe actions for punishing their own citizens in accordance with principles of strict democratic accountability. Still, the Athenians did not act with brute violence; the *dēmos* resorted to legal institutions and democratic procedures, not weapons, in order to accomplish its will. The surprisingly moderate character of the actions taken by the Athenians—before, during, and after their own outbreaks of domestic civil war, or *stasis*—ought to weigh heavily in the balance of justice when rendering a final judgment on the nature of *dēmokratia*.[74]

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72 To argue that Athenian political and military decisions were reasonable and deliberative is not to claim that every decision of the *dēmos* proved to be strictly rational or finally good for Athens.

73 See Thuc. 3.52–68, 70–81, 84; 7.29–30, 84–87; 4.46–48 (the savagery of which is reported to have been unleashed precisely because it was thought that the Athenians themselves would *not* impose the death sentence). See also Isoc. 15.300. On Spartan justice: Gish 2009.

74 The 'greatest necessity' for the Athenians in deliberating about what must be done, is to guard above all against *stasis* (Thuc. 8.48.4).

What we learn from a close reading of Xenophon's account of the trial of the victorious Arginusae generals should not lead us to conclude that the Athenian *dēmos* is a petty and easily incensed mob, or that the regime itself is inherently flawed and corrupt—far from it. While there is much about the outcome of the trial which, in hindsight or from the perspective of modern liberal ideals, might be wished otherwise, we must nonetheless resist the temptation to condemn Athenian democracy as 'mob rule', or to consider the *dēmos* nothing more than a crowd of 'men without chests' prone to passionate irrationality and merely base concerns, as much anti-democratic criticism would have us believe. Under pressure from a decades-long war with Sparta and besieged by a discontented oligarchic faction at home, Athenian democracy demonstrated its capacity for sustained and reasonable deliberation and for the most part sound decision-making. Once the oligarchic faction had a chance to rule, after the surrender of Athens to Sparta and the overthrow of the democratic regime, citizenship was expressly limited to 'the better sort'—inaugurating the bloody but brief reign of oligarchic tyranny that is exposed in the second book of Xenophon's *Hellenica*.

Of course, the violent opponents of democracy proved incapable of ruling well and were expelled. *Dēmokratia* was restored by the resilient Athenians and—under the auspices of an unprecedented amnesty to reconcile the civil factions as well as legal reforms to moderate the will of the *dēmos*—preserved for three-quarters of a century. In other words, if we can judge from the history of Xenophon, the Athenian *dēmokratia* did not just survive but soon flourished, long after the oligarchic faction at Athens was defeated and the fierce Spartans themselves had succumbed beyond all expectation to a contemptuous weakness (see 7.5.1–11, 13–14, cf. 5.12). Whatever conclusion we draw from the ending of his *Hellenica*, when 'confusion and disorder' dominated Greek affairs, Xenophon seems to offer his attentive readers his own quiet, measured defence of Athenian justice and *dēmokratia*. For, in his view, democracy is preferable to the other regimes found among the Greek *poleis*. By the end of his history, the *dēmos* at Athens, which Xenophon disassociates in his narrative from the pursuit and possession of empire, had managed to restore and even moderate the democratic regime and its deliberations, while the Athenians themselves recovered their ancestral reputation for virtue.[75]

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[75] Confusion and disorder among Greeks: 7.5.26–27. Athenian democratic deliberation: see, e.g., 5.4.19, 34, 60–64; 6.3.1–2, 11; 5.1–3, 33–49; 7.1.1–14; 2.10; 4.1–6; 5.1–3, 7; cf. Tuplin 1993:

Far from writing to condemn or subvert Athenian democracy, Xenophon in his *Hellenica* aims to persuade that part of the *dēmos* at Athens that is willing to listen (without creating too much of an 'uproar') to abandon its misguided imperial ambitions for the sake of improving its deliberations about justice.[76] To conclude that Xenophon deemed *dēmokratia* preferable in many crucial respects to the other available regimes of antiquity is not to argue that he thought it the best regime simply, or even that Athenian democracy could command his complete loyalty as an Athenian citizen.[77] Xenophon, in other words, because he sees the political things (*ta politika*) clearly, because he sees beyond the horizon of Athens and of politics as such, is a friendly rather than a hostile critic of Athenian *dēmokratia*; his intention is not only to write a possession for all time, but also to contribute to the prospects for justice in his own time.[78] Viewed from this perspective, stripped of the corrosive anti-democratic patina that for centuries has tended to conceal its complexity and obscure its meaning, Xenophon's detailed excursus on the trial of the Arginusae generals in his *Hellenica* can be seen as an insightful account of the institutional virtues, as well as the limits, of *dēmokratia* at Athens.

Appendix I

Estimates of the human losses at the Arginusae sea battle vary, although the difference has much to do with how one interprets the two conflicting figures of ships lost according to *Hellenica*. In his narration of the battle, Xenophon is clear: *twenty-five* ships lost 'with their men, except for a few' (1.6.34; see D.S. 13.100.3). Later, Euryptolemus (not Xenophon), in giving his account of the battle as part of a defence of the generals, mentions only

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157–168. Athenian recovery of ancestral reputation (including, anonymously, Xenophon's own son): 7.5.15–17.

[76] On the intended audience of Xenophon's *Hellenica* (as well as his *Poroi* and other treatises): Tuplin 1993: 166; Higgins 1977: 128–143. On its intended effect: Tuplin 1993: 163–168; Higgins 1977: 102, 124–127. See 2.4.40 (*sumbouleuō egō gnōnai humas autous*).

[77] Regarding the definitive attachments in Xenophon's own life and thought, consider the absence of his patronymic and near-silence about his familiy in his writings, the character of his Socratic education and disputed loyalty to his fatherland, and the perspective of philosophy that informs his speeches, deeds and writings: see *An.* 3.1.4–10; Diog. Laert. 2.47,48,56; Strauss 1939: 531; Strauss 1972: 179–180; Higgins 1977: xiv, 142–143; Buzzetti 2008: 5–8, 31–35, 255 n. 11, 257 n. 37.

[78] Strauss 1959: 27–28, 78–94.

twelve ships lost with crews in need of rescue (1.7.30). He argues that the generals, after their post-battle conference, ordered a few of the captains to begin rescue operations with *forty-seven* ships (1.7.17, 30; cf. 1.6.35: forty-six); that is, around *four* ships for *each one* of the *twelve* ships lost.

If we suppose (see Krentz 1989: 168) that Euryptolemus is shading facts in favour of the generals by making a distinction here between the total number of ships disabled and the number of those wrecked and breaking apart, whose crews would be either floating on debris or stranded in the water, the order of the generals looks prudent. They are splitting the fleet between rescue and military operations in such a manner as to provide adequate space for rescuing vessels to take aboard survivors (about 2,200 men, or 40–50 each),[79] on ships not structurally constructed as transport vessels intended to carry much more weight beyond the crew, while simultaneously maintaining a significant numerical advantage (150^{+} - 25 - 47 = 78^{+}) over the Peloponnesian fleet being pursued (120 - 70 = 50).[80]

Aside from the veracity of his account of the disposition of the fleet, what is significant about Euryptolemus' account is the extent to which the generals' decision is meant to alleviate their guilt in the eyes of the Assembly. The generals, he has basically argued, far from neglecting the stranded crewmen, had assigned *more than one-third* of their active force to the task of rescuing survivors on the sinking ships, even as they (with the bulk of the fleet) sailed to engage and destroy the enemy. If the storm prevented the generals from 'finishing the job' against the enemy fleet, then Euryptolemus has cleared the generals of responsibility *both* for not rescuing the survivors (which should be blamed on the captains, if not on

[79] Crews of 200 on average, minus a small proportion of immediate fatalities (say, ten percent), would result in 2,160 men in need of rescue (180 men each on twelve ships), according to Euryptolemus' count; this reasoning, I presume, is accepted by Munn (2000, 181), who says that about half the crews from the twenty-five ships put out of action 'were recovered'—presumably because thirteen ships were merely disabled, so their crews were not stranded and the ships could limp to shore, immediately or eventually (after the storm)—while '[m]ore than 2,000 crewmen of the disabled ships still at sea were lost overnight in the storm'. Some of those on shore must have been added to the crews setting out in pursuit, in order to replenish their ranks which had been thinned by casualties or losses incurred during the battle.

[80] Once the reduced Peloponnesian fleet from the battle rejoined with the fifty ships at Mytilene blockading Conon's forty Athenian ships (but with crewmen for seventy ships, including all of 'the best rowers': 1.6.16–17), the generals' numerical advantage would have been lost (one hundred Peloponnesian ships *versus* around eighty ships in the pursuing Athenian fleet). This disadvantage could quickly be overcome, *if* Conon's beached ships and extraordinary crews re-launched immediately.

the storm) *and* for failing to chase down and destroy the Peloponnesian fleet (also to be blamed on the storm).

Based on the estimates of total losses, according to Xenophon (not Euryptolemus), we see the true scope of the disaster—and the cause for fear of revolution at home which the losses provoked, especially by comparison with the disaster in 411/410.[81] Conservative estimates of the losses in Sicily between 415 and 413 are astounding: 9,000–10,000 killed in action or died in captivity, including about 2,700 hoplites (out of 5,500 for the entire war) as well as about 6,800 sailors from the ranks of poor citizens, metics, and hired foreigners (12,600 for the entire war). Losses among the poor *thētes* likely amounted to *more than two-thirds* of the total. The loss was felt deeply at Athens, from a demographic point of view.[82] While losses at Arginusae did not reach the epic proportions of the losses sustained by the *dēmos*, and the entire *polis*, during its Sicilian expedition, the percentage of lost citizens (especially of *thētes*, recently expanded with the extension of citizenship to slaves willing to man the ships) are demographically substantial.

Xenophon records the loss of twenty-five ships and almost all crews from these ships. With a crew of 200 per trireme, this means the number of men lost must be calculated at around 4,500 (the total of 5,000 being reduced by ten percent to account for 'some' reported survivors). Strauss (1986: 179–182, Appendix on hoplite and thetic casualties) estimates that hoplite ranks or higher ordered to serve in the crews must have lost at most 500 (ten percent of the total losses), whereas sailor-citizens lost from the ranks of the *thētes* must have numbered (by a conservative estimate) around 3,300 (minus hired foreigners). According to the description of the battle itself, the heaviest fighting occurred in the areas where the ships from Athens were congregated, and thus the Athenians (rather than the allies) would have incurred the bulk of the losses.[83]

What is most important to notice about these casualty estimate is: (1) that the number of thetic losses dwarfs by comparison the losses of hoplites and cavalry—even though their losses in this campaign are higher than at

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[81] See Munn 2000: 138: 'One of the factors enabling the oligarchic movement to surface at Athens in 411 was a progressive demographic shift among the Athenian citizenry, a consequence of the plague of the 420s, of losses in war, and especially of the Sicilian disaster'.

[82] See Hansen 1988: 15–16; Munn 2000: 138: '… the poorest class of Athenians that twenty years earlier had roughly equalled the numbers of citizens of middling or better means was now reduced to virtually nothing'.

[83] See Hansen 1988: 16. The psychological and political impact of these losses among the *dēmos* reverberated immediately in Athenian drama: Strauss 1966: 236–262; Worthington 1989b; Arnott 1991; Clay 2002.

any other point in the war, apart from Delium, Amphipolis, and the Sicilian expedition; (2) that the main thetic ranks of the *dēmos* had been drastically reduced at a time when it had struggled even to man the ships it had with citizens; and (3) that almost all the fatalities taken by the *dēmos* as a whole were a result of mismanagement or the failure to launch the rescue effort after the battle—which is to say, their deaths did not come at the hands of an enemy, and were preventable. The vast loss of human life, even or especially in warfare, was deemed unacceptable by the democracy, which viewed the navy and naval tactics strictly in terms of democratic concerns rather than military efficiency.[84]

Appendix II

The role of the storm at Arginusae, its impact on pre- and post-battle operations (for the former see 1.6.28), and its invocation by various parties before, during, and even after the trial, poses what may be an 'insuperable problem' when it comes to assessing what actually happened in the aftermath of the battle, and assigning responsibility, praise, and blame. Estimates of the storm and its effects vary according to its usefulness to those who refer to it. The sudden and at times severe character of the storm is invoked alternatively to explain why the generals or the captains (or both) should, or should not, be held accountable for failing to act decisively and successfully (see Lang 1992: 268–272, esp. 272 n. 14).

On the one hand, the storm:

(a) prevented the rescue operation of ships entrusted to the captains from setting out to gather the survivors stranded at sea, while at the same time the bulk of the fleet was re-launched in pursuit of the badly defeated Peloponnesian fleet (1.6.35; 7.5–6, 17, 29–30 [the generals exonerated, whereas the captains—if anyone—should be blamed for not rescuing survivors]);
(b) prevented the bulk of the Athenian fleet from pursuing and engaging the fleet of the Peloponnesians (1.7.3–4, 31 [generals held accountable for not finishing the battle decisively, but not for the failure to rescue the stranded sailors]); *or*
(c) prevented both the captains and generals from doing anything (1.7.6, 32–33 [all exonerated and praised simply for the victory in battle—

[84] Strauss 2000: 315–319, 323.

contra the claim of Diodorus (13.100.2) that the sailors were so frightened by the storm that they refused to follow orders and insisted on staying safely on shore]).

On the other hand, the storm:

(a) did not prevent the bulk of the Athenian fleet from landing safely ashore and delivering the generals to a conference on shore where a discussion or debate as to how they should proceed took place (1.6.33; 7.29–30);
(b) did not prevent a 'few' survivors from being 'saved by chance' and delivered to land by various means (swimming, floating on debris, etc.)—including a sailor who floated to safety on a meal tub, and one of the generals who managed to find his way, perhaps on a disabled ship, to shore (1.6.34; 7.11, 32);
(c) did not prevent a Peloponnesian messenger ship from being dispatched to Eteonicus at Mytilene, and from sailing in and out of the harbour there, twice (1.6.36–37);
(d) did not prevent the rest of the Peloponnesian fleet from regrouping after the defeat and sailing safely away to Mytilene (or Phocaea), where they re-joined the ships stationed there under Eteonicus, and then sailed off altogether to Chios (1.6.33, 36–37);
(e) did not prevent Conon from launching his own contingent of 40 Athenian ships immediately after the blockade of Eteonicus is lifted (1.7.38); *and*
(f) did not prevent Conon's fleet from meeting with the rest of the Athenian fleet as it was 'sailing out from Arginusae', conveying information about the enemy, and the Athenians altogether sailing back into Mytilene, and then 'from there' sailing on to Chios, where 'they accomplished nothing', before heading to Samos (1.6.38).

Not long after the trial and execution, Critias, leader of the Thirty accused Theramenes of (among other things) failing to rescue the drowning Athenians after the battle—in addition to denouncing the generals in the Assembly, thereby setting the proceedings in motion, merely to save himself. Critias, according to Theramenes, revives the original accusation against him made by the generals themselves: that he failed to accomplish what they had ordered him to do. Theramenes reminds the Council that, at that time, he had defended himself against the generals' accusations by explaining that the storm had 'made it impossible to sail, much less pick up the men', and that the *polis* had decided he spoke reasonably, whereas the

generals had made their guilt evident by just sailing off even though they claimed that it was possible to rescue the men (2.3.35). Since it is perhaps impossible to reconcile all of the various alternatives proposed in the account of Xenophon, both by those in the account as well as by the author, we turn our attention instead to reflection on the tense, even hostile situation back home at Athens where formal accusations, defence speeches, and judgments regarding the battle, storm, and aftermath were being debated and contested. The real tempest must be understood as the perfect storm in politics created back at Athens, in which a set of unforeseeable and complex factors quickly gathered in confluence, and ultimately led to the judgment of guilt and execution of the deposed board of generals.

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CHAPTER SIX

TIMOCRATES' MISSION TO GREECE—ONCE AGAIN

Guido Schepens

Introduction

It is difficult to think of any aspect of the task of writing history that would be more open to subjective assessment, or more susceptible of partial or even partisan discussion, than the treatment of historical causes. The ancient historiographical controversy over how the Corinthian War (395–386) came about is an apt example to illustrate this proposition. Hardly ten years after their victory in the Peloponnesian War, which had secured them a position of supremacy in the Greek world, the Spartans had to face the combined attacks of the Persian navy (Cnidus, 394) and of a formidable Greek coalition, involving the major cities Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos. In one view, the war was stirred up by the Persians in response to the war the Spartans were conducting in Asia Minor on behalf of the freedom of the Greek cities there. Xenophon tells us how the Persian chiliarch Tithraustes sent the Rhodian Timocrates with an amount of fifty talents to Greece, ordering him 'to distribute it among the leaders of the cities on the condition that they start a war against the Lacedaemonians'.[1] According to the anonymous author of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* such an explanation cannot stand: those, he argues, who say that the money from Timocrates was responsible for the creation of war-parties at Athens, in Boeotia and elsewhere, do not know that all had been ill-disposed towards the Spartans 'already a long time before they had dealings with Timocrates and took the gold'. He gives it as his view that 'the cities' hated the Spartans because of their interference in their internal affairs.[2]

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[1] Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1.

[2] *Hell. Oxy.* 10.2–3; compare 21.1. Quotations from the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* are made from Chambers 1993. The English translations are borrowed, sometimes in slightly modified form, from McKechnie and Kern 1988.

In addition to disagreement over the root cause of the war, there are three further points on which our two surviving contemporary fourth-century historical accounts differ:[3] (a) the author of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*—hereafter called 'P'[4]—implies a much earlier date for Timocrates' mission than the one which is attested by Xenophon; (b) in close connection with the foregoing, P names Pharnabazus, not Tithraustes, as the satrap who commissioned the Rhodian; and (c) P's list of recipients of the money includes, next to the Thebans, Corinthians and Argives, the Athenians as well; Xenophon denies that the Athenians had any share in the gold, and provides them with a specific motive for taking action against Sparta: 'they were anyhow, eager for war, since they thought it was their right to rule'.[5]

The ancient Greek debate on the causes of the Corinthian War still continues in modern scholarly variance of opinion over the proper weight that should be assigned (admittedly in a complex interplay of reasons) to such factors as Persian involvement and Greek economic *versus* strictly political motives for waging war against Sparta.[6] Regarding the question as to which of the two contemporary accounts deserves to be trusted (or to be trusted more), historians today tend, at least up to recent times, to subscribe by and large to the views defended by the Oxyrhynchus historian.[7]

3 For some more recent surveys of the divergences, see e.g. Buckler 2004: 397–398; Rung 2004; Bleckmann 2006: 91–100.

4 Although I believe that a strong case can be made for identifying the author as Cratippus (see Schepens 1993 and 2002), it is preferable not to prejudice, from the very start, the ensuing discussion by whatever *a priori* assumption regarding the authorship of the Oxyrhynchus history.

5 *Hell.*3.5.2. Xenophon and P are the only contemporary fourth-century authorities available to us. All later versions (Paus. 3.9.8; Plut. *Art.* 20.4–6; *Lys.* 27.3; *Ages.* 15.1–4; Polyaen. 1.48.3) seem ultimately indebted, directly or indirectly, to either one of the primary authors or represent some combination of their accounts. In this paper the later tradition will only be occasionally considered for the light it may throw on some of the features of the original accounts.

6 For a succinct, yet fairly balanced treatment, see Hornblower 1983: 181–201. Fuller discussions, with reference to previous literature, will be found in Hamilton 1979: 182–208; Cook 1981: esp. 92–195; Urban 1991: 25–58; Lendon 1989: 300–313. Cook 1990 argues, against Kagan 1961, that '50 talents was a ludicrously inadequate sum when compared to the actual cost of even a single season of war'.

7 The bibliography is extensive: see, among others, Grenfell and Hunt 1908: 204–206; Jacoby 1926: 9 stresses that P gives the correct view and adds the following comment well worth quoting: 'das ist wichtig, weil man P so häufig als 'Spartanerfreund' bezeichnet hat' ('that is important, because P has so often been described as "friend of Sparta"'). Compare Cartledge 1987: 290. Urban 1991: 47–48 considers P's version far superior to Xenophon's 'ziemlich plumpen, monokausalen Erklärung' ('rather clumsy single-cause explanation'); McKechnie and Kern 1988: 135; Lendon 1989: 300–313 defends P's sound judgement against the criticism of Bruce 1967: 11.

The main difficulty raised by Xenophon's version is that his late chronology for the dispatch of Timocrates renders the crucial role attributed to his intervention historically absurd. At the time, in mid-summer 395, when Tithraustes supposedly took his initiative to stir up, through adroit use of money, a Greek war against Sparta, the war had started already. I may quote here Margaret Cook's succinct presentation of the problem:

> Tithraustes was sent to Sardis to replace (and execute) Tissaphernes after the battle of Sardis in the summer of 395; he could not possibly have arrived in Sardis before June, and July is more probable. Timocrates then, if sent by Tithraustes, could not have reached the mainland before August. The border dispute which began the war, however, took place when the grain was ripe (Paus. 3.9.9), about mid-May, and the first major battle in the war, at Haliartus, must have been fought in July. Thus, the war would have been well under way before Timocrates arrived, and it is inconceivable that the money could have been widely regarded as the cause of the war. The prevailing view, therefore, is that Xenophon was mistaken.[8]

Such a grave inadequacy in the account of a contemporary, who at the time of the events was present in Asia and had privileged access to Agesilaus, does not augur well for the reliability of the view which he tries to bring home. According to Christopher Tuplin Xenophon has misrepresented the historical reality about Timocrates. Bruno Bleckmann, who, as a rule, advocates Xenophon's superior trustworthiness against the sustained 'fiction' of the Oxyrhynchus historian, admits that Xenophon has transmitted a distorted and heavily compressed version: although he correctly attributed to Tithraustes the initiative to send Timocrates, his pro-Spartan bias made him wrongly connect the mission with the very origin of the Corinthian War.[9] Yet, as this scholar rightly observes, the fact that Xenophon got it wrong, does not imply that P must be right.[10] But, as may be observed here already in anticipation of the discussion which will follow, this principle is also true

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[8] Cook 1990: 69 n. 1. The historians who have dealt with the historical and chronological problems are many. See, e.g. Barbieri 1955: 94–95; Bruce 1967: 58–61; Bonamente 1973: 67–69, 103–135; esp. 110–111; Hamilton 1979: 179–192; Funke 1980: 55–56 n. 30; Riedinger 1991: 18, 111–112. The timing of Tithraustes' arrival in Asia Minor is also discussed by Lewis 1977: 142 n. 47.

[9] Tuplin 1993: 169–170; Bleckmann 1998: 195 n. 40, and, more extensively, Bleckmann 2006: 91–100, esp. 92–95, and, in his wake, Binder 2008: 280–281. A roughly similar view was taken by Busolt 1908: esp. 271–273 who maintained that Xenophon, although chronologically and interpretatively mistaken, was factually correct in naming Tithraustes as the initiator of the mission. According to Busolt Xenophon was well-informed on the policies of the satraps and on the trial of Ismenias (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.36).

[10] Bleckmann 2006: 95, 99.

the other way around. If for some reason which I fail to see (except for the fact that, here too, Bleckmann seems to align himself on Busolt's position in the debate) the otherwise historically untenable version of Xenophon is deemed correct in naming Tithraustes as source of the gold, such a view does not necessarily entail that P erred in naming Pharnabazus as the satrap who commissioned Timocrates. What needs to be assessed, is whether there are serious reasons for casting doubt on the historical validity of P's view in this respect. As I intend to argue, Bleckmann's arguments for throwing suspicion on P are anything but compelling: they find their ultimate justification in the assumption that the Oxyrhynchus historian, according to his alleged method of ἀξιοπίστως ψεύδεσθαι, deliberately and arbitrarily substituted another name for the historically correct one.[11] The imputation of such a method to the Oxyrhynchus historian rests on a double assumption: (1) that the author of the papyrus history should be identified as Theopompus and (2) that Theopompus, being a 'rhetorical' historian, engaged in some kind of 'fictional' history-writing, taking a malign pleasure in freely elaborating upon Xenophon's account without any concern for the truth. I disagree with both of these presuppositions, but it is not possible to re-examine them critically within the compass of this chapter.[12]

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11 See Bleckmann 2006: 99–100; on the method attributed to P, see, ibid.: 9–35.

12 See the critical observations by Nicolai 2007; on the modern prejudices against Theopompus, see also Chávez-Reino 2010. Regarding the authorship question, I may refer to my discussion in Schepens 1993 and 2002. As far as Theopompus is concerned, I still consider him to be the ἀνὴρ φιλαλήθης as ancient tradition called him (Athen. 3.85a–b; cf. Zecchini 1989: 50–59, esp. 51) and as a historian who, especially also with regard to Sparta's 'empire', pronounced himself on a number of issues in a way neatly different from the author of the papyrus history (cf. Schepens 2001a). Regarding Porphyry's 'capital' testimony according to which Theopompus plagiarized Xenophon, we may recall here the brief, but considered, remark made by McKechnie and Kern 1988: 10: 'It seems possible (at least to us) from this account [*scil.* of Agesilaus' conversation with Pharnabazus] that what Porphyry was reading in Theopompus was not an unsuccessful plagiaristic semi-rewrite, but an independent account which lacked the features Porphyry liked in Xenophon (the rather lively conversation which points up to the characters of the actors).' As I suggested (Schepens 2001a: 540 n. 35), Theopompus' apparently 'unpleasant' rewriting of the conversation, which robbed the Xenophontic dialogue of its charm, might have something to do with his casting of Pharnabazus in the role of the 'tragic' warner. The dialogue took place less than a year before the battle of Cnidus put an end to Sparta's supremacy at sea. Theopompus, who seems to have followed the Herodotean model of history writing in many respects, might very well have grasped the occasion to stylize the conversation between the admiral of the Persian fleet and the Spartan king according to the well-known pattern of the ignored warning. Such a rewriting would be very much in line with this historian's sharp criticism of Agesilaus' neglect of naval affairs: see 115 F321 (in its new, enlarged edition, discussed in Schepens 2001a: esp. 555–560).

But, however one may think about these questions, the idea of the superior reliability of the Oxyrhynchus historian has, as suggested above, not remained unchallenged in recent years. Critics who want to salvage as much as possible Xenophon's version, have been focusing their attention on scenarios which, in one way or another, aim at reducing, or even explaining away, the chronological gap between P and Xenophon. In the first of his extended 'Endnotes', devoted to critically assessing the available evidence regarding controversial subjects, Tuplin envisaged the possibility of such a scenario, although he sees it as a 'theoretical construct' rather than as a solution for which positive evidence would be readily available.[13] But in a paper entitled 'Xenophon, the Oxyrhynchus Historian and the Mission of Timocrates to Greece', read at the 1999 Liverpool Xenophon conference, Eduard Rung went all the way down the road: reducing, on the basis of several considerations, the chronological gap between Xenophon and P to next to nothing, he concludes that 'the two Greek traditions about Timocrates' mission to Greece do not contradict each other', and, that 'the sources in question complement each other on the circumstances and results of the mission'.[14] My aim in this paper is not to attempt yet another critical examination and reconstruction of the reasons and incidents that led to the outbreak of the Corinthian war. What I would like to do instead is to take Xenophon's and P's accounts at face value, look at their most salient features and try to understand them in the larger historiographical context of their works. Such an inquiry also inevitably raises the question whether and how the two versions under discussion—which are roughly contemporaneous, although their exact chronological relationship is still a matter of dispute—relate to one another. And, as has been inevitable since the discovery of the fragments of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, when it comes to proposing solutions for problems raised by fourth-century Greek historiography, choices with regard to the question of the authorship of the papyrus history can, eventually, not be evaded.[15]

Xenophon's Explanation of the Corinthian War

Let us, first, consider more closely the two divergent explanations offered of the root cause of the Corinthian war. Xenophon brings up the question

13 Tuplin 1993: 169–170.
14 Rung 2004: *passim*, with the conclusion at 424.
15 See Schepens 2004: esp. 46–55.

twice in his *Hellenica*, at 3.5.1–2 and at 4.2.1. His notices have two features in common, which may be considered fundamental to his view: (a) they closely link the origin of the war in Greece with the war in Asia, and (b) identify as its cause the money distributed by Tithraustes' Rhodian agent. The connection of the two wars is also made visible in the narrative syntax which subordinates, on both occasions, the discussion of the origin of the war in Greece to the main account of Agesilaus' Asian campaign. Xenophon thus introduces his account of the war in Europe as some kind of *peripeteia* within the Asian War. I will revert to this point later on.

In his first notice Xenophon discusses the measures taken by Tithraustes after the battle of Sardis (summer 395). This battle constituted, at least in Xenophon's view,[16] the first major Persian defeat since the war had started in 399. Being at a loss how to cope with the threat posed by Agesilaus' successful campaign and his further ambition of 'conquering the King', the newly appointed satrap conceived a plan to embroil the Spartans in difficulties in mainland Greece. A closer look at the text (3.5.1–2) reveals how all the particulars of the story of Timocrates' mission are designed to establish the causal connection between the 'gold' and the war. Timocrates is instructed to distribute the money to the leaders at Thebes, Corinth and Argos, ἐφ' ᾧτε πόλεμον ἐξοίσειν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, and to take, to that end, the strongest pledges. The concern expressed for the right use of the money (πιστὰ τὰ μέγιστα λαμβάνοντα) underlines the purposiveness of the action and the earnestness with which it is—still prospectively—proposed as the effective cause of the war. The list of the names of the recipients at Thebes, Corinth and Argos imprints the money's actual distribution on the reader's mind. The measures taken to foment hostility towards Sparta are equally described. Xenophon states unambiguously that the men who took the money began to make *false charges* against the Lacedaemonians: διέβαλλον τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους;[17] and these very calumnies, we are told, brought the individual cities to hate them: ταύτας εἰς μῖσος αὐτῶν προήγαγον.[18] And, for

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[16] I do not enter here into the question of the reliability of the highly diverging accounts of the battle given by Xenophon and P. I have exposed my views on the untrustworthiness and tendentiousness of Xenophon's version in Schepens 2005: esp. 57–60 and will come back, later on in this paper, to the main conclusions that ought to be drawn.

[17] The translation by Krentz 1995: 99, 'attack the Lakedaimonians', does not retain the connotation that the charges were unfounded or unfair.

[18] Plut. *Art.* 20.3–4 is the first to explicitly refer to the money as a bribe. But this is, obviously, also implied by Xenophon, although he does not openly denounce the Greek leaders' acceptance of Tithraustes' money: cf. Tuplin 1993: 61. On the suggestive quality of his language (διέβαλλον τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ... εἰς μῖσος αὐτῶν προήγαγον), see Lévy 1990: esp. 135–

this reason (ἐπεὶ δὲ ...), those men, then, set about organising the largest cities into a coalition (συνίστασαν καὶ τὰς μεγίστας πόλεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας). It is a further peculiarity of Xenophon's account that it sets the Athenians apart from the general picture drawn so far: they had no share in the Persian gold.[19] This statement, however, does not undercut the causal analysis that is being made.[20] The Athenians' attitude rather represents the exception which proves the rule. It is argued that they did not need any pecuniary incentive: thinking that 'empire was their own prerogative',[21] they were, anyhow, eager for war (ὅμως πρόθυμοι ἦσαν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον). Xenophon may, indeed, have felt that he could strengthen his case about the imperialistic ambition of the Athenians, if he maintained that they had no share in the 'bribes'.[22]

The focus on χρήματα as the fundamental cause of the war reappears a second time in Xenophon's *Hellenica*, at 4.2.1. There he discusses the reason for Agesilaus' departure from Asia in spring 394 It is important to note that the passage is not a mere duplication of the earlier notice, but reports that a further stage has been reached in the process that was set in motion by Tithraustes. The Spartans found out definitely that money *had come* to Greece, and that the largest states *had united* for war against them, and, therefore, thought their city was in great danger. Compared with the

139. It is a delicate balancing act to believe with Tuplin (1993: 62) that Xenophon's account can still be read in such a way that the charges made by those engaged in διαβολή need not have, in his eyes, the meaning that their criticism was entirely baseless.

[19] Xenophon is most likely wrong. P, who maintains the contrary, is supported by Paus. 3.9.8, who is, apparently, drawing his names from an independent list: see Cook 1981: 128–129; Bruce 1967: 58. Xenophon's exculpation of the Athenians has been assumed to be patriotically motivated by Accame 1951: 31–32; Lehmann 1978: 76–77; Badian 2004: 50; Rung 2004: 421. Cook 1981: 129; Urban 1991: 44–45; Tuplin 1993: 61–63 have rightly criticized this view. In maintaining his version, Xenophon must not necessarily have falsified the historical record: Timocrates' dealings were, by their very nature, secret. It took Spartan intelligence some time to obtain reliable information (*Hell.* 4.2.1). For lack of unassailable evidence, Xenophon was as free as any other Greek at the time to decide for himself what he wanted to believe from rumours that kept circulating; cf. Lewis 1989: 232–233; but also Buckler 1999: 400 and Rung 2004: 418 n. 4.

[20] Meyer 1909: 48–49 goes rather too far in pointing out that *both* Xenophon and P opposed the view held by τινές that money was the root cause of the war.

[21] *Hell.* 3.5.2. Translation Warner 1979. Although there is a textual problem here, the corrupted phrase νομίζοντές † τε αὐτῶν ἄρχεσθαι† most probably contained a reference to empire. This theme reappears in Xenophon's (self-composed) speech of the Theban ambassadors (*Hell.* 3.5.10; cf. also 3.5.14).

[22] Athens' desire to regain her position of pre-eminence is widely acknowledged as a major factor by modern historians: see, for instance, Lehmann 1978: 86–87; Hornblower 1983: 195–196 and Cartledge 1987: 292.

inchoative aorist συνίστασαν in 3.5.2, the perfect tense in the phrase τὰς μεγίστας πόλεις συνεστηκυίας indicates that the money had, in the mean time, produced its desired effect. The particles τε … καί connecting the phrases τά τε χρήματα ἐληλυθότα εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ τὰς μεγίστας πόλεις συνεστηκυίας ἐπὶ πολέμῳ πρὸς ἑαυτούς highlight, once again, the link between the money and the coalition for war. We also note that, this time, Xenophon presents his view of the critical situation that had arisen in Greece, under the form of an analysis made by the Spartans themselves: οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐπεὶ σαφῶς ᾔσθοντο … ἐν κινδύνῳ τε τὴν πόλιν ἐνόμισαν καὶ στρατεύειν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. While, strictly speaking, σαφῶς ᾔσθοντο solely indicates an act of military intelligence, the fact that this information is given as part of a narrative in which the distribution of the money has already been recorded before, produces the effect of raising the Spartans' interpretation of the origin of the war above the status of a mere opinion and of validating it as an unambiguously ascertained historical fact. If any positive evidence were needed to prove the *Spartan* origin of the view which blames the Persian gold for having caused the war, it could be found in this very passage.[23]

At this point too, Xenophon's narrative strongly conveys the idea that the wars in Europe and in Asia are interlocked. The story of Agesilaus' urgent recall 'to come to the aid of his fatherland' is, quite dramatically, 'sandwiched' between two notes, the purpose of which is to underline how the new war in Greece prevented the Spartan king from rounding off his successful Asian campaign with a crowning achievement.[24] The passage immediately preceding his recall raises high expectations: it draws a picture of Agesilaus on the point of extending the war far outside western Asia Minor; the second note sketches his disappointment over the fact that his forced return deprived him of 'the great honours and hopes' connected with carrying out his plan 'to march as far inland as he could …, and to detach from the King all the nations he could put in his rear'.[25] Thus, the narrative,

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23 Bleckmann 2006: 93–94 agrees, and points to Agesilaus himself as Xenophon's most likely source.

24 Compare Plut. *Ages*. 15.1–4. The biographer's rhetorically embellished, highly dramatic description serves as a foil for praising Agesilaus' supreme Lycurgan virtue of obedience (cf. Xen. *Ages*. 1.36). At *Ages*. 15.4 Plutarch expresses his own regret that, by causing a war at Agesilaus' back, the Greeks deprived themselves of the opportunity of dethroning the Persian King, a honour that was left to the 'Macedonian' Alexander; cf. Shipley 1997: 200–206.

25 The grandiose schemes attributed to the Spartan king, especially in the still more extravagant version of Xenophon's *Agesilaus* (1.8; 1.36), lack historical credibility. They owe their existence to the author's tendency to heroize Agesilaus: cf. Hamilton 1991: 101–103. *Hell.*

at this stage, plainly confirms the suspicions which Tithraustes is said, at 3.5.1, to have entertained with regard to Agesilaus' ambition of 'conquering the king'.

Looking back at Xenophon's discussion of the cause of the Corinthian war, we may safely conclude that the two passages of the *Hellenica* which are explicitly concerned with the issue, make their case for representing the war as a Persian stab-in-the-back remarkably well. From the first notice to the second, there is undeniably a build-up: whereas in 3.5.1–2 Tithraustes' plan is still presented as a bet he was less than confident he could win (Timocrates is instructed to *attempt* [πείρασθαι] to get *assurances* from the leading politicians to stir up a war against Sparta in return for cash), in 4.2.1, the Spartans establish that the money had achieved its particular purpose. *Bis repetita placent.* And, as if this was not enough, Xenophon does not miss two further opportunities for restating his view. First, in his account of the revolution in Corinth (392), where 'the best elements in the state, who began to desire peace [with Sparta]', are said to have been opposed—and eventually killed—by the 'Argives, Athenians, Boeotians, together with those among the Corinthians who had taken money from the King, namely the people who had become fully responsible for the war' (Κορινθίων οἵ τε τῶν παρὰ βασιλέως χρημάτων μετεσχηκότες καὶ οἱ τοῦ πολέμου αἰτιώτατοι γεγενημένοι).[26] The other occasion is provided by the trial of Ismenias, in which the Theban leader is accused of 'Medism', and, as a most tangible

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Oxy. 25.3 presents Agesilaus with a more precise, and, at the same time, less ambitious and more feasible plan to march to Cappadocia; cf. Bruce 1967: 148–149. There is no reason to cast doubt, as Lehmann 1978: 126 does, on the authenticity of P's report. On the propaganda involved in Xenophon's presentation, see Schepens 2005; cf. also below, pp. 231–235.

[26] *Hell.* 4.4.2. This passage has been interpreted differently. Are the groups connected by τε … καί to be considered as identical (cf. Daverio Rocchi 2002: 403: '… tra i Corinzi, quanti erano stati comperati dal denaro del Re—identificabili con i fautori della guerra—si rendevano conto …', 'among the Corinthians those who had had a share of the King's money—identifiable as the supporters of war—realized that …')? Or should we translate, as Hatzfeld 1939: 26 does ('ceux des Corinthiens qui, les uns, avaient reçu leur part de l'argent du Roi, et les autres, s'étaient montrés les principaux responsables de la guerre, …' 'those of Corinthians who had (one group) received their share of the King's money and (the other group) shown themselves principally responsible for the war'), and postulate, with Hamilton 1979: 263–264, the existence of two factions? The first option, apart from being more in line with the Xenophontic view that Timocrates' money caused the war, is to be preferred. The τε … καί connection, though not formally indicating the identity of the groups concerned, points, at least, to some degree of overlap. It is difficult to agree with Hamilton that the 'deliberate usage of the τε … καί construction' would express a neat distinction rather than a close connection between the two phrases.

illustration hereof, 'of having taken money from the King, and of being chiefly responsible, with Androcleidas, for all the disorders which had taken place in Greece'.[27]

P's Explanation of the Corinthian War

Xenophon's singular emphasis on χρήματα as *causa efficiens* seems to leave no room whatsoever for the alternative explanation advocated by the author of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*.[28] It comes as no surprise that P, confronted with this—Spartan—view, chose a polemical format for expressing his own ideas on the matter:

> καίτοι τινὲς λέγουσιν αἴτια γενέσθαι τὰ παρ' ἐκείνου χρήματα τοῦ συστῆναι τούτους καὶ τοὺς ἐν Βοιωτοῖς καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι ταῖς προειρημέναις, οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς συνεβεβήκει πάλαι δυσμενῶς ἔχειν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ σκοπεῖν ὅπως ἐκπολεμώσουσι τὰς πόλεις. (*Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 10.2)

> And yet some say that the money from him was the cause of concerted action by these people and some of the Boeotians and some in other cities previously mentioned. But they do not that that all had long been ill-disposed towards the Spartans, looking out for a way that they might make the cities adopt a war policy.

It is not possible within the limited space of this paper to bring a full and completely balanced appraisal of the many observations which P makes on the situation in the Greek cities in the context of his refutation of the view of those who believed the money of Timocrates to be the root cause of the war. I confine myself to three remarks.

Firstly, in trying to evaluate P's account, it is important to realise that we do not have the full picture. In chapter 10 we just have his critical assessment of the role to be attributed to the Persian gold in terms of historical causation; in his account this discussion apparently follows upon an earlier treatment of Timocrates' mission. On the view exposed by P, Timocrates visited the Greek cities some time before the Demaenetus affair.[29] Given the

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[27] *Hell.* 5.2.35.

[28] The contrast between the two versions is equally underlined by Bleckmann 2006: 91. In his view, P, adopting his usual method of freely 'elaborating' his predecessor's account, has almost completely inverted, as in a 'Spiegelbild' ('mirror-image'), the picture drawn by Xenophon.

[29] As many scholars have argued, the polemical excursion on the historical significance of Timocrates' money in chapter 10 would hardly make sense in P's narrative, if he had not dealt with the mission itself at some stage before. Cf. e.g. Grenfell and Hunt 1908: 204–205;

strict chronological order in which he arranges his narrative, this points to a date somewhere in the year 397 or, at the very latest, in early 396.[30] It is a pity that we have to reconstruct P's view from the scanty back-references in chapter 10 and that we miss the details which he is likely to have included on the circumstances in which the Rhodian was dispatched by Pharnabazus (maybe at the instigation of Conon),[31] on the instructions he received with

Meyer 1909: 44; Jacoby 1926: 9: 'aus II 5 (dazu II 2; XIII 1) [= *Hell.Oxy.* 10.5 in combination with 10.2; 21.1] ergibt sich mit sicherheit, daß P die sendung des Timokrates bereits erzählt hatte' ('from II 5 (also II 2; XIII 1) it emerges as certain that P had already narrated the despatch of Timokrates'). See, e.g. also Bruce 1967: 59; Bonamente 1973: 63–67 (on the basis of an attentive analysis of text and context in P); Hamilton 1979: 178–179. This most obvious and widely shared conclusion has recently been contested by several scholars (Tuplin 1993: 170; Rung 1994: 416; Bleckmann 2006: 95–97) on the basis of various observations, none of which seem to me to be strong enough to justify their criticism of the validity of the inference that can be drawn from the text of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*. To begin with, the suggestion that P may have limited himself to making a casual reference to Timocrates, since his trip was notorious, would be entirely against this historian's habit of covering, in great detail, all events, which he deemed of some importance. Bleckmann, on his part, misrepresents the traditional view, when he argues that it is solely (and not compellingly) inferred from P's back-reference to 'the previously mentioned cities'. Also Bleckmann's ensuing observation that P, for his purposes, did not need to fix the date of Timocrates' trip, calls for some comment: whereas P could, theoretically, do without a precise date for stating that anti-Spartan resistance groups had been engaged in actions in Athens and elsewhere '*a long time before* Timocrates' mission' (10.2), the relative date of the Rhodian's visit—its anteriority with regard to Demainetus' action—really mattered to his argumentation: this point has been excellently made by Lehmann 1978: 112–113 with nn. 10, 11 and Cook 1981: 99 with 123 n. 19, 104–106. Other arguments for lowering the date of Timocrates' mission to the summer of 395 are considered by Rung 2004: one of them is related to the Rhodian origin of the Persian agent and capitalizes on his connexion with Conon and his possible role played in the Rhodian democratic revolution, which, in the end, could result in establishing this event as a *terminus ante quem* for his mission to Greece (418–419); another line of reasoning followed by Rung concerns the point in time in which the money to be distributed by Timocrates became available to the satraps (419–421); for all the ingenuity that is invested in using such an argument, it seems to me that, here too, the author can only jump to conclusions, since there is no way which leads from the 'balance sheet' of the deficits in financing Conon's fleet to the 'finding' that only the extra money from the confiscated property of the executed Tissaphernes made it eventually possible for Tithraustes (and Pharnabazus) to equip Timocrates with the necessary means for his mission to Greece. None of the above observations argue strongly against an inference that must most clearly be drawn from the *text* of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*.

30 Various options (with references to previous literature) are discussed by Accame 1978: esp. 125–142; Hamilton 1979: 177–178; Funke 1980: 55–56 n. 30; Cook 1981: 123–127; Rung 2004: 415–418.

31 Polyaen. 1.48.3—a passage perhaps resulting from some combination of P and Theopompus (cf. de Sanctis 1931: 169–170); but Polyaenus may as well have drawn solely on Theopompus, who himself might have combined data from P and Xenophon—credits the Athenian Conon with having persuaded Pharnabazus to send money to 'the demagogues of

regard to the purpose and the distribution of the money, and on how it found its way to the pockets of the political leaders in the Greek cities.[32] His account at 10.2 still informs us that the Athenians Epicrates and Cephalus figured on his list of recipients.[33] Regarding the motives of these Athenian politicians, P concurs with Xenophon to the extent that he, too, stresses that they did not, as a matter of fact, need this very stimulus for behaving provocatively against Sparta. 'They opposed Sparta … and were keen to involve the city in war', he observes, 'long before they had their dealings with Timocrates and took the gold.' But, at the same time, the Oxyrhynchus historian is at pains to make it clear that Epicrates and Cephalus and their associates only represented a segment of the Athenian citizenry and that their 'faction' was, at the time of the Demaenetus affair, not able to rally the support of the *ekklēsia*. Although P betrays his own aristocratic bias in commenting upon the ulterior motives of the 'war party' in Athens, his detailed report of the various—and predominantly negative—reactions which the Demaenetus-crisis provoked, contrasts favourably with Xenophon's rather sweeping attribution of such warlike feelings to the Athenians collectively.[34] The fact that the Athenians voted unanimously for the alliance with the Thebans in midsummer 395 (*Hellenica* 3.5.16) should not be held, as it sometimes is, against the validity of P's assessment of the political climate at the time of the Demaenetus affair. It only shows that, at the latter occasion, Thrasybulus and a majority of Athenian citizens did not yet regard the situation as favourable. Important changes on the international scene can account for the shift in the Athenian position.[35]

Secondly, the effort made by P to draw a differentiating picture of the political scene in Athens is in itself revealing of the more than average

the cities in Greece'. On Conon's likely involvement, see Barbieri 1955: 90–100; Hamilton 1979: 187–189; Cook 1981: 95–99; March 1997: 266–267; Rung 2004: 418–419.

32 The relatively small amount of money distributed *per caput* was, no doubt, intended for the private use of the recipients: see Cook 1981: 101–107; Riedinger 1991: 177.

33 Meyer 1909: 46 surveys the ancient tradition about the recipients of the money.

34 Although P has been rightly criticised for his sarcastic comments on the motives of the πολλοὶ καὶ δημοτικοί, there, still, is some truth in his assessment: see Cook 1981: 148–149; also Bonamente 1973: 31–32; 59–74. This is not to say that P's narrative is, in every respect, flawless: for some proper criticism, see Strauss 1986: 109–110. But there is no need to dismiss P's sketch of the Athenian political factions as hindsight, as do, in the wake of Meyer 1909: 83–84, Lehmann 1978: 79–93 and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Funke 1980: 57–70. A more recent, damning condemnation of P's party scheme can be found in Badian 1995: 82–83. The problem here, as Cook 1988: 65 explains, is not so much in P's account as in modern assumptions about political groups or 'parties'; cf. Schmitz 1988: 209–221. For a defence of P against his modern critics, see Urban 1991: 33–42.

35 See, for instance, Cook 1981: 211–217 and Urban 1991: 48–50.

historiographical quality of his discussion of the cause of the war. In trying to bring home his fundamental thesis about the widespread and deep-seated hostility towards Sparta in the cities, the author takes care not only to distinguish between Athens and the other cities, but also to remain sensitive to the particular situation in each of the other cities. That much can still be concluded from his back-references in chapter 10, although it is manifest that its polemical aim provides scope for making summary statements only of his view in contrast to the simplistic opinion held by τινές. As P himself suggests with reference to his earlier discussion, a more detailed assessment of the political climate in the major Greek cities was to be read in parts of his account now lost to us. The elaborate description of the internal situation in Thebes[36] and Boeotia, which follows later on as part of his treatment of the precipitating cause of the war, still gives us an idea of the extraordinary care he invested in exploring such matters. Even in the recapitulatory chapter 10, P's concern for the credibility of the general picture offered goes so far as to call attention to the 'private grounds' which alienated the Corinthian Timolaus from his former friends, the Spartans (10.3). Obviously, the author did not want to leave his readers with any reason for expressing disbelief at the anti-Spartan actions undertaken by a man whom he had himself portrayed, in his account of the Decelean war, as a staunch Laconizer. Although P is inclined to make strong statements and does not shrink from using emotional language, such as 'hatred of the Spartans',[37] his exposition of the root cause of the war displays all the characteristics of a carefully researched piece of historical writing.[38]

My third observation is a rather obvious one and mainly intends to answer some modern criticisms to the effect that P would seem to have gone too far in playing down the impact of Timocrates' money as a causal factor.[39] Quite evidently, his refusal to attribute significance to the Persian

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[36] See 21.1, where it is stated that Androcleidas and Ismenias' reason to precipitate the war was their fear of destruction διὰ τοὺς λακωνίζοντας.

[37] They hated the Spartans (ἐμίσουν ... τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους), he points out, because of their interference in their internal affairs (ὅτι τοῖς ἐναντίοις τῶν πολιτῶν αὐτοῖς ἐχρῶντο φίλοις). Μισέω is the key-verb around which P's whole exposition of the cause of the war gravitates: 10.2: ἐμίσουν ... τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους in combination with 10.2: δυσμενῶς ἔχειν; cf. also 10.3; and 10.5: ἐπηρμένοι μισεῖν ἦσαν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. Reports of anti-Spartan actions take pride of place in his narrative (9.3: ἀντέπραττον' 10.2: ἠναντιοῦντο).

[38] See Bonamente 1973: 120, where he draws the conclusion of his detailed examination.

[39] See e.g. Urban 1991: 47–48; Lehmann 1978: 82–83; Bleckmann 1998: 195 n. 40, goes as far as to argue that P did not attach any significance to the mission of Timocrates ('völlig bedeutungslos').

gold in the framework of a discussion which aims at defining the *true* cause of the war (10.2), does not allow the inference that he considered the issue as totally irrelevant. P may very well have valued the Rhodian's mission (in his previous treatment now lost to us) as a contributory factor. The presence in his mind of a more complex scheme of historical causation is hinted at in the forceful restatement of his opinion at the end of chapter 10: 'it was for those reasons', he concludes, '*much more than* on account of Pharnabazus and the gold that those in the aforementioned cities had been incited to hate the Spartans' (10.5). The use of the comparative degree presupposes an analysis in terms of a hierarchy of causes. For that matter, P does not neglect to mention, somewhat later in his account, that the promise of further subsidies which had, apparently, been made by the envoy of the Persian king,[40] was an element of some importance to the deliberations of the Theban politicians, when they were weighing their chances of success before engineering the opening preliminaries of the Boeotian war. Significantly, the prospect of future financial backing by the Persian king is assessed as a subsidiary factor[41]—something that will ease their undertaking: οἰόμενοι δὲ ῥᾳδίως τοῦτο πράξειν—alongside the main motivation, which, from their point of view, is essentially twofold: their fear of being swept aside by the Spartans and their expectation that hostility to Sparta will make the Corinthians, Argives and Athenians share in the war.

To sum up: P's refutation of the very factor on which Xenophon's narrative focuses and his emphasis on the hostile feelings of the Greek cities,

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40 I take ὁ παρὰ τοῦ βαρβάρου πεμφθείς at 21.1 as a reference to Timocrates (cf. Accame 1978: 125–128). If it is not, the passage illustrates, all the same, P's care to evaluate, at several stages of the conflict, the impact of Persian finances on the course of events. Compare his remarks on the Great King as a slow and irregular paymaster of the fleet (*Hell. Oxy*. 22). Considering the fact that fifty talents are a quite modest amount of money for conducting a war, the promise of Persian funding of the military operations may, indeed, have been the main purpose of Timocrates' mission; cf. Buck 1994: 34.

41 Except for Kagan 1961: 322, 329, who tends to overrate the impact of the money as a cause, modern assessments are very much along the same lines as P's: they consider the Persian gold at best as a catalyst in the decision to precipitate a latent war, not as its true cause: see, for instance, Grenfell and Hunt 1908: 205, 209; Hamilton 1979: 182–208, esp. 192, 198; Funke 1980: 46–70; Cook 1981: 107–110; Strauss 1986: 110–113; Jehne 1994: 20 n. 65: 'Persisches Gold war eine willkommene Hilfe bei der Erhebung gegen Sparta, aber nicht deren Ursache' ('Persian gold was a welcome help in the uprising against Sparta, but not its cause'). The Persian money was certainly helpful in bringing about the liaison between the war parties of the various states: see Lendon 1989: 310–311. Also the news brought by Timocrates concerning Persian naval preparations is justly regarded by modern critics as a contributory cause to the Corinthian war.

to which Xenophon seems to turn a blind eye,[42] make the two remaining fourth-century accounts of the origin of the Corinthian War appear profoundly different, if not mutually exclusive.[43]

Such a 'contrasting' reading, however, while largely concurring with the traditional understanding of their narratives, has not gone unchallenged in recent years. The idea of Xenophon as a biased writer, composing his historical account—or at least parts of it[44]—in a philolaconian spirit, has become increasingly unpopular with scholars. In keeping with a tendency to rehabilitate him as a critical historian, students of Xenophon have been pointing out that all too often in the past his allegedly simple view of the cause of the Corinthian War has been unfairly discounted.[45] The papers of John Buckler and Eduard Rung read at the previous Xenophon-conference illustrate this trend: dealing with the events surrounding the outbreak of the Corinthian War, they 'each reveal ways in which Xenophon's treatment is variously reconcilable with or superior to that found in the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*'.[46] On a more appropriate historiographical reading of his narrative—one that is sensitive to his own distinctive, non-analytical approach to history

[42] This is not to say that the surrounding narrative in the *Hellenica* does not contain any expressions of displeasure or resentment over Spartan rule. Those can, for instance, be found in various forms in Xenophon's account of the war between Sparta and Elis. But inasmuch as Xenophon is at pains to represent this conflict as a *war which Sparta was fully justified to conduct* (as I have tried to show in Schepens 2004), it becomes difficult to read his account, at this point (as opposed to the critical assessment of Sparta's imperial policies that follows later) as already an indictment of Spartan ἀρχή. For a different view, see Tuplin 1993: 62–64. I shall come back later to the question of the purport of the sharp criticism formulated by the Theban envoys before the Athenian *ekklēsia*.

[43] The incompatibility of the two accounts is rightly stressed by Lehmann 1978: 111–112 n. 9; cf. also Bleckmann 2006. Hence, reconciliation—be it by increasing the number of missions on which Timocrates was supposedly sent (Bonamente 1973: 103–120 concludes, after a long discussion, that there were 3 missions) or by postulating other agents—should not be the aim of modern criticism. Some desperate attempt to salvage Xenophon was undertaken by Lenschau 1933: 1325–1328. He is refuted by Cook 1981: 130–133.

[44] Riedinger 1991: 126–128, 138 points out, convincingly in my view, that Xenophon himself makes the point (*Hell.* 5.1.36; 5.3.27; 5.4.1) that Sparta's decline did not begin until well after the King's Peace and that it is only in the narrative of events from that time onwards that he shows signs of an attitude much more complex and nuanced. Before that time he is consistent in his pro-Spartan (and anti-Theban) prejudices. Cf. also Henry 1967: 161–163; Lanzillotta 1984: 59–86.

[45] Krentz 1995: 194, 181. As an example of allegedly unfair criticism Krentz quotes from Andrewes 1971: 223 the following passage: 'It is easy to discount Xenophon's simple view that the root cause was the Persian gold brought to Greece by Timocrates of Rhodes, in order to stir up war in Greece and so stab the heroic Agesilaus in the back'.

[46] See Buckler 2004 and Rung 2004. The quote is taken from 'Introductory Review' to the conference proceedings: Tuplin 2004: 16.

writing—Xenophon's position in this debate, it is argued, should no longer be pinned down to the key passages we have been analysing. 'His account', a recent commentator writes, 'provides other, more fundamental reasons for the war too.'[47] The speech of the Theban ambassadors, delivered at Athens shortly before the beginning of the 'Boeotian' War (3.5.8–15), is referred to as particularly important in this respect. In a similar vein, Tuplin has drawn from his close reading of *Hellenica* 3–4.2 the conclusion that it provides a fairly balanced account of the causes of the Corinthian war, one that is not 'as far removed from *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* as is sometimes thought'.[48]

The Theban Denunciation of Sparta

There is no doubt that the Theban ambassadors' appeal for Athenian alliance constitutes an inexorable critical assessment of Sparta's policy towards the Greek cities. The question that I would like to re-examine here, however, is whether Xenophon is likely to have composed the speech with the aim of *supplementing* or *adjusting* the view conveyed by his narrative so far. The question of how to evaluate the meaning and function of the Theban speech has long been a controversial issue in Xenophontic studies. In the following I can only state, in the barest possible outline, my main reasons for considering the speech as a specimen of defamation of Sparta and for regarding its delivery before the assembly in Athens as yet another opportunity for Xenophon to highlight, if not to satirize, the Athenians' desire for ἀρχή.

My starting-point is the fact that the Thebans are consistently portrayed throughout Xenophon's *Hellenica* as the great villains of Greek history and, more in particular, as Sparta's worst enemies and critics.[49] Against this background, it is hard to conceive that this historian would—at whatever stage of composition—have availed himself of Theban speakers as a mouthpiece for putting his *own* ideas across to his readers.[50] Especially revealing in this

[47] Krentz 1995: 194.

[48] See Tuplin 1993: 43–64 for a detailed analysis of *Hell.* 3–4.2 and, in particular, of the Theban speech (62–63); 62 n. 42 (quote).

[49] Xenophon seems to have shared Agesilaus' anti-Theban grudge; Thebes was 'his and Agesilaus' *bête noire*': Cartledge 1987: 198; cf., in general, Schepens 2005. Also in the present context, the Thebans are portrayed as the instigators of all evil in Greece: see Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.5; cf. 5.2.35–36. See Riedinger 1991: 123 n. 3; Henry 1967: 205; Hack 1978: 212; Buckler 1980: 263–268, esp. 264–265; Buck 1994: 34.

[50] Using the Thebans as commentators on the state of affairs that was prevalent in the

connection is the fact that the Thebans are not given any voice at the pre-Leuctra peace conference of 371. On that occasion serious criticism (with which Xenophon himself seems to agree) is levelled at Sparta's imperial policies. The absence of a Theban speaker at that particular moment is truly astonishing: Thebes' alarming rise to power, as Xenophon himself underlines, was the reason for the conference, and we know from other sources that Epaminondas delivered a most impressive speech at the time.[51] In sum: the *Hellenica* in their entirety exude a strong anti-Theban sentiment which raises the question whether Xenophon's Thebans are fit for anything other than unfair criticism of Sparta.

While admitting that the Theban speakers get little credit for uttering criticism 'that deserves to be taken seriously', Tuplin, nonetheless, maintains that, as far as the speech before the Athenian assembly is concerned, lack of credibility must not necessarily cast doubt upon the validity of their 'concentrated and damning indictment of Spartan ἀρχή'.[52] Validity in whose eyes? For my part, I find it difficult to believe that the account surrounding the speech is full of ambivalences to the disadvantage of Sparta.[53] Both the contents of the speech and its narrative setting seem to point rather in the opposite direction and invite us to read the Theban address as an illustration of the activities undertaken by the 'bribed' cities to stir up hatred against the Spartans.[54] Their method of slandering the Spartans is in Xenophon's account mentioned only a few paragraphs before (3.5.2) and is undoubtedly still present in most readers' minds when the Theban envoy begins to speak. Readers, who might be less attentive to the specific narrative context in which the speech is inserted, get an extra clue in the

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Greek cities, would, in Xenophon's case, make as much sense as naming Agesilaus the spokesperson for Boeotian interests. Cf. Riedinger 1991: 153: 'Le seul fait de n'attribuer ces critiques qu'aux Thébains, qui sont présentés invariablement dans les *Helléniques* sous un jour défavorable, rend cette solution peu probable' ('the fact that these criticisms are only attributed to the Thebans, who are invariably presented in an unfavourable light in *Hellenica*, by itself makes this solution fairly improbable'). Riedinger believes that Xenophon may, nevertheless, have been interested in rendering how Sparta's *Greek enemies* judged her policies.

51 Nep. *Epam.* 6.4; Plut. *Ages.* 27–28; Paus. 9.13.2. Cf. Schepens 2001b.

52 Tuplin 1993: 62–63.

53 Analyzed by Tuplin 1993: 56–64.

54 Cf. Gray 1989: 107–112, esp. 108: 'to take the Theban speech as an analysis of the nature of Spartan empire in Greece, … presents difficulties'. Xenophon, obviously, need not to have composed this speech on the basis of reliable information as to what was really said. As mainly Xenophon's own fabrication (cf. Perlman 1964: 72) the speech is no safe basis for a historical reconstruction against P's alleged misrepresentation of Athenian party politics.

opening sentence. The orator starts with a clumsy attempt to evade Theban responsibility for Erianthes' proposal of 404: this, if anything, must instantaneously ring false to Athenian ears, as it is also contradicted by Xenophon's earlier account at 2.2.19; there we are told that the Thebans had urged that Athens be destroyed. Much of what the Theban ambassador goes on to say is either patently untrue, exaggerated or undercut by the previous narrative. An analysis of the speech along these terms has often been made, and need not be repeated here in any detail.[55] The comment made by Thrasybulus after the Theban stopped speaking (§ 16) is also significant: it points out the absurdity of the claim that the Athenians would receive greater benefit from the alliance than the Thebans would themselves (§ 15).[56] Xenophon seems to agree in his own right with Thrasybulus' sarcastic remark, stating 'that the Thebans were preparing to defend themselves, and the Athenians to help them' (§ 17). The deceptive arguments and the empty boasts notwithstanding, the Athenians unanimously voted for concluding the alliance (3.3.16).[57] Under the circumstances, the vote has a malign ring to it:[58] it shows the Athenians responding positively to the passages in the speech which acknowledge and encourage the Athenian ambition to recover their lost empire (and to make it even greater) and which represent the alliance as a means to that end (§ 10 and 14). Seen in this perspective, the scene in the Athenian *ekklēsia* sheds light on the 'imperialistic' motive which earlier in his account (3.5.2) Xenophon had already singled out as the Athenians' specific reason for making war on Sparta.[59]

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55 See Krentz 1995: 198. Cartledge 1987: 292 describes the speech strikingly as 'a heterogeneous cocktail of truths, half-truths and demonstrable falsehoods'. The few elements of truth contained in it do not invalidate the thesis that is being proposed here: διαβολή characteristically mixes truth with falsehood and exaggeration.

56 Krentz, 1995: 200.

57 Funke, 1980: 68–70.

58 Urban 1991: 44–46. Well worth recalling in this respect is the historiographical assessment of the Theban speech made by Schwartz 1889: 155–157 and 164–165: throughout his work Xenophon warned the Athenians against concluding an alliance with the Thebans and exhorted them to cooperate with Sparta. Persuading the Athenians (Riedinger 1991: 86–88) can hardly have been the main purpose of the speech as composed by Xenophon. There are too many oddities to make such a reading plausible; cf. Gray 1989: esp. 107–108. *Pace* Buck 1998: 97, the Theban orator is not made to say anything of the great services the Thebans rendered to Thrasybulus and the other Athenians democrats in exile; cf. Underhill 1900: 113–114; Seager 1967: 97.

59 According to Buckler 2004: esp. 409–410, Xenophon concocted the Theban speech with the aim of providing lofty motives for Athenian participation in the war. I tend to share the opposite view that 'Xenophon is manipulating the record so as virtually to satirize imperial ambition' (so, much more convincingly, Tuplin 1993: 61).

In summation, then: Xenophon composed the Theban speech with the purpose of vividly and dramatically illustrating both of the points that his narrative presents as causes of the war. His aim, apparently, was not to break new ground or to broaden or modify the scope of his previous remarks. Fully answering to the requirements of the context,[60] the speech, situated between the two notices at 3.5.1–2 and 4.2.1 performs, in Xenophon's progressive treatment of the origin of the Corinthian war, the function of elucidating and showing at work the factors which in his view are the 'Greek' reasons for the war. The speech can be read as a sort of gloss on the Athenians' desire for ἀρχή and represents how Sparta's enemies could think of her rule. With the emphasis thus put on hatred of the Spartans, Xenophon reminds us in a sense of P's account, but the motivations given for it are in each case at sharp variance. The idea that it was slander which brought the cities to hate the Spartans implies, in Xenophon's account, that he believed or wanted his readers to believe that such anti-Spartan feelings did not exist until Timocrates arrived and distributed the money.[61] In this way the war is represented as the direct outcome of Persian bribes. P, as we have seen, states quite the opposite and focuses on the inner Greek dynamic of long-standing anti-Spartan discontent which led several cities to unite and undertake war against their common enemy.

Agesilaus and the Spartan View

Xenophon's simple and historically inadequate explanation represents, as many commentators have already stressed, a 'Spartan' view on the origin of the Corinthian war.[62] It may be helpful for a proper understanding of the peculiarities of his account to try and define the nature of this view

[60] Taking the Theban charges seriously, several Xenophon scholars have argued that the anti-Spartan tendency of the speech sets it off distinctively from the pro-Spartan narrative in the surrounding chapters; hence, the idea that it was inserted, as a 'Fremdkörper' ('foreign body'), at some later time in a pre-existing draft: Riedinger 1991: 152–153, still adheres to this view, previously advocated by scholars as Sordi 1950: 25–29 (with earlier literature); Breitenbach 1967: 1681. For a perceptive discussion of the difficulties raised by the 'analyst' position, see Henry 1967: *passim*, and esp. 172–174.

[61] Cook 1981: 101.

[62] 'Di matrice spartana' (Cataudella 1998: 616); 'eine tendenziöse spartanische Version' (Busolt 1908: 272, 275); 'die spartanische version' (Jacoby 1926: 9); 'the official Spartan view' (Kagan 1961: 328); cf. also Bruce 1960: 82–84; Perlman 1964: 71–72: '[Xenophon's] view is clearly influenced by Spartan propaganda'; Bleckmann 2006: 93–95.

somewhat more closely. Sparta, as everyone knows, never produced an indigenous historian, at least not in the classical period, but was, throughout the centuries, very proficient in spreading an image of herself that responded to her own interests.[63] Primarily concerned as the Spartans were with propagating their city's pre-eminence and claim to lead and protect the Greeks, the Corinthian war made them face one of the greatest crises in their long history of hegemony. After having successfully fought, together with their allies, the long-protracted struggle against Athens in the fifth century, those very own allies had by now joined in an hostile alliance with Athens. Answering to the challenge, the Spartan official view tended to turn a blind eye to the fundamental anti-Spartan reasons for the conflict and gratefully exploited, to that end, the chronological coincidence of the war that had broken out in Greece with the one they were conducting against Persia (400–394). As Spartan propaganda was already involved in the presentation of the campaign against Persia as a Panhellenic expedition for the sake of the freedom of the Greek cities in Asia,[64] it was simply a logical further step to try and establish a *causal* link between the ongoing war in Asia and the new one in Europe. Essential to the Spartan view is the presentation of the Corinthian war as a Persian stab in the back. The potential for propagandistic exploitation of the historical fact of Timocrates' mission proved huge on both the Persian and Greek sides of the 'interlocking' conflict.[65] On the Asian side, glorification of Agesilaus' war as a highly successful campaign—perceived by the Persians as a serious threat to their empire—gave credibility to the view that the Corinthian War was, indeed, a Persian

[63] Cf. Tigerstedt 1965: 79–80 and n. 606; Hooker 1989: 122–141. On the Spartan origin of the greater part of Xenophon's information, see Riedinger 1993.

[64] On the amount of propaganda involved in Xenophon's narrative of Agesilaus' Asian war, see Seager and Tuplin 1980: 141–154; Lanzillotta 1984: 68–74; Seager 1977: 183–184; and Kelly 1978: 97–98. Hooker 1989: 129, believes that Spartan propaganda was not very successful in the fourth century; cf. Clauss 1983: 62–63, who observes that, unlike the Athenians in the early fifth century, the Spartans could not exploit the theme of the struggle against Persia. Although the Spartans may, in this respect, have been less fortunate than the Athenians, they, nevertheless, concentrated on this very theme, as can be seen (a) in the attempt to exploit the Panhellenic sentiment, in spring 396, by making Agesilaus imitate Agamemnon at Aulis; (b) in the emphasis on 'liberation' ideology, and (c) in the blatant inflation of the threat their expedition posed to the Persian empire and in the concomitant importance attached to *Persian* bribes as the real cause of the war.

[65] It would, of course, not make sense to try to deny that there were connections between the two wars and that the Greek cities exploited, to some extent, the developments of the Spartan-Persian war: see, above all, Perlman 1964. But Spartan propaganda clearly overstated its case in focusing on Persian money as single cause of the war.

countermove to force the Spartans out of their territory.[66] And, on the European side, the idea that there would not have been any uprising against Sparta if it had not been provoked by Persian money, projected an image of the world of the Greek city-states fundamentally at peace under Spartan leadership.

Xenophon's account in *Hellenica* 3–4.2 bears the mark of Spartan propaganda in both these areas and, for all its historical inadequacies, makes exciting reading if seen in this light. I have discussed this topic more extensively in the context of a comparative examination of Agesilaus' portrayal in fourth-century Greek historiographical literature. At the end of this paper, I shall therefore limit myself to summarizing the main conclusions, which all point to Agesilaus' pivotal role in the shaping and development of the traditions filtered by Xenophon.[67]

To begin with, it is more than likely that the Spartan king held a view which amounts to making Persian money the explanation of the Corinthian war. Consorting with Agesilaus and other Spartans in his entourage, Xenophon might have heard, even from Agesilaus' mouth 'that the King was driving him out of Asia with the help of ten thousand archers':[68] 'this', Plutarch adds, 'was the sum of money which had been sent to Athens and Thebes and distributed to the demagogues, and it was for this reason that their peoples now went to war with the Spartans'.[69] According to another tradition, Agesilaus refused πάμπολλα δῶρα, which Tithraustes offered him in exchange for ending the war and leaving Asia, and replied in the following terms: "Among us, Tithraustes, a ruler's honour requires him to enrich his army rather than himself, and to take spoils rather than gifts from the enemy."[70] The Spartan king, as one can imagine, may have been keen on contrasting his own truly Greek and honourable attitude with the disgraceful behaviour of the 'demagogues' in the major Greek cities who were ready to assist the Persians in backstabbing him in return for cash. Does it make sense to suppose that this story may have led people to think of Tithraustes as the initiator of the plan to bribe the Greeks? Possibly, but I do not want to press this point.

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66 In Xenophon's account, as Kelly 1978: 97 appositely observes, Agesilaus' ambitious plans are bound up with his 'misapprehensions over Timocrates' mission to Greece'.

67 See Schepens 2005. My analysis of the reasons why Xenophon failed to give a historically more pertinent account is in fundamental agreement with Bleckmann 2006.

68 Persian gold coins at this time, Plut. *Ages.* 15.8 explains, were stamped with the figure of an archer; cf. Plut. *Art.* 20.6; *Ap. Lac.* 211b (= *Agesilaus* 40; see also 38–39).

69 Plut. *Ages.* 15.8 (tr. Scott-Kilvert). Regarding the confusion over the amount of money and the context of the passage, see Shipley 1977: 203–210.

70 Xen. *Ages.* 4.6; cf. Plut. *Ages.* 10.7 with Shipley 1977: 161–162.

Far more decisive for explaining the shift away in the tradition from Pharnabazus to Tithraustes is, in my opinion, the appropriate point in time at which the latter appeared on the scene in Asia Minor, right after Agesilaus had obtained his one and only important victory over the Persians, in the battle of Sardis. For the Spartans, in order to gain maximum credibility for their view about the Persian origin of the Corinthian war, it was of some importance to represent the Persian commander as a man driven to desperation by Agesilaus' military strength and ambitious plans of further conquest, as someone who saw no other means of ending the war than by causing another one in Greece. The highly endangered and hopeless situation in which Xenophon—in the *Hellenica* and, still more so, in the *Agesilaus*[71]—depicts Tithraustes conceiving his covert action scheme perfectly fits all those parameters. The unhistorical telescoping or compression that such a construction entails (by no means unusual in propaganda), may not have mattered to the Spartan originator of such a view.[72] Even by ancient standards, however, Xenophon, as a historian, should (and could, if he had wanted) have bothered more about the chronological oddity which his presentation of the facts entailed. The blunder, in this case, is such that his usual slipshod chronological method fails to adequately account for it.[73] Admittedly, the 'propagandistic' explanation suggested here is bound to remain hypothetical; still, it strikes me as an altogether more likely way out of the quandary than all previous attempts to salvage his version.[74]

Yet, for the Spartans, the main and politically most relevant impulse to develop their view of the origin of the Corinthian War may only have

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71 *Ages.* 1.35.

72 Meyer 1909: 45 overlooks the creative role of propaganda in the shaping of this tradition, when he maintains that the secret mission of Timocrates was only revealed to the Spartans by its practical consequences in the summer of 395, and that this explains why they made Tithraustes the initiator. In a similar—positivistic—spirit, he argues that, as opposed to rumours (cf. Pl. *Meno* 90a), Timocrates' negotiations were only officially established as a fact by the Spartan trial of Ismenias in 382 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.35), as if preconceived ideas and anti-Theban prejudices would have had nothing to do with the accusations brought against the Theban democratic leader.

73 The solution proposed by Bleckmann 2006: 93–95 for Xenophon's historical inadequacy moves along the same lines.

74 Lack of information on a mission that was secretly organised has been invoked by several scholars, such as Meyer (see n. 72, above); Accame 1951: 29–31. and Barbieri 1955: 90–100; but such explanation fails to account for the chronological absurdity involved in Timocrates' late arrival in Greece. The same holds true for the attempts to double or triple the number of missions on which Timocrates (or other envoys) were sent to Greece. For a brief discussion, with bibliography, see Funke 1980: 55–56 n. 30; cf. also Cook 1981: 130–134 n. 19.

come in the immediate aftermath of the war. Having concluded the King's Peace they were, as Diodorus states, 'in bad repute because it was generally believed that in the agreement ... they had betrayed the Greeks of Asia'.[75] In response to such criticisms the Spartans played, in turn, on the Panhellenic feelings of betrayal of the Greek cause by the 'Medizers' who had provoked the conflict in the first place. They had their line of defence ready at hand: while they were fighting Persia for the sake of the independence of the Greeks of Asia Minor and on the verge of accomplishing a major success, their fellow Greeks had—for a motive as dishonourable as Persian bribes—been sabotaging this noble enterprise. Agesilaus is said to have given the following comment at the issue of the Nemea battle: 'Alas for Greece, that she has herself been responsible for the deaths of so many men—the very number that would be enough to defeat all the barbarians'.[76] A few years later, the accusations brought against Ismenias, at his trial in 382, strikingly reveal how Sparta found cause to direct public blame at her enemies of the Corinthian war, and at the Thebans in particular. Ismenias, according to Xenophon, was accused of being a supporter of the barbarians, ... of having received a share of the money which came from the King, and of being, together with Androcleidas, chiefly responsible for all the trouble and disorder in Greece.[77] Plutarch, it would seem, renders the bottom-line of Spartan propaganda pertinently with a quote from Euripides: Ὦ βάρβαρ' ἐξευρόντες Ἕλληνες κακά.[78] If the Greeks had not inflicted barbaric evils on themselves, barbaric evils would have been done by Greeks to barbarians.

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[75] Diod. 15.9.5; cf. 14.110.4; Philoch. 328 F149a. For some echoes in contemporary rhetoric, see Lys. 2.57.2; 33.4.7; Isoc. *Paneg.* 120–121 and 177–178; *Panath.* 59–61: cf. Mathieu 1966: 76–77; Nouhaud 1982: 83–87.

[76] Plut. *Ap.Lac.* 211b (tr. Talbert). Several 'sayings' of Agesilaus point again to his leading role in promulgating the official Spartan view: Plut. *Mor.* 213B = *Ap.Lac.* 60 and 61, corresponding to Plut. *Ages.* 23.3–4; cf. Shipley 1997: 276–278. Plutarch also preserves an *apophthegma* in which Agesilaus, allegedly, dissociates himself from the shameful schemes of the 'Spartan citizen' Antalcidas, who had handed over to the Great King the Greeks in Asia, in whose defence he had gone to war. It is worthwhile to recall, in this context, that Xenophon's use of the catchword 'freedom of the Greeks of Asia', which first appeared as a slogan at the time of the Peace of Antalcidas (see Seager and Tuplin 1980: 141–154), still shows the extent to which his account is influenced by views that developed in the aftermath of the Corinthian War.

[77] *Hell.* 5.2.35–36. See Bruce 1960: 85.

[78] *Tro.* 764 ('O Greek inventors of barbaric evils')

Conclusion

If I have not gone completely astray in suggesting that the Spartan 'official' version about the origin of the Corinthian War was mainly promulgated (and perhaps also shaped) in retrospect, then, we may have gained some insight into the historical context in which P's criticism of the Spartan view originated. At the time when the Oxyrhynchus historian—whom I believe to be Cratippus, composing his *Hellenica* not long after the Peace of Antalcidas[79]—set about writing his work, the Spartans had succeeded in disseminating throughout the Greek world their view of how the Corinthian War came about. As a contemporary historian, working in the still mainly oral Greek culture of the early fourth century, and practicing a method of enquiry, which, after Thucydides' manner,[80] privileged direct research on the spot and oral sources over written evidence, P quite naturally came across the interpretation of Timocrates' mission which the Spartans had been spreading for public consumption. As a critical historian he felt challenged to get the facts straight. Although the idea that P reacted against written accounts has found ready acceptance among modern critics,[81] I take

[79] For the authorship and the dating (372 as *terminus ante quem*), see Schepens 1993: 169–203. More arguments in favour of an early dating are discussed by Cataudella 2002.

[80] Bruce 1967: 6–8.

[81] Bruce, 1967: 5: 'It is perhaps likely, although not certain, that the persons to whom P refers were writers, but his critical view of their judgements implies only acquaintance with, and not dependence upon, their works.' The idea that written accounts hide behind the formula 'τινὲς λέγουσι', was first put forward by Meyer 1909: 48–49, arguing that a list of names was included in this tradition. See also Urban 1991: 47; Breitenbach 1970: 390–391, who, however, observes himself that such an inference is not compelling (406); for some speculation on names of literary authorities, see ibid. 406–407.—On the assumption that P can be identified as Theopompus, some critics have advocated the view that Xenophon was, indeed, P's real target: see, in the wake of Meyer 1909: 121, Lehmann 1972: 397 n. 35; Bleckmann 1998: 195–196 n. 40; Bleckmann 2006: 92 n. 284, reiterating the view defended by Busolt 1908: 281, according to which P systematically reworked Xenophon's account. Apart from the general objections that can be raised against Theopompus' authorship of the Oxyrhynhus history (see Shrimpton 1991: 183–195), this solution fails to convince for at least two specific reasons. Firstly, P's polemical digression, being occasioned by the Demaenetus affair, focuses first and foremost on the situation in Athens; the author is at pains to show that Epicrates and Cephalus were, indeed, engaged in anti-Spartan activities already a long time before they had their dealings with Timocrates. If some author is criticised here, it can hardly have been Xenophon, since he explicitly maintained that the Athenians had no share in the gold; cf. already Peter 1911: 138–142, esp. 141 n. 5; Jacoby 1926: 9; Bonamente 1973: 30 n. 1. Secondly, if Theopompus took issue with Xenophon—which is very likely to have happened, since Theopompus conceived his Greek history, as we know, in a spirit of rivalry to his predecessor (see 115 F21)—it is utterly unlikely that he would have attacked Xenophon silently. Theopompus was infamous for the unbridled violence and πικρία of his criticism

his refutation of the views held by τινές to be mainly, if not exclusively, concerned with the erroneous beliefs of people, who, in various cities in Greece, were disposed to lend a ready ear to Spartan propaganda. For that matter, the very phrases in which P formulates his criticism (καίτοι τινὲς λέγουσιν ..., οὐκ εἰδότες), refer more likely to common belief or current tradition not (yet) put into written form.[82] Scholars, who think of literary accounts, tend to underestimate the impact of oral reports on Greek public opinion and risk missing the propagandistic reality behind it.

A few decades later, when Xenophon published his *Hellenica*, he apparently felt called upon to reaffirm the Spartan view. Having returned to Greece with his patron Agesilaus in 394, he had been closely and actively involved, on the Spartan side, in the Corinthian War himself, and was perhaps exiled as a political consequence of it.[83] Here as elsewhere in his work Xenophon completely ignores the account of the Oxyrhynchus historian, and strained his talent as a writer to put the Spartan view across to his readers. But, while aligning himself with the facile Spartan interpretation, Xenophon seems to have set about it cleverly. For, as already noted, he does not seem to be willing to take authorial responsibility for stating that Persian money caused the war: the two key-passages discuss the matter once in terms of a Persian plan conceived by Tithraustes, and again, as a Spartan finding. An artful reporter, Xenophon only proves apparently naïve in propagating a view about which he might have felt himself that it could not stand up to close and impartial historical scrutiny.

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(T20a). Finally, regarding the views proposed by both Busolt and Bleckmann, it requires a good deal of imagination—more than one is normally expected to possess—to understand how P, following his method of ἀξιοπίστως ψεύδεσθαι, could almost hit by accident upon the truth concerning Timocrates' mission.

[82] As Bonamente 1973: 65, points out, οὐκ εἰδότες is a typical phrase for criticizing views current among people not capable of understanding deeper reasons; cf. McKechnie and Kern 1988: 135.

[83] See Tuplin 1987: 59–68.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

THREE DEFENCES OF SOCRATES: RELATIVE CHRONOLOGY, POLITICS AND RELIGION[*]

† Michael Stokes

This paper aimed originally to firm up from further reading and reflection the tentative conclusions on the relative chronology of *PA, XA*, and *XM*[1] reached in the Introduction to Stokes (1997).[2] It has now become in the first instance a defence of that chronology in the light of some subsequent scholarly work. The argument inevitably falls short of absolute proof, but the conclusion eventually reached is that the works by Plato and Xenophon were indeed produced in the order just stated (*PA*, *XA*, *XM*), and that a fourth work, Polycrates' lost pamphlet *Accusation of Socrates*, appeared between *XA* and *XM*. Along the way the paper may help to convince people that Xenophon's methods of work were in places a trifle slipshod. By his 'methods of work' is meant the way in which he treats other writers' texts in cases of intertextuality. This may lead to a deeper understanding of Xenophon as a creative writer. A final corollary will contribute to the debate on the question why Socrates was tried and condemned. In this contribution religious issues are highlighted. The corollary (I confess) seems to me more important than the chronological detail.

We must start the chronology from a passage of the orator Isocrates referring to Polycrates' *Accusation of Socrates*.

Isocrates *Busiris* 4–5

In the proem to his *Busiris*, Isocrates suggests that Polycrates is especially proud of his defence of Busiris and his *Accusation of Socrates*. He points out, however, that Polycrates was far wide of the mark in both these pamphlets.

[*] Gabriel Danzig read critically successive drafts of this paper: my warmest thanks to him. He is not responsible for errors and omissions; I am.

[1] I thus abbreviate Plato's and Xenophon's *Apologies of Socrates* and Xenophon's *Memorabilia Socratis*.

[2] Stokes 1997: 3–4.

A defence or praise, Isocrates says, should reveal more good qualities than the subject actually possessed. An attack should show the victim as having fewer good qualities. Polycrates has not done this; far from it. In defence of Busiris he has not just freed him from many slurs; he has also added to his qualities the worst lawlessness one could think of. Others trying to attack Busiris have said he sacrificed strangers; Polycrates says he ate them. By contrast, in his attempt to attack Socrates Polycrates gave Socrates Alcibiades as a pupil, presumably hitherto not known as such. Isocrates characterizes Alcibiades as one whose superiority all Greeks would admit. Socrates, the orator says, would be grateful for this change, whereas Busiris would be angry at the slur on him.

It would be all too easy to dismiss this as a mere rhetorical flourish, deserving no credence.[3] However, it deserves discussion, and now more discussion than ever, as an anonymous reader drew my attention to Niall Livingstone's valuable 1999 commentary on *Busiris*. That commentary deals at length with (among other things) the date of the work and in particular with the point of the passage under discussion. Many people (including me) have taken this passage for granted as evidence for the dating of the works here discussed. That is no longer possible. Livingstone has raised questions about the date of the *Busiris* and about the seriousness of the work of Polycrates to which it refers. These questions need answers, if possible, and in any case deserve discussion. Livingstone's arguments are not uniformly strong.

First, a specific date: Polycrates' *Accusation of Socrates*, referred to in Isocrates' *Busiris*, must be dated after 393–392, mentioning as it did the rebuilding of the Long Walls of Athens. How long after is debatable.

Busiris also refers, in its idealised account of ancient Egypt, to several ideas forming central political themes of Plato's *Republíc*. Livingstone dates it accordingly after the *Republic*, and hence in the 370s.[4] It would, however,

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[3] Waterfield 2009 pays no attention to Isocrates at all; in the present volume he does use Isocrates as evidence for what Polycrates actually said. He does cite another orator, Aeschin. 1.173, writing some 50 years later and probably acquainted directly or indirectly with Polycrates' work. Macleod 2008: 13 devotes a few sentences to the reference in the Busiris. He suggests that Isocrates here 'sounds like a rival sophist speaking'. This seems subjective, and raises the question how far one sophist could go in falsehood about another. He cites a suggestion from M.M. Willcock to the effect that the topic of Alcibiades 'was avoided as a weak link in the defence'. On that view see below. Macleod also thinks the politics of reference to Alcibiades and Critias may have been left to Meletus' supporter Anytus, himself a politician of some distinction. However, there were other political topics for Anytus to talk about. See further below.

[4] Livingstone 1999: 48–56.

by no means follow that Polycrates' *Accusation* followed the *Republic*. In any case the dating of Isocrates' *Busiris* depends on Plato's behaviour in regard to these central themes. Did he keep silent about them until he had finished and circulated the *Republic?* Or did he in his enthusiasm spread them around? Did he even hold what Ryle called dialectical 'moots' about them?[5] If so, such radical notions would soon have become a popular topic of conversation with leisured young men, some of Isocrates' pupils perhaps among them. Certainly we cannot rule out this possibility.[6] It follows that the *Republic* offers no clear *terminus post quem* for *Busiris* and certainly none for *Accusation of Socrates*. We can if necessary go back to whatever date fits best with other evidence.

Next question: what do we *know* of Polycrates' broadside? In truth we *know* very little.[7] Polycrates himself may or may not have made a serious work of it.[8] Whether he was serious or not, almost any *Accusation of Socrates* which spoke of such charges as his having had the distinguished but wayward Alcibiades for a pupil would have had to be treated with care by Socrates' defenders. It is no surprise that *XM* mounts an elaborate defence of Socrates' relations with Alcibiades, even though the scene with Pericles at *XM* 1.2.40–46 strikes an ambivalent note. Other Socratics, most notably Plato, joined in depicting the relationship in a light favourable to Socrates.

It is still at least credible that Polycrates was the first to depict Alcibiades as (at least for some time) having enjoyed Socrates' company. The vital sentence of *Busiris* reads as follows:

> Σωκράτους δὲ κατηγορεῖν ἐπιχειρήσας ὥσπερ ἐγκωμιάσαι βουλόμενος Ἀλκιβιάδην ἔδωκας μαθητήν, ὃν ὑπ' ἐκείνου μὲν οὐδεὶς ᾔσθετο παιδευόμενον, ὅτι δὲ πολὺ διήνεγκε τῶν ἄλλων ἅπαντες ἂν ὁμολογήσειαν.
>
> After undertaking to accuse Socrates, as if you wished to laud him, you gave him Alcibiades for a pupil—Alcibiades whom no-one observed being educated by him, but everyone would agree to have been by far the most distinguished of his contemporaries.[9]

[5] Ryle 1966: 18 and elsewhere (see his General Index.).

[6] A somewhat similar situation arises in the case of Aristotle's extant works. They were clearly not readied for publication, but ideas from them were well known by the late fourth century. See e.g. Furley 1967 with Stokes 1969.

[7] Many scholars from Chroust 1957 on have believed that Libanius, writing centuries later, made use of Polycrates; that is far from certain.

[8] Livingstone 1999: 28–40.

[9] Translations in this paper are my own unless otherwise noted.

Livingstone thought the emphasis here lay on the word μαθητής, 'pupil'.[10] He has Isocrates say that Polycrates depicted Alcibiades as an actual *pupil* of Socrates. Earlier scholars had thought Isocrates meant simply that Polycrates added Alcibiades to the list of Socrates' young companions. Livingstone makes a point of the fact that in talking of Alcibiades Xenophon nowhere refers to him as a μαθητής, The force of this is greatly diminished by the fact that Xenophon does not use this word of any of the young members of the Socratic circle. Xenophon's commonest expression for this circle is οἱ συνόντες, 'his associates' or 'those in his company'. His Socrates does however claim at *XA* 26 to teach and to have in some quarters a high reputation as an educator. He claims also (*XA* 20) to have taken what amounts to a professional interest in education, comparable with a doctor's interest in medicine. Someone educated by Socrates would in normal Greek be termed a 'pupil'. Isocrates says that nobody before Polycrates' work had heard of Alcibiades being educated by Socrates. Here whether one uses the term 'pupil' or not seems a trifling question. The usage suggests only that some people (Isocrates? Polycrates?) found it difficult, or possibly failed deliberately, to distinguish Socrates' young companions from pupils in a strict sense of the term. Isocrates implies quite clearly that Polycrates was the first to make Alcibiades for at least some time a young companion of Socrates, educated by him. This rendering does indeed make sense of the whole passage: Isocrates finds fault with Polycrates for giving Socrates a companion who was actually, in Isocrates' genuine or pretended view, the most distinguished Greek of his day, not mere nobodies such as *PA* mentioned. This balances well Isocrates' earlier portrayal of Polycrates' Busiris as not merely sacrificing strangers but actually eating them.

Xenophon in *XM* 1.2 puts into the mouth of the 'accuser' a number of serious complaints against Socrates, not just his association with Alcibiades and Critias. These charges have often been thought to stem from Polycrates. Livingstone gives this attribution short shrift. He thinks that (e.g.) Alcibiades occupied the minds of the prosecutors at and around the trial. However, if these charges remained locked in the prosecutors' minds how would Xenophon know about them, when he was out of Athens at the time and presumably did not hobnob later with the prosecutors or their friends? If the charges found a voice, and if (in addition) this were well enough known to reach Xenophon's ear, Isocrates could scarcely say that Polycrates was the first to *perceive* Alcibiades as Socrates' 'pupil'. It is hard to

[10] Livingstone 1999: 37–38.

believe that Isocrates could have expected to get away with a blatant falsehood well known to be such.[11]

Whether Libanius several centuries later in his *Defence of Socrates* drew on Xenophon or directly on Polycrates seems at this point immaterial. Either way Polycrates remains a likely source for Xenophon's remarks. It is not like Xenophon to go inventing charges to defend Socrates against; we have seen that the actual prosecution probably was not the source, and we hear of no other speech about Socrates of prosecution type written and circulating in the early fourth century.[12] Would such a composition, like Shakespeare's 'insubstantial pageant faded', have left 'not a rack behind'? For the originator of these charges Polycrates is the best candidate. I believe unrepentantly that Isocrates tells us he was indeed their originator, even their inventor.

Indeed *something* must explain why neither Plato nor Xenophon in their respective *Apologies* mentions these charges, and in particular the association with Alcibiades and Critias. To draw attention to the by no means notable list of candidates for corrupted young men in *PA* while ignoring the prominent figure of Alcibiades seems to invite trouble. Any reasonably sharp reader or hearer would ask (in American terms), Where's the beef? So obvious an evasion would have been a serious rhetorical error. Plato was hardly the man to make a rhetorical mistake.

Suppose, for a moment, we imagine *PA* and *XA* to have been written after Polycrates' *Accusation*: in that case the omission by Plato in *PA* seems even more of a rhetorical risk. It is hard to see why Xenophon should perpetuate it. It still seems probable that the cause of the difference in this respect between *PA* and *XA* on the one hand and works dealing with the Alcibiades question on the other was the intervention of Polycrates. In this context it does not matter much how serious Polycrates' intentions were.

It results that indeed it is likely that *PA* and *XA* antedate, and works such as *XM* and Plato's *Symposium* postdate, Polycrates' *Accusation of Socrates*. To resist this conclusion one has to impute to Plato a rhetorically seriously risky omission when a few sentences could have repaired it. Tentatively we will avoid such an imputation.

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11 Danzig 2010: 202.

12 Waterfield (this volume, p. 287) thinks Polycrates used material from Anytus' actual prosecution speech. He may have done, but probably at least embellished it with matter of his own. Plato, at least, certainly did that with Socrates' defence. One would expect originality from a sophist in a display speech, serious or not.

XM Is Later Than *PA*

Apart from Polycrates, there is independent evidence for *PA*'s priority over *XM*. It is necessary to quote from *XM* 1.1.11:

> Οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως, ᾗπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι, διελέγετο σκοπῶν ὅπως ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος ἔχει καὶ τίσιν ἀνάγκαις ἕκαστα γίγνεται τῶν οὐρανίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φροντίζοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα μωραίνοντας ἀπεδείκνυε.
>
> [Socrates] did not even discourse on the nature of the universe in the way most of the others did, or consider what the thing is like which the sophists call the Cosmos. Nor [did he consider] what forces led to the creation of each of the heavenly bodies. Rather, he demonstrated the folly of those who think about (φροντίζοντας) such things.[13]

Here 'the others' are unlikely to have been 'the other' sophists, since, as L. Edmunds has recently expounded,[14] Plato and Xenophon do not refer to Socrates as a sophist.[15] They are also unlikely to be the ordinary citizens going about their business in the Athenian Agora, despite the casual mention of the Agora a few lines before the passage here quoted. Ordinary citizens presumably did not spend much time discussing the nature and origins of the universe and heavenly bodies. In fact it looks very much as if Xenophon has based what he is saying here on *PA* 23d. There Plato's Socrates speaks of the study of astronomy as one of the charges laid against all those that do philosophy. Xenophon has either toned down Plato's remark or simply held it in his fallible memory. Whichever he has done, he has done it in a way that might have left his more careful contemporary readers justifiably puzzled. There is more evidence in the shape of *XM* 4.8.1. Xenophon suggests, if anyone should suppose that Socrates' condemnation to death proved that he lied about the *daimonion* when he said that it signalled to him beforehand what he ought or ought not to do, then …

> ἐννοησάτω πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὕτως ἤδη τότε πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας ἦν, ὥστ', εἰ καὶ μὴ τότε, οὐκ ἂν πολλῷ ὕστερον τελευτῆσαι τὸν βίον· εἶτα ὅτι …

[13] The word for 'think about' here recalls, doubtless deliberately, the 'Thinkery' of Socrates in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. So e.g. Classen 1984: 158.

[14] Edmunds 2006, cf. Classen 1984: 164.

[15] Gera 2007 draws attention to the story of Tigranes, *Cyr*. 3.1.14, and 38–40. There we hear of a sophist clearly resembling Socrates. That does not (I think) amount to calling Socrates himself a sophist.

> … let him bear in mind, first that he was then already so far advanced in years that he would have departed from life if not then, at any rate not long after that, and secondly …

The passage continues with a second argument (εἶτα ὅτι …), to the effect that Socrates left life at its most painful and at a time when everybody's mental faculties decline.

There is no actual contradiction between these two arguments. Nevertheless they sit somewhat uneasily side by side. The first argument weakens the second. All the fuss about mental decline and loss of faculties might be thought less than dignified if the decline is not going to last long. The less long, the less dignified. Now Xenophon himself in *XA* 6 had given Socrates the second argument. The first argument, however, is not to be found elsewhere in Xenophon. It echoes Socrates' point at *PA* 38c that he would not have lasted long if the Athenians had only waited. Socrates does not use it as an argument in Plato, but the resemblance is there. The relative weakness of this Xenophon passage, in relation to both his own argument in *XA* and to the very natural Plato passage, suggests strongly that Xenophon derives the point from Plato rather than *vice versa*.[16]

These points offer welcome internal support to the external argument from the remarks of Isocrates for the posteriority of *XM* to *XA*.

XA Is Later Than *PA*

We may pick out some salient items from *XA* and compare them with relevant passages in *PA*. The one furnishing the strongest argument will be placed last.

The Opening of XA

Fortunately it is not necessary to rely on the first substantive statement of *XA* to prove that *PA* was known to Xenophon when he wrote it: 'Many have written (γράφουσι) about [Socrates' defence and death], and all hit on his boastfulness … But they have not made clear Socrates' judgment that death was for him preferable to life'.[17] Von Arnim and Hackforth, among older

[16] Von Arnim 1923: 25–66, on this passage 26–30, tried to make a case for the intervention of *PA* between *XA* and *XM*. But the present and any similar cases could be explained just as well (e.g.) by Xenophon's having returned to *PA* in a calmer mood some years later.

[17] On the plural γράφουσι see Vander Waerdt 1993: 14–15.

writers, doubted the force of the argument from this statement.[18] Indeed, taken by itself it is unconvincing: if there really were many apologists for Socrates, enough for πάντες, 'all of them', to be taken literally, how can we be sure at this stage that Plato was one of those Xenophon had read? True, we know so little of the very first steps in the development of the Socratic literature as to forfeit any feeling of certainty about how many versions there were of Socrates' trial, defence and death, and about who reacted to whom.[19] Unbelievers in the argument from *XA*'s opening, such as Hackforth, have urged also that Socrates in *PA* grounds his own boastful pronouncements thoroughly in his defensive argument; clarity does not require Xenophon's more prosaic and practical reasoning. It would be unwise to rely on *XA's* opening alone, even though we know of no Socratic apologies certainly published before *PA* and *XA*. One would like to know the date of the *Defence of Socrates* attributed to Lysias, whether or not the attribution was correct.[20] Xenophon did after all react in some measure to Plato's *Symposium*.

Socrates' daimonion *or Divine Sign*

After *XA*'s perhaps conventional beginning, indicating the subject of the work and the inadequacies of previous writings or speeches on it,[21] we find a report supposedly by Hermogenes of Socrates' reluctance to prepare a defence. In reply to Hermogenes' complaint about this, Socrates produces two main arguments: first, that his blameless life was sufficient defence in itself; secondly (when Hermogenes reminds him of Athenian juries' erratic verdicts) that the *daimonion* twice opposed him when he was about to ponder his defence.

To Xenophon here on the *daimonion* there is at least one objection. First, though readers of *XA* need not have realised it until later in the book (*XA* 13), there is the question why Socrates tried again when the *daimonion* was always right even for his friends (and presumably also for himself). Unless due to scribal error (δίς derived visually from Δία earlier in the sentence?), this 'blunder', as Dorion calls it,[22] is more likely to be a mistake of Xenophon's than a piece of Socratic mockery aimed at Hermogenes. It

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18 Hackforth 1933: 13–14, von Arnim 1923: 11.

19 For what can be known about these first steps, see Clay 1994. However, one should not place too much faith in the ascription of dialogues to minor Socratics in later antiquity. Such ascriptions were too obviously valuable to the book trade to be entirely trustworthy.

20 Ascriptions to Lysias have looked more risky since Dover 1968.

21 Compare e.g. Hecataeus *FGrH* 1 F1 and *PA*, and Xenophon's own *Poroi*.

22 Dorion 2005: 78 n. 3. Xenophon himself avoided the mistake in *XM*.

is not naturally taken as ironic, having as it does none of the marks of Xenophontine irony explored recently by Vivienne Gray.[23] If it is designed rhetorically to aid Socrates in persuading Hermogenes, that does not make it any the less a mistake. Any actual falsehood from Socrates would run counter to the assumption, underlying much of this paper, that the Socratics do not attribute to Socrates any deliberate falsehood within their fictions. I know of no proven example to upset this assumption. A mistake such as this does not suggest a writer in full control of his material with a trustworthy informant; it suggests rather a writer over-egging his pudding, and going one better than (a) previous writer(s).

Secondly, a point telling against Xenophon's priority though not decisively so, whereas *PA* takes trouble to introduce the *daimonion* to the 'jury' and to its readers, *XA* dives into the *daimonion's* opposition to Socrates' intentions without warning or introduction of any sort. Now conceivably *XA* is aimed in the first instance at a readership in the circle of friends surrounding Socrates, readers familiar with the *daimonion*, whereas *PA* envisaged a wider audience. In that case Xenophon would have been preaching to the converted. Such an audience, if familiar with a *daimonion* such as Xenophon describes, would have recognised all too easily the 'blunder' of having Socrates trying to get round a warning from the supposedly infallible *daimonion* (for which see *XA* 13 ad fin.) by testing it twice. For good measure, such an audience, though perhaps in need of support after Socrates' death, should not have needed to be convinced that Socrates was 'wise and noble' (*XA* 34). Furthermore, even if the first audience for *XA* was a Socratic circle needing reassurance, that can hardly have constituted the only and whole audience. If the point of *XA* was merely to show Socrates' friends that Socrates' boastfulness in court was explicable in prudential terms, then the work seems over-elaborate for the purpose: it was unnecessary to that end to give Socrates three speeches and to tell the whole purported story of his trial, aftermath and all. It begins to look as if Xenophon depends on a wider audience's knowledge of *PA* and its *daimonion*.

Later in *XA* a third point arises. This too would hardly be decisive by itself, but is a useful addition to the evidence. In reply to the charge of introducing new *daimonia*, at *XA* 12 Xenophon makes his Socrates stress his own report that the voice of a god signals to him, and argue that such a voice is nothing out of the ordinary. That the *daimonion* took the form of a voice

23 See Gray 2011: esp. 335–336.

is an essential link in the chain of argument. But the connection does not become clear to uninitiated readers till 12 lines below in Marchant's Oxford text, by which time the argument is all but complete. In Plato (*PA* 31c–d), however, the connection is crystal clear at exactly the point where clarity is needed. Again we have to ask ourselves whether *XA* was written by a man who knew *PA*, or knew something very like *PA*. Again it seems likely that it was. All in all, it seems easier to believe that *XA* was relatively hard to read before reading *PA* because it was written after *PA* than it is to believe that Xenophon penned a somewhat difficult work, which Plato then (as it were) tidied up.

It is harder to draw any chronological conclusion from the actual nature of the *daimonion* in the two works. As is well known, Xenophon's *daimonion* differs from Plato's in two principal respects. It gives advice both positive and negative, unlike Plato's *daimonion*, which gives only negative warnings. Further, the advice works in Xenophon, but apparently not in Plato, for Socrates' friends no less than for himself, even though it speaks directly only to Socrates. These may be literary points:[24] Xenophon's more positive *daimonion* fits his more positive Socrates; Plato's negative one fits the more negative Socrates of his 'early' or 'short' dialogues. Xenophon likes to stress the benefits Socrates brought to his friends.[25] There are those who belittle the first difference by arguing that a *daimonion* which says 'no' to a prospective action is saying 'yes' to the opposite action.[26] Against this view it has to be said that not all forbidden actions have one simple opposite; there may be a number of things one can do if one line of action is forbidden. Though of little chronological help, this genuine difference, if *PA*'s priority is admitted, may show Xenophon at work as a writer on the data he gathered from *PA*. Xenophon's both positive and negative *daimonion* enables him the more easily to portray the *daimonion* as close to a normal mode of prophecy. Plato's more quirky *daimonion* does not lend itself so readily to such treatment.[27]

[24] Stokes 1997: 7–10.

[25] See recently Macleod 2008: 58–60. *XA* 17 supplies an example; there are many more in *XM*.

[26] E.g. Waterfield 2009: 46.

[27] See Gera 2007: 35 n. 6. For more on *daimonion* and *daimonia* see on Aristophanes below (pp. 261–266).

The Oracle

The next matter to be explored is the presence of Delphic Oracle stories in both *XA* and *PA*. It is sufficiently well known that the general tendency in Xenophon's directly apologetic *Socratica* is to paint Socrates as saying and doing, and hence being, nothing much that is out of line with conventional beliefs and values. The δαιμόνιον in *XM* offers an example. Further, the motivation for Socrates' boastfulness is the daunting prospect of old-age decline. Socrates is thus brought down to earth, if viewed against the background of *PA*.[28] Against this background of ordinariness the tale of the Oracle—whatever the oracle's precise import—sticks out like the proverbial sore thumb. Ordinary people do not have oracles lauding them. In *PA*, however, the oracle finds a natural and central place. Plato's Socrates is indeed, as he says, held to be different from other men (33e–34a, and cf. 30e). It is in keeping with this that *PA* should have him singled out by the Delphic Oracle as a man than whom none was wiser—with his strange sort of wisdom. I have argued elsewhere that Plato's Oracle-story is a fiction.[29] It fits indeed well with Plato's general attitude in *PA*. For Xenophon to run an Oracle-story at all does not fit well into Xenophon's general tendency (mentioned above) to bring Socrates down to earth, even if his oracle's values are conventional. The divine communications mentioned in *XM* 1.1 are dressed up to look ordinary. The odds are already in favour of Xenophon's story, if it was not true, being the imitation. If Socrates' oracle was an invention, probably Plato was the originator of the story rather than Xenophon. In that case Xenophon will have created a rival fiction to Plato's without fully realising at the time how this went against the grain of his apologetics.[30]

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28 On *pragmata* at *PA* 41d and the possibility that it refers to the afflictions of old age, see Dorion 2005: 135–138; Plato makes much less of such afflictions than Xenophon, and relates them to the god's motivation, not to Socrates'. Again it looks as if Xenophon has brought *PA*'s version down to earth.

29 Stokes 1991: esp. 60–62, summarised at Stokes 1997: 115–116.

30 The Hippias chapter, *XM* 4. 4. 9–10, contains an example of Xenophon adapting Plato all oblivious of his own general tendency. Hippias twice accuses Socrates of not revealing his opinion of justice, or indeed of anything else. Xenophon's Socrates, however, does often reveal his opinions. This looks like an imitation of Plato *Resp.* 336b–338c. The distinction of the sophist in each case, and the topic of justice, and the rebuke to Socrates, form too much coincidence for the two passages to be unrelated. Xenophon's Socrates does not shrink from revealing his own views to another sophist, Antiphon, at *XM* 1.6. esp. 9. So Kahn 1996: 397, in a list of Xenophon's adaptations of Plato too sweepingly criticised in Dorion & Bandini 2000: LVIII n. 2. See now on the generally positive Xenophontine Socrates Gray 2011: 333–334. Note also, the fact that the oracle is likely to attract disbelief from Xenophon's imagined jury does not weaken this point. Oracles often attracted disbelief.

Some details of Xenophon's version of the Oracle-story may help at this point. If the MSS are right at *XA* 14 ad fin., and von Arnim and Hackforth were wrong to emend, Xenophon's Oracle, in listing the virtues Socrates excels in, does not include wisdom.[31] No-one, in this passage, is more liberal, or more just, or more temperate than Socrates; however, he is not here unexcelled in wisdom, but is merely (in *XA* 16) 'wise'—and that is apparently not in the oracle.[32] That the MSS are indeed right is suggested by the arguments advanced in the text of *XA*. We have three rhetorical questions in *XA* 16 designed to bring out the point that no man is superior to Socrates, one for each of the three virtues listed in the MSS. But the argument for applying the epithet 'wise' does not bring out any superlative of any kind. It shows (in Xenophon's view) merely that Socrates is wise, not that there is none wiser. Xenophon may possibly have wanted his readers to conclude that no-one else was so continuously devoted to and apt for the acquisition of knowledge; but such exclusiveness is conspicuously absent from the text. Moreover, if Xenophon had wished to convey the absolute superiority of Socrates' wisdom to all other men's, it was not in his interest for his Socrates to say that he had spent his time learning what good *he could*.[33] So the omission of 'wise' from the list of virtues in which nobody surpasses Socrates is Xenophon's, not a scribe's, and is deliberate. The mention of wisdom in tandem with nobility at the end of *XA* also suggests that Xenophon *in the oracle story* is deliberately avoiding wisdom. He was perhaps avoiding too close a repetition of *PA*'s brilliant version of Socrates' wisdom, or perhaps wishing to subordinate the intellectual to the moral in the Oracle's pronouncement.

Xenophon has also altered the point of the fiction, while adhering closely in certain respects to its form. One notices that the formulation of the oracle's compliment with the expression 'nobody is wiser than Socrates' has a point in Plato. In Plato either one realises that one's wisdom is virtually worthless or one does not. He is wisest who like Socrates realises that (*PA* 23b). For Plato's Socrates in *PA* there can in principle be for mortal men no higher wisdom than that. For Xenophon's Socrates there is no such limit on the virtues of liberality, justice and temperance. So why not use the plain

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31 Von Arnim 1923: 87, Hackforth 1933: 8 n. 2. Hackforth names also Gomperz.

32 Macleod 2008: 29 translates *sōphrōn* in the oracle by 'prudent'. But Socrates' justification of the oracle in *XA* 16 clearly indicates the meaning of *sōphrōn* here to be 'not enslaved to bodily desires'.

33 As Gabriel Danzig remarked to me, this suggests an awareness in Xenophon of Socrates' intellectual humility contrary to his general portrait.

superlative at *XA* 14 (cf. 34)?[34] Xenophon spoils what point he might have made by his adoption of the Platonic type of formulation by adding a few lines below a note on Socrates' *great* superiority to other men. The relatively modest tone of the formulation without a straight superlative is alien on the whole to the otherwise extremely boastful *XA*. However, Xenophon's Socrates is not *intellectually* supreme; the oracle does not say he is. Rather he is morally superior. That Xenophon mentions wisdom at all in or outside the oracle-context may be a result of his reading *PA*.[35]

Here we may turn aside for a moment to examine another view of the passage in *XA*, put forward by Paul Vander Waerdt.[36] Vander Waerdt explains that in sundry parts of *XM* Socrates equates σοφία and σωφροσύνη, rendered above by 'wisdom' and 'temperance'. On this view, since in *XA* 14 no-one is more σώφρων than Socrates, he is there accordingly not only unexcelled in temperance but also in wisdom. This explanation is doubtful. It is doubtful whether Xenophon could have assumed an understanding of this equation in his more general readers as early as *XA*, which (as not mentioning Alcibiades or Critias) ought to antedate *XM*. Certainly the two virtues were often associated, and they overlap in some circumstances, but the mere accumulation of knowledge could hardly be popularly supposed to make a man temperate.

As evidence of his wisdom Socrates cites at *XA* 17–18 (i) the many citizens and foreigners who seek out especially him as a companion; why do so many wish to bestow money on him though they know he can offer no money in return? (ii) the many men who ask no benefactions from him but admit they owe him a debt; (iii) his never asking for a benefit from anyone, though many say they owe him favours; (iv) his continuing to live his normal way, no worse off than usual, in the Siege of Athens while others indulged in self-pity; (v) his drawing on his own personality for the greatest pleasures whereas others bought luxuries expensively. Here, iii–iv bespeak wisdom in his choices of how to live, and also a reputation for wisdom. But they do not all rely on temperance to explain his wisdom. The nearest we come here to σωφροσύνη in the sense of 'temperance' is in his choice of a life without luxuries; is that a wise choice or a temperate one? This seems to be one case where the two do overlap. Self-sufficiency—is it wise or temperate? Or are all these factors simply good things to have learnt? At all events

[34] Notice the number of superlatives (6) in *Agesilaus* 13.10–12. Xenophon was certainly not averse to them.

[35] Rutherford 1995: 48.

[36] See Vander Waerdt 1993: 60 with n. 109.

Socrates has learnt good things, and cites the above list in evidence for that. Yet (whatever Xenophon says elsewhere) the main pointers here for Xenophon's readers to show that Socrates is the wis*est* are his reputation and the sheer continuity of his learning. These are not, one would think, decisive proofs of his status as the wisest of men, and Xenophon is right not to treat them as such. What Xenophon has done is to trump Plato's oracle on wisdom with the ace of superlative moral stature, while conceding a trick in the matter of supreme wisdom.

This is not to say that Xenophon was entirely uninterested in intellectual as opposed to moral stature. In the peroration of *XA* (34) we find wisdom co-ordinate with nobility of character in the expression τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τήν τε σοφίαν καὶ τὴν γενναιότητα. This puts wisdom on a par with the moral qualities as the basis for Xenophon's admiration of Socrates. The treatment of wisdom in that passage throws emphasis in retrospect on the apparent absence of wisdom from the oracle.

The question is now urgent, what is it that makes Xenophon's Socrates wise? Was it, as just hinted above, the accumulation of knowledge? Socrates tells us in *XA*. Ever since he could understand speech he has continuously sought and learned what he could that was good. Pretty evidently Xenophon's Socrates here is basing his remarks on an already ancient conception of σοφία, 'wisdom'. As Gladigow pointed out,[37] the early Greeks thought of σοφία in the main as the accumulation of many items of knowledge.

Since Xenophon's Socrates has learned as many good things as he could, he has become as wise as he could have. There are variants on this ancient theme.[38] It looks as though Xenophon's Socrates would have added that the many items had to be good things. This structure with an addition at the end of the clause is not uncommon, though Xenophon's Socrates was saying something unique in extant Classical literature. For him, learning *good* things brings wisdom—whatever 'good' means here. The question must be raised whether Xenophon's report of the oracle is true. If it is true, then theoretically the possibilities remain open either that Xenophon was correcting Plato's account or that Plato was embroidering Xenophon's. If Xenophon's story is also a fiction, then the above arguments have their full force, and we can see what Xenophon was doing with Plato's tale. Once again Xenophon's version is more conventional and more down to earth.

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[37] Gladigow 1965.

[38] See Stokes 1971: 88–89 for such variants.

So, is Xenophon's oracle a fiction? To this question at least one point suggests an affirmative answer. There seems to be no parallel to the question(s) that would have to be put to the oracle to secure the precise reply Xenophon's oracle offers. Either the question would have had to be a portmanteau affair, including several questions in one: 'Is there anyone more liberal or anyone more just or anyone more temperate than Socrates?' or else there would have had to be three separate questions. Another possibility might be 'Is there anyone better than Socrates'—but the response to that would surely, if offering a list of virtues at all, have included piety.[39] There seems to be no parallel consultation of the oracle to any of these theoretical possibilities.[40] Another suggestive point is the lack of any oracular or Delphic tinge to Xenophon's oracle about Socrates.[41] No-one ever doubted what Xenophon's oracle meant, as 'Socrates' doubted the meaning of Plato's oracle. Both question and answer in Xenophon's story seem atypical of Delphi. Indeed Xenophon's fiction seems less plausible than Plato's. Then there is the standing query why every writing we possess except for the two extant *Apologies of Socrates* fails even to mention the oracle. The oracle would have been useful to Plato's Socrates in several places in the dialogues.[42] Xenophon's oracle would in large measure have made his case for him in *XM*. The only reason I can see for both authors' abandonment of the oracle is that the fiction became impossible to maintain. No-one had heard of the oracle, and they surely would have if it were fact rather than fiction. Xenophon (*XA* 14) even has the oracle given out in the presence of a crowd. No doubt Xenophon intended this touch to lend verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative; for us (and very possibly for his contemporaries too) it makes it all the more implausible that apparently no-one had heard of Socrates' oracle. One might have expected the devoted Chaerephon to spread the message, if no-one else. One observes that the oracle does not enjoin silence either in *XA* or in *PA*.

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[39] Raised by Gabriel Danzig in correspondence.

[40] Fontenrose 1978: 34 expresses doubts about this particular oracle; at 1978: 8, however, he seems to use it as historical. Inspection of extant early oracles in Parke-Wormell 1956: 2.99–102 for multiple enquiries shows up only follow-up questions and requests for lists. There is nothing in the record quite like the Xenophontine consultation of the Oracle.

[41] Gigon 1946: 4 remarked that '… der Katalog der drei bzw vier Tugenden [ist] dem Orakelstil kaum gemass' ('the catalogue of the three or four virtues hardly fits the oracular style').

[42] Some such places are to be found at Stokes 1991: 55.

We *may* find further help in the existence, documented in scholarly accounts of the Delphic Oracle, of a series of oracular responses answering questions of the type 'Who is the most … of men?'.[43] Such oracles normally specify in answer someone rather completely unknown, and suspect of being fictitious. Socrates as a person was certainly not fictitious. It is questionable, however, whether Delphi would have heard of him, Chaerephon apart, before Attic Comedy got hold of him; after Aristophanes' *Clouds* he was far too well known to serve as an unknown paragon.

All in all, it is more likely that Xenophon was following in Plato's footsteps as a composer of fiction than correcting him. There is, further, a telling parallel: both Chaerephon and the δαιμόνιον receive introductions from Plato but not from Xenophon. Perhaps Chaerephon and the δαιμόνιον were both too well known for Xenophon to introduce them? Perhaps, yes; but the coincidence remains. If they were so universally known, why does Plato take such trouble to introduce them? Different audiences for the two works? The audiences are unlikely to have been so radically different. It seems more likely that Xenophon drew on Plato for the oracle story than *vice versa*.

Socrates' Third Speech in XA and PA

This last seems to me to provide the strongest argument for Plato's priority in the case of the two *Apologies*.

Both *PA* and *XA* give Socrates a third speech, delivered after verdict and sentence have been settled. Whether a speech at this stage was possible or not is hard to say, even though there is no other extant example. The reasons why no extant law-court speech has such an accompaniment are obvious. Speechwriters were not going to advertise their failures. One might publish a speech which lost, but hardly an appendix underlining the failure. Nor is a speechwriter likely to have composed such a speech: it would be poor sales technique to warn the customer of an adverse verdict. Historians also, however, record no such speech; but even this is not proof that Socrates could not have been an exception. There could be no hurry to drag Socrates off and execute him, since religious reasons, according to the opening scene of Plato's *Crito*, compelled the postponement of his execution.

Suspicion remains. Plato uses Socrates' third speech to say what Plato himself could either have said in his own person or—much more likely—have had Socrates say if (and only if) he had provided *PA* with a narrative

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43 Parke-Wormell 1956: 1.384–385, with texts at 2.97–101, citing Herzog's pioneering work of 1922 (to be found at Horneffer 1922: 166).

frame or had been content blatantly to break the dramatic illusion.[44] This third speech is suspiciously convenient for Plato. If Plato were going to say those things in *PA* as we have it he had to have a third speech in which to say them. Xenophon was under no such compulsion. Plato's third speech contains some magnificent material; Xenophon's does not. If we ask what Xenophon's contains which is un-Platonic and significant the answer is thin. The following items exhaust its content: (i) commonplaces: prosecution witnesses are forsworn, Socrates is innocent, he has committed none of the crimes that normally carry the death penalty, and Socrates wonders how the jury were persuaded that he deserved the death penalty; (ii) repetitions: he has been a beneficial companion (cf. *XA* 17) and has taught free of charge (note his poverty ibid.); (iii) two items of some interest: that the jury should be more ashamed than he, and the *exemplum* or parallel case, of Palamedes. The two interesting motifs are to be found in *PA*. There the former is aimed at prosecutors rather than jury (cf. 35d and 39a–b); the latter has Palamedes in the underworld, to be met there by Socrates, rather than brought in as an example conventionally as by Xenophon (*XA* 26).[45] Once more Xenophon's Socrates is the more conventional of the two, even though his version of this speech was probably written later since Plato had a better reason to invent it.

It is a question which one finds the easier scenario to believe. Did Xenophon write from scratch a speech he did not have to? Did Plato then quarry Xenophon's on the whole rather ordinary third speech for a usable item? Or, on the other hand, did Plato, perforce, compose a magnificent third speech and Xenophon then pick out some plums from it for the sweetening of his own creation? Faced with this choice in isolation, one could be excused for preferring the second of these scenarios. Given the other evidence we have examined, the choice of the second scenario becomes almost inevitable. In that case we find Xenophon once again toning down Plato's flights of fancy even while making use of them.

Interim Conclusions and Some Consequences

We have duly arrived, by giving Plato an escape from a rhetorical mistake, at the chronological order *PA, XA*, Polycrates, *XM*. We have seen how

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[44] See Stokes 1997: 179–180.

[45] Rutherford 1995: 48 n. 24 remarks justly that Palamedes is integrated into a larger context in Plato, but receives a casual and unintegrated mention in Xenophon.

Xenophon tries, *vis à vis* Plato, to transform the extraordinary into the ordinary. We have seen that Xenophon is not incapable of making a mistake while doing that. The transformations produce works characteristic of Xenophon, very much his own. Nevertheless, he wrote them in the shadow of one of the very greatest of Greek prose writers, and the shadow is visible.

Isocrates deserves to be taken seriously, even if only by way of experiment. It remains true, if I am right, that the decision to omit overt reference to Alcibiades and Critias in both *PA* and *XA* makes better sense before Polycrates' pamphlet than after it. If that assertion meets with approval, then we can accord Polycrates a measure of originality, though surely not of paradox, that suits his reputation as a sophist.

But what about the actual historical trial?[46] We have seen that *PA* casts some doubt on the thesis that Alcibiades and Critias stood in the forefront of the prosecution's case. Again, *XA* talks oddly of frugality and of Socrates' particular skill in educating the young. But that leaves us with a question: if the trial was sufficiently important politically to engage the attention of a leading democratic politician like Anytus, wherein did its political importance lie? It could very well have lain in four popular beliefs about Socrates that a practised speaker could make much of. First among them is Socrates' reputation for sympathy with Spartan laws (*Crito* 52e–53a).[47] Second is his apparent dislike of the use of lots for the selection of public officials. Third comes his having remained in Athens under the Thirty; and fourth the effect of his supposed teachings on the conduct of the city's business.[48] These topics, if indeed they were attributable to the real Socrates, would seem to suffice for a supporting speaker in a one-day trial. In any case we do not have to attribute to Anytus a speech dealing only with narrowly political topics.[49]

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46 Livingstone 1999: 33 suggests that the first sentence of *XA* evinces an interest in the actual trial and the arguments produced at it. I am not so sure. The construction 'I wonder by what arguments ...' is presumably analogous to the construction 'I wonder if ...'. The latter means normally 'I am surprised that ...'. By analogy 'I have wondered by what arguments ...' should mean 'I am surprised that by any arguments ...'. Xenophon is ridiculing the charges, not expounding the arguments in support of them at the trial.

47 Against Vlastos on this passage, who interpreted it as praising Spartan obedience to their laws, rather than the laws themselves, see Stokes 2005: 165.

48 See on this below.

49 These remarks were called forth in particular by two recent books, Macleod 2008 and Waterfield 2009. I have the deepest respect for both these scholars, but it seems to me they exaggerate the importance of the political element in general, and of Alcibiades and Critias in particular, in the historical prosecution of Socrates. Prosecutors in Classical Athens often strayed beyond the bounds of the actual charge before the court; but the question remains

Robin Waterfield has recently argued forcefully that the charge of impiety played only a subordinate role, dealing essentially with the *daimonion*, while the main reason for the prosecution lay in Socrates' political leanings as transmitted to well-known 'pupils' of his.[50] In that case *PA* and *XA* are putting on Hamlet without the Prince. Moreover, Polycrates' function in the developing literary quarrel will have been nothing more than to remind people of what they knew already. There will then have been little originality left in Polycrates' 'speech'. One might have expected more than this from a sophist's epideictic oration, even a burlesque one. If, however, the political element in the prosecution of Socrates was not especially important, is there a genuine religious charge to fall back on? Waterfield in particular tries determinedly to treat this charge as of secondary importance. Socrates stands accused of not acknowledging the gods the city acknowledges? He worshipped at their altars and performed all customary rites. The state of mind in which he did so was irrelevant. He is charged with importing new divinities? People did that from time to time and the city raised no objection. These points are well taken.

However, Aristophanes' *Clouds* needs to be taken more into consideration. Plato appears in *PA* to have believed *Clouds* influential at the trial. It is more than possible that, in default of other clear evidence, the prosecution used it extensively. In that play, Socrates does not necessarily do two separate things: (a) fail to acknowledge the city's gods, and (b) import new divinities. What he does is to *replace* some gods, notably Zeus, with new divinities of his own coinage, much to the pain of Zeus' worshippers. Examples follow. First, 365–369:[51]

ΣΩ. αὗται γάρ τοι μόναι εἰσὶ θεαί, τἄλλα δὲ πάντ' ἐστὶ φλύαρος.
ΣΤ. ὁ Ζεὺς δ' ὑμῖν, φέρε, πρὸς τῆς Γης, Οὐλύμπιος οὐ θεός ἐστιν;
ΣΩ. ποῖος Ζεύς; οὐ μὴ ληρήσεις. οὐδ' ἐστὶ Ζεύς. ΣΤ. τί λέγεις σύ;
ἀλλὰ τίς ὕει; τουτὶ γὰρ ἔμοιγ' ἀπόφηναι πρῶτον ἁπάντων.
ΣΩ. αὗται δήπου ...

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how far they strayed, and in what direction, from the charge levelled at Socrates. That the team prosecuting Socrates *could* legally have mentioned Alcibiades and Critias in court without infringing the amnesty in force after the democrats' return is shown by Waterfield in the present volume; that they did so on a large scale has yet to be proved. The political theory does, however, have widespread support—e.g. Burnyeat 1997: 1–2. Note also that Waterfield 2009: 195–201, seems to be arguing that Polycrates' pamphlet drew largely on Anytus' actual trial speech in support of the prosecution. I see no reason to believe this—not even if Busse 1930: 218 was right in conjecturing that the pamphlet was put into the mouth of Anytus as *PA* was put by Plato in Socrates' mouth.

[50] Waterfield 2009: 32–47.

[51] I print Dover's 1968 text throughout.

Socrates. These (sc. the Clouds) alone are goddesses, and all the rest are rubbish.
Strepsiades. Come now, by Earth, isn't Zeus an Olympian god?
Soc. What Zeus? Do stop talking nonsense! Zeus doesn't even exist.
Str. What are you saying? Who rains then? Explain that to me first of all!
Soc. These [goddesses] do …

Next, 374–381:

ΣΤ. … ἀλλ' ὅστις ὁ βροντῶν ἐστὶ φράσον, τοῦθ' ὅ με ποιεῖ τετραμαίνειν.
ΣΩ. αὗται βροντῶσι κυλινδόμεναι.
…………………………………………………………………
ΣΤ. ὁ δ' ἀναγκάζων ἐστὶ τίς αὐτάς—οὐχ ὁ Ζεύς;—ὥστε φέρεσθαι;
ΣΩ. ἥκιστ', ἀλλ' αἰθέριος δῖνος. ΣΤ. Δῖνος; τουτί μ' ἐλελήθει,
ὁ Ζεὺς οὐκ ὤν, ἀλλ' ἀντ' αὐτοῦ Δῖνος βασιλεύων.

Str. Tell me, who is it that thunders and makes me tremble?
Soc. These [goddesses] as they roll on …
… [*a naturalistic explanation is provided*] …
Str. But who is it that compels them to move? Isn't it Zeus?
Soc. Certainly not; it's an eddy in the sky.
Str. Eddy? That I hadn't noticed, that Zeus isn't there, but Eddy is King in his place.

Here we see two things quite plainly. First, that 'Socrates' regards the Clouds as divine, and all other gods as rubbish. Secondly, he does not acknowledge Zeus, the supreme god in the Athenian pantheon: he substitutes Eddy for Zeus as King. One could put the matter like this: 'Socrates' does not acknowledge the city's gods, but imports new divinities'. This substitution cannot be explained away by denying that the Athenians cared what gods a citizen worshipped, or by pointing out that they allowed on occasion the importation of new divinities. Zeus was important to the average Athenian as the god *par excellence* by whom one swore when making any kind of business agreement.[52] Zeus was the guarantor of such oaths.

Next, *Clouds* 423–426, which is hardly less exclusive than the first passage:

ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι δῆτ' οὐ νομιεῖς ἤδη θεὸν οὐδένα πλὴν ἅπερ ἡμεῖς,
τὸ Χάος τουτὶ καὶ τὰς Νεφέλας καὶ τὴν Γλῶτταν, τρία ταυτί;

ΣΤ. οὐδ' ἂν διαλεχθείην γ' ἀτεχνῶς τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐδ' ἂν ἀπαντῶν,
οὐδ' ἂν θύσαιμ' οὐδ' ἂν σπείσαιμ' οὐδ' ἐπιθείην λιβανωτόν.

52 See for this *Clouds* 395–397.

> Soc. Surely, by now, you're not going to acknowledge any other god but the ones we [sc. Socrates' school] acknowledge—Chaos here and the Clouds and Tongue, [just] these three?[53]
>
> Str. I simply wouldn't talk to the others if I met them, nor would I sacrifice nor pour a libation nor offer a sacrificial cake.

One observes here that Socrates' pupil Strepsiades will not acknowledge the city's gods in normal ways by sacrifice libation or offering. The verb Socrates uses, νομιεῖς, you will acknowledge, is a form of the same verb as the prosecution used in the indictment of Socrates.[54]

Now turn back to the memorable scene where Strepsiades meets Socrates for the first time. *Clouds* 245–248:

> ΣΤ. … μισθὸν δ' ὅντιν' ἂν
> πράττῃ μ' ὀμοῦμαι' σοι καταθήσειν τοὺς θεούς.
>
> ΣΩ. ποίους θεοὺς ὀμεῖ σύ; πρῶτον γὰρ θεοὶ
> ἡμῖν νόμισμ' οὐκ ἔστι.

> Str. … Whatever fee you exact from me, I will swear by the gods I will deposit for you.
>
> Soc. You will swear by the *gods* indeed? First, gods are not currency (νόμισμα) for us.[55]

At first meeting with a prospective pupil 'Socrates' scorns the gods and scorns Strepsiades for swearing by them. This pours scorn on the characteristic Athenian way of sealing an agreement. Here, it is not just Zeus he belittles, but rather gods in general. However, 'Socrates' does refer to the Clouds as god(desse)s more than once, starting at 265. Socrates acknowledges no gods, but believes in some gods. He is both an atheist and a believer in strange new divinities. One has to remember that we are dealing with a comedy.

Indeed the play abounds in such contradictions. Strepsiades swears by Zeus to his first creditor at 1234. Nevertheless, when the creditor says (1239), 'By great Zeus and the gods I will not let you go scot-free', Strepsiades replies, 'I enjoyed the marvellous crack about the gods. Swearing by Zeus is a joke to those in the know.' Strepsiades swears by Zeus only when it is convenient; swearing by Zeus is a joke when *that* is convenient.

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53 For the meaning of this see Dover 1968: ad loc.

54 Cf. also *Clouds* 329 and 247–248.

55 The word for 'currency' is again related to the word for 'acknowledge' in Meletus' indictment.

Strepsiades is not of course Socrates' only pupil in the play. His son Phidippides emerges from the school beating his father. Heaping contempt on normal Athenian moral standards he swears (1331) by Zeus that he will prove that beating Strepsiades is just. Strepsiades in turn swears by Zeus. There is stronger stuff to come. Invited by Strepsiades to join him in destroying Chaerephon and Socrates, begged indeed 'by Zeus [god] of fathers' (Ζεὺς πατρῷος), Phidippides expresses his contempt. First we have 1469–1473:

ΦΙ. ἰδού γε Δία πατρῷον. ὡς ἀρχαῖος εἶ.
Ζεὺς γάρ τις ἐστίν; ΣΤ. ἐστίν. ΦΙ. οὐκ ἔστ', οὔκ, ἐπεὶ
Δῖνος βασιλεύει, τὸν Δί' ἐξεληλακώς.
ΣΤ. οὐκ ἐξελήλακ', ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοῦτ' ᾠόμην
δία τουτονὶ τὸν δῖνον.

Phid. Listen to that! 'Zeus god of fathers'! How old-fashioned you are! Is there any Zeus?
Str. There is.
Phid. No, there is not, because Eddy has driven Zeus out and is King.
Str. He has not driven him out. I just thought he had, on account of that Eddy.

There, for this play, you have the fruits of a Socratic education. Once again, Eddy is *substituted* for Zeus, who does not exist. Then we have 1476:

ΣΤ. ... ὡς ἐμαινόμην ἄρα
ὅτ' ἐξέβαλον καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς διὰ Σωκράτη.

Str. I must have been crazy when I threw out, actually threw out the gods on account of Socrates.

Strepsiades now apologizes to the Herm at his front door for his behaviour. He proceeds to burn down Socrates' school with the pupils inside. As he does so, he asks them (1506–1509),

ΣΤ. τί γὰρ μαθόντες τοὺς θεοὺς ὑβρίζετε
καὶ τῆς σελήνης ἐσκοπεῖσθε τὴν ἕδραν;
δίωκε, παῖε, βάλλε, πολλῶν οὕνεκα,
μάλιστα δ' εἰδὼς τοὺς θεοὺς ὡς ἠδίκουν.

Str. What did you learn to make you do violence to the gods, and examine the seat of the moon? Chase, strike, pelt [them]! Especially as you know they wronged the gods.

What needs special emphasis here in the close of the play is the association of the study of the heavens with the insults to the gods. Is it any wonder that *XA* and *PA* deny Socrates' involvement with astronomy?

To explain Isocrates' remark in the *Busiris*, and to allow Polycrates some originality, we have invoked the Socrates of *Clouds*. Granted the influence of that play on popular prejudice, we can also explain why *XA* and *PA* devote so much space and rhetoric to dealing with the popular prejudice so influenced. The charge of impiety must then be taken seriously,[56] and given its proper meaning and force. The Socrates of *Clouds* does indeed, as the prosecution said in their indictment, 'not acknowledge the gods the city acknowledges, but imports new divinities.' This becomes a way of saying by means of a hendiadys that Socrates replaced traditional gods with new and strange deities. It might not be a serious matter to omit some of the city's gods from one's personal pantheon; it might in certain circumstances be permissible to import new divinities. But what the 'Socrates' of *Clouds* does is different. He *replaces* important gods—notably Zeus himself—with new and outlandish powers. In his view, to swear by Zeus is ridiculous. Casual swearing in conversation, yes; serious swearing by way of contract, no. For him the gods—if they exist at all, and Zeus does not—are an object of contempt. *This* Socrates is both impious and socially disruptive. What is more, he trains a young man, Phidippides, to disrupt in the same way. He corrupts the young men. The formal indictment of Socrates could be, and probably was, put together out of Aristophanes' play.

This emphasis in *Clouds* may serve to explain another major point, about Meletus in *PA*. Many readers have believed *PA* to be unfair when Plato (26b8 ff.) has Socrates cause Meletus to contradict himself, by saying Socrates is an atheist in the same breath as he says Socrates believes in new divinities.[57] Now in *Clouds* 'Socrates' is to all appearances both an atheist ('Gods are not currency here') and a believer in new deities or divinities. If the prosecution relied heavily on what many of the jury will have seen about 20 years before, and others heard about, Plato's tactic is quite legitimate.[58] Meletus could easily have muddied these waters in the prosecution. Certainly they will have been muddied in the minds of ordinary jurymen—or ordinary readers—not used to exact thought. It would be a sound rhetorical tactic for the prosecutors to exploit this confusion. There was ample material here for a competent orator to dwell on in prosecuting Socrates for impiety.

56 See also Dover 1988.

57 Gigon 1953: 7 argued that the conclusion of *XM* 1.1.5 also marks a defence against a charge of atheism. Xenophon too had no doubt read his Aristophanes as well as his *PA*.

58 One is not therefore obliged to believe with Steinberger 1997: 16 that 'Meletus did indeed make a serious mistake', or (ibid. 21) that the mistake is due to Socrates goading Meletus.

There is also a further point needing explanation from me. Why was Socrates' *daimonion* such a recurrent theme in the literature surrounding Socrates' trial and death? It is worth suggesting that, given the prejudice aroused by the *Clouds* and other comedies, the prosecution latched onto it as a good and still current peg on which to hang the accusation of importing new divinities. This even though extant comedians do not mention the sign, and it does not entail the kind of substitution I have argued was the principal burden of the impiety charge. The *word* δαιμόνια, however, may have been chosen for the indictment because of the sign. The Clouds are δαίμονες at 253, though they are not δαιμόνια anywhere.

Final Conclusion

This removes the last major obstacle to the tightening up of the relative chronology of *XA, PA*, Polycrates, and *XM*, in that order. It suggests that the successful prosecution of Socrates arose from popular prejudice based on *Clouds*, together with some political material. To this *PA* and *XA* will have replied each in its own fashion. Polycrates then gave the whole matter a particular political twist involving Alcibiades and Critias. To that *XM* and several Platonic and other Socratic dialogues will have responded in kind. Isocrates was not, in his *Busiris* as I have interpreted it, a blatant liar.

Only if the point can be made to stick that Alcibiades and Critias were the explicit basis of the prosecution's case and the impiety charge not very significant can one find hard evidence to dent the overall case for the chronological order here supported. As my readers will have seen, it is not easy to see how it can be made to stick. The case for the prosecution having forcefully alleged Socratic impiety, whether or not he was in fact impious, is strong. Political overtones need have had no special reference to Alcibiades and Critias.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

XENOPHON ON SOCRATES' TRIAL AND DEATH

Robin Waterfield

Xenophon starts his *Apology of Socrates* as follows:

> Another aspect[1] of Socrates that I think worth recording is what decisions he made with regard to his defence and his death after he had been summoned to court. Now, others have written accounts of the trial, and they have all managed to hit off his boastfulness (*megalēgoria*),[2] so there can be no doubt that this is how Socrates actually spoke. But what they didn't make clear—and without it his boastfulness is bound to appear ill-considered—is this: he had already concluded that for him death was preferable to life. (*Apology* 1)

A good start. He tempts anyone interested in Socrates' trial and death with a vital piece of information—what Socrates had made up his mind to do—and gives an astonishing answer: Socrates had decided that for him death was preferable to life. Xenophon claims to be the only one to have revealed the truth on this matter (always a good way to start a pamphlet) and simultaneously solves what was taken to be one of the outstanding puzzles of Socrates' famous trial, his boastful tone of voice, by asserting that Socrates had nothing to lose: he preferred to die. This is clearly Xenophon's deduction; there is no other way, he claims, to explain Socrates' behaviour.

Of course, we immediately want to know *why* Socrates might have preferred death, and Xenophon does not keep us waiting. He relates a conversation (2–9)[3] between Socrates and Hermogenes Hipponikou.[4] Hermogenes

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1 Xenophon also uses *de*, followed by *kai* ('also'), to link many of the *Memorabilia*. Though 'published' as a separate work, like *Apology*, *Oeconomicus* similarly starts as if it were directly linked to a previous work. It is not impossible that the first part of *Oeconomicus* (the first six or six and a half chapters, the conversation with Critobulus) was originally written as a chapter of *Memorabilia*. So too might *Apology* have been, but certainty is impossible, and in any case *Apology* reads as though it were unpolished. There is certainly no need to suggest that 'The *de* must have been added by an editor or copyist who thought that the work belonged to *Mem.*': Hackforth 1933: 173. Even poems could sometimes start with a connective: e.g. Solon F4 W.

2 The word has proved troublesome, but 'boastfulness' captures its core meaning in classical Greek. See e.g. Danzig 2010: 25, Dorion 2005: 132.

3 Echoing, or echoed by, *Mem.* 4.8.4–10.

4 On whom see Nails 2002: 162–164. He was undoubtedly Xenophon's source for much of

wanted to know why Socrates appeared to be unconcerned about the impending trial; Socrates replied that his *daimonion sēmeion* had prevented him considering his defence, and that he understood this to mean that 'the god thinks it is better for him to die' because his life so far has been enjoyable (secure in the knowledge of his pious and moral behaviour), but 'if my years are prolonged, I shall doubtless have to pay the penalties of old age: impaired vision and hearing, increasing slowness at learning, and forgetfulness of what I have learned'—which would nullify the pleasantness of his life so far.[5] Besides, he adds, hemlock poisoning is not a bad way to go.[6]

So it was not just Socrates who thought that he should die; the god thought so too. This is an important addition: if you are a religious person, it is not enough to choose to die just from your own calculations; you await divine blessing for the act. And this is, it must be said, a good reason for speaking boastfully (that is defiantly, arrogantly, and without compromise): if you are going to die anyway, and you have the opportunity, why not go out with a forceful statement?

What I should like to do in this paper is try to test the truth of this assertion of Xenophon's, that Socrates sought death, or chose not to mount the kind of defence Athenian democratic dikasts would take seriously, because he preferred this form of assisted suicide. This innocuous-seeming quest has wide-ranging ramifications, and I apologize in advance for cutting some corners in order to keep this paper within bounds, but this corner-cutting has, I am sure, never led to any significant distortion.

Plato versus Xenophon?

How would one go about testing the truth of Xenophon's claim? It relates to little or nothing else that we know about Socrates; none of our other sources for his life and work ever has him explicitly or unambiguously claim that death is preferable to a miserable old age. Many scholars therefore simply dismiss it as one more case of Xenophon imposing his own concerns on his Socrates,[7] but that seems too cavalier. In this section I shall explore the few relevant passages from Plato, in order to sharpen up both the similarities and the differences between Plato's and Xenophon's versions of Socrates in this respect.

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the period when Xenophon himself was not in Athens, but serving in Asia. We are not told that Hermogenes was at the trial himself.

5 Xenophon himself agreed: *Ap*. 32.

6 Which we now know to be true: see Bloch 2002.

7 E.g. Brickhouse & Smith 1989a: 61–62, de Strycker & Slings 1994: 198–199.

The first relevant passages are those parts of Plato's *Apology* where Socrates considers the nature of death. It seems likely that they reflect Plato's take on the same story that Xenophon related on Hermogenes' authority. In Xenophon, Socrates' little voice prevented him from 'considering his defence' (*Apology* 4) and Socrates understood this to mean that it was preferable for him to die.[8] In Plato, Socrates' little voice failed to prevent his coming to court, and since that led to his death, Socrates understood this to mean that 'death was one of two things', either a not-unpleasant blank state like dreamless sleep, or a wonderful chance to converse with interesting people of the past (Plato *Apology* 29a–c and 40a–42a; see also *Phaedo* 63b–c).[9] As usual with cases of intertextuality between our two authors,[10] Plato makes something more out of the same material that Xenophon treats straightforwardly. In fact, however, in this case they end up not quite on the same page: Xenophon's Socrates says that it *is* better for him *to die*, Plato's that it *may be* better for him, as for everyone for all he knows,[11] *to be dead*.

A second relevant passage is Plato *Phaedo* 61c–62c, where Socrates, now awaiting death in prison, discusses suicide. Or rather, Plato has Socrates relate the Pythagorean prohibition on suicide, and add, as his own comments: (a) that it would be surprising if the prohibition on suicide were the one absolute in the world—that there were never occasions when it was appropriate for some people to take their own lives (62a);[12] (b) 'So perhaps it would be reasonable to conclude that no one should kill himself unless or until the god sends some necessity—such as the one now before me' (62c). What necessity is now before Socrates? Surely not, as everyone assumes, the fact that he is in prison, and in a few hours is going to drink some deadly hemlock; that by itself could not be described as suicide. If I am on death row, awaiting execution for a crime I did not commit, I am hardly going to describe my imminent death as suicide. It must be the whole situation, from trial, to refusal to escape, to imminent hemlock. Again, 'the god' has intervened to ensure that Socrates kills himself (not that he is killed, because he could easily have avoided it). Gallop comments, perhaps with a degree

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[8] This looks like a clear case of Socrates having to interpret the *daimonion*. How did he know, in any instance, what it was actually meaning? See Long 2006 for a recent discussion.

[9] See also pseudo-Plato, *Axiochus*, which draws on both *Apology* and *Phaedo* to argue that death for some people is preferable. This section of Plato's *Apology* is subjected to close analysis by Rudebusch 1991 and Austin 2010.

[10] See especially Waterfield 2004.

[11] This 'as also for everyone' is stressed by Brickhouse & Smith 1989b.

[12] A difficult sentence, thoroughly analysed by Gallop 1975: 79–83. For the thought, see also Pl. *Leg*. 873c–d, which again recognizes exceptions to the prohibition on suicide.

of exaggeration: 'In his case, at least, self-destruction would be not merely permissible, but a religious duty.'[13]

What is important for our purposes about all this is that, broadly speaking, there is no real clash between Plato's and Xenophon's Socrateses on this score. Both our authors have Socrates choosing suicide, which is interesting enough in itself. It is plain to see that there is no clash between Xenophon's suicide claim and Plato's *Phaedo*, because in *Phaedo* Socrates does not endorse an absolute prohibition on suicide, and claims that in his case the gods want him to do just that. We can also go some way towards bringing Plato's *Apology* into alignment too: even if we accept that the Socrates of Plato's *Apology* would want to go on living as long as he could do philosophy (which is one of the fundamental messages of Plato's *Apology*), we may well also attribute to him the thought, attributed to him by Xenophon,[14] that senility would make him incapable of philosophizing (as in extreme forms such as Alzheimer's it certainly would). In which case, he too might have preferred death. In fact, at one point some words of Plato's can be read as attributing to Socrates exactly this kind of thought. As I have already said, the end of Plato's *Apology* consists of generalizations about death, but at one point Socrates descends to his own case: 'I have no doubt,' he says, 'that for me to die now and be released from my troubles is better for me' (41d). *Pace* Burnet,[15] I find it hard to see what the combination of the temporal adverb 'now' and reference to 'troubles' might mean unless they imply old age.

Nevertheless, we cannot quite so readily align the two *Apologies* on this score. The problem is not just that Plato's words are rather elusive, but more fundamentally that whereas Xenophon's Socrates wants to die, Plato's Socrates seems to want to be acquitted (19a, especially).[16] Even granted that Plato's Socrates acknowledges the preferability of death in his case, he does so late in *Apology*, and in *Phaedo*—that is, only *after* his defence has failed,

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13 Gallop 1975: 85. Note also that at *Crito* 46c Plato acknowledges the validity of describing what Socrates is doing as suicide: he is 'throwing away his life when it is possible to save it'. Plato then has Socrates argue that this is the right thing for him to do. A couple of other good discussions of the *Phaedo* passage: Miles 2001, Warren 2001. General background: Cooper 1989.

14 *Ap.* 6–7, *Mem.* 4.8.1.

15 Burnet 1924: 171 ad loc. begs the question: 'I cannot believe that it [the Greek phrase] refers to the troubles of old age ... That is Xenophon's idea, not Plato's.'

16 This is what has, typically, led commentators to sneer at Xenophon's attribution of this motive to Socrates: it is 'commonplace' (Stokes 1997: 5), 'absurd' (A.E. Taylor 1926: 166), and not worth even criticizing (Burnet 1924: 66). On the contrary, with Navia 1984, I believe that 'Xenophon's *Apology*, its limited and sketchy character notwithstanding, constitutes an important and revealing complementary piece of testimony on Socrates' trial' (62).

when it is then important for him to interpret the *daimonion*'s apparent endorsement of his appearance in court. Why should it have let him come to court, if that led to his death? It must be (a) because death is no bad thing, and (b) because there are certain circumstances in which death is preferable to life, and presumably the fact that he is now sixty-nine or seventy years old[17] is relevant. That seems to be Socrates' thinking in Plato's *Apology*.[18]

We cannot, then, bring Plato and Xenophon into full alignment on this score. Xenophon's assertion remains extreme and startling: Socrates wanted to die, and believed that the god wanted him to die, *before even coming to court and beginning his defence*.[19] This is suicide, whereas in Plato's version he is merely accepting death. So Xenophon's claim is consistent with Plato's *Phaedo*, but somewhat incompatible with Plato's *Apology*.[20]

Socrates' *megalēgoria*

The claim we are trying to test, then, is that Socrates came to court on that fateful spring day in 399 intending to die. Xenophon himself gives us the obvious starting point for investigation, when he says that this and only this explains his *megalēgoria*. He himself, in the version of the defence speeches

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17 Everyone seems to assume that Socrates was seventy, but if there is any truth that he was born on 6 Thargelion (Diog. Laert. 2.44) that would place his birthday *after* the trial, which is not datable with exact precision, but took place in the spring, the most likely season for the Delia festival. I thank Robert Parker for an email interchange on the dating of the Delia.

18 See Brickhouse & Smith 1989a: 60.

19 I cannot see that this makes the defence speeches that Xenophon's Socrates goes on to deliver inconsistent, as Allen 1984: 70 has suggested: his Socrates may not have been seriously trying to be acquitted, but he relished the opportunity to defend his life and work before a sizeable audience. (As the trials of many Christian martyrs demonstrate, there is no incompatibility between mounting a defence and seeking death; I thank Sarah Ferrario for pointing out this parallel to me.) Allen presumably would have preferred Xenophon's Socrates to remain silent. And in fact I believe that Xenophon's assertion that Socrates chose to die is, in combination with a literal interpretation of Pl. *Grg*. 521e (where Plato has Socrates say that, if he were ever on trial, he would be tongue-tied), the origin of the strange tradition that Socrates mounted no defence at all at his trial, but just stood there mute and defiant. Such a stance is compatible only with choosing to die. Maximus of Tyre tells us about this tradition (*Or*. 3 in Trapp 1997), in the late second or early third century CE. We would not otherwise know about it, were it not for the chance preservation of a papyrus fragment containing part of a Socratic dialogue, in which Socrates is asked why he did not mount a defence. The fragment is *PKöln* 205 (in M. Gronewald, *Kölner Papyri* 5 [Opladen, 1985], 33–53); it is summarized by J. Barnes in *Phronesis* 32, 1987: 365–366, among his editorial notes.

20 And Plato is inconsistent on this score: in *Phaedo* he has Socrates acknowledging that what he is doing is suicide, whereas in *Apology* he merely accepts death.

that he gives, will naturally display this *megalēgoria*, and Plato should too (especially, but not exclusively, if Plato is one of the 'others' referred to by Xenophon at the very start of his *Apology*).[21] I do not propose to give an extensive summary of either of these two *Apologies*, both of which are well known, but here are some salient points.

There are striking examples of *megalēgoria* in Xenophon's *Apology*. Socrates claims to have a direct hotline to the divine and to be a special agent of the gods (13); he claims to be 'by far the most outstanding human being' (15); he compares himself to great figures of the past, such as Lycurgus (15) and Palamedes, the archetypal wronged innocent (26); he says that he should be acclaimed by gods and men alike (18); and he claims to bring the greatest benefit to those who associate with him (21).

Plato's *Apology* contains even more striking examples of Socratic *megalēgoria*.[22] Plato even uses the term, or its exact equivalent, at one point (20e), when Socrates asks the dikasts not to create a hubbub, even if he seems to *mega legein*.[23] Socrates' *megalēgoria* in Plato's *Apology* has two main facets. First, there is the general tone of the whole piece. Socrates comes across as a man of principle who finds to his dismay that others are nowhere near as high-minded as he. He undertakes a mission to try to get others to see the errors of their ways—which is, of course, to assume that he knows best what is good for them. And he refuses to flinch from this mission, however much pressure he is under to do so. He is secure in the certainty that he is a good man and that his mission is god-given; from this it follows that those who oppose him are not good men, and are at the very least insensitive to the requirements of the gods. 'The supposedly ignorant man claimed superior human wisdom, the unpolitical man purported to be most beneficial to the polis, the allegedly impious man claimed to be the most pious, the accused corrupter of the youth presented himself as their only improver, and the man of apparently unheroic stature elevated himself to a hero.'[24] *Megalēgoria* indeed.[25]

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[21] See Vander Waerdt 1993 and Stokes (this volume, pp. 243–267) for the thesis that Xenophon's *Apology* was written in response to Plato's.

[22] Danzig 2010: 46–56, however, argues that Plato actually toned down Socrates' *megalēgoria*.

[23] A couple of the instances of *megalēgoria* in Xenophon's *Apology* are also marked by *thorubos* (14, 15). For this feature of Athenian courtroom protocol, see Bers 1985 and Gish (this volume, pp. 187–191).

[24] Colaiaco 2001: 179.

[25] It is interesting that the comic poets also accused Socrates of arrogance (Ar. *Nub*. 362–363), or of producing arrogant young men (Callias F12 *CAF*). Perhaps it really was a trait of his.

But apart from the general tone of the speeches, there are many specific instances of *megalēgoria* in Plato's *Apology*, and what is remarkable about them is that they are all, or almost all, openly political[26]—so much so that it is tempting to contrast Socrates' *megalēgoria* with the democratic virtue (or slogan) of *isēgoria*, equality of speech. Socrates argues that any just man, such as himself, who takes part in democratic politics will be killed (31d–32a, 32e); he denies the educational value of the democratic 'inherited conglomerate'[27] and even suggests that this kind of education is a major cause of corruption (24e–25c); he states his preference for following his own conscience rather than the collective will of the masses (29c–d); he makes himself out to be morally superior to the dikasts (the *dēmos*), because they expect him to resort to the usual methods of invoking pity, which he says are beneath his dignity (34c–35d); he says that their values are shallow (29d–30b); so far from directly addressing the charge of impiety, he asserts that he would be an atheist if he *stopped* doing what he did, and claims to have a superior sense of piety to that of the dikasts (28e–29a, 35d); he charges the dikasts with acquitting only flatterers and yes-men (38d–e);[28] he criticizes the democratic legal system for restricting the time allowed for his defence (37a–b); he expresses surprise that so many people voted for him in the first instance—which is to express surprise that the Athenian legal system might actually work in favour of an innocent man (36a); and, finally, his suggestion that he should be fed at public expense (36d–e) amounts to a refusal to accept the authority of the dikasts to find him guilty.

These aspects of the speeches are well known—but familiarity should not breed negligence. These are remarkable statements, and if we believe that they reflect what happened at Socrates' actual trial, they would have helped to make the trial as notorious as it quickly became. And, surely, such *megalēgoria* is inconsistent with mounting a true defence. It is sheer provocation—and provocation of a particularly sensitive kind, political provocation—and therefore certainly does not rule out the possibility that Xenophon's suicide claim is right. And this remains true even if we adopt the more subtle view that Socrates was not just being provocative, but was

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26 For the broad sense of the term 'political' that applied in classical Athens, as in classical Greece as a whole, see Cartledge 2000.

27 The useful phrase invented by Gilbert Murray (*Greek Studies* [London, 1946], 67) for the inherited values and norms of a society. The classic study is Dover 1974; Dillon 2004 is far more readable.

28 See also Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.4.

challenging the dikasts to follow *his* conception of justice.[29] For why should the dikasts have been inclined to do any such thing?

This is as far as we can go towards testing the truth of Xenophon's suicide claim by comparison with the relevant Platonic texts. Since Xenophon's testimony is, in the final analysis, unique, the matter is not susceptible to further textual or philosophical investigation; we cannot finally establish or disprove the plausibility of Xenophon's assertion by comparison with other Socratic texts. All we can do is note that the similarities between Plato and Xenophon in this regard certainly do not rule out the possibility that Xenophon is right, even for those scholars, still the vast majority, who prefer Plato's testimony to that of Xenophon.[30] The rest of this paper, then, will be taken up with historical analysis—with the attempt to uncover some of the facts about Socrates' trial and see if Xenophon's assertion, that Socrates had chosen to die *before* coming to court, is compatible with these facts. If so, the compatibility between Plato's and Xenophon's evidence becomes more significant.

Does Socrates Mount a Serious Defence?

But in suggesting that even Plato's Socrates does not mount a serious defence, I am contradicting what may fairly be termed the 'new orthodoxy'. The suggestion would scarcely have raised an eyebrow for decades, perhaps centuries,[31] but in the late 1980s two outstanding books appeared, more or less independently of each other, both of which argued that Plato's *Apol-*

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29 See Vander Waerdt 1993: 19–27.

30 In fact, Xenophon's version is more likely to be accurate than Plato's, chiefly because geniuses like Plato are more likely to have personal agenda than lesser mortals. Note also that *Ap.* 1 makes it possible that Xenophon was expressly correcting Plato, as he does also over whether Socrates proposed a fine: compare Xenophon's 23 with Plato's 38b, and see the note of Burnet 1924 on 38b1. With Stokes 1997: 5, I do not believe the often-repeated proposition that Plato's presence in court allows us to impugn Xenophon's second- or third-hand version (see e.g. Colaiaco 2001: 18). We have only Plato's own word for his presence, and there was clearly a Greek literary device by which one claimed eyewitness status for the sake of verisimilitude; Xenophon does it throughout *Memorabilia*, it may explain some features of Herodotus's style, and it was picked up (see Morgan 1985) by later fiction-writers. *Mem.* 4.3.2, implies that other Socratics used the same device. On this and other background matters pertaining to reading Xenophon's Socratic works, see Cooper 1999. Gray 1989, however, argues that Xenophon's *Apology* is too dependent on rhetorical theory to be trusted.

31 See e.g. Hackforth 1933: 14: 'Who that reads the Platonic *Apology* to-day can fail to understand that the man who defended himself thus did not *expect* to be acquitted, and moreover did not *wish* to be if that were only possible through a sacrifice of his principles?'

ogy (both ignore Xenophon) can and therefore should be read as a proper defence against the charges. These books are of course Brickhouse's and Smith's *Socrates on Trial* and Reeve's *Socrates in the* Apology. I do not here have the space to engage with either of these books in detail (and there are as many differences between them as there are similarities), but since I think that both of them are fundamentally flawed—brilliant, but flawed—I can focus on the fundamentals and ignore the details. I agree that, failing good evidence to the contrary, if we could establish that Socrates (or our author's Socrates) did mount a serious and sincere (non-ironical) defence, that should be our default position. But I think the evidence to the contrary is too good.

Here are the main problems. First, Socrates can hardly be said to offer a straightforward defence against the charge that he did not worship/acknowledge the city's gods when, in Plato's *Apology*, at any rate (and that, to repeat, is what both these books focus on), he never addresses the issue once. In the dialogue with Meletus (24b–28a), he argues that he is not irreligious (see also 35d), but he never once argues that his religion is the religion of the city. Brickhouse and Smith devote four pages to this issue, but only to conclude, somewhat weakly, that no decisive resolution is possible, and that Socrates' lack of overt commitment to the city's gods fits well with his lack of dogmatism.[32]

Second, not only does neither book offer Socrates a defence against the first clause of the charge (because Socrates himself offers no such defence),[33] but they also fail adequately to address the second and third clauses of the charge, in which Socrates was accused of being a 'missionary' (to borrow Hansen's term):[34] Socrates failed to recognize the city's gods, but *introduced* new gods instead, and (thereby) corrupted young men. Of course, both books discuss these charges, but the discussion is inadequate because (a)

[32] Brickhouse & Smith 1989a: 124–128.

[33] I doubt he did so in the historical trial, either. I happen to believe (see Waterfield 2009, 32–50; *contra* e.g. Burnyeat 1996, Vlastos 1989) that Socrates was not actually impious, but that a number of his beliefs had him skating on thin ice. Since it would have involved lengthy and complex argument to try to show the dikasts that his views were not in fact impious, he avoided doing so (as I have avoided doing so in this paper). But Socrates was widely believed (the belief having been influenced by various comic poets: see Giannantoni 1990: section I A) to be the leader of a cabal of necromancers, and that, plus innuendo, would have been all the prosecutors required in the face of Socrates' silence on this score. Note, however, that Stokes (this volume, pp. 259–266) defends the idea that the religious charges were potent.

[34] Hansen 1996: 160–161.

they believe Plato's portrait of an ironic, non-teaching Socrates,[35] and (b) they dismiss any reference to Socrates' most notorious pupils.[36]

If neither book provides Socrates with an adequate defence against any of the clauses of the charge against him, we can hardly agree that they have made their case. In (b) just above, I have begged a big question, to which I will return, but for the time being we may, I think, isolate two basic reasons why these books fail to satisfy in this regard. First, they are both exclusively focused on Plato's *Apology* and this means that they create too simple a picture of the trial. Their analyses of this text are excellent, but it is not the only relevant text; any conclusions they reach apply to nothing outside the closed universe of Plato's *Apology*.[37] One of the most important consequences of this is that both books (perhaps especially Reeve's) show well that Socrates' defence stems from his philosophical principles—but why, to repeat, should we think that such a defence would have made the slightest impact on the 500 or 501 non-Socratic dikasts? Many of these principles are pretty unclear, even counter-intuitive: questioning can reveal whether or not a person is virtuous (30a–b); a good man cannot be harmed by a bad man (30c); injustice harms the agent's soul (30c); refined intellectual activity will make you a happier and better person than, for example, making money (29d–30b, 38a); it is stupid to fear death (29a–b).

The second fundamental reason for the books' failure is simply that, even though all the authors involved are good philosophers, they display a certain lack of historical awareness. This shows above all in their denial that there was any political subtext to the trial. They have to deny this as strongly as they can because, of course, since in the surviving *Apologies* Socrates does not mount any kind of political defence, his speeches would not be 'nonevasive'[38] if politics were involved. I shall have more to say on this dimension of the trial, but for the time being let us note that to deny, as they do, that the charges against Socrates were political in nature is to ignore what we know about the Athenian legal system in general and about other impiety trials in particular.

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[35] Brickhouse & Smith 1989a: 38–47, 117–137, 194–201, 253–256, Reeve 1989: 160–169.

[36] See especially Brickhouse & Smith 1989a: 82–87, 194–201.

[37] Though both books assume the historicity of Plato's *Apology*: Reeve 1989: xiii, Brickhouse & Smith 1989a: 2–9.

[38] Reeve 1989: xiii. Irwin 1989 also seeks to downplay the political aspects to Socrates' trial.

This, again, is a large topic.[39] Suffice it to say for now that the open texture of the Athenian legal system meant that few, if any, trials on social charges such as those faced by Socrates were or were expected to be limited to the charges themselves. It was up to the dikasts—sitting as the democracy in court mode—to judge whether the defendant was a good citizen, as much as whether he was guilty of the particular crime or crimes with which he was charged.[40] The Athenian legal system was *specifically* geared towards defending the democracy; whatever else we may think of it, it served this, its primary purpose, extremely well.[41] And the charge of 'impiety' in particular is hard to distinguish from a vague charge of 'un-Athenian activities'. So it is not surprising that, as Todd says,[42] 'a surprisingly high proportion of known impiety trials reveal, on examination, a surprisingly strong political agenda'. Certainly the Athenians themselves thought that Socrates' trial was political: we need no more than the famous statement (actually part of an argument against Demosthenes) by Aeschines, only fifty or so years later: 'Athenians, you had the sophist Socrates put to death because he seemed to have been the teacher of Critias, one of the Thirty who destroyed the democracy.'[43]

Moreover, piety and impiety were *in themselves* political attributes. Over the course of the fifth century the Athenian people had taken more and more religious matters under their control. It was not just that they decided, for instance, what temples and festivals to fund, or what new gods to introduce and when.[44] More fundamentally, it was incumbent upon every citizen to play his or her part in both public and private forms of worship, because the prosperity of the city depended on it. It is hard for us moderns to project ourselves back into a culture where religion and politics (in the broad sense of the public life of the city) were so closely bound up together. When Socrates was accused of not sacrificing to the city's gods, this was to accuse

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[39] There has been a lot of really good, innovative work on Athenian law recently—too much to cite in detail. I have restricted myself, bibliographically speaking, to Carey 1994, Gagarin & Cohen 2005, Harris 2000, MacDowell 1978, and Todd 1993.

[40] And Socrates makes little attempt to prove himself a good citizen; indeed he might have classified this stock element of Athenian court oratory as one of the rhetorical devices to which he was too moral to resort, since it commonly involved not just embellishing your own self-portrait, but casting aspersions on your opponent's birth, character and sexual practices.

[41] See Gish (this volume, pp. 161–212).

[42] Todd 1993: 308; see also Cohen 1988. A recent study confirms the political purpose of impiety trials of philosophers towards the end of the fourth century as well: O'Sullivan 1997.

[43] Aeschin. 1.173 (*Against Timarchus*). The speech was delivered in 345.

[44] See Garland 1992.

him of betraying the common weal. Shared public rituals helped to weld society into a concordant whole, and as the sovereign power in Athens, it was up to the assembled people to ensure that citizens did their duty in this regard, as in others. In classical Athens, impiety was a matter of public and political concern because one bad apple could spread the rot (*miasma*) and undermine the city's prosperity and concord.[45]

The 'missionary' and corruption charges were also politically loaded,[46] in the sense that it was perceived as vital for the continued functioning of the city that the next generation adhered to the traditional ways that had served Athens in the past. If Socrates was thought to have spread his impiety among the future power-possessors who associated with him, that would indeed be a serious charge. Relatedly, Socrates had been famous as a philosopher and teacher of young men since, at the very latest, the middle of the 430s.[47] Neither of these two books addresses what is surely a vital question: why was Socrates brought to trial in 399, when he had been pursuing his peculiar mission for at least thirty-five years? Why, in fact, was he considered such a threat that the dikasts condemned an old man, who had already well outlived the average lifespan of his contemporaries?[48]

I take it that these problems, however sketchily outlined, are enough to allow us to move on, with the assumption that matters were not as straightforward as these two books make out. Understanding Socrates' trial is not just a matter of close scrutiny of one primary text; the whole socio-historical background is essential, for which an entirely different set of texts is required.[49]

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45 Again, there is plentiful literature on this topic; Sourvinou-Inwood 1990 is the best starting point.

46 See also Wallach 1988.

47 The earliest comic fragment mentioning Socrates, datable to before 430, is Callias fr. 12 Kock = 15 Kassel-Austin (Giannantoni 1990: I A2), in which a character accuses Socrates of making people arrogant. Clearly, young men had already begun to imitate his questioning of others, as a means of making themselves feel superior to others. I also take it that Pl. *Lach.* 187d–188a dates the start of Socrates' mission to around 440: see Stokes 1992, 53–54. Two of Plato's teaching dialogues—*Protagoras* and *Alcibiades*—are both located in 433.

48 Perhaps 45 years for a man? See Morris 1992: 72–81.

49 In Waterfield 2009 I go far more thoroughly into the socio-historical background to the trial; see also Cartledge 2009: 76–90.

Amnesty?[50]

Countless scholars believe that, even if there were a political dimension to the trial, it was covert at best, because the amnesty of 403 forbade the prosecutors from mentioning Socrates' association with Critias, Alcibiades and others, all of whom were dead or in exile before the amnesty.[51] This is not as uncontroversial as all these scholars have assumed. The evidence for the amnesty comes from Ps.-Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution* 38–39, and Andocides, *On the Mysteries* 81–87. Andocides says (81) that, after the fall of the Thirty, the returning democrats 'decided to let go of the past, and counted the safety of the city as more important than personal grievances, and so decreed not to recall past misdeeds committed by either side'. Ps.-Aristotle says (39.6) that 'no one was to recall the past misdeeds of anyone except the Thirty, the Ten, the Eleven, and the governors of Piraeus, and not even of these if they successfully submitted to an assessment'.

First, even if the implication of this is that there was an amnesty, it is not clear how much of the past was covered by it. On the face of it, one would assume that the point was to heal the wounds of the civil war, and so that only crimes committed during the regime of the Thirty were covered by it.[52] If so, then while Socrates' association with Critias might have been excluded by the terms of the amnesty, his association with Alcibiades, or any other pre-404 alleged crimes, might well have figured in the trial. Second, even the existence of the amnesty has been called into question. In a series of papers, Carawan has argued that the 'no reprise' condition falls well short of a blanket amnesty, and applies only to the specific terms of the reconciliation agreement of 403.[53] Though some of the details are unclear, the reconciliation agreement between the men of Piraeus and the men of the city was, first, a property deal: everyone (or his heirs, if the Thirty had killed him) was to regain his original property, or comparable property if the original had already passed to a third party, except for the Thirty and

[50] I thank Peter Rhodes in particular for enabling me to correct (and shorten) an earlier version of this section (for which see Waterfield 2009: 132–134).

[51] See e.g. Reeve 1989: 99. Since Reeve believes that politics played no part in the trial, he mentions the idea only to dismiss it. For plainer statements, see e.g. Vlastos 1983: 497: 'This fact [the lack of reference to Critias] is perfectly explicable by the amnesty: to substantiate the imputation in court Socrates' tutorial link to Critias or other leaders of the oligarchic coup would have had to be rehearsed, and this would have been a violation of the amnesty.'

[52] This is how Joyce 2008: 514 takes it: 'the focus of the amnesty was to pardon crimes committed in the time of the Thirty in the interest of re-establishing civil concord'.

[53] Carawan 2002 (esp.), 2004, 2006. But he has met with a good response from Joyce 2008.

their henchmen, who were free to go to Eleusis if they wanted. Second, if any of the Thirty and their henchmen chose to stay in Athens and submit to trial, the verdict of that trial was final. There was to be no reprise on either issue. According to Carawan, this 'no reprise' provision falls short of a blanket amnesty, since it refers only to the two provisions of the agreement.

Fortunately, I do not need to decide this complex issue here, since Hansen found a way to cut through the Gordian knot.[54] He argued that even if the prosecutors could not mention Socrates' politically unfortunate associates from before 403, another four years had passed, during which time Socrates had gone on with his mission; the prosecutors, then, need only have brought up these intervening four years. It is true that this would have seriously weakened the prosecutors' case, since they could mention only, say, relative undesirables such as Xenophon, rather than those monsters of impiety[55] Critias and the Thirty, and the man who fled into exile in 415 rather than face charges of impiety, and who was condemned to death *in absentia* and publicly cursed for his impiety. Nevertheless, what was left was enough to get the case to court—to persuade the King Archon that there was a case to be heard[56]—and then the prosecutors could go to town.

But could they go to town in a political sense? Again, discussion of this question has been somewhat slipshod. Vlastos, for instance (as quoted already in note 51) says that the amnesty made it impossible for the prosecutors to 'rehearse' Socrates' past political connections. If this were true, a great many extant speeches flouted the amnesty. Many litigants continued to exploit their opponents' involvement in pre-403 crimes, particularly that of having been an associate of the Thirty, and so offered the dikasts the chance to avenge themselves on the Thirty in the person of the defendant. This went on for many years: nothing casts so long a shadow in the collective memory of a people as civil war.[57] Lysias's *For Mantitheus* (16) shows that Mantitheus had been accused of having served the Thirty as a knight, and

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[54] Hansen 1996.

[55] Their impiety is well expressed by Cleocritus in *Hell.* 2.4.20–22. On Alcibiades' impiety, see of course Thuc. 6.27–29, 60–61, and Andoc. 1 (*On the Mysteries*). The rhetoric used against both Alcibiades and the Thirty well illustrates the concatenation between religion and politics.

[56] A necessary preliminary, to prevent resources being wasted on hopless or frivolous cases. On the *anakrisis*, or preliminary hearing, see MacDowell 1978: 240–242, Todd 1993: 126–127.

[57] There are plenty of signs of tension in the decades following the end of the war: see *Hell. Oxy.* 9.3 (Chambers), with Krentz 1982: 116–124, Munn 2000: 247–291, Strauss 1986: 55–59, Wolpert 2002.

his *Against the Charge of Subverting the Democracy* (25) does the same for an unnamed defendant.[58] His *Against Agoratus* (13) not only accuses Agoratus of crimes committed before and during the regime of the Thirty, but refers at 56–57 to another case, against Menestratus, that did the same. His *Against Evander* (26) accuses the man of working for the Thirty, and in the course of his *Against Nicomachus* (30) he tries somewhat feebly to argue that Nicomachus had helped them, at least in one instance (11–12). Isocrates' *Against Euthynus* (21) also accuses the defendant of crimes committed during the regime of the Thirty.

I have listed here only the clearest cases, enough to make the point; there may be more.[59] Every single one of these speeches would violate the amnesty, if the amnesty forbade the 'rehearsal' or mention of such alleged crimes. Given the tiny percentage of speeches that have survived, compared to the hundreds or thousands that must have been delivered, we can multiply the figures up: a great many speeches, in the decades immediately after 403, explicitly referred to alleged crimes committed before 403, and especially to the crime of association with the Thirty.

The solution is simple: the amnesty forbade the inclusion *in the formal indictment* of crimes committed before 403,[60] but there was no way the authorities could prevent prosecutors from supporting their accusation by reference to alleged crimes committed before 403.[61] We can, then, tweak Hansen's suggestion to give it more force: although the formal indictment, as presented to the King Archon at the *anakrisis*, could not mention Socrates' pre-403 associations or alleged crimes, Meletus and the others could refer to them as copiously as they wanted in the course of their speeches. And not only could they have, but they surely must have: everything we know about Athenian courtroom procedure points in that direction.

I take it, then, that the rather loud silence of both Plato and Xenophon (in his *Apology*, at least) about Critias and Alcibiades (let alone others of Socrates' unfortunate associates) is due simply to their desire not to

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58 See also Lysias *For Eryximachus* F107 Carey. I have not here listed his *Against Eratosthenes* (12) because, as an attack on a member of the Thirty who had chosen to stay in Athens and accept the consequences, it was a legitimate trial even under the terms of the supposed amnesty.

59 Lintott 1982: 176, lists twelve speeches by Lysias, and three by Isocrates. See also Wolpert 2002: 63–64.

60 Or the accused could have entered a *paragraphē* to have the accusation ruled out of order.

61 See also Brickhouse & Smith 1989a: 73–74.

mention the most telling point the prosecutors made. The inclusion of Alcibiades and Critias in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* is due to the intervening publication of Polycrates' pamphlet.[62] Stokes argues that, if the prosecutors had mentioned Alcibiades and Critias, Plato displays unusual rhetorical ineptitude in mentioning only less controversial figures as Socrates' students.[63] But at *Apology* 33c–34b, Plato is making only a limited point about witnesses: if I corrupted anyone, Socrates says, he or his relatives should have stepped up to accuse me, or Meletus should have called them as witnesses. This is perfectly compatible with the prosecutors having mentioned Alcibiades and Critias; but of course they could not call them as witnesses (since they were dead), and nor, for obvious reasons, did any of their few surviving relatives step up to accuse Socrates either.

I do not think, then, that Polycrates invented or was the first to mention Socrates' association with Alcibiades and Critias. I think it played a major part in the trial.

The Resurrection of Chroust

If the argument of the previous section is sound, a major obstacle to understanding Socrates' trial has been removed. It would have been perfectly acceptable for his prosecutors to refer to his pre-403 association with Alcibiades, Critias and others—as acceptable as it was for Lysias to have attacked Agoratus, and so on.

Domino-fashion, the falling of this obstacle to understanding the trial removes another one. There was an incredible amount of circumstantial and anecdotal evidence stacked up against Socrates. Just from this alone we could draw up a list of things we might reasonably guess that the prosecutors might have said, but we do not have to resort entirely to guesswork, since at least some of the content of their speeches can be gleaned from three sources. The first two of these are the defence speeches written by Plato and Xenophon, since from time to time they appear to be responding to points that had been raised by the prosecution speeches; the third is the pamphlet published by Polycrates in 392, and responded to by Xenophon at *Memorabilia* 1.2.9–61.

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[62] See Stokes (this volume, p. 247). Plato's silence in his *Apology* is well discussed by Brickhouse & Smith 1989a: 73–87. However, I do not share their view that Polycrates was the likely source of all future political interpretations of the trial.

[63] Stokes (this volume, p. 247), referring to Pl. *Ap.* 33c–34b.

Polycrates was an Athenian rhetorician, best known for writing paradoxical pieces defending famous villains or attacking famous heroes. None of his work survives, but some of it is visible as reflected by others. His defence of the legendary Egyptian king Busiris, for instance, who had the nasty habit of slaughtering visitors to his country, met with an extended response from Isocrates.[64] His other famous work was the *Prosecution Speech against Socrates*, which purported to be the speech Anytus had delivered at the trial. Its purpose was to advertise Polycrates' wares as an aspirant to the speech-writing profession and to express support for the democracy. It met with responses from both Xenophon and, centuries later, Libanius of Antioch (and presumably from unknown others in between).[65]

Polycrates' pamphlet has long been sidelined as a way to reconstruct Anytus's speech, because of the grip of the belief in the amnesty, or in its potency.[66] Since Polycrates' pamphlet plainly contravened such an amnesty (for instance, by charging Socrates with having been Alcibiades' teacher), it seemed safe to ignore it. But it should now be clear that Socrates' prosecutors could have said pretty much anything they wanted at his trial, and so we may cautiously turn to what is recoverable of Polycrates' *Prosecution Speech against Socrates* and mine it for information about Anytus's speech. And this is what Xenophon suggests too: in *Memorabilia* 1.2, when he refers to Polycrates' work, he attributes the arguments to 'the prosecutor' (or 'the accuser'), which looks very like a reference to Socrates' trial and to one of his three prosecutors.

The most thorough reconstruction of Polycrates' pamphlet is that of Chroust 1957, a book which is far from perfect, but most of whose imperfections apply to chapters other than the one in which he reconstructs the pamphlet (chapter 4). I think we may safely assume that Polycrates' work attributed to Anytus the following arguments against Socrates to substantiate the charge that he was a corrupting force on the young men of the city.[67]

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64 Isoc. 11 (*Busiris*).

65 Lib. *Ap.* (*Declamationes* 1.157), from the fourth century CE.

66 For example, de Strycker & Slings 1994: 5: 'Anytus … cannot have reproached Socrates for his connection with men who were dead when the amnesty was voted. Polycrates' *Katēgoria* is in fact a fictitious speech.' The nature of Polycrates' writing has also been held against him. Like his more illustrious predecessor Gorgias of Leontini, he was known for writing paradoxical pieces, designed to display rhetorical skill in an unlikely cause. The name of the game was not truth, but rhetorical display. But neither Gorgias's nor Polycrates' repertoire was restricted to paradox or to mere display. If the *Prosecution Speech against Socrates* were no more than entertainment, Xenophon would not have bothered to respond to it, since no one would have taken it seriously in the first place.

67 We can also safely assume that the prosecutors also resorted to character defamation

He induced his followers to despise the laws and generally to disregard Athenian moral norms; he undermined family ties by implying that the inherited conglomerate was worthless; he argued that the only true friend was one who did you good, and that he, Socrates, did more good than parents; he cited elitist poets with approbation; he bred arrogant, antidemocratic young men;[68] he accosted people and tied them up in sophistic knots to their embarrassment and to the amusement of his followers; he was a clever arguer and taught young men to be clever arguers; he mocked the lottery and despised the working class; the result of his influence can be seen in the conduct of Alcibiades and Critias; his denial that he is a teacher is nonsense, because everyone believes that teachers of opinions (as opposed to teachers of facts) are the sources of the students' views.

Even though that is as far as we can go, basing ourselves on extant sources, it would be foolish to think that Anytus did not also name others whom Socrates had presumably infected with these same corrupt views. Both Plato's and Xenophon's Socratic works are peopled by undesirable characters; where we know their political alignments, anti-democrats outnumber the non-aligned or the pro-democrats by a considerable factor. Socrates was known to have taught and loved not just Alcibiades, but also Charmides; not just Critias, but also Euthydemus, Critias's beloved; another of the Thirty, Aristotle of Thorae, was at least in the Socratic circle, as was Clitophon, who helped to prepare the ground for the oligarchy of 411 and was on the margins of the oligarchy of 404; at least seven of those who fled into exile as a result of the scandals and failed oligarchic coup of 415 were close associates;[69] Xenophon was a student, and he was banished some time in the 390s from Athens for his anti-democratic and pro-Spartan leanings; Socrates' half-brother Patrocles was King Archon of the board of ten oli-

(Socrates hangs around gymnasia ogling naked lads and surrounded by effeminate aristocrats—that kind of thing) and innuendo, the usual stock in trade of Athenian forensic oratory.

68 Remember that the phrase 'the young' had become a kind of code in late-fifth-century Athens for those, whatever their actual ages, who took part in the sacrileges of 415; were abreast of the latest fashions in clothing and music; tended to be philolaconic and antidemocratic; were championed by Alcibiades; knew the new rhetorical tricks; were in favour of the Sicilian expedition; and so on. These were the people Socrates was believed to have influenced. See Forrest 1975, Ostwald 1986: 229–250.

69 See the list in Nails 2002: 18, which includes Phaedrus, Eryximachus, Acumenus, Axiochus, Charmides, Critias and Alcibiades. See Nails also for brief essays on the people I list in this paragraph as Socrates' unfortunate associates: the evidence is their occurrence, especially as Socratic interlocutors, in either or both of Plato's and Xenophon's works.

garchs who replaced the Thirty after their downfall;[70] in general, Socrates moved in the circles of those who were or were suspected of being pro-Spartan oligarchs,[71] and was close to the politically suspect Pythagoreans.[72] Socrates could have been condemned just on the strength of his unfortunate associates and students, by those dikasts who knew nothing else about him.

As we might expect from a democrat of Anytus's standing, all the allegations we know or can guess that he made were, in Athenian terms, politically loaded. We may surely add some further charges and arguments too, while perhaps attributing them to one of the other two prosecutors, Lycon and Meletus,[73] but I am not here concerned with further reconstruction. I have made the point: the amnesty did not prevent Socrates' prosecutors from mentioning Socrates' politically unfortunate associates and other pre-403 episodes and events; they certainly were mentioned; the trial, like other impiety trials, was overtly a political trial.[74]

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70 We cannot be entirely certain that this Patrocles is Socrates' half-brother, but it seems likely; at any rate, his deme is the same, and he moved in the same circles. See Nails 2002: 218.

71 On the Socratics' philolaconism, see Cartledge 1999.

72 At any rate, in *Phaedo*, Plato has a Pythagorean associate of Socrates ask Phaedo for an account of the conversation which Socrates had in prison with, among others, two prominent Pythagoreans. See further n. 83.

73 Of course, it is impossible finally to sort out which of the prosecutors said what from our flimsy evidence, but I take it that our chief source for Anytus's speech is Polycrates, and that one or two things Meletus said might peep through the mini-dialogues between Socrates and Meletus in Pl. *Ap.* 24d–28a and Xen. *Ap.* 19–21. At any rate, it seems clear that while Anytus focused on the corruption charge, Meletus focused on impiety. I also believe that a few more points or pointers may be gleaned from Libanius's *Apology of Socrates*, Isoc. 11.5 (*Busiris*), Pl. *Meno* 90b–95a (the conversation with Anytus) and Pl. *Ap.* 33a–b (on Socrates' denial that he was a teacher) and 29c (on Anytus calling for the death penalty).

74 In this context it is worth remembering that both Lycon and Anytus were prominent democratic politicians. We know too little about Lycon, but Anytus had been a general in 409 and, though a political ally of Theramenes (one of the ringleaders of the Thirty), he left Athens soon after the Thirty took power and joined Thrasybulus's resistance movement. He rapidly became one of the leaders of the resistance, to be mentioned in the same breath as Thrasybulus himself (*Hell.* 2.3.42–44). He was equally prominent after the civil war, especially as one of the architects of the attempt to reconcile democrats and oligarchs and promote social concord (Isoc. 18.23 [*Against Callimachus*]). In *Meno*, set in 402, Plato said that the Athenian people were choosing Anytus for the most important positions in the state (*Meno* 90b; see also Xen. *Ap.* 29). He was plausibly described as one who served the democracy well, and as a man of power in the city (Andoc. 1.150 [*On the Mysteries*]).

Socratic Politics: Basic Principles

If the trial was political, we need to know something about Socrates' political views. Otherwise, we will not be able to guess what the prosecutors, acting on behalf of the democracy, found so offensive—offensive enough, to repeat, to kill an elderly man.

First, I should clear the ground. There is no *a priori* reason why Socrates should not have been political, and there are good reasons why he might have been. The reason for thinking that he was not actively political is his denial in Plato's *Apology* that he had taken part in politics (31d–32e, 36b–c). But this is only a denial that he ever sought major office in Athens, in response to the good question (31c) why he practised politics in private, but never addressed the Assembly on political issues. He was certainly involved in the public life of Athens in other respects: from 449, when he became eligible for public service, he did his duty as a soldier (three times, and one of those was an extended campaign), on the Council (once) and probably also as a dikast (more than once).[75] We have no way of knowing whether this amount of service was more or less than usual, and in any case, since both membership of the Council and empanelment as a juror were subject to a lottery, even definite statistics would still leave room for doubt. It is worth remembering, however, that both involved first volunteering for the job. When Plato's Socrates says that he has never taken part in the political life of the city, he means high office, of the kind that might have enabled him to push through reforms more quickly.[76]

And the main reason for thinking that Socrates might have been a political thinker is just that he was an ethical thinker.[77] It was a universal or almost universal belief among ethical thinkers of the time that the polis was the correct and only environment for human moral flourishing—that a good polis

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[75] Pl. *Ap.* 28e (soldier), 32b (councillor), 35a (dikast). The last is a little uncertain, but is a possible deduction from Socrates' words: 'I have personally often seen such people on trial …'.

[76] Note, by the way, that Socrates attributes his failure to play at politics to his divine sign. Since this usually prohibits him from continuing on a course he has already started, this suggests that Socrates wanted and perhaps repeatedly tried to stand for office, but was always stopped by his *daimonion*. He was condemned to be a teacher of future politicians, rather than being one himself.

[77] I think Horn 2008, for whom Socrates is only marginally a political thinker, overlooks the close connection between ethics and politics. For Penner 2000 Socrates is radically unpolitical, committed by his moral psychology to one-to-one conversation and utterly pessimistic about the likelihood of there ever being political experts. I disagree so completely that it is best just to let the differences between us appear in what we say.

created goodness in its citizens.[78] So (to take the two prominent examples) Plato occupied himself in *Republic* with imagining an ideal state in which all members of society would be good to the best of their abilities, while for Aristotle education in moral goodness was a product of the right constitutional environment (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1179b–1181b)—which is why his *Politics* was expressly a continuation of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. As a moral philosopher, Socrates was also concerned with the circumstances that would allow his hopes and aspirations for people to be fulfilled. Hence Plato has him describe himself as the only true *politikos*.[79] 'The virtue that concerned Socrates was primarily the virtue that political leaders ought to have.'[80]

It is fairly easy to garner an outline of Socrates' political positions from Xenophon and Plato. There are no serious incompatibilities between the two of them on this score,[81] and the frequent coincidence of their evidence is in itself a good reason for taking Socrates to be the common source. However, since both Xenophon and Plato fundamentally agreed with Socrates, it remains impossible finally to disentangle which strands originated with Socrates and which with Plato or Xenophon.

Socrates approached political philosophy *via* the question 'Who should rule?' He took rulership to be a profession: the ruler should not be partisan, but just an expert ruler. And he argued that professional rulership meant improving the lot and especially the moral behaviour of the citizens:

> We found that all the other results which one might attribute to statesmanship—and there are many of these, of course: provision of a high standard of living for citizens, for example, and freedom, and concord—are neither good nor bad. We decided that, if as a result of statesmanship the citizen body was to be benefited and happy, it was crucial to make them wise and knowledgeable. (Plato *Euthydemus* 292b–c)

Wisdom and knowledge were, for Socrates, either identical with moral goodness or its necessary conditions. A professional ruler, then, is one with the appropriate knowledge:

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78 Balot 2006 coined the phrase 'virtue politics' (after 'virtue ethics') to describe this aspect of Greek political thinking.

79 *Grg*. 521d. Socrates also describes himself as skilled at politics at *Meno* 99e–100a, on which see C.C.W. Taylor 1998: 52. It is also an implication of *Ap*. 30a: since the basic duty of a *politikos* was to do good to the city, Socrates is there claiming to be the best *politikos*.

80 Woodruff 1993: 158.

81 Whatever Vlastos 1983 says. But he has been answered on this, and on other points, by Wood & Wood 1986, and Schofield 2000.

> Socrates said that it was not those who held the sceptre who were kings and rulers, nor those who were elected by unauthorized persons, nor those who were appointed by lot, nor those who had gained their position by force or fraud, but those who knew how to rule.[82] (Xenophon *Memorabilia* 3.9.10)

It may seem innocuous, even obvious, that only experts should undertake the difficult task of government, but Socrates drew conclusions from this premise that were radical in their time. The single sentence just quoted dismisses in turn the claims of monarchy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny as legitimate constitutions, in favour of government by experts, however many there may be.[83]

Socrates envisioned no totalitarian form of government. If someone was an expert and was recognized as such, people would willingly obey him, because they would see that he had their best interests at heart and that there was no one more effective than him at doing them good. 'This I know,' he said, 'that to do wrong and to disobey my superior, whether god or man, is bad and disgraceful' (Plato *Apology* 29b)—and the reason he felt certain of this was that it was just obvious: naturally, he felt, all of us would obey someone we recognized as an expert, just as we do what the doctor tells us.[84]

The only qualification on his call for true statesmen was his belief that perfect wisdom is unavailable for any human being, in any sphere of activity.[85] Above all, we cannot see the future, and so we have to pray to the gods that the consequences of our actions turn out well. But the ultimate unattainability of perfect knowledge does not undermine his, or anyone's, search for it; ideals are always worth striving for. Socrates always hoped to see true moral experts, who knew what justice was and therefore had a reliable standard by which to see to its instantiation in the world.

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82 See also especially *Mem.* 3.6–7, and Pl. *Cri.* 47a–d and *Ap.* 25b.

83 The idea of government by experts was also Pythagorean. Pretty much all we know about Pythagorean politics is that for about fifty years, from somewhat before 500 to around 450, a number of cities in southern Italy were administered by members of the school, and that this administration was far from democratic: see Walbank 1957: 223, with references to other scholarly works; scholarship has not found significantly more to say on this, that I know of, since Walbank was writing.

84 See Gray 2007 for the pervasiveness of this Socratic idea in Xenophon.

85 See especially Pl. *Ap.* 20c–23b and, for ignorance of consequences and the necessity of calling on the gods, Xen. *Mem.*1.1.7–9.

Socratic leaders rise to the top simply by demonstrating their expertise to a receptive citizenry, or by being trained by already existing experts. There would be no point to the democratic lottery, and Socrates argued against it.[86] The lottery can no more expect to throw up competent politicians than competent athletes or doctors (*Memorabilia* 1.2.9, 3.1.4; Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1393b). But the lottery was fundamental to Athenian democratic egalitarianism; elections were used rarely, only when it was felt to be essential to favour those with specific abilities. A Socratic principle was that if something could be tackled by human intelligence, that was the instrument best used; only if something is completely incomprehensible, like the future, should one resort to the gods, by prayer or divination (*Memorabilia* 1.1.7–9). But the use of the lottery in the Athenian democracy was equivalent to praying for the right leaders.

Socrates likened a good statesman to a herdsman, whose job it is to look after his flock (Plato *Republic* 342a–e, 345c–e; Xenophon *Memorabilia* 1.1.32, 3.2.1). The image has become a comfortable cliché, but that should not disguise the fact that it is fundamentally undemocratic: democratic officers did not have the unchecked power of a herdsman.[87] Just as Socrates was explicitly opposed to the lottery, so, in the case of genuinely talented politicians, he was implicitly opposed to many of the democratic safeguards, such as annual elections and many-headed committees, which served to check the power of individuals.

Socrates also seems to have believed that the 'mass wisdom' on which democratic procedure was predicated was an oxymoronic fiction, and even that the masses, in the mass, are a source of corruption and are riddled with false values.[88] One can acquire virtue only under the right conditions, and manual work is a major impediment (Plato *Alcibiades* 131a–b; Xenophon *Oeconomicus* 4.2–3, 6.4–9; and see also Aristotle *Politics* 1328b, 1337b). Such snobbery about work was typical of upper-class Greeks, but we should not

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[86] Socrates was far from being the only critic of democracy, and his arguments sometimes resemble those of others: see Roberts 1994, Bultrighini 2005.

[87] Hansen 1996: 155. Hence the frequency of the notion of king as shepherd among ancient Near Eastern monarchies (e.g. the Standard Inscription of Ashurnasirpal II of Assyria: http://www.metmuseum.org/explore/anesite/html/el_ane_inscript.htm).

[88] Oxymoron: Pl. *Hip. Mai.* 284e, *Lach.* 184e, *Ap.* 25b, *Cri.* 47c–d, Xen. *Mem.* 3.7.5–7. Corruption and false values: Pl. *Ap.* 29d, 31c–32a, *Cri.* 48c. *Megalēgoria* is a predictable attitude if one holds these views and is addressing a crowd of such people.

be too quick to judge. Before the days of universal education, the condition of the poor was in many respects benighted enough to invite snobbery, and the sentiment lingered long: even in the eighteenth century, the Scottish philosopher David Hume opined that 'poverty and hard labour debase the minds of the common people'.[89] So Plato admits at *Crito* 52e that for Socrates the Spartan and Cretan constitutions were models of good government, because these societies were highly structured:[90] political concord was guaranteed by everyone knowing his place. If Plato went on to develop political views based on a stratification of society into workers and experts, he was hardly breaking away from his mentor.[91]

Despite his misgivings about democracy, Socrates still chose to spend his life in Athens. Does this not show that in fact he preferred the democracy to other constitutions?[92] Socrates himself addressed this issue,[93] but the reason he gave for his staying in the city was not that he *preferred* its constitution, but that he was obliged to respect its laws: by the accident of having been born and having grown up in democratic Athens, he had, as someone who was committed to the rule of law, taken on this obligation. This forms part of his explanation of why he did not defy the court ruling and escape from prison as he could have. We may guess that another reason for his having stayed in Athens was that it gave him the freedom to pursue his life's work. He stayed, not because he was satisfied with Athenian democracy as a political system, but because he was allowed (for a long time, anyway, before the special circumstances of his trial) to pursue his mission.

It will not do to argue, as several influential commentators have,[94] that, even if Socrates was no democrat, he still thought democracy better than the alternatives—that he did not really believe that moral/political experts

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89 Quoted by Guthrie 1969: 128, from the essay 'Of National Characters'.

90 See also Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.20, where there is a hint of nostalgia for the pre-democratic Athenian constitution.

91 Plato also has Socrates criticize the most eminent democratic politicians of Athens's past as useless: 'Pericles made the Athenian people idle, work-shy, garrulous and mercenary ... There's never been a good statesman here in Athens ... These men from Athens's past made the city bloated and rotten' (extracts from *Grg.* 515e–519a; cf. *Meno* 93a–94e).

92 The thesis is commonly stated, e.g. by Vlastos 1983: 500: 'Thus his preference for [Athens] ... could only be a preference for the democratic form of government over the leading specimens of oligarchy.'

93 Pl. *Cri.* 51c–52d. I still believe that we can take the views of the personified Laws to represent Socrates' views, despite a recent vociferous minority (see e.g. Weiss 1998); I agree, then, with the most recent commentary on *Crito*: Stokes 2005.

94 Especially Vlastos 1983, Kraut 1984; see also Ober 2011.

would ever be found, and so did not really believe that there was a viable alternative, and limited himself to a little constructive criticism of democracy. His criticisms are too fundamental for that. And was his lifelong search for experts no more than a gesture, from someone who never expected to find them? Socrates believed that a small group of even somewhat imperfect political experts was preferable to democracy, with its reliance on the lottery and on the illusion of mass wisdom. Besides, the people of Athens clearly saw Socrates as an enemy of democracy; if Socrates was even tepid about democracy, we can legitimately wonder why, given that he stayed in Athens during the rule of the Thirty, those murderous creatures did not put him to death and the relatively benign democracy did.

It is irrelevant that Socrates counted among his lifelong friends the 'loyal democrat' Chaerephon (Plato *Apology* 21a).[95] Most of us are, and all of us should be, open-minded enough to have friends with different political views from our own. In any case, the way that Socrates introduces Chaerephon points in entirely the opposite direction. Socrates says not only that Chaerephon was a loyal democrat, but that 'he also shared your recent exile and restoration'. The reference is to the period when the Thirty were in charge of Athens—when democrats fled the city (or were put to death) and were restored only after the nasty little civil war. And Socrates admits his distance from these events: he does not say 'our' recent exile and restoration, but 'your'—as he must, because it was well known that he had stayed in Athens during the regime of the Thirty.

Is this, his residence in Athens in 404–403, not sufficient evidence on its own to prove that Socrates was some kind of oligarch? Far from it, because pretty much the same reasons that make Socrates no democrat make him no oligarch either. Oligarchy is the rule of the few—a greater or lesser number in different states, but always defined as those with certain property and/or birth qualifications. But—logically, at least—Socratic rulers are not necessarily wealthy or high born; they are simply those with the requisite knowledge. Socrates *inclined* more towards oligarchy, because philosopher-rulers[96] were bound to be few, and because the rich were the only ones with

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[95] Too much is made of this by, e.g., Brickhouse & Smith 1989a: 77–78.

[96] We might as well use the Platonic term, since in *Republic* Plato describes a political system with which Socrates would have felt comfortable. 'The whole intellectual project of *Republic* is a Socratic project—an attempt to think through how Socrates might have conceived of an ideal political system': Schofield 2006: 315–316. See also Kraut 1984: 10 ('The *Republic* describes the sort of state he [Socrates] would have infinitely preferred to all others'), and Ober 1998: 10 (in *Republic*, Plato sought to 'establish a city in which "Socratic

the leisure to acquire the kind of expertise he demanded of his rulers; but Socrates could not have approved of any existing oligarchy, which would strike him as government by the ignorant just as much as democracy. It was not a wealth or birth elite he was interested in, but an educated elite, distinguished not by breeding, nor by money, nor by eloquence, but by their ability to know the good and how to make it happen.

Socrates and the Thirty

What of the inescapable fact of Socrates' remaining in Athens during the regime of the Thirty? The Thirty made Athens an exclusive zone: 'All those who were not on the list [of the Three Thousand] were forbidden to enter the city' (Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.4.1). This presumably means to enter the city for political purposes, since it is hard to see how the regulation would have been enforceable at the city gates,[97] and of course shopkeepers and others continued to live and work in Athens during the regime of the Thirty, without incurring any politically based charges later. We cannot prove that Socrates' continuing residence in Athens during the regime of the Thirty was in any sense a sign of his political leanings.[98] Nevertheless, it seems likely that Socrates' prosecutors tried to make something of it.[99] Otherwise, why did both Xenophon and Plato take steps to distance Socrates from the Thirty? He must have been associated with them in at least some people's minds for them to do so.

Xenophon did his best to defend Socrates by making out that the Thirty tried to curb him by legislation aimed specifically at him, and that Socrates then fell out with both Critias and Charicles (*Memorabilia* 1.2.31–38). Plato communicated the same message at *Apology* 32c–d by telling how the Thirty tried to involve Socrates in their schemes by getting him, along with four

politics" might flourish'). And from there it is only a short step to argue, as Rowe 2007 has done, that Plato's *entire* political project, right up to his latest works, is Socratic in inspiration.

97 Debra Nails made this point to me, by email.

98 Perhaps this is why it is ignored by Vlastos 1983. This is by far the most influential paper on Socrates' political position; it has been reprinted (so far, to my knowledge) four times, apart from its original publication. The paper aims to resolve the issue of Socrates' political views, in favour of democracy—but never once mentions that Socrates stayed in Athens during the regime of the Thirty.

99 Compare Lysias 25 (*Against the Charge of Subverting the Democracy*). A lot of the speech consists of a fairly desperate attempt to argue that residence in Athens at the time was *not* a sign of allegiance to the Thirty.

others, to arrest a wealthy and distinguished Athenian citizen called Leon of Salamis (a known democrat),[100] so that they could kill him and confiscate his assets;[101] Socrates flatly refused and just went back home instead, leaving the others to get on with the nasty job.

But despite these apologetic efforts,[102] Socrates was almost bound to have become associated in people's minds with the Thirty. His affiliations reached right to the very top, with Critias and Charmides and Aristotle of Thorae his pupils and friends, with his half-brother Patrocles and other students on the margins of the Thirty, and with views that the oligarchs could well have taken to be compatible with their own. Socrates must have known that his remaining in Athens, with friends and associates in power, would look like approval, and that since he was a figurehead his actions would be noticed and assessed; and until the Leon episode, which Plato implies occurred towards the end of the regime (because the Thirty had no time to put him to death), he had done nothing to distance himself from them. So it was either tacit approval, or stupidity, or inappropriate indifference.

Things were only made worse by the intentions of the Thirty to turn Athens into a Spartan-style society[103] and by Critias's published eulogies of Sparta (about which we unfortunately know little). Socrates and his followers had long been known or at least widely reputed to be attracted to Sparta (see e.g. Aristophanes *Birds* 1281–1282). Not that they wanted to decamp and live there, but they liked the sound of a more structured society, if not also its oligarchic regime. How could Socrates not have seemed a sympathizer? And, since he was a famous person, why did he stay? It did not take great intelligence or sensitivity to see what kind of people the Thirty were; it did not take Thrasybulus and hundreds of others long to see what was going on, and we should not rate Socrates' intelligence or sensitivity as less acute than theirs. It certainly seemed possible, then, that Socrates was

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100 Nails 2002: 185–186.

101 See also Xen. *Mem*. 4.4.3 and [Pl.] *Ep*. 7 (324e–325a).

102 As attempts to whitewash Socrates, they are scarcely convincing. In Xenophon, the conversation with Critias and Charicles is too detailed not to be fictional, and it is highly implausible to suggest that a blanket ban on teaching 'the art of words' was aimed specifically at Socrates. In Plato, the story about the arrest ends with a significant whimper, not a bang: if Socrates saw Leon's arrest as illegal or immoral, why did he not protest? He did nothing more than return home—hardly a courageous moral stand.

103 See Whitehead 1982–1983. Athens now had five ephors, a ruling council of thirty, like the Spartan *gerousia*, and a citizen body of 3,000 (about the same number as the Spartan 'Peers' at the time).

attracted to the Thirty at least to the minimal extent that he was prepared to give them time, to see if their intentions for Athens coincided with his own.

Socrates' Political Mission

We do not have to look far to see what the attraction was: the Thirty were promising the moral reform of Athens; they wanted to purge the dross and leave only the gold of a few good men and true, who would manage a now-virtuous city.[104] This crusade is so close to Socrates' political ideal that some must have wondered whether Socrates was actually their adviser. No doubt Socrates became disillusioned when it became clear that their means of implementing this fine-sounding policy included mass executions and expulsions, and no doubt that is why he refused to help them when they asked him to arrest Leon (who was indeed killed without trial),[105] but by then it was too late: the regime collapsed soon afterwards.[106] The regime had been brief, but long enough for Socrates to become tainted by association with it. Even (especially?) great philosophers can be naïve.

Socrates was caught by his desire to see the moral regeneration of Athens. In *Apology* Plato has him undertaking this task single-handedly (presumably as an implicit defence against the charge of having influenced or corrupted others), while throughout *Memorabilia* Xenophon, more realistically, has him trying to educate others to become moral leaders of the city: see 1.6.15, 2.1, 3.1–7. Xenophon even reports him as saying, in a conversation set in 407, that as a result of the social crisis Athens was experiencing,[107] it was ready for moral regeneration (*Memorabilia* 3.5.5). But Socrates' questioning had failed to reveal the political experts he wanted to see. He would have to train them himself.

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104 See Lys. 12.5 (*Against Eratosthenes*), and [Pl.] *Ep.* 7 (324c–d). Moral renewal is, of course, a common aim, or alleged aim, of tyrants.

105 Andoc. 1.94 (*On the Mysteries*).

106 Pl. *Ap.* 32d.

107 The chief ingredients of which were prolonged warfare, now combined with the certainty of defeat; the spread of morally subversive ideas; population displacement; relative poverty following a period of relative prosperity; the polarization of rich and poor; turbulence with occasional outbursts of violence, even civil war (especially disturbing since Athens had been so free of civil strife, compared with many Greek states); the reorganization of the law code; inter-generational conflict and changes of fashion; increasing criticism of democracy and a marked widening of the rift between rich and poor; and changes in the economic structure. See Akrigg 2007.

Happily, we know the names of at least some of the talented and politically ambitious young men whom Socrates was encouraging to take political power, once they had laid the moral foundation in their own lives.[108] The whole of the conversation that makes up Plato's *Alcibiades* has Socrates preparing Alcibiades for this task. Charmides, Euthydemus Dioklou and Critobulus all appear in this kind of role in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (2.6, 3.7, 4.2–3, 5)—and we should add Critias as well, except that for obvious reasons no Socratic writer showed Socrates grooming the future mass murderer for political life. The list should perhaps contain the name of Xenophon himself, since, when serving abroad, he showed a strong inclination to set himself up as king or tyrant of an overseas colony (*Anabasis* 5.6.15–18, 6.4.1–7, 6.4.14, 6.6.4, 7.1.21). And in the dialogue *Theages* (included in Plato's corpus, but written by an unknown contemporary), Socrates is introduced to Theages as the teacher best able to satisfy his desire for political power.

The brief dialogue ends inconclusively, with Socrates saying that he will take the young man on if his supernatural voice lets him, but it confirms that Socrates was remembered for helping ambitious and talented young men become expert statesmen. Within his circle, this was the point of his questioning and his discussions; within his circle, it was widely known that this was his purpose (or so I assume, since both Plato and Xenophon provide our evidence for it). An important aspect, perhaps the central aspect, of Socrates' mission was political: to train one or more philosopher-kings, who might turn Athens into the kind of morally governed city where all citizens could become good to the best of their ability. This is what both Plato and Xenophon[109] show him trying to do, and it fits perfectly with the picture of Socrates that has been building up in the course of this paper.

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108 On this aspect of Socrates' work, see especially O'Connor 1998.

109 This is clear enough in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, but my key Platonic text is *Alcibiades*, which has commonly been thought spurious (though the majority of recent scholars seem to accept it). Still, there will be critics who want to take this easy route to disbelieving my thesis. I ask them, then, to reconsider Pl. *Resp.* 494c–e. No one doubts that Alcibiades is on Plato's mind in this passage, but note that the context is finding young men of talent to take up philosophy, in order that they can rule Plato's Kallipolis. This was clearly how Plato understood the point of Socrates' association with Alcibiades. At 494e he even says that anyone who tries to train such a young man for philosopher-rulership will be taken to court for it. And that is, I am arguing, precisely what Socrates was taken to court for.

Conclusion: A Scapegoat?

But Socrates had been irritating people with his questions since about 440, was known to be the teacher of arrogant young men by the end of the 430s (his first mention in an extant comic fragment), and seems to have been committed to a political path for at least thirty years before his trial (the dramatic date of Plato's *Alcibiades* is 433). To judge by the references to Socrates in the comic poets, his heyday was in the 420s and 410s, and he had somewhat dropped out of the limelight for at least a decade before his trial. It was twenty-four years since Aristophanes and Ameipsias had made him the most notorious atheist and subversive intellectual in Athens. Why take the elderly philosopher to court just then, in the spring of 399?

Like other intellectuals, Socrates became a target only once he was perceived as a threat to public order.[110] His links to the Thirty changed his status from harmless eccentric to undesirable. He had been living on borrowed time ever since the defeat of the Thirty in 403;[111] for a figurehead, a trial was the logical next step.

That Socrates was taken to court as a figurehead is suggested by Plato's identification of his most potent enemies as the 'old accusers' (*Apology* 18a), who had made Socrates such a figurehead. He was punished for the intergenerational conflict, which was caused by social factors rather than by individuals, and certainly not by a single individual; he was punished as a morally subversive teacher, when there were others who could equally have had this odd charge pinned on them; he was punished as a critic of democracy, when he was far from alone; even Critias and Alcibiades were products of the time more than of his teaching. Socrates died because the Athenians wanted to purge themselves of undesirable trends, not just of an undesirable individual.

At the end of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians could look back on a record of moral uncertainty, which had led them to episodes of ruthless brutality (especially on Melos and at Scione).[112] They also knew that from time to time they had behaved with the utmost stupidity—in their treatment of the Arginusae generals, for instance,[113] or in turning down respectable peace

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110 See Wallace 1994 and 1996, preferable to Dover 1976.

111 Similarly, academics who were appointed during the regime of the colonels in Athens, 1967–1974, often found themselves *per se* suspect when the republic was restored. I thank Melina Tamiolaki for pointing out this parallel to me.

112 Thuc. 5.116 (Melos), 5.32 (Scione). That there was remorse is shown by Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.3.

113 Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.24–1.7.34, with Andrewes 1974, Munn 2000: 181–192, Ostwald 1986: 431–445, and Gish (this volume, pp. 161–212).

offers from Sparta.[114] But over and above these human faults, there was the divine. In a society so thoroughly permeated and cemented by religious sentiment, catastrophe could only be seen as a sign of the gods' displeasure. Athens had just lost a war; the gods were clearly not on the city's side; the rot must be stopped.[115]

Since the gods were motivated by reciprocity, the removal of their goodwill towards the city proved that the Athenians had let them down somehow, and deserved to be punished. In other words, there was a vein of impiety in the city, which the gods were punishing. The easiest way to deal with such a trend was to make it particular, to attribute it to a single individual. This mental leap was facilitated by the concept of pollution, which was seen as a kind of pernicious vapour that could spread from even a single individual and infect an entire community.[116] Punishing a murderer was as much a religious as a legal obligation, since his *miasma* had to be prevented from spreading. Even animals and inanimate objects that had 'caused' a human death could be 'tried' and, once found guilty, killed or banished beyond the city's borders.[117]

But since it was impossible to guarantee that all sources of pollution had been dealt with, once a year, in the month of Thargelion, two people, one representing the men of the community and wearing a necklace of black figs, the other representing the women and wearing green figs, were driven out of the city. Much remains obscure about this ritual, known as the Thargelia (the month was named after it).[118] Both the scapegoats were paupers or criminals, and once they were outside the city walls, they were flogged. The festival lasted for two days, with the expulsion on the 6th of the month, and then feasting and enjoying the good things the expulsion had made possible on the following day.

The usual Greek words for 'scapegoat' (the English word derives from the ancient Judaic practice of using a goat rather than a human)[119] were *katharma* ('rubbish') or *pharmakos*, which is closely related to *pharmakon*, meaning 'medicine' or 'remedy': the scapegoat carried away the city's ills

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114 Perhaps especially in 424 after Pylos (Thuc. 4.17–21; see 4.27.2).

115 'The decision to prosecute an old man for saying and doing what he had been saying and doing unmolested for so many years must have been a response to the wounds of recent history: a lost war, a lost empire, an oligarchic *coup*': Parker 1996: 201–202.

116 The essential study remains Parker 1983.

117 See [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 57.4, with Rhodes's note.

118 See Parker 2005: 481–483 for the most important texts, and for discussion Parker 1983: 257–280 and Bremmer 1983.

119 Leviticus 16: 20–22.

(somehow symbolized in Athens by dried figs) and cured them. In fact, the ritual probably started as an attempt to prevent or cure disease; hence it was sacred to Apollo, the god of disease. The flogging, and the symbolic death by expulsion from the community, diluted the ancient practice of actually killing the scapegoat. Voluntary scapegoats were far more propitious than unwilling ones, and there would always be criminals available who preferred a ritual flogging and expulsion to whatever fate the courts had decreed for them.

There are issues here that were still vital for Socrates' contemporaries in Athens, not just because the annual ritual was still carried out, but also because all Athenians were constantly being reminded of the importance of self-sacrifice for the good of the city. The Parthenon, the temple of Athena on the Acropolis, was completed in 438, and its sculptures by 434. On the interpretation of the frieze that I prefer,[120] the story it told was one of the main Athenian foundation myths, the legend of King Erechtheus and his daughters. Faced with a barbarian invasion, Apollo told the king that he would have to sacrifice one of his three daughters to save the city, and in order to spare him the impossible choice, all three chose to die.

We are faced with a number of strange coincidences, on which it might be hazardous to construct much of an edifice. But Apollo was not only the god of the Thargelia and of the legendary king's daughters' self-sacrifice; he was also Socrates' god, the one who had prompted his mission in Plato's story, the one whose moral maxims (such as 'know yourself') Socrates felt himself to be perpetuating, and, as the god of divination, the one who was probably the source of his little voice.[121] Perhaps most astonishingly, 6 Thargelion, the first day of the scapegoat festival, was Socrates' birthday—or so the tradition had it[122]—and possibly even the day of his death.[123] But even if these dates are fabrications or guesses, they show that someone made a connection between Socrates and the Thargelia. And scapegoats were expected to be ugly—as ugly as Socrates.

I think that Socrates, the devotee of Apollo, accepted his death, as a voluntary scapegoat. He had failed to see his vision for Athens become a reality, and had even watched it become horribly distorted by the Thirty. No doubt if he were still free he would continue to think that the continuation

120 Connelly 1996.

121 Know yourself: Pl. *Alc.* 124a, *Chrm.* 164e–165a, Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.24. Little voice: Reeve 2000.

122 Diog. Laert. 2.44, on the authority of Apollodorus of Athens, a chronographer poet of the second century.

123 White 2000: 156–158.

of his mission was the best chance Athens had for regeneration (see e.g. Plato *Apology* 30a, 31a, 36c–d). But that was in the past. Socrates was not just a political theorist, but a visionary, a man with a mission, and visionaries are more likely to suffer from disappointment than cool-headed theorists. Now it was too late:[124] he was too old, all his star pupils were dead or scattered, and his mission had become too tainted by the Thirty for him ever to be able to resurrect it.[125] If, even in a temporary fit of post-war zeal, the Athenians thought it would take the death of a troublesome thinker to heal the rifts in the city and to create the concord that all politicians appeared to be committed to, and that he himself had worked for in his own way, so be it.[126] Rather than escape, as he easily could, he let himself be killed.

Trying to determine the plausibility of Xenophon's bold assertion that even before coming to court Socrates wanted to die has led us on a roundabout route, but that is as it should be: we will never understand Socrates' trial, or any trial, without first understanding enough of the social and historical context. We now have the full context within which Xenophon's suicide claim becomes plausible. It is not ridiculous in itself; it is not altogether contradicted by Plato's *Apology* and it is strongly supported by Plato's *Phaedo*; Socrates had for much of his life pursued a political mission which ultimately failed, and now his age and other circumstances made it impossible for him to start again.[127] On the plus side, he expected that his death would heal some of the wounds that had been opened up by the social crisis Athens experienced in the last quarter of the fifth century.[128] We need to dig beneath the heroization of Socrates that permeates the sources to reveal the historical man as a mere mortal, and, having done so, it seems to me to be far from impossible that Xenophon was right.

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124 The final words of Plato's *Alcibiades* have Socrates prophesying that Athens would get the better of him, so that he would not be able to see through his political mission.

125 In the future, such ideas would be confined to books rather than practice—books such as Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*, or Zeno's *Republic*.

126 Towards the end of Plato's *Apology*, however, Socrates threatens the Athenian people with the possibility that after his death others will come and irritate them. This is a peculiar paragraph, perhaps best understood (with e.g. Stokes 1997: 182) as referring to Plato himself. But it does not seem to prophesy lack of concord in any significant degree or sense.

127 Interestingly, the later biographical tradition has several other philosophers committing suicide to avoid debilitating old age: see Grau 2010.

128 The healing function of his death may cast light on the mystery of his last words, as reported by Pl. *Phd.* 118a: a cock was owed to Asclepius as the healing god.

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CHAPTER NINE

MIND THE GAP: A 'SNOW LACUNA' IN XENOPHON'S *ANABASIS*?*

Shane Brennan

Introduction

The question of the march chronology in *Anabasis*, Xenophon's account of the expedition of Cyrus the Younger and the retreat homeward from Babylonia of his Greek mercenaries, has drawn the interest of several scholars in recent decades.[1] While Xenophon's march framework provides a fairly comprehensive relative chronology, there are no absolute dates in the work to which this framework could be anchored. In the nineteenth century a date of 6 March 401 was put forward for the start day and this convention has been widely adopted by editors since.[2] In this scheme the army crosses the Euphrates on 27 July 401, fights at Cunaxa on 3 September, and sees the Black Sea from Mount Theches on 27 January 400. However, concerns about the feasibility of sustained winter marching in eastern Anatolia, aired by at least one early traveller in Xenophon's footsteps, have grown in the modern era.[3]

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1 Manfredi 1986, Glombiowski 1994, Lendle 1995, Tuplin 1999, Lane Fox 2004, Lee 2007, Brennan 2008.

2 See Koch 1850: 3–12. Koch provided no basis for the start date, other than that it seemed to him to be the most likely one. See Lee 2007: 283–289 for a tabular view of marches.

3 John Kinneir, one of the first and best regarded travellers to engage with Xenophon's route, wrote: 'I also repeat my belief of the impossibility of an army of ten thousand men marching at the rate of five parasangs a day, for so many days successively, through a country where the snow lay a fathom [1,828 metres] deep on the ground' (1818: 490). In the 1930s, Gustav Gassner, a German botanist based in Trabzon, made seminal investigations into the adventures of the Ten Thousand in the Black Sea region and one of his conclusions was that it would not have been possible for the army to cross the Pontic Mountains in winter (1953: 3).

This study does not set out to propose a solution to the chronology problem, but rather to focus on a section of the march which has proved difficult to map in both space and time. The uncertainty surrounding the journey through eastern Anatolia has admitted of some speculation on both counts, and the main aim of this chapter is to set the problem on firmer ground; in so doing an important theory about a gap in this part of Xenophon's record is addressed: according to this, there are up to three months missing from Book IV, a whole chunk of time which Xenophon chose to omit from his account.[4] By establishing a climatic context for Book IV, the 'snow lacuna' theory is critically evaluated. My conclusion will be that there may be a small gap in the record but that it is not materially incomplete.

The Nature and Purpose of Xenophon's Travelogue

Xenophon supplies two categories of travel information in *Anabasis*: march details and road descriptions. The first category includes information about start and finish points, distances (stages and parasangs), and rest days. While every stage of the route is not described in all of these terms, the record furnishes a sufficiently full picture of the march to warrant its being characterised as systematic. The second category contains first-hand descriptions of landscapes, natural features, and the natural world, as well as impressions of places and peoples encountered. By its nature this is subjective, and it is the case furthermore that large stretches of the journey are passed virtually without comment.[5] On the other hand, it has been observed that Xenophon's attention is drawn by features that were remarkable to him (and his Greek audience), in which case there is a method of sorts in his provision of descriptions;[6] extending from this, we may have some confidence that significant environmental events are being reported.[7]

His work has been developed and refined by several subsequent commentators. See further the section on 'The "snow lacuna" theory', pp. 327–332 below.

4 Manfredi 1986, Lane Fox 2004.

5 For instance, the marches across Syria (1.4.9–11), through Media (2.4.27), and through various tribal lands in the north-east of Anatolia (e.g. 4.7.18–19).

6 Cf. Dalby 1992, Brulé 1995, Tuplin 1999, Roy 2007. The following examples illustrate this tendency. 1.5.1–2: Xenophon remarks on the appearance of the Syrian desert, noting its flatness and the fact that there was not a single tree (δένδρον δ' οὐδὲν ἐνῆν), but does not comment on heat; in the same passage he names several types of animal, few of which would have been common sights in Greece. 2.3.15: Xenophon notices dates that are not found in Greece. 4.2.28: extraordinary weaponry of Carduchi. 4.5.25: underground houses of Armenians. 5.4.34: the Mossynoeci, of all the peoples the army encountered, the 'furthest removed from Greek customs'.

7 Cf. Lee 2007: 19, who argues that, for instance, Xenophon's mentions of weather epi-

A related matter to consider is the march record's function in the narrative. Was it intended to be a reliable record of the journey, or is it merely a backdrop to the narrative, assembled without imperatives of completeness or accuracy? Alternatively, could it be a paradigmatic scheme, with for example distances acting as signifiers of march difficulty and remoteness?[8] Xenophon's *Anabasis* is a rich yet complex text and his intentions in it are not transparent. Arguably to a greater degree than any of his other works it engages a range of concerns and interests, among these the subject of military leadership, Panhellenism, commentary on Spartan hegemony of Greece, and *apologia*;[9] *Anabasis* does not contain a prologue or any programmatic statement and was probably written thirty years or more after the event. Should it be, then, that the record was put together without a marked interest for accuracy, or topographical truth, its use for students of the route and chronology would be limited. One way of coming towards a view on the author's intention for the travelogue is to test the detail provided in the account. A degree of precision across any substantial or several smaller portions of the march would offer support for the view that he intended to leave a verifiable trace of the army's passing. Two contrasting sections are examined briefly here.

The first half of Book I, describing the journey through Asia Minor, a region with a long and continuous settlement history, offers good grounds for testing.[10] In his account of the march up-country Xenophon includes several locations on the Royal Road and a number of major cities; although he does not define the parasang, granting a distance to the unit of slightly less than that assigned by Herodotus (2.6.3), his travel figures have been shown

sodes occur when he is contextualising important events, although he adds 'it seems unlikely that he would have omitted weather conditions that did have a severe impact on the Cyreans' (20). Roy 2007: 68 states this principle more clearly: 'weather and climate were of no interest to Xenophon, unless they affected the Greeks' progress'.

8 Higgins 1977: 95 writes: '[Xenophon] records the numbers of stathmoi and parasangs traversed by the army of Cyrus not just to give his book an air of authenticity but to suggest quietly the ever deepening ensnarement of the Greeks within Persian territory'. Purves 2010: 168 sees the use of parasangs as a way of enabling the reader to share the *aporia* of the army as it struggles in unfamiliar space; Rood 2010 also considers that the parasang in *Anabasis* serves a literary function. But S.E. Bassett 1917: 567 puts the record down to a compulsive tendency in the author, he being 'an industrious gatherer of facts of this kind'.

9 Gera 1993: 24–25 regards *Cyropaedia* as the pre-eminent vehicle for Xenophon's enthusiasms and interests.

10 The second part of Book I covers remoter areas of Syria and Iraq. For problems associated with these stages see especially Farrell 1961, Barnett 1963, and Donner 1986.

to approximate closely to the modern road distances.[11] In the case of sites which have not been conclusively identified, the travel information provided by the author has enabled plausible routes to be marked: for example, one of Xenophon's early followers, William Hamilton, convincingly reconstructed the stages from Celaenae to Iconium (1.2.10–19) by measuring out the distances given by the author between these fixed points and noting his description of one of the halting places, Ceramon Agora, as 'the farthest in the direction of the territory of Mysia' (ἐσχάτην πρὸς τῇ Μυσίᾳ χώρᾳ: 1.2.10).[12]

The trek across eastern Anatolia, recounted in Book IV, has been more difficult to verify because of the limited information provided by Xenophon. From the crossing of the Centrites River in south-eastern Anatolia to the arrival at Trapezus on the Black Sea, only one settlement (Gymnias), one mountain (Theches), and five rivers (Tigris, Teleboas, Euphrates, Phasis, Harpasus) are named. This lack of detail may be down to Xenophon's being distracted by events on the ground,[13] a circumstance which could be argued

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[11] Hdt. 2.6, 5.53, 6.42 has a parasang equal 30 *stadia* (5.328 kilometres where 1 *stadion* = 177.6 metres). By comparing modern distances with Xenophon's figures on verifiable sections, French 1998: 20 calculates that his parasang must be equivalent to 4.561 kilometres. The parasang is a measure not perfectly understood and even in the ancient world there were different interpretations of it; Strabo 11.11.5 writes that, 'according to some [it] is 60 *stadia*, but according to others 30 or 40'. Many modern commentators think that the parasang had a time element, possibly the distance an army marched in 1 hour: Farrell 1961: 153; cf. Williams 1996: 285. Variations between routes and authors, and even within the same, are not, therefore, to be unexpected. Tuplin 1997: 404–417 deals at length with the matter of parasangs in *Anabasis*; see also Lendle 1995: 14, 97–98, 334, and for a recent analysis, Rood 2010. Purves 2010 discusses Xenophon's use of parasangs in her stimulating study of time and space in ancient Greek narrative, though her arguments in relation to *Anabasis* are somewhat undermined by a looseness in her historical geography: Sardis as a coastal town rather than an inland city, the army stranded in Asia Minor instead of Mesopotamia, Herodotus at 2.6 giving the length of the parasang as 60 *stades*.

[12] Hamilton 1842: 2.198–205. This was a section which writers of the day, owing to 'ignorance of the sites, and … the circumstance that the names of towns in ancient days were frequently changed', had suspected was inaccurate. French 1998: 20, using his own calculation of 1 parasang = 4.561 kilometres, demonstrates that the distance of 72 parasangs which Xenophon gives for the route from Celaenae to Tyriaeum (20 parasangs from Iconium)—Dinar, Işıklı, Banaz, Sincanlı, Afyon, Ilgın—relates 'almost exactly to the modern figure, 326 kilometres (= 71.48 parasangs)'. The detail of the route continuing from here, between the fixed points of Iconium and Tarsus (1.2.19–23), has been a matter of longstanding debate: see most recently Williams 1996 and Tuplin 2007: 17–24. The former (313–314) concludes that the text is not inaccurate and that the problems in matching detail to topography on the crossing of the Taurus arise from various assumptions, such as, for example, that the army had to go through the Cilician Gates.

[13] Cf. Ramsay 1903: 388 on the crossing of the Taurus Mountains and Tarn 1927: 12 on the journey through Carduchia.

to point more towards an incidental function for the record; or the sketchiness of the narrative could have a literary purpose: the very absence of the travel detail that helped define earlier sections of the journey brings out a sense now of the army being adrift. It is equally likely, however, that the threadbare information contained in the account is down to the author's, or his sources, limited knowledge of the region.[14] Importantly, and leaving aside for the moment the question of how he obtained the figures, Xenophon does maintain his count of days and, for the majority of the stages, the distances travelled—albeit his parasang figures often seem too great given the conditions underfoot (cf. 4.5.2–3). In the absence of a means of verification for these numbers, the chronology provides an important external check, and, as will be shown, it indicates that the record is not materially understated.

In any discussion of Xenophon's travelogue the question of a diary needs to be addressed. A widely held view is that he did maintain one during his journey. The line of argument is that he could hardly have supplied figures for remote stages of the march, as above, unless he had been keeping a record at the time; nor could his figures for 'rest-days' have come from any external source, as distances and way-stations for many sections might have done.[15] Nonetheless, some argue that omissions of significant places and events in the narrative—the crossings of the Lesser and Greater Zab Rivers are frequently cited as cases in point—and the practical difficulty of maintaining a diary in the arduous circumstances of the march, contradict this hypothesis, and that in fact Xenophon's detail derives from other sources.[16] In terms of the framework's function, this debate is not pressingly

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14 Understanding of ancient settlement patterns in central and eastern Anatolia is still only partial, with just a comparatively small number of sites investigated to date. On Xenophon's account in *Cyropaedia* of how Cyrus the Great negotiated a peace between Armenians and Chaldeans (3.2.12–24), Rothman 2004: 142 comments: 'it is unclear how well Xenophon understood the incredibly complex ethnic character of this region'. Taking up this last point, it is important to emphasise that eastern Anatolia was not an empty inland space but a settled area of local and regional cultures with attendant commerce and infrastructure. For significant recent contributions to the pre-Hellenistic picture see Briant 2002, the studies in Sagona and Sagona 2004, and the proceedings of the Istanbul Achaemenid workshop published in Delemen 2007.

15 See Tuplin 1991 for a consideration of the diary question. At the Liverpool 2009 conference Professor Tuplin affirmed his belief in some sort of diary, while expressing difficulty with accepting the view that Xenophon drew heavily on other sources.

16 See especially Cawkwell 2004: 51–59, and note Donner 1986: 6. I am inclined towards this view myself and consider that a reliable record does not have to be dependent on a diary. There was a range of sources from which *most* of the information Xenophon supplies could have been obtained. In addition to the categories named by Cawkwell—periegetic literature

relevant as both stances point to an intention to leave a verifiable trace of the army's passing, an outcome which builds confidence in the integrity of the record.

Finally, and assuming that the bulk of his *oeuvre* was composed in the later part of his life, the historical context for Xenophon's writing and his writing agenda may provide further support for a reliable record. At 1.5.9 he writes: 'it was possible for anyone who paid attention to the King's empire to see that it was strong in its extent of territory and number of people, but weak in the length of its roads and the separation of its forces, if someone should make war quickly'. His provision of a road map into the interior, and indeed the story of the Ten Thousand's successful retreat, could have been intended to serve the Panhellenic goal of a war against the Great King.[17] Secondly, from the evidence of his *oeuvre*, practical and moral instruction were important ends. Xenophon's didactic agenda is frequently realised through the use of exemplars and it is suggested here that a feature of his literary method in *Anabasis* is his setting of these exemplars in *real* contexts: by marrying moral and historical truths his aim is to lend greater force to the embedded lessons of the narrative.

The Climatic Conditions on the March Down to the Sea

Following the Battle of Cunaxa and subsequent negotiations with the Persians, the Greeks set off down-country on their homeward journey. Their route took them north along the Middle Tigris, into the rugged hills of Kurdistan, and onto the highlands of Armenia. Having endured both determined hostility from native tribes and severe winter conditions, the Ten Thousand eventually arrived in sight of the Black Sea.

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and Achaemenid administrative documents—he could have talked to merchants and travellers with first-hand knowledge of the areas traversed; he could also have interviewed slaves native to particular localities: cf. the Macronian peltast at 4.8.4, and the recent study of David Lewis 2011, who argues that the numbers of slaves in Classical Attica from the Near East has been underestimated. Stylianou 2004: 76 cites the Macronian peltast incident as evidence of how Xenophon gathered information: 'enquiry made at the time was the chief source of information for Xenophon, much of it noted down, in my view'. But why not enquiry made afterward? Regarding the question of rest-days, I suggest that these could be viewed as relative measures of delay; that is, Xenophon recollected the halts as being short or long and in his record applied an appropriate and consistent number of days.

17 Rood 2010: 63 notes that the march framework provided by Xenophon could equally be intended to serve as a warning to invaders 'by stressing the length and difficulty of the march up-country'.

Between the plains of Mesopotamia and the Black Sea, the army traversed three distinct geographical regions: the Arabian Platform, Eastern Anatolia, and the Black Sea zone. The chief physical and climatic characteristics of each are described in this section and in the next an attempt is made to situate Xenophon's road descriptions in their appropriate environmental context. The data presented in Tables A and B illustrates the general descriptions below. The locations chosen, the towns of Cizre, Siirt, Bitlis, Muş, and Bayburt, all sit on, or close to, the probable line of the army's retreat and are broadly representative of variations in the regional climatic profile. The section starts with an overview of climate in the region.

Table A. Temperatures (°C) for stations on or near to the line of the retreat in Eastern Anatolia and the Arabian Platform (1975–2008).

Eastern Anatolia (see map for locations)

	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	April
Bitlis. 38.43 N. 42.14 E. 1545 metres.							
Av. mean	11.2	4.5	-0.7	-2.9	-2.2	1.5	7.8
Av. max.	18.5	10.1	3.4	1.2	2.3	6.1	13.2
Av. min.	6.1	0.7	-3.8	-6.4	-5.8	-2.1	3.3
Muş. 38.44 N. 41.31 E. 1404 metres.							
Av. mean	12.5	4.4	-2.8	-7.1	-6.0	0.2	9.1
Av. max.	19.9	9.8	1.0	-2.9	-1.4	5.1	14.6
Av. min.	6.3	0.1	-6.1	-11.0	-10.3	-4.0	4.0
Bayburt. 40.15 N. 40.14 E. 1510 metres.							
Av. mean	9.0	2.3	-3.5	-6.4	-5.5	-0.3	7.1
Av. max.	16.1	8.2	1.3	-1.4	-0.3	4.9	12.8
Av. min.	3.1	-2.2	-7.5	-10.9	-10.2	-5.0	1.7

Arabian Platform (see map for locations)

	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	April
Cizre. 37.19 N. 42.11 E. 355 metres.							
Av. mean	21.2	13.4	8.4	6.8	8.4	12.5	17.5
Av. max.	30.3	22.0	17.2	13.2	18.4	23.6	29.1
Av. min.*	14.5	8.7	4.6	2.7	3.8	7.3	11.6

	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	April
Siirt. 37.55 N. 41.57 E. 895 metres.							
Av. mean	17.8	10.1	4.6	2.7	4.2	8.4	13.9
Av. max.	24.3	15.3	8.7	6.8	8.7	13.4	19.4
Av. min.*	12.6	6.0	1.6	-0.7	0.1	3.8	9.0

* For period 1971–2000

Source: Research and Statistics Office, Turkish State Meteorological Service (DMİ), Ankara.

Table B. Weather events on the Arabian Platform (1975–2008).

	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	April
Cizre							
Average precipitation (mm)	25.0	67.4	113.6	109.8	125.6	101.8	69.7
Rain days: 10 mm or greater	0.8	2.4	3.9	3.7	4.4	3.8	2.0
Snowfall days	–	–	0.2	0.8	1.1	0.1	–
Snow cover days	–	–	0.2	0.3	0.3	–	–
Storm days	0.9	0.2	0.6	0.9	1.2	1.5	1.8
Fog days	–	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.1	–
Siirt							
Average precipitation (mm)	48.2	79.8	89.8	78.1	100.2	108.6	99.0
Rain days: 10 mm or greater	1.6	3.0	3.6	2.8	3.8	4.0	3.2
Snowfall days	–	0.6	2.5	5.1	4.7	2.0	0.1
Snow cover days	–	0.1	2.3	5.0	4.5	1.1	–
Storm days	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.8	0.5	0.9
Fog days	0.1	0.6	2.8	3.5	1.4	0.4	0.1

Source: Research and Statistics Office, Turkish State Meteorological Service (DMİ), Ankara.

Climate of Eastern Turkey

The climate in the east of the Turkish Republic is one of the most varied and extreme in the world. The interplay of diverse topography with major climatic determiners such as atmospheric circulation and maritime influence produces several distinct regimes.[18] Winter and summer are the dominant

[18] *Climatic factors: Altitude*: in general terms, an increase in height of 100 metres will lead to a fall in temperature of 0.65°C (Environmental Lapse Rate). From the low-lying plains of Mesopotamia the Ten Thousand gradually ascended to heights in excess of 2,500 metres before dropping rapidly to the Black Sea. *Distance from the Sea*: the surrounding seas have a significant impact on levels of precipitation and temperatures in Anatolia; because of its distance from both the Mediterranean and the Black Seas, and its encirclement by

seasons, with spring (April and May) and autumn (September and October) brief but mild transitional periods.

The climate prevailing in this region in the Classical era is not considered to have been notably different than today's; referring to the Sub-Atlantic period—c. 750 to the present—in the eastern Mediterranean, Bintliff writes: 'The general environmental and archaeological evidence from the Levant is of a climate comparable to the present day ... In Turkey, once again, the woodland record offers little apparent sensitivity to changes detectable in river regimes and other geological evidence'.[19] A more recent study shows, however, that in the period 1950–2003, there has been a statistically significant upward trend in temperature indices for the region.[20] This is part of a global trend which has seen mean surface air temperature rise between 0.3°C and 0.6°C in the last hundred years.[21] Anecdotal evidence also suggests that the dam building programme in the east of Turkey (GAP) has led to increases in levels of precipitation and humidity. These factors can be borne in mind when examining the data presented in the tables, as can the possibility that the climate record for any given year can be anomalous.[22]

Arabian Platform

This region might be described as the transitional zone between the highlands of eastern Anatolia and the plains of Mesopotamia. It stretches from the base of the Amanos Mountains (Nur Dağları) in the west to the foothills of the northern Zagros in the east; to the north the space is bounded by the Anti-Taurus (Güney-Doğu Toroslar). The piedmont is marked by gentle relief, with the terrain descending gradually from the base of the Anti-Taurus (750 m.) to the frontier of the Syrian Plain (300 m.). Emerging from the highlands the Euphrates and Tigris drive across the platform and continue on to form Mesopotamia.

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mountains, the interior experiences these effects to a much lesser degree. *Atmospheric Circulation*: the dominant large-scale determiners of Near Eastern climate are the Polar and Subtropical jet streams. The latter pushes into the region in May carrying strong upper westerly winds and rain fronts; in winter the Polar Jet blows cold air in from the Atlantic and creates rain-bearing low-pressure systems in the Mediterranean.

19 Bintliff 1982: 150, 152. See also Mariolopoulos 1925 and Kuniholm 1990.

20 Zhang et al. 2005.

21 Erkan et al. 1998: 519.

22 See generally introduction in Harding 1982. The basis of climatic description is typically observational records which span thirty years or more for sites in a given regional environment: see Barry 2008: 11–16.

Latitude, distance from the Mediterranean, and the presence of mountain barriers give the region its distinctive climatic character. This is marked by very hot and dry summers but notably mild winters: average temperatures in January, the coldest month, rarely fall below freezing (see Table A). Low pressure systems in the Mediterranean carry light precipitation to the platform, December through to March being the wettest months. What falls as snow in the higher areas rarely survives for more than a week (Table B).

Eastern Anatolia

North of the Anti-Taurus the terrain is rugged and mountainous. Bordered in the west by the Central Anatolian High Plateau and in the north by the Pontic range, the region is dominated by a dense system of fold mountains. Volcanic cones and their produce are a prominent feature of the landscape; lava flows in recent geological time have buried whole valleys, creating undulating tablelands and numerous lakes. Four major rivers rise in the region: the Çoruh (Harpasos), Aras (Araxes), Fırat (Euphrates), and Dicle (Tigris). Rainfall and enormous quantities of melt water from the winter snows constitute the bulk of their total volumes. The catchment area of the Euphrates and Tigris alone is said to produce some fifty billion cubic metres of water annually. Cutting into the lava layers, in places the rivers have formed deep gorges and often are the most practical routeways.

The climate profile of this vast area is not uniform, though understanding of the climatic system is still not complete.[23] In broad terms, mountains and distance limit the moderating sea influence, with altitude (average elevation is over 2,000 metres: see map) an important climatic determiner; summers, consequently, are hot and dry and winters are severe. In the north-east of the region, where the Cyreans may have travelled in late winter, conditions are especially difficult: night time temperatures can go as low as -40°C and there is snow on the ground for over 120 days of the year.[24]

23 Bintliff & Van Zeist 1982: 4; Newton 2004: 103. The essential determinants of the climate gradually came to be understood by early scientists. Ainsworth 1854: 319–320 writes: 'The knowledge which we now possess of the great elevation of these Armenian uplands explains the extreme severity of the winters, which has been the subject of much controversy; so much so, that Tournefort, the traveller and botanist, suggested that it might be owing to so unnatural a cause as the impregnation of the soil with sal-ammoniac. Positive elevation, in which the immediate results of a lower temperature are increased by a continental climate, and a long continuity of open woodless tracts, appears to be the main causes of the phenomenon in question.'

24 Robert Curzon 1854: 162, who spent the winter of 1842–1843 in Erzurum, writes: 'During a great part of the year, and naturally in the winter, the cold was so severe that any one standing still for even a very short time, was frozen to death. Dead frozen bodies were

Black Sea

The Turkish Black Sea coastal region is defined by the Pontic Mountains, which extend along much of the northern coast of Anatolia. Towards the eastern end they gradually become higher and press in towards the sea, so that within a short distance of the coast, 20–30 kilometres, they rise up to heights in excess of 3,000 metres. The landscape in this area consists of steep valleys, regularly occupied by rapid streams which tumble down towards the sea. The topography in the eastern part makes land travel difficult; until the engineering projects of the twentieth-century travellers went by sea, though in the case of the Ten Thousand, their numbers meant that the main body had to undertake lengthy sections of the *parabasis* on foot.[25]

The climate of the southern Black Sea littoral is mild and damp. Summer temperatures are moderately hot and winters are mild;[26] the region is Turkey's wettest, with the eastern section having the highest level of rainfall (average p.a. 1,400 mm.). Year-round northerly winds cool over the heights resulting in precipitation on the seaward side that is more or less evenly distributed over the calendar.[27] The mountains themselves experience a regime close to that of the interior, with altitude lending an added sharpness to temperatures in winter. Snow in the highland pastures does not clear until as late as May.

Space and Time: Mapping the Route of the Ten Thousand

Much of the route recorded by Xenophon has been uncovered by travellers and classical scholars in the modern era.[28] The least well established section of the march is the way taken by the army across eastern Anatolia. A lack

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frequently brought into the city; and it is common in the summer, on the melting of the snow, to find numerous corpses of men and bodies of horses, who had perished in the preceding winter. So usual an event is this, that there is a custom, or law, in the mountains of Armenia, that every summer the villagers go out to the more dangerous passes and bury the dead whom they are sure to find.'

[25] 5.3.1–2: Trapezus to Cerasus; 5.4.1–5.3: Cerasus to Cotyora; 6.2.17–6.38: Heraclea to Chrysopolis.

[26] Average January temperature for Trabzon is 7.2°C, with the hottest month, July, 23.3°C.

[27] The effectiveness of the mountain barrier in the eastern section of the range is illustrated by the fact that Bayburt, which sits south of the heights to the south-east of Trabzon (see map), receives less than a third of the rainfall which falls on the coast. The amount of air moisture in the region is thought to be related to sea temperature: highest rainfall occurs in September, when the water temperature is at its maximum, and lowest in May when the sea is coolest.

[28] For an account of travellers in the tracks of the Ten Thousand see Rood 2004: 134–161.

of identifiable way-marks in Xenophon's narrative, together with comparatively limited knowledge of settlement patterns in the region, has made the route difficult to reconstruct, though there has been no shortage of suggestions.[29] The route proposed in this section is based on the researches of early and more recent travellers, including journeys by this author in the region.[30] No way-marks are suggested for the arduous trek from beyond the headwaters of the Euphrates up until the Black Sea (Pontic) Mountains (4.5.3–7.19), but, since that part of the journey lay in any case within a single geographical and climatic region (Eastern Anatolia), absolute precision about the route does not matter for the present purposes.[31]

The method adopted for exposing the chronology of the army's steps towards the sea is to situate Xenophon's reports of the world around him in an appropriate environmental context. By combining his descriptions with characteristics of the relevant geographical regions, it should be possible to make inferences about a window of time, if not an exact time of year, to which the descriptions relate.

Anabasis 3.5.7, 4.1.2. The Size of the Tigris at the 'Crossroads'

Modern identification: Cizre. See map.

Geographical region: Arabian Platform.

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[29] See Lendle 1995: 221, 237 and Manfredi 1986: 4–5 for illustrations of several of the hypotheses.

[30] Especially Kinneir 1818, Layard 1853, Ainsworth 1854, Manfredi 1986, Lendle 1995.

[31] Layard's 1853: 65 remarks on this problematic stretch are still as good a summation of the problem as any: 'There is not, I conceive, sufficient data in Xenophon's narrative to identify with any degree of certainty his route after crossing the Euphrates. We know that about twenty parasangs from that river, the Greeks encamped near a hot spring, and this spring might be recognised in one of the many which abound in the country. It is most probable that the Greeks took the road still used by caravans through the plains of Hinnis (Khanus) and Hassan-Kalah, as offering the fewest difficulties. But what rivers are we to identify with the Phasis and Harpasus, the distance between the Euphrates and Phasis being seventy parasangs, and between the Phasis and Harpasus ninety-five, and the Harpasus being the larger of the two rivers? I cannot admit that the Greeks turned to the west and passed near the site of the modern Erzeroom. There are no rivers in that direction to answer the description of Xenophon. Moreover, the Greeks came to the high mountain, and beheld the sea for the first time, at the distance of thirty-two parasangs from Trebizond. Had they taken either of the three modern roads from Erzeroom to the coast, and there are no others, they must have seen the Euxine in the immediate vicinity of Trebizond, certainly not more than six or eight parasangs from that city. I am, on the whole, inclined to believe that either the Greeks took a very tortuous course after leaving the Euphrates, making daily but little actual progress toward the great end of their arduous journey, the sea-coast, or that there is a considerable error in the amount of parasangs given by Xenophon.'

Route: With Tissaphernes and his army hard on their heels, the Greeks arrived at a place where routes led west to Ionia, east to Susa and Ecbatana, and north into the territory of the Carduchi (3.5.14–15). A longstanding view is that this junction by the Tigris was situated in the vicinity of Cizre, the site of a Roman fortress (Bezabde) and an important trading post since at least the early Islamic era.[32]

Chronology:

> *3.5.7.* ... on one side there were extremely high ranges, on another there was a river so deep that their spears did not even break the surface of the water when they tested its depth.
>
> *4.1.2.* When they arrived where the Tigris River was in every way impassable on account of its depth and great breadth, and there was no way alongside it, but the Carduchian heights hung sheer above the river, the soldiers thought it best that they go through the mountains.[33]

The Tigris drains a considerable area of eastern Turkey, and receives a number of major tributaries along its middle and lower course. It carries a greater volume of water than the Euphrates and its flow is much less predictable: heavy rain in the Zagros Mountains, for instance, can lead to a rise of 3–4 metres in its level within twenty-four hours.[34] The river experiences its ebb in September/October, whereafter its level begins to rise with the first rains. By mid-December, when rain amounts are substantial, it can have risen to over 2.5 metres above low water. From this point its level increases steadily until high water is reached (3.5 metres above minimum) in early April.[35] This regime indicates that Xenophon's reports fit better with winter than autumn, the later part of that season being best. However, given the sensitivity of the river to local rainfall, it may be possible to associate the descriptions of the river's size with an exceptionally wet autumn.

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[32] See Talbert 2000: map 89; Manfredi 1986: map 13; Ainsworth 1854: 310–311. Ainsworth was struck by how Xenophon's description accorded with the topography of this location: 'This is the great pass of the Tigris I have just alluded to immediately beyond Jizirah [Cizre] ibn Umar: there cannot be a moment's question on the subject'. See also Syme 1995: 12, 29–30. French 1998: 18 locates the Tigris crossing further to the south, at Eski Mosul. C. Sagona 2004: 302–303 places the crossroads Xenophon writes of by the Euphrates to the north-west of Muş, but she fails to explain properly why his references to the Tigris at this juncture should be disregarded.

[33] 4.1.1–4 is regarded as an interpolation by most editors.

[34] Fisher 1978: 365. The Euphrates, by contrast, is constituted of precipitation from a single and more closely defined catchment area.

[35] Fisher 1978: 366–367; see Table B for precipitation amounts on the Arabian Platform.



Map of Eastern Turkey.

Anabasis 4.1.15, 2.2, 2.7. Weather Events in Carduchia

Modern identification: The area is bounded by Jebel Judi (Cudi Dağı) in the south, and the Botan Su, a major tributary of the Tigris, in the north.[36] See map.

Geographical region: Arabian Platform.

Route: Having made the decision to take the way north, the Greeks trekked over a height that led into Carduchian territory (4.1.4–7). A week fighting through the lands of this people brought the army within sight of the Centrites, which Xenophon reports as being almost 60 metres in width (4.3.1). The topography of this area is worth highlighting. Beyond Cizre the plain gives way abruptly to a rugged hillscape marked by steep heights and valleys. The terrain provides a natural defence for inhabitants, and to this day has proved difficult for armies to control.[37] It is not until the Anti-Taurus is met to the north that the terrain becomes mountainous in the sense that we might understand it, although highpoints in Carduchia could be properly classified as such. It can be noted that Xenophon's use of ὄρος, usually translated as 'mountain', can also refer to a hill or range of hills.[38]

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36 For Carduchia see Hewsen 2001: map 17; Talbert 2000: map 89. The Botan Su is widely considered to be Xenophon's Centrites: see Layard 1853: 63, Ainsworth 1854: 314, Lendle 1995: 224, Schachner 2008: 411. Manfredi 1986: 189, who makes the same identification, thinks that the name (Κεντρίτης) derives from the Armenian *Serkhet'k*, which survives today in the name of the nearby provincial capital, Siirt. Kinneir 1818: 483 identified the Centrites with the Habur to the south; C. Sagona 2004: 306 thinks it is the Aras in the north.

37 Xen. 3.5.16 remarks that a royal army of 120,000 once penetrated into the heights, and that 'on account of the difficulty of the ground not one of them returned'. The practice of modern military strategists has been to evacuate the villages and control movement from hill-top forts.

38 Definitions of mountain areas have traditionally been arbitrary and vary according to the topographical profile of a region. Barry 2008: 2 writes: 'Usually no qualitative, or even quantitative, distinction is made between mountains and hills. Common usage in North America suggests that 600 metres or more of local relief distinguishes mountains from hills'. Bell 1924: 293 offers a rare view of Carduchia from the top of Jebel Judi (c. 2,100 m.). 'The prospect from the ziyârah was as wild, as rugged and as splendid as the heart could desire, and desolate beyond measure. The ridge of Jûdî Dâgh sinks down to the north on to a rolling upland which for many miles offers ideal dwelling-places for a hardy mountain folk. There were but four villages to be seen upon it. The largest of these was Shandokh, the home of a family of Kurdish âghâs whose predatory habits account for the scantiness of the population. To the east of it lay Heshtân, which is in Arabic Thamânîn (the Eighty), so called because the eighty persons who were saved from the Deluge founded there the first village of the regenerated world when they descended from Jebel Jûdî. Further

Chronology:

> *4.1.15, 2.2. Wintry storm, heavy rain.* (1.15) On the following day there was a wintry storm, but it was necessary to march on, for there were not sufficient provisions. (2.2) Having agreed to all this, the volunteers set out, about two thousand in number, and a heavy rain fell.

Xenophon's use of χειμών at 4.1.15 seems to be a clear seasonal indicator.[39] The severe weather described—the conditions bad enough that the army would have halted had it not needed to secure provisions—would best fit with the winter profile of the regional climate. The mention of heavy rain one/two days later reinforces the winter conjecture. Rain days are more frequent and rainfall amounts greater in winter than in autumn, with February on both measures being the wettest month (see Table B).

> *4.2.7. Fog.* And here they passed the night. When dawn was just barely visible, they marched in silence and in order against the enemy. There was also fog, so they escaped notice even when they got close.[40]

The day after the heavy rain the army encountered fog. This could have been one of two types: radiation or advection. The former is caused by a combination of thermal conditions (strong cooling) and high pressure, and in inland areas is most common in autumn. The fog is dispersed, or burned off, by the rising sun. Advection fog forms when a warm, moisture bearing air-stream passes over a cooler surface. This type of fog, which occurs in winter in the south-eastern region of Turkey, will sit until blown off by a strong wind. Xenophon's description is insufficient to determine the type which is being referred to; the possibility that it could have been advection fog, however, shows that the event need not be tied to autumn.[41]

Anabasis 4.4.8, 4.11, 5.1. Heavy Snowfalls between the Teleboas (Karasu) and Euphrates Rivers

Modern identification: Otluk Mountains, north of Muş Plain. See map.

Geographical region: Eastern Anatolia.

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to the north an endless welter of mountains stretched between us and Lake Vân. They rose, towards the east, into snowy ranges.'

[39] Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 3.8.9 χειμῶνος, 'in winter-time'; 4.3.8 ἐν χειμῶνι, 'in winter'.

[40] A Kurdish proverb has it: 'Morning fog is the wolf's delight' (Roja duman e, kêfa guran e).

[41] *Contra* Manfredi 1986: 215, Lee 2007: 30. For number of days in the region with fog see Table B.

Route: On crossing the Centrites River, the army marched no less than five parasangs across a terrain marked by gently rolling hills, coming to a palace of the satrap (4.4.1–2).[42] From here they marched for two days until they crossed the sources of the Tigris River (4.4.3). This route would probably have taken the army up through the Bitlis Valley, a crack in the Taurus wall which opens not far from Lake Van.[43] They next marched three days to the River Teleboas (Karasu), and thence another three days, across a plain, until coming to a palace around which were many well-provisioned villages (4.4.3, 7). The likely route here was north-westward down onto the Muş Plain, which is watered by the Karasu, and then north on to the foothills of the Otluk Mountains. These climb high above the plain, offering striking views of the imposing Süphan Dağı (4,058 m.) to the east.

Chronology:

> *4.4.8.* While they were camping there [by a royal residence with many well-provisioned villages around], during the night there was a heavy snowfall, and at dawn they decided to send their companies and generals into quarters throughout these places; for they saw no enemy, and it seemed to be safe because of the quantity of the snow.
>
> *4.4.11.* But while they were passing the [second] night, a tremendous snow fell upon them, so that it hid both the weapons and the people lying there. The snowfall also hampered the baggage animals, and there was a great reluctance to get up, for the fallen snow was warm to whomever it did not slip off.
>
> *4.5.1.* On the next day it seemed they had to march away [from the villages] as rapidly as they possibly could, before the enemy army was gathered together again and occupied the narrow passes. After packing up they set out immediately through deep snow with many guides …

These are the first mentions of snow in the text and they confirm the army's presence in the Armenian Highlands. That Xenophon has not referred to snow up until this point does not mean that there has not been any; his reports of *heavy* (πολλή) and *tremendous* (ἄπλετος) falls almost invite the

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[42] Ainsworth 1854: 317 and Manfredi 1986: map 13 tentatively locate the large settlement in the area of modern Siirt.

[43] Layard 1853: 63–64 can see no other alternative. '*There was no road* into Armenia, particularly at that time of year ['nearly midwinter'], for an army encumbered with baggage, except that through the Bitlis valley. The remains of an ancient causeway are even now to be traced, and this probably has always been the great thoroughfare between western Armenia and the Assyrian plains.'

understanding that there has already been 'standard' snow. As has been noted, Xenophon is more likely to remark on exceptional phenomena, and it is unlikely that he or most of his men would have previously experienced such weather events.[44]

As the first snows in this region usually begin in November and cease in March, the description is theoretically valid for anytime within this window. However, a narrowing of the timeframe seems to be permitted on the basis that the heaviest snows here are experienced in January and February (see n. 48 below).

Anabasis 4.5.3–6. Deep Snow after Crossing the Euphrates Close to Its Sources

Modern identification: North of Murat Nehri (Euphrates headwater) at Bulanık. See map.

Geographical region: Eastern Anatolia.

Route: Descending from the Otluk Mountains the army crossed the Euphrates and proceeded to march for three days across a plain blanketed in heavy snow (4.5.3). The crossing of the heights and the apparent change from a north-west to a north-east direction was presumably dictated by a known crossing place of the river: on coming to the Teleboas, had the army followed this river they would have reached the Euphrates much sooner and with much less effort. At the crossing place Xenophon comments that 'they got wet to the navel, and it was said that its sources were not far away' (4.5.2).[45] This location may be around modern Bulanık, though the Alparslan Dams

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44 Xenophon was not unfamiliar with snow: cf. *Cyn.* 8.1–2. Both Manfredi 1986: 215 and Lee 2007: 30 contend that the snows mentioned by Xenophon in these passages were the first ones the army met on the journey.

45 In a reconsideration of the course of the Royal Road through Asia Minor, French 1998: 18 suggests as a possible route onwards from Elazığ one going east through Bingöl, Muş, and Bitlis, and thence southwards to Siirt. While most commentators, including French, prefer a route through the Maden-Ergani gap ('on the grounds that not only is it the natural route between Elazığ and Diyarbakır but it is also the shortest route through the Anti-Taurus Mountains'), the apparent feasibility of the Muş way increases our wish to know why the army decided to go north-east. In addition to the possibility of a fordability issue (though they could have turned west after their actual crossing), an explanation for the failure to pursue a direct way to Ionia could be that Tiribazus, the ὕπαρχος of Western Armenia, was intentionally blocking their way. Xenophon's account of the army's dealings with him may not tell the full story.

(I and II) now distort the river's natural level and have submerged a wide area.[46] Beyond the river, a rolling tableland stretches northwards.

Chronology:

> *4.5.3–4, 6*. From here, they marched through deep snow and across a plain … (4) … but the depth of the snow was six feet, as a result of which many of the baggage animals and captives perished, and about thirty of the soldiers … (6) … Since the snow was melting where fire was burning, large holes developed, reaching down as far as the ground. Accordingly, one could here measure the depth of the snow.[47]

Xenophon's account must be indicative of accumulated snowfall. The deep snow lies on a plain, and the subsequent remark about the fires suggests compacted snow rather than recent precipitation. The depth of six feet (ἦν δὲ τῆς χιόνος τὸ βάθος ὀργυιά) would be extreme for any plain in this region, even at the point of greatest accumulation in February, though wide variations are found depending on the local topography.[48] These descriptions are most appropriate to the later part of winter.

Anabasis 4.7.21–26.
Crossing of the Black Sea Mountains, Mount Theches

Modern identification: Madur Dağı. See map.

Geographical region: Black Sea.

Route: In the north-east of Anatolia the Greeks came to a city called Gymnias, and a guide sent by the ruler of this territory promised that in five days

46 For discussion of the crossing see Lendle 1995: 231–233, Manfredi 1986: 205–207. The programme to harness eastern Anatolian rivers for economic benefit has intensified in recent years, causing not only the loss of important historical landscapes but large-scale ecological and social disruption: www.vimeo.com/21679494 (accessed 14 September 2011).

47 Cf. also 4.5.36. 'Here the village chief also taught them to wrap small bags around the feet of the horses and baggage animals whenever they would go through the snow; for without the bags, they would sink in as far as their stomachs'.

48 Correspondence with Faize Sarış, March 2009. For most, if not all weather stations in eastern Anatolia, the highest level of recorded snowfall, and greatest depth, has occurred in February. In the period 1975–2006 (DMİ data): *Bitlis*—depth 341 cm on 13/02/76, greatest precipitation 122 kg/m^2 on 23/02/92; *Muş*—depth 163 cm on 23/02/92, greatest precipitation 85.6 kg/m^2 on 22/02/04; *Erzurum*—depth 110 cm on 24/02/04, greatest precipitation 59.6 kg/m^2 on 23/02/04; *Kars*—depth 88 cm on 19/02/90, greatest precipitation 61.3 kg/m^2 on 14/07/01; *Bayburt*—depth 110 cm on 04/03/76, greatest precipitation 41.6 kg/m^2 on 25/10/96.

he would lead them to a place from where they would see the sea (4.7.19–20). Gymnias has traditionally been identified with modern Bayburt;[49] the route to the mountains from here is across the rolling Bayburt Plain, a land which the Ten Thousand, at the behest of their guide, left ravaged.

Attempts to identify the mountain, which most of the manuscripts name as Θήχης, have been made since at least the time of Arrian (*Periplus* 1), though there is no agreement today on a precise location.[50] The site proposed here is Madur Dağı (2,742 m.), which lies south-east of Trabzon, around thirty kilometres direct distance from the sea at Araklı. The peak, distinctively shaped, rises about two hundred metres above a shoulder, which serves as a natural pass for traffic to and from the coast. The slope would be accessible enough for a large body of people to hike to the summit. A levelling just before the top measures approximately 12 m. × 6 m., while the top itself is a flat space measuring approximately 30 m. × 8 m. At almost all times in late spring the coastline is said to be visible. On the shoulder a collection of stones lie scattered, possibly the remains of a cairn.[51]

Chronology: The crossing of the Pontic range in winter would have been difficult, but is not completely out of the question, despite Gustav Gassner's insistence to the contrary in his important study of the chronology.[52] The army had already negotiated severe snow conditions in the passage through Armenia, and with the aid of the local guide, could well have made their way through. Nonetheless, in addition to the obvious fact that Xenophon makes no mention of snow, it is the case that the passes would probably have been firmly blocked in winter, opening up only in late spring. Travelling up to the

[49] A recent survey of the area places Gymnias further west at Gümüşhane: Sagona & Sagona 2004: 68.

[50] Recent studies have argued for Deveboynu Tepesi (Mitford 2000, Manfredi 2004, Waterfield 2006), the highest peak in the region at just over 3,000 metres, and for the area around Zigana Pass (Lendle 1995: 273–281, Lee 2007: 29 n. 68). For a selection of historical candidates for the mountain see Manfredi 1986: map 16.

[51] Madur Dağı and its nearby sister, the slightly taller Polat Dağı (2,880 m.), are regarded by local archaeologists as the most likely candidates for Theches. See especially Bilgin 2000: 16–23. Hamilton 1842: 1.166 seems to me to have passed near this spot on a journey from Trabzon to Erzurum in 1836, but on various grounds he dismissed it as the point in question. Having roamed in the area for a number of weeks in late spring 2001, I came upon no more suitable location than Madur to fit Xenophon's account; I have not investigated here the confluence Xenophon describes at 4.8.1–2, but hope to be able to do so, and explore routes onto the sea, at a future stage.

[52] 'Diese Gebirge sind im Winter nicht passierbar' ('these mountains are not passable in winter'): Gassner 1953: 3. See further below (pp. 327–328).

heights from Trabzon in late May, 1836, Hamilton writes: 'We left Karakaban a few minutes before six [a.m.], still ascending by a bad and stony road; at every step the country became more bleak and barren, and the vegetation had not recovered from the effects of the snow, which was just melted. In fact, it was only within a few days that this pass had been open; and, on reaching the top, we had still to cross an undulating plain where we found several great tracts of snow, which caused us much delay, as the horses were constantly breaking through the crust, and sinking up to the girths.'[53] In late April 2001, I followed a route from Bayburt to Trabzon via the Kostandagı Pass (2,280 m.); though conditions on several days were poor (high winds, snow, low cloud), much of the snow in the low-lying areas had melted, with just the occasional snowfield to cross. Consequently progress was slow, but not unfeasible.

There are other factors which argue against the army crossing in winter. With stones lying under a thick cover of snow, erecting a sizeable cairn at Theches, as the Cyreans did to mark the sighting of the Euxine (4.7.25–26, Diodoros 14.29.4), would have presented difficulties.[54] Manfredi makes the point too that Xenophon and the cavalry could hardly have galloped forward (from the rear to give aid, thinking something had happened at the front) had there been a thick snow covering beneath the horses.[55] Both Manfredi and Gassner favour a dating of May 400 for the arrival at Theches.[56] In light of the personal experience cited above I consider that the arrival could have been in the second half of April, but no earlier than that.[57]

The 'Snow Lacuna' Theory

The traditional view on the march chronology has the army set out from Sardis in mid-spring 401, fight at Cunaxa in September, and reach Mount Theches in late January 400. Arguing that both the crossing of the Pontic

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53 Hamilton 1842: 1.165–166, and see Ainsworth 1854: 334. Lee 2007: 31, *contra* Gassner 1953: 5 and Manfredi 1986: 213, considers that the Zigana Pass would have been practicable 'even in intense winters'.

54 See Gassner 1953: 6, Manfredi 1986: 212.

55 Manfredi 1986: 213 *ad* 4.7.24.

56 Manfredi 1986: 215 early May, Gassner 1953:33 late May.

57 Further support for a 'late' dating may come from Xenophon's report at 5.4.27 of νέον σῖτον (new grain) in the houses of a Black Sea tribe west of Trapezus. With the grain harvest in August, counting back through the record the army's arrival at Trapezus is placed in June. See Gassner 1953: 8, Manfredi 1986: 233–234, Lendle 1995: 329.

Mountains and the raising of a cairn at the base of Theches would have been impossible in January due to snow, Gustav Gassner proposed instead that this happened around the end of May 400.[58] Using evidence from the physical and natural worlds, he built a case for a late chronology, with the crossing of the Euphrates at Thapsacus moved to the start of September and subsequent encounters with canals and dates to November.[59] He did not, however, adequately explain the gaps that appeared in the record as a consequence of his scheme, a fact that undermined the influence of his important methodological approach.[60] A more recent proponent of a 'late' chronology, Otto Lendle, has drawn a similar criticism for the way he seems to have stretched the retreat framework by his translation of the count of days into passage of months.[61]

Taking an opposite view on the chronology, Glombiowski has presented arguments for an 'early' timeframe. Basing his theory on a view that the Arcadian Lycaean Festival, celebrated by the Greeks at Peltae (1.2.10), took place on the vernal equinox, he has the march begin in early February, with his subsequent dating one month earlier than that of the traditional framework.[62] This structure has been used, with some modifications, by John Lee in his recent work on the logistics of the march.[63]

[58] Gassner 1953: 3, 6, 33.

[59] Gassner 1953: 11–12.

[60] For example, Gassner 1953:11 has the army crossing the Euphrates in early September, not much more than a month after Koch had placed the crossing using the 6 March start (see n. 2 above), yet he then has the army on Theches in late May (33), leaving an unexplained gap in the record. Glombiowski 1994: 40 adjudges that the 'frailty of Gassner's method is in his quite perfunctory relation to the fundamental source, which is Xenophon's *Anabasis*'.

[61] Lendle 1995 has the army at Cunaxa in October 401 BC (105–106) but not reach Trapezus until June 400 BC (291, 329). For a criticism of his methodology see Tuplin 1998.

[62] Glombiowski 1994. The army crosses the Euphrates in late June, reaches Babylonia in early August and Mount Theches at the end of December.

[63] Lee 2007. He has the army arrive in Trapezus in early January 400 BC (35), although he elsewhere writes that it was early February (28). Our view on the chronology affects how we understand the environmental conditions under which the march was undertaken. An important illustration of the differences between time-frames comes in Lee's assertion that at Cunaxa the army 'may have suffered some casualties from heat stroke and exhaustion' (27): in the 'late' scenario, the battle would have been fought under a softer autumnal sun which would not have had so severe an impact on combatants. A writer's view on the chronology can also impact on his evaluation of internal evidence. For example, Donner 1986 makes a case for Xenophon having misnamed the eastern part of Mesopotamia as Arabia. In formulating his argument he offers as an explanation for Xenophon's failure to mention pastoral nomads, 'long associated with Arabia and Arabs' (1), the possibility that they were 'either away in the steppe or in hiding when Xenophon and his army passed through' (3). But he discounts this, not implausible, explanation partly on the assumption that the traditional

The merit of the 'early' scheme is said to be that the worst of winter is avoided, but the problems associated with crossing the Pontic range highlighted by Gassner are hardly resolved. Moreover, the famous encounter in the Colchian hills with hallucinogenic honey (4.8.20–21) has been convincingly dated to late spring, although Lee has questioned the value of the episode for the chronology.[64] Leaving aside these matters, and the fact that the early scheme does not fit well with a number of other chronological pointers in the text, some scholars doubt that the Lycaean Games would have been celebrated as early as March. The current excavator at Mount Lycaeum, David Gilman Romano, points to the present-day practice of holding games in the hippodrome in summer and notes that conditions in spring would have made athletic competition difficult.[65] In the panel discussion at the Liverpool conference Jim Roy expressed the view that the games were held to boost the morale of the soldiers at the outset of the march and that there need not have been any correlation with a fixed date of celebration.[66] Thus the anchor of the early timeframe cannot be said to be secure.

In his 1986 topographical commentary Valerio Manfredi, who travelled the entire route over a number of years, endorsed the arguments of Gassner with regards to the army's arrival at Trapezus at the end of spring or begin-

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chronology is accurate: 'According to Xenophon's account, the passage of Cyrus' army down the Euphrates would have occurred around mid-summer, when the nomads and their flocks would have been forced by the heat and parched pastures to remain close to the river. Simply driving one's flock off 'into the steppe' to avoid contact with the approaching army would be suicidal [...] under the conditions of mid-summer heat' (5). So because it was mid-summer Xenophon would have encountered Arab nomads had there been any; the fact that he does not leads to the conclusion that his use of the term Arabia to designate the eastern part of Mesopotamia is, for the period in question, inaccurate.

64 Working from the knowledge that bees live through winter on the stores of honey they have produced during the flowering season, and that the Ten Thousand evidently came across significant quantities, Gassner 1953: 6–7 realised they must have encountered new honey well into the production period (April – early June). He thus asserted that the incident occurred towards the end of May 400 BC. Lee 2007: 29–30 n. 72 thinks that they ate honeycombs from the previous (401 BC) spring. See further his criticism on Lane Fox's work below. On the subject of 'mad honey' (*deli bal*) see, for instance, Pastiades 1939, Mayor 1995, Dubey et al. 2009.

65 Correspondence with author, April 2009. Dr Gilman Romano writes: 'I am dubious about the idea that the games were held 21–24 March. I was in Greece at about this time this year and on the 26th or 27th of March there was a snow in the mountains of Arcadia that I witnessed including Mt. Lykaion and the neighbouring villages. This would not be uncommon and I prefer to think that the Lykaion Games would have been held later in the Spring if for no other reason than the weather and the fact that the hippodrome is at 1,170 m. above sea level and on a mountain plateau.'

66 See further Roy 1967: 314, 2004: 279.

ning of summer 400; less satisfied with his observations about the departure date from Sardis, he presented a case for the army's entry into Babylonia being in early September 401, a date which at the same time provided an anchor for the chronology of the retreat.[67] With an arrival date at the sea of no earlier than May established, a gap in Xenophon's record of up to three months was exposed.

Manfredi's theory was subsequently taken up by Robin Lane Fox who, through a study of the Azalea flowering season, circumscribed the dating of the 'mad honey' episode, and hence put down a more precise chronological marker at this end of the retreat:

> The notion, previously widespread, that the Ten Thousand reached Trapezus in February–March 400 is therefore wrong. It founders on the absence of snows, which would have blocked the passes at that date, but above all it founders on the exact azalea season below Maçka …
>
> Among the Colchians, the fresh 'mad honey' is a mid May to early June phenomenon. If we then work backwards down Xenophon's route, we find the Greeks encountering their first snowfalls by the River Centrites as they entered into Armenia in late 401. Here, snow regularly begins in late November, or at most, early December … On the evidence, then, of the narrative, and nothing else, the Greeks should have reached the honey and the Colchian villages by mid February. In fact, they did not reach them until mid May or early June. At least three months of the story have therefore dropped out of Xenophon's account.[68]

The favoured explanation of both Manfredi and Lane Fox for this alleged omission is that Xenophon was seeking to cover over an event, or events, that did not reflect well upon his leadership. Manfredi speculates that this arose from misidentification of the Araxes (Aras), an error that led to the army marching east towards the Caspian Sea, and which may have resulted in heavy casualties due to the weather.[69] While both concede that the

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[67] Manfredi 1986: 211–215. Evidence for early September in Babylonia is said to come from Cyrus' holding of his review of troops (prior to the battle) at midnight (1.7.1), this on account of the heat in Mesopotamia at that time of the year, and from an argument that the climate of lower Mesopotamia can result in dates ripening in the first week of September (214).

[68] Lane Fox 2004: 43. Lee 2007: 39 disputes Lane Fox's claim (39) that the toxic honey can *only* come from absolutely fresh combs and flowers, arguing that its toxicity is related 'only to the amount consumed, not to its freshness … Turkish physicians have observed cases of honey intoxication in all seasons'.

[69] Manfredi 1986: 215–219. The view that the Greeks thought the Araxes was the Phasis, a river further to the north which emptied into the Euxine, and followed it in error, was current among nineteenth-century antiquarians: cf. Ainsworth 1854: 323, 333.

supposed 'snow lacuna' could be the result of poor record-keeping on Xenophon's part, their common opinion is that a conscious decision to omit information is the more likely. Lane Fox concludes that this would fit with a view of Xenophon as 'evasive, apologetic, and a master of leaving unwelcome things out'.[70]

A mainstay of objections to a 'late' chronology—in which the army is in Babylonia in November or later—is that the climate of eastern Turkey is more or less uniform, with all regions subject to severe winter regimes. On this reasoning Xenophon could not have been in the south-eastern ranges in mid-winter without encountering snow, and his weather descriptions moreover are typical of autumn in this area. Commenting on 4.2.2 and 4.2.7, Manfredi writes: 'the descriptions of the first marches in the land of the Carduchi make us think of a climate that is typical for late autumn or early winter.'[71] In a similar vein, and arguing that the climatic reality seriously undermines the veracity of Gassner's late chronology, Glombiowski writes:

> If, according to his idea, the Greeks had begun retreating from Babylonia at the beginning of November, they would have met winter conditions and snow not as far in as the Armenian tableland, but much earlier (after about two months of the march)—as well as in the Kurdish Mountains ... It was 28 November in Koch's chronology [the traditional one] and the first snows would be quite normal in Armenia at 1,200–1,300 metres above sea level just then. If it had been the end of January, as Gassner wants, the snow would have been covering all the distance from the Kurdish Mountains (where the Greeks would have been in the second decade of January) and any abundant snowfalls would not have been surprising.[72]

In accordance with this climatic view, Lane Fox thinks that the Greeks encountered their first snowfalls 'as they entered into Armenia in late 401'.[73]

The climatic evidence presented in this chapter shows that these views are based on a misconception about the regional climate, there being a distinction between the regimes prevailing in the east and south-east of Turkey. The evidence shows that there is no bar to the army being in the south-east of Turkey in winter and not encountering snow, and that Xenophon's account at 4.1–4.2 is, in fact, consistent with the regional cli-

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70 Lane Fox 2004: 45. Many scholars believe that Xenophon's method of dealing with unpleasant realities is to leave them out. See for instance Basset 2001: 9.

71 Manfredi 1986: 215.

72 Glombiowski 1994: 40.

73 Lane Fox 2004: 43. The author appears to identify 4.4.8 with the Centrites, but the army is at least nine days beyond the river at that point.

matic pattern for this time of the year.[74] The army, then, would very probably not have entered snow-bound lands until north of Kurdistan, probably on their emergence from the Bitlis Valley. By placing the army in Carduchia in early February, and proceeding with the march detail given by Xenophon—88 days from the entry into Carduchia to Trapezus—the Black Sea coastline is reached at the start of May and the putative gap is closed.

Summary and Conclusions

This chapter has considered the chronology of the retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks, focussing on the march from upper Mesopotamia to the Black Sea. Neither the length of time nor the route taken by the army on this long stretch is known with certainty. Xenophon's march record, which I have argued was constructed with the intention of being a reliable record of the journey, is restricted here by limited knowledge and by the difficult circumstances of many of the stages. Nonetheless, granted that we can have a degree of confidence in the detail that he does provide, a number of chronological markers can be put down by assigning to the narrative dates that best fit with the events and episodes described along the way. The picture of the chronology which emerges shows no material gap in the record of this part of the journey.[75]

The first datings suggested derived from descriptions of the size of the Tigris River along its upper middle course, and from subsequent and related weather events in Carduchia. The flow of the river is highly sensitive to rainfall and the first rains lead to a notable rise in its level, a trend which continues at a lesser rate through to high water in early April. A combination of reports on the river's large size and heavy rain almost certainly place the episodes in winter, probably towards the end of that season, when rainfall and the river levels respectively are high. A counter argument is that significant tributaries of the river, notably the Greater and the Lesser Zab, would have been swollen by rains in the Zagros Mountains when the army came to them a few weeks earlier and Xenophon would have

[74] Given Xenophon's tendency to report exceptional phenomena (see above, 'The nature and purpose of Xenophon's travelogue'), it follows that even if they had encountered (modest) snowfalls in the area, it being winter, he may well not have thought them worthy of note.

[75] The possibility of an anomalous year in terms of climate cannot be discounted. Conceivably, an exceptionally mild winter, especially in its later part, could have left northern Anatolia relatively snow free, allowing the army to make its way across the mountains in January/February.

commented on how they were forded. However, as has been argued, his road reports are subjective, though he has a tendency to remark on extraordinary circumstances: the army evidently crossed both the Zab rivers and Xenophon's silence suggests that, unlike at the Tigris, no insurmountable problems presented themselves. We might also expect that at these junctures, both situated on a major travel route and in an area of traditional settlement, a crossing infrastructure was in place.[76]

The next indications of time are provided by Xenophon's descriptions of snow. These begin in the eastern highlands in November, with the biggest falls occurring typically in February. Xenophon emphasises at several points in the narrative that the army had to march through heavy snow, estimating it to be almost two metres deep in places. These reports are a clear indication of snow accumulation and situate the crossing of the Armenian tablelands in late winter. The army's arrival at the Pontic Mountains is marked by the apparent absence of heavy snows, which would have made progress extremely slow, if not impossible: in May travel would have been largely unhindered, and the second half of April too would probably have been feasible.

With these chronological pointers set down along the route, working backwards through the march record gives us a date of late November for the Battle of Cunaxa. The sun over Baghdad at this time can still be strong,[77] and white dust and flashes of bronze, such as reported by Xenophon at 1.8.8, could be assigned without difficulty to this period. The case for a November dating is strengthened by what the author says about dates and water channels in Babylonia.

Date palms. 2.3.14–16. Xenophon's account of the fruit gives the distinct impression that it was plentiful; assuming a regular consumption rate throughout the year, it might reasonably be inferred that the harvest was not long finished. In Iraq the female date palms are pollinated in April, and fructification typically takes around five months. In theory the harvest date is determined by variables: higher than average summer temperatures

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[76] The route followed by the army was a principal Achaemenid military one: Tissaphernes led his own army and the Greeks north along it, and near Opis they met a bastard brother of Cyrus and Artaxerxes at the head of a large force (2.4.25). Just before this they had arrived at the Physcus river, which had a bridge over it (2.4.25), and prior to that they had crossed large canals off the Tigris, 'one by a bridge and the other by seven boats tied together' (2.4.13). Perhaps such a pontoon system was in place at the Zab Rivers.

[77] The average temperature for November is 17°C, with considerable diurnal variation. Daytime temperatures in excess of 30°C have been recorded during the month and the average maximum is 25°C. See Fisher 1978: 373–375.

ripen the fruit quicker, while different varieties (some 130 are known) have comparatively longer or shorter growing cycles;[78] however, in practice, the cutting season is likely to have been fixed, as it is today. The labour intensive process requires all available hands and other tasks have to be arranged with this in mind. The window which farmers along the Iraqi Euphrates set aside today opens in mid-September, with the bulk of the harvest in store one month later. Assuming the same growing regime and farming economics to have applied 2,500 years ago, the army's stay in the Babylonian villages can be dated to the second half of October or later. Properties of the dates themselves may allow this estimate to be circumscribed. Most varieties of date need to be dried before they can be eaten. They are edible from the tree, but taste bitter, and in the case of the common *zahidi* type are liable to cause diarrhoea. The desiccation process, which sweetens the fruit, usually requires around two months. In his account of the dates Xenophon remarks: 'they also dried some and stored them as treats. And these were pleasant with wine, but liable to cause headaches' (2.3.15). The sense is that the dates he is referring to were ready to eat; the fact that they caused headaches could as well be down to the way they were consumed (with the palm wine?), or the quantity eaten, as to the possibility that they were not ripe. Assuming these dates were not from the previous year's harvest (402), as Tuplin thinks might have been the case,[79] then the three day stay at the villages can be dated to mid-November onwards.

Irrigation canals. 2.3.10, 13. As the soldiers began their march out of Babylonia they encountered ditches full of water. Clearchus suspected that the King had deliberately filled the channels as a warning to the Greeks of the difficulties that lay ahead, 'for it was not the season to be watering the plain' (οὐ γὰρ ἦν ὥρα οἵα τὸ πεδίον ἄρδειν). Gassner remarked: 'irrigation is only necessary during the dry season whilst the crops are ripening ... once the rainy season begins, irrigation measures clearly become quite superfluous. In this particular region the rainy season would begin towards the middle of November'.[80] By this reckoning, and on the assumption that he had some knowledge of agriculture, Clearchus' concern can be assigned to late November on.

[78] These factors have been used to argue for a September dating of events in Babylonia. Glombiowski 1994: 43 contends it would be possible for the fruit to be ripe in August and Manfredi 1986: 214, who makes a parallel with North African conditions, argues for the first week in September. See further n. 67 above.

[79] Tuplin 1999: 358.

[80] Gassner 1953: 12.

Finally, a later time-frame fits better with earlier chronological pointers on the march up-country, notably the crossing of the Euphrates (1.4.16–18), which reaches its lowest level in September/October.[81] Cyrus’s men were able to cross the river on foot, something that had apparently never been done before.

In summary, then, the suggested chronology is as follows:

Battle of Cunaxa	Late November, 401
Crossing of Greater Zab River	Mid January, 400
At the Tigris junction	Early February, 400
Through the Carduchian hills	Early February, 400
Deep snow beyond the Euphrates	Early March, 400
Arrival at Mount Theches	Late April, 400
Arrival at Trapezus	Early May 400

The ‘snow lacuna’ theory argues that a significant chunk of time is missing from Xenophon’s record of the retreat. It is based on the view that the Battle of Cunaxa was fought in September and that the Greeks did not reach the Black Sea until May. This consumes a period of approximately eight months, whereas the record accounts for just over five, 155 days. A principal ground for dismissing a late chronology—which would close, if not eliminate the alleged gap—is that the first mention of snow does not come until Armenia: had the army travelled at a later time of year, then the first snows would have been met beforehand in the Kurdish hills. Xenophon’s weather descriptions in these lands, moreover, are typical for autumn in the region. The evidence presented here demonstrates that this is a misconception and that there is no bar to the army being in this area in winter and not encountering snow.

This conclusion is not intended to assert that Xenophon produced an infallible record of the march down to the sea: even if he had kept a diary (and any independent source[s] he might have used cannot be assumed to be wholly reliable), in the trying circumstances of the retreat it would have been remarkable had he been able to record faithfully every daily movement. In all probability there are inaccuracies in his account.[82] Evidence

81 Fisher 1978: 366. See Brennan 2008 for additional pointers in line with a ‘late’ chronology.

82 It should be noted that there are also likely to have been errors in the transmission of the text, numbers being particularly liable to textual corruption: see Brunt 1980: 487. An instance of this in *Anabasis* is apparent at 5.4.31. In the steep Black Sea valleys inhabitants were able to ‘hear one another when they shouted from one town to the next’; the

from modern expeditions undertaken in similarly difficult circumstances shows that even experienced officers can overstate distances travelled in a day, and days not accounted for at the time can blur into others.[83] A gap, then, the product of cumulative errors and omissions, is likely to exist, but the control provided by chronological markers shows that it cannot be a substantial one and that we may have a good degree of confidence in the march record produced by Xenophon.

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manuscripts give 80 *stadia* as the distance between these towns, but to fit with voice-range and local topography it must be less than this.

[83] Bunbury 1959: 362–363 cites the case of a nineteenth-century British expedition into Abyssinia. 'Here the distances traversed by the army were afterwards actually measured, and it was found that a day's march, estimated by experienced officers at 16 or 18 miles, often did not exceed 8.'

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CHAPTER TEN

HISTORICAL AGENCY AND SELF-AWARENESS IN XENOPHON'S *HELLENICA* AND *ANABASIS*[*]

Sarah Brown Ferrario

Introduction: Creating Historical Meaning in Classical Greece

Historical agency is difficult to define in the abstract, because any attempt to do so poses questions about the nature of history. If history is an objective reality, then the true agent or agents of any given event merely await analytical discovery; if history is essentially a product of constructed memory, then agency, at the extremes, is either endlessly debatable or the result of deliberate assignment by academic argument or popular will.[1] Although none of the Greek historiographers offered an explicit philosophical treatment of this problem, a number of near contemporaries of Xenophon, most notably Herodotus, Thucydides, and the orators, addressed the 'ownership' of specific historical actions, and they did so in a manner that suggests that history for the ancient Greeks was over time increasingly seen as a product of *human design*.[2] Immanent in this phrase are not only a gradual departure from the divine causality so evident in the Homeric poems,[3] but also the acknowledgement that historical meaning could be the result of human decision, an awareness of the inherent selectivity involved in the creation of memory through text, and the recognition, particularly in the course of

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[1] My articulation of this situation derives from the lucid summary of Southgate 2001: xi et al.

[2] Starr 1968.

[3] E.g. Agamemnon at *Il.* 19.78–184, esp. 85–90; see Starr 1968: 16–18.

the classical era, that individuals could deliberately 'perform' towards their own historical memorialization.[4]

Herodotus, for example, attempts to correct popular representations of the Tyrannicides as the founders of the Athenian democracy by shifting the focus back to the contributions of the Alcmaeonids,[5] and Thucydides highlights the personal, rather than patriotic, motivations for the assassination of Hipparchus.[6] But statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton had been standing in the Athenian Agora since before the coming of Xerxes, and well-known sympotic *skolia* praised them as liberators.[7] Both historians, then, were trying to re-orient the perceived meaning of the affair of the Tyrannicides by venturing claims that conflicted with contemporary foundation myths,[8] and their presentations reveal that agency is for them a mobile concept: the bare facts of what happened are fixed, but causality and consequence are open to interpretation.

Demosthenes and Aeschines further show that historical agency—and therefore historical relevance and even memory—can be claimed through the ownership of signs of historical events, whether these signs take the form of speech, symbols, or written words. Demosthenes argues for the importance of semantics in establishing the honour and authority of the Athenian *dēmos*, noting that while people used to say that 'the Athenians' won at Salamis and Marathon, they now acclaim individual victorious generals instead (23.198); Aeschines recalls that the herms granted by the *dēmos* to the victors at the Strymon lacked the commanders' names, so that the triumph might appear to be shared by the entire populace (3.183).

Self-consciousness in the invocation of historical memory, however, is evident as early as Herodotus. In Book VII, the historian speculates that Leonidas may have dismissed his allies from Thermopylae in order to seek glory for himself, his men, and Sparta. The use of the authorial voice here

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4 Self-advertising or 'performative' behaviour towards the goal of *religious* memorialization seems to be traceable somewhat earlier (see esp. McCauley 1993, Currie 2002), though later evidence suggests that it was eventually construed as a means of access to historical memorialization, as well (see esp. McCauley 1993 and Ferrario [forthcoming]).

5 Hdt. 5.55–56, 6.109, 123. As also noted below, I have conducted closer studies in the past of the examples in this introductory section (see Ferrario 2006 and [forthcoming]) and repeat their interpretations here in briefer form for convenience.

6 Thuc. 6.54.1–59.4.

7 Taylor 1986: 52–54 summarizes the case for an early (i.e. during the time of the Persian Wars) date for the Tyrannicides *skolia* (texts quoted by Ath. 15.695A–B: Page 1968: 474–475 nos. 893–896).

8 On this issue (though with a different orientation), see Ober 1996.

functions as an implicit claim to the memory-making qualities of Herodotus' own literary genre,[9] for his presentation of Leonidas' motivations recalls the wording and content of his own preface.[10] A similar technique is employed in Thucydides, where Pericles reflects upon how the Athenians will be remembered by posterity in terms that recall the historian's own programmatic statements. Pericles argues that the Athenians have no need for memorialization by a poet who may 'provide pleasure' but can obscure what really happened (2.41.4). This echoes Thucydides' famous claim that despite his history's lack of τὸ μυθῶδες ('storytelling'), which may make it 'less pleasurable' (my English renderings: the same word-root for 'pleasure', τερπ-, occurs in both passages), his work will nevertheless provide an accurate account of the past as a guide for the future (1.22.4).[11]

Xenophon's two major historiographic predecessors, then, address the problem of historical agency both directly and indirectly, and this chapter suggests that Xenophon too, particularly in the *Hellenica* and the *Anabasis*, engages with this issue in complex ways. Further, several of his characters, including his representation of himself in the *Anabasis*, seem to demonstrate awareness of the role that historiography can play in the deliberate creation of memory, and to act within the world of the narrative with the goals of the historical text in mind.

This discussion is presented in three parts. The first treats Agesilaus in the *Hellenica*; the second examines Alcibiades and Lysander. These two sections explore Xenophon's understanding of historical agency, and of the historiographer's role in assigning it, by focusing upon the actions taken by and ascribed to individuals. The third and final section provides a reading of some of the most important appearances of Xenophon himself in the *Anabasis*. The tension between Xenophon's dual involvement in the text *qua* author and character, I suggest, necessitates especially careful technique on his part as he experiments with the advertisement of historical agency, and the *Anabasis* therefore functions, both for Xenophon and for modern readers, as a case study of the interaction between the 'performance' and the writing of history.

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[9] See Luraghi 2006, esp. 87.

[10] See Ferrario (forthcoming) for a more detailed study of this passage. Others have also analysed this echo: e.g. Baragwanath 2008: 68–70 and nn. 41–42 (reading a connection between Leonidas and Herodotus himself in thought as well as in words), Pelling 2006: 93–94 and n. 51 (noting the performative qualities of the behaviour of Leonidas and his Spartan warriors), both with additional references.

[11] See Ferrario (forthcoming) for a more detailed analysis of this passage.

Agesilaus in the *Hellenica*

In the introduction to his revised Loeb edition of the *Anabasis*, John Dillery notes a narrative structure in the text that seems largely to subsume the thoughts and actions of the group (in this case, the Ten Thousand) to those of the individual, particularly during the march to the sea. Citing Connor on such 'commander narrative' in Thucydides,[12] Dillery reads Thucydides as providing 'a careful blending of the two modes of presentation',[13] that is collective versus individual, as opposed to the less balanced discourse in Xenophon. This assessment might well also be applied to the *Hellenica*, where a similar rhetorical emphasis upon the individual tends to overshadow the intimate connection between leader and *polis* (city-state). Given the determinative role, however, that such individual-group relationships played in the texts of Xenophon's historiographic predecessors and in fourth-century Greek political life, they may provide important insight into Xenophon's evaluations of historical agency. How is acknowledgement for important actions, political, military or otherwise, sought after by leaders, awarded by audiences, and memorialized by the historian?[14] And to what extent do the characters, even within the world of the text, seem to demonstrate awareness of these processes?

These issues can be examined in particular detail in the case of Agesilaus, who is featured more prominently in the *Hellenica* than any other character, and who is frequently credited—by internal audiences or by Xenophon as narrator—with historically significant activities, either on his own or in partnership with his army or his state.[15] Here, however, 'commander

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[12] Dillery 1998: 13–15, citing Connor 1984: 54–55.

[13] Dillery 1998: 14 and n. 13.

[14] Or, conversely, how are connections with negative or unflattering events disavowed?

[15] Having acknowledged that 'historical significance' is, in the eyes of the Greek writers, something that can be assigned by them or by others, I prefer for current purposes to let Xenophon himself indicate as far as possible what he views as historically significant. Rahn 1971: 498–502 has reviewed Xenophon's programmatic statements regarding topics appropriate for historical writing (he summarizes these as 'expenditures, dangers and varying strategy of powerful states': 501), and sees the balance of Xenophon's interests as shifting in the course of the *Hellenica* away from the latter, more Thucydidean perspective, towards 'the remarkable behaviour of individuals and small states' (502). Because my analysis of Xenophon's narratives aims at articulating some of the ways he explores individual historical agency, I employ examples from both ends of Rahn's spectrum. Xenophon's individuals, including his representation of himself in the *Anabasis*, seem no less concerned with their respective positions in history and memory when their context is 'small' than when it is apparently momentous. Their own behaviours and meditations within the texts point out moments that the historian flags as significant, either crediting them with particular achievements

narrative' can be deceiving. By this point in Greek literary history it has become an accepted way of describing military movements,[16] but its broad application for this purpose can give the surface impression that Xenophon is assigning far greater prominence to Agesilaus' actions and choices than a closer reading of the narrative reveals. For this reason, particular attention is paid here to some places where 'commander narrative' should not be construed as anything more than a convenient rhetorical mode.

The first major military act of Agesilaus' reign is the expedition to Asia, and the theme of self-presentation and reception is established by Xenophon at the outset in his coverage of the attempted sacrifice at Aulis (3.4.3).[17] Xenophon notes the connection to Agamemnon in neutral language, but the invocation of heroism seems to derive from Agesilaus' own intentions, as he takes personal umbrage (not unlike the Agamemnon of the *Iliad*) at the interruption of his performance by the Boeotians (3.4.4).[18] The confrontation seems in its rhetoric to set up an individual conflict between Agesilaus on the one hand and the Boeotarchs on the other, as no other parties are mentioned. Shortly thereafter, however, the episode is recalled by the Spartans in very different terms as they make plans to attack Thebes, thereby beginning the Corinthian War:

> οἱ μέντοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἄσμενοι ἔλαβον πρόφασιν στρατεύειν ἐπὶ τοὺς Θηβαίους, πάλαι ὀργιζόμενοι αὐτοῖς τῆς τε ἀντιλήψεως τῆς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος δεκάτης ἐν Δεκελείᾳ καὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ μὴ ἐθελῆσαι ἀκολουθῆσαι. ᾐτιῶντο δ' αὐτοὺς καὶ Κορινθίους πεῖσαι μὴ συστρατεύειν. ἀνεμιμνῄσκοντο δὲ καὶ ὡς θύειν τ' ἐν Αὐλίδι τὸν Ἀγησίλαον οὐκ εἴων καὶ τὰ τεθυμένα ἱερὰ ὡς ἔρριψαν ἀπὸ τοῦ βωμοῦ καὶ ὅτι οὐδ' εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἀγησιλάῳ συνεστράτευον. ἐλογίζοντο δὲ καὶ καλὸν καιρὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἐξάγειν στρατιὰν ἐπ' αὐτοὺς καὶ παῦσαι τῆς εἰς αὐτοὺς ὕβρεως· τά τε γὰρ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ καλῶς σφίσιν ἔχειν, κρατοῦντος Ἀγησιλάου, καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι οὐδένα ἄλλον πόλεμον ἐμποδὼν σφίσιν εἶναι.[19] (3.5.5)

or allowing them to reflect upon unrealized potential. For further thoughts upon political and military affairs as subjects of central concern for the ancient Greek historiographers, see Momigliano 1972; cf. Starr 1968: 91–94.

16 See Dillery 1995: 75 n. 50. Cf. n. 12, above.

17 Cf. Dillery 1998: 15 and 1995: 107, and see also on Homeric overtones nn. 18, 74, and 99, below. All numerical text references in this section are to the *Hellenica* and all translations of it are from Brownson's Loeb edition unless otherwise specified.

18 Dillery 1995: 23–24 further suggests that the connection to Agamemnon here may be 'drawing attention to the scale of Agesilaus' *unfulfilled* plans for his campaign in Asia', and that this would help to foreshadow the scale of the disappointment Xenophon represents upon the expedition's withdrawal (cf. below, p. 348).

19 All Xenophon quotations in Greek throughout this chapter are from the Oxford Classical Text editions by Marchant.

> Now the Lacedaemonians were glad to seize a pretext for undertaking a campaign against the Thebans, for they had long been angry with them both on account of their claiming Apollo's tenth at Decelea and their refusing to follow them against Piraeus. Furthermore, they charged them with persuading the Corinthians likewise not to join in that campaign. Again, they recalled that they had refused to permit Agesilaus to sacrifice at Aulis and had cast from the altar the victims already offered, and that they also would not join Agesilaus for the campaign in Asia. They also reasoned that it was a favourable time to lead forth an army against the Thebans and put a stop to their insolent behaviour toward them; for matters in Asia were in an excellent condition for them, Agesilaus being victorious, and in Greece there was no other war to hinder them.

This passage suggests that the Spartan decision to open hostilities with Thebes is a collective one, indebted to multiple factors. Agesilaus' experiences at Aulis are cited amongst several other causes, but nearly all of these are of larger strategic concern (the πρόφασις, 'pretext', at the opening of the passage, for example, is the recent Theban invasion of Phocis: 3.5.3–4). Xenophon's choice to describe Spartan thinking in this way assigns responsibility for the hostilities not to a powerful individual whose symbolic act was slighted, but to the political and military interests of the *poleis* involved.[20] Although Agesilaus himself may have viewed his personal frustrations as an important motivation, Xenophon refuses to inflate the significance of his character's original 'performance': after narrating it in detail, he ultimately asserts the privileged perspective of the historian in offering a more complicated reading of the causes and the agents of the events that follow. This pattern, as will emerge below, is repeated elsewhere in the *Hellenica* and the *Anabasis*:[21] a character acts in a manner apparently intended to affect his historical reception, but is 'thwarted' thereafter by Xenophon's resumption of the historian's control over the narrative.[22]

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[20] I am grateful to R. Coons for helpful conversations about individual *vs.* group dynamics in Spartan politics that took place during the development of his undergraduate senior thesis project in 2008–2009 ("Spartan Foreign Policy in the Archaic and Classical Periods: From Practicality to Propaganda", Department of Greek and Latin, The Catholic University of America). His work demonstrated to me the important tension between Agesilaus (*qua* individual) and Sparta during the Aulis-Thebes sequence here.

[21] Gray 2011 represents a recent case for—and demonstration of—the utility of reading literary and conceptual patterns (in this case relating to the issue of leadership) across multiple works from the Xenophontic corpus (see esp. 179–245). Gray's book emerged too recently to play a foundational role in the construction of the arguments presented here, but I have endeavoured to note some productive points of contact.

[22] See also Harman's contribution to this volume (pp. 427–453) for a reading of rhetorical tensions within the text of Xenophon's *Agesilaus*. Among other points, Harman suggests

Another passage worth noting for the pattern it establishes is the arrival of Agesilaus' expedition in Asia at the opening of Book IV, which also demonstrates the careful distinction that must be maintained between pure 'commander narrative' and narration that ascribes agency (or the intention thereof):

> Ὁ δὲ Ἀγησίλαος ἐπεὶ ἀφίκετο ἅμα μετοπώρῳ εἰς τὴν τοῦ Φαρναβάζου Φρυγίαν, τὴν μὲν χώραν ἔκαε καὶ ἐπόρθει, πόλεις δὲ τὰς μὲν βίᾳ, τὰς δ' ἑκούσας προσελάμβανε. λέγοντος δὲ τοῦ Σπιθριδάτου ὡς εἰ ἔλθοι πρὸς τὴν Παφλαγονίαν σὺν αὐτῷ, τὸν τῶν Παφλαγόνων βασιλέα καὶ εἰς λόγους ἄξοι καὶ σύμμαχον ποιήσοι, προθύμως ἐπορεύετο, πάλαι τούτου ἐπιθυμῶν, τοῦ ἀφιστάναι τι ἔθνος ἀπὸ βασιλέως.
> (4.1.1–2)

> Now when Agesilaus arrived, at the beginning of autumn, in Pharnabazus' province of Phrygia, he laid the land waste with fire and sword and gained possession of cities, some by force, others by their voluntary surrender. And when Spithridates said that if he would come to Paphlagonia with him, he would bring the king of the Paphlagonians to a conference and make him an ally, Agesilaus eagerly undertook the journey, since this was a thing he had long desired—to win some nation away from the Persian King.

The first sentence here simply uses the king's name as a metonym for his military forces, but the second points to Agesilaus' own personal authority and action. Its indications are borne out by the extended conversational scene that follows, in which Agesilaus negotiates the marriage between Otys and the daughter of Spithridates (4.1.3–15). Gray has argued that a central purpose of this section (and of others like it) is to draw attention to certain of Agesilaus' personal qualities,[23] but Agesilaus' desire to provoke defections from the king of Persia is also a genuine political and military strategy. Xenophon's deliberate inclusion of this motivation within the text not only helps to justify the report of the conversation (which may still simultaneously serve moralizing purposes), but also suggests the possibility of

that the text's depictions of seeing, viewing, and spectatorship, as performed or experienced both by internal audiences and by the external reader, have paradoxical qualities. Despite the potential for observation to provide guarantees of reliable knowledge (as, for example, in the case of Herodotean *opsis*, or firsthand inspection), display can also be deceptive (as, for example, in certain evaluations of the sophists that were ventured during the classical period). The *Agesilaus* seems to use this complexity to explore broader issues at stake in the shifting evolution of Greek self-identity during the earlier fourth century. Related methodology is also employed in Baragwanath's contribution to this volume (pp. 631–663), which considers Xenophon's *Symposium* and its nuanced treatment of slavery as it might be interpreted both by internal audiences of literary spectacle and by external readers of the text.

[23] Gray 1989: 46–58 (anticipated by Gray 1981: 321–326, 331–332, 334).

individual action leading to genuine historical impact. Agesilaus' particular attempt here, however, fails, and the strong expression of regret that follows (Ἀγησιλάῳ μὲν δὴ τῆς ἀπολείψεως τοῦ Σπιθριδάτου καὶ τοῦ Μεγαβάτου καὶ τῶν Παφλαγόνων οὐδὲν ἐγένετο βαρύτερον ἐν τῇ στρατείᾳ, 'nothing happened during the campaign that was more distressing to Agesilaus than the desertion of Spithridates, Megabates, and the Paphlagonians': 4.1.28) seems to indicate a personal sense of loss.[24]

Agesilaus' disappointment over Spithridates, as Xenophon reports it, may also be connected to the loss of opportunity for historical achievement when the expedition is suddenly recalled (4.2.1):[25] in retrospect, this particular situation represented the last chance for Agesilaus to make significant political impact in Asia. The tension between individual glory and civic duty is expressed in particularly high relief in Xenophon's treatment of the withdrawal (4.2.1–5). The image of the weeping allies determined to follow Agesilaus from their continent to his may show the personal loyalty that Agesilaus could inspire, but such ties are fruitless in this situation; even as king, Agesilaus commands the Spartan army at the authorization of the *polis*, and the *polis* here is necessarily depriving its king of the (potential) opportunity for a history-making campaign. The quasi-heroic prizes awarded during the mustering of the troops (4.2.6–7) are a virtual palindrome with the invocation of Agamemnon at Aulis, and the individual-centred imagery culminates in the ironic recollection that Agesilaus conducts his troops back to Greece in the footsteps of Xerxes (4.2.8). Agesilaus' chief accomplishments here take the form of virtue in the exercise of duty, the submission of the individual to the needs of the state, and the deliberate denial of individual achievement. This is not, of course, the conventional way of 'making history' as an eminent leader in classical Greece[26]–which may help to explain why Xenophon treats the events in Asia and the withdrawal very differently in his encomiastic *Agesilaus*.[27]

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24 M. Flower, referring to Xen. *Ages*. 5.4–5 and *Hell. Oxy*. 24.4, points out that part of what made this loss personal may also have been Agesilaus' affection for Megabates. The fact, however, that Xenophon does not reiterate this information in the *Hellenica* has the effect of relegating it to the background of the larger picture he is here creating. On Megabates see Pontier (this volume, pp. 612–618).

25 See n. 18, above, and n. 27, below.

26 See esp. Ferrario (forthcoming).

27 See Xen. *Ages*. 1.36–38 on the withdrawal, and Dillery 1995: 114–118 on some of the contrasts in Xenophon's two versions of this period in Spartan history. Dillery views Xenophon as being disappointed with Agesilaus' achievements (or lack thereof) in Asia: ibid. and 107–108. See now also Gray 2011: 81–87 on Xenophon's construction of 'greatness' through authorial interventions in the *Agesilaus*.

The Spartan army and its allies travel through Thessaly, and Xenophon again explores the tension between individual and group historical agency during the scene at Pras. Agesilaus continues to hold out hope to his Asian allies that the Spartans will resume their overseas campaign, but his dispatch notes that this is contingent upon success in the burgeoning Corinthian War, the conflict for which the *polis* has summoned its army home (4.3.1–2). Agesilaus arranges his own troops during a cavalry skirmish (4.3.4–6, with true 'commander narrative' visible in 4.3.3) and is said to be quite happy with this victory over skilled riders, which he views as his own personal accomplishment (4.3.9).[28] In the end, however, he must continue his passage back to Sparta.

Another interesting variation on the 'commander narrative' technique is used for the battle of Coronea (4.3.15–21). Throughout the passage, fighting contingents from the various Greek *poleis* (noted as 'Boeotians, Athenians, Argives, Corinthians, Aenianians, Euboeans', and the like: 4.3.15 et al.) repeatedly oppose 'Agesilaus' (4.3.15, 19) or 'those with Agesilaus' (4.3.15, 16, 17, 18). The parlance is striking—perhaps one of the most unbalanced examples of its kind in extant classical Greek historiography—and Agesilaus therefore occupies a disproportionate position in the recollection of the battle. After the fighting is over, the wounded king still manages to spare the enemy fighters who have sought sanctuary, to have a trophy erected and thank-offerings made, and to journey to Delphi to present Apollo's share of the spoils. This section prefers the role of the individual at the near-total expense of the group: 'the Spartans' and the allies are given little to no attention. The sudden exaggeration feels almost apologetic, as if Agesilaus *must* for some reason be emphasized in deliberate contrast with the other, more 'ordinary' Greeks who contend around him, both on his side and amongst his enemies. Here Xenophon, as historian, may in his manipulation of the 'commander narrative' be metaphorically reclaiming for Agesilaus some of the potential glory and memory that the king lost in Asia—but he may also be calling attention to the rhetorical power that the writer wields over his material.

Shortly after Coronea, Agesilaus is once more pulled away from pretensions to individual glory by the pressing needs of the state. In the area of the Isthmus, he almost accidentally gains the surrender of the region of

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[28] The trophy that Agesilaus 'sets up' at 4.3.9 may be a further invocation of his agency in the battle, but the parlance for such actions seems to shift significantly from the fifth century into the fourth (West 1969: 14, nn. 35–36, with references; see also Pritchett 1974: 246–275, esp. 273–274). While the behaviour itself is of interest, then, its phraseology, taken in isolation, is probably not so special as it might initially appear.

Piraeum. When he sends embers up to those spending the night on high ground, the inhabitants below, seeing the army's new campfires, rush for sanctuary (4.5.4–5), and the fort at Oenoe is quickly taken. During the settlement that follows, Agesilaus conducts himself in striking fashion. Surrounded by envoys, he ignores the representatives from Boeotia, and instead, καθήμενος δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν λίμνην κυκλοτεροῦς οἰκοδομήματος ἐθεώρει πολλὰ τὰ ἐξαγόμενα, 'sitting in the circular structure near the lake, he occupied himself in watching the great quantity of prisoners and property that was being brought out' (4.5.6). The refusal to acknowledge the ambassadors, the almost greedy focus upon viewing the captured men and the tribute, and even Xenophon's characterization of Agesilaus' behaviour as μάλα μεγαλοφρόνως ('very lofty', as Brownson renders it; this particular word-root is used in *fifth*-century historiography only by Herodotus, and then only to describe Xerxes)[29] all present Agesilaus as closer to an Eastern despot[30] than to a Spartan king. The scene contrasts effectively with Agesilaus' mustering of the troops for the Asian campaign at Ephesus (3.4.16–18). There, Agesilaus was active as both leader and participant; here, however, he is passive, a distant and distanced figure whose power derives not from action, but from deliberate inaction.[31]

The tension is suddenly broken by word of a Spartan defeat at Lechaeum. Again, as during his expedition to Asia, Agesilaus has been called away

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[29] Hdt. 7.24.1, 7.136.11. Xerxes is frequently invoked as Herodotus' most avid 'spectator': on the historiographic gaze in general see e.g. Walker 1993; on Xerxes in particular, see e.g. Konstan 1987, esp. 62–67, with references, and Gray 1989: 162, who also connects Agesilaus here with Xerxes but uses different passages to do so. Baragwanath 2008: 254–265 supplies appropriate caution that this particular term in Herodotus need not be construed as entirely negative in its connotations, but it does label a particular way of thinking that is characteristic of Herodotean tyrants. See also Hau (this volume, pp. 593–595, 602–606) for a more detailed discussion of the related phrase *mega phronein* in Xenophon, which concludes that, while the interlocutors in his *Symposium* may seem to use this phrase in a positive sense, Xenophon as narrator in his historical works tends to employ it negatively. Hau views this gap as a means of deliberate characterization by Xenophon the author, and also connects the 'moral world-view' it represents back to Herodotus.

[30] Dewald 2003: 26 and *passim* discusses a pattern of behaviour amongst Herodotean autocrats that she terms the 'despotic template'. Although Dewald addresses Greeks as well as non-Greeks in her analysis, the Eastern monarchs comprise the strongest and most detailed paradigms for many of the actions she treats. Hau (this volume, pp. 600–601) agrees that this section depicts Agesilaus as 'arrogant', citing as well (n. 22) other readings by Gray and by Tuplin. See also n. 29, above.

[31] Xenophon interjects a generalization concluding the description of a spectacle into each of these passages, as well (3.4.18 at Ephesus; cf. the conclusion of 4.5.6 here). Hau (this volume, pp. 600–601) reads the relationship between these two passages somewhat differently.

from his aspirations to individual glory by the urgent needs of his *polis*. His demeanour immediately shifts: he leaps to his feet, grasps his spear, and orders the herald to summon his officers for orders: Sparta's reverse has transformed him from despot to general. In what initially appears to be part of the same change, Agesilaus at last agrees to speak with the Boeotian delegates, who request passage into Lechaeum. He promises to accompany them there (4.5.9)–but his 'escort' takes the form of a ravaging expedition outside the city walls, in order to demonstrate, says Xenophon, 'that no one wanted to come out against him' (4.5.10). The contrast between this behaviour and that of the relatives of the Spartans killed at Lechaeum, described immediately thereafter, is highlighted by Xenophon: the bereaved families rejoice. Praise of death in war has clear heroic overtones, and seems also to have been part of received ancient traditions about the Spartan way of life.[32] But archaeological evidence also suggests that those who fell in battle may have been granted easier or even exclusive access to grave-markers.[33] They would thus have enjoyed individualized, permanent remembrance not generally accessible to the ordinary population.[34] Agesilaus, in contrast, has not earned such honour here. His behaviour at the Heraeum was problematic; he was unable to save the troops at Lechaeum; and he has vented his anger by deceiving the Boeotian ambassadors and ravaging orchards. Historical memory as measured by traditional Spartan standards—and as selected and reported by Xenophon—here belongs to the fallen soldiers, not to Agesilaus, despite the poses he deliberately assumed.

A similar structure governs the episode of the Acarnanians (4.6.1–7.1). When Sparta is drawn into the conflict between Acarnania and Achaea, 'the ephors and the Assembly' (4.6.3) send out Agesilaus as leader of the army. He devastates the countryside (4.6.5), captures and sells spoils (4.6.6),

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32 A convenient listing of some of the important ancient literary testimonia on this issue is Powell 1988: 233. Cartledge 2002: 51 collects some of the extensive bibliography on the Spartan 'mirage' in general, as do the papers in Powell & Hodkinson 1994.

33 See e.g. Low 2006 (adducing Plut. *Lyc.* 27.2 and *Mor.* 238d), who collects the evidence, with tentative dates, at 86 and n. 3 (six of the stones in Low's list that mention death ἐν πολέμῳ, 'in war', have likely or possible dates in the fourth century). Low's belief that these monuments 'do not mark the location of a burial' (90) does not compromise her argument that 'these stones provide a medium through which individual Spartans—possibly even individual Laconians—can make a quite personal demonstration of, or even argument for, their relationship to the larger community' (91). Cf. also Cartledge 1978: 35 and n. 71.

34 See Low 2006: 91. One might also recall Herodotus' note that he has learned the names of all of the Spartans who perished at Thermopylae (7.224).

even defeats the Acarnanians in a skirmish (4.6.8–11), and then commemorates his actions with a battle-trophy (4.6.12). But the Achaeans, Xenophon relates, πεποιηκέναι τε οὐδὲν ἐνόμιζον αὐτόν, ὅτι πόλιν οὐδεμίαν προσειλήφει, 'thought that he had accomplished nothing because he had gained possession of no city' (4.6.13). Agesilaus' gesture is an invocation of the importance of the actions he and his troops have accomplished, and an inherent bid for their consequence, even their memorialization.[35] His primary 'audience', however, refuses to read his accomplishments in the same way, and asks for a concession: that the Spartans remain to stop the spring planting. Agesilaus' tactics again change abruptly: now, rather than looking towards the longer-term reception of his actions, he invokes τὸ συμφέρον, 'expediency',[36] claiming that it will be more effective to ravage again in the following season after the crops are already in the ground. From an apparent initial goal of remembrance, Agesilaus' justification of his own decisions has regressed to the idea of mere usefulness.[37]

The affair of the Phliasian exiles provides further opportunity to examine individual and group authority amongst Xenophon's Spartans. The pro-Spartan party has been expelled from Phlius, and this has severely compromised the two states' relationship (5.2.8). The ephors demand that the exiles be restored (5.2.9), but when the citizen rights of those who returned are not renewed, they complain directly to the Spartans (5.3.10–12), and the ephors make plans to dispatch troops under one of the kings. Agesilaus has friends amongst the partisans and is therefore pleased with the opportunity to settle Phlius (5.3.13), but the shaky negotiations degenerate into an unpopular siege (5.3.16). Agesilaus responds in one of the limited ways in which he can exercise autonomy: by transforming Phliasian supporters into soldiers loyal to his command (5.3.16–17). In short, he creates a miniature imitation of Spartan society under his personal control as a solution to what for him is still in large part a personal problem. This, however, does not guarantee the recognition of his authority at Phlius. Rather than negotiating with their immediate besieger, the Phliasians seek passage for an embassy (5.3.23). Agesilaus, chafing at this (ὁ δὲ ὀργισθεὶς ὅτι ἄκυρον αὐτὸν ἐποίουν, 'angered because they treated him as one without authority'), negotiates for

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[35] On the attributions of battle-trophies in the fourth century, see n. 28, above; Pritchett 1974 also analyses the religious and prestige value of both temporary and permanent trophies.

[36] Brownson renders this phrase as 'the advantageous course'.

[37] Coons (n. 20, above) argues that expediency is one of the least meaningful historiographic justifications for Spartan actions.

the privilege of determining the outcome at Phlius, and Xenophon reports that he does so by arrangement with his personal allies in Sparta, rather than through the popular assembly or the ephors (5.3.24). Agesilaus' settlement is comparatively mild, even generous (5.3.25), leaving the modern reader—and likely the ancient one, as well—wondering about the extent to which his sentiments were governed by the personal ties with which Xenophon opened the episode. Once again, the individual leader finds himself at odds with the state, not merely over political authority, but over *perceptions* of political authority and therefore of credit for action achieved.

Was Agesilaus as an individual agent finally responsible for Sparta's rapid fall?[38] For Xenophon, the king seems rather to have functioned as a symbol behind which to gather some of the most important political and interpretive problems challenging Sparta in the earlier fourth century.[39] Power, both real and perceived, appears to have been at issue in Sparta,[40] and it is perhaps in partial response to this situation that Xenophon has depicted agency under dispute between leader and city. He has sketched in his version of Agesilaus an awareness of the potential for advertising oneself as a mover of history—but he has also demonstrated that the permanent assignment of memory rests, finally, with the historian. In the end, Xenophon's version of Agesilaus seems to have had in mind a more substantial historical reputation for himself than events—or than the historiographer's text—ultimately permitted.[41]

Alcibiades and Lysander

Patterns similar to those constructed around Agesilaus in the *Hellenica* are also evident in Xenophon's treatments of Alcibiades and Lysander. These characters are credited both by internal audiences and by the historian's authorial voice with history-making actions, and they also seem at times to be themselves conscious of the historical 'records' they can create.

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[38] See e.g. the varied interpretations of Hamilton 1991 (anticipated in brief by Hamilton 1982), Cartledge 1987: esp. 405–412, Cawkwell 1976.

[39] Dillery 1995 and esp. Cartledge 1987.

[40] See n. 38, above.

[41] See n. 25, above.

Alcibiades

Xenophon's Alcibiades is isolated in many ways from the very *dēmos* that believes it desperately needs him,[42] but the character seems also to be well aware of the position he will occupy in thought and in memory if he is able to present himself as an agent of history. Although the return to Athens is Alcibiades' crowning symbolic moment in the *Hellenica*, there are several others (including especially the withdrawal to the Chersonese) that show Xenophon using his coverage of Alcibiades to explore the power of historiography, as opposed to individual 'performance', to assign historical agency.

Productive discussions of Alcibiades' return scene have long demonstrated its resonances with Thucydides, and over time have moved from acknowledging links with the departure of the Sicilian expedition to examining connections—at the levels of diction, thought, and even tone—with the rest of the *History*.[43] Self-consciousness permeates the entire episode, both historiographically and (probably) historically as well.[44] Xenophon's Alcibiades is overtly concerned about his reception by his Athenian audiences, to the point where he times his arrival according to popular sentiment (1.4.11–12),[45] and refuses to leave his ship until he can do so in the company of loyal supporters (1.4.18–19). But Xenophon invites additional reflection at this point upon the abilities of individuals to control their recollection in historiography. Anonymous voices in the watching crowd provide varied interpretations of Alcibiades' past actions (1.4.13–17), none of which are strictly essential to Xenophon's narrative. These both offer potential ways of 'reading' the historical Alcibiades and demonstrate the degree of control that the historian has over those readings.[46] The presentation of variants, as has frequently been noted in Herodotean scholarship, places the onus of the immediate interpretation upon the reader. Conversely, however, it implicitly demonstrates the writer's authority in having already completed this process of selection elsewhere in the text,

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42 E.g. Due 1991: 46 *et passim*, specifically reading the return scene to Athens.

43 Chronologically, e.g. Soulis 1972, Due 1991, Rood 2004.

44 Bloedow 1973: 67–71 has read the entire historical episode as an act of political theatre, and Xenophon's presentation of the character's internal motivations and thought processes supports that interpretation.

45 All numerical text references in this section are to the *Hellenica* and all translations of it are from Brownson's Loeb edition unless otherwise specified.

46 See Rood 2004: 367–369.

and even in having governed the precise 'options' now presented for the reader's choice.[47]

The character Alcibiades responds directly to the most important accusations in the speeches that he delivers upon his arrival: ἀπολογησάμενος ὡς οὐκ ἠσεβήκει, εἰπὼν δὲ ὡς ἠδίκηται, 'saying that he had not committed sacrilege and that he had been unjustly treated' (1.4.20), echoing the verbal root and even the precise tense used to quote indirectly the earlier summary of his charge by his supporters (ἠσεβηκότος, 'he had committed sacrilege', 1.4.14). The diction highlights Xenophon's rhetorical technique: the character is attempting to control his own reputation, and the historian, in having recorded both doubts and rumours (even in the partial guise of their refutation by Alcibiades' followers), does not fully permit it. The historical Alcibiades may have been attempting, as Bloedow suggests,[48] to claim agency and credit for himself in the recent Athenian successes in Asia Minor, but the historiographer here refuses to accept the performance—or the elaborate stunt of the ceremonial return—wholesale.

The actions that follow include further bids by Alcibiades for the recognition of individual agency: the staging of the overland procession to Eleusis, protected by his personal troops (1.4.20); the deliberate setting-up of a trophy after his first successful battle engagement as ἁπάντων ἡγεμὼν αὐτοκράτωρ ('general-in-chief with absolute authority', ibid. and 22–23). But his withdrawal to the Chersonese (1.5.11–17) and his last warning there prior to the battle of Aegospotami (2.1.23–26) have more complex implications. Firstly, these two passages represent mirror images of the approach towards and the moment of Alcibiades' earlier homecoming. Alcibiades does not plan for a fight at Notium, and when his lieutenant engages in needless displays of bravado (1.5.12), he cannot stage his signature last-minute intervention, as he had done earlier at Abydus (1.1.4–6) and Cyzicus (1.1.9–18) before he had even been reappointed as general (1.4.12).[49] Perhaps in an effort to reclaim his credibility after the loss at Notium, Alcibiades stages a stand-off of his own,[50] but Lysander refuses to engage, and Alcibiades' smaller forces

47 On variants in Herodotus, see e.g. Baragwanath 2008: 122–132, Lateiner 1989: 76–90, Dewald 1987, with references; cf. also Luraghi 2007.

48 See n.44, above.

49 At Chalcedon, too, Alcibiades swept into battle to help (ἐβοήθησε, 'came to the rescue', 1.3.6) when the fighting dragged on.

50 Xenophon depicts it as such with the implied motivation stated as εἴ τις βούλοιτο ναυμαχεῖν, 'if perhaps anyone would wish to fight by sea'. Brownson recommends this reading *via* an interpolation (here italicized) in his Loeb translation ad loc.: '[Alcibiades] formed

recommend pulling back (1.5.15). The reception that Alcibiades receives at Athens this time (1.5.16–17) is in many ways a reversal of the return scene. The Athenian citizenry once again expresses opinions about Alcibiades, here balanced exclusively towards the negative, and then appoints new commanders, just as took place before, when Alcibiades was named ἁπάντων ἡγεμὼν αὐτοκράτωρ. Once again, too, the motivations behind the actions are injected here by Xenophon, who makes special mention of ἀμέλεια and ἀκράτεια ('neglect of duty' and 'dissolute conduct', in Brownson's words) as factors in the demotion of Alcibiades: they are the crowd's perceived reasons for the failure at Notium, and in recording them Xenophon is again invoking the power of the historian to determine how people and events are remembered. Alcibiades the historical personage may well have had one eye upon his reputation when he challenged Lysander: Alcibiades the character, in Xenophon's reading, certainly did, but the attempt has ended only in criticism. The historian thus presents himself as the ultimate arbiter of history, once more thwarting the interpretation that he has depicted his character as attempting to provide.

Alcibiades' last opportunity to make an historical impact takes place as he advises the Athenians near Aegospotami to base their activities at Sestos, so that they will 'gain a harbour and a city. "For if you are there," he said, "you will be able to fight when you please"' (2.1.25). Xenophon offers only the barest framing narrative here, perhaps to highlight the dramatic irony for the reader who knows the outcome.[51] But the advice that Alcibiades provides could potentially have been construed, by Xenophon's day, as a service worthy of civic honours, even without its leading to a victory. An inscription from Athens dating to the time of the Corinthian War provides a potential model, honouring one Phanocritus of Parium for providing advice to the generals that was not actually taken. 'But if the generals [had] obeyed', the decree reads, 'the enemy triremes would have been captured'.[52] In this case, Alcibiades, Xenophon, or (most likely) both might have been thinking of the potential currency to be gained by warning the Athenians that they were not securely based at Aegospotami. Honours like those extended to Phanocritus are not well-paralleled in fifth-

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the fleet in line at the mouth of the harbour *as a challenge to battle*, in case anyone cared to fight'.

[51] Rood 2004: 371–372 also notes the spare quality of Xenophon's account. Gray 1989: 148, with references, offers the productive suggestion that Alcibiades here might be compared to the recurring figure of the 'wise adviser' or 'tragic warner' in Herodotus.

[52] *IG* II/III^2 29, Tod 1948: 45–47 no. 116, Rhodes & Osborne 2003: 80–83 no. 19.

century inscriptions, but the distance in time from Aegospotami to the Corinthian War is still quite short, and if the paradigm was not already in place, the roots might well have been.[53]

Lysander

As Agesilaus' chief competitor, and as an individual whom independent evidence suggests was deeply invested in his personal legacy,[54] Lysander, too, presents a particularly rich opportunity for the study of Xenophon's treatment of historical agency. The very moment of Lysander's ascent to command is given special emphasis in a tale of a conference and banquet attended by him and by Cyrus, the Persian prince. The anecdote (1.5.1–8) begins with conventional 'commander narrative' (1.5.1) describing Lysander's dispatch as admiral, but once he and his ambassadors approach Cyrus, the tenor of the scene changes. Negotiations over the Persian pay scale for the Peloponnesian sailors who will man the new allied fleet stagnate, and Lysander is unable to exact the amount of money he believes necessary—until he manages to reiterate the request in response to the offer of a friendly favour (1.5.6).

The moment in which the alliance between Lysander and the Persians is sealed shapes the entire outcome of the Peloponnesian War. That Xenophon intends the passage to be read in this larger historical context is further suggested by the direct oppositions between Peloponnesian and Athenian attitudes and experiences treated immediately afterwards. At 1.5.7–8, the results of the negotiations become known, ὥστε τὸ στράτευμα πολὺ προθυμότερον εἶναι. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούοντες ταῦτα ἀθύμως μὲν εἶχον, 'so that the men of the [Peloponnesian] fleet were much more zealous. Now when the Athenians heard of this, they were despondent'; at 1.5.11–16, the episode of Notium continues the contrast. The battle, already noted above as a personal reversal for Alcibiades, is a personal triumph for Lysander, who is featured so prominently throughout that the confrontation seems in its rhetoric to be taking place between him on the one side and 'the Athenians' on the other.[55]

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[53] Domingo Gygax 2006 represents one recent suggestion that honorific behaviours observable at Athens during the fourth century were probably already practiced by the later fifth.

[54] On Lysander's 'Nauarch's Monument' at Delphi, see Plut. *Lys.* 18.1, Paus. 10.9.7–10; on its reconstruction, e.g. Vatin 1991: 103–138; on its potential impact upon its audiences, e.g. Crane 1996: 177–179, 205–206. See Ferrario (forthcoming) for a more detailed discussion of this monument; I remain grateful to M. Flower for the recommendation that I take note of it.

[55] Lysander's name is mentioned at least once in every section from 10–14, and from 10

The character Lysander claims an extraordinary degree of achievement when he hands over his position as admiral to Callicratidas at the end of his term, calling himself θαλαττοκράτωρ, 'master of the sea' (1.6.2). The boldness of his assertion is attested both by the challenge that Callicratidas presents in response (suggesting that Lysander prove his 'mastery' by guiding the Spartan fleet directly past the Athenian one *en route* to Miletus) and by the exceptional rarity of the word-root in Greek literature outside of the *Hellenica*.[56] Again, however, Xenophon undermines his own character's rhetoric. Lysander is staking a claim to individual agency: Callicratidas counters it by depicting himself as an agent of *Sparta*, following the dispatches of his *polis*,[57] and offering to resign in favour of 'anyone [who] professes to be more experienced in naval affairs' (1.6.5). The pose of indifference is disingenuous, but well understood by the members of his audience, who do not object to his continuation in command (1.6.6). The scene as a whole directly contrasts two characters' different articulations of historical agency. But it also shows that the assignment of such agency can be nominal, can shift, and can be re-represented even by the same individual: in nearly the same breath as his reminder that he has been assigned to his post by Sparta and his offer to leave it, Callicratidas cites his own ambition as a reason why he would really prefer to continue in command (1.6.5).

The decisive battle of Aegospotami is hallmarked by individual-centred discourse surrounding Lysander. Cyrus gives his ally personal charge of the vast sums of tribute and other monies to be used to fund the Peloponnesian fleet (2.1.14), and the approach to the final confrontation (2.1.15–24) sets up an extended verbal contrast between 'Lysander' on the one hand and 'the Athenians' on the other, in much the same manner as will be done with Agesilaus later in the narrative at Coronea (cf. p. 349, above). The moment of the outbreak of the battle is postponed by a brief two-sentence section (2.1.25–26) that represents Alcibiades' last appearance in the narrative, with his unheeded warning about the Athenians needing a base at Sestos (cf. p. 356, above), showing one self-promoting individual agent being literally replaced in the narrative by another. And in the battle itself, while 'the

to the beginning of 13 occurs in every sentence demarcated by modern punctuation. During the actual combat in 13–14, 'the Athenians' are named four times, and their commanders, Antiochus and Alcibiades, briefly disappear (save one mention of the former simply as the recipient of Athenian 'help' early in 13). The contrast is not nearly so strong as it is in the case of Agesilaus at Coronea (cf. above, p. 349), but the technique is similar.

[56] See Moles 1994: 72.

[57] Moles 1994: 74.

Athenians' accompany their generals as named fighters throughout the conflict, there is no mention made at all of the sailors who entered battle under Lysander: neither 'the Spartans' nor 'the Peloponnesians' are named. Lysander is credited openly with the victory (or takes this credit to himself, 2.1.30), and sends the news to Sparta. He then personally settles all affairs following the battle (2.1.30–32.2, 5–6). Not until he makes plans to reunite with Agis on the Greek mainland (2.2.7–8) do 'the Spartans' and 'the Peloponnesians' re-enter the discourse, but even then, they are the forces led by Agis and Pausanias, not those that are returning with Lysander. Finally, Lysander has his arrival in Piraeus described in firm 'commander narrative' that features him as sole agent (2.2.9).

But Xenophon again chooses to juxtapose this individual-centred discourse with material that complicates the picture it creates. During the peace negotiations that close the Peloponnesian War (2.2.16–23) the historian meticulously tracks the tortuous assignment and reassignment of responsibility for the actions to be taken. Theramenes presents Lysander to the Athenian Assembly as a personal arbiter (2.2.16) who then changes his mind and cedes to the ephors (2.2.17). Lysander, in turn, carefully informs the ephors that he has told Theramenes that the power to end the war rests with them, not with him (the direct content of 2.2.18). This gesture of submission to the government back in Sparta feels somewhat disingenuous:[58] not only is it not in keeping with the way that Xenophon has described Lysander's behaviour thus far, but it is also quite difficult to reconcile it with Theramenes' three-month absence (2.2.16).[59] The text up to this point has strongly suggested that Lysander's actions were important in bringing the war to a close, but in the end he is not the one openly credited, either by the internal audiences or by Xenophon, with concluding it. Regardless of what the living Lysander's motivations may have been for refusing to engage directly with Theramenes and the Athenian ambassadors,[60] the character's actions in the text demonstrate not only that one may attempt to

[58] Proietti 1987: 38–39 also questions Lysander's behaviour here, suggesting that Lysander as vice-admiral may technically need to yield privilege to his military superiors or to Agis, but may be doing so in an exaggerated fashion to indicate his resentment. Proietti's correct recollection that Lysander at this stage wields enormous physical, logistical, and cognitive power seems to me to strengthen that argument, as well.

[59] Xenophon is probably implying by this sequence of events that personal relationships are being cemented, in order to set up the coming appointment of Theramenes amongst the Thirty.

[60] See n. 58, above.

manipulate the assignment of historical agency, but also that such manipulations may fail. Despite Lysander's attempts to rewrite the historical responsibility for the truce, the historian's privileged position has permitted Xenophon to present a different interpretation.

After the end of the Peloponnesian War the debate over historical agency surfaces again, as Lysander's interests are threatened by the rise of Agesilaus. Xenophon's account of the planning for the Asian expedition has Lysander considering external motivations (the threat of attack, the strength of the Greek naval forces, and the success of the Ten Thousand in escaping from Persia) and acknowledging that the effort will require the approval of the Spartan government (3.4.1–2). But Xenophon's Lysander also has personal reasons for wanting to undertake the campaign: he wishes to restore his decarchies, which the ephors have dissolved (3.4.2). That this is not merely an issue of authority, but also of public perception and of the establishment of historical legacy, is suggested by the confrontation that takes place between Lysander and Agesilaus once they have arrived in Asia (3.4.7–10).

In this passage, Xenophon shows Lysander's personal popularity accelerating past that of Agesilaus, but the reason that the historian claims that this has happened is particularly telling: ἅτε συντεταραγμένων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν πολιτειῶν, 'since the governments in the cities were in a state of confusion' (3.4.7). In the absence of perceived governmental structure, then, direct appeals are being made to prominent individuals, in the belief that they will be able to achieve the resolution of certain concerns. Xenophon leaves the precise nature of these concerns unclear. They may very well have been private disputes for which a more powerful arbiter was sought, but given the preceding discussion of constitutional upheaval the suggestion is that direct approach to Lysander is now substituting for the ordinary machineries of *polis* government. The technique of reported rumour is then employed to suggest that Lysander is behaving 'more pompously than royalty' (τῆς βασιλείας ὀγκηρότερον, 3.4.8). The implication here is that Lysander's conduct is part of a pattern of cooperative behaviour between himself and his audiences. He carries himself in the manner of a king and thereby invites the escalation of the attentions that are already being paid to him. This positive feedback loop is constructed here in the reading of the historian, who suggests that it is a conscious choice. When Lysander himself is finally said to comprehend why Agesilaus has begun to undermine him (3.4.8), the concept of honorific transaction is addressed openly in their conversation. Agesilaus acknowledges that greatness is in the eye of the proverbial beholder, and that the reception of eminent individu-

als can be directly controlled through the choices of those who are positioned to manipulate it: τούς γε βουλομένους ἐμοῦ μείζους φαίνεσθαι· τοὺς δέ γε αὔξοντας εἰ μὴ ἐπισταίμην ἀντιτιμᾶν, αἰσχυνοίμην ἄν, '[I know how to humiliate] those who wish to appear greater than I; but as for those who exalt me, if I should prove not to know how to honour them in return, I should be ashamed' (3.4.9). The question as to who achieves great things, therefore, seems to bear multiple interpretations in different contexts and before different audiences. And the characters' open discussion of this issue suggests another invocation by the historian of the authority of his own genre.

Xenophon and 'Xenophon' in the *Anabasis*

The *Anabasis*, where Xenophon serves as both author and character, offers a unique opportunity for him to explore the issues under examination here.[61] That being so, his first major entry into the text (3.1.4–14)[62] introduces themes and methods that will be important for the rest of the narrative. One is the issue of religion, especially divination.[63] In the real world, the support of the gods, as witnessed by good omens, sanctions the decisions of individual leaders as well as the actions of groups. In the world of the narrative, the outcomes of sacrifices and other signs are not only employed to justify actions and decisions taken by the character Xenophon, but are also used by Xenophon the historian to mark out significant moments and privilege their inclusion in the historical record.[64]

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[61] It should be acknowledged, however, that 'Xenophon' himself, though he is of primary interest, need not serve as the only locus for such analysis within this text. As an anonymous reviewer points out, the obituaries of Cyrus and of the assassinated Greek leaders (*An.* 1.9.1–31 and 2.6.1–30, respectively) might also be read in the same agonistic fashion, as an historiographer's addendum (or corrective) to the performances of these characters earlier in the narrative. See also Gray 2011: 71–79, who shows that 'the obituaries use the devices of rhetoric to persuade the audience of their views' (73).

[62] All numerical text references in this section are to the *Anabasis* and all translations of it are from Brownson's Loeb edition (in the 1998 revision by Dillery) unless otherwise specified. Xenophon is mentioned by name in passing at points earlier in the text than this citation, specifically at 1.8.15, 2.4.15, 2.5.37, and 2.5.40, but the opening of Book III is styled as the character's formal introduction.

[63] Parker 2004, esp. 142–152, surveying examples of different kinds of religiosity in the *Anabasis* and noting the central role of divination, particularly military divination.

[64] Dillery 1995: 73. In commenting on this particular scene, Dillery further notes that dreams in the *Iliad*, too, are associated with prominent characters and with 'major turning point[s] in the course of the narrative'.

That these signs and portents are more complicated than just 'yes' or 'no' statements from the gods is indicated by the character Xenophon's trip to Delphi prior to embarking on his journey (3.1.5–8). Socrates points out that Xenophon's question to Apollo about how to preserve his safety while away omitted the crucial first inquiry as to whether Xenophon ought to join the expedition in the first place. As is typical of Delphi, a response is nevertheless provided (3.1.6–7). Has Xenophon consciously manipulated the oracle? No more than did Croesus in Herodotus,[65] but both characters were admittedly selective, the latter in his interpretation of the answer, the former in his presentation of the question. With this Herodotean connection in mind, by including Socrates' criticisms here, Xenophon the historian both acknowledges the chance that his religious records will be taken as propaganda and claims some objectivity by demonstrating his willingness to report material that is not necessarily favourable to him.[66] This may be specifically intended to provide a way of dealing with the scene that follows: the dream from Zeus (3.1.11–14). Here, in contrast to his over-shaping of his question at Delphi, Xenophon deliberates fiercely with himself as he reacts to the dream in (internal) direct speech (3.1.13–14). The presentation of the omen highlights both Xenophon and the event,[67] but the character's careful reaction to it in context reads as a self-conscious historiographic gesture, virtually 'correcting' his earlier oversight.

Another important technique that the historian introduces in this opening scene is that of the speech by the character Xenophon himself. No one in the *Anabasis* speaks as frequently or at such length as Xenophon does, and his reflections on the action offer insights into how the remainder of the text is to be understood. It has often been pointed out that Xenophon's proposals to the army are not vetoed, and that unpopular suggestions are withdrawn prior to their formal consideration to prevent just such an outcome.[68] But there are also significant moments in the speeches that sug-

[65] See Hdt. 1.53–54, 71, 90–91. On Herodotean connections in Xenophon, Brown 1990: 99 n. 14 calls attention to Breitenbach's index (1967: 2038–2039), but Brown's own analysis also demonstrates other ways that resonances may be identified. The brief overview of Hornblower 2006 on Herodotus' *Nachleben* notes in particular (311 n. 29) the contribution of Gray 1989. I am grateful to E. Baragwanath for correcting my initial interpretation of both of these oracle scenes.

[66] Cf. now on this technique Gray 2011: 39–42, and esp. 41 n. 40.

[67] On this scene's general symbolic value in the narrative, I agree with the interpretation of Dillery 1995: 72–73, who notes that the placement of the dream anecdote 'confers great significance on Xenophon himself and on the events which follow'.

[68] Cawkwell 2004: 60 summarizes: 'Indeed [in the *Anabasis*] he seems never to make a mistake. Both in counsel and in action, Xenophon was always right.' Rood 2006: 53 moderates

gest self-consciousness on the parts of both writer and character, as well as enduring concern for the reception of history-making events.

The closing of Xenophon's first speech to the captains under Proxenus (3.1.21–25) introduces this way of reading the remainder of the narrative. Of particular interest is its use of athletic imagery, as for example:

> ἐν μέσῳ γὰρ ἤδη κεῖται ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἆθλα ὁπότεροι ἂν ἡμῶν ἄνδρες ἀμείνονες ὦσιν, ἀγωνοθέται δ' οἱ θεοί εἰσιν, οἳ σὺν ἡμῖν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ἔσονται. (3.1.21)
>
> For now all these good things are offered as prizes for whichever of the two parties shall prove to be the braver men; and the judges of the contest are the gods, who, in all likelihood, will be on our side.

The phraseology here recalls the well-known construct of the competition for virtue and invokes heroic qualities for the struggle and its participants. But the treatment of victorious athletes in the later fifth and fourth centuries seems also to have provided a model for the esteem paid to military commanders, and individuals in both of these professions were able to seek memorialization in some similar ways.[69] That Xenophon would choose the paradigm of the athletic victor here therefore suggests significant concern with the reception of the deeds to come.

As speaker in this passage, Xenophon the character deliberately echoes the sentiments that he had expressed to himself alone earlier in the scene, by suggesting that no one ought to wait for 'others to come to us and summon us to the noblest deeds' (3.1.24; cf. 3.1.13–14) and then exhorts his audience, φάνητε τῶν λοχαγῶν ἄριστοι καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀξιοστρατηγότεροι, 'show yourselves the best of the captains, and more worthy to be generals than the generals themselves' (3.1.24). The beginning of this utterance is well in keeping with conventional historiographic battle-speeches[70]–except that Xenophon is not positioned to deliver one, either by rank or by circumstance. The final word in the Greek is extremely rare, so much so that this particular form is unknown either before or after Xenophon;[71] under ordinary political or military circumstances it might even sound

this perspective slightly, but notes that 'Xenophon is the man who gives the most, and the best, advice in the *Anabasis*'. Cf. also n. 89, below.

69 E.g. Domingo Gygax 2006, esp. 486, Currie 2002, esp. 37 n. 133, 43, McCauley 1993: 206–248.

70 Zoido 2007 represents one of the most recent collections of the major bibliography on battle-speeches.

71 *Axiostratēgos* occurs in the superlative in Arr. 4.11.5 and Xiphilinus *Epitome of Dio* 19.12 Dindorf-Stephanus. A slightly different adjective, *axiostratēgētos*, appears in the positive form in Dio 45.21 and in the superlative in Dio 36.25.1, 41.55.1. (The latter passage corresponds to the Xiphilinus passage just mentioned.)

revolutionary. The total effect is to show the character parsing out his situation with exceptional care, mingling traditional expressions of military encouragement with implicit acknowledgements of the unique position that the Ten Thousand are now in. In his second speech, really a continuation of the first, he adds that commanders must inspire courage in their inferiors by their own attitudes and actions (3.1.35–44). This passage highlights some of Xenophon's most important ideas about leadership and virtue,[72] but given the programmatic elements that have already emerged in this chapter, it also suggests that readers might expect some self-conscious 'performances' from the protagonists, and particularly from Xenophon himself.

The first such 'performance', at the military assembly where Xenophon debuts in command, further demonstrates the power of historiography to construct historical memory by controlling the reception of symbolic behaviours and meaningful actions. At 3.2.7, Xenophon prepares to speak, and the narrative pauses to note that he is wearing his best clothing and armour. A new general would doubtless hope to invite the regard of his audience by dressing in a manner worthy of his rank and station.[73] But the historian records higher motivations here, and emphasizes the possibility that the character is prepared either for a noble victory or a beautiful death.[74] That theme, in turn, is carried into the speech that follows (3.2.8–32), which is part battle-exhortation, part funerary oration.[75] The recollections of the victories over the Persians (3.2.11–13), of the *eleutheria* ('freedom') that the Greek states enjoy (3.2.13), and of the achievements of the soldiers' *progonoi* ('ancestors', 3.2.13–14) are all also traditional themes of the Athenian *epitaphios logos* ('funerary oration').[76] And this connection, in turn, invokes a special kind of historical agency both for Xenophon and for his men. According to Thucydides (and to the evidence of the surviving texts, as well), Athenian funeral orations were delivered by eminent leaders like Pericles,[77] and

72 On 'Xenophon's literary presentation of the leadership of individuals in their communities' in general, see Gray 2011 (quotation at 1), which takes this issue as its central focus.

73 Brownson's translation suggests this, but the Greek does not actually state it explicitly.

74 Cf. n. 10, above, on the performative behaviours of Herodotus' Spartans, which are probably (Baragwanath, also citing Pelling) further based upon Homeric paradigms. On Homeric associations in treatments of arms and armour elsewhere in the Xenophontic corpus, see Gray 2011: 132–142.

75 On the use of themes, tropes, and methods from the genre of funerary oration in battle-exhortations in Thucydides, see Zoido 2007: 147–149.

76 See Loraux 1986; on the manipulation of the expected tropes in their redeployment, e.g. Frangeskou 1999.

77 Thuc. 2.34.6; see Loraux 1986: 8–12.

depicted the war dead as a high-achieving but anonymous collectivity.[78] The connection with this genre in a battle-exhortation is a very natural one, but here it also suggests how the character Xenophon is to be construed within the narrative: not only as his men's commander, but also as the important voice that interprets their performance before the citizenry *and* records their achievements in the annals of history.

A similarly meaningful moment occurs when the forces of Tissaphernes are racing the Ten Thousand to take a hill within the sight of their armies (3.4.44–49). The emphasis upon the gaze[79] in this passage suggests that the entire episode is to be seen as a performance; Xenophon's exhortation to the troops (3.4.46) deploys one of the best-known tropes of the genre ('Men, believe that now you are struggling for Greece, for children and wives');[80] and the commander's bravado decision to march with a tired man's shield presents him in a very favourable light. It is never stated that Xenophon's leadership has propelled the Greeks to the top of the hill first, but Xenophon's much later suggestion to Seuthes that his men will perform better if he is on the ground with them (7.3.44–46) invokes openly what is only implied here: that Xenophon's presence makes a discernible difference in the achievements of his men, and perhaps, by extension, that he may be interpreted as the chief agent of their success.

It cannot be denied that Xenophon, particularly in the *Anabasis*, dedicates greater space and energy to the thoughts, motivations, character, and leadership of individuals than he does to groups.[81] During most of the march towards the sea (beginning after 3.3.1), 'commander narrative' is frequent, but the precise form it takes and its distribution are of interest. The leaders, most notably 'Xenophon' and 'Chirisophus', are the only Greeks among the Ten Thousand who are possessed of clear individual identities,[82] but even they are not simply employed as wholesale metonyms for their troops. Instead, 'Xenophon', for example, is often shown 'accompanied by', 'leading', or 'bringing' a section of the army, and 'the Greeks' are often verbally represented as the collective protagonists or receivers of the action at

78 Loraux 1986: 23 *et passim*, with references.

79 See e.g. Walker 1993.

80 Among other memorable literary passages, this one resonates with Aeschylus' *Persae* (the battle-cry of the Athenians before Salamis, 402–405). On the 'country and family' trope in general e.g. Zoido 2007: 141–142 and esp. 145 n. 20.

81 Dillery 1995: 73–75, viewing this contrast as being particularly pronounced during Books III–IV of the *Anabasis*.

82 Ibid.

hand.[83] While Xenophon is certainly not representing historical agency as being shared equally between the commanders and the army, the fact that the troops are never wholly suppressed seems harmonious with the inclusion of the military assemblies throughout the narrative. Although these differ from the typical *polis* assembly,[84] they represent some limited interaction between the will of the individual leader and the will of the group,[85] even if the nature of military life means that the balance of agency is tilted even more significantly towards the commander than it would be towards the eminent politician in a fourth-century Greek city.[86]

Attention to history-making and historical legacy increases in the *Anabasis* after the 'long march'[87] is over, while the remains of the Ten Thousand are engaged in mercenary activities in the Hellespontine and Thracian regions. Once the forces are back in Greek territory, the possibility exists of controlling how the achievement of the completed march is received. Xenophon, his fellow leaders, and his men are now in a position to help define what they have accomplished by how they act upon their return and what they bring back with them, and as such, 'reputation' becomes an increasingly prominent theme. Xenophon, however, defines this theme very differently from the way that his men do: they seem throughout to be rather more interested in plunder than in memory, and to reckon their honour in spoils rather than in text.[88] Two productive examples are the 'campaign' against

83 Xenophon accompanied by troops: e.g. *An.* 3.3.8, 3.4.38–39, (a refusal), 3.4.42–43, 4.1.6, 4.2.2, 4.2.9, 4.2.16, 4.3.20, 4.3.26, 4.5.7, 4.5.16, 4.5.19, 4.5.21, 4.7.3, 4.7.22, 4.8.16. 'The Greeks' by this name only: e.g. 3.4.5, 3.4.18, 3.4.27, 3.4.33, 3.4.36–37, 3.5.1, 4.1.8–11, 4.2.12, 4.2.28, 4.3.1, 4.3.5, 4.3.32, 4.6.24–26, 4.7.17, 4.7.18–20, 4.7.27, 4.8.1, 4.8.8–9, 4.8.19. This list is not complete: most notably, it omits the numerous places where the members of the army are called 'soldiers', or are recognized only through the use of verbs in the third person plural.

84 Dalby 1992, with bibliography, reading the Ten Thousand as a 'colonizing expedition' rather than a city. Nussbaum 1967, cited by Dalby (op. cit. 16–17) via Marinovich as a strong advocate of the *polis* model, explores the 'democratic' qualities of the military assemblies in particular at 48–68. Dillery 1995, esp. 92–94, sees the resemblance between the Ten Thousand and a *polis* as evolving in the course of the *Anabasis*.

85 See Hornblower 2004. This (im)balance, in the abstract, is not actually so far removed from some of the negotiative behaviour that was embedded in fourth-century Athenian political life: e.g. Ober 1989.

86 See Ober 1989.

87 This phrase is borrowed from the title of Lane Fox 2004.

88 See Dillery 1995: 78–83. Dillery recognizes an important gap between Xenophon's interests and those of his men, but distinguishes them somewhat differently from the way that I do: 'while the army was primarily interested in returning to Greece and in personal gain, Xenophon was committed to maintaining the unity of the Ten Thousand above all else' (83).

the Drilae (5.2.3–32) and the consideration as to whether the Ten Thousand should found a colony (5.6.15–31).

At the opening of Book V, after Chirisophus departs to seek transport by sea, Xenophon attempts to acclimate the men to the unpopular idea that they may need to continue travelling by foot, but this quickly becomes one of the only withdrawn plans in all of the military assemblies in the *Anabasis* (5.1.14).[89] When neither the men's quests for booty (5.1.17) nor their attempts to exploit the surrounding countryside (5.2.1) yield sufficient livelihood for the army, Xenophon enlists the assistance of the Trapezuntians, who in turn invite the Greeks to attack the Drilae (5.2.2). Xenophon treats the operations of the Greek forces against the fortified main settlement of the Drilae in significant detail. While the fight that ensues can hardly be construed as history-making, it does offer the opportunity to view Xenophon the character on display as a commander on the attack, rather than on the defensive, and demonstrates his methods (5.2.3–27). Xenophon appears as a meticulously conscientious general, consulting the omens (5.2.9), encouraging his captains to design their own deployments in order to foster competition for bravery (5.2.11), engineering the plans for the light-armed troops (5.2.12), and taking advantage of an accidental opportunity to fire the town in order to avoid being trapped inside it (5.2.24–27). In the end, a clever trick (5.2.28–32) enables the escape of the invading force from the area (for the defenders have not been eradicated, despite the loss of their city), and the entire army regroups at the Greek colony of Cerasus (5.3.2). To the soldiers, the operations against the Drilae were intended to meet their need for supplies and their desire for booty. Xenophon, however, has reserved for himself as historian the right to determine the significance of the attempt on the town, and his account of the episode has dwelt instead upon military strategy and his own behaviour as a model commander.

The respective interests within the army are contrasted again once the Greeks reach Cerasus, as the spoils from 'the sale of the captives' (5.3.4, presumably both from the Drilae and from the earlier part of the journey) are divided. The ordinary soldiers receive money; the generals are further entrusted with the shares to be dedicated to the gods, and Xenophon moves to ensure his place in history by placing a gift with his own name on it, and

[89] The idea is never actually formally raised for the army's consideration, since Xenophon senses that it will be poorly received. The character is quite canny in this regard: Nussbaum 1967: 58, exploring the political relationship between the army and its leaders, points out that 'not a single proposal which is recorded as being once moved is rejected' (see also 57, 66–67). Cf. also n. 68, above.

that of Proxenus, in the sanctuary at Delphi (5.3.5). Such commemorative effort was certainly a known behaviour on the part of high-achieving military commanders,[90] but Xenophon here exercises an additional prerogative to guarantee the memory of his gesture: he records it in historiography.

I have explored elsewhere the interpretation of the colony-narrative in a manner that relates to this discussion,[91] and so will summarize those arguments here. The conversion of the Ten Thousand into a colony would cast Xenophon in the position of κτίστης, 'founder', which would render him a political and religious leader in life, a hero after his death,[92] and an indisputable agent of history, all well in keeping with the character's established interests. It would also, however, provide him with preferential access to power and wealth, a chief concern of his men. As the historian tells it, the character Xenophon ponders the possibility of the colony and privately makes sacrifice in search of divine guidance (5.6.15–16). His motivations, however, both with regard to the rites themselves (5.6.22, 27) and with regard to his goals for the potential colony and its settlers (5.6.17), are misinterpreted by the army, and Xenophon is accused by escalating rumours of secret self-aggrandizement (5.6.19–20, 27), to the point where he is forced to discard his plan in a defensive speech before the assembled soldiers (5.6.28–31). Not unlike Agesilaus recalled from Asia in the *Hellenica*, Xenophon here sacrifices a dramatic opportunity for personal historical agency. In committing the contemplation of it to historiography, however, he is nevertheless able both to suggest reflection upon what he *might* have achieved, had his men been willing, and to highlight his altruistic abandonment of his own aspirations.[93]

Similar self-consciousness on Xenophon's part, as both character and historian, is visible when he rejects the proffered position of sole commander (6.1.17–31), despite the fact that he is well aware of what it offers to him, his reputation, and his memory. The passage at 6.1.19–24, in particular, shows Xenophon considering and ultimately setting aside the kinds of considerations that motivated Alcibiades in the *Hellenica*.[94] Having evaluated

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[90] See e.g. n. 54, above, on Lysander's 'Nauarch's Monument' at Delphi.

[91] Ferrario (forthcoming).

[92] Dalby 1992: 23 n. 50, citing Graham 1964: 29–39.

[93] Indeed, the remainder of Book V is occupied with the scrutiny of the generals and the reconciliation of Xenophon with the army.

[94] I do not mean either here or elsewhere (see n. 101, below) to imply certainty about the relative dates of composition of the *Hellenica* and *Anabasis*; I raise these arguments only as points of interest that might be more or less meaningful depending upon the actual order of the two texts.

the positive reputation that he might enjoy amongst his supporters in his home city (of Athens, 6.1.20), the potential for himself to become the army's chief benefactor (6.1.20–21, using the very same word, αὐτοκράτωρ, that he used of Alcibiades in the *Hellenica*), and, in contrast, the possibility that he might fail, he leaves the issue to the outcome of a sacrifice. The recollections of the Delphic prophecy and of the Zeus dream anecdote from Book III (6.1.22), along with a remembrance of an omen from the earliest days of his journey (6.1.23), provide a literary clue that this moment is especially important.[95] And when the will of the gods seems to oppose his promotion (6.1.24), Xenophon refuses the commission with a recollection of the power struggles of the Peloponnesian War (6.1.26–31). In using the experiences of wartime Athens to justify giving up an echo of the position offered to Alcibiades, he presents himself as more selfless, more ethical, more pious, and perhaps wiser than his problematic fellow countryman.[96] The redemption here suggested in the historiography acts almost as a substitute for the historical achievements whose opportunity Xenophon is now refusing.[97]

The fact that the sole-command arrangement is so short-lived[98] seems to validate Xenophon's choice. The vindication comes shortly thereafter, when Xenophon's portion of the divided army is in a position to rescue the Arcadian faction from its Thracian attackers. Xenophon exhorts his men to the defence of the rebels by suggesting the possibility of accomplishing a 'most noble deed' (κάλλιστον ἔργον). The vocabulary in this brief section (6.3.17–18) bears overtones of heroic renown and memory (to κάλλιστον ἔργον add e.g. εὐκλεῶς, 'glorious[ly]', and ἐντιμοτέρους, 'of higher honour'): although Xenophon does not quite say so explicitly, part of what is at stake is reputation for the saviours—and for their leader, who also ventures rather cannily that adhering to the apparent will of the gods has created opportunities for achievement and admiration.

The struggle with the Bithynians that follows (6.5) contains many of the same rhetorical effects and historiographic themes, deployed on a larger scale. Favourable omens as obeyed by Xenophon (6.5.2, 8) and pious behaviour (the burial of the dead, 6.5.5–6) suggest that the gods will be on the side of the Greeks. A moment of hesitation at a geographical obstacle (6.5.12)

[95] Compare n. 64, above.

[96] Pownall 1998: 262 sees Xenophon as recalling Alcibiades' impiety during the return scene to Athens in order to foreshadow his fall after Notium.

[97] On the *Anabasis* as an apologia, e.g. LaForse 2005: 5–6, Azoulay 2004, Cawkwell 2004: 59–67, Rood 2004a: 322–326, Dillery 1995: 63–64, all with additional references.

[98] Chirisophus is deposed at 6.2.10–12 when the army splits into factions over the treatment of Heraclea; the factions are reconciled at Calpe Limen at 6.4.10.

is met with urging by Xenophon, who again appeals to reputation: οὐ γὰρ δόξης ὁρῶ δεομένους ὑμᾶς εἰς ἀνδρειότητα, ἀλλὰ σωτηρίας, 'as I see the situation, you do not stand in need of reputation for bravery, but of a safe return' (6.5.14). This phrase recalls central themes of both major Homeric poems,[99] and the pressure of the heroic code may thus be at work. Xenophon's subsequent speech to the soldiers echoes the same themes (standing ground before the enemy, travelling homeward), but is even more explicit about the reputation that the men will gain through their conduct: they will be remembered for it (ἡδύ τοι ἀνδρεῖόν τι καὶ καλὸν νῦν εἰπόντα καὶ ποιήσαντα μνήμην ἐν οἷς ἐθέλει παρέχειν ἑαυτοῦ, 'it will surely be sweet, through some manly and noble thing which one may say or do today, to keep himself in remembrance among those whom he wishes to remember him': 6.5.24). And this memory is made tangible in Xenophon's own text: he himself is able to complete this promise of remembrance as historian by writing it up, thereby converting one reality (the event) into another (the memory).[100]

Another of Xenophon's aspirations is also revisited shortly thereafter. Although he never succeeded in founding his colony, the army in place in Bithynian territory is said to be perceived by outsiders as a kind of settlement, which Xenophon πολίζει, 'is making a city' (6.6.4). The verb πολίζω is comparatively rare, occurring mainly in the earlier poets (Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar) before its occasional use in Herodotus: here, it seems to recollect the lost potential of the colony. The army, ironically, has become very much like a *polis* after all, and Xenophon is being treated as if he were its leader. This scene may also be a redemption of another prominent image from the *Hellenica*: the approach of the peoples of Asia Minor to Lysander as proxy for Agesilaus.[101] Here, there is no jealousy, and rather than subjected allies, the petitioners are now submissive enemies. The character Xenophon's presentation of these envoys to the soldiers serves several purposes: it avoids the circulation of the kinds of rumours that Xenophon the historian claims destroyed the original colony plan; it highlights Xenophon's reputation as an individual leader; and it also offers implicit proof as to the accuracy of the account provided by Xenophon the historian, in suggesting that there were witnesses to the events he records.

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99 On the *Anabasis* as an *Odyssey*, see e.g. Gray 2011: 143–144, LaForse 2005: 7, 10–11, citing Tuplin 2003, Higgins 1977: 89, 96, with references.

100 The relationship between writing and memory is addressed by e.g. Shrimpton 1997: 48–72, 88–91, 186–190, Thomas 1989, esp. 118–154; cf. also Derderian 2001, esp. 63–113 (all also cited in Ferrario [forthcoming], where this issue is treated in greater detail).

101 See n. 94, above.

When the Greek army falls foul of the Spartan governor Cleander, who threatens to have them debarred from all of the Greek cities of Asia Minor, Xenophon's attempt to reconcile the soldiers to Spartan control acknowledges the expectations that the Ten Thousand now have for their return home: χαλεπὸν εἰ οἰόμενοι ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι καὶ ἐπαίνου καὶ τιμῆς τεύξεσθαι ἀντὶ δὲ τούτων οὐδ' ὅμοιοι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐσόμεθα, ἀλλ' εἰρξόμεθα ἐκ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων, 'it will be hard if we who expected to obtain both praise and honour in Greece, shall find instead that we are not even on an equality with the rest of the Greeks, but are shut out from their cities' (6.6.16). The goal, in Xenophon's account, has now become not merely a safe return, but one that will bring honour and memory to the members of the Ten Thousand when they arrive. Key to this, as my discussion thus far has suggested, seems to have been, in Xenophon's eyes, the establishment of noble conduct—and, in his men's, the acquisition of plunder.

An important passage near the conclusion of the *Anabasis* takes note of both of these priorities. It describes how Xenophon prevented the Greek soldiers from seizing control of Byzantium:

> οἱ δὲ στρατιῶται ὡς εἶδον Ξενοφῶντα, προσπίπτουσι πολλοὶ αὐτῷ καὶ λέγουσι· Νῦν σοι ἔξεστιν, ὦ Ξενοφῶν, ἀνδρὶ γενέσθαι. ἔχεις πόλιν, ἔχεις τριήρεις, ἔχεις χρήματα, ἔχεις ἄνδρας τοσούτους. νῦν ἄν, εἰ βούλοιο, σύ τε ἡμᾶς ὀνήσαις καὶ ἡμεῖς σὲ μέγαν ποιήσαιμεν. (7.1.21)
>
> As soon as the soldiers saw Xenophon, many of them rushed towards him and said: 'Now is your opportunity, Xenophon, to prove yourself a man. You have a city, you have triremes, you have money, you have this great number of men. Now, should you so wish, you would render us a service and we should make you great'.

Xenophon does not accept their invitation, coming as it does from men who cannot themselves deliver the kind of historical memory that Xenophon himself desires. Instead, he calms the mob with a direct speech (7.1.25–31) that not only reviews how great the danger will be to them if they persist, but also appeals to their sense of duty, noting that it would be shameful for them to attack a Greek city (7.1.29–31). By stopping the seizure of Byzantium, Xenophon reorients 'greatness' away from the soldiers' understanding of it and towards his own; by recording the 'opportunity' he has rejected, he claims for himself a different kind of honour. In this performance, then, the character and the historian unite to demonstrate the essence of Xenophon's conception of historical agency: 'greatness' may be suggested by the performer or the receiver of memorable deeds, but final authority rests with those who record them. For that reason, history must be made in words as well as actions.

Conclusion: The Historian's History

This chapter has explored an agonistic relationship that the historian sometimes constructs with his own characters over the acknowledgement of historical agency and, consequently, of historical memory. Characters in Xenophon can advertise their own versions of their personal achievements and how they would like to be remembered; Xenophon himself will record these attempts, but will often deliberately juxtapose them with other material ranging from reported rumours to direct authorial interpretations. The historian's additions can emend or even contradict the messages sent by the characters, demonstrating the final authority of both the writer and his genre.

The relationship between reality and text under these circumstances is complex, and Xenophon provides a number of different explorations of the latter's control over the recollection of the former. One of the most involved occurs at the conclusion of Book V of the *Anabasis*, where Xenophon defends himself during the scrutiny of the generals (5.8.1–26). His direct speech represents the character's retelling of events that have already been treated by the historian earlier in the narrative,[102] and they differ in one key feature: the issue of when, how, and why Xenophon may have beaten some of the men. The main accuser holds that Xenophon struck him during the march through the snows in Armenia; with questioning, it emerges that Xenophon was punishing him for attempting to bury a dying comrade alive in order to avoid carrying him (5.8.1–11). The story is a new one, not originally related during the snow episode (4.4.7–5.21), and it portrays the accuser's actions as monstrous: the listening soldiers side with Xenophon, and no other specific incidents are mentioned (5.8.12). Xenophon nevertheless explains that any aggressive discipline he issued was for a given man's own benefit, or for that of the whole army (5.8.13–24), and concludes with an expression of regret at the selectivity of memory:

> θαυμάζω ὅτι εἰ μέν τινι ὑμῶν ἀπηχθόμην, μέμνησθε καὶ οὐ σιωπᾶτε, εἰ δέ τῳ ἢ χειμῶνα ἐπεκούρησα[103] ἢ πολέμιον ἀπήρυξα ἢ ἀσθενοῦντι ἢ ἀποροῦντι συνεξεπόρισά τι, τούτων δὲ οὐδεὶς μέμνηται, οὐδ' εἴ τινα καλῶς τι ποιοῦντα ἐπῄνεσα οὐδ' εἴ τινα

[102] I am grateful to T. Rood for suggesting that I examine material of this sort, which he points out is concentrated in *Anabasis* V and VII and presents unique opportunities for observing re-narration within the same text.

[103] Brownson's Loeb (in the Dillery revision) prints ἐπεκούφισα here, but the variant does not substantially change the sense of the phrase.

ἄνδρα ὄντα ἀγαθὸν ἐτίμησα ὡς ἐδυνάμην, οὐδὲν τούτων μέμνησθε. ἀλλὰ μὴν καλόν τε καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον καὶ ἥδιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν κακῶν μεμνῆσθαι. (5.8.25–26)

I am surprised that if ever I incurred the ill-will of any one among you, you remember that and are not silent about it, while if I gave relief to anyone in the cold, or warded off an enemy from him, or helped to provide something for him when he was sick or in want, these acts, on the other hand, are not remembered by anybody; nor, again, if I praised a man for a deed well done, or honoured according to my ability a man who was brave, do you remember any of these things. Yet surely it is more honourable and fair, more righteous and gracious to remember good deeds than evil.

This anecdote shows Xenophon the *character* appropriating the right to the narration of past events, and the remainder of the speech represents a bid for the control of memory, as well: the disciplinary acts, which were largely absent from the earlier narrative, are recast in retrospect as gestures necessary for the common good. The final paragraph, however, quoted above, cleverly ventures a gesture of apparent humility: the speaker now implies that memory is the result not of the performer of deeds, but of a conscious decision by his audience. Xenophon the historian records that ἐκ τούτου μὲν δὴ ἀνίσταντο καὶ ἀνεμίμνῃσκον. καὶ περιεγένετο ὥστε καλῶς ἔχειν, 'then people began getting up and recalling past incidents, and all turned out well in the end' (5.8.26). The audience has responded to Xenophon's rhetoric by joining in a positive rescripting of their shared past. The historian, however, maintaining control over his narrative to the last, does not report the details, instead choosing to leave the possibilities unspoken and thereby demonstrate the selectivity that he has exercised both here and elsewhere.[104] His own particular versions of events, of 'greatness', and of historical causality, even at multiple levels of remove, remain the only memories to which his readers have access.

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[104] I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this point.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

SPARTAN 'FRIENDSHIP' AND XENOPHON'S CRAFTING OF THE *ANABASIS*

Ellen Millender

Scholars have generally agreed that Xenophon is the author of the *Anabasis* and that he employs a pseudonym to refer to himself in his claim that a certain Themistogenes of Syracuse wrote about the events covered by the first four books of the *Anabasis* (*Hellenica* 3.1.2).[1] There is, however, far less consensus concerning the dating of this work. Xenophon, of course, furnishes some helpful details within the *Anabasis*, such as his references to the battle of Coronea, which occurred in 394 (5.3.6), and to his possession of Scillus, the estate near Olympia that the Spartans granted to him at some point after the battle of Coronea (5.3.7).

Beyond the obvious conclusion that Xenophon composed the *Anabasis* after 394, these and the other autobiographical references that scholars have used to date the text offer little help in providing either a more definite *terminus post quem* or a firm *terminus ante quem* for the composition of the *Anabasis*. Xenophon mentions that Megabyzus, a priest of Ephesian Artemis, visited him while attending the Olympic games and returned the money that Xenophon had deposited with the priest when he returned to Greece with Agesilaus II (5.3.4–7). In the same section Xenophon claims that he later used this money to buy a plot of ground upon which he built a temple and altar to Artemis (5.3.7–9). Xenophon, however, fails to provide information that can allow us to date firmly his occupation of the estate at Scillus, Megabyzus' visit, or the completion of the temple. Xenophon's mention of his sons' participation in the hunting expedition that coincided with the yearly festival that he held to honour Artemis is equally unhelpful, given our lack of both information concerning his sons' birthdates (cf. 7.6.34) and certainty concerning the age at which boys started hunting.[2] Modern scholars, nevertheless, have repeatedly employed such problematic bits of

[1] See, e.g., Delebecque 1957: 199; Masqueray 1930–1931: 1.4; Breitenbach 1967: 1640, 1645–1646; Roy 1967: 45; Cawkwell 1972: 17; Humble 1997: 26.

[2] For theories concerning the date of their birth, see, e.g., Stronk 1995: 265.

evidence to support arguments in favour of a range of dates for the *Anabasis*, from the 390s to the early 360s.[3]

A number of scholars, moreover, have offered later dates for the *Anabasis*' composition on the basis of Xenophon's employment of particular tenses. Ernst Badian, for example, has argued that Xenophon's use of the present and perfect tenses at 5.3.7–13 demonstrates that he wrote the fifth book of the *Anabasis* after 362/1.[4] Both Badian and others have also argued that Xenophon's use of the imperfect tense in this same section of the text suggests that at the time of composition he had left Scillus and that the passage on Scillus provides a *terminus post quem* of c. 371/0.[5] However, as Noreen Humble has rightly cautioned, the use of verb tenses to provide dates is far from conclusive.[6]

While any work on the date of the *Anabasis* can offer little in the way of 'surety', in this paper I argue that greater attention to Xenophon's depictions of the major participants in his account and his focus on particular themes can provide far more insight into the historical context of the *Anabasis* than the more common focus on either his autobiographical references or his tense usage. I will attempt to locate the historical circumstances of the work's composition on the basis of thematic criteria, specifically Xenophon's focus in this work on the theme of 'friendship' with the barbarian as an element of Spartan hegemony and foreign policy. The quotation marks around the term 'friendship' signal my use of this term to refer to a variety of social bonds that the Spartans in the *Anabasis* form with non-Greeks, including but not limited to *philia*.[7] My thematic approach to the

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3 For an overview of these arguments, see Humble 1997: 26–31, who concludes (31) that 'the most that can be said with any degree of surety is that the work was likely written sometime after the late 380s and before *HG* 3.1.2'. For pre-380 theories, see, e.g., MacLaren 1934: 246–247; Breitenbach 1967: 1641–1642; Perlman 1976–1977: 245 n. 10, 248 n. 18. See also Nickel 1979: 38–43. For post-371 theories, see, e.g., Körte 1922: 16; Dillery 1995: 59, 94; Cawkwell 1972: 16; 2004. See also Rahn 1981: 118 n. 96. Other scholars have opted for the view that Xenophon either wrote this work in two stages (cf. Delebecque 1957: 199–206, 288–300; Stronk 1995: 8–10) or produced multiple editions (cf. Masqueray 1930–1931: 1.7–11).

4 Badian 2004: 45–46.

5 See, e.g., Cawkwell 1972: 16; Dillery 1995: 59, 264 n. 1; Stronk 1995: 8; Badian 2004: 43, 45.

6 Humble 1997: 29. See also MacLaren 1934: 244; Breitenbach 1967: 1640–1641.

7 The paper, consequently, provides an overview of Xenophon's accounts of Spartan relations with the barbarian rather than a study of Xenophon's attitude towards *philia*. For Xenophon's views concerning friendship, see, esp., *Mem.* 2.4–6; *Cyr.* 8.7.13; *Symp.* 8.18; *Hier.* 3.2. In all of these works, Xenophon suggests that he views fidelity and reciprocity as

Anabasis builds upon the work of Édouard Delebecque, the main proponent of the view that Xenophon composed the *Anabasis* in two stages: (1) the 'Anabasis' (1–5.3.6), written c. 385 under the pseudonym Themistogenes and (2) the 'Parabasis' (5.3.7-end), written c. 377.[8] Delebecque bases his division of the text on perceived differences in Xenophon's tone and attitude towards the major political players of the time. According to Delebecque, Xenophon's marked hostility to the Persians and critiques of the Spartans in his 'Anabasis' reflect his indignation at the Lacedaemonians' ratification of the Peace of Antalcidas—or King's Peace—in 386 (cf. *Hellenica* 5.1.25–36), which betrayed both the Asiatic Greeks and Xenophon's Panhellenic dreams.[9] Delebecque, in turn, attributes Xenophon's ostensibly more laudatory treatment of the Lacedaemonians in his 'Parabasis' to his concern about the rise of the Second Athenian League in 377 and the threat it posed to Spartan hegemony.[10]

The general consensus on the unity of the *Anabasis* has led scholars to dismiss Delebecque's theories on this work's composition, and this paper likewise aims to show that the *Anabasis* is far more thematically unified than Delebecque argues.[11] As I also hope to demonstrate, Xenophon's depictions of Spartan hegemony in the last two books of the *Anabasis* are far more condemnatory than Delebecque claims. Nevertheless, we should beware

necessary components of friendship. See Konstan 1997: 79–80, 82. See also Azoulay 2004: 281–326, who examines the relationship between *philia* and *charis* in Xenophon's works and argues (282) that 'Xénophon donne à la *philia* une tournure manifestement inégalitaire' ('Xenophon gives friendship a manifestly inegalitarian form'). Gray 2011: 291–329 provides a detailed study of Xenophon's treatment of friendship but concludes (328) that he 'presents the dynamics of friendships as a partnership for mutual *eudaimonia*. He finds these dynamics within families and other kinds of friendships, where the assessment of the credits and debits on the balance sheet between partners to the relationship takes into account the valuation of the gift from the point of view of the recipient as well as the principle of giving "according to ability"'. On Xenophon's treatment of friendship at *Symp.* 8.18, see Huss 1999: 390–391. On friendship in the *Oeconomicus*, see Stevens 1994. I would like to thank David Johnson and Gabriel Danzig for pointing me towards both the primary and secondary sources on Xenophon's views on friendship.

8 Delebecque 1957: 199–206, 288–300. Cf. Lengauer 1979: 84–85. Stronk 1995: 8–10 argues that Xenophon was likely writing the *Anabasis* in the late 390s and *c.* 370 'revised his earlier written story … and completed it with the sequel of the vicissitudes of the "Cyreans" until they went into Spartan service'. See also Soesberge 1982: 137.

9 Delebecque 1957: 199–206.

10 Delebecque 1957: 288–300, esp. 288–292, 298–300. For the view that Xenophon offers a laudatory and even defensive treatment of Sparta in the *Anabasis*, see Stronk 1995: 127.

11 For examples of this 'unitarian' view, see Anderson 1974: 83–84; Nickel 1979: 39; Hirsch 1985: 154 n. 5; Humble 1997: 26–27.

of throwing out the baby with the bathwater, for Delebecque's attempt to locate at least one part of the *Anabasis* (1–5.3.6) in the late 380s deserves careful reconsideration. In this paper I offer a close analysis of the focus of the *Anabasis* on the Spartans' associations with the Greeks' barbarian enemies to the detriment of their fellow Hellenes. I argue that Xenophon's interest in this aspect of Spartan foreign policy best fits the aftermath of the notorious King's Peace of 387/6.

This is not to say, of course, that I believe that Xenophon necessarily composed the entirety of the *Anabasis* in the late 380s. While I would not go so far as Delebecque in his two-stage theory of composition, it seems both dangerous and unnecessary to dismiss the arguments scholars have provided for a later dating of the *Anabasis*. Most compelling, in my opinion, is Melina Tamiolaki's observation that Xenophon's description of the Arcadians' and Achaeans' secession from the Cyrean force (6.2.9–12) mirrors his account of the Arcadians' aspirations in the early 360s in the *Hellenica* (7.1.23–26).[12] Indeed, the inclusion in the *Anabasis* of such details, which have led scholars to posit a broad range of dates from the 390s to the 360s, suggests that Xenophon continued to work on the *Anabasis* over a number of decades. It is also possible that, as Paul Masqueray contends, Xenophon composed the first (and main) edition of the text before 380 and produced a second edition later.[13] Nevertheless, the prominence of the thematic strand of Spartan 'friendship' throughout the text suggests that Xenophon composed at least the bulk of his *Anabasis* in the late 380s through the lens of the Spartans' self-serving and divisive foreign policy following their negotiation of the King's Peace in 387/6.

'Friendship', Laconian Style

Clearchus and the 'Friendship of the Barbarian'

As I argue in a forthcoming article, Xenophon's *Anabasis* provides an unusual amount of detail concerning both the individual Spartans who participated in the expedition and the Spartan commanders in the Hellespontine region who frustrated the Cyreans' return to Greece. The prominence of individual Spartans at both the beginning and conclusion of his account not only supports the 'unitarian' view of the *Anabasis* against the minority view

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12 Tamiolaki 2010: 365–366. I would like to thank the author for sharing her manuscript with me ahead of publication.

13 Masqueray 1930–1931: 1.7–11.

of Delebecque but also, more importantly, suggests Xenophon's continued interest in analyzing Spartan foreign policy and leadership in this work. More specifically, I argue that Xenophon uses these Spartan portraits to provide a critique of Spartan hegemony that runs throughout the *Anabasis* and that is far more focused and sustained than Xenophon's negative treatments of Spartan leadership in his *Hellenica* and in Chapter 14 of his *Spartan Constitution*.[14]

Xenophon's exploration of Spartan leadership and policy in the Aegean begins with his detailed portrait of Clearchus, the Spartan who became the most powerful of Cyrus' Greek mercenary commanders and retained this position after Cyrus' death at Cunaxa in the summer of 401 (2.2.5) until Tissaphernes, the satrap of Sardis, executed him (2.5.31–6.1).[15] Clearchus first appears in the *Anabasis* as a Lacedaemonian exile who made Cyrus' acquaintance and earned both his admiration and ten thousand darics.[16] With this money Clearchus hired an army ostensibly for Cyrus' use and proceeded to employ it to attack the Thracians dwelling beyond the Hellespont (1.1.9).[17]

Xenophon's brief introduction of Clearchus is striking in its focus on the Spartan as a liminal figure—an exile available for hire at the right price. Xenophon, in fact, further highlights Clearchus' status as an exile (Λακεδαιμόνιος φυγὰς) in his later description of Clearchus' services to Cyrus (1.2.9), in the long speech Clearchus delivers to his troops at Tarsus (1.3.3; cf. 1.3.6), and in Clearchus' obituary (2.6.4).[18] Xenophon, however, provides no details concerning the circumstances of Clearchus' exile from Sparta until this obituary (2.6.2–4), and his account omits many of the damning

14 Millender (forthcoming). On Xenophon's criticism of Sparta in these other works, see, esp., Higgins 1977: 65–75; Proietti 1987; Tuplin 1993: esp. 31, 163–165; 1994; Dillery 1995: esp. 6, 15–16, 100, 118–119, 160–171, 192–237; Laforse 1997; Humble 1997, 1999, 2004; Stanke 2006: 72–135. See also Badian 2004: 47–49, 51 and Harman (this volume, pp. 427–453).

15 Cf. Diod. 14.26.6–7. Xenophon demonstrates Clearchus' prominent position in his accounts of the trial of Orontas (*An.* 1.6, esp. 1.6.5, 9) and the battle at Cunaxa (1.7.1; 1.8.4–5, 12–13; 1.10.14; cf. Diod. 14.22.5; 14.23.1; 14.24.2–5). See also Xenophon's claim that Clearchus was the only one of Cyrus' generals who knew the real aim of the campaign (3.1.10). On Cyrus' preferential treatment of Clearchus, see, esp., Roisman 1985–1988: 33–38, who argues that Clearchus came to occupy the leading position in the force after quelling the revolt at Tarsus (1.3). Cf. Westlake 1987: 246. See also Roy 1967: 292–293; Herman 1987: 100; Trundle 2004: 139; Millender (forthcoming).

16 See also Diod. 14.12.7–9; Polyaen. *Strat.* 2.2.2–3.

17 See also Xen. *An.* 1.2.1, 9; 1.3.3; 2.6.3–5.

18 On Xenophon's emphasis on Clearchus' status as an exile, see Humble 1997: 63; Millender 2006: 241; Millender (forthcoming).

aspects of the Spartan's fall from favour that found their way into the accounts of Diodorus (14.12.2–7) and Polyaenus (2.2.6–10). Some scholars have accordingly accused Xenophon of trying to provide a whitewashed treatment of Clearchus.[19] One, indeed, may wonder at this lack of detail concerning Clearchus' exile, since a full rehearsal of his arrogant and brutal behaviour at Byzantium could only enrich the critique of Spartan foreign policy that, I argue, figures so largely in the *Anabasis*.[20]

Xenophon, nevertheless, manages to provide a generally negative characterization of Clearchus in the *Anabasis* without the benefit of these details, which he may have omitted in order to focus on Clearchus' role in the Cyreans' expedition. However, the exclusion of details concerning Clearchus' troubled relationship with the Spartan authorities makes it possible for Xenophon to treat Clearchus as the main representative of Sparta in the first two books of the work despite his exile. At the same time, this abridged version of the events allows Xenophon to exploit the symbolic aspect of Clearchus' status as an exile to enrich his depiction of both Clearchus and other Spartan leaders in the *Anabasis*.[21] As I hope to demonstrate, Xenophon consistently portrays Clearchus as an adventurer with no real allegiance to anyone, ever ready to shift his loyalties, and willing to sacrifice the needs of his fellow Greeks to further his own interests. More importantly, Clearchus, through his dual status as a Spartan and an exile, also operates in the *Anabasis* as a paradigm of the Lacedaemonians' self-interested foreign policy in the early fourth century.[22]

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[19] See, e.g., Laforse 2000: 85–88; Bassett 2001: 7–9, 12–13. See also Braun 2004: 100–107. Bassett, who offers sound reasons for privileging Diodorus over Xenophon, argues (9; cf. 13) that 'Xenophon has not merely omitted significant detail here, which is his most common method of dealing with unpleasant realities, but has actively attempted to re-write the portrait to cover unpalatable aspects of Clearchus' career'. See also Parke 1930: 57; Westlake 1987. For the various theories concerning Clearchus' exile, see Best 1969: 51–52; Mitchell 1997: 83; Laforse 2000: 75–76; Bassett 2001.

[20] As Christopher Tuplin has kindly pointed out to me, a fuller account of Clearchus' tyrannical behaviour would also provide an invitation to contrast Xenophon's later exemplary leadership at Byzantium (cf. 7.1.4–31).

[21] The figure of the Spartan exile appears elsewhere in the *Anabasis*. Xenophon twice mentions Dracontius (4.8.25–26, 6.6.30), who was forced to leave home after accidentally killing another boy with a dagger. See Ma 2004: 333. We also meet Procles, the descendant of the exiled Eurypontid king, Demaratus (2.1.3; 2.2.1; 7.8.17). On the figure of Demaratus, see Hdt. 6.70.2; 7.2–3, 101–105, 209, 234–237, along with Millender 2002a: 13–15, 17; 2002b: 33–36. See also Stronk 1995: 130–131.

[22] For the view that Xenophon reveals a more positive attitude towards the pursuit of self-interest, see Danzig (this volume, pp. 499–539).

After introducing Clearchus the Spartan exile (1.1.9), Xenophon provides little information about this Spartan mercenary until his account of the crisis at Tarsus, in which Clearchus suddenly occupies centre stage in the stand-off between the Ten Thousand and Cyrus (1.3).[23] Xenophon here painstakingly records Clearchus' attempt both to allay the Cyreans' suspicions regarding Cyrus' intentions and to convince them to follow Cyrus beyond Tarsus. We learn that Clearchus first tried to force his men to move, but when such force almost got him stoned to death, he resorted to deception (1.3.1–2). Clearchus, he tells us, wept and launched into a speech in which he claimed his unwavering allegiance to Hellas and to his fellow Greeks (1.3.3–6). The Spartan's appeal proved so successful that the whole mercenary force, trusting his claim that he would not march on to the Persian King's capital, commended him, and two thousand troops under the generals Xenias and Pasion joined Clearchus' force (1.3.7).

In his narrative of the elaborate machinations that followed Clearchus' speech, Xenophon reveals the limited nature of the Spartan's professed loyalty to his fellow Hellenes.[24] Despite his public refusal to meet with Cyrus, Clearchus secretly managed to reassure the Persian prince of his good intentions and encouraged Cyrus to join this game of charades by continuing to send for him (1.3.8). After further stating his concern about the dangers that could arise from turning Cyrus into an enemy (1.3.9–12), Clearchus encouraged the mercenaries to hold a debate at which he arranged for his cronies to state the difficulties involved in either remaining or departing without Cyrus' consent (1.3.13–17). Through such stratagems Clearchus managed to have himself chosen to lead a group of representatives who decided to follow Cyrus but nonetheless exacted from the Persian prince a promise of increased wages for the troops (1.3.18–21).

As Xenophon makes clear, the Greek mercenaries were not the only pawns in Clearchus' game. Cyrus—whom Xenophon describes as both perplexed and pained (1.3.8: ἀπορῶν τε καὶ λυπούμενος)—also was initially just as much in the dark as the Cyreans concerning Clearchus' scheme at Tarsus (1.3.8). One must also wonder whether Cyrus had been forewarned of the Cyrean representatives' request for extra pay, which Clearchus had likely instigated (1.3.19, 21). The only winner in this elaborate hoax, as far as

[23] See also 1.2.1, 9, 15.

[24] Hirsch 1985: 24–25. See also Laforse 1997: 216–261, who argues that such Panhellenic sentiments in Xenophon's works routinely prove to be little more than rhetoric designed to play on the audience's emotions. For a more positive view of Clearchus' conduct at Tarsus, see Roisman 1985–1988: 35–36.

Xenophon is concerned, was Clearchus, who played the Greeks and Cyrus off against each other and emerged as the benefactor and beneficiary of both parties. Indeed, the Spartan gained more troops (1.3.7) and rose in the estimation of the deceived Cyreans (1.3.7, 13–20) without sacrificing his ties to Cyrus.

Xenophon again emphasizes Clearchus' willingness to put his own needs before the interests of his fellow Greeks in his account of a serious rift that Clearchus precipitated among the Cyreans once they had crossed the Euphrates. After getting involved in a dispute between one of his own men and a soldier belonging to the Thessalian Menon's contingent, Clearchus decided against Menon's man and accordingly flogged him. Clearchus' rough handling of the man so angered Menon's soldiers that they attacked Clearchus and almost precipitated a full-scale battle between two contingents of the Ten Thousand (1.5.11–17).[25] Perhaps not coincidentally, it was the barbarian Cyrus who ostensibly maintained the Cyreans' unity by helping the personally affronted Clearchus see the dangers of a divided Greek force and come to his senses (1.5.15–17).

Clearchus' self-interest, however, not only endangered his fellow Hellenes but also apparently played a role in Cyrus' defeat at Cunaxa. Xenophon claims that Cyrus ordered Clearchus to lead his army against the enemy's centre, where the King was stationed (1.8.12). Clearchus, however, disobeyed his command, ostensibly out of fear that he might be encircled on both flanks, and told Cyrus somewhat cryptically that he was making sure that everything would go well (1.8.13: αὐτῷ μέλοι ὅπως καλῶς ἔχοι). After noting Clearchus' disobedience and hinting at his self-interest, Xenophon provides a somewhat murky depiction of the battle of Cunaxa in which he neither mentions Clearchus nor illuminates the Spartan commander's battle strategy (1.8.14–29). Xenophon, however, shows that Clearchus had indeed made sure that everything went well—at least for himself and his troops, who soundly defeated the division opposite them (1.8.14–21). Cyrus, on the other hand, was left to fall at the hands of the force that surrounded the King (1.8.21–27). Although Xenophon does not explicitly condemn Clearchus, the Spartan cuts a poor figure in this account of the battle in comparison with those noble Persian attendants who died alongside Cyrus, especially the faithful Artapates (1.8.27–29).[26] Xenophon's description of Cyrus' self-

[25] On the threats that Clearchus posed to the Cyreans' unity and the harmony among their generals, see Humble 1997: 75–80.

[26] Cf. 1.9.30–31. See Azoulay 2004: 312.

less death furnishes an even sharper contrast with Clearchus' behaviour at Cunaxa. As Xenophon poignantly notes, Cyrus only charged against his brother when he feared that the King was about to get behind and cut down Cyrus' Greek troops (1.8.24). Xenophon also implicitly criticizes Clearchus' disloyalty and self-interest in his ensuing eulogy of Cyrus as a leader who knew when to obey (1.9.5) and attached the greatest importance to keeping his word (1.9.7–10).

The questionable nature of Clearchus' allegiance to Cyrus—or to anyone for that matter—again receives attention in Xenophon's description of the aftermath of Artaxerxes II's victory at Cunaxa. Directly after his eulogy of Cyrus, Xenophon turns his attention to Clearchus and his Greek troops, who were in the dark concerning the location and fortunes of Cyrus' force (1.10.4, 16; 2.1.2). They only learned of his death from Procles, the ruler of Teuthrania—a descendant, no less, of yet another Spartan exile and Persian ally, the Eurypontid king Demaratus.[27] Procles also informed them that Ariaeus, the Persian who commanded Cyrus' barbarian troops, was waiting for the Greeks on the chance that they would want to return to Ionia with him and his forces (2.1.3). While the other Greeks became distressed upon hearing this news, Clearchus, who was looking for a new opportunity to fight, at once declared his intention to set Ariaeus on the Persian throne (2.1.4).

Clearchus' self-interest, however, appears most clearly in Xenophon's treatment of the Cyreans' deadly encounter with the Persian satrap Tissaphernes. Although one might naturally blame the treacherous Tissaphernes for the capture and murder of Clearchus and the other leaders of the Ten Thousand (2.5.31–2.6.1), Xenophon assigns much of the responsibility for this debacle to Clearchus (2.5.1–30).[28] According to Xenophon, the satrap skilfully exploited the Lacedaemonian leader's ambitions by convincing him that some of his fellow Greeks had been falsely accusing Clearchus of plotting against Tissaphernes. If only Clearchus would bring him the Cyreans' generals and captains, Tissaphernes would give the Spartan the names of those responsible for such false reports (2.5.24–25). Clearchus played right into the satrap's hands (2.5.26–29), primarily because he feared that Menon was trying to deprive him of his leadership of the army, and

[27] See n. 21, above.

[28] Cf. 2.5.38–41. See Millender (forthcoming). On the lethal combination of jealousy, self-interest, and poor diplomacy that led to Clearchus' execution, see Humble 1997: 76–80. *Contra* Roisman 1985–1988: 46–50, who finds fault with Xenophon's account and defends Clearchus.

he 'desired to have the entire army devoted to him' (2.5.29: ἐβούλετο δὲ καὶ ὁ Κλέαρχος ἅπαν τὸ στράτευμα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχειν τὴν γνώμην). In assigning Clearchus this key role in his colleagues' brutal execution, Xenophon's account differs greatly from that provided by Ctesias, the personal physician of Artaxerxes II. According to Ctesias, Clearchus rather tried to oppose this plot, which Tissaphernes was able to orchestrate with the help of Menon.[29] While scholars have debated the relative merits of both traditions, Steven Hirsch has rightly argued that 'the existence of a discrepant version of these events accentuates the particular slant which Xenophon gave to his portrait of Clearchus'.[30]

After reporting the Persians' decision to behead Clearchus and his fellow generals (2.6.1), Xenophon provides an obituary that encapsulates his earlier representations of the Spartan commander as a self-centred adventurer (2.6.1–15). Clearchus, according to Xenophon, appears to have lived for battle and based his shifting loyalties—to Sparta and Cyrus (and, one can presume, Tissaphernes)—on his obsessive passion for war (2.6.1–6):

> … Clearchus, by common consent of all who were personally acquainted with him, seemed to have been a man who was both fitted for war (πολεμικός) and fond of war (φιλοπόλεμος) to the last degree. For, in the first place, as long as the Lacedaemonians were at war with the Athenians, he stood fast with them; then, as soon as peace had come, he persuaded his city that the Thracians were injuring the Greeks and, after gaining his point as best he could from the ephors, set sail with the intention of making war upon the Thracians who dwelt beyond the Chersonese and Perinthus. When, however, the ephors changed their minds for some reason or other and, after he had already gone, tried to turn him back from the Isthmus of Corinth, at that point he declined to render further obedience, but went sailing off to the Hellespont. As a result he was condemned to death by the authorities at Sparta for disobedience to orders. Being now an exile he came to Cyrus, and the arguments whereby he persuaded Cyrus are recorded elsewhere; at any rate, Cyrus gave him ten thousand darics, and he, upon receiving this money, did not turn his thoughts to relaxation but with this money collected an army and made war upon the Thracians. He defeated them in battle and from that time on plundered and ravaged them and continued to make war until Cyrus wanted his army; then he went off, again for the purpose of making war, this time with Cyrus. Now such conduct as this, in my opinion, reveals a man devoted to war (φιλοπολέμου).[31]

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[29] Ctesias *FGrH* 688 F27; cf. Plut. *Artax.* 18.

[30] Hirsch 1985: 160 n. 48. Cawkwell 1972: 24–26 seems to privilege Ctesias' version of events over that of Xenophon, while Hirsch 1985: 160 n. 48 claims that Xenophon's account is both 'subtler and less open to suspicion of bias'.

[31] Κλέαρχος ὁμολογουμένως ἐκ πάντων τῶν ἐμπείρως αὐτοῦ ἐχόντων δόξας γενέσθαι ἀνὴρ καὶ

Xenophon had already hinted at Clearchus' primary allegiance to warfare when he had the Lacedaemonian leader in his speech at Tarsus refer to his troops as his fatherland, friends, and allies (1.3.6: πατρίδα καὶ φίλους καὶ συμμάχους). Here he even goes further and claims that Clearchus 'wanted to spend money on war just as one might spend it on a loved one or on any other pleasure, so devoted was he to war' (2.6.7: φιλοπόλεμος). In his obituary of Clearchus, Xenophon also suggests that Clearchus' warlike (2.6.7: πολεμικός) nature arose from his similarly obsessive attachment to danger (2.6.7: φιλοκίνδυνος).[32]

Xenophon, nevertheless, admits that Clearchus' addiction to war and danger made him a capable commander (2.6.6–11; cf. 3.2.31), a view that accords with the accounts that he provides in the *Anabasis* of Clearchus' energy, experience, and ability to turn the Cyreans into a disciplined force.[33] One should note, however, that Xenophon undermines such positive images of Clearchus' leadership by attributing his success as a commander and the obedience of his men to his use of violence and severe discipline, characteristics that receive emphasis in the fallen Spartan's 'eulogy' (2.6.9–12):

> He accomplished this result by being severe (χαλεπός); for he was gloomy in appearance and harsh in voice, and he used to punish severely (ἐκόλαζέ τε ἰσχυρῶς), sometimes in anger (ὀργῇ), so that there were times he regretted what he had done. Yet he also punished (ἐκόλαζεν) on principle, for he believed there was no good in an army that went without punishment (ἀκολάστου) … In the midst of dangers, therefore, the soldiers were ready to obey him completely and chose no other; for they said that at such times his gloominess appeared to be brightness in the faces of others, and his severity (τὸ χαλεπόν) seemed to be confidence against the enemy, so that it appeared to be safety and no longer severity (χαλεπόν). But when they had got beyond the danger and could go off to serve under other commanders,

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πολεμικὸς καὶ φιλοπόλεμος ἐσχάτως. καὶ γὰρ δὴ ἕως μὲν πόλεμος ἦν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους παρέμενεν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἰρήνη ἐγένετο, πείσας τὴν αὑτοῦ πόλιν ὡς οἱ Θρᾷκες ἀδικοῦσι τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ διαπραξάμενος ὡς ἐδύνατο παρὰ τῶν ἐφόρων ἐξέπλει ὡς πολεμήσων τοῖς ὑπὲρ Χερρονήσου καὶ Περίνθου Θρᾳξίν. ἐπεὶ δὲ μεταγνόντες πως οἱ ἔφοροι ἤδη ἔξω ὄντος ἀποστρέφειν αὐτὸν ἐπειρῶντο ἐξ Ἰσθμοῦ, ἐνταῦθα οὐκέτι πείθεται, ἀλλ' ᾤχετο πλέων εἰς Ἑλλήσποντον. ἐκ τούτου καὶ ἐθανατώθη ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Σπάρτῃ τελῶν ὡς ἀπειθῶν. ἤδη δὲ φυγὰς ὢν ἔρχεται πρὸς Κῦρον, καὶ ὁποίοις μὲν λόγοις ἔπεισε Κῦρον ἀλλαχοῦ γέγραπται, δίδωσι δὲ αὐτῷ Κῦρος μυρίους δαρεικούς· ὁ δὲ λαβὼν οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥᾳθυμίαν ἐτράπετο, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν χρημάτων συλλέξας στράτευμα ἐπολέμει τοῖς Θρᾳξί, καὶ μάχῃ τε ἐνίκησε καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου δὴ ἔφερε καὶ ἦγε τούτους καὶ πολεμῶν διεγένετο μέχρι Κῦρος ἐδεήθη τοῦ στρατεύματος· τότε δὲ ἀπῆλθεν ὡς σὺν ἐκείνῳ αὖ πολεμήσων. ταῦτα οὖν φιλοπολέμου μοι δοκεῖ ἀνδρὸς ἔργα εἶναι …

32 On Clearchus' passion for war, see Humble 1997: 64–65.

33 See, e.g., 2.2.6, 19–21; 2.3.10–13; 2.4.26. See Laforse 2000: 76 and n. 7; Ma 2004: 337–338.

> many deserted him; for there was nothing pleasing about him, but he was always severe and savage (χαλεπὸς ἦν καὶ ὠμός) ... [34]

Xenophon's suggestion that this Spartan commander's brand of leadership was not to everyone's taste (2.6.12–13) recalls his earlier accounts of Clearchus' violent methods, whether he was trying to force his men to move from Tarsus (1.3.1–2), flogging one of Menon's soldiers (1.5.11), or striking shirkers as the Cyreans built bridges in Babylonia (2.3.10–13).[35]

Building upon Xenophon's earlier depictions of Clearchus' harsh and self-serving leadership, this obituary provides a generally unflattering portrait of Clearchus as a gloomy and severe commander who was at once disobedient[36] and yet obsessed with the obedience of others,[37] self-interested and treacherous, ever in search of warfare, given to using violent methods to discipline his soldiers, and thus incapable of gaining their lasting loyalty, friendship (2.6.13: φιλίᾳ), and goodwill (2.6.7–15).[38] Clearchus emerges in the *Anabasis* as the polar opposite of Cyrus, Xenophon's ideal leader, whose faithfulness, friendship, and fairness earned him the obedience, loyalty, and love of Greeks and barbarians alike (1.9; cf. 1.5.8).[39]

Many aspects of Xenophon's unflattering portrait of Clearchus are not in themselves remarkable but rather accord with Spartan stereotypes that widely circulated through fifth- and fourth-century Athenian-based texts.

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[34] τοῦτο δ' ἐποίει ἐκ τοῦ χαλεπὸς εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ὁρᾶν στυγνὸς ἦν καὶ τῇ φωνῇ τραχύς, ἐκόλαζέ τε ἰσχυρῶς, καὶ ὀργῇ ἐνίοτε, ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ μεταμέλειν ἔσθ' ὅτε. καὶ γνώμῃ δ' ἐκόλαζεν· ἀκολάστου γὰρ στρατεύματος οὐδὲν ἡγεῖτο ὄφελος εἶναι ... ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς δεινοῖς ἤθελον αὐτοῦ ἀκούειν σφόδρα καὶ οὐκ ἄλλον ᾑροῦντο οἱ στρατιῶται· καὶ γὰρ τὸ στυγνὸν αὐτοῦ τότε φαιδρὸν †ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις προσώποις† ἔφασαν φαίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν ἐρρωμένον πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἐδόκει εἶναι, ὥστε σωτήριον, οὐκέτι χαλεπὸν ἐφαίνετο· ὅτε δ' ἔξω τοῦ δεινοῦ γένοιντο καὶ ἐξείη πρὸς ἄλλους ἀρξομένους ἀπιέναι, πολλοὶ αὐτὸν ἀπέλειπον· τὸ γὰρ ἐπίχαρι οὐκ εἶχεν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ χαλεπὸς ἦν καὶ ὠμός.

[35] Cf. 1.3.1–2: ἐβιάζετο, βιάσασθαι. On Clearchus' penchant for brutality, see Humble 1997: 70–71; Millender (forthcoming). See also Braun 2004: 101, who argues that Clearchus exceeded his authority when he flogged one of Menon's soldiers.

[36] Cf. 1.8.13; 2.6.3–4, 15. On his tendency to disobey orders, see Humble 1997: 64–65, 106.

[37] Cf. 1.3.6; 2.2.6; 2.6.8, 11, 13. See Millender (forthcoming).

[38] Compare Xenophon's description of Seuthes at 7.7.29. On Xenophon's unflattering portrayal of Clearchus, see Nussbaum 1967: 118–120, 138–139; Higgins 1977: 87; Hirsch 1985: 28; Humble 1997: 63–80; Braun 2004; Danzig: 2007: 34–36; Tamiolaki 2010; Millender (forthcoming). *Contra* Parke 1930: 57 and Bigwood 1983: 345–346, who argue that Xenophon positively slanted his portrait of Clearchus because of his friendship with the Spartan commander. Roisman 1985–1988 takes the middle course by arguing that Xenophon's obituary of Clearchus (2.6.1–15) is much more negative than his earlier depictions of Clearchus.

[39] Cf. *Cyr.* 8.7.13; *Mem.* 2.6.9. See Tuplin 1994: 133–134. See also Gray 2011: 37–38, 73, 182–183, who provides a detailed study of Xenophon's interest in the issue of obedience (cf., esp., 15–18, 30–34, 37–38, 180–196). On the passages in the *Anabasis* that seem to subvert Xenophon's idealized presentation of Cyrus, see Tamiolaki 2010. See also Danzig 2007: 32.

The duplicitous Spartan, for example, appears explicitly in Andromache's attack on Menelaus in Euripides' *Andromache* of *c.* 425 (455–452) and in the Athenian citizens' criticism of Dicaeopolis for concluding a treaty with the Spartans in Aristophanes' *Acharnians* of 425 (307–308).[40] The works of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon likewise feature what we may term the 'severe' Spartan, the Lacedaemonian focused on warfare, obsessed with discipline, and often violent in his interactions with his fellow Greeks.[41] Clearchus, more importantly, seems to exemplify the type of Spartan leader that apparently figured with increasing regularity in the late fifth and early fourth century, as Xenophon suggests in his *Hellenica* and Chapter 14 of his *Spartan Constitution*—the Spartan who abandoned the traditional discipline in his search for wealth and power and his ambition to exercise rule abroad.[42]

Far more striking is Xenophon's emphasis on Clearchus' interest in forging ties with the barbarian to the detriment of his fellow Greeks.[43] As I have shown above, Xenophon focuses a great deal of attention on Clearchus' easily and ever shifting loyalties, beginning with his description of the first major turning-point in the adventure of the Ten Thousand at Tarsus, where the Cyreans had to make the critical decision either to follow Cyrus or to turn back (1.3). Especially noteworthy is the speech that Clearchus delivers to the suspicious Cyreans, in which he repeatedly addresses the related issues of allegiance and friendship. In the midst of tears that may indicate his greater attachment to Cyrus than to his compatriots,[44] the distressed

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[40] See also, e.g., Hdt. 9.54.1; Thuc. 1.128–130; 2.39.1, 48.2; 3.52–68; 4.22.2, 80.3–4, 85–87, 108.5; 5.27.2, 29.3, 45.3, 105.3–4; Eur. *Supp.* 187, 321–325; Ar. *Lys.* 168–169, 618–625, 628–631, 1233–1235, 1269–1270; *Pax* 216–218, 622–623, 1065–1068, 1076, 1083–1087. On deception and treachery as key components of fifth-century Athenian constructions of Spartan character, see Bradford 1994; Tuplin 1994: 158; Millender 1996: 182–183, 185–208, 320–327; Hesk 2000: 26–40, 64–84. Millender 2002b examines Athenian representations of Spartan lawlessness. On the theme of deception in the *Anabasis*, see, below, n. 59.

[41] For examples of such violence, see Hdt. 6.75 (Cleomenes); Thuc. 3.32.1–2 (Alcidas), 4.130.4 (Polydamidas), 8.84.2–3 (Astyochus); Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.15, 18–19 (Mnasippus); Plut. *Lys.* 15.7 (Callibius). On the Spartans' reputation for severe discipline and violent treatment of other Greeks, see, esp., Hornblower 2000; Millender (forthcoming). On the Spartans' ostensible obsession with obedience, see Millender 2002b and Millender (forthcoming).

[42] Cf. *Hell.* 3.1.8 (Thibron); 3.1.9–27, 3.2.8–11, 4.3.2 (Dercylidas). For a detailed discussion of the changing nature of Spartan leadership following the Lacedaemonians' victory over the Athenians, see Hodkinson 1993.

[43] See Nussbaum 1967: 127 and Hirsch 1985: 24–25, 28, who notes Clearchus' decision to put friendship with the barbarian before the interests of his fellow Greeks. Hirsch (25), however, less cogently argues that Xenophon does not disparage the Spartan for this trait.

[44] See Herman 1987: 17–18.

Clearchus first reminds the mercenaries of his obligations to Cyrus. The Persian prince had honoured him, had given him a large sum of money, and had also formed a bond of *xenia* with him (1.3.3: ἐμοὶ γὰρ ξένος Κῦρος ἐγένετο).[45] Clearchus, however, next claims that he used the money he received from Cyrus not for his own or Cyrus' benefit but to aid his fellow Greeks (1.3.3–4):

> When I received this money, I did not set it apart for my own personal use or squander it in pleasure but spent it on you. First I made war on the Thracians, and for the sake of Greece (ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος) I punished them with your help, driving them out of the Chersonese when they wanted to deprive the Greeks settled there of their land.[46]

Clearchus pursues this theme of conflicting loyalties throughout the remainder of the speech, turning from his services to Hellas back to his obligations to Cyrus (1.3.5). Here one should note the change in Clearchus' terminology, as he poses his dilemma as a choice between remaining with the Greeks or continuing to enjoy the bond of friendship (1.3.5: φιλίᾳ, rather than ξενία) with Cyrus.[47] This transition from *philia* to *xenia* seems significant, despite the close relationship between these terms and modern authors' tendency to translate both as 'friendship'.[48] As Gabriel Herman has argued, there are key differences between these two social bonds. While *xenos* and related terms 'refer invariably to individuals originating from different social units',[49] *philia* 'in the Greek states bound together individuals partaking of the same social system and sharing similar values'.[50] Herman also suggests that the two terms emphasize different aspects of a friendship. A speaker who wished to emphasize the privileges and obligations of ritualized friendship would have employed the more formal *xenos* words. A speaker who rather wanted to stress the sentiments that were

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45 On Clearchus' obligations to Cyrus, see Herman 1987: 17–18, 120–121.

46 οὓς ἐγὼ λαβὼν οὐκ εἰς τὸ ἴδιον κατεθέμην ἐμοὶ οὐδὲ καθηδυπάθησα, ἀλλ' εἰς ὑμᾶς ἐδαπάνων. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν πρὸς τοὺς Θρᾷκας ἐπολέμησα, καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐτιμωρούμην μεθ' ὑμῶν, ἐκ τῆς Χερρονήσου αὐτοὺς ἐξελαύνων βουλομένους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας Ἕλληνας τὴν γῆν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ Κῦρος ἐκάλει, λαβὼν ὑμᾶς ἐπορευόμην, ἵνα εἴ τι δέοιτο ὠφελοίην αὐτὸν ἀνθ' ὧν εὖ ἔπαθον ὑπ' ἐκείνου.

47 According to Tamiolaki 2010: 352, the tension in this passage exists between 'la hiérarchie intérieure (dans l'armée) et la hiérarchie extérieure (à l'égard de Cyrus)' ('the interior hierarchy [within the army] and the exterior hierarchy [in relation to Cyrus]').

48 On the close link between *xenia* and *philia*, see, esp., Herman 1987: 11–12, 30, 179.

49 Herman 1987: 11.

50 Herman 1987: 29; cf. 11–12, 29–31. Herman (11 n. 5) claims that the modern rendering of *xenos* as 'friend' obscures 'the distinction that the Greeks drew between friends who were aliens and friends who were fellow-citizens'.

supposed to prevail between *xenoi* would have preferred words such as *philos*.[51] Xenophon implicitly demonstrates his understanding of the differences between these relationships when he describes Menon as both the *philos* and *xenos* of the Persian Ariaeus (2.1.5). If Xenophon's choice of terminology is as purposeful as I think it is, his notice of Clearchus' shift from *xenia* to *philia* at 1.3.5 signals at once the Spartan's increasing intimacy and identification with Cyrus.

Clearchus' claim to have a bond of *philia* (1.3.5; cf. 1.3.12; 2.5.11) as well as a bond of *xenia* (1.3.3) with Cyrus is also significant in light of Xenophon's earlier silence on this relationship and observation of Cyrus' ties to other leaders of the Ten Thousand.[52] As I have noted above, Xenophon's earlier references to Clearchus in the *Anabasis* focus on the mercenary nature of the Spartan's relationship with Cyrus (1.1.9; cf. 1.2.1, 9).[53] In his initial list of the various Greek generals who flocked to Cyrus' standard (1.1.9–11), Xenophon, more importantly, manages to distinguish Clearchus from Cyrus' Greek *xenoi*—such as Aristippus the Thessalian and Proxenus the Boeotian—by his silence concerning the specific nature of the Spartiate's relationship with Cyrus.[54] He mentions only that Cyrus, after having made Clearchus' acquaintance (συγγενόμενος), came to admire (ἠγάσθη) the Lacedaemonian exile and gave him the funds with which Clearchus assembled an army (1.1.9). Cyrus, of course, had likewise given Aristippus money to collect an army (1.1.10), and his admiration for Clearchus may have initiated and/or coexisted alongside a bond of *xenia* with the Spartan adventurer. Xenophon, nevertheless, pointedly fails to identify the Spartiate as a *xenos* of Cyrus.[55]

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51 Herman 1987: 12–13; cf. 29–30. On friendship, see also Konstan 1997: 53–56, who, however, argues (55–56; cf. 61–62) that *philos* means 'friend' while *philia* signifies 'affection'.

52 Other Greeks in the text may generally talk about *philia* with the barbarian (cf., e.g., 1.3.19; 3.2.5; 5.4.21; 5.5.18), and we hear about some Greek peoples seeking such friendships (cf., e.g., 7.3.16). Nevertheless, in the *Anabasis* we do not hear about individual Greeks forming bonds of *philia* with barbarians except for Clearchus and Xenophon. As we shall see below, Xenophon becomes a *philos* of the Thracian Seuthes in Book VII (cf., e.g., 7.3.30) but presents this relationship as qualitatively and quantitatively different from Clearchus' bonds with both Cyrus and Tissaphernes.

53 Cf. 1.3.3; 2.6.4–5. While Herman 1987: 91–92 views Cyrus' payment to Clearchus as an example of a common practice of ritualized friendship, Xenophon in this section of the *Anabasis* does not make it clear that Clearchus was a *xenos* of the Persian prince.

54 Xenophon also notes Cyrus' *xenia* with Sophaenetus the Stymphalian and Socrates the Achaean (1.1.11). On Cyrus' *xenoi*, see Herman 1987: 45, 99–101. See also Mitchell 1997: 119–120.

55 Even if one agrees with Herman 1987: 99–101 that all of the Cyrean leaders—including Clearchus—were Cyrus' *xenoi* before the march, Xenophon seems to be very selective in his notice of such bonds of *xenia*, especially in the case of Clearchus.

Clearchus suggests in his later speech at Tarsus that he had become Cyrus' *xenos* at the time of their first 'business' transaction (1.3.3), but it is not until this point in the *Anabasis* that we learn about this bond between the two men. Clearchus' *xenia* with Cyrus, consequently, appears to be a relatively new relationship; and immediately after we first hear about it, Clearchus describes this bond as a *philia*, a friendship with Cyrus not enjoyed by any of the other Greek mercenary leaders.[56] By highlighting Clearchus' bonds of *xenia* and *philia* with Cyrus, Xenophon not only treats Clearchus as an unusually close associate of the Persian prince but also suggests that this (albeit rather recent) bond of friendship with the barbarian trumped Clearchus' obligations to his fellow Greeks. Clearchus, as the lone Greek *philos* of Cyrus, thus assumes in the *Anabasis* responsibility for the Greeks' perilous decision to commit themselves to the prince's plans (1.3). Xenophon later explicitly assigns Clearchus this role of 'special friend' in the expedition, when he rather implausibly claims that Clearchus was the only Greek who was privy to Cyrus' plans (3.1.10).[57]

Despite his claim of a special bond of friendship with the Persian prince, Clearchus concludes his appeal to the mercenaries by asserting that he will put his connections with the Greeks before the friendship of the barbarian. Throughout this portion of his speech, the Spartan commander uses φιλία and related terms to describe his relationships with both his fellow Hellenes and the Persians (1.3.5–6):

> Never shall any man say that I, after leading Greeks into the land of the barbarians, betrayed the Greeks and chose the friendship of the barbarians (τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων φιλίαν). Nay, since you are not willing to obey or follow me, I shall follow with you and suffer whatever I must. For I consider you to be my fatherland, my friends (φίλους), my allies. With you I think I shall be honoured

[56] At 1.7.7 Cyrus refers generally to his friends but is not clear whether he includes the Greeks in this group. Aside from Clearchus, the only other figure in the *Anabasis* described as a *philos* of Cyrus is Tissaphernes (1.1.2). It is noteworthy that while Menon claims that his men are friends with Cyrus (1.4.16), he never describes himself in the same terms; and Xenophon only mentions the Thessalian general's *philia* and *xenia* with Ariaeus (2.1.5). Proxenus' ostensible desire to make Xenophon a *philos* of Cyrus may imply that he himself enjoyed a bond of *philia* with Cyrus (3.1.4). Xenophon's claim that Proxenus regarded Cyrus as worth more to him than his country (3.1.4) also suggests that the Boeotian leader's relationship with Cyrus was far stronger than the standard bond of *xenia*. Xenophon, however, never explicitly describes Proxenus as one of Cyrus' *philoi*; and, as I point out below, he does not clarify whether or not he himself ever enjoyed bonds of *philia* with Cyrus.

[57] See Westlake 1987: 242–243, who views Diodorus' claim that all of the Greek commanders were privy to Cyrus' real plan (14.19.9) as 'more consistent and convincing than that of Xenophon'. See also Roisman 1985–1988: 38 n. 22. *Contra* Herman 1987: 100.

> wherever I may be; bereft of you I do not think I shall be able either to aid a friend (φίλον) or to ward off a foe. Understand, therefore, that wherever you go, I shall go also.[58]

As we have seen, the hollowness of Clearchus' Panhellenic rhetoric became clear through both his continued demonstrations of loyalty to Cyrus (1.3.8) and his complicity in Cyrus' deception of his fellow Greeks. While it is true that Clearchus engineered Cyrus' promise of increased pay for the Greeks (1.3.21), the Spartan's double-dealing offered far greater benefits to his Persian friend than to the duped mercenaries who followed Cyrus to Cunaxa.[59]

Xenophon continues to highlight Cyrus' unique bond with Clearchus in his description of the trial of the Persian conspirator, Orontas (1.6.5–10). While Cyrus ordered the Greek generals to station their hoplites around his tent, he summoned his circle of Persian advisors to his tent and invited Clearchus, honoured above the rest of the Greeks, to join the latter group as a fellow counsellor (1.6.5). Xenophon, more importantly, makes it clear that Clearchus was not simply an observer but rather one of a small group

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[58] καὶ οὔποτε ἐρεῖ οὐδεὶς ὡς ἐγὼ Ἕλληνας ἀγαγὼν εἰς τοὺς βαρβάρους, προδοὺς τοὺς Ἕλληνας τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων φιλίαν εἱλόμην, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὑμεῖς ἐμοὶ οὐκ ἐθέλετε πείθεσθαι οὐδὲ ἕπεσθαι, ἐγὼ σὺν ὑμῖν ἕψομαι καὶ ὅ τι ἂν δέῃ πείσομαι. νομίζω γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἐμοὶ εἶναι καὶ πατρίδα καὶ φίλους καὶ συμμάχους, καὶ σὺν ὑμῖν μὲν ἂν οἶμαι εἶναι τίμιος ὅπου ἂν ὦ, ὑμῶν δὲ ἔρημος ὢν οὐκ ἂν ἱκανὸς οἶμαι εἶναι οὔτ' ἂν φίλον ὠφελῆσαι οὔτ' ἂν ἐχθρὸν ἀλέξασθαι. ὡς ἐμοῦ οὖν ἰόντος ὅπῃ ἂν καὶ ὑμεῖς οὕτω τὴν γνώμην ἔχετε.

[59] On Clearchus' repeated use of deception in his relations with both Greeks and barbarians, see Hirsch 1985: 23–25; Danzig 2007: 32. On the stereotype of the duplicitous Spartan, see, above, n. 40. On the major role that the motif of deceit plays in the *Anabasis*, see Higgins 1977: 84; Wencis 1977; Hirsch 1985: 14–38; Danzig 2007. As Hirsch cogently argues, Xenophon provides a negative view of deception throughout the *Anabasis*. For a more general study of Athenian attitudes towards deception, see Hesk 2000, who examines (122–142) Xenophon's treatment of deceit in the dialogue between Cyrus the Great and his father Cambyses in the first book of his *Cyropaedia* (1.6.1–46). Hesk claims (134; cf. 141) that 'Xenophon's texts always maintain a view that military trickery is right and proper, that it is essential for a commander to be skilled in the art of deceit'. Hesk, however, also argues that this dialogue in the *Cyropaedia* 'does not allow for deception of a friend' (cf. 134–141). On the ostensible contradiction between Xenophon's negative treatment of deception in the *Anabasis* and the advice that Cambyses offers to Cyrus in the *Cyropaedia*, see Danzig 2007. As David Johnson has pointed out to me, Xenophon in the *Memorabilia* (4.2.17) similarly seems to suggest that the general should be allowed to mislead his troops in order to improve their morale, presumably in order to help them in the end. On Xenophon's treatment of the deception of followers and friends in these passages in the *Cyropaedia* and the *Memorabilia*, see Gray 2011: 265–267. While one cannot ignore this passage in the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon implies in the *Anabasis* that Clearchus' deception of his fellow Hellenes only served to aid Cyrus' plans and his own ambitions as the leader of the Cyreans.

of friends (φίλοι) privy to Cyrus' deliberations (1.6.6). Cyrus, moreover, privileged Clearchus by asking him to be the first among those present to express his opinion (1.6.9).[60] Clearchus, in turn, ostensibly offered a response that brings us back, again, to the issue of friendship (1.6.9):

> My advice is to get this man out of the way as quickly as possible, so that we shall no longer have to be on our guard against him but may have the time, so far as he is concerned, to do good to those who are willingly friends (τοὺς ἐθελοντὰς φίλους).[61]

Clearchus, we may assume, counted himself among the willing friends of Cyrus, who requited the Spartan's friendship by endowing him with pre-eminent status among his generals. Indeed, directly after his account of Orontas' trial, Xenophon notes that as Cyrus marched through Babylon, he ordered Clearchus to assume command of the right wing in the approaching battle with the King (1.7.1).[62] The extent of Clearchus' willing friendship, however, proved to be limited, according to Xenophon's account of Cyrus' fall (1.8.12–27). As we have seen, both the disobedience and self-interest that Clearchus displayed at Cunaxa (1.8.12–13) suggest that the Spartan's view of friendship turned out to be more utilitarian than that of his Persian *xenos* and *philos*, whose concern for his Greek troops precipitated the charge that led to his death (1.8.24). Xenophon's eulogy of Cyrus seems to drive this comparison home through its emphasis on the Persian prince's respect for the bonds of *philia* and loyalty to his friends (1.9.10, 20–31).[63]

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[60] Clearchus may have been Xenophon's source of information on the trial and thus may have exaggerated the role that he played in the proceedings. We must, however, keep in mind that he was also the leader of the mercenaries stationed around the tent and may have been included in the trial of Orontas to ensure Cyrus' safety. Whatever the case may be, Xenophon's focus on Clearchus' close relationship with Cyrus in the Orontas episode accords with the *Anabasis*' overall portrayal of Clearchus. On the Orontas episode, see also Petit 2004.

[61] συμβουλεύω ἐγὼ τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον ἐκποδὼν ποιεῖσθαι ὡς τάχιστα, ὡς μηκέτι δέῃ τοῦτον φυλάττεσθαι, ἀλλὰ σχολὴ ᾖ ἡμῖν, τὸ κατὰ τοῦτον εἶναι, τοὺς ἐθελοντὰς φίλους, τούτους εὖ ποιεῖν.

[62] Cf. 1.8.4–5, 12–13; 1.10.14; Diod. 14.22.5; 14.23.1; 14.24.2–5. On Clearchus' preeminent authority and status among Cyrus' generals, see, esp., Roisman 1985–1988: 31–41.

[63] The number of terms connected with friendship in this section of the obituary is striking: 1.9.10 (φίλος), 20 (φίλους), 21 (φίλων, φίλοις), 23 (φίλοις, φίλους), 24 (φίλους, φίλων), 25 (φιλεῖς), 27 (φίλους *bis*), 28 (φίλους, πεφιλῆσθαι), 31 (φίλοι). Compare Xenophon's discussion of friendship at *Cyr.* 8.7.13, where fidelity is seen as the most valued quality in one's friends, and also *Mem.* 2.4.5–7; 2.5.5; 2.6.35. At *Mem.* 2.6.28 Xenophon's Socrates accentuates the importance of reciprocity between friends. See, above, n. 7.

Clearchus thus leaves the first book of the *Anabasis* just as he entered it, as the quintessential exile—a loyal, reliable friend of neither his fellow Greeks nor the barbarian.[64] He was the only Greek leader in the *Anabasis* who became a *philos* of Cyrus—to his benefit and the detriment of his fellow Greeks—but then failed to requite Cyrus' friendship when he was most needed at Cunaxa. It is this calculating attitude to such social bonds that separates Clearchus from the other Cyrean leaders who enjoyed bonds of *xenia* with Cyrus (cf. 1.1.9–11) and served under him at Cunaxa but did not deceive their fellow Greeks in the process.[65] Xenophon, for example, claims that the (presumably Greek) generals and captains who came overseas to serve Cyrus for money judged loyal obedience to the Persian prince as more valuable than their monthly pay (1.9.17). While he notes that Proxenus joined Cyrus in order to gain repute, power, and wealth, Xenophon asserts that the Boeotian general hoped to secure such benefits from Cyrus both justly and honourably (2.6.17–18). Later, he even claims that Proxenus valued Cyrus more highly than his own country (3.1.4).[66]

Clearchus' behaviour in Persia, however, particularly contrasts with the conduct of Xenophon, who appears to be the only Greek at Cunaxa who sought out Cyrus to learn whether the Persian prince had any orders to give to his Greek allies (1.8.15). Xenophon's allegiance becomes even more striking when one considers his failure to elucidate the nature of his own relationship with Cyrus. While the Athenian claims that his old *xenos*, Proxenus, promised to make him a friend of Cyrus (3.1.4: φίλον), he never makes it clear that he himself either sought or gained the Persian prince's friendship.[67] Xenophon's lack of clarity on this issue may point to his desire to distance himself from those other Cyrean leaders who forged social bonds

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64 Clearchus' less than candid dealings with Cyrus at Tarsus (1.3.8) and his disobedience at Cunaxa (1.8.12–13) both argue against Hirsch's (1985: 25) claim that Clearchus' primary loyalty was to Cyrus. As Xenophon makes clear in the first two books of the *Anabasis*, Clearchus proved loyal only to his own interests.

65 While it is true that Xenophon depicts the Thessalian general Menon as perfidious and self-interested (cf. 2.5.28; 2.6.21–27), he never designates Menon as a *xenos* of Cyrus. See, above, n. 56.

66 See, above, n. 56. Xenophon provides little information concerning the other Cyreans who enjoyed bonds of *xenia* with Cyrus, but he notes in his obituary of the murdered leaders that in the matter of friendship (φιλίαν), no one ever found fault with Socrates the Achaean, one of Cyrus' Greek *xenoi* (2.6.30; cf. 1.1.11).

67 See, above, n. 56. See 3.1.4–9; 6.1.23; cf. Diog. Laert. 2.49–50. On Xenophon's relationship with Cyrus, see Herman 1987: 4–5, 14–15, 47. Xenophon clearly asserts his bond of *xenia* with the Spartan Cleander (6.6.35). See Stronk 1995: 145. He also explicitly describes his bond of *philia* with the Thracian Seuthes (cf., e.g., 7.3.30).

with Cyrus, especially Clearchus. Nevertheless, his participation in Cyrus' expedition, his account of his exemplary behaviour at Cunaxa (1.8.15), and his repeated allusions to Cyrus' fidelity[68] make it clear that he is neither uniformly biased against Persians in the *Anabasis* nor as hostile to connections between Greeks and Persians as his contemporary, Isocrates.[69] In his detailed account of Clearchus' service under Cyrus, Xenophon rather critiques an approach to 'friendship' that privileges such ties with the barbarian to the detriment of the Hellenes.

Xenophon even more explicitly condemns Clearchus' relations with the Persians in his later account of the Spartan leader's fatal negotiations with the Persian satrap, Tissaphernes.[70] This time, however, Clearchus' self-interested pursuit of friendship with the barbarian not only seriously imperilled the Ten Thousand but also led to his own brutal execution (2.5). Xenophon highlights Clearchus' interest in friendship with Tissaphernes throughout this section of the *Anabasis*, commencing with the Spartan's attempt to convince the satrap that he would prove to be a far greater benefactor to the Greek mercenaries than Cyrus. In this speech φιλία and related terms appear no fewer than five times (2.5.8–12). Clearchus begins by describing the arrangement covenanted between the Cyreans and Tissaphernes as a friendship (2.5.8: φιλίαν συνθέμενοι). The Spartan then goes on to explain why he so desired Cyrus' friendship and now wishes to become the friend of Tissaphernes (2.5.11–12):

> I set my heart upon having Cyrus for my friend (φίλον), because I thought that of all his contemporaries he was the best able to benefit whom he pleased. But now I see that you possess Cyrus' power and territory and retain your own as well and that the power of the King, which Cyrus found hostile, is on your side. Since this is so, who is so mad as not to desire to be your friend (φίλος)?[71]

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68 See, e.g., 1.6.6–8; 1.8.24; 1.9.7–10, 20–31. While it is true that Cyrus ostensibly deceived his Greek troops about his true objective, Xenophon focuses a great deal of attention on Cyrus' faithfulness to his own friends and ability to inspire trust in others. See Hirsch 1985: 23–24. On Xenophon's questioning of this idealized portrait of Cyrus, see, above, n. 39.

69 On Xenophon's complex attitude towards the Persians, see Hirsch 1985: esp. 36–38, 140–142, who argues (36–38) that the conclusion of the *Anabasis* demonstrates Xenophon's balanced attitude towards barbarians. Hirsch (3) also suggests that Isocrates was less hostile to the Persians than interested in promoting concord among the Hellenes.

70 Azoulay 2004: 218 n. 238 considers the role of *charis* and remuneration in the relationship between Clearchus and Tissaphernes.

71 ἐγὼ γὰρ Κῦρον ἐπεθύμησά μοι φίλον γενέσθαι, νομίζων τῶν τότε ἱκανώτατον εἶναι εὖ ποιεῖν ὃν βούλοιτο· σὲ δὲ νῦν ὁρῶ τήν τε Κύρου δύναμιν καὶ χώραν ἔχοντα καὶ τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀρχὴν σῴζοντα, τὴν δὲ βασιλέως δύναμιν, ᾗ Κῦρος πολεμίᾳ ἐχρῆτο, σοὶ ταύτην ξύμμαχον οὖσαν. τούτων δὲ τοιούτων ὄντων τίς οὕτω μαίνεται ὅστις οὐ βούλεται σοὶ φίλος εἶναι;

After making it clear that he seeks friendship from those who can offer the greatest material and political advantages, Clearchus describes the military services that the Cyreans could provide in order to turn Tissaphernes into their friend (2.5.12: φίλον)—and not just any friend, but the greatest possible friend (2.5.14: φίλος ... μέγιστος).

Tissaphernes may not have turned out to be the kind of friend Clearchus was looking for, but Xenophon portrays the Persian as adept at manipulating the Spartan's desire for friendship in the wrong places. Tissaphernes managed to convince Clearchus that he was both trustworthy and interested in using the Ten Thousand to support his aspiration to the Persian throne (2.5.22–24). Xenophon's account of Tissaphernes' and Clearchus' exchange is noteworthy, given these figures' different readings of their partnership. What Tissaphernes views as mutual benefits (2.5.22–23) Clearchus sees as grounds for friendship (2.5.24: φιλίαν; cf. 2.5.28). Clearchus, moreover, makes it clear that this *philia* trumps his ties to those Cyreans he believes guilty of sabotaging this friendship and thus deserving of the worst penalty (2.5.24).

As we have seen, Tissaphernes took advantage of Clearchus' misplaced loyalties and persuaded the Spartan to bring his fellow generals and captains to him by promising to reveal the names of the Greeks who had falsely accused Clearchus of plotting against the satrap and his army (2.5.24–26). According to Xenophon, Clearchus acceded to Tissaphernes' request not just out of fear of Menon's conspiracy to rob him of his command but also because he believed that Menon hoped in this way to gain Tissaphernes as a friend (2.5.26–29; cf. 2.5.24). Throughout his description of these events, Xenophon emphasizes the importance that Clearchus attached to his friendship with Tissaphernes. He also highlights the Spartan's interest in exploiting this friendship to establish his control over the Cyreans and to get rid of his opponents (2.5.27–29):

> After this conversation Tissaphernes, showing kindness (φιλοφρονούμενος), invited Clearchus at that time to remain with him and made him his guest at dinner. On the following day, when Clearchus returned to the camp, he not only made it clear that he imagined he was on very friendly terms (φιλικῶς ... διακείσθαι) with Tissaphernes and reported what he had said, but he also said that those whom Tissaphernes had invited must go to him, and that whoever among the Greeks should be convicted of making false charges ought to be punished, as traitors themselves and as ill-disposed to the Greeks. Clearchus suspected that Menon was responsible for the slander, for he knew that Menon had not only had meetings with Tissaphernes, in company with Ariaeus, but was also organizing opposition to him and plotting how to win over to himself the entire army and thereby become a friend (φίλος) of

> Tissaphernes. Clearchus, however, wanted the entire army to be devoted to him and the troublesome members to be put out of the way.[72]

Clearchus' assumption that friendship with Tissaphernes would enable him to gain power vis-à-vis Cyrus' other mercenary generals is not all that surprising, given his earlier description of the services that the Cyreans could perform for the Persian satrap. As he points out in his attempt to persuade Tissaphernes to become a friend to the mercenaries, the Ten Thousand could help bring troublesome and annoying peoples to heel (2.5.13–14). While Clearchus never had the chance to make good on these offers, he turned out to be the best possible friend Tissaphernes could have found among the Cyreans. All too ready to trust Tissaphernes' words (cf. 2.5.24), Clearchus forced his fellow Greeks to send the leading Cyreans to visit his new Persian friend and thus unwittingly led five generals and twenty captains to their deaths (2.5.29–32). Once again, Clearchus appears to have sacrificed the interests of his fellow Greeks for the sake of friendship with the barbarian, with even more dire consequences. Just as his loyalty to Cyrus had ostensibly driven the Greek mercenaries into the heart of the Persian Empire, the ambitions that led Clearchus to accept Tissaphernes' friendship now trapped the mercenaries there.

Anaxibius, Aristarchus, and the 'Gratification' of Pharnabazus

Xenophon returns to this issue of the Lacedaemonians' pursuance of alliances with the barbarian to the detriment of their fellow Hellenes in his descriptions of the Spartan commanders the Cyreans encountered after they reached the safety of the Black Sea. As noted above, these Spartans occupy a prominent position in the last two books of the *Anabasis* and thus help to frame the work in terms of an ongoing critique of Spartan leadership abroad that began with Xenophon's portrait of Clearchus. Xenophon's account of the Cyreans' final adventures, however, suggests that the dangers that Clearchus' Persian friendships posed to the Ten Thousand paled

[72] ἐκ τούτων δὴ τῶν λόγων ὁ Τισσαφέρνης φιλοφρονούμενος τότε μὲν μένειν τε αὐτὸν ἐκέλευε καὶ σύνδειπνον ἐποιήσατο. τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ ὁ Κλέαρχος ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον δῆλός τ' ἦν πάνυ φιλικῶς οἰόμενος διακεῖσθαι τῷ Τισσαφέρνει καὶ ἃ ἔλεγεν ἐκεῖνος ἀπήγγελλεν, ἔφη τε χρῆναι ἰέναι παρὰ Τισσαφέρνην οὓς ἐκέλευεν, καὶ οἳ ἂν ἐλεγχθῶσι διαβάλλοντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ὡς προδότας αὐτοὺς καὶ κακόνους τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὄντας τιμωρηθῆναι. ὑπώπτευε δὲ εἶναι τὸν διαβάλλοντα Μένωνα, εἰδὼς αὐτὸν καὶ συγγεγενημένον Τισσαφέρνει μετ' Ἀριαίου καὶ στασιάζοντα αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντα, ὅπως τὸ στράτευμα ἅπαν πρὸς αὑτὸν λαβὼν φίλος ᾖ Τισσαφέρνει. ἐβούλετο δὲ καὶ ὁ Κλέαρχος ἅπαν τὸ στράτευμα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχειν τὴν γνώμην καὶ τοὺς παραλυποῦντας ἐκποδὼν εἶναι.

in comparison with the perils the Cyreans met upon their return to a Greek world dominated by other Spartan leaders affiliated with the barbarian.[73] Clearchus, we should remember, imperilled his fellow Greeks through his ambition and privileging of Persian friendships over his ties to his fellow Greeks. The Spartans examined in this section of the paper, however, purposefully stymied the Cyreans' homecoming in order to please their Persian associates and brought about the enslavement and death of many fellow Hellenes in the process.

Chief among these Lacedaemonians was the navarch Anaxibius, who looms large throughout the concluding books of the *Anabasis* as the greatest threat not only to the Cyreans' return home but also to their very unity and survival.[74] Although Anaxibius does not make a direct appearance in the *Anabasis* until Book Seven, Xenophon earlier drops hints concerning the navarch's involvement in the mercenaries' difficulties, the first of which—perhaps not coincidentally—touches upon Anaxibius' attitude towards 'friendship'. According to Xenophon, Chirisophus, the Spartan general who assumed Clearchus' command over the Cyreans,[75] asked to be sent from Trapezus to Anaxibius, his fellow Spartiate and friend (φίλος), to obtain ships to transport the mercenaries to Greece (5.1.4). Despite his ostensible bond with the Spartan navarch and his presumption that he would return speedily with ships (5.1.4),[76] Chirisophus came back far later than the Cyreans had expected (cf. 5.3.1) with nothing more than Anaxabius' commendation and a vague promise of pay once the force left the Euxine (6.1.16).[77]

73 See Millender (forthcoming).

74 See Millender (forthcoming). On Xenophon's treatment of Anaxibius as a gullible, greedy, and inconsistent leader, see Humble 1997: 94–100. See also Stronk 1995: 135–139. For a more positive view of Anaxibius, see Roisman 1988, who questions many aspects of Xenophon's portrayal of Anaxibius, including the navarch's relationship with Pharnabazus.

75 While Diodorus claims that Chirisophus formally assumed command of the Cyreans immediately after Clearchus' death (14.27.1), Xenophon suggests that Chirisophus took formal charge of the mercenary army months later, when the Cyreans elected him as sole commander-in-chief (6.1.32). Xenophon only indirectly notes Chirisophus' leadership of the Cyreans following Clearchus' death (cf. 3.1.45–47; 3.2.2–3, 33, 37; 3.3.3; 3.4.38; 4.1.6–7, 15). On Xenophon's and Diodorus' different accounts of Chirisophus' status, see Roy 1967: 293–294; Westlake 1987: 246; Humble 1997: 87 n. 153; Cawkwell 2004: 62–63; Millender (forthcoming).

76 Cf. Diod. 14.30.4.

77 Cf. Diod. 14.31.3. See Millender (forthcoming). Roisman 1988: 81 argues that Anaxibius was not acting in opposition to the Cyreans but was rather using caution, because he was uncertain about the Cyreans' future plans.

When we next hear of Anaxibius in connection with the official election of Chirisophus as the Cyreans' commander-in-chief, he appears as a distant but threatening figure both capable of endangering and desirous of controlling the mercenary force. Although the mercenaries apparently wanted to elect Xenophon, the Athenian leader turned down the command in favour of Chirisophus, who had only recently rejoined the force at Sinope after an absence of more than three months in his vain attempt to get ships from Anaxibius (6.1.16–32). In his acceptance speech Chirisophus claims that the mercenaries actually benefited Xenophon by not electing him, because the Laconian *perioecus* Dexippus had slanderously reported to Anaxibius that Xenophon was trying to deprive the Lacedaemonians of the command over 'Clearchus' army' (6.1.32; cf. 6.6.34).[78] Xenophon again alludes to Anaxibius' powerful position and ability to harm the Cyreans in his account of the speech he himself delivered after Cleander, the Lacedaemonian governor at Byzantium, threatened to outlaw the mercenaries from the Greek cities under Spartan control (6.6.12–14; cf. 6.6.9):

> Fellow soldiers, it seems to me that it is no trivial matter if Cleander is to go away with such an intention as he has expressed. For Greek cities are now close by, but the Lacedaemonians are the lords of Hellas, and they are able—every single one of them—to accomplish in the cities whatever they please. If, then, this man begins by shutting us out of Byzantium and then sends orders to the other governors not to receive us into their cities, because we are disobedient to the Lacedaemonians and lawless; and if, further, this report about us reaches Anaxibius, their admiral, it will be difficult for us either to remain or to sail away, for at present the Lacedaemonians are supreme both on land and sea. The rest of us, then, must not be kept away from Greece for the sake of one or two men, but we must obey whatever they command, for the cities from which we come likewise obey them.[79]

As Xenophon implies in this bleak picture of Spartan hegemony, a single Lacedaemonian commander had the power to accomplish what hordes of

[78] On Dexippus' status and role in the *Anabasis*, see Millender 2006: 242; (forthcoming). See also Stronk 1995: 122–126.

[79] ὦ ἄνδρες στρατιῶται, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὐ φαῦλον δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, εἰ ἡμῖν οὕτως ἔχων τὴν γνώμην Κλέανδρος ἄπεισιν ὥσπερ λέγει. εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἐγγὺς αἱ Ἑλληνίδες πόλεις· τῆς δὲ Ἑλλάδος Λακεδαιμόνιοι προεστήκασιν· ἱκανοὶ δέ εἰσι καὶ εἷς ἕκαστος Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅ τι βούλονται διαπράττεσθαι. εἰ οὖν οὗτος πρῶτον μὲν ἡμᾶς Βυζαντίου ἀποκλείσει, ἔπειτα δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἁρμοσταῖς παραγγελεῖ εἰς τὰς πόλεις μὴ δέχεσθαι ὡς ἀπιστοῦντας Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ ἀνόμους ὄντας, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς Ἀναξίβιον τὸν ναύαρχον οὗτος ὁ λόγος περὶ ἡμῶν ἥξει, χαλεπὸν ἔσται καὶ μένειν καὶ ἀποπλεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ γῇ ἄρχουσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ τὸν νῦν χρόνον. οὔκουν δεῖ οὔτε ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς ἕνεκα οὔτε δυοῖν ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀπέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πειστέον ὅ τι ἂν κελεύωσι· καὶ γὰρ αἱ πόλεις ἡμῶν ὅθεν ἐσμὲν πείθονται αὐτοῖς.

barbarians had failed to achieve, namely, the obstruction of the Cyreans' return home and, possibly, their very destruction.

These glimpses of the navarch prepare the reader for the entrance of Anaxibius into the *Anabasis*, where he appears to be in the service of Pharnabazus, the Persian satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. According to Xenophon, Pharnabazus asked Anaxibius to remove the Greek army from Asia, because he feared that the mercenaries might continue to campaign against his own land (7.1.2).[80] In return, the Persian satrap ostensibly promised to do everything for Anaxibius that the navarch might require (7.1.2).[81] Although Xenophon never specifies the nature of Pharnabazus' rewards, it is likely that the satrap was exploiting the Spartans' reputed attraction to silver and gold that apparently became rampant during their period of hegemony, especially among those who served in posts abroad.[82] Whatever the nature of his compensation, Anaxibius induced the Cyreans to cross from Chrysopolis to Byzantium (7.1.3–7).

After the soldiers crossed over, Anaxibius reneged on his promises of regular pay to the mercenaries (7.1.7).[83] On the pretext that he needed to count the Cyreans before sending them home, Anaxibius lured the mercenaries out of Byzantium with the intention of stranding them outside the city walls with neither money nor provisions. With his aide, Eteonicus, ready to close the gates and to thrust in the crossbar, Anaxibius ordered the leaders of the Ten Thousand to get their provisions from the Thracians and then to proceed to the Chersonese, where the Spartan general Cyniscus would take them into his pay (7.1.7–13).[84] When the mercenaries grabbed their arms and made a run towards the gates, Eteonicus and his men shut the gates and thrust in the bar. Those Cyreans still within Byzantium, however, managed to throw open the gates to their fellow mercenaries, while others

80 Cf. 6.4.23–6.5.32.

81 See Humble 1997: 96–98; Azoulay 2004: 383. Roisman 1988: esp. 86–87, dismisses Xenophon's linkage between Anaxibius' treatment of the Cyreans and Pharnabazus' bribery.

82 Cf. Xen. *Lac.* 14.2–5. See Stronk 1995: 135–136; Millender (forthcoming). On the notorious greed of Spartan harmosts, see David 1981: 8, 175 n. 14. The trope of the corruptible Spartiate runs through a number of fifth- and fourth-century works, such as Herodotus' *Histories* (3.148; 5.51.2–3; 6.72; 8.5.1; 9.88), Euripides' *Andromache* (451), Aristophanes' *Peace* (622–624), and Aristotle's *Politics* (1270b6–13, 1271a3–6, 1272a40–b1). For examples of corrupted Spartan officials, see Sphodrias (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.20) and Thorax (Plut. *Lys.* 1.19.4). For discussions of the Spartans' reputed susceptibility to corruption, see, esp., Hodkinson 2000: 20, 172, 359–361; Millender 2002b: 36–39.

83 Cf. 6.1.16; 7.1.3.

84 On Eteonicus, see also *Hell.* 1.1.32; 1.6.26–38; 2.1.1–10; 2.2.5; 5.1.1, 13. See Stronk 1995: 147–148. On Cyniscus, see Stronk 1995: 151.

returned by scaling the city's walls (7.1.15–17). Xenophon, who decried Anaxibius' deception (7.1.25), nevertheless managed to calm his fellow Cyreans and prevented a battle between the mercenaries and the Lacedaemonian forces at Byzantium that threatened to embroil the mercenaries in a far deadlier conflict with the Spartans and their allies (cf. 7.1.18–32). The Cyreans agreed to obey the Spartans (7.1.30–31) and withdrew peacefully outside the walls of the city (7.1.35). Despite Anaxibius' suggestion that such obedience would be rewarded and his assurance that he would devise whatever good counsel he could in their case (7.1.34), he closed Byzantium's gates and proclaimed that any soldier caught inside the city would be sold as a slave (7.1.36). Anaxibius thereby put an end to whatever unity the Ten Thousand still possessed, as many of the soldiers either found ways to sail home or mingled with the people of the neighbouring Greek cities (7.2.3).

What is especially striking about Xenophon's account of this sad turn of events is his claim that 'Anaxibius rejoiced (ἔχαιρε) at the news that the army was breaking up, for he thought that if this process continued, he would particularly gratify (χαρίζεσθαι) Pharnabazus' (7.2.4). The term χαρίζεσθαι, through its connection with the Greek term χάρις—defined by David Konstan as 'the obligation to reciprocate kindnesses'—locates Anaxibius and Pharnabazus in a relationship marked by the reciprocity of services.[85] While Anaxibius ostensibly cared little about helping his fellow Spartiate and φίλος, Chirisophus, with a plan that would have aided the Cyreans' homecoming (5.1.4; 6.1.16), he appears to have been more than happy to fulfil an obligation to his Persian associate that harmed his fellow Hellenes. Anaxibius, moreover, was not content with the dissolution of the Ten Thousand. As he sailed homeward at the conclusion of his navarchy, he met with the new Spartan harmost of Byzantium, Aristarchus, and charged him to sell into slavery all of the Cyreans who remained behind at Byzantium, an order that Aristarchus carried out with alacrity (7.2.6).[86] Such an assault on the Cyreans could only have further gratified Pharnabazus, whom Anaxibius notified in accordance with the terms of their agreement (7.2.7: κατὰ τὰ συγκείμενα).

[85] Konstan 1997: 81. Konstan (81–82) discusses the relationship between friendship and 'the demand for reciprocity of services'. One might compare Pharnabazus' description of his relationship with the Spartans in general at *Hell.* 4.1.32–33. For a general study of Xenophon's views on χάρις, see Azoulay 2004, who would probably treat this relationship as an example of 'la *charis* corruptrice' ('corrupting *charis*') (cf. 149–170).

[86] See Stronk 1995: 175–176.

Out of self-interest and misplaced loyalty to Pharnabazus, Anaxibius managed to inflict unprecedented harm on the Greek mercenaries, who saw at least four hundred sick and wounded comrades enslaved (7.2.6). Even his later attempt to aid the mercenaries' escape from Byzantium arose from purely personal motives—in this case, spite towards his erstwhile associate, Pharnabazus.[87] When Anaxibius learned that the Persian satrap no longer had need of his services and had formed a new arrangement with Aristarchus, he advised Xenophon to unite the Cyreans and to take them back to Asia (7.2.7–8), where they would again pose a threat to Pharnabazus (cf. 7.1.2). In order to escape the perils of their fellow Greeks' political machinations and rivalries, the Cyreans were now forced to seek refuge back in Asia.

Xenophon and the Cyreans, however, now encountered opposition from Aristarchus, the latest Spartan recipient of Pharnabazus' favours (7.2.7; cf. 7.2.12).[88] Aristarchus attempted, like Anaxibius before him, to keep the Ten Thousand out of Asia to aid Pharnabazus. Unlike Anaxibius, however, Aristarchus did not try to persuade the mercenaries with promises of payment but rather forbade them from passing over into Asia and went so far as to threaten to sink any ship caught transporting the Cyreans (7.2.12–13). Aristarchus was also rumoured to be plotting to lure Xenophon into a trap reminiscent of Tissaphernes' treacherous invitation to Clearchus and the other leaders of the Cyreans (7.2.14, 16).[89] As Xenophon makes clear in his account, the Spartans had again put the mercenaries in an impossible situation. Aristarchus and his triremes prevented the Cyreans from safely crossing over to Asia (7.2.13, 15).[90] At the same time the Spartan harmost was repeating Anaxibius' attempt to force the mercenaries to proceed to the Chersonese and to enter Spartan service (7.2.15; cf. 7.1.13).[91] Once in the

87 See Hodkinson 1993: 163; Humble 1997: 98–99; Millender (forthcoming). *Contra* Roisman 1988: 84–86.

88 Humble 1997: 103–105; Millender (forthcoming). *Contra* Roisman 1988: 86–87, who questions the validity of Xenophon's claims regarding Aristarchus' relationship with Pharnabazus. On this relationship, see also Mitchell 1997: 120.

89 Cf. Hirsch 1985: 33; Rood 2004: 320.

90 Cf. 7.3.3; 7.6.13, 25.

91 Cf. 7.3.3; 7.6.14. On this consistent Spartan policy, see Roisman 1988: 86; Stronk 1990–1991: 129; Millender 2006: 239–245; (forthcoming). Neon, the Lacedaemonian *perioecus* who served under Chirisophus and later assumed his command (cf. 6.4.11), also had apparently supported this scheme in the hope that he would become leader of the Cyreans once they came under Lacedaemonian control (7.2.2). For Neon the Asinaean, see 5.3.4; 5.6.36; 5.7.1; 6.2.13; 6.4.11, 23; 6.5.4; 7.1.40; 7.2.1–2, 11, 17, 29; 7.3.2, 7. On Neon's ties to the Spartan authorities, see Roy 2004: 281. Neon, like his commander, Chirisophus, cuts a rather poor figure in the text,

Chersonese, Aristarchus claimed, the mercenaries would no longer be enslaved and cheated but would receive pay and provisions (7.3.3). Xenophon, however, distrusted Aristarchus and was concerned that the Cyreans would end up trapped in the Chersonese, at the mercy of another Spartan harmost (7.2.15; 7.3.3).[92] Xenophon, accordingly, organized a series of meetings through which the Cyreans concluded that their only option was to throw their lot in with another barbarian prince, the Odrysian Seuthes, whom they joined against the wishes of Aristarchus (7.2.17–7.3.7).

Xenophon the φιλοστρατιώτης

One cannot help but be struck by this twist in events, as the Ten Thousand now found themselves retreating into hostile territory from the seacoast that they had once greeted with relief (7.3.12; cf. 4.7.21–26). In the face of Spartan hostility, the Greek mercenaries turned to a barbarian who promised the Cyreans pay, a variety of benefits, and refuge from the Lacedaemonians.[93] More significantly, Seuthes offered the Greeks friendship, a theme that once again takes centre stage in Xenophon's narrative—but this time in connection with Xenophon himself rather than the Lacedaemonians.[94] The issue of friendship with the barbarian comes up in Xenophon's first speech to Seuthes, in which he claims that Seuthes had promised to treat him in all ways as a brother and a friend (φίλῳ ... καὶ ἀδελφῷ) in return for bringing him the Cyreans (7.2.25). In response, Seuthes claims that the Athenians are his kinsmen and loyal friends (7.2.31: συγγενεῖς ... καὶ φίλους εὔνους), promises to treat the mercenaries as brothers and table companions (7.2.38: ἀδελφούς ... καὶ ἐνδιφρίους), and offers his daughter to Xenophon (7.2.38).[95]

One should note that thus far the overtures towards friendship have come from Seuthes rather than Xenophon and the Cyreans. We should not be surprised by this state of affairs, given Xenophon's earlier equivocation concerning his own probable *xenia* with Cyrus[96] and the doubts he earlier

especially in comparison with Xenophon (cf. 6.4.23–26; 6.5.4). See Nussbaum 1967: 132–139; Tuplin 1994: 166 n. 10; Cawkwell 2004: 49–50; Roy 2004: 281; Millender (forthcoming). See also Stronk 1995: 89, 105–106, 171–172.

92 See Hirsch 1985: 33–34.

93 Cf. 7.2.35–38; 7.3.4, 8–13. See Hirsch 1985: 34, who rightly notes that 'nobody any longer believes that Greeks are inherently more trustworthy than barbarians'.

94 On Xenophon's association with Seuthes, see Azoulay 2004: 159–163.

95 On Seuthes' declaration of friendship, see Herman 1987: 18.

96 Cf. 3.1.4–9; 6.1.23. See, above, n. 67.

expressed to the Cyreans concerning the benefits of friendship (3.2.8: φιλίας) with the barbarian. Xenophon only reveals his commitment to such a bond with Seuthes after he recounts the mercenaries' straitened circumstances (7.3.1–6), Seuthes' ready provision of supplies and promises of pay (7.3.8–14), and a dinner hosted by Seuthes, at which the guests—including the Cyreans' generals and captains—were expected to honour the host with lavish gifts (7.3.15–28).[97] Xenophon, who occupied the stool nearest Seuthes, ostensibly understood the need to repay this honour but lacked suitable possessions to present to the Odrysian prince (7.3.29; cf. 7.3.19–20). Xenophon suggests that this uncomfortable situation, together with the consumption of sufficient alcohol, gave him the courage needed to make the following declaration of friendship to the Thracian (7.3.30–31):

> And I, Seuthes, give you myself and my comrades here to be your faithful friends (φίλους ... πιστούς), and not one of them against his will, but all even more desirous than I of being your friends. And now they are here, asking you for nothing more, but rather putting themselves in your hands and willing to endure toil and danger on your behalf.[98]

Seuthes' offer of friendship, however, proved hollow; and his relationship with Xenophon soured after he reneged on his promise of full payment to the Cyreans (7.5.4–8, 16). In an attempt to rid himself of his Greek mercenaries, Seuthes turned to the Lacedaemonians, who were still determined to induce the Ten Thousand to enter their service. Two Lacedaemonians, Charminus and Polynicus, arrived on a mission from the Spartan general Thibron, who wanted to hire this force to fight Tissaphernes (7.6.1–7).[99] Seuthes promised to deliver the Cyreans over to the Spartans (7.6.3: ἀποδίδωσι) as if they were slaves. More significantly, he both entertained the Spartans at dinner and declared his desire to be their friend and ally (7.6.3: φίλος τε καὶ σύμμαχος). At this dinner Seuthes advised the Lacedaemonians to bypass Xenophon, whom he criticized as a meddlesome friend of the soldiers (φιλοστρατιώτης), if they wanted to take the army without opposition (7.6.3–4; cf. 7.6.39). On the following day the Odrysian prince arranged a meeting between the Lacedaemonians and the Cyreans, at which some

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97 Stronk 1995: 198, however, argues that the two figures become each other's *pistoi* through their 'giving and receiving of the hand-clasp of friendship' (7.3.1: δεξιὰς δόντες καὶ λαβόντες).

98 ἐγὼ δέ σοι, ὦ Σεύθη, δίδωμι ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἐμοὺς τούτους ἑταίρους φίλους εἶναι πιστούς, καὶ οὐδένα ἄκοντα, ἀλλὰ πάντας μᾶλλον ἔτι ἐμοῦ σοι βουλομένους φίλους εἶναι. καὶ νῦν πάρεισιν οὐδέν σε προσαιτοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ προϊέμενοι καὶ πονεῖν ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ προκινδυνεύειν ἐθέλοντες.

99 Cf. *Hell.* 3.1.4–6.

mercenaries accused Xenophon of collusion with Seuthes (7.6.7–10). Xenophon, in response, delivered a lengthy speech in defence of his leadership that ostensibly addresses Seuthes' treachery but equally calls attention to the harm inflicted on the Cyreans by their fellow Greeks (7.6.11–38).

Xenophon's speech, like the entire preceding account of the Cyreans' adventures with the Odrysian prince, is noteworthy in terms of its emphasis on the intertwined themes of friendship and loyalty.[100] While Xenophon may have embarked on his affiliation with Seuthes out of a combination of necessity, shame, and drink, he reveals just how seriously he took this bond through the comparison he makes between his own behaviour as a friend and Seuthes' more utilitarian approach to friendship (7.6.20–22). The Athenian commander admits to having been deceived by Seuthes' offer of friendship, but he manages to turn what might appear to have been a lack of judgment into a testimonial of his own fealty (7.6.21). At the same time, Xenophon defends himself as the constant advocate of the Cyreans.[101] He makes it clear that he—in contrast to Clearchus, Anaxibius, and Aristarchus—had forged a bond of *philia* with the barbarian to aid his comrades and had sacrificed this friendship in order to get them the payment they deserved.[102] As he reminds the mercenaries, it was this more powerful and lasting loyalty to his men—this quality of being the soldiers' friend (φιλοστρατιώτης)—that provoked Seuthes' dislike and that made things worse for him in his dealings with both Seuthes and the Lacedaemonians (7.6.4, 39).[103] Against this reading, one might argue that Xenophon's account of his loyalty is nothing more than a 'response to the needs of the moment, a clever piece of rhetoric designed to get Xenophon off the hook with his troops'.[104] While it is true that Xenophon has to portray himself as loyal to the Cyreans, he does not have to defend himself in terms of friendship and highlight this issue throughout his speech.

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[100] Again, φίλος and related terms appear with striking frequency: 7.6.15 (φίλος), 20 (φίλον), 21 (φίλῳ), 22 (φίλους). Compare Xenophon's later statements at 7.7.5 (φίλοι), 7 (φίλοι), 9 (φίλον), 37 (φίλου), 43 (φίλος). See also 7.7.45, 47. See Hirsch 1985: 35–37.

[101] See, esp., 7.6.11, 35; cf. 7.3.45; 7.5.7.

[102] See, esp., 7.6.15, 27, 34. Cf. Nussbaum 1967: 127. On Xenophon's loyalty to the army, see also Humble 1997: 58–59.

[103] On this term, see Stronk 1995: 258–259.

[104] Hirsch 1985: 35 points out this possibility but argues that Xenophon here is emphasizing the importance of *pistis* among friends. See also Azoulay 2004: 159, 161–162. I want to thank John Dillery for reminding me of the possibility that Xenophon here is simply defending himself in the most logical way possible.

Xenophon, more importantly, reminds his comrades of the key role that the Lacedaemonians played in the mercenaries' decision to put themselves at the mercy of Seuthes.[105] By counting Pharnabazus as a 'friend' and the Cyreans as foes, the Spartan Aristarchus had driven his fellow Greeks to seek refuge with the Thracian prince (7.6.13–14). Since the mercenaries found themselves in terrible straits, having been forced to remain on the Thracian coast in the middle of winter without sufficient supplies (7.6.24–26), Xenophon claims that he had no choice but to conclude an alliance with the barbarian Seuthes (7.6.27). Even though Seuthes did not turn out to be the friend and ally he had promised to be, he did immediately help the Cyreans find abundant provisions and keep their Thracian enemies at bay (7.6.28–32).

Although Xenophon's comrades decided to put themselves under the Spartans' leadership (7.6.8, 40), Xenophon makes it clear that he still found it difficult to choose between fellow Greeks, who had proved to be enemies rather than 'friends' in the past, and barbarian allies, who had provided benefits, if not sufficient pay. Xenophon, who had earlier been the target of Dexippus' and Aristarchus' enmity, now received several warnings concerning the Spartan Thibron's intent to put him to death and accordingly considered the possibility of remaining in Thrace with Seuthes (7.6.43–44).[106] While such a decision might seem inconceivable, given Seuthes' deception of the Cyreans, Xenophon reveals that the Thracian prince ultimately turned out to be a true benefactor of the mercenaries. When Xenophon reproached Seuthes for violating the bonds of friendship and for failing to uphold the promises he had made to the Cyreans, the Thracian prince acknowledged the Athenian's claims and agreed to pay the mercenaries (7.7.48–55).[107]

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[105] Stronk 1995: 199 argues that Xenophon carefully avoids 'stating that it is Spartan policy or calling Aristarchus "the Lacedaemonian", but puts all the blame on Aristarchus in person'. Although Xenophon focuses on Aristarchus, he does not treat this Spartan as exceptional in his attitude towards the Cyreans. Rather, by noting Aristarchus' continuation of previous Lacedaemonian leaders' attempts to frustrate the Cyreans' *katabasis*, Xenophon treats this harmost as another representative of Spartan hostility towards the Cyreans.

[106] Dexippus' enmity: 6.1.32; cf. 6.6.34. Aristarchus' enmity: 7.2.14, 16. Compare Xenophon's comments on Thibron at *Hell.* 3.1.5–8, 10; 3.2.7. On Thibron, see Stronk 1995: 251. In the *Anabasis* Xenophon also describes the troubles that he experienced at the hands of the Lacedaemonian *perioecus* Neon (5.7.1–10). See Millender (forthcoming).

[107] Seuthes' violation of the bonds of friendship: 7.7.37, 43, 45, 47. Seuthes' failure to uphold the promises he had made to the Cyreans: 7.7.21–47. As Hirsch 1985: 37 has aptly noted, 'after all the treachery, lies, deceit, and suspicion recounted in the *Anabasis*, and against a backdrop of repeated Greek deception of fellow Greeks, it is a "barbarian" who finally sees and accepts the importance of *pistis* in human affairs'.

Spartan 'Friendship', Isocrates, and the King's Peace

Despite the fact that Seuthes had honoured his obligations, Xenophon decided to march with the army to Pergamum, where Thibron employed them to wage war against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus (7.8.24).[108] With this laconic comment on the Spartans' new Persian campaign, Xenophon rather abruptly terminates his account of the Cyreans' adventures. This stark conclusion, however, is purposeful, for it provides both a bookend to the opening account of Cyrus' attempted coup and a capstone on the critique of Spartan hegemony that runs throughout the text. At once we see that there is no comfortable ending for the Cyreans, no real escape from their troubles, no glorious homecoming.[109] Rather, the Greek mercenaries at the end of the *Anabasis* are back where they started—ready to return to Asia to fight Persian enemies, but finally under the direct control of the Spartans.[110]

Xenophon, however, has demonstrated that the Spartans not only denied the Cyreans such a homecoming soon after they reached the Black Sea[111] but also had transformed the Greek homeland that the mercenaries sought so eagerly (cf. 6.6.14, 16). Instead of finding refuge, the Cyreans found themselves navigating the hazardous waters of the 'Spartan Sea', an alien world in which faith, 'friendship', and fealty had no place; it was difficult to tell 'friend' from foe; and the lines between Greek and barbarian were blurred.[112] They came under the jurisdiction of a series of Lacedaemonians who seemed to be little more than opportunistic renegades and often behaved as if they were Persian agents.[113] Like Clearchus, the Spartan exile who had deceived the Ten Thousand into marching into the heart of Persia and then stranded them there, the Lacedaemonians that the Cyreans encoun-

[108] Cf. Diod. 14.37.4.

[109] See Ma 2004: 333–335; Rood 2005: 209; Millender (forthcoming). See also Bradley 2010: esp. 522–528, 549–542, who, however, argues that the autobiographical focus of the narrative 'reveals a more complex and productive closural strategy than may be apparent on the surface.' Nussbaum 1967: 145–146, in turn, argues that the *Anabasis* moves 'to a dignified conclusion in the respectful official Spartan take-over of the Army's services'.

[110] Cf. 7.1.13; 7.2.2, 15; 7.3.3; 7.6.14. See, above, n. 91.

[111] Ma 2004: 335.

[112] On the role of deceit and suspicion in the *Anabasis*, see, above, n. 59.

[113] Xenophon generally portrays Spartan rule in the Hellespont as decentralized and disordered. Although he notes that the harmosts had to report to the navarchs (cf. 6.6.13; 7.1.8–11, 39; 7.2.6–7), Xenophon provides such information indirectly at best. See Humble 1997: 239 on the Spartan leaders' inclination to follow their own personal agendas while abroad.

tered in the Hellespontine region obstructed the mercenaries' safe *katabasis* through their misplaced affiliation with the barbarian.[114]

The *Anabasis*' stark conclusion, in addition, provides yet another twist on the Lacedaemonians' Machiavellian attitude towards 'friendship'—especially with the Persians.[115] While it is true that Tissaphernes proved to be no friend to Clearchus, both he and Pharnabazus had aided the Spartans during the last stages of the Peloponnesian War. Moreover, both Anaxibius and Aristarchus—not to mention Clearchus (cf. *Hellenica* 1.3.17)—had concluded agreements with Pharnabazus. At the end of the *Anabasis*, however, we learn of the Spartans' plan to wage war against these erstwhile 'friends', a shift in policy that Xenophon explores in greater detail in his *Hellenica* (4.1.32–38). In this section of the *Hellenica*, Xenophon recounts a dialogue between Pharnabazus and the Spartan king Agesilaus II, which begins with Pharnabazus' plea that he had been a loyal friend and ally to the Spartans during the Peloponnesian War (4.1.32–33; cf. 37: φίλος καὶ σύμμαχος).[116] According to Xenophon, Agesilaus responded to the Persian's complaints with the pragmatic observation that political exigencies trump such friendships (4.1.34):[117]

> I think that you know, Pharnabazus, that in the Greek cities also men become guest-friends (ξένοι) of one another. But these men, when their states are at war, fight with their fatherlands even against their former friends (ἐξενωμένοις) and, if it so chance, sometimes even kill one another. And so we today, being at war with your king, are forced to consider as hostile everything that belongs to him. As for you, however, we should prize it above everything to become friends (φίλοι) of yours.[118]

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114 It is certainly possible that such opposition to the Cyreans resulted from either the Spartan authorities' desire not to antagonize the Great King (cf. Lewis 1977: 138 n. 16; Cartledge 1987: 191, 320; Dillery 1995: 101) or the Hellespontine commanders' interests in avoiding instability in this politically sensitive region (cf. Roisman 1988: 83–84; Millender 2006: 244). Nevertheless, Xenophon provides no information concerning the Spartans' motives and thus makes these Hellespontine commanders appear all the more arbitrary.

115 For a detailed treatment of the Spartans' relations with the Persians, see Lewis 1977; Cartledge 1987: 186–202; Stronk 1990–1991.

116 Cf. *Ages.* 3.5. On this unusual dialogue in the *Hellenica*, see Cartledge 1987: 192–193. See also Azoulay 2004: 46–48. For Pharnabazus' support of Sparta during the Peloponnesian War, see Lewis 1977: 127.

117 Dillery 1995: 118 discusses Agesilaus'—and by extension the Spartans'—untraditional attitude towards such bonds of friendship. See also Cartledge 1987: 187, 243; Herman 1987: 1–2, 46–47, 51; Humble 1997: 145. For a different reading of this exchange between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus, see Konstan 1997: 83–85.

118 ἀλλ' οἶμαι μέν σε, ὦ Φαρνάβαζε, εἰδέναι ὅτι καὶ ἐν ταῖς Ἑλληνικαῖς πόλεσι ξένοι ἀλλήλοις γίγνονται ἄνθρωποι. οὗτοι δέ, ὅταν αἱ πόλεις πολέμιαι γένωνται, σὺν ταῖς πατρίσι καὶ τοῖς ἐξενωμένοις

Agesilaus seems to privilege fatherland over the bonds of *xenia*, but the conclusion of the passage suggests that he is at the same time willing to obviate his country's demand for hostility towards the Persians by seeking friendship with Pharnabazus. Equally noteworthy is Agesilaus' terminology, which once again calls attention to the striking interplay between *philia* and *xenia* in Spartan foreign policy. While Greeks ostensibly enjoy bonds of *xenia* with one another, Agesilaus—like Xenophon's Clearchus—specifically desires to form a bond of *philia* with the barbarian (cf. 4.1.38).[119]

As Xenophon suggests elsewhere in his *Hellenica*, such inconsistency was not unique to the Spartans' relationship with Pharnabazus. In this work Xenophon charts the many twists and turns that the Spartans' relations with both their fellow Greeks and the Greeks' barbarian enemies took from their positive response to the Asiatic Greeks' appeal for aid against Tissaphernes in 400[120] to their volte-face towards Persia with the ratification of the King's Peace in 386.[121] Such quick and numerous shifts in loyalties cannot help but remind one of the *Anabasis*' equally changeable Clearchus.[122]

What makes Xenophon's treatment of Spartan-Persian relations in the *Anabasis* unusual is both its parade of Lacedaemonians who form bonds with various Persians to the detriment of their fellow Greeks and the detail with which Xenophon recounts these relationships. As we have seen above, the issue of 'friendship' with the barbarian dominates Xenophon's treat-

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πολεμοῦσι καί, ἂν οὕτω τύχωσιν, ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ ἀπέκτειναν ἀλλήλους. καὶ ἡμεῖς οὖν νῦν βασιλεῖ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πολεμοῦντες πάντα ἠναγκάσμεθα τὰ ἐκείνου πολέμια νομίζειν· σοί γε μέντοι φίλοι γενέσθαι περὶ παντὸς ἂν ποιησαίμεθα.

119 I would like to thank Christopher Tuplin for pointing out the further irony that soon after this scene Pharnabazus' son makes Agesilaus his *xenos* rather than his *philos* (4.1.39).

120 *Hell.* 3.1.3–4; cf. 3.2.12, 3.4.5; Diod. 14.35.6–36.2.

121 *Hell.* 5.1.25–36; cf. Diod. 14.110.2–4. For examples of the twists and turns in the Spartans' relationship with the Persians, see (1) the Spartan Dercylidas' initial truce with Tissaphernes in 399 (3.1.9), later truce with Pharnabazus in 399 (3.2.1; cf. Diod. 14.38.3; 14.39.1), and armistice with both Persians in 397 (3.2.18–20; cf. Diod. 14.39.6); (2) the Spartans' revitalized Persian campaign in 396 (3.4.1–3; cf. Diod. 14.79.1); (3) Agesilaus' truce and campaign against Tissaphernes in 396 (3.4.5–6, 11–24); (4) Agesilaus' unofficial truce with Pharnabazus in 395 (4.1.38, 41); (5) Agesilaus' recall in 395 (4.2.1–8; cf. Diod. 14.83.1); (6) Antalcidas' mission to secure peace between Sparta and the Persian King in 392 (4.8.12–16); and (7) the Spartans' renewal of hostilities and Thibron's expedition against Struthas in 391 (4.8.17; cf. Diod. 14.99.1–3). Isocrates offers a stinging critique of the Spartans' ever-changing stance towards both their fellow Hellenes and the barbarians in his *Panathenaicus* (103–107). See Lewis 1977: 139–147; Cartledge 1987: 186–202, esp. 190–191, 194; Stronk 1990–1991.

122 I would like to thank Gabriel Danzig for his observation of the parallel between Xenophon's portrayal of Clearchus and his accounts of Spartan foreign policy.

ment of Clearchus, particularly in his account of Clearchus' speech to the Cyreans at Tarsus and its aftermath (1.3.3–12) and his explanation of the factors that enabled Tissaphernes to entrap Clearchus (2.5.22–29). Xenophon, moreover, attributes the harm that both Anaxibius (7.1.2; 7.2.4, 7) and Aristarchus (7.2.7, 12) inflicted on the Cyreans to their desire to accommodate Pharnabazus. Finally, Xenophon's lengthy defence of his friendship with Seuthes as a perhaps misguided attempt to aid the Cyreans rests on an implied critique of the Spartans' less noble pursuit of such relationships (7.6.11–38).

Through its focus on Lacedaemonian 'friendship' with the Persians, the *Anabasis* furnishes a different perspective on Spartan foreign policy and leadership than Xenophon provides in his other treatments of Spartan hegemony. This theme does not appear in Xenophon's biting critique of the Lacedaemonians' greed and hunger to exercise rule abroad in Chapter 14 of his *Spartan Constitution*, probably composed at some point after Sparta's loss at Leuctra in 371.[123] Xenophon does, however, note Spartan 'friendship' with the barbarian at several points in his *Hellenica*, the bulk of which was completed after 362.[124] In addition to his references to the bonds of *xenia* between Agesilaus II and Pharnabazus' son (4.1.39) and between Antalcidas and Ariobarzanes (5.1.28),[125] Xenophon notes Cyrus' claim to friendship with both Lysander and Sparta (2.1.14: φιλίας) and Agesilaus' identification of the Paphlagonian king Otys as a friend of the Spartans (4.1.7: φίλος). Xenophon later mentions the Cyzican Apollophanes' attempt to establish friendly relations between Pharnabazus and Agesilaus (4.1.29: φιλίας). We have, moreover, already seen both Pharnabazus' claim to friendship and alliance with the Lacedaemonians (4.1.32: φίλος καὶ σύμμαχος; cf. 4.1.37) and Agesilaus' assertion that he and the Spartans would prize Pharnabazus' friendship under the right circumstances (4.1.34: φίλοι; cf. 4.1.38: φίλος).

123 For this late date of composition, see, e.g., Cartledge 1987: 57. For an overview of the theories on this work's composition, see Humble 1997: 39–44. See also Humble 2004.

124 See Dillery 1995: 12–15. Dillery provides a concise overview of the schools of thought on both the unity and date of the *Hellenica*. He opts for the middle course between the extreme 'unitarians' and 'analysts' and argues that the work was written in two stages (14): 'Perhaps the first part (1–2.3.10) was finished soon after Xenophon's return to Greece (394). The second (2.3.11-end) was clearly completed only after the battle of Mantinea (362); what is more, I believe, as do many others, that the bulk of this, the major portion of the *Hellenica*, was composed from start to finish in the same period'. See also Tuplin 1993: 29–36.

125 On these *xeniai*, see Herman 1987: 15, 28, 45, 58–60, 152, 170–171. See also Konstan 1997: 86.

These references to the Spartans' bonds of 'friendship' with the barbarian are certainly noteworthy, but most of them are clustered in Xenophon's aforementioned treatment of Agesilaus'—and by extension the Spartans'—utilitarian attitude towards 'friendship' (4.1.29–40); and Xenophon has little to say about this aspect of Spartan foreign policy in the rest of the *Hellenica*. Xenophon, moreover, demonstrates in this work that the Spartans were not alone in forming such bonds with the barbarian. He notes, for example, the Athenians' ties of *philia* with the Persian King (4.8.24, 27), the Persian satrap Pharnabazus (4.8.31), and both Seuthes and Amedocus (4.8.26). In his account of the so-called 'Conference of Susa' in 367, he also has the Athenian Leon respond to the Thebans' new pact with the Persians by admonishing his fellow Athenians to seek some other friend (φίλον) than the Persian King (7.1.37).

While the issue of Spartan 'friendship' with the barbarian does not figure largely in Xenophon's other accounts of Lacedaemonian leadership, it receives attention in Isocrates' *Panegyricus* of 380, which offers a stinging critique of Spartan hegemony throughout its attempt to incite the Greeks to put an end to internecine strife and to make war upon the barbarian. At various points in his account of the shameful state of inter-Greek relations under Spartan leadership, Isocrates rebukes the Lacedaemonians for their role in the ratification of the humiliating King's Peace in 386.[126] Under the terms of this peace, the Greeks had submitted themselves formally to the Persian King's authority as the final arbiter of their disputes and as the guardian of their *poleis*' autonomy. At the same time the Hellenes had sold out their Asian counterparts in order to guarantee this crowning ignominy that brought neither autonomy nor peace.[127]

One, of course, may point out that Isocrates does not blame the Spartans alone for this sorry state of affairs but makes it clear that the Athenians, too, had put their ties to the barbarian before the needs of their fellow Greeks.[128] As with many of the attacks that he makes on the Greeks in the *Panegyricus*, Isocrates effects this critique of his fellow Athenians through a negative example—here the Athenians' forefathers (85; cf. 86–99, 117–120):

> Now while our forefathers and the Lacedaemonians were always emulous of one another, during that time [= the Persian Wars] their rivalry had the

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[126] For both direct and indirect criticism of Lacedaemonian hegemony, see, esp., Isoc. 4.18, 80–81, 110–114, 116, 123–132.

[127] Cf., esp., Isoc. 4.85, 115–128, 137, 141, 175–180.

[128] On the joint responsibility of the Spartans and the Athenians, see Isoc. 4.85, 133, 137, 139, 175–178; 5.42; 12.162.

> noblest ends. They considered themselves to be competitors rather than enemies and did not pay court to the barbarian in order to enslave the Hellenes.[129]

Isocrates, nevertheless, holds the Lacedaemonians primarily responsible for his fellow Hellenes' 'enslavement' to the barbarian as a result of the King's Peace (122–125, 127) and describes them as the permanent allies of the Persians (128). For the sake of such allies, he further suggests, the Spartans refuse to join their fellow Greeks in subjugating all barbarians to the whole of Hellas (131).

Although Isocrates never explicitly criticizes the Spartans' 'friendship' with the Persians in the *Panegyricus*, he may have the Lacedaemonians in mind when he claims that the Cyreans returned from Persia in greater security than ambassadors on a mission to the King 'concerning friendship' (149: περὶ φιλίας). Isocrates later asks why it is necessary to desire the friendship (φιλίαν) of the Persians, who punish their benefactors and so openly flatter those who do them wrong (155). The clearest references to the Spartans' bonds with the Persians appear, however, via the negative example of the Athenians' attitudes towards their fellow Greeks and Hellas' barbarian enemies. Isocrates, for example, claims that among the Athenians one finds as nowhere else the most faithful friendships (45: φιλίας ... πιστοτάτας). In addition, he consistently portrays the Athenians' progenitors as the true protectors of the Hellenes and victors against the Persians (92–99). At several points in the *Panegyricus*, Isocrates also emphasizes the Athenians' continued concern to protect the Hellenes from Persian domination during their period of hegemony (106, 120, 122, 124). More significantly, Isocrates argues—to the point of excess—that the Athenians have always been the inveterate enemies of the barbarian (157–158):[130]

> Now I also have a similar tale to tell of our fellow-countrymen. For they also, with respect to other peoples with whom they have been at war, forget their past enmities as soon as they are reconciled, but towards the peoples of Asia they feel no gratitude even when they receive favours from them; so everlasting is their anger against them. And while our fathers condemned many to death for Medism, in public assemblies even to this day, before transacting any other business, they curse any citizen who makes a proposal for a treaty with the Persians. And at the celebration of the Mysteries, the

129 ἀεὶ μὲν οὖν οἵ θ' ἡμέτεροι πρόγονοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι φιλοτίμως πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἶχον, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ περὶ καλλίστων ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς χρόνοις ἐφιλονίκησαν, οὐκ ἐχθροὺς ἀλλ' ἀνταγωνιστὰς σφᾶς αὑτοὺς εἶναι νομίζοντες, οὐδ' ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ τῇ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὸν βάρβαρον θεραπεύοντες ...

130 Cf. Isoc. 4.66–72, 156, 159. Isocrates further contrasts Athenian and Spartan attitudes towards the barbarian in his *Panathenaicus* (42–47, 59–61, 102–104).

> Eumolpidae and the Ceryces, because of our hatred of the Persians, warn the other barbarians as well, as if they were murderers, to keep away from the sacred rites. So ingrained in our nature is our hostility to them that the stories that we linger most fondly over are those of the Trojan and Persian wars, because through them we can learn of our enemies' misfortunes. And one may find that our warfare against the barbarians has inspired our hymns, while that against the Hellenes has been the source of our dirges; and that the former are sung at our festivals, while we recall the latter in the midst of our misfortunes.[131]

While it seems safe to trace this emphatic defence of Athenian enmity to the barbarian (and its unstated foil, Spartan 'philobarbarism') to Isocrates' outrage in 380 at the King's Peace, both the source of Xenophon's interest in Spartan 'friendship' with the barbarian and the date of the *Anabasis*' composition are, admittedly, far less clear. Equally uncertain is the relationship between the *Panegyricus* and the *Anabasis*. A number of scholars have argued that Isocrates at several points in his oration borrows details from Xenophon's account and that such links between the texts bolster their pre-380 dating of the *Anabasis*.[132] Malcolm MacLaren, for example, specifically focuses on Isocrates' claim in the *Panegyricus* that the Persians were so weak at Cunaxa that 'they made themselves ridiculous at the very gates of the King's palace' (149: ὑπ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς βασιλείοις καταγέλαστοι γεγόνασιν). According to MacLaren, this statement bears an uncanny resemblance to a passage in the *Anabasis* in which many of the Cyreans, after Cyrus' death, express their belief that the King is planning to attack or impede their *katabasis* (2.4.4): 'For never, if he can help it, will he allow us to return to Greece and report that we, few as we are, were victorious over the King's forces at his very gates and, having made him ridiculous, departed'.[133]

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131 ἔχω δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τῶν ἡμετέρων τοιαῦτα διελθεῖν. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅσοις πεπολεμήκασιν, ἅμα διαλλάττονται καὶ τῆς ἔχθρας τῆς γεγενημένης ἐπιλανθάνονται, τοῖς δ' ἠπειρώταις οὐδ' ὅταν εὖ πάσχωσι χάριν ἴσασιν· οὕτως ἀείμνηστον τὴν ὀργὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔχουσιν. καὶ πολλῶν μὲν οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν μηδισμοῦ θάνατον κατέγνωσαν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς συλλόγοις ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀρὰς ποιοῦνται, πρὶν ἄλλο τι χρηματίζειν, εἴ τις ἐπικηρυκεύεται Πέρσαις τῶν πολιτῶν· Εὐμολπίδαι δὲ καὶ Κήρυκες ἐν τῇ τελετῇ τῶν μυστηρίων διὰ τὸ τούτων μῖσος καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις βαρβάροις εἴργεσθαι τῶν ἱερῶν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἀνδροφόνοις, προαγορεύουσιν. οὕτω δὲ φύσει πολεμικῶς πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔχομεν, ὥστε καὶ τῶν μύθων ἥδιστα συνδιατρίβομεν τοῖς Τρωικοῖς καὶ Περσικοῖς, δι' ὧν ἔστι πυνθάνεσθαι τὰς ἐκείνων συμφοράς. εὕροι δ' ἄν τις ἐκ μὲν τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους ὕμνους πεποιημένους, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας θρήνους ἡμῖν γεγενημένους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς ᾀδομένους, τῶν δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς συμφοραῖς ἡμᾶς μεμνημένους.

132 See, e.g., MacLaren 1934: 246–247; Delebecque 1957: 205; Masqueray 1930–1931: 1.8–9; Breitenbach 1967: 1641–1642.

133 οὐ γάρ ποτε ἑκών γε βουλήσεται ἡμᾶς ἐλθόντας εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀπαγγεῖλαι ὡς ἡμεῖς τοσοίδε ὄντες ἐνικῶμεν τὴν βασιλέως δύναμιν ἐπὶ ταῖς θύραις αὐτοῦ καὶ καταγελάσαντες ἀπήλθομεν.

In addition to the parallel between Isocrates' use of καταγέλαστοι and Xenophon's use of καταγελάσαντες, MacLaren argues that it must be more than coincidental that 'in localizing the scene of the Persian defeat, each one of the statements calmly annihilates the five hundred stades that separate Cunaxa from the King's palace at Babylon'.[134] MacLaren, nevertheless, admits that his theory concerning the relationship between the two texts can never be 'absolutely convincing'; and scholars like John Dillery have argued in favour of Xenophon as the borrower rather than the lender of such material.[135]

While it may be impossible to decide definitively on the order of these works, both the strong resemblances between their accounts of the Cyreans and their mutual interest in the issue of 'friendship' with the barbarian (especially of the Spartan variety) suggest, at the very least, that they were 'in conversation' and that their 'conversation' took place in the same historical context, namely, the aftermath of the Spartans' negotiation of the King's Peace. Further evidence for this link between the two texts can be found in their negative treatments of Spartan hegemony.[136] As I argue in my forthcoming article on Spartan leadership in the *Anabasis*, Xenophon in this work consistently portrays Sparta as a power that maintains its authority through compulsion, repeated demands for total obedience, and, consequently, the reduction of its opponents to slavery—literally and figuratively.[137] Forms of the verb πείθομαι (to obey) and the noun ἀνάγκη (necessity/compulsion) occur with striking frequency in Xenophon's descriptions of both individual Spartan leaders' maintenance of authority and the Lacedaemonians' establishment of their hegemony.[138] Xenophon, moreover, links both terms in his accounts of the power wielded by Clearchus (2.6.13)

134 MacLaren 1934: 246.

135 Dillery 1995: 80; cf. MacLaren 1934: 245–246.

136 For more positive readings of Xenophon's accounts of Spartan hegemony in the *Anabasis* (e.g. 6.1.27; 6.6.12; 7.1.27), see Delebecque 1957: 288–300; Stronk 1995: 127.

137 Millender (forthcoming). See also Tamiolaki 2010: 155–201. For actual enslavement, see *An.* 7.1.36: πεπράσεται; 7.2.6: ἀποδόσθαι, ἐπεπράκει, ἀπέδοτο. Xenophon also focuses on the Spartans' domination of their fellow Greeks at 6.1.26–28; 6.6.12–14; 7.1.26–28; cf. 6.6.9; 7.6.37. See Hornblower 2000, who considers Spartan leaders' use of violence to assert their authority. He argues (57) that 'the Spartans had an unacceptable tendency to treat other, free Greeks as if they were helots'.

138 πείθομαι and related forms: 1.3.6 (πείθεσθαι); 1.4.15–16 (πειθομένοις, ἐπείθοντο); 2.2.6 (ἐπείθοντο); 2.6.8 (πειστέον), 13 (πειθομένοις); 6.6.13 (ἀπιστοῦντας), 14 (πειστέον, πείθονται), 20 (πείθεσθαι), 32 (πειθόμενοι); 7.1.30 (πειθομένους), 31 (πειθόμενοι), 34 (πειθομένοις); 7.2.15 (πείθεσθαι). See also 6.6.35. Seuthes also demands obedience repeatedly in the *Anabasis* (7.4.1, 5, 13; 7.5.15). ἀνάγκη: 2.6.13; 7.2.6, 15; 7.6.24, 27.

and Aristarchus (7.2.15), which together imply that the Spartans exercised authority not because they had been chosen to command but because their fellow Greeks had been reduced to such circumstances that they were compelled to render obedience.[139]

One might well argue that the period of Spartan hegemony thus represented in the *Anabasis* is just what it purports to be, namely, the early days of Lacedaemonian supremacy during the years 401 to 399. Xenophon, of course, needs to provide the proper historical context for his account, and we should not be surprised by his remarks concerning either the Spartans' recent defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War (cf. 6.1.27–28; 7.1.27) or their mastery over the Hellenes on both land and sea (cf. 6.6.9, 12–14). Xenophon's repeated references to the Lacedaemonians' ruthless drive for dominance over their fellow Hellenes, however, suggest that the *Anabasis*' critique of Spartan hegemony rather reflects the foreign policy that the Spartans, under Agesilaus II's leadership, pursued in the 380s and 370s following the ratification of the Peace of Antalcidas in 386 (*Hellenica* 5.1.25–36), which David Lewis has aptly described as a 'betrayal of panhellenism'.[140] As Xenophon himself demonstrates throughout much of the fifth and sixth books of his *Hellenica*, the Spartans exploited their rapprochement with the Persians to pursue selfish and divisive policies that bolstered their domination of their fellow Hellenes, especially the Thebans.[141]

Xenophon's depiction of the Lacedaemonians' supremacy in Hellas in the *Anabasis*, indeed, accords to a great degree with the portrayal of Spartan hegemony that the *Panegyricus* offers in its critique of the Peace of Antalcidas and its aftermath. Particularly resonant is Isocrates' denunciation of the Spartans' dual policy of making war on their fellow Greeks and allying themselves with the Persians (128): 'The most monstrous thing of all is to see those who claim for themselves the right of hegemony making war every day against the Hellenes and concluding an alliance for all time with the bar-

139 Xenophon likewise suggests that the Cyreans were compelled to elect Chirisophus (6.1.26–32). See Millender (forthcoming). One might again compare Xenophon's description of Seuthes' rule at 7.7.29. According to Xenophon, Seuthes' subjects were not persuaded to live under his rule out of affection for him but rather by stress of necessity. See, above, n. 38.

140 Lewis 1977: 145. Cf. Diod. 15.5; 15.9.5; 15.12; 15.19.1, 3–4; 15.20; 15.23.2–5.

141 See, esp., *Hell.* 5.1.32–36; 5.2.1–10; 5.3.10–17, 21–27; 6.1.1; 6.2.1; 6.3.18–6.4.3. See also Isoc. 4.85, 115–117, 125–128, 175–180; 8.99–100; 12.106–107. For detailed discussions of the King's Peace and the Spartans' subsequent domination of their fellow Hellenes, see Cartledge 1987: esp. 194–199, 242–313, 369–381; Tuplin 1993: 87–100; Dillery 1995: 199–221.

barian'.[142] Both in this statement and elsewhere in the *Panegyricus*, Isocrates emphasizes the Spartans' belief in their right to lead their fellow Greeks.[143] Through his praise of Athenian hegemony, Isocrates also indirectly accuses the Spartans of tyrannizing over their fellow Greeks, acting as masters rather than leaders, and exulting in their exercise of power (80–81, 104). Finally, Isocrates claims that the Spartans not only prevent the Greeks from governing themselves but even try to compel them to submit to slavery (127: ἀναγκάζειν δουλεύειν).[144]

This reading of Xenophon's treatment of Sparta in the *Anabasis* may seem surprising, given the traditional view of Xenophon as a largely uncritical Laconophile and, more importantly, as an unquestioning supporter of Agesilaus II. While many recent studies have demonstrated that Xenophon's corpus offers far more complex and critical depictions of Sparta than scholars long asserted, Humble notes the longevity of the belief in Xenophon's leniency towards Agesilaus.[145] As Humble has rightly noted, this view has largely arisen from Xenophon's hyperbolic praise of the Eurypontid king in his *Agesilaus*, which he probably wrote shortly after the king's death in 360.[146] In his *Agesilaus*, for example, Xenophon repeatedly depicts Agesilaus as the inveterate defender of the Greeks against the Persians and goes so far as to deem him a 'Greek-lover' (φιλέλληνα) and a 'Persian-hater' (μισοπέρσην).[147] From Xenophon's more balanced accounts of both Agesi-

142 ὃ δὲ πάντων δεινότατον, ὅταν τις ἴδῃ τοὺς τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἔχειν ἀξιοῦντας ἐπὶ μὲν τοὺς Ἕλληνας καθ' ἑκάστην τὴν ἡμέραν στρατευομένους, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς βαρβάρους εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον συμμαχίαν πεποιημένους. Cf. Isoc. 4.85, 122–125, 131.

143 Cf. Isoc. 4.18.

144 Cf. Isoc. 4.85. Although Isocrates' later speeches contain few references to the Peace of Antalcidas (cf. 12.106–107; 14.61), in his *Plataicus* he repeatedly characterizes the Spartans as masters over their fellow Greeks (14.12–18, 30, 41, 45, 61). His *Panathenaicus* even more explicitly portrays the Spartans as obsessed throughout their history with the domination of their fellow Greeks (12.42, 45–47, 54–55, 70–71, 91–94, 98–107, 166, 177–181, 188, 207, 210, 219–220).

145 Humble (forthcoming). For examples of more nuanced readings of Xenophon's treatment of Spartan leaders, traditions, institutions, and foreign policy, see, above, n. 14. For the view that Xenophon spares Agesilaus from his critiques of Sparta, see Lipka 2002: 16–17; Schepens 2005: esp. 31, 49–50, 62. On Xenophon as a source on Agesilaus, see Cartledge 1987: 55–73; Dillery 1995: esp., 6, 107–118, 211–237. See also Humble 1997: 23–25, 126–158.

146 Humble (forthcoming). See also Humble 1997: 126; cf. 23–24, 247–253. On the date of the composition of the *Agesilaus*, see, e.g., Cawkwell 1976: 63; Cartledge 1987: 55; Humble 1997: 23.

147 *Ages*. 7.4–7. See also 1.7–8, 34, 36; 2.29; 6.1; 8.3, 5; *Hell*. 3.4.5. Hirsch 1985: 39–60 notes the predominance of both Agesilaus' campaigns against Persia and Xenophon's notice of the Spartan king's hostility towards the Persians in the encomium. He argues (51–60) that

laus and the Spartans in general in his *Hellenica*,[148] we know that Agesilaus certainly took pains to depict himself as the Panhellenist *par excellence*, as we can see in his attempt to portray himself as a second Agamemnon in his failed pre-embarkation sacrifice at Aulis in 396.[149]

Xenophon, however, seems to question Agesilaus' Panhellenism in both his *Agesilaus* and his *Hellenica*.[150] He claims, for example, that Agesilaus was more interested in subduing Asia than in benefiting his fellow Greeks when he led his campaign against the Persians (*Agesilaus* 1.8).[151] Equally suggestive is Xenophon's description of the warm welcome that the coastal cities and offshore islands of the eastern Aegean offered to the victorious fleet of Pharnabazus and Conon, who drove out the Lacedaemonian harmosts from this region in 394. The eastern Greeks' joyous reaction to the victors' guarantee of autonomy and freedom from garrisons reveals both the unpopularity of Spartan hegemony and the limited nature of the autonomy that the Spartans offered to their fellow Greeks in the East (*Hellenica* 4.8.1–2, 5).[152]

Even more significant is Xenophon's treatment of the Persian-backed Peace of Antalcidas of 387/6, by which the Greeks (and especially the Lacedaemonians) formally recognized Artaxerxes II's control over the Greek

Xenophon's concentration on Persian affairs throughout the *Agesilaus* points to his interest in defending Agesilaus against the charge 'that he had repeatedly collaborated with the Persians and had spent the better part of a lifetime engaged in aggressive activity against the cities of Greece' (51). Hirsch (53) further argues that it is Xenophon's aim to counter accusations of Agesilaus' *philobarbarism* that may explain the absence from the *Agesilaus* of those historical details that linked the Spartan king with the Persians, such as Agesilaus' guest-friendship with the son of Pharnabazus (cf. *Hell.* 4.1.39). Cf., esp., Hamilton 1994; Dillery 1995: 114; Azoulay 2004: 156–159; Schepens 2005: 52, 54–57. On the apologetic aspects of the *Agesilaus*, see also Humble (forthcoming), who treats them as a feature of encomia.

148 See Humble 1997: 23–25, 126–158; Humble (forthcoming). See also Anderson 1974: 167–169.

149 *Hell.* 3.4.3–4; 3.5.5; 7.1.34; Plut. *Ages.* 6.6–11.

150 For a detailed study of both texts' treatment of Agesilaus' Panhellenism, see Humble (forthcoming). See also Harman (this volume, pp. 427–453). For a more positive view of Xenophon's representation of Agesilaus, see Hirsch 1985: 51–60. On Agesilaus' reputed Panhellenism, his representation of his campaign in Asia as a Panhellenist enterprise, and his lack of concern for the autonomy of his fellow Greeks both in Asia and in Greece, see Cartledge 1987: 180, 192, 194, 199–202, 256, who (200) rightly describes Agesilaus' Panhellenism as 'bogus'.

151 Cf. *Ages.* 1.36; *Hell.* 3.5.1; 4.1.1, 41. Humble 1997: 143–145, 151, 158 argues that Xenophon's account of Agesilaus' expedition against the Persians highlights the Spartan king's personal ambition.

152 Cf. Diod. 14.84.3–4. See Cartledge 1987: 194. See also Lewis 1977: 143. On the Spartans' limited definition of autonomy, see also *Hell.* 3.4.5, together with Lewis 1977: 141–142 n. 45; Dillery 1995: 108; Humble 1997: 144.

poleis in Asia (*Hellenica* 5.1.31).[153] As Christopher Tuplin has noted, Xenophon emphasizes that the peace that ended the Corinthian War was a 'King's Peace' through his repeated mention of Artaxerxes' commands[154] and his decision to quote the King's letter (read out by the Persian Tiribazus) rather than the text of the eventual agreement (5.1.30–31). Although Xenophon refers to the peace as the 'so-called Peace of Antalcidas' (5.1.36), Tuplin adds that 'Xenophon is manifestly indicating that this was a mere *façon de parler*: it was called ἡ ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνη, but the next sentence reasserts that it was ἡ ὑπὸ βασιλέως καταπέμφθεισα εἰρήνη'.[155]

It is true that Xenophon in his encomiastic *Agesilaus* attempts to put the most positive face on Agesilaus' support for the King's Peace by emphasizing the Spartan king's initial opposition to it (2.21). Xenophon, in addition, claims that it was φιλεταιρία (attachment to one's comrades) that motivated Agesilaus' exploitation of the King's Peace to enforce Sparta's will among its Greek neighbours (2.21–22).[156] Nevertheless, Xenophon also notes Agesilaus' zeal in using the King's Peace to pursue unpopular policies against the Corinthians, Thebans, and Phliasians (2.21–22).[157] Equally noteworthy is Xenophon's description of Agesilaus' never-ending hostility to the Persians, in which he alludes to the Persian King's exploitation of peace negotiations to create strife among the Greeks (7.7):

> Or again, if it is honourable to hate the Persian because long ago he set out to enslave Hellas, and now allies himself with that side with which he thinks he can cause greater harm, makes gifts to those who, as he believes, will take them and make the most trouble for the Greeks, and negotiates the peace that he thinks most certain to make us go to war with each other—well, everyone can see these things, but who except for Agesilaus has ever endeavoured either to bring about the revolt of a tribe from the Persian, or to save a revolting tribe from destruction, or by any means to involve the Great King in trouble so that he will be unable to create problems for the Greeks?[158]

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153 See also Diod. 14.110.2–4.

154 See *Hell.* 5.1.25, 30, 32, 35, 36.

155 Tuplin 1993: 84. For a more positive reading of this passage, see Schepens 2005: 49–50.

156 Compare Plutarch's account, in which Agesilaus claims that the King's Peace is more a matter of the Persians Laconizing than the Spartans Medizing (*Ages.* 23.4 = *Artax.* 22.4 = *Mor.* 213b). On Xenophon's statement at *Ages.* 2.21–22, see Cartledge 1987: 242–243; Tuplin 1993: 84, 92; Humble (forthcoming).

157 On Xenophon's discomfort with Agesilaus' policy at *Ages.* 2.21–22, see Cartledge 1987: 198.

158 εἰ δ' αὖ καλὸν καὶ μισοπέρσην εἶναι, ὅτι καὶ ὁ πάλαι ἐξεστράτευσεν ὡς δουλωσόμενος τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ ὁ νῦν συμμαχεῖ μὲν τούτοις μεθ' ὁποτέρων ἂν οἴηται μείζω βλάψειν, δωρεῖται δ' ἐκείνοις οὓς ἂν νομίζῃ λαβόντας πλεῖστα κακὰ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ποιήσειν, εἰρήνην δὲ συμπράττει ἐξ ἧς ἂν

While Xenophon here may imply that Agesilaus opposed such Persian meddling in Greek affairs, the lack of clarity on this issue in the encomium is, to quote Tuplin, 'decisive'.[159]

Xenophon's *Hellenica* far more explicitly recounts Agesilaus' exploitation of the King's Peace to establish the Lacedaemonians' dominance over their fellow Hellenes.[160] Xenophon, for example, records Agesilaus' demand that the hated Thebans swear, in accordance with the Persian King's directions, that every Greek city should be independent (5.1.32–33). We next learn that Agesilaus forced the Corinthians and Argives to dissolve the union of their *poleis* (5.1.34). Even though Xenophon offers no judgment on Agesilaus' enforcement of the King's Peace, his ensuing account of its ratification demonstrates his understanding of the leverage that the Peace gave Agesilaus and the Spartans vis-à-vis the Thebans, the Argives, and the Corinthians (5.1.36).[161] In the next section of the *Hellenica*, Xenophon likewise shows how the King's Peace allowed the Spartans to punish those allies that had proved disloyal during the Corinthian War, beginning with the Mantineans (5.2.1). Finally, Xenophon reveals his own discomfort with such policies throughout the *Hellenica*, as, for example, in his description of Agesilaus' needless provocation of the Phliasians in 381 (5.3.16).[162]

While it was relatively safe—if not entirely easy—for Xenophon in the late 360s or early 350s to critique both the King's Peace and the Spartans' exploitation of its provisions under Agesilaus II's guidance, Xenophon may have found it far more challenging to express his dismay with this particular brand of Spartan foreign policy when he was still a direct beneficiary of Agesilaus' patronage. The focus in the *Anabasis* on the Spartans' pursuit and exploitation of 'friendship' with the barbarian, however, allowed Xenophon to offer an indirect yet sharp criticism of what Paul Cartledge has

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ἡγῆται μάλιστα ἡμᾶς ἀλλήλοις πολεμήσειν, ὁρῶσι μὲν οὖν ἅπαντες ταῦτα· ἐπεμελήθη δὲ τίς ἄλλος πώποτε πλὴν Ἀγησίλαος ἢ ὅπως φῦλόν τι ἀποστήσεται τοῦ Πέρσου ἢ ὅπως τὸ ἀποστὰν μὴ ἀπόληται ἢ τὸ παράπαν ὡς καὶ βασιλεὺς κακὰ ἔχων μὴ δυνήσεται τοῖς Ἕλλησι πράγματα παρέχειν;

159 Tuplin 1993: 84. On this passage see also Harman (this volume, p. 448).

160 For Agesilaus' support of the Peace of Antalcidas, see Cartledge 1987: 195: 'No doubt Agesilaos would ideally have preferred not to have to resort to negotiation and surrender the liberty (as he understood it) of the Asiatic Greeks … But Agesilaos should not thereby be represented … as a genuine Panhellenist dragged kicking and screaming to the conference table and itching for revenge upon Artaxerxes from 394 on'. See also Lewis 1977: 145; Humble 1997: 152. *Contra* Cawkwell 1976: 66–71. See also Delebecque 1957: 202–204.

161 See Dillery 1995: 206.

162 On Xenophon's growing doubts about Sparta following the ratification of the King's Peace, see Dillery 1995: esp. 15–16, 118–119, 160–171, 192–237.

deemed the 'moralizing language of friendship' with which Agesilaus clothed his enforcement of the Peace of Antalcidas.[163] Xenophon's interest in this aspect of Spartan hegemony thus prompts a far more subversive reading of his treatment of Agesilaus' foreign policy in the *Agesilaus* than scholars have so far provided.[164] As mentioned above, Xenophon in that work claims that Agesilaus' attachment to his comrades (φιλεταιρία) was manifestly responsible for both his forced restoration of oligarchic exiles to Corinth, Thebes, and Phlius and his repeated expeditions against Thebes (2.21–22).[165]

It is in this meddlesome period of Spartan hegemony, the late 380s, that the *Anabasis* best fits as a response to the Spartans' calculated exploitation of 'friendship'—in both their negotiation of the King's Peace and their ruthless suppression of their neighbours. One might even go further and see in Xenophon's treatment of Clearchus a warning to the Spartans of the possible dangers that these mutually reinforcing strands of their foreign policy entailed. In his account of this Spartan's deadly negotiations with the Persian Tissaphernes, Xenophon makes Clearchus the veritable spokesman for 'friendship' with the barbarian. As we have seen, Clearchus' cost/benefit analysis of such relationships made him pursue *philia* with both Cyrus and Tissaphernes (2.5.11–12). Clearchus, moreover, thought he understood the benefits that such a relationship could confer, especially the ability to shore up one's position and to get rid of one's enemies (cf. 2.5.28–29). Far more telling, however, is his aforementioned description of the services that the Cyreans could perform for Tissaphernes. Here Clearchus reveals his belief that the greatest boon to be gained from such an alliance is the ability to tyrannize over one's troublesome neighbours (2.5.13–14):

> For there are the Mysians, who, I know, cause you trouble and whom, I believe I could make submissive to you with the force I have at present. I know about the Pisidians, too, and I hear that there are many other peoples of the same sort, whom, I think, I could stop from constantly disturbing your prosperity. As for the Egyptians, with whom I am aware you are particularly angry, I do not see what force you could better employ to aid you in punishing them than the force I now have. Yes, and to those who dwell around you, if you chose to

163 Cartledge 1987: 242. On Agesilaus' recourse to this 'moralizing language of friendship', see Cartledge 1987: 242–273, esp. 242–243. Cartledge, however, does not consider Xenophon's language at *Ages.* 2.21–22 in the context of Xenophon's other statements concerning Agesilaus' and his fellow Spartans' attitude towards 'friendship'.

164 Millender (forthcoming).

165 Cf. *Hell.* 5.2.9, 38; 5.3.13, 17; 5.4.46, 49. See also Diod. 15.5.2–3; 15.19.1.

> be a friend to any, you could be the greatest possible friend, while if any were to annoy you, you could behave like a despot with us in your service ... [166]

Clearchus, at first, may seem to have gauged the advantages of such affiliations correctly, for the King's Peace gave Sparta just such a free hand to tyrannize over its own share of annoying 'neighbours' (cf. *Hellenica* 5.1.36; 5.2.1). This Spartan's brutal capture and execution, however, suggest that the costs of such relationships could greatly outweigh their perceived benefits.

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[166] οἶδα μὲν γὰρ ὑμῖν Μυσοὺς λυπηροὺς ὄντας, οὓς νομίζω ἂν σὺν τῇ παρούσῃ δυνάμει ταπεινοὺς ὑμῖν παρασχεῖν· οἶδα δὲ καὶ Πισίδας· ἀκούω δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔθνη πολλὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι, ἃ οἶμαι ἂν παῦσαι ἐνοχλοῦντα ἀεὶ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ εὐδαιμονίᾳ. Αἰγυπτίους δέ, οἷς μάλιστα ὑμᾶς γιγνώσκω τεθυμωμένους, οὐχ ὁρῶ ποίᾳ δυνάμει συμμάχῳ χρησάμενοι μᾶλλον ἂν κολάσαισθε τῆς νῦν σὺν ἐμοὶ οὔσης. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔν γε τοῖς πέριξ οἰκοῦσι σὺ εἰ μὲν βούλοιό τῳ φίλος εἶναι ὡς μέγιστος ἂν εἴης, εἰ δέ τίς σε λυποίη, ὡς δεσπότης ἂν ἀναστρέφοιο ἔχων ἡμᾶς ὑπηρέτας ...

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CHAPTER TWELVE

A SPECTACLE OF GREEKNESS: PANHELLENISM AND THE VISUAL IN XENOPHON'S *AGESILAUS*[*]

Rosie Harman

The *Agesilaus* is an odd work. It praises the Spartan king Agesilaus as the champion and defender of Greeks: the text is imbued with the highly politicised language of Greek-barbarian opposition, claiming that Agesilaus' anti-Persian military activities are necessarily 'pro-Greek'. Through the language of praise, the reader is invited to identify with him; he is held up as a paradigm (παράδειγμα, 10.2) for imitation (μιμούμενος, 10.2). However, Agesilaus' involvement in violent conflict against non-Spartan Greeks, which occupies a significant portion of the narrative, is also made the subject of praise: it too, we are assured, is the behaviour of the ideal Greek. How would a Greek reader respond to such a text?[1]

Xenophon's representation of Agesilaus must be understood within the political context of the early fourth century and the intellectual context of Panhellenism. A time of upheaval, conflict and violence, this period saw multiple shifting alliances and struggles for ascendancy between Greek states in the Corinthian War. With the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War and the fall of the Athenian empire, Sparta became the new centre of power in the Greek world, although Spartan supremacy itself soon failed following Sparta's defeat at Leuctra in 371.[2] Sparta therefore occupies a particularly fascinating, and troubling, place in the Athenian imagination of this time.

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[1] In discussing the responses of 'the reader', I am clearly not attempting to reconstruct the responses of the text's real-life contemporary readers, which could have varied enormously and are hard to access, apart from through later writers' comments on Xenophon; rather I refer to the implied reader: see Iser 1978.

[2] See Ryder 1965, Hamilton 1979, Kagan 1987.

This period is associated with Panhellenist thought; we can note in particular the calls for an end to Greek-on-Greek conflict and for collective Greek action against Persia which begin to appear around this time, especially in the writings of Isocrates.[3] I wish to make two broad points about the way Greekness is imagined in this period, before turning to a consideration of the *Agesilaus*. The first point is that the conceptualization of Greek identity in Panhellenist writing is often more complex and conflicted than it might at first sight appear. The works of Isocrates are far from straightforward or simplistic; as Too notes, 'as an Athenian writer invoking what appears to be a panhellenic ideology, he is caught up in a complicated tension that exists in being both Athenian and Greek'.[4] The *Panathenaicus* can be read as a Panhellenist tract in its praise of Athens for having worked for the collective benefit of the Greeks; it also contains a eulogy of Agamemnon for having united the Greeks and led a collective Greek attack on Asia (74–83). Yet it remains an encomium specifically of one state, Athens, and is structured around the condemnation of Sparta: the text sets out the differences between Athens and Sparta in order to show the superiority of Athens in championing the Greek cause and the inferiority of Sparta in failing to do so, revealing Athens and Sparta not just as enemies, but as fundamentally culturally opposed. While arguing for the importance of laying aside differences between Greeks, therefore, the text both represents and reinscribes those differences.

Further, the security of a reading of the *Panathenaicus* as a praise of Athens and attack on Sparta is itself undercut: not only are the text's accusations against Sparta framed by comparison with a list of Athens' crimes against other Greeks which we are assured are not as bad (53–73), but the authority of the authorial *persona* receives internal criticism through the introduction of a competing voice which comments on the text's argument. When, towards the close of the text, Isocrates claims to be unsure about what he has written about Sparta (231–232) and describes presenting the

[3] The term 'Panhellenism' can also be used more broadly to indicate a concern with a Greek identity above and beyond identities associated with the polis, the region (such as the Peloponnese) or the ethnic group (such as the Dorians or Ionians); in this sense it has a much longer history. 'Panhellenism' has been used to describe the growth of collective Greek consciousness in the aftermath of the Persian Wars; see Hall 1989: 16–17. It has also been used to describe the interest in a Greek community and culture in the *Iliad*; see Nagy 1979: 6–7 on the synthesis of local Greek traditions, especially in the representation of the gods, in Homer. For a discussion of the different ways in which the term 'Panhellenism' has been used, see Mitchell 2007: xv–xxii.

[4] Too 1995: 129.

speech to his former pupils in order to gain their opinion (233), one pupil claims to perceive that its argument is deliberately constructed so as to be unconvincing and open to be read as a praise of Sparta (235–263). Importantly, Isocrates neither valorizes nor dismisses this reading; he says that he praised his pupil's ability but did not tell him whether or not he had correctly surmised his intentions (265). The question of whether the pupil's interpretation is 'right' is left unresolved;[5] the text self-consciously challenges its readers to reconsider their responses, but provides only for a loss of certainty.

The second point I wish to make about the representation of Greek identity in this period is that claims about identity are frequently involved in the manipulation of power.[6] Isocrates' *Panegyricus* is often cited as evidence of the cultural rather than ethnic definition of Greekness in this period; it asserts that the Athenians had so far surpassed all other men in thought and speech that 'it is those who share our education who are called Greeks rather than those who share our common nature'.[7] This definition of Greekness opens up Greek identity beyond the confines of ethnic distinction, but it also closes it down, by making Athens the gatekeeper of Greekness, thereby asserting its cultural supremacy.[8] As noted above, in the *Panathenaicus* it is Athens which stands for Greece, whereas through the claim of their exploitation of other Greeks the Greekness of the Spartans is questioned[9]—although the text's distinctions between Athens and Sparta are also undercut. Claims about what it means to be Athenian, Spartan, Greek and non-Greek (and especially Persian) of this period must be understood as highly fraught; the definition of Greekness is open to be contested and fought over.[10]

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5 Livingstone 1998: 276.

6 See Perlman 1976. See also Ober 1999: 254–255 and Azoulay 2004a: 157 on the class aspects of Panhellenism.

7 μᾶλλον Ἕλληνας καλεῖσθαι τοὺς τῆς παιδεύσεως τῆς ἡμετέρας ἢ τοὺς τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως μετέχοντας: Isoc. *Panegyr.* 50. This echoes Thucydides' Pericles' praise of Athens in his funeral speech as an 'education for Greece' (τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσιν: Thuc. 2.41.1).

8 See Saïd 2001: 282–283, Hall 2002: 209, Whitmarsh 2001: 9, Too 1995: 129. Compare Hall 1989: 16 on the 'tension between Panhellenic and Athenian propaganda in Athenian discourse of the fifth century': she argues that the conceptual polarisation of Greek and non-Greek in fifth century literature was based on an Athenian opposition between barbarian tyranny and Athenian democracy aimed at consolidating Athenian power over the Delian League.

9 Saïd 2001: 283 notes how *Panathenaicus* 189–195 'goes so far as to include the invasion of Attica by the "Peloponnesians" led by Eurystheus among the wars waged by Athens against the "barbarians"'.

10 Trédé 1991: 76–80 has demonstrated how definitions of Hellenism are debated and

The *Agesilaus* has traditionally been treated as a Panhellenist text; one influential reader has seen it as warning the Greeks of the need to unify against the threat of Persia under Artaxerxes III Ochos.[11] An important recent Panhellenist reading describes it as 'unreservedly an attempt to glorify the Spartan king',[12] contrasting it with the 'disappointment and even anger' of the *Hellenica*'s presentation of Agesilaus' actions against fellow Greeks.[13] Such a straightforwardly celebratory treatment of the *Agesilaus* has been questioned. Whereas various apparently apologetic aspects of the text (for example, the comments on Agesilaus' lack of corruption in money matters) have often been noted, one interpreter has read the text as a whole as apology. Noting its 'peculiar' and 'defensive' tone and choice of subject matter,[14] he sees it as a response to lost contemporary critiques of Agesilaus, whose accusations he attempts to reconstruct. He states that 'the panhellenism of the *Agesilaus* is motivated primarily by the unpanhellenic character of much of Agesilaus' activity'.[15]

Such a description is paradoxical. If Agesilaus was so notoriously 'unpanhellenic', why would claims of Panhellenism be thought an effective persuasive strategy? In this chapter I argue that although the *Agesilaus* can be understood as a 'Panhellenist' text in that it engages with questions about the nature of Greek identity current in contemporary Panhellenist thought, it reveals the complex, discursive nature of Panhellenism by engaging in those questions in a troublingly contorted and challenging way. Agesilaus' actions against the Persians are described in highly polarised, ethnocentric language,[16] which makes explicit reference to the Persian wars.[17] Yet not only

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contested in the fourth century through competing representations of Philip of Macedon in Isocrates and Demosthenes: for Isocrates Philip is a Greek, whom he calls upon to unite the Greeks against Persia, whereas for Demosthenes, Philip is a barbarian, aiming like Xerxes to subjugate Greece. Cf. Usher 1993.

11 Delebecque 1957: 462–470.

12 Dillery 1995: 114.

13 Dillery 1995: 117.

14 Hirsch 1985: 51 ('peculiar'), 53 ('defensive'). Compare Hamilton 1994: 212, who calls the *Agesilaus* an 'unusual treatise' which is 'patently apologetic'. See also Azoulay 2004a: 156–159, Cawkwell 1976: 64, Tuplin 1993: 53 n. 32, Cartledge 1987: 55, Pernot 1993: 685, Daverio Rocchi 2007: 393.

15 Hirsch 1985: 51.

16 It is described as ⟨τὸ⟩ μὴ περὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς Ἀσίας τὸν ἀγῶνα καθιστάναι, 'making the contest not for Greece but for Asia' (1.8). Compare ἂν πολεμεῖν βούληται ὁ βάρβαρος, ἀσχολίαν αὐτῷ παρέξειν στρατεύειν ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας, 'if the barbarian wished to fight, [Agesilaus] would pose a hindrance to his attack on the Greeks' (1.7).

17 ἐπειδὴ ὁ Πέρσης πρόσθεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα διέβη, ἀντιδιαβῆναι ἐπ' αὐτόν, 'since the Persian had previously invaded Greece, [Agesilaus] would invade his land in return' (1.8).

is attention paid to his Spartan identity, as indicated in the praise of Sparta which functions as praise of his genealogy at the beginning of the text (1.3–4) and in the later praise of his patriotism (φιλόπολις, 7.1), but more importantly, the most 'Panhellenist' language of the text appears in the description of his wars on fellow *Greeks*.

We are told that although his fatherland was at war with Greeks he did not neglect the common good of Greece (ὃς καὶ πολεμούσης τῆς πατρίδος πρὸς Ἕλληνας ὅμως τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τῇ Ἑλλάδι οὐκ ἠμέλησεν: 7.7), and that he looked on victory in a war against Greeks as a disaster (συμφορὰν νομίζοντα τὸ νικᾶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ἕλληνας πολέμῳ: 7.4).[18] He is even described as responding to the news that only eight Lacedaemonians but ten thousand enemy Corinthians had fallen in the battle of Corinth by bewailing the fate of Greece: φεῦ ⟨σου⟩, ὦ Ἑλλάς, ὁπότε οἱ νῦν τεθνηκότες ἱκανοὶ ἦσαν ζῶντες νικᾶν μαχόμενοι πάντας τοὺς βαρβάρους ('alas for you, oh Hellas, since those who are now dead would have been sufficient, had they lived, to have conquered in battle all of the barbarians': 7.5). I return to this passage below.

Such claims strike an odd note. Yet the text presents all its arguments about the meaning of Agesilaus' actions as equally valid and self-evident. All his actions, even those which seem mutually exclusive, are celebrated as pro-Greek, and are subsumed within a uniform rhetoric of praise. Arguing that the *Hellenica*, unlike the *Agesilaus*, is critical towards Agesilaus' campaigns against fellow Greeks, one reader comments that it describes Agesilaus' route from Asia to Greece, as he turns from attacking barbarians to attacking Greek states, as following in the footsteps of Xerxes (*Hellenica* 4.2.8).[19] Yet this same comparison is made in the *Agesilaus*: Agesilaus is praised for making the same journey as Xerxes but accomplishing it in a fraction of the time (2.1). What *sort* of praise is it that lauds Agesilaus for being better than Xerxes at being Xerxes? If Agesilaus' virtue offers a paradigm to be imitated—if Agesilaus is a paradigm of Greekness—what sort of Greekness is this? I argue that something more problematic, and interesting, is going on here, which reveals much about the complexities of fourth-century Greek self-consciousness. I avoid the contentious and much discussed issue of the relationship of the *Agesilaus* to the representation of Agesilaus in the *Hellenica*;[20] I focus not on Xenophon's representation of Agesilaus the historical character, but on the *Agesilaus* as a text, considering what expec-

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18 Quotations from the *Agesilaus* follow the OCT version of Marchant 1920.

19 Dillery 1995: 117.

20 See Dillery 1995: 114–117, Momigliano 1993: 50, Cartledge 1987: 65–66, Hirsch 1985: 56–57, Henry 1967: 107–133, Bringmann 1971.

tations the *Agesilaus* has of its readers, and what is at stake in the reader's response.

I approach these issues through examining how the text's rhetoric of the displayed and the seen positions the reader. Xenophon is interested in display and visual self-presentation throughout his works, especially when describing struggles for power between political figures or cultural groups. For example, Cyrus the Great manipulates deceptive dress before his subjects and discusses the visual effects of an army on its enemies in the *Cyropaedia*; the Spartans are described as exercising social control through watching each other in the *Spartan Constitution*; and the Ten Thousand attempt to cow their enemies with impressive display in the *Anabasis*.[21] Similar concerns are evident in the *Agesilaus*. The *Agesilaus* implicitly imagines the reader as a spectator of the events of the narrative. The text describes itself as a display (ἐπιδείξειεν, 1.9), and its argument is upheld through a rhetoric of visibility, as the assertions of the narrator are justified by appeals to the reader's ability to see what is described. The claim implicit in such appeals is that sight is a transparent, self-evident process, which provides direct access to knowledge, and therefore offers authoritative confirmation of the text's assertions. Elsewhere, however, the sight of Agesilaus and his actions is offered to the reader in a way that is more ambiguous: the reader is invited to look at Agesilaus' display of harmonious Greek troops in Ephesus (1.25–27), but is also offered the spectacle of the carnage-strewn battlefield after the Greek-on-Greek battle at Coronea (2.14).

Further, there are numerous scenes of spectatorship within the text in the description of Agesilaus' life and virtues. Agesilaus is praised for his visual availability; the experience of his viewers is used to back up the text's claims. He is also depicted as organising displays: there are references throughout the text to the responses of viewers of Agesilaus and his army. In the text's scenes of internal spectatorship, sight is revealed as a much more complex and conflicted experience than the narratorial rhetoric of the visual would have us believe. Yet, as I will show, the text's rhetoric also continually

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[21] Powell 1989 treats the concern with display and what is seen in the *Agesilaus* (and the *Spartan Constitution*) as evidence of the real-life manipulation of the visual by Spartans in political and military strategy; for a different approach to the rhetorical play on sight in the *Constitution* see Harman 2009. See also: Goldhill 1998 on Socrates' viewing of the *hetaira* Theodote at Xen. *Mem*. 3.11; Wohl 2004 and Baragwanath (this volume, pp. 632–633) on display in the *Symposium*; Azoulay 2004b, Too 1998 and Harman 2008 on visual self-presentation in the *Cyropaedia*; L'Allier 2004 and Harman (forthcoming) on display and viewing in the *Anabasis*; and Dillery 2004 on Xenophon's representation of processions in a variety of works.

undercuts itself, subverting its own claims even as it insists upon them: the presentation of the text as display self-consciously links the artifice of the text's own rhetoric to the processes of spectacle almost always associated in this text with Agesilaus himself.

Narratorial Authority and the Reader's Sight

The *Agesilaus* makes claims for and simultaneously undercuts its own authority. This is partly a product of encomium discourse as such. In its opening claim of the difficulty of the task of praise, familiar from fourth-century encomia,[22] the proem paradoxically both establishes and undermines the project of the text:

> Οἶδα μὲν ὅτι τῆς Ἀγησιλάου ἀρετῆς τε καὶ δόξης οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἄξιον ἔπαινον γράψαι, ὅμως δ' ἐγχειρητέον. οὐ γὰρ ἂν καλῶς ἔχοι εἰ ὅτι τελέως ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἐγένετο, διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲ μειόνων ἂν τυγχάνοι ἐπαίνων. (1.1)
>
> I know that it is not easy to write praise worthy of the virtue and reputation of Agesilaus, but nevertheless it is necessary to set my hand to the task. For it would not be fitting if, for the very reason that a man is so completely good, he should not receive praise even of an inadequate sort.

This introduction is self-conscious, addressing the problems involved in writing. It also draws attention to the problem of reading: what will the reader get out of reading this text? The reader is informed that what he or she is about to read is incapable of fully carrying out the function that it attempts to fulfil, but is inadequate (μειόνων). At the opening of the argument, the reader is invited both to engage with and doubt the narrator's voice as an authoritative source of praise. This introduction also problematises the reader's relationship with Agesilaus. How will the reader respond to a figure whose virtue is so great as to be beyond representation? Will the reader identify with Agesilaus, or does the excess of his virtue transform him into an oddity from whom the reader can only feel alienated?

The formulation of the rhetoric of praise similarly invites doubt. Everything that Agesilaus does becomes a reason for praise in a way that can seem contrived. Again, this is partly in the nature of encomium. As Whitmarsh puts it: 'Encomium invites polar thought: the praise-blame axis suggests an

[22] Isoc. *Evag.* 8. Compare also Thuc. 2.35.2, Lysias 2.1, Hyperides 6.1, Dem. 60.1. See Humble (forthcoming) for a discussion of the place of the *Agesilaus* within the literary history of the encomium. I am most grateful to Noreen Humble for kindly allowing me to read this paper prior to publication.

interpretative template, a fixed, schematic distribution of subjects into good and bad. But it also, of necessity, draws attention to the 'constructedness' of this distribution, and to this extent every encomium exposes its own arbitrariness.'[23] In the *Agesilaus*, this problem is the subject of self-conscious concern, and is directly addressed by the narrator. In the description of Agesilaus' preparations at Coronea, we are told:

> καὶ οὐ τοῦτο λέξων ἔρχομαι, ὡς πολὺ μὲν ἐλάττους πολὺ δὲ χείρονας ἔχων ὅμως συνέβαλεν· εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα λέγοιμι, Ἀγησίλαόν τ' ἄν μοι δοκῶ ἄφρονα ἀποφαίνειν καὶ ἐμαυτὸν μωρόν, εἰ ἐπαινοίην τὸν περὶ τῶν μεγίστων εἰκῇ κινδυνεύοντα· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τάδ' αὐτοῦ ἄγαμαι, ὅτι πλῆθός τε οὐδὲν μεῖον ἢ τὸ τῶν πολεμίων παρεσκευάσατο. (2.7)

> I am not going to say that he had far fewer and far inferior forces but that he nevertheless accepted battle. If I were to say this, I think I would show Agesilaus as foolish and myself as stupid, if I praised him for rashly endangering the greatest interests. On the contrary, I admire him for this very reason—that he equipped himself with a force in no way smaller than that of the enemy.

As the narrator contemplates how best to praise Agesilaus, one possible option for praise is considered, only to be rejected and replaced with praise of an entirely contradictory characteristic. The self-criticism of the narratorial voice attempts to pre-empt the expected scepticism of the reader; the effect, however, is that the text undermines its own authority. In this self-conscious critique of the generic clichés of encomium discourse, the logic of praise elsewhere in the text is similarly laid open to evaluation and criticism.[24]

The text's simultaneous assertion and subversion of its own authority can be seen in its rhetorical manipulation of the language of display. The narrator asks, 'How could anyone display more clearly how he led the army than to narrate the things that he did?' (πῶς ἄν τις σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξειεν ὡς ἐστρατήγησεν ἢ εἰ αὐτὰ διηγήσαιτο ἃ ἔπραξεν; 1.9).[25] Not only does the text characterise itself as a display, but Agesilaus' actions are framed as displays of his virtues. We are told that he displayed himself (ἀντεπιδείξας, 1.12) as keeping his oaths; that he displayed (ἐπεδείξατο, 1.37) his kingship as worthy of praise; that he displayed (ἐπεδείκνυτο, 11.9) courage more through good

[23] Whitmarsh 2006: 309.

[24] Compare Plato's *Symposium* for self-consciousness about how encomium should be done, as each speaker criticises other speakers' attempts at praise speech, all of which are finally capped by Socrates. See Nightingale 1993 on Plato's criticism of the encomiastic genre.

[25] We are also told that the narrator will give an account of Agesilaus' actions in order to make clear/visible (καταδήλους) his character (1.6). This vocabulary of 'showing' occurs elsewhere: ἔνδηλον, 1.36; ἐδήλωσαν, 1.38; δηλοῦν, 3.1.

judgement than through risk-taking; and that he was unique in displaying (ἐπιδεῖξαι, 11.14) that although bodily strength weakens with age, strength of soul in good men does not. We are also asked which of his deeds do not display his wisdom (τήν γε μὴν σοφίαν αὐτοῦ ποῖαι τῶν ἐκείνου πράξεων οὐκ ἐπιδεικνύουσιν; 6.4). The use of the verb ἐπιδείκνυμι coincides with the vocabulary of signs (σημεῖα: 1.5, 6.2), memorials (μνημεῖα: 6.2, 11.7, 11.16), witnesses (μάρτυς: 3.1, 4.5, 5.7) and evidence (τεκμήρια: 1.5, 3.1, 4.1, 4.3, 6.1)—terms which do not carry a specifically visual meaning but which are often used in a way that implies the visual in this text (see discussion of specific examples below).[26]

The history of this terminology is revealing. Herodotus introduces his work as ἀπόδεξις in his proem, and backs up his assertions with claims of autopsy.[27] Herodotus is concerned with the problem of how to discuss the invisible (τὸ ἀφανές),[28] using the analogy of the invisible with the visible (φανερός), and relies on the language of evidence and proof (especially the terms τεκμήριον and μαρτύριον) to support his claims. As Thomas has shown, in addition to referring to the Homeric concern with the visible sign, this language draws on the terminology of the Presocratic philosophers and early medical writers.[29] The assumption lying behind this invocation of the visual seems to be that sight is a secure means of acquiring knowledge, as

[26] The term μάρτυς, which occurs three times in the text, is once explicitly visual, when describing eyes (μάρτυρας τοὺς πάντων ὀφθαλμοὺς τῆς σωφροσύνης ποιούμενος, 'making everyone's eyes witnesses of his self-control': 5.7). It is used once in a way that strongly implies the visual, when Agesilaus' military exploits (ἔργων), which are said to have been witnessed (3.1), are contrasted in terms of knowability with his soul (τῇ ψυχῇ), understood as invisible elsewhere in Xenophon (*Mem.* 1.4.9, 4.3.14). The third use of μάρτυς is not obviously visual: we are told that the whole of Lacedaemon is witness to the fact that Agesilaus gave half of his inheritance to his mother's family (4.5). The term σημεῖα, which occurs twice, is once used to describe the marks on Agesilaus' body left by fighting (σαφῆ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς σημεῖα ἀπενεγκάμενος τοῦ θυμῷ μάχεσθαι, 'carrying clear signs on his person of the vigour of his fighting': 6.2) which are specifically presented as visible. Its other use, however, is non-visual, referring to the decision to crown Agesilaus king (1.2). The term μνημεῖα, which occurs three times, is once explicitly visual, referring to memorials of fighting which are described as available to be seen (6.2). It is once not visual, referring to memorials of soul which are explicitly contrasted to the physical memorial of a statue (τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς οὐδέποτε ἐπαύετο μνημεῖα διαπονούμενος, 'he never stopped working on memorials of his soul': 11.7); and once it is ambiguous, referring to memorials of virtue left across the earth (μνημεῖα μὲν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρετῆς ἀνὰ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν κτησάμενος: 11.16). The term τεκμήρια is not generally visual, but seems to refer to the visual when we are told that Agesilaus offered 'not unclear/invisible proofs' (οὐκ ἀφανῆ τεκμήριά, 6.1) of his courage by always fighting the strongest enemies and by placing himself on the front line.

[27] See Hartog 1988.

[28] See, for example, the comments on the existence of the river of Ocean, Hdt. 2.23.

[29] Thomas 2000: 190–212, 221–228, 249–269.

is indicated in Herodotus' famous story of Gyges and Candaules' wife and in Candaules' near-quotation of the phrase of Heraclitus—that the eyes are more trustworthy than the ears (Herodotus 1.8).[30]

However, the trustworthiness of sight is often disproved in Herodotus' representation of deceptive display or misled viewers.[31] Indeed, this terminology is also associated with the Sophists and with forensic and epideictic oratory, and therefore can carry slightly suspect connotations. There is a close association between the rhetorical and the visual in late fifth-century Greek thought; both visual appearance and spoken word were understood as open to be used flamboyantly or deceptively in order to manipulate.[32] Thomas traces the use of the verb ἀποδείκνυμι in fifth-century prose, noting its widespread use in Antiphon and Gorgias and its near absence from Thucydides, with the significant exception of his protagonists' speeches, where it makes a frequent appearance. Here the term seems to imply a form of scheming persuasion from which Thucydides wished to distance his narratorial *persona*.[33] The rhetorical use of display in the *Agesilaus* must be read through these contradictory connotations of display[34]—the display of knowledge and manipulative display—in Classical thought.

The *Agesilaus* is also structured by repeated appeals to the visibility of what it describes. Language suggesting visual clarity is used to persuade the reader. After an account of Agesilaus' threats to Thebes and Corinth and his attack on Phlius on behalf of their exiled pro-Spartan factions, we are told that, 'although someone could criticise these actions on other grounds, it is clear/visible that they were done through friendship' (εἰ δέ τις ἄλλῃ πῃ ταῦτα μέμφεται, ἀλλ' οὖν φιλεταιρίᾳ γε πραχθέντα φανερά ἐστι: 2.21). The possible negative reaction of 'someone' is countered by the suggested visibility of Agesilaus' virtuous motives. Similarly, the claim that Agesilaus showed reverence for religion is supported by the assertion that even his enemies trusted his oaths, which is backed up by a show of visibility: 'In case anyone does not believe this, I wish to name the most visible/famous among them' (ὅπως δὲ μή τις ἀπιστῇ, καὶ ὀνομάσαι βούλομαι τοὺς ἐπιφανεστάτους αὐτῶν: 3.2). The suggestion of visual accessibility urges the reader to accept the narrator's claims; yet the expectation behind these asides seems to

30 See Heraclitus 22 B 101a (D.-K.).

31 See Pisistratus' false display of Phya as Athena (Hdt. 1.60) or Xerxes' viewing of Artemisia's behaviour at Salamis (Hdt. 8.88), for example.

32 Worman 2002: 149–192.

33 Thomas 2000: 226–227.

34 See Goldhill 1999: 3–4.

be that the narrator's claims are not likely to be believed.[35] Although the voice of the narrator seems intent on limiting responses to the narrative,[36] making the reader passively accept what he or she is told, the expectation of disbelief also both prompts and licenses a more critical engagement with the text.

In an address in the third person imperative, the reader is directed to look at Agesilaus' home in order to believe the claim that Agesilaus lived very simply:

> εἰ δέ τις ταῦτα ἀπιστεῖ, ἰδέτω μὲν οἵα οἰκία ἤρκει αὐτῷ, θεασάσθω δὲ τὰς θύρας αὐτοῦ· εἰκάσειε γὰρ ἄν τις ἔτι ταύτας ἐκείνας εἶναι ἅσπερ Ἀριστόδημος ὁ Ἡρακλέους ὅτε κατῆλθε λαβὼν ἐπεστήσατο· πειράσθω δὲ θεάσασθαι τὴν ἔνδον κατασκευήν, ἐννοησάτω δὲ ὡς ἐθοίναζεν ἐν ταῖς θυσίαις, ἀκουσάτω δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ πολιτικοῦ καννάθρου κατῄει εἰς Ἀμύκλας ⟨ἡ θυγάτηρ αὐτοῦ⟩. (8.7)
>
> If anyone doubts this, let him see what sort of house was sufficient for him, and let him gaze at his doors. Someone would think that they were still those same doors which Aristodemus, descendant of Heracles, took up and fixed in place when he came there. Let him try to gaze at the arrangements inside, let him notice how he entertained at sacrifices, let him hear how his daughter used to go down to Amyclae in a public carriage.

The invitation to see is mixed with invitations to notice and hear; it forms part of a complete scrutiny of Agesilaus' private arrangements. The reader is taken on a miniature visual tour which gradually narrows its focus and zooms in: first we look at the house, then we look at the doors, then we look inside—or rather we try. Although the direction to look makes the implicit claim that looking is a straightforward process which guarantees belief, the instruction to 'try to look' seems to hint at the difficulty of really 'seeing' and understanding Agesilaus. The imagined response of τις, who would think that the doors were those of the mythical hero Aristodemus, frames the vision of Agesilaus' house as a glimpse of a mysterious and inaccessible world.

The *Agesilaus* also invites the reader to look at Agesilaus and his behaviour in a more open-ended way, leaving the nature of the viewer's re-

[35] Following the text's description of Agesilaus sexual self-control, for example, the narrator adds, 'what opinion some people hold in regard to these matters I know well enough' (καὶ ὅ τι μὲν δὴ ὑπολαμβάνουσί τινες ταῦτα οὐκ ἀγνοῶ: 5.6). Cf. the expectation of doubt in *Spartan Constitution* at its claims about Spartan pederasty.

[36] The narrator is concerned to identify the genre in which he is speaking, claiming that the text should be read not as a funerary lament (θρῆνος) but as an encomium (ἐγκώμιον), and giving explanations as to why this designation is more appropriate (10.3). This generic quibbling evinces self-consciousness about how the text will be received; the reader is informed how to read.

sponse undetermined. The first such scene, part of the description of Agesilaus' campaigns in Asia, presents Agesilaus' organisation of his troops at Ephesus. His encouragement of training and exercise in his men is imagined as producing a sight to be watched:[37]

> ἐκ τούτου δὲ παρῆν ὁρᾶν τὰ μὲν γυμνάσια μεστὰ [τῶν] ἀνδρῶν γυμναζομένων, τὸν δὲ ἱππόδρομον ἱππέων ἱππαζομένων, τοὺς δὲ ἀκοντιστὰς καὶ τοὺς τοξότας ἐπὶ στόχον ἱέντας. ἀξίαν δὲ καὶ ὅλην τὴν πόλιν ἐν ᾗ ἦν θέας ἐποίησεν. (1.25–26)
>
> Because of this it was possible to see the gymnasia full of men exercising, the race-course full of horsemen riding, and the javelin-men and archers shooting at targets. Indeed, he made the whole city in which he was stationed worthy of being gazed at.

The laying out of the Greeks' activities for the eye of the reader potentially invites identification with them. This image of social harmony is not just a spectacle of a virtuous and industrious city, but of the men's absolute obedience and Agesilaus' power as commander. The reader cannot be impressed by the Greeks' unity and social cohesion, and identify with them as 'ideal' Greeks, without identifying with Agesilaus as leader. However, identification is not the only possible response.

What is the effect of the description of Ephesus as a city worth looking at (ἀξίαν ... θέας)? The phrase recalls Xenophon's use of the adjective ἀξιοθέατος. Most frequently this term refers to the sight of a group or community: it describes cavalry processions, choruses, festivals, a body of victorious Spartan troops, an orderly warship and the sights of the city of Athens, both sacred and secular.[38] The term can also have erotic connotations: the beautiful Abradatas is worth seeing even before he arms himself (*Cyropaedia* 6.4.4), and Callias is worth seeing when inspired by love for Autolycus (*Symposium* 1.10). The erotic aspect of the latter example is tempered by religious or cult overtones as we are told that not just those inspired by the god of love but all those inspired by gods are worth seeing (1.10): the sight of the ἀξιοθέατος suggests both pleasure and estranging awe.

In the *Oeconomicus* the chorus that is worth watching is specified as orderly (8.4) whereas the sight of a disorderly chorus provides no pleasure (θεᾶσθαι ἀτερπές, 8.3). The pleasure of the viewer suggests a sense of identification with the group who are the object of sight: the sight of the chorus is compared to other sights of group activities, where a response of pleasure

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[37] See Dillery 1995: 30 on the equivalent passage in the *Hell.* (3.4.16–17), which he describes as 'written in a way which imagines a reader who sees the camp.'

[38] Cavalry: *Eq. mag.* 3.1, *Eq.* 11.10, 11.12. Choruses: *Oec.* 8.4, *Lac.* 4.2. Festivals: *Hier.* 1.11. Spartan troops: *Hell.* 4.5.6. Warship: *Oec.* 8.8. Sights of Athens: *Por.* 5.4.

depends on the viewer's relation to the group. An orderly army is a beautiful sight for friends but a most unwelcome sight for enemies (κάλλιστον μὲν ἰδεῖν τοῖς φίλοις, δυσχερέστατον δὲ τοῖς πολεμίοις: *Oec.* 8.6), and the orderly warship is worth watching for friends but a frightful sight for enemies (φοβερόν ἐστι πολεμίοις ἢ φίλοις ἀξιοθέατον: *Oec.* 8.8).

However, the term ἀξιοθέατος does not always imply identification with the object of sight. Although it is not directly specified, in the case of the spectacle of Spartan troops, mentioned above, those watching seem to be members of embassies from Boeotia and other states (*Hellenica* 4.5.6). The worth-watching chorus of the *Spartan Constitution* is seen by the Spartan law-giver Lycurgus as part of his viewing of the practices of other states (4.2). When used of festivals, the term describes the pleasures of travel to festivals in foreign cities (ἐν ἄλλῃ χώρᾳ ἐστὶν ἀξιοθέατα: *Hiero* 1.11), and the worth-watching sights of Athens are referred to as something that will draw foreign visitors to the city (*Poroi.* 5.4).[39]

These examples engage usefully with the sight-worthiness of Agesilaus' Ephesus. Do Agesilaus' men present a pleasurable vision of a community with which the reader is expected to identify, or does the absolute obedience of the army to Agesilaus offer a fascinating, yet alienating, glimpse of a curiosity? The phrase παρῆν ὁρᾶν is impersonal: no potential responses to the sight are described. The reader is informed in a second person address what he or she would think of the activity in the city (... τὴν πόλιν ὄντως ἂν ἡγήσω πολέμου ἐργαστήριον εἶναι, '... you would have thought that the city was a workshop for war': 1.26), yet it is not stated how the reader is expected to feel before such an overwhelming sight.

Immediately following this, we are offered another vision of Agesilaus and his men in Ephesus. Here we are told how the viewer would respond:

> ἐπερρώσθη δ' ἄν τις κἀκεῖνο ἰδών, Ἀγησίλαον μὲν πρῶτον, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους στρατιώτας ἐστεφανωμένους τε ὅπου ἀπὸ τῶν γυμνασίων ἴοιεν, καὶ ἀνατιθέντας τοὺς στεφάνους τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι. (1.27)
>
> Somebody would have been encouraged/strengthened in watching Agesilaus in the lead, then behind him the other soldiers returning garlanded from the gymnasium and dedicating their garlands to Artemis.

The introduction of τις invites the reader to replicate the response described, feel encouraged by the sight and so identify with Agesilaus and his

[39] Goldhill 2000: 166–175 has discussed how the verb θεᾶμαι and its cognates function as part of a democratic terminology of vision, describing travel to other Greek states for the purpose of watching festivals; see also Goldhill 1999: 5–8.

followers. Yet immediately the identity of the 'somebody' is closed down, defined much more narrowly within the narrative frame, in the explanatory rhetorical question: ὅπου γὰρ ἄνδρες θεοὺς μὲν σέβοιεν, πολεμικὰ δὲ ἀσκοῖεν, πειθαρχίαν δὲ μελετῷεν, πῶς οὐκ εἰκὸς ἐνταῦθα πάντα μεστὰ ἐλπίδων ἀγαθῶν εἶναι; ('for where men reverence the gods, train in warfare and practise obedience, is it not likely that everything there would be full of good hopes?': 1.27). In this justification of the claim about the response the procession would evoke, τις seems to be someone on the spot (ὅπου ... ἐνταῦθα), watching the procession of men, participating in the virtuous activities of the city and experiencing 'good hopes'; the imagined response to the sight becomes the response of a participant.[40] The reader, reminded that his or her viewing of events can only be a distanced, literary viewing, may feel excluded from the response imagined.

The second key passage where events are described through the experience of an imagined viewer occurs at a very different moment:[41] as a response to the Greek-on-Greek destruction on the battle-field at Coronea:

> ἐπεί γε μὴν ἔληξεν ἡ μάχη, παρῆν δὴ θεάσασθαι ἔνθα συνέπεσον ἀλλήλοις τὴν μὲν γῆν αἵματι πεφυρμένην, νεκροὺς δὲ κειμένους φιλίους καὶ πολεμίους μετ' ἀλλήλων, ἀσπίδας δὲ διατεθρυμμένας, δόρατα συντεθραυσμένα, ἐγχειρίδια γυμνὰ κολεῶν, τὰ μὲν χαμαί, τὰ δ' ἐν σώματι, τὰ δ' ἔτι μετὰ χεῖρας. (2.14)
>
> When the battle was over, in the place where they fought each other it was possible to look upon the earth stained with blood, the corpses of friends and enemies lying side by side, shields smashed to pieces, spears snapped in two, daggers bared of their sheaths, some on the ground, some embedded in bodies, some still gripped by hands.

The phrase παρῆν δὴ θεάσασθαι ('it was possible to look upon') offers the field of battle as a sight to be perused by the reader. No imagined responses are given. What is the hypothetical viewer to make of the sight? In this scene of violence and destruction, all sides are equally implicated: the bodies of friend and enemy are muddled up, shields for defence and spears for attack are both destroyed, and daggers are found in the lifeless hands of those who struck with them and in the bodies of those killed by them. The sight is carefully framed so that the beholder is unable to take sides in the mutual frenzy of destruction: the scene is not focalised from any one position. Crucially, both friend and enemy (φιλίους καὶ πολεμίους) are Greeks.

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[40] See Dillery 2004: 265, who stresses that one of the main audiences for this procession is the men themselves.

[41] Cartledge 1987: 60 reads the description of the visual effect of the battlefield as evidence that Xenophon was himself an eyewitness to the battle.

What lesson are we supposed to learn about Agesilaus from this? His response is to order a spectacle of his own: 'In the morning Agesilaus ordered the polemarch Gylis to draw up the army in battle order and to set up a trophy and to have everyone wear garlands in honour of the god and to have all the flute-players play' (πρῳ̂ δὲ Γῦλιν τὸν πολέμαρχον παρατάξαι τε ἐκέλευσε τὸ στράτευμα καὶ τρόπαιον ἵστασθαι καὶ στεφανοῦσθαι πάντας τῷ θεῷ καὶ τοὺς αὐλητὰς πάντας αὐλεῖν: 2.15). The spectacle of Greek corpses is replaced by a spectacle of Agesilaus' triumph. But how easily is this sleight of hand performed—how far can one spectacle be elided into the other? If the reader is shocked by the sight of Coronea, what response will the celebratory display of Agesilaus provoke? Are we to identify with his self-congratulation, or be disturbed by it?

This openness or indeterminacy in focalisation also occurs in the description of the battle of Coronea itself, which is framed so that despite the text's overarching concern with the life of Agesilaus, the reader is left unsure whether this remains his narrative or has widened into a larger narrative of Greek events. Before the battle proper begins, there is a moment of pause and reflection where each side views and weighs up its opponent—and this experience is presented as shared:

> συνῆσαν μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὸ κατὰ Κορώνειαν πεδίον οἱ μὲν σὺν Ἀγησιλάῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ Κηφισοῦ, οἱ δὲ σὺν τοῖς Θηβαίοις ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἑλικῶνος. ἑώρων δὲ τάς τε φάλαγγας ἀλλήλων μάλα ἰσοπάλους, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ οἱ ἱππεῖς ἦσαν ἑκατέρων ἰσοπληθεῖς. (2.9)
>
> They met on the plain of Coronea, those with Agesilaus coming from Cephisus, those with the Thebans coming from Helicon. They saw that each other's battle-lines were equally matched, and that the cavalry of each side were equally numerous.

Just as the verb συνῆσαν (they met) has both armies as its subject, equally weighted in a μὲν—δὲ construction, so too the verb ἑώρων presents the experience of viewing focalised through the eyes of both sides simultaneously. The narrator's justification for describing the battle similarly focuses on its communal significance: 'I will describe the battle, for there was none other like it among those in our time' (διηγήσομαι δὲ καὶ τὴν μάχην· καὶ γὰρ ἐγένετο οἵαπερ οὐκ ἄλλη τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν: 2.9). Who are ἡμῶν? Are 'we' (as the 'Greeks') both sides, who are about to kill each other? In that case, is the text as a whole, as a narrative focused on Agesilaus, not in a full sense about 'us'?

The text moves on into a description of the actions of first one side, then the other (2.10–11). For much of this description, Agesilaus is not the main instigator of action, and appears only when he is inappropriately garlanded in victory before the battle is over (although he reappears in control of the

action at the end of 2.11). Those who act are rather the Thebans, the Argives, the men under Herippidas (who consist of those who came with Agesilaus from home and some of the remains of the Ten Thousand), the Ionians, Aeolians and Hellespontines. Those who are next described as seeing are the Thebans (2.11). The narrative is told as a narrative of various Greek groups; despite the text's stated aim to praise Agesilaus, the reader is not invited to identify or side with any one group.

Internal Spectators

In the scene of the battle of Coronea discussed above, the nature of the reader's engagement with the text is informed by the way that internal spectators see the events described. I now wish to consider how the representation of visual experience within the text impacts on the reader's literary viewing of Agesilaus. As with the rhetorical appropriation of the reader's viewing to back up the text's argument, the experiences of spectators within the *Agesilaus* are offered as confirmation of the text's claims.[42] In order to back up claims of Agesilaus' *andreia*, we are told that after each of his battles,

> τρόπαιον ἐστήσατο, ἀθάνατα μὲν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρετῆς μνημεῖα καταλιπών, σαφῆ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς σημεῖα ἀπενεγκάμενος τοῦ θυμῷ μάχεσθαι· ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἀκούοντας ἀλλ᾽ ὁρῶντας ἐξῆν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν δοκιμάζειν. (6.2)
>
> he set up a trophy, leaving undying memorials of his virtue, and bearing on his person clear marks of his spirited fighting. The result was that it was possible to judge his soul not by hearing but by seeing.

Sight is privileged above hearing in the acquisition of knowledge: Agesilaus' viewers are imagined as able to scrutinise and judge him. Yet we are informed that the memorials are specifically memorials of virtue, and that the marks are marks of courageous fighting: the visible signs that his viewers are to judge have already been interpreted.

In the discussion of Agesilaus' sexual abstinence, expected disbelief is countered by the claim of Agesilaus accessibility to view by others:

[42] After an account of Agesilaus' military exploits we are told καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ εἴρηται ὅσα τῶν ἐκείνου ἔργων μετὰ πλείστων μαρτύρων ἐπράχθη. τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα οὐ τεκμηρίων προσδεῖται, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναμνῆσαι μόνον ἀρκεῖ καὶ εὐθὺς πιστεύεται ('described so far are those of his deeds that were performed before many witnesses; such things do not require proof, but just mentioning them is sufficient and immediately they are believed': 3.1). As mentioned above, μαρτύρων does not necessarily refer to visual witnessing, although the military context may imply it.

> ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὀλίγων εἰδότων πολλοῖς ἔξεστιν ἀπιστεῖν· τὰ δὲ πάντες ἐπιστάμεθα ὅτι ἥκιστα μὲν οἱ ἐπιφανέστατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λανθάνουσιν ὅ τι ἂν ποιῶσιν· Ἀγησίλαον δέ τι πράξαντα [μὲν] τοιοῦτον οὔτε ἰδὼν πώποτε οὐδεὶς ἀνήγγειλεν οὔτε εἰκάζων πιστὰ ἂν ἔδοξε λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ εἰς οἰκίαν μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἰδίᾳ ἐν ἀποδημίᾳ κατήγετο, ἀεὶ δὲ ⟨ἦν⟩ ἢ ἐν ἱερῷ, ἔνθα δὴ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττειν, ἢ ἐν φανερῷ, μάρτυρας τοὺς πάντων ὀφθαλμοὺς τῆς σωφροσύνης ποιούμενος. εἰ δ' ἐγὼ ταῦτα ψεύδομαι ἀντία τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐπισταμένης ἐκεῖνον μὲν οὐδὲν ἐπαινῶ, ἐμαυτὸν δὲ ψέγω. (5.6–7)
>
> When things are known only to a few, it is possible for many to disbelieve them. But we all know that the most visible are least able to escape notice in what they do. Certainly, no-one ever reported seeing Agesilaus doing such a thing, nor was anyone who conjectured such actions believed to speak the truth. For when away from home he never stayed in a house by himself, but always stayed either in a temple, where it was impossible to do such things, or in the open, where he made the eyes of all men witnesses of his self-control. If I lie about these matters against the knowledge of Greece, I do not praise him, but censure myself.

The implicit claim is that viewing allows unmediated access to knowledge. However, importantly, the exposure of Agesilaus to the sight of those around him seems to be part of a deliberate self-fashioning: we are told not just that he is observed, but that he actively engages his viewers, staging a display of abstinence. The argument is based on assertions about what 'we all' know (πάντες ἐπιστάμεθα: 5.6), and about what Greece knows (τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐπισταμένης: 5.7), even while informing the reader what he or she *should* know.[43] The appeal to the eyes of all (τοὺς πάντων ὀφθαλμούς: 5.7) constructs an imagined community of viewers in which the reader is invited to participate, and is thus both constitutive of political identity and coercive; the sceptical viewer, who might see and know something different, is excluded from being part of 'us', or part of Greece.

Jarringly, however, the expectation of the passage seems to be that the narrator's statements will not be believed; the passage invites scepticism even while ruling it out as the response of a proper Greek. Further, the description of Agesilaus' behaviour, as well as inviting the reader to identify with him as a virtuous ideal, also offers up Agesilaus' most private habits as a source of speculation and curiosity: the expectation of disbelief about Agesilaus' sexual practices and sleeping arrangements suggests their exoticism

[43] This strategy is familiar from Socrates' discussions with his interlocutors. At *Symp.* 8.11–12 Socrates claims to know that Callias is inspired by chaste 'Heavenly' Aphrodite rather than carnal 'Vulgar' Aphrodite; Hermogenes comments that in flattering Callias Socrates is in fact educating him in how he ought to behave (χαριζόμενος Καλλίᾳ καὶ παιδεύεις αὐτὸν οἷόνπερ χρὴ εἶναι: 8.12).

and strangeness.[44] His permanent exposure to the eyes of all, while acting as the guarantee of his virtue, figures him as an oddity. His sexual self-control is said to be worthy of mention because of its wondrousness (θαύματος ἕνεκα ἄξιον μνησθῆναι: 5.4); the term θαῦμα suggests awe, but also scrutiny of the alien.[45]

As this passage indicates, in this text viewing and display are frequently involved in the construction of power relations, as Agesilaus stage-manages his visual effect in order to influence his viewers, and also in political self-positioning, as responses to a sight are framed in terms of what they imply about the viewer's identity. As we shall see, the rhetoric of these scenes invites the reader to identify with Agesilaus, but often simultaneously reveals such identification as politically problematic.

Agesilaus is often shown as controlling the visual responses of others.[46] He uses deceptive display to disempower his enemies. Although the Spartans and allies are visibly (φανεροί: 1.13) distressed after Tissaphernes tricks them, Agesilaus greets Tissaphernes' envoys with a beaming face (φαιδρῷ τῷ προσώπῳ: 1.13), informing them that he is grateful to Tissaphernes for his deception as it has caused the gods to support the Greeks.[47] Agesilaus deliberately manipulates the visual effect of his army. At Coronea, he arrays his army to face the enemy Greeks in full view (ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ ἀντιπαρέταττε: 2.6) and arms them so that they appear a solid mass of bronze and scarlet (ὥπλισέν τε οὕτως ὡς ἅπαντα μὲν χαλκόν, ἅπαντα δὲ φοινικᾶ φαίνεσθαι: 2.7). He inspires his men with rivalry against each other to appear the best (ἔτι δὲ φιλονικίαν ἐνέβαλε πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοῖς μετ' αὐτοῦ ὅπως ἕκαστοι αὐτῶν ἄριστοι φαίνοιντο: 2.8), a display which is directed not just externally at his Greek enemies but internally at his own men, to reinforce

44 Of the weight placed on the claim that Agesilaus did not stay in a house when travelling, Hirsch 1985: 54 notes 'Xenophon's protestations here are excessive'. He reads this passage as indicating that Xenophon is contradicting a rumour of scandal.

45 Compare 2.27: ἄξια θαύματος διεπράξατο ('he did things worthy of wonder').

46 In his defeat of the Persians, 'he caused those who had previously thought themselves worthy to enjoy the privileges of gods to be unable to return the gaze of the Greeks ...' (τοὺς δὲ ἀξιοῦντας καὶ τὰς τῶν θεῶν τιμὰς καρποῦσθαι, τούτους ποιήσας μηδ' ἀντιβλέπειν τοῖς Ἕλλησι δύνασθαι: 1.34).

47 Elsewhere Agesilaus' reversal of expected appearances is a sign of his virtue: εἴθιστο δὲ φοβούμενος μὲν ἱλαρὸς φαίνεσθαι, εὐτυχῶν δὲ πρᾷος εἶναι ('he was accustomed to look cheerful when in fear, but to be humble when successful': 11.2). Compare the unexpected countenance of Spartans faced with disaster in the *Hellenica*: 'like victors with shining countenances' (ὥσπερ νικηφόροι λαμπροί: 4.5.10) and 'bright and beaming' (λιπαροὺς καὶ φαιδρούς: 6.4.16). Such reversals indicate moral superiority, but also strangeness.

their obedience. Agesilaus also inculcates obedience through personal display. As evidence of his love of his country (φιλόπολις: 7.1), we are told that although Agesilaus was the most powerful man in the state he was visible (φανερὸς: 7.2) in being a servant to the laws. This statement is immediately followed by the explanation: 'for who would wish to disobey when he saw the king obeying?' (τίς γὰρ ἂν ἠθέλησεν ἀπειθεῖν ὁρῶν τὸν βασιλέα πειθόμενον; 7.2). The visibility of Agesilaus, which initially seems to be offered to the reader as a sign of his virtue, is also shown as a means of garnering power over his subjects. Agesilaus' self-conscious manipulation of his visual effect problematises the reliability of the text's visual presentation as unmediated testimony, and therefore the reader's relationship to it.

The language of display is also used to suggest Agesilaus' manipulation of responses to events. When Tissaphernes tricks him, we are told:

> Τισσαφέρνην μὲν ἐμφανίσας ἐπίορκον ἄπιστον πᾶσιν ἐποίησεν, ἑαυτὸν δ' ἀντεπιδείξας πρῶτον μὲν ὅρκους ἐμπεδοῦντα, ἔπειτα συνθήκας μὴ ψευδόμενον, πάντας ἐποίησε καὶ Ἕλληνας καὶ βαρβάρους θαρροῦντας συντίθεσθαι ἑαυτῷ, εἴ τι βούλοιτο. (1.12)
>
> By revealing Tissaphernes as a breaker of oaths he made him distrusted by all, whereas by displaying himself as someone who after swearing oaths does not break his agreements, he encouraged everyone, Greeks and barbarians alike, to make agreements with him whenever he wished.

An apparent failure, as Agesilaus is outmanoeuvred by a wily adversary, is transformed into a coup in the tactics of appearance. However, when Agesilaus goes on to trick Tissaphernes in his turn, we are told:

> στρατηγικὸν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐδόκει διαπράξασθαι, ὅτι ἐπεὶ πόλεμος προερρήθη καὶ τὸ ἐξαπατᾶν ὅσιόν τε καὶ δίκαιον ἐξ ἐκείνου ἐγένετο, παῖδα ἀπέδειξε τὸν Τισσαφέρνην τῇ ἀπάτῃ. (1.17)
>
> This also seemed to be an act of good generalship, that when war had been declared and deception was for this reason sanctioned and just, he displayed Tissaphernes as a child in deception.

The way that things are to be interpreted is manipulated not just by Agesilaus himself but by the narrator, who frames all of Agesilaus' actions as signs of his virtue and success, even those which seem mutually exclusive. Yet the narrator's apology for Agesilaus' deceit—that it was now moral to deceive because open warfare had been declared—far from wiping out all traces of contradiction,[48] draws attention to the tricky rhetoric of the argument, where every twist and turn is marshalled in the service of praise.

[48] See Hesk 2000: 122–142 on *Cyr.* 1.6.27–34 and Azoulay 2004b: 155 on *Oec.* 10.8.

Display is involved not only in the construction of power but in cultural positioning, when Agesilaus provides a spectacle of defeated enemies in Ephesus for his troops:

> ἡγούμενος δὲ καὶ τὸ καταφρονεῖν τῶν πολεμίων ῥώμην τινὰ ἐμβαλεῖν πρὸς τὸ μάχεσθαι, προεῖπε τοῖς κήρυξι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν λῃστῶν ἁλισκομένους βαρβάρους γυμνοὺς πωλεῖν. ὁρῶντες οὖν οἱ στρατιῶται λευκοὺς μὲν διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ἐκδύεσθαι, πίονας δὲ καὶ ἀπόνους διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ἐπ' ὀχημάτων εἶναι, ἐνόμισαν μηδὲν διοίσειν τὸν πόλεμον ἢ εἰ γυναιξὶ δέοι μάχεσθαι. (1.28)
>
> Considering that contempt for the enemy would inspire the strength to fight, he ordered his heralds to expose for sale naked those barbarians who had been captured by raiders. When his soldiers saw them on the one hand white from never stripping, and on the other fat and flabby from always going in carriages, they considered that the war would not be any different from fighting with women.

The display is self-consciously revealed as intended to manipulate its audience. The soldiers enact their dominance over the prisoners through their gaze, but also enact their obedience to Agesilaus, whose power is bolstered through their readiness to see the spectacle in the way that he wishes it to be seen. Responses to the display are value laden and culturally determined. The Greek soldiers do not just see the white, fat or flabby bodies of the prisoners, but see their failure to strip, their propensity for carriages, and their femininity: the explanatory διά clauses appear to be focalised through the eyes of the soldiers. In their sight not just of the prisoners' bodily condition but the causes of it, they see the prisoners' 'otherness', their cultural difference—a difference which is also gendered. The Greeks' gaze at the barbarian prisoners' bodies formulates the masculinity, and the Greekness, of the viewers.

Similar processes are at work in a passage which compares the life and style of rule of Agesilaus with that of the Persian king.[49] The first point of comparison between them is that:

> πρῶτον ⟨μὲν⟩ γὰρ ὁ μὲν τῷ σπανίως ὁρᾶσθαι ἐσεμνύνετο, Ἀγησίλαος δὲ τῷ ἀεὶ ἐμφανὴς εἶναι ἠγάλλετο, νομίζων αἰσχρουργίᾳ μὲν τὸ ἀφανίζεσθαι πρέπειν, τῷ δὲ εἰς κάλλος βίῳ τὸ φῶς μᾶλλον κόσμον παρέχειν. (9.1)
>
> First of all, [the Persian king] was proud of rarely being seen, whereas Agesilaus delighted in being continuously visible, considering that being unseen is fitting for shameless conduct, but that light was rather an adornment of a life of nobility.

[49] See Higgins 1977: 79.

As in the description of Agesilaus' sleeping habits, a moral slant is placed on visibility; just the fact of being seen takes on meaning.[50] However, visibility is not just made moral, but political: being seen makes Agesilaus the opposite of the Persian king. The implicit claim of the comparison seems to be that Agesilaus represents a paradigm of Greekness. However, although the passage insists on the difference between Agesilaus and the Persian king, the rhetoric of contrast poses them as counterparts: through being compared, their parallel roles as objects of curiosity are stressed. On a scale of visual accessibility, the Persian and Spartan kings occupy opposite yet equally extreme points. In his absolute availability to view, Agesilaus risks appearing almost as much of an exotic oddity as the Persian king.

In another passage, being Greek is shown as a matter both of how one presents oneself, and of how one responds to display. As mentioned above, as evidence of Agesilaus' Philhellenism (φιλέλληνα: 7.4), we are told that when he was informed that only eight Lacedaimonians but ten thousand Corinthian enemies had fallen at the battle of Corinth, he displayed no pleasure (οὐκ ἐφησθεὶς φανερὸς ἐγένετο: 7.5), but exclaimed 'Alas, oh Hellas' (Φεῦ ⟨σου⟩, ὦ Ἑλλάς), saying that those who had died would have been enough to defeat all the barbarians (7.5). This is followed by a similar anecdote about Agesilaus' attitude to the destruction of Greeks at a later point in the Corinthian War. However, strangely, in this latter episode Agesilaus is himself involved in an attack on Corinth: we are told that when the Corinthian exiles on whose side he was fighting informed him that the city was about to be taken, and displayed (ἐπιδεικνύντων: 7.6) to him the siege-engines with which they hoped to capture the walls, he refused to attack, saying that if our own people (ἡμῶν αὐτῶν: 7.6) are annihilated, we risk lacking men 'with whom we can conquer the barbarians' (μεθ' ὅτου τῶν βαρβάρων κρατήσομεν: 7.6).

These responses are presented as the proper responses of a Greek: the passage containing these anecdotes is introduced with the phrase εἴ γε μὴν αὖ καλὸν Ἕλληνα ὄντα φιλέλληνα εἶναι ('if it is good as a Greek to love the Greeks …': 7.4), and informs us that Agesilaus treated victory in war against Greeks as a disaster (συμφορὰν νομίζοντα τὸ νικᾶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ἕλληνας πολέμῳ: 7.4). Agesilaus identifies with the Corinthians, encompassing them in the collective 'us' (ἡμῶν: 7.6), which he earlier names as 'Greece' (Φεῦ ⟨σου⟩, ὦ Ἑλλάς), and imagines in opposition to 'the barbarians'.

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50 However, Agesilaus' avoidance of self-display is claimed as proof of his modesty when he refuses to have a statue of himself erected (11.7).

The language of Greek-barbarian opposition, familiar from the opening section of the text describing Agesilaus' anti-Persian campaigns, is followed up as the argument continues. The phrase which opens this passage, 'if it is good as a Greek to love the Greeks …' (εἴ γε μὴν αὖ καλὸν Ἕλληνα ὄντα φιλέλληνα εἶναι …: 7.4), is paired with the phrase 'if it is good to hate the Persians …' (εἰ δ' αὖ καλὸν καὶ μισοπέρσην εἶναι …: 7.7), in order to begin a new section which reintroduces Agesilaus' actions in Asia. The crimes of the Persian king are listed—in earlier times he tried to enslave Greece, and now he allies himself and gives gifts to those who do most harm to the Greeks (δωρεῖται δ' ἐκείνοις οὓς ἂν νομίζῃ λαβόντας πλεῖστα κακὰ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ποιήσειν: 7.7) and he negotiates the peace agreement ἐξ ἧς ἂν ἡγῆται μάλιστα ἡμᾶς ἀλλήλοις πολεμήσειν ('by which he might most easily lead us to make war on each other': 7.7).

These crimes are presented as visually accessible: 'everyone can see these things, but who except Agesilaus has ever done anything about them?' (ὁρῶσι μὲν οὖν ἅπαντες ταῦτα· ἐπεμελήθη δὲ τίς ἄλλος πώποτε πλὴν Ἀγησίλαος; 7.7). Agesilaus is included in the 'everyone', becoming not only one of 'us' (note ἡμᾶς: 7.7), looking at the Persians just as 'we' look, but the 'one of us' whose reaction is offered as a model. The spectacle of Agesilaus as an ideal Greek in his response to Greek slaughter is matched by a spectacle of Persian crime to which, again, Agesilaus alone offers the right, truly Greek, response.

However, the rhetoric of this passage strikes an odd note. Earlier, Agesilaus has been depicted as overjoyed by victory over fellow Greeks in Thessaly (μάλα ἡδόμενος τῷ ἔργῳ: 2.5). The return to Agesilaus' anti-Persian wars not long after a description of his attack on fellow Greeks both distracts attention from the reality of his violence against Greeks and simultaneously draws attention to it, by throwing into high relief the jarring distinction between his two areas of warfare. The listing of instigation of war between Greeks as a Persian, anti-Greek, crime makes the claim that Agesilaus' manner of prosecuting such war manifests his pro-Greek sympathies appear rather strained. The claim that 'everyone can see' the crimes of Persia attempts to draw the reader into a passive, complicit relationship with the text's rhetoric, recognising the Persians as utterly foreign opponents, and therefore by contrast acknowledging Agesilaus as a champion of Greekness. The text's claims of what can be seen become not just a strategy of rhetorical manipulation, but also of political manipulation.

The problem of how to look at and respond to Agesilaus is taken up in a further passage, which both allows and circumvents the possibility that seeing Agesilaus may be a problematic or alienating experience. In stark contrast to the rhetoric of visibility at play throughout the majority

of the text, Agesilaus' visual obscurity and trickiness is also stressed: 'For he used night as if it were day, and day as if it were night, and he often was invisible/unclear in relation to where he was, where he was going and what he was doing' (*καὶ γὰρ νυκτὶ μὲν ὅσαπερ ἡμέρᾳ ἐχρῆτο, ἡμέρᾳ δὲ ὅσαπερ νυκτί, πολλάκις ἄδηλος γιγνόμενος ὅπου τε εἴη καὶ ὅποι ἴοι καὶ ὅ τι ποιήσοι*: 6.6). The difference is that the audience of his visual trickery is specified as enemies, against whom he practised deception (ἐξαπατῶν: 6.5) and concealment (λήθων: 6.5): 'he practised all the opposite methods with enemies to those he practised with friends' (πάντα δὲ τἀναντία πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἢ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἐπιτηδεύων: 6.5).

This deceptive Agesilaus, whom it is difficult to see clearly, is transformed into the subject of praise, as his visual trickery is presented as a display of *sophia*: 'Which of his deeds do not display his cleverness / wisdom?' (Τήν γε μὴν σοφίαν αὐτοῦ ποῖαι τῶν ἐκείνου πράξεων οὐκ ἐπιδεικνύουσιν; 6.4). However, he is praised not only by his friends but also, oddly, by his enemies. The enemies are first described as 'unable to find fault with him, although they were forced to hate him' (τούς γε μὴν πολεμίους εἶχε ψέγειν μὲν οὐ δυναμένους, μισεῖν δὲ ἀναγκαζομένους: 6.5). However, in a sudden change of tack, their responses are marshalled into becoming one voice in a general chorus of praise and love:

> ὥστε ἀκαταφρόνητος μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν διετέλεσεν, ἀζήμιος δ' ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν, ἄμεμπτος δ' ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων, πολυεραστότατος δὲ καὶ πολυεπαινετώτατος ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων. (6.8)
>
> The result was that he succeeded in never being despised by his enemies, never being punished by the citizens, and never being blamed by his friends, but was most greatly loved and most greatly praised by all of mankind.

Through the distinctions drawn between the manner of Agesilaus' self-presentation to friends and enemies, the viewer's experience of seeing Agesilaus is made dependent on his or her relationship to him; yet all viewings of him, from whatever side, end in praise. The repeated insistence that in order to know about Agesilaus we must simply look, and the declaration that looking can only lead to praise, are framed as rhetorically manipulative as it becomes apparent that looking at Agesilaus is not always straightforward, but may be a puzzling, alienating experience. The passage attempts to smooth over and obscure political difference, as enemies respond in the same way as friends. Viewing is presented as an analytical process of evaluation (for the enemy, seeing Agesilaus involves discerning where he is, where he is going and what he is doing), but the text attempts to close down the effective force of evaluative sight so that only the praiseworthiness of

Agesilaus can be seen. Yet the representation of Agesilaus as elusive and stealthy might evoke a more dubious response: the description of Agesilaus as advancing quietly like the most modest virgin (ἡσύχως δ' ὥσπερ ἂν παρθένος ἡ σωφρονεστάτη προβαίνοι: 6.7) might recall the response of the Greeks at Ephesus to the exotic and sensual bodies of the naked barbarians—that fighting against such men would be like fighting with women.

Conclusion

In this discussion I have argued that the *Agesilaus* is a much more subtle and sophisticated text than has previously been recognised, and that, through the problematic nature of its rhetorical engagement with and claims about Greek identity, it allows us insight into the complexities of fourth-century Greek self-consciousness. We have seen not only that viewing and display are an important theme of the *Agesilaus* but also that, through the text's self-conscious invocation of the reader as a viewer of the events and characteristics described, the representation of viewing impacts on the reader's relationship to Agesilaus. The self-positioning involved in the production of this relationship means that scenes of viewing challenge the reader's conception of him- or herself as Greek.

The narratorial voice, which insists upon the paradigmatic status of Agesilaus as ideal Greek, also undercuts its own authority, inviting a more critical engagement with its assertions. The repeated claim that the reader can see the truth of what the text describes both assumes and provokes the reader's doubt. In impersonal statements about what can be seen, the implications of the reader's viewing are ambiguous: the reader is encouraged to consider his or her response to scenes of Greek unity but also of Greek violence.

The rhetorical appeal to the reader to look at and believe what is described makes the implicit claim that sight provides unmediated access to knowledge. However, in the text's scenes of viewing, such a claim is revealed as coercive, as the manipulative nature of visual display is made clear: Agesilaus displays his army and his person as a means of acquiring power over his viewers. Further, scenes of viewing are involved in the construction of identity: how one responds to a sight is made dependent on and indicative of the viewer's political relationship to the object of sight. How his viewers see Agesilaus and his displays is determined by and determines their identity. These scenes reflect back on the text's displays to the reader: we are made aware of the cultural expectations which control

the act of viewing. What is it that the reader will 'see' in the displays of Agesilaus? The text claims that particular forms of response to a sight are those of an ideal Greek; yet it also invites a more sceptical engagement with those sights.

We began by asking if the *Agesilaus* should be read as a Panhellenist text. We have seen that in its keen interest in what it means to be Greek, the *Agesilaus* must indeed be understood as participating in this discourse. However, we have also seen the complex, self-reflexive nature of Panhellenist thought: the text reveals the difficulties, ambiguities and manipulations of Panhellenism as much as its political potential. The convoluted, slippery logic of its persuasive rhetoric betrays a sense of anxiety about what it means to be Greek in this troubling period. The text challenges the reader to reconsider his or her relationship to the problematic figure of Agesilaus, and therefore his or her own identity as Greek. The problem of whether the reader will identify with or be alienated from Agesilaus becomes a problem of determining what it means, at this time, to see (and read) 'as a Greek'.

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE NATURE AND STATUS OF *SOPHIA* IN THE *MEMORABILIA*[*]

Louis-André Dorion

In Book Four of the *Memorabilia*, when he responds to Socrates' question whether he knows what 'good things' are, Euthydemus mentions health (4.2.31) and *sophia* (4.2.33). Socrates has no difficulty in demonstrating to him that health is ambivalent, since it can be helpful or harmful to its possessor, and Socrates analyzes *sophia* similarly. This cannot but startle us, insofar as one might have thought that Xenophon's Socrates would accord the same status to *sophia* as Plato's Socrates does, that of an absolute good which could never be shown as harmful or disadvantageous to its possessor.[1] The question obviously arises whether the position Socrates expresses in 4.2 is indeed his final word on the status of *sophia*, or whether it is not, rather, merely an *aporia*, in the sense that Socrates is content to raise a difficulty that he submits to Euthydemus in order to see if the latter is capable of resolving it. The objective of this paper, therefore, is to determine the status and nature of *sophia* in the ethical thought of Xenophon's Socrates in light of all the pertinent texts.[2]

The Ambivalence of *sophia*

Let us examine in greater detail the passage in *Memorabilia* 4.2 where Socrates objects to the idea that *sophia* is to be considered a good pure and

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[*] A first version of this paper appeared in French in 2008, under the title 'La nature et le statut de la *sophia* dans les *Mémorables*,' in *Elenchos* 29: 253–277. For the present version (prepared in French and now presented in an English translation by W.E. Higgins), I have taken into account the recent study of D.R. Morrison 2010. I am grateful for, and have profited greatly from, the comments David M. Johnson kindly offered following a first draft of this paper.—Translations of Xenophon are by Marchant (*Memorabilia*), Todd (*Symposium*, *Apology*) or Miller (*Cyropaedia*), sometimes with slight modification.

[1] Compare Johnson 2005: 67: 'Euthydemus' next suggestion (sc. *sophia*) is even more promising, and Socrates' quick rejection of it appears more problematic.'

[2] Of the term *sophia*'s thirty-three appearances in the corpus of Xenophon, twenty-three occur in the *Memorabilia*, and it is likewise the only text that expressly poses the question of the nature and status of *sophia*. This paper focuses, therefore, principally on the *Memorabilia*, but will refer to other texts of Xenophon as well whenever they seem relevant.

simple, an absolute good. Socrates counters by saying that men who were renowned for their wisdom, like Daedalus and Palamedes, suffered great evils by very reason of their *sophia*:

> [Euthydemus] But wisdom (σοφία) now, Socrates,—that at any rate is indisputably a good thing (ἀναμφισβητήτως ἀγαθόν); for what is there that a wise man (σοφός) would not do better than a fool?—[Socrates] Indeed! have you not heard how Daedalus was seized by Minos because of his wisdom (διὰ τὴν σοφίαν), and was forced to be his slave, and was robbed of his country and his liberty, and essaying to escape with his son, lost the boy and could not save himself, but was carried off to the barbarians and again lived as a slave there?—That is the story, of course.—And have you not heard the story of Palamedes? Surely, for all the poets sing of him, how that he was envied for his wisdom (σοφίαν) and done to death by Odysseus.—Another well-known tale!—And how many others, do you suppose, have been kidnapped on account of their wisdom (διὰ σοφίαν), and hauled off to the Great King's court, and live in slavery there? (4.2.33)

This passage prompts the following observations:

(a) The mythical figures Daedalus and Palamedes[3] are renowned for their technical, not their ethical *sophia*. Daedalus and Palamedes are indeed famous for their technical discoveries and inventions, and that is precisely why Daedalus had to serve Minos and why the Great King kept other men enslaved.

(b) Socrates does not maintain that *sophia* is susceptible, like health or strength (cf. 4.2.32), to good or bad use, but that the possession of technical *sophia* can sometimes harm its possessor. Is that to say that Socrates denies one can misuse *sophia*, whether it is of a technical or moral nature? Since the present passage does not permit a resolution of this important question, I will leave it hanging for the moment.

(c) Section 33 occurs within an exposition (sections 31–35) that has often been linked to a passage in Plato's *Euthydemus* (278e–281e). There are, unquestionably, several overlaps between the two. Indeed, in each text Socrates demonstrates to his interlocutor (Clinias in the *Euthydemus*) that the good things most commonly recognized as such, like wealth, health, beauty, noble birth, power, and honours (cf. *Euthydemus* 279a–b), can sometimes be useful to their possessor, but sometimes harmful. So it does

[3] On the *sophia* of Palamedes, cf. also *Cyn.* 1.11: 'Palamedes far outstripped the men of his generation in wisdom (σοφίᾳ) while he lived.'

not seem that these alleged goods are absolute goods, since they can sometimes injure the one who has them. The case of *sophia* allows us to assess all that differentiates the argument of sections 31–35 from the argument of the *Euthydemus*, despite appearances which, once more, prove deceptive. In Xenophon, *sophia* is no different from any other goods to the extent that it is susceptible of advantaging or disadvantaging the one exercising it, just like bodily and external goods.[4] In the *Euthydemus*, not only does Socrates never entertain the possibility that *sophia* may sometimes cause its possessor harm, he even makes it the condition of the other goods' usefulness and beneficence. For the Socrates of the *Euthydemus*, it is understood that *sophia* is always good and profitable, and that it serves as the basis and condition of the usefulness of the other alleged goods, such as bodily and external goods. Provided one knows in what the true usefulness of wealth, health, beauty, noble birth, etc., consists, one will never misuse them. With Xenophon, *sophia* never plays this role of basis or guarantor vis-à-vis other goods,[5] and the only thing that can play this role (although there is absolutely no mention of it in the present passage) is *enkrateia* (cf. 1.5.4; 4.5.11). This major difference between Xenophon and Plato concerning *sophia* arises, perhaps—and this is the hypothesis I propose to explore—from the fact that Xenophon does not conceive of *sophia* right from the start as a moral knowledge but most often as a technical ability.[6] If *sophia* is knowledge of the good, as it is for Plato, it would be a contradiction if one could use it badly, whereas if *sophia* is simply a technical knowledge, it is easily understandable that this type of ability is susceptible to good or bad use. The question of *sophia*'s status is closely tied to that of its nature: if *sophia* is the knowledge of the good or the bad, it cannot have the same status as ambivalent 'goods' or technical abilities, while if it is nothing more than one technical ability among others, it will be susceptible to the same type of ambivalence that affects technical abilities.

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4 Compare Johnson 2005: 67: 'Here we enter on ground untouched by Plato's Socrates, the claim that wisdom itself is not always good.'

5 Despite the numerous overlaps between the *Euthydemus* and *Memorabilia* 4.2.31–35, it seems impossible to me to determine with certainty whether (a) Xenophon is seeking to correct the position Plato defends in the *Euthydemus* or (b) on the contrary, it is Plato who is arguing against the position Xenophon gives Socrates in the *Memorabilia*, or (c) Plato and Xenophon are both referring to a third text, now lost.

6 Cf. Johnson 2005: 68: 'The problem with the argument Xenophon has Socrates advance here [*scil.* 4.2.33] is that the sort of wisdom involved in the examples is not the moral knowledge which Socrates aims for, but rather some technical skill.' My position differs from Johnson's in that I do not think that *sophia*, for Xenophon's Socrates, is above all a moral knowledge. So, in my eyes, there is nothing 'problematic' in the argument of 4.2.33.

The first passages we have to consider, in the hope of determining the nature and status of *sophia*, are those immediately following 4.2.33, where Socrates once more discusses *sophia* in Euthydemus's company. Taking as a given, once Euthydemus has recognized his total ignorance at the end of 4.2, that Socrates has decided to torment him no longer and to reveal clearly and simply to him all that he needs to know (4.2.40), one can indeed hope that Socrates, in his conversations with Euthydemus after 4.2, will finally lift the veil on *sophia*'s nature and status. There are two passages after 4.2 where Socrates deals with *sophia* again. The first comes in 4.5, when *enkrateia* is the principal topic of discussion. Apropos of *sophia* Socrates makes this important assertion:

> [Socrates] As for wisdom, the greatest blessing (σοφίαν δέ, τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν), does not incontinence (ἡ ἀκρασία) exclude it and drive men to the opposite? Or don't you think that incontinence prevents them from attending to useful things and understanding them, by drawing them away to things pleasant, and often so stuns their perception of good and evil (αἰσθανομένους τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ τῶν κακῶν) that they choose the worse instead of the better? (4.5.6)

The position elaborated in this passage, and elsewhere in the *Memorabilia*, is that *enkrateia* is the necessary condition for acquiring knowledge.[7] That *sophia* is expressly characterized as 'the greatest good' (τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν) is obviously not insignificant, and one might be tempted to think that such an assertion settles once and for all the question of *sophia*'s status: if *sophia* is the greatest good, how could it be an ambivalent good? Moreover, since the absence of *sophia*, which is itself a consequence of a lack of *enkrateia*, causes a muddled perception of good and bad things, must it not follow that *sophia* is fundamentally a knowledge of the good and the bad, and that it alone can make us unerringly to choose the good? A similar conception of *sophia* seems to arise in another passage (3.9.4–5) which I will examine later (see below, pp. 464–465). For now, we had better suspend judgment until we have examined all the relevant texts.

The second passage is much more developed, since here Socrates, after having defined in succession piety (4.6.2–4) and justice (4.6.5–6) with Euthydemus, makes a similar effort to define *sophia*. Because of its importance, I cite this text in its entirety:

> [Socrates] And what of wisdom (σοφίαν)? How shall we describe it? Tell me, does it seem to you that the wise (σοφοί) are wise (σοφοί) about what they know, or are some wise (σοφοί) about what they do not know?—About what

[7] Cf. Dorion 2003: 648–650.

> they know, obviously; for how can a man be wise (σοφός) about the things he doesn't know?—The wise (σοφοί), then, are wise (σοφοί) by knowledge?—How else can a man be wise (σοφός) if not by knowledge?—Do you think that wisdom (σοφίαν) is anything but that by which men are wise (σοφοί)?—No.—It follows that wisdom is knowledge (ἐπιστήμη ἄρα σοφία ἐστίν…)?—I think so.—Then do you think it possible for a man to know all things?—Of course not—nor even a fraction of them.—So an all-wise man (σοφόν) is an impossibility?—Of course, of course.—Consequently everyone is wise (σοφός) just in so far as he knows?—I think so. (4.6.7)

This text raises the interesting question whether man can attain to and acquire *sophia*. At first glance, the answer Socrates gives here accords with what is likewise found in Plato: *sophia* is unattainable by man. For Plato's Socrates, *sophia* is the privilege of the gods, and for this reason it is unattainable by man, who must be content with aspiring to knowledge and *sophia* by means of *philosophia*. *Sophia* is therefore not divisible: it is one and it is unattainable. Xenophon's Socrates, on the other hand, thinks that the *sophia* of all things is what is unattainable by man, but this still does not entail that *sophia* is denied to man, because there are as many individual *sophiai* as there are individual fields of endeavour where one can be capable or knowledgeable. One can, therefore, attain a *sophia* in a particular area, and the *sophia* of all things, which is denied to man, would be, in fact, a sort of cumulative *sophia*, that is to say, the sum of all particular *sophiai*. *Sophia* thus appears to be divisible, while it is not so for Plato. The conception of *sophia* as a specific knowledge bearing upon a particular area is opposed to the conception of *sophia* as the knowledge of all things.[8] Xenophon's Socrates thus defends a conception of *sophia* that clearly deflates the conception of those who consider it a universal knowledge. It is likewise significant that this definition of *sophia* makes no reference to the good or the bad, or to the different virtues, which seems to confirm that *sophia* ought not be understood as a moral knowledge[9] right from the start and that it is often assimilated to one technical knowledge among others,[10] so that it can have

8 Cf. Arist. *Metaph.* 1.2, 982a8–10 and a21–25.

9 For a contrary view cf. Morrison 2010: 238: 'Wisdom is a single virtue (and not merely a genus), namely knowledge of the beautiful and good.' I am not convinced by Morrison's recent attempt to show, against my interpretation, that *sophia* is knowledge of the good and the bad. No passage in the *Memorabilia* expressly recognizes that the good and the bad constitute the objects of *sophia*, and Morrison does not pay sufficient attention to the fact that the *definition* of *sophia* at 4.6.7 is completely silent about the question of the good and the bad, as well as the different virtues.

10 This amoral conception of *sophia*, by virtue of which the *sophos* is a capable, skilled or insightful individual in a particular area, is similarly set forth in other works of Xenophon (cf.

neither a foundational dimension nor application. If someone is knowledgeable (σοφός) in respect of that which he knows (ὃ ἐπίσταται), it follows that there will be as many distinct *sophiai* as there are individual areas of knowledge. These *sophiai* will, for the most part, be technical *sophiai* situated on an equal footing, without any possibility of identifying one *sophia* dealing with what is good and bad which would thus have a foundational position with regard to the other *sophiai*.

There is undoubtedly a close connection between, on the one hand, the absence of a conception of *sophia* as a knowledge of the good and the bad, and, on the other hand, the repeated presence in the *Memorabilia* of a relativistic conception of the good.[11] Socrates, indeed, maintains that there is nothing that is good strictly speaking and that everything considered good is good for someone relative to something, so that one and the same thing can be at the same time good (for someone) and bad (for someone else). So there is no Good strictly speaking, that is, an unconditional Good that is good for all, in all circumstances and on all occasions, nor can there be a *sophia* understood as knowledge of the Good. Assuming that all knowledge is knowledge of something, the absence or non-existence of an object necessarily entails the impossibility of the knowledge that would relate to it.

The following passage from the *Memorabilia* seems to me to confirm the interpretation I have presented of the definition of *sophia* in 4.6.7:

> [Socrates] Tell me, Aristodemus, do you admire any human beings for wisdom (ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ)?—I do, he answered.—Tell us their names.—In epic poetry Homer comes first, in my opinion; in dithyramb, Melanippides; in tragedy, Sophocles; in sculpture, Polyclitus; in painting, Zeuxis. (1.4.2–3)

Socrates asks Aristodemus which men he admires for their *sophia*, without specifying what *sophia* is at issue or if he is thinking of a single, unique *sophia*. Aristodemus immediately responds by naming several men, each of whom excels in a particular field of endeavour, which tends to confirm that there are as many *sophiai* as there are distinct areas of expertise and that these *sophiai* do not have a basis in the moral faculties. This conception of *sophia*, understood as ability or excellence in a particular skill, notably in the arts, corresponds exactly to the usual meaning of the term *sophia* as Aristotle describes it and which he contrasts with a more exalted *sophia* that is a more comprehensive knowledge:

Oec. 20.5, *Symp.* 4.13, *Cyr.* 1.1.1, *Ages.* 6.4, 11.5, *Hier.* 5.1, *Hell.* 5.2.7, *Eq. mag.* 4.20, *Cyn.* 13.3). This skilfulness is sometimes even seen in dogs (*Cyn.* 3.7, 6.13).

[11] *Mem.* 3.8.2–3, 4.6.8.

> We ascribe wisdom in crafts (τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις) to the people who have the most exact expertise in the crafts (τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τὰς τέχνας), e.g. we call Phidias a wise stone-worker (λιθουργὸν σοφόν) and Polyclitus a wise bronze-worker, signifying nothing else by wisdom (τὴν σοφίαν) than excellence in a craft. But we also think some people are wise (σοφούς) in general (ὅλως), not wise in some [restricted] area (οὐ κατὰ μέρος), or in some other [specific] way (οὐδ' ἄλλο τι σοφούς) (*NE* 6.7, 1141a9–14: tr. Irwin)

Although Socrates does not expressly address the status of *sophia* in 4.6.7, the definition he gives, provided one draws all its inferences, necessarily entails that *sophia* is an ambivalent good, since nothing prevents either our using a technical competence badly[12] or its very possession from drawing down upon us numerous burdens, as happened with Daedalus, Palamedes, and the men whom the Great King kept in slavery. There is nothing contradictory in asserting that *sophia* is the greatest good for man (4.5.6) and yet is ambivalent; *sophia* is the greatest good insofar as it is indispensable to all the activities which secure man's livelihood and permit his prosperity,[13] but it is still ambivalent since all these *sophiai* can just as well harm man as serve him. The definition of *sophia* in 4.6.7, therefore, confirms that the ambivalent character of *sophia*, as affirmed by Socrates in 4.2.33, is not just an aporetic position Socrates develops with the sole purpose of testing Euthydemus's knowledge. There is a close connection between these two passages: we are dealing with the same two interlocutors, and, more important, the second passage (4.6.7) sets forth the definition of the subject (*sophia*) about which Socrates only questions Euthydemus in the first (4.2.33).

It remains for me to examine two other passages concerning *sophia*'s ambivalent character. The first is found in *Memorabilia* I, when Socrates has a conversation with Antiphon:

> [Socrates] Antiphon, it is common opinion among us in regard to beauty and wisdom (τὴν σοφίαν) that there is an honourable and a shameful way of bestowing them (ὁμοίως μὲν καλόν, ὁμοίως δὲ αἰσχρὸν διατίθεσθαι εἶναι). For to offer one's beauty for money to all comers is called prostitution; but we think it virtuous to become friendly with a lover who is known to be a man of honour. So is it with wisdom (καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως). Those who offer it to all comers for money are known as sophists, prostitutors of wisdom, but we think that he who makes a friend of one whom he knows to be gifted by nature, and teaches him all the good he can, fulfils the duty of a citizen and gentleman. (1.6.13)

12 *Mem.* 4.3.11.

13 For another way of interpreting in what sense *sophia* is 'the greatest good,' cf. Morrison 2010: 236.

What distinguishes Socrates from the sophists, in Socrates' own words, is not that the sophists have an apparent *sophia*, while Socrates' is genuine, but rather that the sophists traffic in their *sophia*[14]—that is what constitutes the shameful use of *sophia*—while Socrates communicates it *gratis* to those he desires to befriend. What distinguishes Socrates from the sophists is not the nature itself of the *sophia* he possesses, so much as the way he uses it. Moreover, it does not seem that the determining factor in deciding to traffic or not in *sophia* derives from the content or very nature of their respective *sophia*: *sophia*, the sophists' as well as Socrates', has the same status as any other knowledge in which one can decide to traffic or not. Is this passage yet another confirmation of *sophia*'s ambivalent character? Apparently not. Indeed, Socrates does not assert that one can use (χρῆσθαι) *sophia* well or poorly, as if *sophia* were capable of a good or bad use, but that one can arrange for or dispose of it (διατίθεσθαι) in an honourable (καλόν) or dishonourable (αἰσχρόν) fashion. What does this mean? The definition of the verb διατίθεσθαι is not 'to make use of' or 'to employ' something,[15] but rather 'to dispose' of something, in the sense of 'to convey'. *Sophia*, in the present passage, therefore, is not a knowledge one might use at will well or poorly, but instead a knowledge one might convey in an honourable or dishonourable manner. Accordingly, the ambivalence does not concern the nature of *sophia* itself, but only its mode of transmission, and the decision to transmit the *sophia* one way instead of another does not seem to follow from the *sophia* in question. In fact, it is *sōphrosunē* (or *enkrateia*) which determines Socrates' decision not to dispose of his *sophia* in a shameful manner, another way of saying refusing to sell it for money. He who practices *sōphrosunē* (or *enkrateia*) necessarily decreases his needs, and for that reason he is less dependent on money, since money's principal use is the fulfilment of desire and the satisfaction of need.[16]

The second passage is found in the *Symposium*:

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[14] Socrates faults the sophists for trafficking in their *sophia*, but he recognizes, nevertheless, that they do possess a *sophia*. Xenophon asserts, to the contrary, in the *Cynegeticus*, that no sophist has ever been or is 'wise' (οὐδὲ γὰρ σοφὸς αὐτῶν ἐγένετο οὐδεὶς οὐδ' ἔστιν: 13.8), so that he does not recognize any *sophia* in them. The opposition between these two texts is not, perhaps, a contradiction, but rather an opposition between Socrates' assessment of the sophists and Xenophon's more severe one.

[15] My French translation of this passage in the Budé edition of the *Memorabilia* (Dorion & Bandini 2000) is therefore faulty.

[16] The sequence *enkrateia*/indifference to money is reprised three times in Book One: 1.2.1–4 (*enkrateia*) and 1.2.5–7 (indifference to money); 1.5.1–5 (*enkrateia*) and 1.5.6 (indifference to money); 1.6.1–10 (*enkrateia*) and 1.6.11–14 (indifference to money). Compare also Xenophon's *Ap.* 16, where the same sequence appears.

> Well, answered Socrates, no one objects to telling what he considers the most valuable knowledge in his possession.—Very well, then, said Callias, I will now tell you what I take greatest pride in. It is that I believe I have the power to make men better.—How? asked Antisthenes. By teaching them some manual trade, or by teaching nobility of character?—The latter, if righteousness is the same thing as nobility (εἰ καλοκἀγαθία ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη).—Certainly it is, replied Antisthenes, and the least debatable kind (ἥ γε ἀναμφιλογωτάτη), too; for though courage and wisdom (σοφία) appear at times to work injury (βλαβέρα) both to one's friends and to the state, righteousness and unrighteousness never overlap at a single point. (3.3–4)

To be sure, it is not Socrates speaking here on *sophia*'s status, but I can see no serious reason to prevent us from thinking that Socrates would entirely agree with Antisthenes's assertion.[17] Indeed, Antisthenes is one of Socrates' closest companions, and the type of wealth in which he takes pride, and which consists in needing nothing (4.34–45), is in fact identical to that wealth and self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*) of Socrates seen in all of Xenophon's Socratic writings. Thus, *sophia* is not presented as an absolute good; justice is. Moreover, justice is not an absolute good insofar as it is a virtue, since courage, which is no less a virtue than justice, is mentioned along with *sophia* as something which can prove harmful. Antisthenes does not specify how or for what reason(s) *sophia* can sometimes prove harmful, but it is probably for the same reason Socrates sets forth in *Memorabilia* 4.2.33: *sophia* exposes its possessors to the envious and jealous who will not hesitate to enslave them in order to profit from their knowledge. The case of courage is certainly different because it is hard to see how its mere possession might prove harmful. One can indeed suppose that the harm derives from its exercise and not just from the mere fact of its possession.[18] A disciple of Xenophon's Socrates would therefore recognize the possibility of something Plato's Socrates refuses to admit, namely, that the practice of a virtue can sometimes prove harmful to the one practicing it.[19] Moreover, granting that courage is likewise a form of *sophia*,[20] Antisthenes would

[17] See Huss 1999: 184–185.

[18] One could just as well suppose that (a reputation for) courage might expose someone to being forced to fight by someone else (as Daedalus was forced to work for someone else). Even as *sophia* might harm its possessor if, because of it, he is forced to serve another's interests, so courage can be harmful to its possessor if he is compelled, because of his reputation as a courageous man, to fight for somebody else. I thank Christopher Tuplin for this interesting suggestion.

[19] Antisthenes would indeed share with Alcibiades the opinion that a courageous act can sometimes harm its perpetrator (cf. *Alc.* I 115b–c). Plato's Socrates, on the contrary, thinks that virtue is always good and useful.

[20] Cf. *Mem.* 3.9.5.

similarly recognize that the exercise of a moral *sophia* (knowledge of a virtue), if not the moral *sophia* itself, can be ambivalent because it can work to the disadvantage of the one exercising it. Here is a major difference with Plato's Socrates, who would never accept that the possession or exercise of a virtue can be harmful for the one possessing and/or exercising it.

Sophia and the Alleged Unity of the Virtues

One of the few passages in the *Memorabilia* where *sophia* seems to consist in a uniquely moral knowledge, which would not endow it with the status of a merely technical ability in a particular field of endeavour, is 3.9.5:[21]

> He said that justice and every other form of virtue is wisdom (σοφίαν). For just actions and all forms of virtuous activity are beautiful and good. He who knows the beautiful and good will never choose anything else, he who is ignorant of them cannot do them, and even if he tries, will fail. Hence the wise (τοὺς μὲν σοφούς) do what is beautiful and good, the unwise (τοὺς δὲ μὴ σοφούς) cannot and fail if they try. Therefore since just actions and all other forms of beautiful and good activity are done thanks to wisdom (σοφίᾳ),[22] it is clear that justice and every other form of virtue is wisdom (σοφία). (3.9.5)

This text can be related to a passage in Book Four, where *sophia* is similarly presented as a knowledge of what is beautiful, good, and just:

> [Socrates] Are you aware that some people are called slavish?—[Euthydemus] Yes.—To what do they owe the name, to knowledge (διὰ σοφίαν) or to ignorance?—To ignorance, obviously.—To ignorance of the smiths' trade, shall we say?—Certainly not.—Ignorance of carpentry perhaps?—No, not to that either.—Of cobbling?—No, to none of these: on the contrary, those who are skilled in such trades are for the most part slavish.—Then is this name given to those who are ignorant (τῶν ... μὴ εἰδότων) of the beautiful and good and just (τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια)?—That is my opinion.—Then we must strain every nerve to escape being slaves. (4.2.22–23)

We must recognize that *sophia* is clearly contrasted here with different technical abilities, since one can perfectly well possess these technical bodies of knowledge and still be 'slavish'; it is, indeed, the knowledge of the beautiful,

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21 Johnson 2005: 68 thinks that Xenophon was perfectly aware of the fallacious character of Socrates' argument in 4.2.33 and that the passages 3.9.4–5 and 4.5.6. confirm that *sophia* is a moral knowledge and not a technical ability: 'Xenophon elsewhere in the *Memorabilia* (3.9.4–5; cf. 4.5.6) is clear on the ultimate importance of wisdom.'

22 For reasons which I develop at length in the note accompanying my Budé translation of this passage (cf. Dorion 2011a: 91 n. 11) it seems to me necessary to adopt Reiske's correction (σοφίᾳ) rather than to follow the MSS reading (ἀρετῇ).

good, and just which 'frees' us from the servile state. *Sophia* here appears as a moral knowledge, but it is unquestionably split up and portioned out among diverse, individual kinds of knowledge to such an extent that, we recall, there is no single, unique knowledge of the beautiful, good, or just but only separate and distinct ways of knowing the *numerous* beautiful, good, or just things (τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια).[23]

If we may return to the text of 3.9.5, the conclusion of section 5 (ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πᾶσα ἀρετὴ σοφία ἐστί) repeats almost word for word the opening assertion of this same paragraph: justice and the other virtues consist in *sophia* (ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι). In the opinion of several commentators, section 5 sets forth the Xenophontic version of the paradox of the unity of the virtues.[24] If justice and all the other separate virtues are identified with *sophia*, it follows, apparently, that possessing *sophia* is sufficient to possess immediately, by that very fact, all the separate virtues. Put another way, since *sophia*, which is the basis of each of the separate virtues, is a knowledge that is one and indivisible, the possession of one virtue based on such a knowledge necessarily entails possession of the other virtues. I, however, do not believe that the argument of section 5 establishes the thesis of the unity of the virtues, or that this is even its intention. In order for *sophia* to serve as a basis for all the virtues, and thus to guarantee their unity, it must be a knowledge that is one and indivisible and that is fundamentally the same for all the virtues. Thus it is, for example, that the knowledge that serves as a basis for the separate virtues in Plato is a single knowledge, that of the good and the bad (cf. *Laches* 197e–199e). Since virtue is useful and enables doing what is good, if virtue consists in a knowledge, it cannot be ignorant of the good and the bad, since otherwise it would not ensure its being actually useful and at the service of the good. Unless we maintain that man's good is splintered and that it differs each time, depending on the virtue at issue—something Plato's Socrates refuses to accept—the knowledge of the good and the bad embodies in itself alone the knowledge that is essential to virtue.

[23] When he refers to 4.2.22, Morrison 2010: 233 presents *sophia* as 'the knowledge of the beautiful, good, and just that is opposed to slavishness', as if there were a single and identical *sophia* which would be the knowledge of the good and the beautiful; now, the definition of *sophia* in 4.6.7 and the use of the plural (τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια; cf. also 4.5.6; 4.5.11) lead one to understand, on the contrary, that it falls to each separate *sophia* to choose the goods that arise in its own sphere, so that there is not a single and identical *sophia* which would be the knowledge of the good and the beautiful.

[24] Cf. Zeller 1884: 134 n. 1, Luccioni 1953: 55 n. 5, Irwin 1974: 412, Devereux 1992: 788 n. 37, Vander Waerdt 1993: 42.

Now, we have no reason for thinking that *sophia*, for Xenophon's Socrates, is the knowledge of the good and the bad, or of any other object deriving from morality that would permit establishing the unity of the virtues. Remember that Xenophon's Socrates believes neither in the existence of an absolute Good nor, accordingly, in a unique *sophia* which would be the knowledge of it. It is revelatory, moreover, that his Socrates speaks very often of goods, in the plural,[25] rather than of *the* good. *Sophia* is certainly identified with knowledge (ἐπιστήμη ἄρα σοφία ἐστίν) in 4.6.7, but it seems to me quite indicative that Socrates does not make the effort to specify its object. In fact, granted that Socrates recognizes in 4.6.7 that one is knowledgeable only in respect of that which one knows, and that it is impossible to be knowledgeable in everything, *sophia* is nothing more, it seems, than a specific ability in a given area, whatever one that may be. In other words, *sophia* is a specific knowledge in a limited field of endeavour, which could derive just as well from varying technical expertise as from morality. Since *sophia*, for Xenophon's Socrates, is an ability limited to a given area, and not an all-encompassing, essentially moral, knowledge underpinning the ways of knowing in which the different virtues consist, we have no reason to see in section 5 the Xenophontic version of the Socratic thesis of the unity of the virtues. *Memorabilia* 4.6, concerned with defining the different virtues, seems to confirm this interpretation. Each of the virtues Socrates defines in Euthydemus's company is presented as a knowledge, but each time a specific and fragmentary knowledge that does not appear to rest upon a basis common to the entirety of the ways of knowing associated with the different virtues. Seen in this light, nothing then prevents possessing one virtue independently of the others, in short, being knowledgeable in one field of endeavour, as Socrates recognizes (cf. 4.6.7), but not in others. The *sophia* in which justice consists, namely, knowledge of the laws (cf. 4.6.6), is thus distinct from the individual *sophiai* in which piety (4.6.2–4) or courage (4.6.10–11) or any other virtue consist.[26] It is surely revelatory that *sophia* is

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[25] Cf. *Mem.* 4.2.23; 4.2.31: 'Well, said Socrates, I may assume, I take it, that you know what things are good and what are evil (τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά)?'

[26] See also Morrison 2010: 228–229, whose interpretation here accords with mine. Our interpretations diverge, however, on one important point, the relations *sophia* maintains with the other virtues. I disagree with Morrison especially over his interpretation of 3.9.4, where Xenophon asserts that Socrates σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν. Since he translates οὐ διώριζεν as 'he did not distinguish' (cf. 227, 228, 233, 234, 238), Morrison is inevitably led to assimilate *sophia* to *sōphrosunē* and to confer on it the status of a virtue: 'In *Mem.* III 9.4 Xenophon reports that Socrates did not distinguish wisdom and temperance. On Socrates' view, then, wisdom and temperance are in some sense the same virtue' (228). If one trans-

not only defined after piety (4.6.2–4) and justice (4.6.5–6), but that its definition does not refer to the virtues at all, as though *sophia* were a knowledge, if not foreign to, at least independent of morality when one is seeking to grasp what it is in itself. Thus we resolve the difficulty pointed out by commentators, who find it hard to understand how the (alleged) thesis of the unity of the virtues in 3.9.5 can be reconciled with the fact that the different virtues are the subject, in 4.6, of individual definitions and irreducible to one another.[27] As I have tried to show, the thesis of the unity of the virtues is actually absent in 3.9.5. All the virtues consist in *sophia*, as 3.9.5 affirms, but each time in a distinct form of *sophia*, and it is necessary, precisely, to wait until 4.6 for Socrates to determine, *for each virtue*, the form of *sophia*, or knowledge (*epistēmē*), indispensable to the virtue's acquisition and exercise.

Zeller has categorically rejected the interpretation that I have just set forth: 'The sense of this passage [*scil. Mem.* 4.6.7], as that of *Mem.* 3.9.4, is surely not that one could possess the knowledge in which one virtue resides while lacking that which constitutes another virtue; Socrates admits here, on the contrary, just like Plato's Socrates in the *Protagoras*, that where one virtue is found, all the virtues must be found, for all rest upon knowledge of the good.'[28] Zeller's position seems mistaken to me because it attributes to Xenophon's Socrates a thesis actually absent from the *Memorabilia*, namely, that all the virtues are founded upon knowledge of the good. Zeller is, however, more insightful when he remarks, in dismay, that 'the Socratic principle that all the virtues consist in one knowledge, he [*scil.* Xenophon] does not seem to accept'.[29]

The assertion of *Memorabilia* 3.9.5, wherein Socrates did not distinguish *sophia* from the various virtues, and each virtue consists in *sophia*, provides the main support for recognizing the presence, in the *Memorabilia*, of a *sophia* that is sometimes portrayed as a moral knowledge. It is equally important to emphasize that Xenophon affirms on several occasions that one cannot act contrary to one's moral knowledge,[30] from which it follows that it would also be impossible to choose to use well or ill the *sophia* in which each of the virtues consists. Put another way, *sophia* is not suscepti-

lates οὐ διώριζεν as 'he did not separate', there is no longer any reason for this assimilation and for thinking of *sophia* as a virtue. Compare Dorion 2011a: 90 n. 13.

[27] Devereux 1992: 788 n. 37, Vander Waerdt 1993: 42.

[28] Zeller 1884: 134 n. 1.

[29] Zeller 1884: 221.

[30] Cf. *Mem.* 3.9.4–5, 4.6.3, 4.6.6; Dorion 2003.

ble, when it consists in a moral knowledge, of being used judiciously or injudiciously, since the one who possesses *sophia* necessarily acts in conformity with its prescriptions. (Moral) *sophia* would therefore not be ambivalent with regard to the choice of how one uses it—it is not possible to choose to use it well or ill—but only with regard to its possession and, sometimes, its exercise, when the consequences of its exercise prove harmful to its possessor.[31] That said, Xenophon plainly recognizes that certain abilities, and not the least significant, are susceptible of being used injudiciously. This is especially so with political ability:

> Skill in speaking and efficiency in affairs (λεκτικοὺς καὶ πρακτικούς), therefore, and ingenuity, were not the qualities that he was eager to foster in his companions. He held that they needed first to acquire prudence (σωφροσύνην). For he believed that those qualities, unless accompanied by prudence (ἄνευ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν), increased in their possessors injustice and power for mischief. (4.3.1)

What guarantees the good use of political ability[32] is therefore not *sophia* but *sōphrosunē*.[33] One can see here further confirmation that *sophia* has no foundational role in Xenophon vis-à-vis the other virtues and most technical abilities; this belongs, rather, to *sōphrosunē*, understood as self-mastery.

Anthrōpinē sophia

The very last occurrence of the term *sophia* in the *Memorabilia* occurs at 4.7. Socrates encourages his companions to study different disciplines (geometry, astronomy, arithmetic, medicine) that will allow them to manage for themselves and to become more self-sufficient, but the pursuit of these disciplines in not to be carried beyond the point where they prove useful for daily life. In the final section of this chapter, Xenophon asserts:

> When anyone was in need of help that human wisdom (τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σοφίαν) was unable to give he (sc. Socrates) advised him to resort to divination; for he who knew the means whereby the gods give guidance to men concerning their affairs never lacked divine counsel. (4.7.10)

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[31] Such would be the case with the exercise of courage, as discussed above.

[32] The aptitude for speaking and conducting affairs (λεκτικοὺς καὶ πρακτικούς) corresponds to political ability (cf. 1.2.15, 2.9.4, 3.6.16, 4.2.1, 4.2.4, 4.2.6; Dorion and Bandini 2000: CCVI–CCVII). So there is not the slightest doubt that the teaching Socrates dispensed aimed at the formation of future political leaders, as he himself claims elsewhere (cf. 1.6.15).

[33] Cf. also 1.2.17: 'Socrates should have taught his companions prudence before politics (ἐχρῆν τὸν Σωκράτην μὴ πρότερον τὰ πολιτικὰ διδάσκειν τοὺς συνόντας ἢ σωφρονεῖν).' (tr. Marchant).

What Xenophon calls ‘human knowledge’ (*anthrōpinē sophia*) applies not only to each of the disciplines whose study Socrates recommends in 4.7, but also, more generally, to each of the various sorts of technical knowledge that man can acquire in different fields of endeavour (cf. 4.6.7). The expression *anthrōpinē sophia*, therefore, does not designate, as it does in Plato, man’s recognition of his own ignorance.

In Plato’s *Apology*, Socrates tries to clear up the misunderstanding that gained him the reputation, in his eyes undeserved, of being wise. He denies that he possesses *sophia* about the things of nature (20d–e), a *sophia* he specifically says is undoubtedly more than human,[34] clearly implying that only the gods possess the knowledge of these things. He nonetheless recognizes that he does possess a *sophia*, more precisely, a *sophia* peculiar to man:

> What has caused my reputation is none other than a certain kind of wisdom (διὰ σοφίαν τινά). What kind of wisdom (σοφίαν)? Human wisdom (ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία), perhaps. It may be that I really possess this …[35]

This human wisdom, the only one Socrates claims, consists in recognizing his ignorance about the most important matters. The *sophia* of Socrates is defined in relation to the gods not only because it is ‘human,’ contrasted to *sophia* pure and simple, which is an attribute of divinity, but also because it is divinity that has revealed to Socrates that he does possess a wisdom.[36] The *Apology* here accords with the *Alcibiades* on what seems to me a fundamental point: man cannot arrive at the knowledge of himself through his own means, because the mediation of another, divinity in this case, is indispensable to him for his self-knowledge.

Although the oracle declared him the wisest man, Socrates is not really proud of the human wisdom that is his:

> What is probable, gentlemen, is that in fact the god is wise (τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι) and that his oracular response meant that human wisdom (ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία) is worth little or nothing (ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενός).[37]

Not only does Socrates take no pride in the human wisdom setting him apart from other men, he does not even claim exclusive rights to it, since he considers this human wisdom to be, in fact, accessible to all men, so that anyone could be as knowledgeable as he: ‘and that when he (sc. the god)

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34 Cf. *Ap.* 20e1: μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον σοφίαν.

35 *Ap.* 20d (tr. Grube).

36 *Ap.* 20e, end.

37 *Ap.* 23a (tr. Grube).

says this man, Socrates, he is using my name as an example, as if he said: "This man among you, mortals, is wisest (σοφώτατος) who, like Socrates, understands that his wisdom is worthless (ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν)".'[38]

For Xenophon's Socrates, 'human knowledge' (*anthrōpinē sophia*) does not designate a moral knowledge,[39] here that of his own ignorance (cf. Plato, *Apology* 20d)—which is finally a trifle, according even to Plato's Socrates, compared to divine *sophia*[40]—but a positive ability accessible to human intelligence. One appreciates the distance separating this conception of *sophia* from that which Plato presents as the knowledge of the most important subjects—good, evil, the nature of the different virtues—a knowledge that is the attribute of the gods and to which, as their name indicates, *philosophers* aspire.[41]

Whereas Plato establishes a radical and marked opposition between *sophia* pure and simple, the attribute of the gods, and human *sophia*, Xenophon establishes a complementary relation between human *sophia* and the knowledge reserved to the gods. The principal aspects of this complementarity are already clearly defined from the opening paragraphs of the *Memorabilia* (1.1.6–9):

> Another way he had of dealing with intimate friends was this: if there was no room for doubt, he advised them to act as they thought best; but if the consequences could not be foreseen, he sent them to the oracle to inquire whether the thing ought to be done. Those who intended to control a house or a city, he said, needed the help of divination. For the craft of carpenter, smith, farmer or ruler, and the theory of such crafts, and arithmetic and economics and generalship might be learned and mastered by the application of human powers (ἀνθρώπου γνώμῃ); but the deepest secrets of these matters the gods reserved to themselves; they were dark to men. You may plant a field well; but you know not who shall gather the fruits: you may build a house well; but you know not who shall dwell in it: able to command, you cannot know whether it is profitable to command: versed in statecraft, you know not whether it

38 *Ap.* 23a–b (tr. Grube).

39 Morrison 2010: 233, 236 contends, on the contrary, that human wisdom is a virtue and a moral knowledge consisting in an 'ability to choose the good and avoid the bad' (236). But Morrison is insufficiently attentive to the occurrences of the expression ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία in the *Memorabilia* (4.7) and the other works of Xenophon (see below). A close examination of the occurrences of this expression reveals that ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία in each instance consists in a technical competence that is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for obtaining success in an undertaking that arises from a particular expertise (agriculture, medicine, seafaring, military science, etc.).

40 Ibid.; cf. also *Hp. Mai.* 289b, *Phdr.* 244d.

41 Cf. *Lys.* 218a–b, *Smp.* 204a, *Resp.* 5, 475b–c, *Phdr.* 278d.

> is profitable to guide the state: though, for your delight, you marry a pretty woman, you cannot tell whether she will bring you sorrow: though you form a party among men mighty in the state, you know not whether they will cause you to be driven from the state. If any man thinks that these matters are wholly within the grasp of the human mind (τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης γνώμης) and nothing in them is beyond our reason, that man, he said, is irrational. But it is no less irrational to seek the guidance of heaven in matters which men are permitted by the gods to decide for themselves by study: to ask, for instance, Is it better to get an experienced coachman to drive my carriage or a man without experience? Is it better to get an experienced seaman to steer my ship or a man without experience? So too with what we may know by reckoning, measurement or weighing. To put such questions to the gods seemed to his mind profane. In short, what the gods have granted us to do by help of learning, we must learn; what is hidden from mortals we should try to find out from the gods by divination: for to him that is in their grace the gods grant a sign. (1.1.6–9)

The expression ἀνθρωπίνη γνώμη, which is used twice in this lengthy passage, seems to me completely equivalent to ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία; indeed, it denotes all the kinds of knowledge available to man which promote, yet without guaranteeing it, the success of his technical activities (carpentry, architecture, metalworking, farming, seafaring, military science, politics, etc.). It is accessible to men, and it is likewise men's duty to learn all the skills indispensable to the conduct of certain activities, such as seafaring, military science, agriculture, etc.; but these technical bodies of knowledge, as important and as indispensable as they are, will never permit men to determine in advance the outcome of the enterprises initiated and carried out under the aegis of these sorts of technical knowledge. The outcome of an enterprise is in all cases what is most important (τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τούτοις: 1.1.8), and that is a knowledge the gods have reserved to themselves. That is precisely why men cannot trust exclusively to human knowledge for the conduct of their affairs and why they must call upon divination, in the hope that the gods will reveal to them how their projected undertaking will turn out. Where Plato conceives of *anthrōpinē sophia* as a type of self-aware *moral* ignorance that he opposes to the absolute knowledge of the gods, Xenophon proceeds, instead, to a division of labours between human *sophia* and divine knowledge. The former consists in technical bodies of knowledge that must be acquired in order to undertake certain activities, but this human *sophia* is not a necessary and sufficient condition for insuring an undertaking's success, since the gods have forever reserved to themselves knowledge of the future outcome of any human activity. Hence, recourse to divination is required in order to know in advance, provided the gods judge us worthy,

the result of an intended action.[42] The complementarity between human *sophia* and divination is evident not only in 1.1.6–9 and in 4.7.10, but also in two other passages of Xenophon where he uses expressions designating human *sophia*. Because of their interest, I think it worthwhile to cite them at length. They are found in the *Cyropaedia*:

> [Cyrus] But how could one become really wise in foreseeing that which will prove to be useful?—Obviously, my son, said he (sc. Cambyses), by learning all that is possible to acquire by learning, just as you learned tactics. But whatever it is not possible for man to learn, nor for human wisdom to foresee (οὔτε προορατὰ ἀνθρωπίνῃ προνοίᾳ), that you may find out from the gods by the soothsayer's art, and thus prove yourself wiser than others.
>
> (*Cyropaedia* 1.6.23)

> [Cambyses] Learn this lesson, too, from me, my son (sc. Cyrus), said he; it is the most important thing of all: never go into any danger either to yourself or to your army contrary to the omens or the auspices, and bear in mind that men choose lines of action by conjecture and do not know in the least from which of them success will come. But you may derive this lesson from the facts of history; for many, and men, too, who seemed most wise (οἱ δοκοῦντες σοφώτατοι), have ere now persuaded states to take up arms against others, and the states thus persuaded to attack have been destroyed. And many have made many others great, both individuals and states; and when they have exalted them, they have suffered the most grievous wrongs at their hands. And many who might have treated people as friends and done them favours and received favours from them, have received their just deserts from these very people because they preferred to treat them like slaves rather than as friends. Many, too, not satisfied to live contentedly in the enjoyment of their own proper share, have lost even that which they had, because they have desired to be lords of everything; and many, when they have gained the much coveted wealth, have been ruined by it. So we see that mere human wisdom (ἥ γε ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία) does not know how to choose what is best any more than if any one were to cast lots and do as the lot fell. But the gods, my son, the eternal gods, know all things, both what has been and what is and what shall come to pass as a result of each present or past event; and if men consult them, they reveal to those to whom they are propitious what they ought to do and what they ought not to do. But if they are not willing to give counsel to everybody, that is not surprising; for they are under no compulsion to care for any one unless they will.[43] (*Cyropaedia* 1.6.45–46)

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[42] Cf. *Mem.* 1.1.9: 'In short, what the gods have granted us to do by help of learning, we must learn; what is hidden from mortals we should try to find out from the gods by divination: for to him that is in their grace the gods grant a sign'.

[43] Should we be surprised that Cambyses expresses here a position that greatly recalls Socrates' in the *Memorabilia*? It is in fact quite common for Xenophon in different works to attribute to various key figures (Socrates, Antisthenes, Cyrus, Lycurgus, Agesilaus,

Divine knowledge, which is the knowledge of the future and an action's outcome, is therefore neither a moral nor a foundational knowledge; it is a purely factual knowledge, which Plato disdains because this knowledge of the future is in itself powerless to determine the good or bad character of what is going to result.[44]

In Plato's view, it is precisely the marked and radical opposition between *anthrōpinē sophia*, understood as the recognition of its own ignorance, and divine *sophia*, that permits the emergence of *philosophia*, insofar as the man who recognizes his own ignorance immediately aspires to the *sophia* which he recognizes he does not possess and the lack of which he feels. *Philosophia*, for Plato, is nothing other than this human aspiration to divine *sophia*. In the view of the *Memorabilia*, on the other hand, the very conception of *anthrōpinē sophia* takes from philosophy its justification and *raison d'être*. Since *anthrōpinē sophia* is not the recognition of its own ignorance but merely a technical ability in a particular field within everyone's reach, philosophy, understood as aspiration to the divine *sophia* that eludes us, has no *raison d'être*, since *sophia* is not unattainable by man and since divine knowledge, which Xenophon never describes as *sophia*,[45] is a knowledge that the gods have reserved to themselves (cf. 1.1.6–9) and to which it is therefore useless to aspire. Actually, when one reviews the different uses in Xenophon of the terms *philosophia*,[46] *philosophos*,[47] and *philosophein*,[48] one observes that philosophy is never described or presented as a discipline whose practice or acquisition Xenophon recommends. But if one understands that the wise man, in Xenophon, is not in search of divine *sophia*, is that to say that he has likewise renounced the ideal of assimilation to divinity? He does subscribe to this ideal, but it appears, in Xenophon, not in the form of an aspiration to divine *sophia*, but rather as a search for the self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*) that is the property of the gods:

> [Socrates] You seem, Antiphon, to imagine that happiness consists in luxury and extravagance. But my belief is that to have no wants is divine; to have

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Simonides) views he himself favours, without our being able to determine with certainty if these views are Socratic in origin.

44 Cf. *Chrm.* 173e–174a, *Lach.* 195e–196a.

45 Xenophon emphasizes on numerous occasions that the gods are omniscient (cf. *Mem.* 1.1.19, 1.4.17–18, *Symp.* 4.47–48, *An.* 7.7.39, *Eq. mag.* 9.9, *Cyr.* 1.6.46, 5.4.31), but this divine omniscience is never described as a *sophia*.

46 *Mem.* 1.6.2, 4.2.23, *Symp.* 1.5, 4.62.

47 *Mem.* 1.2.31, *Oec.* 16.9, *An.* 2.1.13, *Por.* 5.4, *Cyn.* 13.6.

48 *Mem.* 1.2.19, 1.6.2, 4.2.23, *Symp.* 8.39.

> as few as possible comes next to the divine; and as that which is divine is supreme, so that which approaches nearest to its nature is nearest to the supreme. (1.6.10)

Conclusion

Although it is a very great good,[49] *sophia* in Xenophon is never invested with the importance Plato's Socrates accords it in numerous dialogues. This relative devaluation of *sophia* in the *Memorabilia* and Xenophon's other Socratic writings is clearly discernible in two key passages where Xenophon stresses Socrates' principal virtues. The first comes in the *Apology*, when Xenophon reports the oracle's response concerning Socrates.[50] As several commentators have already emphasized, it is remarkable that the oracle does not mention *sophia* among the principal virtues that cause Socrates to stand out from the rest of men.[51] This absence of *sophia* is not to be interpreted as an implicit indication that Socrates is not *sophos*, since he leaves no doubt that he is capable in several areas, especially education,[52] and he does not hesitate to convey his knowledge of the areas where he is competent.[53] The second passage is no less significant than the first: I refer to the very last paragraph of the *Memorabilia* (4.8.11), when Xenophon, in one final encomium of his master, summarizes his principal virtues and qualities. Just as it does not appear among the virtues mentioned by the oracle, so too *sophia* does not appear in the long catalogue of 4.8.11,[54] where Xenophon for the last time stresses the qualities and virtues that have made of Socrates an exceptional man, the *nonpareil*. The absence of *sophia* in these two key passages highlights all the more by contrast the presence and importance in them of self-mastery. This contrast prompts me, in conclusion, to propose the following hypothesis: self-mastery is the

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49 *Mem.* 4.5.6.

50 *Ap.* 14: 'Once on a time when Chaerephon made inquiry at the Delphic oracle concerning me, in the presence of many people Apollo answered that no man was more free than I, or more just, or more prudent (μήτε ἐλευθεριώτερον μήτε δικαιότερον μήτε σωφρονέστερον).'

51 'So when Xenophon modifies Plato's formulation, it is not because, out of prudence, he wants to avoid the mention of *sophia* but because, according to his views, *sophia* is just one among the virtues of Socrates, and not even the most important one' (Strycker 1994: 77). Cf. also Vander Waerdt 1993: 39–41, Dorion 2006: 100–101.

52 E.g. *Ap.* 20–21.

53 E.g. *Mem.* 1.6.14, 4.7.1.

54 Cf. Vander Waerdt 1993: 42 n. 116. *Contra*, cf. Morrison 2010: 233, 236–237, who recalls that Xenophon describes Socrates as *phronimos* in *Mem.* 4.8.11 and that *phronēsis* seems to be equivalent to *sophia*.

fundamental basis of virtue that is in fact an absolute and not an ambivalent good; even as *sophia* in Plato has the status and nature of a good of this sort, so in Xenophon *enkrateia* is an absolute good whose possession, unless I am mistaken, apparently never proves itself harmful to its possessor and user. In this one sees again that *enkrateia* takes precedence over *sophia* in the moral thinking of Xenophon's Socrates.

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CHAPTER FOURTEEN

WHY DID XENOPHON WRITE THE LAST CHAPTER OF THE *CYNEGETICUS*?*

Louis L'Allier

Introduction

Just like the *Art of Horsemanship*, the *Cynegeticus* of Xenophon is a manual, a pedagogical work, aimed at a young audience.[1] The end of the work is characterized by a robustly critical response to those who belittled hunting (chapter 12) and a diatribe against the sophists (chapter 13). A number of explanations have been offered for the violent critique in these two final chapters. Some have pictured it as a response to the work of Polycrates against Socrates,[2] whereas for others it underlines the extent to which *Cynegeticus* is an attempt to save a traditional moral code that was under attack at the time.[3] *Cynegeticus* 13 is certainly only one of a number of texts that disparage the sophists, and it is not without specific parallels in certain pages of Isocrates.[4]

* An earlier French version of part of this chapter appeared as L'Allier 2008.

1 The *Art of Horsemanship* starts as follow: 'consequently, we want to indicate to the youngest of our friends the principles that we think are the best to deal with horses' (βουλόμεθα καὶ τοῖς νεωτέροις τῶν φίλων δηλῶσαι ᾗ ἂν νομίζομεν αὐτοὺς ὀρθότατα ἵπποις προσφέρεσθαι). In the *Cynegeticus*, Xenophon exhorts the young not to despise hunting (1.18) and to seek the benefits it affords (13.7).

2 Cf. Delebecque 1957: 177, and the introduction to his translation of the *Cynegeticus*: 1970: 27–28. Much of what we know (or think we know) about Polycrates' pamphlet (written in or after 393–392) derives from the *Memorabilia*, where some believe Xenophon answers Polycrates word for word. It can also be assessed from the answer given by Libanius in his *First Declamation* 88–92, on which see Canfora 1994: 111. For more on Polycrates see also Humbert 1930, Jaeger 1964: II.20, III.158, Dodds 1990: 28–29, and the chapters by Stokes and Waterfield in the present volume.

3 Waterfield 2004: 83. Gray 1985: 163 notes that the idea that hunting is a school for virtue appears in Ar. *Eq*. 1382, where the demagogues ask the knights to leave the *ecclesia* and go hunting. As we shall see, Xenophon is trying to keep a tradition alive through what are in some respects non-traditional methods.

4 Isoc. 13.7–8.

I believe not only that *Cynegeticus* belongs to an aristocratic tradition exalting the pedagogical virtues of hunting[5] but also that the final part of the work was written to defend Xenophon himself rather than (just) his master. This defence takes the form of a celebration of aristocratic tradition against those who disparage hunting (12.10–21) and a rebuttal of those who disapprove of the manner in which the author of the *Cynegeticus* writes (13.1–18). The violence of Xenophon's words against the sophists can be explained by the fact that the work could itself easily be labelled as sophistic. Xenophon wants the reader to see this, but also to be convinced that his own teaching is in fact quite different from that of his adversaries. Hence, Xenophon is not only protecting the memory of Socrates and defending traditional values but, above all, seeking to prevent any misunderstanding about the style and content of *Cynegeticus* itself.

The Political Context

Cynegeticus was composed in the context of what Gabriel Danzig labels 'the post-trial charges' brought against the followers of Socrates after his death.[6] Polycrates and others accused the Socratics of incompetence because they failed to save Socrates, who produced no effective defence of his own, even though he was supposedly a master of persuasion. I believe that Danzig is right to direct our attention toward the intense debate of which such accusations were part and to assert that the scope of the debate was much larger than just the *post-mortem* reputation of the philosopher.[7] The Socratics probably felt their failure to save Socrates as a humiliation, and Xenophon's absence from Athens at the time at which his master needed him the most might have increased his own peronal sense of shame. There was a need to fight back. *Cynegeticus*—which does not mention Socrates by name but does attack the sophists (a class of whom Polycrates was a notable member)—is a part of that response.

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[5] On the aristocratic value of hunting in ancient Greece, see Barringer 2001: 10–69 and Johnstone 1994: 227.

[6] Danzig 2003: 283, 289, 292, 295–297, 300, 2010: 19–68; cf. Pl. *Cri.* 45d–e and *Grg.* 486a–b.

[7] Danzig 2003: 294.

The Text: Articulation, Integrity and Authenticity

This short text of just over nine thousand words is divided into thirteen chapters, which can be grouped into three parts of uneven length, the last of which consists of two sub-parts. In sum, there are really four parts: 1.1–18, 2.1–12.9, 12.10–21 and, finally, 13.1–18. Contrary to the opinion that prevailed in the nineteenth century,[8] I believe, with Vivienne Gray, that all of these parts were wholly composed by Xenophon,[9] and this entails that the treatise can only be understood if we take the articulation between these four parts properly into consideration. This paper will concentrate on the first, the third and the last parts of the *Cynegeticus*.

Many authors have noticed that one of the characteristics of Xenophon's style is his use of rhetorical figures.[10] As early as 1911, Léopold Gautier stated that 'the influence of Gorgias is strongly apparent in the style of Xenophon'.[11] Moreover, we know that Xenophon knew some of the sophist's students since he tells us in the *Anabasis* (2.6.16) that Proxenus—the friend who got him involved in the expedition of Cyrus—had heard the lectures of Gorgias. Among the consequences of the influence of Gorgias mentioned by Gautier are abundance of metaphors[12] and use of assonance. Thus, even if Xenophon, as Gautier says,[13] is 'neither a rhetor nor a sophist and does not write for a living', he borrows freely from sophistic rhetors in order to vary his style.[14]

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[8] A good example is Radermacher 1896.

[9] Gray 1985: 157 states: 'in fact, the *Cynegeticus* is not a grotesque composite, but a specimen of a respectable literary genre exhibiting real unity and this implies a uniformity of composition date for all sections of the work'.

[10] Cf. Bigalque 1933 and Cavenaile 1975: 238–252.

[11] Gautier 1911: 111: 'l'influence de Gorgias est fortement sensible dans le style de Xénophon'. According to Aristotle, Gorgias's style is too poetical and improper for a clear presentation of facts (*Rh.* 1404 a26); cf. Isoc. *Ev.* 10–11.

[12] Gautier 1911: 111; for examples see Xen. *An.* 3.2.19, *Hier.* 1.22, *Ages.* 11.15, *Cyr.* 5.1.1.

[13] Gautier 1911: 110: '(il n'est) ni un rhéteur, ni un sophiste, il n'écrit pas par métier'.

[14] For example, Xenophon has Socrates telling a fable borrowed from Prodicus—relating the choice of Heracles between Vice and Virtue personified by two young women (*Memorabilia* 2.1.21; the attribution to Prodicus is from Xenophon himself)—in which Schacht 1890: 20, cited by Gautier 1911: 119, has noted a large number of coordinated synonyms which, according to Gautier, are 'a luxury, a rhetorical procedure' ('un luxe, un procédé de rhétorique'). Xenophon might not be the author of the fable, but this shows at least that he was familiar with that type of exercise. Cole 1991: 77, sees the proof of the existence of three different versions of the fable in Xenophon's text: (a) a written version destined to a wide audience; (b) a version coming from Socrates' memory; (c) a more polished version used by Prodicus in front of a chosen audience. Dorion 2008, on the other hand, has argued convincingly that the fable is Xenophon's own, since he rewrote it entirely even if the original idea was someone else's.

Parallels between the style and the ideas of Isocrates and Xenophon, especially in the *Memorabilia*, have also often been noticed.[15] But Sarah Pomeroy (1994: 10) believes that Xenophon's long absence from Athens meant that he played no role in the evolution of rhetoric that was initiated by Thrasymachus and carried forward by Isocrates; consequently Xenophon's rhetoric was, according to Pomeroy (1994: 255), more traditional. Thomas Cole (1991: 119) adopts a similar position: 'the model of praise or blame, whether for an individual or, as in the Athenian *epitaphios logos*, a group or an entire city, persists in the fourth century, sometimes unaltered, sometimes combined with elements of philosophical dialogue (Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*) or actual biography (the *Evagoras* of Isocrates or the *Agesilaus* of Xenophon)'. At the same time a recent study (Gray 1985: 159–160) has shown that *Cynegeticus* follows the tradition of the *parainesis* and the Isocratean programme as stated in a number of passages (*To Demonicus* 5; *Nicocles* 2; *Against the Sophists*)—and Isocrates is also known to have defended hunting and the traditional values attached to this activity, so there is a substantive connection as well.

There is no reason to doubt, then, that Xenophon possessed the skills and aptitudes required to write the highly rhetorical first chapter of the book, even if it is different from the usually more sober style of our author.[16] By contrast with his practice in other works, Xenophon seems to have set out to provide *Cynegeticus* with an attractive introduction to a rather dry technical treatise. The result is a rhetorical exercise and one that has no parallel in Xenophon's work (whether in an exordium or elsewhere), since he never otherwise enumerates a series of mythological figures either to sustain an argument or adorn a text. The effect might seem to the modern reader a touch ingenuous—written by a young author or at least deemed

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[15] Delatte 1933: 44, 69, for example, sees resemblances between Isoc. 3.6–9 and 15.253–257 and *Mem.* 3.3.11, 4.3.12, or between Isoc. 4.54,64–65,68,76 and 7.6,49,75 (cf. Mathieu 1925) and *Mem.* 3.5.

[16] In his 1925 introduction to the minor works of Xenophon, Marchant affirmed that it contained rhythms dating from the second sophistic. Norden 1898: 433 also thought that the first chapter had been written by an author from the second sophistic. Gray 1985 settled the question by showing that Xenophon's text was closely in touch with his time and that there was no need to put it in a much more recent period. Gray has also shown that some of the rhetorical passages from the *Cynegeticus* were written in a style that was perfectly compatible with Xenophon's own style. This being said, the peculiarity of the last chapter still requires explanation. The problem of authorship remains puzzling since, as Delebecque 1970: 39–46 indicates in his edition of the text, the manuscripts transmit two versions of the first chapter that differ substantially both in form and in content. For a detailed description, see Pierleoni 1937: XIII–XXXII and 1932: 53–65.

suitable to the putatively youthful target audience (cf. n. 1)—but the chapter is certainly something of a show-piece. Proper interpretation of the work must provide an explanation of this fact.

Chapter 1: The Mythological Paradigm

As we have just seen, the first part of the text consists of a rather ornate mythological introduction. This begins by invoking the two divinities responsible for the invention (εὕρημα) of both the game and the dogs: Apollo and Artemis.

> Τὸ μὲν εὕρημα θεῶν, Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ Ἀρτμέμιδος, ἄγραι καὶ κύνες· ἔδοσαν δὲ καὶ ἐτίμησαν τούτῳ Χείρωνα διὰ δικαιότητα. ὁ δὲ λαβὼν ἐχάρη τῷ δώρῳ καὶ ἐχρῆτο.
>
> The wild animals and the dogs were invented by the gods Apollo and Artemis. They offered them to Chiron and honoured him for his justice and he, having received this gift, rejoiced and used it.

There follows a list of the mythical pupils (μαθηταί) of Chiron, and the chapter as a whole then elaborates on the education and general excellent of these pupils,[17] evoking various mythological stories along the way, including the hunt of the Calydonian Boar.[18]

This grandiose introduction is surprising for a treatise that deals mostly with the hunting of hares but, since it follows the hortative style (παραίνεσις), it allows the author to put the virtues developed by hunting (albeit hunting of a modest type) in a larger paradigmatic context. The virtues in question are ones that are generally important to Xenophon—diligence (ἐπιμέλεια: 1.5), the love of effort (φιλοπονία: 1.7) and moderation (σωφροσύνη: 1.11)—and, although he sees hunting as a school for war (1.18)[19] and envisages his mythological heroes making Greece invincible (1.17), they are remarkably peaceful and moderate virtues. This can be explained by the fact that Xenophon will later (chapters 12–13) try to convince his reader that the practice of hunting is a preparation for civic life.[20] He does not perceive the hunter as an antisocial character, like Hippolytus in Euripides' play of

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17 The list is quite long: Cephalus, Asclepius, Milanion, Nestor, Amphiaraus, Peleus, Telamon, Meleager, Theseus, Hippolytus, Palamedes, Odysseus, Menestheus, Diomedes, Castor, Polydeuces, Machaon, Podalirius, Antilochus, Aeneas and Achilles.

18 Cf. Hom. *Il.* 9.529–549.

19 See also Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.10 and *Lac.* 4.7. Cf. L'Allier 2004: 15, 91–92, 172.

20 The validity of hunting as a part of the education of young Athenians was questioned in the fourth century and, as Schnapp 1997: 13 notes, hunting scenes disappeared from vase painting. Hunting is not seen as a preparation for civic life anymore.

the same name, but more like another Cyrus the Elder, the great hunter and politician (as well as warrior) whom he depicts in the *Cyropaedia*.

Such a programme calls to mind the great poets who praised the aristocratic ethos; one might think, for example, of Theognis, a poet whom Xenophon cites elsewhere.[21] The beginning of *Cynegeticus* goes beyond the expected allusion to Artemis, goddess of the hunt, to mention Apollo as well—a pairing of deities (both important in Sparta, as it happens) that precisely evokes the start of Theognis' poem (1–10 for Apollo; 11–14 for Artemis)—while the first chapter ends with an exhortation to the young (τοῖς νέοις) whose tone resembles the call upon Cyrnus in Theognis, notably in 27–37 West.

Chapters 2–11: Technical Instruction and the Individualistic Hunt

This is the longest part of *Cynegeticus*. Its authorship is not disputed and it does not present any particular problems, besides those involving our understanding of the quarry and techniques of ancient hunting. It is the heart of the treatise and the most technical part of the work, where Xenophon describes how to hunt small game with a dog and ends (11.1–4) with a brief allusion to the hunting of large predators. We shall comment on the relevant aspects of this section in more detail later, but the fact that it presents hunting in a new light deserves note from the outset. While hunting had once been perceived and codified as a way to integrate young men within a given social body and was performed by a specific age class, the hunt described here by Xenophon is performed by an individual (who could still hunt with whomever he chooses) who usually belongs to the aristocracy and who perceives the exercise as a way to better himself, both physically and mentally.[22] There is an contrast between the old collective hunt and the new individualistic way, and the ideological shift involved has ramifications that are (as we shall see) important for a proper understanding of *Cynegeticus*.

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[21] Xenophon alludes to Theognis in *Mem.* 1.2.20 and *Symp.* 2.4. Stob. *Flor.* 4.29.53 cites a fragment from a work on Theognis that he thinks was written by Xenophon, but this is probably an error: Persson 1915. Some authors like Canfora 1994: 111 still believe in the authenticity of the text.

[22] On this topic, see Schnapp 1997: 123–171.

Chapters 12–13: Defending the Hunt and Denouncing the Sophists

Most of our attention will focus on the last two parts of the treatise, since they raise problems about the intention of the author. They are primarily characterized by an extremely robust critique of people whose opinions are disparaging of the ideas expressed by Xenophon—a rare phenomenon, for, although our author can be apologetic on occasion,[23] he rarely does it in such an open and aggressive manner.[24] The difference between the two chapters lies in the activity being criticised: first a physical activity and then an intellectual occupation. Chapter 12 deals with the idea that hunting is a school for life, and one that creates good citizens. Here Xenophon develops a theme that he cherishes and he argues against those who consider that hunting is a futile pastime; in other words, he defends the traditional values of a land-based aristocracy, such as the one we find in Athens. Chapter 13 attacks the sophists as exponents of rhetoric who care only about form at the expense of substance. This attack demands attention and explanation inasmuch as Xenophon himself is an author who frequently borrows from the arsenal of rhetoric.

The Defence of Hunting

Let us start at the beginning of chapter 12 in order to understand its exact message. I have already mentioned that this chapter marks the end of the technical part of the *Cynegeticus*—'the practice itself (αὐτῶν τῶν πράξεων) of the things related to hunting (τοῖς κυνηγεσίοις)', as Xenophon says (12.1). The author now moves to the physical and moral advantages that come from hunting (12.1–9), giving special stress to a favourite idea, viz. that it is particularly good at teaching a man how to make war (τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον μάλιστα παιδεύει),[25] while also indicating its association with the aristocratic style.[26]

12.10 introduces the first critique: 'some say', Xenophon writes, 'that one should not like hunting because it leads a man to neglect his domestic affairs'. Here Xenophon answers critics of the aristocratic way of life, guarantor of traditional values. The authors of this critique are not named.

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[23] Apologetic tendencies in Xenophon have been studied since Dürrbach 1893, but Xenophon is usually good at hiding such apologies: see for example Azoulay 2004a: 198–200.

[24] Cawkwell 1979: 33 notes that 'Xenophon was a man of uncommon reserve'.

[25] For this theme: cf. n. 19.

[26] Johnstone 1973: 226–229, Schnapp 1973: 317.

Xenophon simply says 'some' (τινες), but this reference, though obscure for us, must have been clear for his audience. In any event, the plural implies a group of opponents, and we shall soon discover that this is correct.

After sketching a response to the immediate charge about neglect of domestic affairs (12.11), Xenophon suddenly increases the emotional temperature by adding (12.12) that 'many of those saying these things' (πολλοὶ τῶν ταῦτα λεγόντων) 'lose their mind because of jealousy' (ὑπὸ φθόνου ἀλόγιστοι). This φθόνος must be caused by the notoriety or the popularity of the man who incites it. In principle Socrates might be such a person, but it is obvious that the envy in question here is directed at a hunter and it is hard to see what links Socrates to hunting, unless the allusion is purely symbolical.[27] This present critique is directed at a real hunter, and this hunter must be Xenophon himself.

Next, in 12.13, Xenophon threatens with all sorts of calamities those who use such empty words (ματαίων λόγων) and attract hatred from all. This represents an attack upon all kinds of demagogues, though mostly those who criticize hunting and offer nothing in return. That is why Xenophon asserts specifically that these people are useless for the preservation of the state. 12.14–17 opposes the notions of uprightness and justice instilled by the mode of education proposed by Xenophon to the ineptitude (and indeed natural evil: 12.15) of those who reject the virtuous toil associated with that education; and 12.18 ties the argument to the work's opening chapter by reminding the reader of the disciples of Chiron. The difficulty of securing virtue without toil then leads to an especially interesting passage (12.19–21), in which the rhetorical colour of the argument is further increased by resort to allegory. Xenophon notes that:

> perhaps, if her body were visible (εἰ ἦν τὸ σῶμα αὐτῆς δῆλον), men would be less inclined to neglect virtue (ἀρετῆς), knowing that she is apparent for them just like they are for her.

This idea of a visible virtue who sees us brings to mind the fable of Heracles' choice between Vice and Virtue told by Socrates in the *Memorabilia*. In this famous text (2.1.21–34), Socrates tells how Heracles met at a crossroad two women representing Virtue and Vice,[28] whose appearance and the

[27] The vocabulary of hunting is used by the Socratics when they refer to the act of chasing for disciples or lovers and Xenophon refers to this later, but this is not my point.

[28] This type of edifying stories is typical of the Cynics; Antisthenes is said to have written a dialogue entitled *Heracles, or on Wisdom and Strength*: cf. Caizzi 1966 and Diog. Laert. 6.15–18. Diogenes Laertius also says that Antisthenes took Heracles and Cyrus as examples. Xenophon also uses such fables, for example the 'fable of the dog' (*Mem.* 2.7.13–14) or the

posture is then described in detail. The situation is the same here in the *Cynegeticus*. What makes this convergence noteworthy is that Xenophon's Socrates claims to have borrowed the story from the sophist Prodicus. Two things follow. On the one hand, Xenophon's view is evidently that sophistic embellishment is not an obstacle to quality, if the message is virtuous, and there may even be a type of sophist whom he can find acceptable. On the other hand, whether or not his own disparagement of sophists is purely traditional,[29] he must realize that, if he seems to write like a sophist himself (e.g. by using rhetorical allegory), he will attract disparagement—and will need to defend himself.

The Attack on Sophists

In chapter 13 we reach the actual diatribe against the sophists—the most interesting part of the work for our purposes. Its structure seems contradictory, as Marchant (1968: XLI) noted:

> But a great difficulty confronts us. In the thirteenth chapter (3–7) the writer, in his most rhetorical passage, says in effect that he despises rhetoric as practised in his days, and has no belief in its value.

Marchant raised a crucial point. None of Xenophon's other works uses rhetoric and sophistic as much as this one and, at the same time, none of them attacks the sophists as vehemently—something that is, moreover, done in the most rhetorical part of the work.

The problem can be settled partially if we admit that Xenophon's style belongs to the age of Gorgias and Prodicus: he attacks contemporary sophistic while using the methods of another age. But one may wonder whether his readers would understand such a subtle difference between old and new sophists. It is customary to recall Aristophanes' *Clouds* and the allusions to Socrates in Plato's *Apology* (18 b) to show that the general public confused modes of thinking that are as different as sophistry and philosophy. That same public would be even more likely to confuse two types of sophistic style.

But once we posit that Xenophon deliberately uses the tools of ancient sophistry himself, the difficulties begin to evaporate, since we can now look

story of Aristarchus who forces his sisters and his cousins living under his roof to work for him (*Mem.* 2.7.2–14).

[29] Gray 1985: 162 explains this apparent incoherence by noting that the παραίνεσις asks for a traditional attitude and that the expected attitude in the fourth century was to disparage the ways of the sophists and to praise the philosophers. This is perfectly true, but it does not erase the fact that Xenophon uses the style of the sophists in order to disparage it.

at this chapter as a defence of the text of the *Cynegeticus* rather than as a general attack on the sophists. Viewed in those terms Xenophon's attack is a sort of diversion, since the author focuses on the mistakes of the sophists in order to show that he himself is truly a philosopher when compared to them—while at the same time making clear that he can write as artistically as they do. The chapter alludes to attacks that go beyond traditional diatribes against hunting and aim at the way Xenophon is writing. He argues against those who confuse means, content and goals, precisely because he believes that a reader could confuse the *Cynegeticus*, with its grandiloquent introduction and rhetorical ending, with the work of a sophist. Therefore, he insists that the difference between his work and that of a sophist resides in the intent and not in the manner in which it is written. Moreover, certain details seem to indicate that the criticicisms were not coming from the sophists but from the ranks of the philosophers.

From Xenophon's point of view, *Cynegeticus* is a philosophical text with a sophistical structure.[30] It is not philosophic in its form, since it is quite different from the Socratic dialogue, but it *is* philosophic in its substance, because it claims to make young Athenians virtuous through the practice of hunting. In that sense I would agree with Körte who claimed long ago that the whole of the *Cynegeticus* is more ideological than practical, since its purpose, even in the technical part, is to reach virtue as an ideological goal.[31] But the method by which it seeks to achieve this purpose is an important issue.

It is well known that the Socratic Method described by Plato, with its emphasis on refutation (*elenchus*), is not Xenophon's method of choice. This does not mean that our author does not understand the *elenchus*, as has often been said,[32] but rather that he thought that the *elenchus* was not the best method to teach virtue. Many have noticed that Xenophon's Socrates likes monologues, and a recent critic adds that dialogues rapidly become homilies in his Socratic works.[33] Two examples are the *Memorabilia* and the *Oeconomicus*, Socratic works in which dialogues rapidly transform into a lecture on the topic at hand. For Xenophon, the road to virtue passes through a lecture based on discussion and not through a real dialectic (i.e.

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30 This is not unique to Xenophon; even if he was a rhetor, Isocrates saw himself as a philosopher, cf. Isoc. 9.66 and Easterling 1989: I.3.97.

31 Körte 1918: 318; more recently Schnapp 1973: 317.

32 For a historical overview, cf. Dorion & Bandini 2000: LXIX–CLVII. Also see the opinion of Gomperz 1905. Robin 1929: CIX poses a very harsh judgment against Xenophon's philosophical aptitude in the notice of his edition of Plato's *Symposion*.

33 Waterfield 2004: 90; cf. Wellman 1976.

through the *elenchus*). For this aristocrat, who lived in a society where any public discussion could turn into a power struggle, using the *elenchus* results in demonstrating someone's ignorance, a process that humiliates and keeps that person away from philosophy.[34] That is why, as Louis-André Dorion has demonstrated, Xenophon's Socrates does not use the *elenchus*.[35] On the other hand, Xenophon's type of teaching, where a knowledgeable teacher speaks in front of an almost silent audience, is typical of the sophists; and the last chapter of the *Cynegeticus* actually defends this type of lecture against all those who deny the value of such a teaching, including philosophers who prefer the *elenchus*.[36]

This is the core of the problem. Fourth century sophistic is based on the teaching of Gorgias and Prodicus,[37] two men who were highly respected by our author; in fact, Xenophon considers that rhetoric is a good teaching method. He even goes further when, in the fable of Heracles at the crossroads in the *Memorabilia*, his Socrates adds that the same story, when told by Prodicus, was even better than his because the version of the sophist was ornamented with even finer expressions (ἐκόσμησε μέντοι τὰς γνώμας ἔτι μεγαλειοτέροις ῥήμασιν).[38] For him not only is rhetoric potentially a good form of education, but it gets even better when it is clothed in beautiful sentences.

Unlike the Platonic Socrates, the Socrates of Xenophon does not profess his ignorance: he is very knowledgeable and he likes to explain what he knows. The art of the philosopher resides in the exposition of true concepts which he knows and which are useful in the promotion of virtue; this is why Xenophon can claim that the *Cynegeticus* is a philosophical work. It aims to make a good hunter from a young man who was previously ignorant, based on the principle that a qualified hunter offers to the community of citizens (εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τοῖς πολίταις: 13.11) a man who is both sound of body (13.11) and virtuous of mind (1.5). We can say, then, that Xenophon uses the techniques of the sophists, the very people he disparages, but that he remains a Socratic—which is what he was considered throughout

34 Dorion & Bandini 2000: CXLII.

35 Dorion & Bandini 2000: LXIX–CLVII.

36 As such, Xenophon's teaching is what King 1976: 223–230 refers to as 'additive teaching', as opposed to the *elenchus* which is 'integrative'. According to King's interpretation, this is precisely the difference between the teaching of the sophists and Socrates.

37 Marchant 1968: XLI.

38 Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.34. This claim that his version is inferior is in itself a rhetorical technique. Xenophon adopts a humble attitude in order to attract praise.

Antiquity[39] and is plainly what he considered himself to be. Socrates is his master, and the only master he mentions; and, as Robin Waterfield notes (2004: 84), 'he is implicitly including himself in the band of philosophers'.

The situation, therefore, is that Xenophon is someone who talks about Socrates but refrains from using the *elenchus*; his Socratic dialogues rapidly become monologues, not because the author does not understand the technique of the *elenchus*, but because he does not recognize its value. This situation must have been noticed in Xenophon's time, and it is in that context that the diatribe against the sophists in *Cynegeticus* must be understood. It is an attempt by Xenophon to assert that, against all appearances, the text we are reading is not sophistical—a quality that would exclude him as a truly Socratic author.

The Defence and the Accusers

Since the style of writing and the method used by Xenophon make him dangerously similar to the sophists, he must distinguish himself in three ways:

(1) He aims for virtue and the well being of the city (1.5; 13.11);
(2) He does not use beautiful but empty sentences (13.1–2);
(3) He is not a professional; he does not 'hunt' young men for money (13.4).

The last stage of this investigation will elaborate upon these elements in Xenophon's defence. This in turn will enable us to determine how he was perceived; and it will then be possible to guess the identity of his accusers.

As we stressed before, Xenophon's defence has to be placed in the context of the intense debate that followed the death of Socrates, when his friends and pupils were accused of incompetence for their failure to save him. Xenophon failed to achieve what he professed: to help friends and harm enemies. The case against Xenophon must have been strengthened by the fact that he professed an individualistic form of hunting—one that seemed to be of no use to the city. Given that situation, Xenophon had a lot to prove in order to restore his reputation.

The programme of chapter 13 becomes obvious right from the beginning, when Xenophon argues against the claim of 'the people called sophists' (τῶν σοφιστῶν καλουμένων) that they lead people to virtue (ἐπ' ἀρετὴν ἄγειν).[40]

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[39] Cic. *Brutus* 292 puts him with Plato and Antisthenes, Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 10 sees him as a Socratic, Quint. 10. 1. 75, 82–83 does the same. For full details see Pomeroy 1994: 22.

[40] According to Plato and Xenophon, contrary to the sophists Socrates never claimed to make people virtuous: cf. Corey 2005: 2.

This is untrue, he says, because they have written (γέγραπται: 13.2) extensively on vain topics (περὶ τῶν ματαίων). It then becomes clear why these texts are vain: their authors only look for words (τὰ ῥήματα: 13.3), and not sound thoughts (γνῶμαι). In this attack on oratory done to the detriment of substance, Xenophon reiterates that he is not guilty of producing such a thing. Anyone who thinks that the *Cynegeticus* is sophistic in nature should be reminded that only γνῶμαι could produce a coherent text that does not fall prey of τύχη.[41] A few lines later (13.5) he repeats that only thoughts (γνῶμαι) and not words (ὀνόματα) can teach and insists that he could not use treacherous or cunning words (τοῖς μὲν ὀνόμασιν οὐ σεσοφισμένοις λέγω), since he does not look for them (οὐδὲ ζητῶ). By saying this, our author wants to assert that he would have been able to write exactly like a sophist if he had chosen to do so.

However, the style of this treatise *is* in certain respects far from the author's usual sobriety and Xenophon must now show that his work reflects the virtue of its author.

This is what he begins to do in the next paragraph (13.4). This passage is crucial, since it establishes the difference between Xenophon and those whom he castigates. First, Xenophon is only an amateur (ἐγὼ ἰδιώτης εἰμι),[42] by contrast with the sophists who are professionals, paid for their teaching. Xenophon has a long history of disagreement with the notion of paid work. As noted by Azoulay (2004b: 295), this attitude originates in the traditional disdain of aristocrats for money, a disdain dating back to the introduction of coinage. Money levels the exchanges between people and disrupts the old networks of gift exchange dear to aristocrats. For Xenophon, money transforms a transaction into something purely utilitarian and fosters a relation of dependence where the receiving partner becomes the employee—if not the slave—of the donor.[43] But, as Azoulay also notes, there are two more specific strands to Xenophon's position, based on his philo-laconism and on the philosophical opposition to money proper to the Socratics. The latter is the more relevant here; its best expression is in the *Memorabilia*, where we

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41 On the importance of the word γνώμη, see Xenophon's demonstration of the 'argument by design' (*Mem.* 1.4.6; on that passage see Greene 1966: 418) where he presents a teleological view of the world in which a divine γνώμη is responsible for man's creation. In that passage, γνώμη is opposed to τύχη; only the γνῶμαι can produce a viable result, just as they are needed to produce a meaningful text that would not be made of random thoughts.

42 I follow Jaeger 1964: III.11; ἰδιώτης as used here, refers to the amateur who is not paid as opposed to the professional, the *demiourgos*.

43 Azoulay's argument is partially based on Kurke 1991 for the general aristocratic background.

read that he who sells his youth (ὥρα) for money (ἀργύριον) is called a prostitute (πόρνος), while if he sells his knowledge (σοφία) for money he is called a sophist (σοφιστής). The distinction between this practice and the Socratic exchange of knowledge is that the second relies on friendship rather that money as the key motivator.[44] While there were no moral taboos against receiving money to teach a skill, the act of taking pay could promote the love of money,[45] and the act of *giving* pay compromised the proper basis for learning: for Xenophon says that it is best to be taught what is good by one's own nature (τῆς αὑτοῦ φύσεως) and that, failing that, the next best way is to find the good from those who truly know what it means[46] and not from those who possess the art of complete deception (τῶν ἐξαπατᾶν τέχνην ἐχόντων).

It is especially interesting that Xenophon insists on the fact that he is not a professional, since one might have thought that this should be taken for granted in a Socratic and that he ought not even to have to mention it.[47] It is not sufficient to say that this is a *topos* and that any philosopher would condemn sophists for receiving money, since Xenophon does not merely castigate the sophists for being professionals but also insists on his personal situation. Again, Xenophon is not just attacking his opponents but also defending himself. He reminds the reader that he is an aristocrat who belongs to a class that will not be enslaved by money, and that a proper education should not be limited to the wealthy.[48] The allusion is so direct that it can only be understood if its aim is to protect Xenophon from a criticism directed at the very text in which it appears. That a rhetor like Isocrates, whose job is to write speeches, has to defend himself against the accusation of being a sophist is understandable, but why would Xenophon feel the need to remind readers that he is not a sophist? The reason is in the *Cynegeticus* itself: a text that starts like a sophistical speech with mythological allusions and lyrical calls at a glorious past, and ends with a chapter more fitting for a law-court than a group of hunters.

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[44] *Mem.*1.6.13. On this passage, Dorion remarks that the Sophists do possess a knowledge but their mistake is that they are selling it (Dorion & Bandini 2000: 45 n. 311). This situations is similar to what is found in the *Anabasis* where Xenophon stresses that he is not a mercenary and that his wealth comes from spoils taken from the enemy at the tip of the lance, in the aristocratic fashion (*Anabasis passim* and 7.8.12).

[45] Corey 2002: 203–209.

[46] This seems like an attempt to escape the debate between nature (φύσις) and law (νόμος), inspired by Pind. F169a and Hdt. 3.38, that characterized the sophists. The same combination of φύσις and παιδεία is found in Xen. *Cyr.* 1.1.6.

[47] As in Pl. *Ap.* 30e1, Xenophon's Socrates opposes a gift economy to a market economy, cf. Scott 2000: 27–36.

[48] Corey 2002: 195–209.

For Xenophon, what is good (τὸ ἀγαθόν) must be taught from someone's own nature (τῆς αὑτοῦ φύσεως), as opposed to the tricks (τέχνη) learned from the sophists. This typically Socratic piece of advice to find the good (τὸ ἀγαθόν) in oneself is followed by a second one: the good can also be sought from those who really know what is good (τῶν ἀληθῶς ἀγαθόν τι ἐπισταμένων). By saying that virtue can be taught by a learned teacher, Xenophon adopts a position opposite to the doctrine of Plato's Socrates and brings us closer to the sophists.[49]

It seems that Xenophon tries to explain himself by saying that he not only uses a text that is beautiful, as the sophists do, but also one that expresses beautiful thought, something that contemporaneous sophists do not do. This is why he says that thoughts can be instructive 'if they are beautiful' (εἰ καλῶς ἔχοιεν).[50] He does not deny that his text has a sophistical tone and structure, but he claims that it differs in its content and by the intent of its author. 13.6 deserves to be cited in its entirety.

> Many others also blame the sophists of today, not the philosophers, because they are subtle in words but not in thoughts.
>
> Ψέγουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τοὺς νῦν σοφιστὰς καὶ οὐ τοὺς φιλοσόφους, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι σοφίζονται, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς νοήμασιν.

Again, we see the same oppositions, sophists/philosophers and words/thoughts, but now Xenophon adds that, in order to differentiate the sophist from the philosopher, one must rely on the content and not the appearance of the text. This is especially relevant for his own time and not for the sophists of old, like Prodicus, since Xenophon admired him and did not hesitate to borrow themes and methods such as exhortation.[51] This seems to indicate that Xenophon admits that he wrote the *Cynegeticus* in the fashion of the sophists, but like a sophist of old who married style and thoughts. But he could not, of course, openly defend the sophists of old since this would inevitably bring the accusation of defending the sophists as a whole. The upshot is that, rather than asserting that he has written a 'good' sophistic text, he asserts instead that, however sophistic the text looks in light of its exordium and its end, it is still a *philosophic* text.

But there is a further complication. When Xenophon specifies that many others (ἄλλοι πολλοί) blame the sophists but do not blame the philosophers, he must be citing philosophers. The layman would blame both sophists and

49 Corey 2005: 1–2.
50 Xen. *Cyn.* 13.5.
51 Corey 2005: 7.

philosophers, but only philosophers would limit the blame to sophists; so the people who do not blame philosophers but *are* blaming Xenophon must themselves be philosophers. We can conclude from this that he is under attack from certain philosophers.[52]

The next part of the argument reads as follow:

> I am not unaware that one of these would probably say, regarding things that are well written and orderly, that they were not well written and orderly; it will be easy for them to blame rapidly and without reason.
>
> Οὐ λανθάνει δέ με ὅτι[53] καλῶς καὶ ἑξῆς γεγραμμένα φήσει τις ἴσως τῶν τοιούτων οὐ καλῶς οὐδ' ἑξῆς γεγράφθαι· ῥᾴδιον γὰρ ἔσται αὐτοῖς ταχὺ μὴ ὀρθῶς μέμψασθαι.

This is not a layman's blame, but the words of an expert. Once again, Xenophon plays with a Socratic theme, the confusion between being and seeming. He warns the reader against those who may confuse his philosophic text with the work of a sophist. He probably gives such a warning because he has already been the target of a reproach of this sort and also because he is conscious of the paradox of presenting a highly rhetorical text as philosophical. Xenophon defends his right to write philosophy using a style that has nothing in common with the Platonic dialogue. He pleads for the right to teach as someone who knows something, as opposed to the right to use dialectic as one who claims to know nothing, and he pleads for this right against other 'philosophers'.

Xenophon, then, is facing accusations from philosophers who attack the sophists of their time and who say that his text is neither well written nor coherent. One remembers the passage of the *Anabasis* (2.1.13) where a young man named Theopompus is mocked because he behaves like a philosopher. In that case a soldier who despises philosophy rails at him because he talks like a philosopher and not like a soldier. In the case of the *Cynegeticus*, Xenophon is accused of writing like a sophist and the accusation comes from someone who despises sophists, but not philosophers—that is, from a philosopher.

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[52] Here one inevitably thinks about the supposed rivalry between Plato and Xenophon as presented in Diog. Laert. 3.34 and Athen. 504e–506a. Even if this rivalry is pure speculation, it might reflect some real tensions between disciples of Socrates. On this topic, the work of Pomeroy 1994: 26–29 is helpful. Even in exile, Xenophon was in contact with some philosophers. He surely knew the philosophical school of Elis created by Phaedo less than fifty kilometres from Scillus. Moreover there was a Pythagorean sect at Phlius, in the northern Peloponnese: cf. Delebecque 1957: 210–211.

[53] This paragraph is difficult, and some editors add ⟨τὰ μὴ⟩ before καλῶς; I follow the text of Delebecque.

In the next paragraph (13.7), Xenophon does admit that he follows the path of the sophists, but he adds that his goals are noble:

> καίτοι γέγραπταί γε οὕτως ἵνα ὀρθῶς ἔχῃ, καὶ μὴ σοφιστικοὺς ποιῇ ἀλλὰ σοφοὺς καὶ ἀγαθούς· οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν αὐτὰ βούλομαι μᾶλλον ἢ εἶναι χρήσιμα, ἵνα ἀνεξέλεγκτα ᾖ εἰς ἀεί
>
> Truly I wrote in such a way in order to remain just and not to train subtle sophists, but men that are wise and good; for I do not want my writings to look useful, but to be useful, so that they may stand forever unrefuted.

This passage is interesting in many ways, and Xenophon interweaves considerations that are both philosophical and rhetorical. He stresses his goal, which is to train wise and good men, and repeats that he does not want to train sophists, an observation that makes sense only if he has been suspected of doing so. This is followed again by a further allusion to an idea dear to both himself and Plato, the dichotomy between being and seeming. Finally, he ends with a highly rhetorical allusion to Thucydides (1.22.4), where he claims that he wants his writings to be useful (χρήσιμα), in order to be forever unrefuted (ἵνα ἀνεξέλεγκτα ᾖ εἰς ἀεί). Once again, he uses the style of the sophists in order to underline the fact that the superiority of the content of his teaching shows that he is not one of them.

The subsequent paragraphs (13.8–16) focus on hunting and affirm the superiority of the hunter over the sophist, a superiority that comes from his capacity for labour, a capacity that makes him more useful to the city. This physical and mental strength corresponds to the way Xenophon depicts both himself and Socrates,[54] but, of the two of them, only Xenophon developed his strength by hunting. Therefore, it is Xenophon and not Socrates who now meets the challenge of the sophists. Xenophon ends his work with a call to those who are at risk of being corrupted by the sophists, viz. 'young people' (τοὺς νέους: 13.17), enjoining them to follow his advice in order to be useful to everyone—parents, city and citizens.

This last remark is worth further exploration, following the lead of Alain Schnapp.[55] Traditionally, hunting was seen as an activity in which young men of a specific age class could learn how to track down and ambush an enemy. Hunting also allowed them to discover the territory through close contact with the terrain. This type of hunting was really an initiation and was codified by a set of rules, as part of the traditional *paideia* of each city. Such texts as the Plato's *Laws* and Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution* provide

54 See Pl. *Symp.* 220e–221a, *La.* 181 b.

55 Schnapp 1997: 123–171, especially 156–159.

ample proof of this; the ephebes of Athens or the young Spartans taking part in the *krupteia* were involved in an exercise dictated by the state and shared with other members of the same age class; it was above all collective.

The *Cynegeticus* introduces a very different type of hunt, where the hunter participates as an individual, not a member of a certain age class. He hunts for his own benefit, to improve and demonstrate his own skill and endurance, and he hunts because he has the financial means to allow him the leisure to do so. The civic form of hunting becomes personal: as Schnapp (1973: 314) says, 'the hunter-landowner replaces the hunter-citizen'.[56] Whereas night hunting and the use of nets and traps is allowed and described in the *Cynegeticus*, a reader of the *Laws* would notice that this is the opposite of the type of hunting recommended in Plato,[57] where nets and night hunting are forbidden.[58] Now, it is easy to perceive the new type of hunting, initiated by a crisis in the city, as a close equivalent to the art of the angler who uses traps and nets in Plato's *Sophist*. In this case the new hunter is not useful for the city and Schnapp (1997: 159) rightly thinks that the middle of chapter 12 is an attempt to clarify this situation and to prove that the hunter is, as an individual, useful to the City when he is taking care of his personal affairs (τὰ ἴδια: 12.11).

Xenophon is attempting here to address the fourth century crisis by proposing a new kind of education for the young *kalos kagathos*, an education based on the excellence of the individual. However, this attempt has its share of ambiguity. As Schnapp (1997: 163) notes, 'as the courageous hunt of the *Laws* opposes the cunning hunt of the *Sophist*, the collective hunt of the *Spartan Constitution* and of the *Cyropaedia* echoes the individual hunt of the *Cynegeticus*'.[59] The main difference is that, for Plato, the sophist is not a role model, whereas Xenophon tries to use the individualistic hunter as

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[56] 'Le chasseur-propriétaire terrien succède au chasseur-citoyen'.

[57] Pl. *Leg.* 824 a: 'This branch of hunting, the kind called night-stalking, which is the job of lazy men who sleep in turn, is one that deserves no praise; nor does that kind deserve praise in which there are intervals of rest from toil, when men master the wild force of beasts by nets and traps instead of doing so by the victorious might of a toil-loving soul.' The remark was made during the colloquium that, since hares are nocturnal, it is only natural to hunt them at night. The same applies to the use of nets (or snares) which is the only practical way to hunt hares in the absence of a fast hound (as noted by Arr. *Cyn.* 2.2–5). Plato's aim is not the capture of the animal, but he wants to train the hunter. Plato's hunter hunts an ever-escaping prey.

[58] See Schnapp 1997: 157.

[59] 'Mais comme la chasse courageuse des *Lois* s'oppose à la chasse ruse du *Sophiste*, la chasse collective de la *République des Lacédémoniens* et de la *Cyropédie* fait écho à la chasse individuelle de l'*Art de la chasse*.'

an ideal. However, at first sight this new hunter, careful to preserve his own property and fond of traps and deception is, in relation to traditional hunting, what the sophist is to the philosopher. Thus the *Cynegeticus* appears sophistic both it its form (rhetorical and technical) and in its content (how to use traps and deception). In order to eliminate the perception that he is promoting the art of the sophist, Xenophon has to separate himself clearly from the sophist. Xenophon's insistence to attack the sophists is then motivated by the very content of his treatise on hunting.

Conclusion

The diatribe against the sophists in *Cynegeticus* 13 thus turns out to be an attempt to rehabilitate the text against the accusations of those who see it as the work of a sophist rather than a philosophical discourse. The introduction and the conclusion of the *Cynegeticus* are a rhetorical exercise, perhaps destined to be presented in public.[60] This sets the work apart from other philosophical texts, since it is well known that Xenophon uses neither the diatribe nor the *elenchus* in his Socratic texts; moreover, his technical works show that his preferred pedagogical method entails a transfer of knowledge from someone who knows to a more or less passive disciple. His Socrates does not claim that he knows nothing.

On the other hand, Xenophon often uses processes and citations borrowed from the sophists of the fifth century, such as Prodicus, to illustrate his works. That is why the end of the *Cynegeticus* is a criticism of the sophists of the fourth century, because some people were confusing the sophists of old with those of his own time. Xenophon criticizes the latter in order separate himself from these new sophists who favour form over substance. Because the *Cynegeticus* is itself written as a rhetorical text, some people have confused its author with those sophists; the accusation did not come from among the sophists, and may have come from philosophers.

The heart of the accusations is the fact that Xenophon wrote the *Cynegeticus* in an elaborate style, filled with allusions to the mythological past. This style, unusual for Xenophon, might have been perceived as vain and pompous, especially since it was coming from an author otherwise known for his sobriety. In addition to this, the topic of the treatise, the individualistic hunt, was also alleged as vain and useless for the city.

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[60] One can think about the annual festivities organised by Xenophon on his estate of Scillus during which the participants of all ages were invited to hunt: *An.* 5.3.9–10.

There is, then, a convergence between the style and the content of the *Cynegeticus* that was liable to attract criticism, and the last two chapters are an attempt at pre-emptive refutation of such criticism. It looks as if, by writing the introduction and the core of the *Cynegeticus*, Xenophon was putting himself in the front line in order to draw the attacks that he then refuted in the last two chapters of his work.

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CHAPTER FIFTEEN

THE BEST OF THE ACHAEMENIDS: BENEVOLENCE, SELF-INTEREST AND THE 'IRONIC' READING OF *CYROPAEDIA*

Gabriel Danzig

The argument of this chapter may be summarized as follows. Critics argue that although he maintains a pretence of benevolence, in reality Cyrus is always relentlessly pursuing his own interest. This, however, is a false dichotomy. For Xenophon, the pursuit of self-interest does not contradict either benevolence or beneficence. On the contrary, benevolence and beneficence contribute to obtaining self-interested ends and therefore the pursuit of self-interest requires them (see *Memorabilia* 3.1.10, *Oeconomicus* 12.15). This is because the most useful possessions are friends, and these are acquired by acts of benevolence. More difficult is the question of conflicts between self-interest and the interests of one's friends and allies. But conflicts between true interests, as opposed to wishes and desires, need not arise often, since different individuals deserve and benefit from different things. This compatibility of interest is illustrated especially by Cyrus' gaining the upper hand over his uncle Cyaxares. Rather than harming him, this development advances both his and Cyrus' interests simultaneously.

Introduction

Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* tells the historical-fictional story of how Cyrus founded the Persian empire. It is easy to assume that in composing this tale Xenophon attributes to Cyrus all the best qualities of his ideal leader. However, a surprisingly large number of scholars has argued that there is irony in the portrait and that in fact Xenophon has serious reservations and objections to the behaviour and modes of governing he attributes to Cyrus.[1]

This argument was presented first by Carlier (1978), and has been repeated and developed by numerous other writers.[2] Carlier's argument was

[1] I am glad to see that in her recent book Gray 2011: esp. 246–290 agrees with many of the arguments I made in this paper.

[2] Gera 1993: 296–299, Sage 1994, Too 1998, Nadon 2001: 87–100, Ambler 2001: 11–18,

perhaps the most theoretically satisfying because he offered an explanation for the negative portrait of Cyrus. Accepting the earlier view that *Cyropaedia* concerns a possible Greek conquest of the east, Carlier argued that rather than offering a favourable view of this prospect, Xenophon offered an unfavourable one. While Cyrus does succeed in conquering his foes, argued Carlier, he also subjugates his friends and allies, depriving them of their freedom and independence and establishing a tyrannical regime. In support of this argument, Carlier considered some nine features of Cyrus' regime which seem to confirm its tyrannical or bad character.

More recent writers have dropped the assumption that Xenophon is addressing the possibility of an eastern invasion and confine themselves to observations about the negative characteristics of Cyrus' behaviour or his regime.[3] Gera (1993: 297) lists some thirteen negative features and reaches the moderate conclusion that Cyrus is a benevolent despot. She adds that despotism may be necessary for the governance of an empire, and one can perhaps hear in this conclusion a reflection of Carlier's argument that conquest itself is a bad idea.

We may distinguish four general arguments that appear in these critiques of Cyrus. One is that the original Persian regime was already an ideal regime. Since there can be only one ideal regime, that instituted by Cyrus cannot be so.[4] A second is that the final chapter, outlining the degeneration of Persia after Cyrus' death, shows the insufficiencies of his institutions.[5] A third is that the modes of governance that Cyrus establishes, especially after the conquest of Babylon, are tyrannical or oppressive of his friends,

Johnson 2005. See also Pangle 1994: 147–150. Perhaps influenced by *Hiero*, Pangle argues that Cyrus himself suffers from his success in that he 'has had to abandon or forget the good of his soul' (149–150), and that the portrait of Cyrus thus provides a negative proof of the superiority of Socrates to that of the most successful political actor (150). Neither Due 1989: 147–184, 207–229 nor Higgins 1977: 54–55 offers an ironic reading, even when considering Cyrus' later career as ruler of an empire. Higgins refers to Cyrus as 'clearly the best man' (53) and says that his entire life 'represents an ideal of action' (54). At the same time, he does doubt that Xenophon believed that monarchy is the best form of government (55) and finds some implicit criticism of Cyrus' optimistic belief that his good example will ensure the virtue of his sons (57–58: 7.5.86). He concludes that 'reality resists perfection' (58) which seems to mean that we cannot blame Cyrus for deficiencies inherent in nature.

[3] But see Tuplin 1993: 35–36.

[4] Pangle 1994: 149, Gera 1993: 290, 299, Too 1998, Nadon 2001: 26–60, see Carlier 1978: 138–143.

[5] Carlier 1978: 160–162, Pangle 1994: 149, Gera 1993: 286 (but contrast 299–300), Nadon 2001: 139–146.

allies and subjects.[6] A fourth is that despite the appearance of benevolence, Cyrus is actually motivated by ruthless personal ambition.[7] After some brief comments about the first three of these, I will concentrate my attention on the fourth argument, that Cyrus is not really benevolent.

(1) The original Persian regime does not provide a standard by which to criticize the regime established by Cyrus for three reasons: a) The assumption that there can only be one ideal regime is gratuitous. Not only is it conceivable that more than one regime might be ideal for a particular community, it is almost inevitable that different regimes would be ideal for different communities (see Aristotle *Politics* 3.7, 4.2–13). While the original Persian regime may arguably be ideal for a small community at peace, it would not suffice for an empire such as the one Cyrus builds. b) In fact there are some negative features of the original regime which are improved on in the regime (or regimes) founded by Cyrus. Prime among these is the levelling of class distinctions and the introduction of a proportional merit-based form of distributive justice. As Nadon (2001: 40) points out, Pheraulas is an example of a commoner who is enabled to display his virtue only because of Cyrus' reforms.[8] c) Even if constitutional monarchy as practiced in Persia were an ideal form of government, and Cyrus' changes were in some way changes for the worse, they are presented as necessary for facing the threat of an Assyrian invasion. Neither Persia nor Media would have survived without these changes; and whatever its 'ideal' qualities, a regime that cannot survive is not worth much, certainly not to someone like Xenophon.[9]

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[6] Carlier 1978: 148–160, Gera 1993: 295–300, Nadon 2001: *passim*, Johnson 2005; see also Tuplin 1993: 35–36; 1997: 66, 82–95.

[7] Carlier 1978: 156, Gera 1993: 294–296, Nadon 2001: *passim*. See also Farber 1979: 509.

[8] See 2.3.7–16, 8.3; see also Newell 1983 and Tuplin 1997, 80–81. Contrast Johnson 2005 who argues that the establishment of a merit-based system contradicts the earlier egalitarianism and is detrimental to the upper classes without significantly improving the lot of the commoners. He also argues that Cyrus replaces virtue with obedience or loyalty and that this represents a degeneration (187; see 193). But he does not show that Xenophon regards loyalty and obedience as inferior forms of virtue, and in several passages it appears that he places a very high value on these qualities (see *Mem.* 4.4, *Cyr.* 8.1).

[9] A similar ambiguity exists between the city at peace and the city at war in Plato's *Republic*. If anything, the city at peace in *Republic* has a greater claim to being the ideal than does the original Persian regime in *Cyropaedia*, for Socrates calls it a healthy city and contrasts it with an inflamed city (372e). Despite this, few scholars have ever claimed that this is Plato's ideal or that the city he goes on to develop at length can be criticized insofar as it diverges from this ideal (but see Rosen 2005: 75–76. I thank Roslyn Weiss for this reference.).

(2) The degeneration of Persia after Cyrus' death serves as a critique of Cyrus only if we assume that the measure of a good leader is the ability to create lasting institutions. Gera (1993: 297–298) argues that it is, and cites the fact that Xenophon frequently credits Cyrus for those good practices that lasted. But these comments serve primarily a) to show continuity between Xenophon's fictional Cyrus and historical reality and b) to show that these contemporary customs originated in an intelligent manner. They do not necessarily aim to demonstrate Cyrus' merit by displaying the virtues of contemporary Persia, and hence they do not conflict with the portrait of the degeneration of Persia recorded in the final chapter. In any case, Xenophon dismisses the question of regime in the opening chapter of his book, where he notes that none of the recognized regimes is stable. Xenophon did not believe that political institutions are a reliable source of good government in the absence of a living ruling intelligence (*blepōn nomos*).[10] As Xenophon says in regard to Persia: 'When the person in control is better, the lawful things are observed with greater purity. When he is worse, they are observed in an inferior way.'[11] A parallel from his defence of Socrates seems pertinent. In *Memorabilia* 1.2, Xenophon argues that Socrates was not responsible for the bad behaviour of his students after they left his company. As Dorion (2002) has argued, if Socrates was not liable for his students' degeneration, why should Cyrus be liable for the degeneration of Persia? That is what always happens when the great leader is absent. It would be wrong then to blame Cyrus for failing to accomplish what he never sought to accomplish and what would have been impossible to accomplish. The final chapter may be explained 1) as a necessary concession to historical reality: Persia did not seem perfect in Xenophon's time, so some decline must have set in, and 2) as a form of eulogy of Cyrus.[12] As in the *Iliad* (22.477–514), the description of the damage caused by the hero's loss is a form of eulogy. The fact that the decline sets in immediately on Cyrus' death does not show that Cyrus failed to educate his sons.[13] That is a subject that is barely broached in the book.

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[10] *Blepōn nomos*: see Weathers 1953: esp. 317–319, Sage 1994: esp. 164–166, Azoulay 2004b: 25–26.

[11] *Cyr*. 8.1.8. Translations from *Cyropaedia* are from Ambler 2001, with minor modifications. Other translations are my own.

[12] See Luccioni 1947: 246–254, Due 1989: 16–22, Mueller-Goldingen 1995: 262–271, Sage 1994: esp. 167.

[13] Sage 1994: 167–174 takes the failure as a mark of Cyrus' neglect. The argument however is almost purely *ex silentio*.

(3) Those who judge Cyrus' regime a tyranny do not generally make the effort to show that Xenophon himself would have judged it so. Does Cyrus encourage *proskunēsis* to an excessive degree? Is it wrong of Cyrus to make himself inaccessible as king? Does Xenophon find his use of eunuchs repugnant? The fact that a practice was not already warmly approved in Greece does not show that Xenophon did not warmly approve of it.[14] He had great admiration for those who depart from conventional judgement—not only in the case of Socrates, but also for example in the case of Lycurgus (*Spartan Constitution* 2). He frequently offers advice that conflicts with generally held opinions in Greece (see e.g. *Poroi*, *Hiero*). Although I cannot discuss here in detail the many Cyrean practices that have raised objection, my general argument is that Xenophon either approves of them or finds them intriguingly plausible, despite or because of the fact that some of them may have seemed problematic to the average Greek reader. Many good observations on the value of the practices Cyrus inaugurates may be found in the under-utilized study of Breebaart (1983). Newell (1983: 900) has suggested that the regime Cyrus establishes is a reformed tyranny, one in which there is rule over willing subjects without law but in accordance with knowledge.[15] Tuplin (1993: 36) describes it as benevolent despotism, which is fine as long as we do not take despotism in a negative sense; and he also notes the importance of distinguishing between the reformed Persia and the empire (87–95). Cyrus' rule might fit even better to Aristotle's concept of a *pambasileus* (*Politics* 3.16; see Carlier 1978: 157), with the understanding that Xenophon either does not share Aristotle's belief that even the best man should use law (3.15.6) or places him among the cases in which this requirement must be waived (3.17.7). It would be impossible, however, to conclude that the empire conforms to the pattern of a tyranny, which for Xenophon is represented by the very different regime of the king of Assyria. Xenophon surely agrees with Plato (*Republic* VIII) and Aristotle (*Politics* 5.10.7–10) that a regime is distinguished not merely by its formal structure, but more essentially by the intentions of its rulers. And as we will see, Cyrus clearly has good intentions.

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[14] See Breebaart 1983, Gray 2011: 280–282.
[15] See also Wood 1964: 62–63.

The Pursuit of Self-Interest

Although James Tatum is not one of those who offer ironical interpretations or negative evaluations of Cyrus, his work has the merit of clearly delineating many of the features for which Cyrus is brought to task by others, above all his pursuit of self-interest. Tatum devoted his work in large part to showing how Cyrus manipulates everyone he meets to serve his own political ends.[16]

In several cases, Cyrus' objectionable behaviour resembles that of Xenophon's master, Socrates. For example, Tatum (1989) comments: 'Although the broad divisions of family, friends, and enemies are real enough, we shall find it hard to see any difference in Cyrus' treatment of his family, friends, or enemies. At every stage of his career, and at every level of involvement with others, he has a curious detachment about other people, even as he makes himself famous throughout the world for his kindness and his generosity, through calculated shows of philanthropy' (71). 'The first victims … were his mother Mandane and his grandfather Astyages …' They were 'the first persons to experience his genius for manipulating others to suit his purposes' (97).

This description of Cyrus' indifference to the claims of family could be applied with minor changes to Xenophon's Socrates. Socrates was accused of alienating the affections of the young from their parents and of teaching that their opinions do not deserve special consideration (*Memorabilia* 1.2; and see *Apology* 20). Xenophon does not deny that Socrates did such things, nor does he criticize him for doing so. Rather he defends the attitude as eminently reasonable: respect is due to those who know, not those who are related (*Memorabilia* 1.2.51–55). Later in *Memorabilia*, he portrays Socrates promoting this attitude of indifference to family bonds. In 2.2 he persuades his son Lamprocles to appreciate his ill-tempered mother by comparing her favourably to a wild beast. In 2.3 he berates Chaerecrates for not recognizing the advantages to be gained by befriending his own brother. And despite this, a case can be made that Cyrus does give preferential treatment to family members—he always treats his father with respect, and even his uncle arguably benefits from preferential treatment as we shall see.

According to Tatum (1989, 98), Cyrus also has a problematic relationship with law and convention. 'Seemingly obedient to every law … [Cyrus] is ruthlessly self-serving and subversive of the status quo'. Indeed, Cyrus fre-

16 Tatum 1989: 66, 71.

quently alters Persian laws and customs; but these alterations are always presented as improvements. Cyrus creates a system of governance in which law holds less of a place than it did in his father's Persia. Here again, the attitude has Socratic parallels. In both Plato and Xenophon, Socrates demonstrates a mixed attitude towards the law. In *Republic*, Socrates conceives a regime in which the wise rule rather than any inflexible law. In response to the accuser who claimed that Socrates criticized the method of choosing certain officers by lot, Xenophon does not deny the charge, but rather praises Socrates for cultivating wisdom (*Memorabilia* 1.2.9–11).[17] The idea that wisdom is a better standard than law seems a common Socratic motif, and it is no surprise if Cyrus, who has the opportunity to establish the rule of wisdom, would do so, and no reason to think that Xenophon criticizes him for it.

So too, Tatum is right to say that Cyrus pursues his own interest in every step he takes. Even in his most seemingly self-abnegating moments, his pursuit of self-interest can be seen. For example, when he persuades the Persians to allow the Hyrcanian troops to divide the spoils he says that this will serve their own interests (4.3.42–45). When he refuses the most beautiful woman in Asia, he does so for self-interested reasons (5.1.8); when he distributes the bulk of his wealth to his friends, he does so for self-interested reasons (8.2.15–23); when he wins the Armenian king's alliance for his uncle, he serves his own advantage (3.3.3, 3.3.5).[18] As Nadon (2001: 52) comments: 'Cyrus' … benevolence is far from self-forgetting. His deeds are all calculated to increase his honour or influence.'[19]

But is Cyrus to be criticized for his pursuit of self-interest?[20] Tatum (1978: 156) does not criticize him. Carlier encourages the reader to draw a negative inference. Pangle (1994: 149–150), Gera (1993: 294–295) and Nadon (2001: e.g. 60, 160, 179–180), on the other hand, do count Cyrus' pursuit of self-interest as a mark against him, but none of them offers an argument to show that Xenophon disapproves of Cyrus' pursuit of self-interest. In order to count

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[17] The question of Socrates' attitude towards statutory law is a complex and interesting one. See Morrison 1995, Dorion 2001, Johnson 2003, Danzig 2009, and Johnson (this volume, pp. 123–160).

[18] See Nadon 2001: 87–88.

[19] See also Gera 1993: 294–296.

[20] This question is not anachronistic. The Greeks were critical of those who act only for their own interest, referring to them as *philautoi* (see Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 9.8). But this trait seems to have been blameworthy only in the case of those whose self-love made them fail to serve the interests of their friends. This is the reason, I presume, why none of the ancients blamed Cyrus as a *philautos*.

as a criticism, a description of Cyrus' behaviour must contradict an ideal that Xenophon himself maintains, not merely one that a modern reader holds. But where does Xenophon say or imply that it is wrong to pursue self-interest?

Only Ambler (2001: 11–18) has offered an argument to show that Xenophon views Cyrus' pursuit of self-interest negatively. He notes that Cyrus is sometimes praised by characters in the book for virtues that he does not possess. In particular, Gadatas gives expression to an ideal of selfless behaviour which gives the lie to Cyrus' claim to virtue, for it is an ideal to which Cyrus fails to live up. After Cyrus has rescued him from the Assyrian king, Gadatas offers thanks in the following terms:

> You need from me now I know not what, nor did you promise me that you would do such things, nor have you experienced at my hands anything good, at least for yourself personally. But because I seemed to you to benefit your friends a bit, you helped me so enthusiastically that—although on my own I would be done for—I have been saved thanks to you. (5.4.11)

In Ambler's view, Cyrus does not live up to this praise. He does not act selflessly, and even his daring rescue of Gadatas was not done for selfless reasons. As Ambler (2001: 13–14) notes, Cyrus himself has spoken of the advantage he expects to gain by helping Gadatas (5.3.31–33). It is advantageous to help Gadatas both because he opposes a common enemy and because by doing so Cyrus acquires a useful reputation for helping his friends and harming his foes (see e.g. 5.3.20 where the Hyrcanians express their gratitude to the gods for meeting a man as benevolent as Cyrus).

But there are several problems with this line of argumentation. First of all, there is no reason to take Gadatas' words as reflecting the values and beliefs of the author to a greater extent than those of any other character. Gadatas has a far less authoritative position in the work than Cyrus himself or Cyrus' father, each of whom, like Socrates, favours the pursuit of self-interest. Further, while Gadatas does praise Cyrus, he does not actually praise him for acting selflessly or deny that he acts for his own interest. He says that he is not aware of what immediate need Cyrus may have of him, but does not *deny* that Cyrus may have such a need. Furthermore, having an *immediate* need of Gadatas is only one possible self-interested motive for saving him from the Assyrian king. Other such possible motives include having a long-term need of Gadatas, desiring to drive the king of Assyria from the region, and creating an impression of loyalty to an ally, all of which are quite relevant. This may seem like quibbling, but as we will see it is not the only place in which there are rewards for taking Xenophon quite literally.

Gadatas also praises Cyrus for acting without any great obligation to do so. Even if true, this of course would not imply that Cyrus was motivated by selfless benevolence: self-interest may be present even when obligation is not. And Gadatas knows full well that there was an obligation: he had in fact risked his life twice to assist in Cyrus' efforts to defeat the king of Assyria. First he entered and betrayed a local fortress (5.3.9–19), and then he returned to his land with a small force to oppose the forces of Assyria (5.3.26–28). Cyrus has acknowledged the great debt he owes to Gadatas publicly (5.3.19; 5.3.30–33), so it would be surprising, and false, if Gadatas denied the existence of any previous obligation. He does not do so; he only minimizes it, saying that the benefit accrued to Cyrus' friends (the Hyrcanians; see 5.3.11). But even so the opportunity for Cyrus to grant this benefit to his friends was provided by Gadatas.[21]

Gadatas' claim that Cyrus never promised to come to his assistance is completely false, since Cyrus has made such a promise (5.3.28).

Since Gadatas does not actually claim that Cyrus has acted selflessly, what is he praising him for? What is so admirable about coming to the defence of a valuable ally to whom one is indebted and facing a common enemy after promising to do so? Possibly, Gadatas admires Cyrus for taking a long-term view of the benefit he will derive or for recognizing the value of a seemingly insignificant player. But we may suspect that Gadatas has other motives as well in speaking highly of Cyrus. He may exaggerate Cyrus' deeds because he wishes to cement a relationship with him by amplifying the degree of his own indebtedness and future obligation. His words are also themselves an expression of his own gratitude to Cyrus. His praise itself constitutes a kind of return for the favour Cyrus has done, since it increases his prestige. By implying that Cyrus has not yet received much benefit, his words magnify the amount of return Gadatas still owes, thus encouraging Cyrus to continue to support and make use of him. Indeed,

[21] There is an interesting parallel between the way Gadatas speaks about Cyrus and the way Cyrus speaks about him which suggests that Gadatas is not at all naïve about Cyrus' motivations. Rather than a contrast between a selfless and a selfish leader, we have a portrait of two leaders who act on mixed motives but praise the other for being first in granting benefits. Just as Gadatas praises Cyrus for acting without any prior obligation, so too does Cyrus praise Gadatas for acting in a similar spirit (5.3.30–31). But Cyrus himself knows perfectly well that Gadatas is acting for personal motives, for when Gobryas first mentioned Gadatas he described him as someone 'who would pay' to get revenge on the king (5.3.10). His public description of Gadatas' motivations is made for his own personal and political purposes. Cyrus wishes to inspire his troops to aid Gadatas, and he does this by describing him as a benefactor who had no prior obligation. Similarly, Gadatas knows perfectly well that he has aided Cyrus significantly, but he still speaks as if Cyrus were first to offer any benefit.

Gadatas will prove an invaluable ally in the day ahead. Far from offering a tribute to the virtue of selflessness, the passage shows the value of being forward in doing favours to honourable men such as Gadatas who are sure to offer a great return on the investment.

In the rest of Xenophon's writings there are numerous signs that he approves wholeheartedly of the pursuit of self-interest. Xenophon frequently praises Socrates for benefiting his friends (e.g. *Memorabilia* 1.3.1). The main benefit Socrates provides is advice on how they may pursue their self-interest more effectively. If that is worthy of praise, then the successful pursuit of self-interest must be a good thing. Cyrus' father, one of the most authoritative voices in *Cyropaedia*, takes a similar attitude. Like Xenophon's Socrates he is primarily concerned with utility, offering his son advice on how to achieve his self-interested goals, even speaking at length of *pleonexia* as a worthy goal (1.6.26–46). Among other things, he argues that performing acts of benevolence can contribute to the leader's pursuit of his own aims (1.6.24), exactly what Cyrus' critics charge that he does.[22]

In Xenophon's view there is nothing wrong with performing an act of beneficence for the sake of self-interest. Acts of beneficence are useful for advancing one's interest, and Xenophon constantly shows Cyrus making good use of them. As Cyrus says, 'by enriching and benefiting human beings, I acquire goodwill and friendship, and from these I harvest safety and glory' (8.2.22). Cyrus' openness about this belies the claim that it is a mark against him. Moreover, if it were wrong to be beneficent for such self-interested reasons, we would not expect to find Cyrus encouraging others to act exactly in this way towards himself. But this is what he does. For example, when rewarding Chrysantas (4.1.3–4; 8.4.10–11) for doing things that were never asked of him he explains that he wishes to encourage others to do so as well (8.4.12). He does not seem the least bit worried that such future acts of generosity towards himself might be motivated by self-interest. On the contrary, by holding out the prospect of reward for such deeds, he encourages his subordinates to act benevolently towards him for the sake of self-interest. Thus Cyrus does not encourage selflessness in his soldiers, as do so many modern leaders and educators. Rather he encourages them to serve others as a means of promoting self-interest. If he encourages others to serve him out of selfish motivation, why should it be wrong for him to benefit others for such reasons?[23]

22 Incidentally, if Cyrus' father represents the old regime, any criticism of Cyrus on this point should apply to that regime as well.

23 Aristotle on the other hand criticizes such self-interested motives in friendship (*Eth.*

Sincere *philanthrōpia*

Selfless behaviour is not a standard to be found in Xenophon, so it would be wrong to criticize Cyrus for a lack of it. But one may still wonder whether Cyrus' relentless pursuit of self-interest comes at the expense of some other value Xenophon does hold dear: justice, for example, or benevolence (*philanthrōpia*). It seems almost self-evident to a modern reader that the relentless pursuit of self-interest implies a lack of concern for the welfare of others, and hence that Cyrus' self-serving *philanthrōpia* is insincere. Azoulay (2004b: 323 n. 229) comments, 'La *philanthropia* est assurement une *technè* de gouvernement et non une générosité "spontanée et authentique" (*contra* J. de Romilly, 140–141)'.[24] But is it true that Xenophon regards these as mutually exclusive options?

One thing we cannot doubt: Xenophon's Cyrus possessed *philanthrōpia* as a natural endowment. When he first describes Cyrus' nature, Xenophon lists one physical characteristic, beauty, and three characteristics of his soul, *philotimia, philomatheia* and *philanthrōpia*, love of human beings (1.2.1).[25] There is no justification for discounting this explicit statement which sets the framework for the book by announcing that *philanthrōpia* was a basic part of Cyrus' nature.

Towards the end of *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon returns to this theme to explain why *philanthrōpia* is a valuable trait for a political leader:

> In the first place, he continually made his benevolence of soul every bit as visible as he could, for he believed that just as it is not easy to love those who seem to hate you, or to be well-disposed toward those who are ill-disposed toward you, so too those known as loving and as being well disposed could not be hated by those who held that they were loved. (8.2.1)

Cyrus certainly made an effort to impress others with his benevolence, and he had good practical motives for doing so. But Xenophon does not say merely that Cyrus acted benevolently towards others. He says that he

Nic. 9.5 [1167a14–18]). If he does not have Xenophon in mind, the kind of friendship he criticizes is clearly quite similar to what we find in Xenophon.

24 'Philanthropy is certainly a technique of government and not a "spontaneous and authentic" generosity (*contra* de Romilly, 140–141)'. Carlier 1978: 153 put it better: 'La générosité de Cyrus n'est pas *seulement* un trait de caractère, c'est une méthod de gouvernement' ('The generosity of Cyrus is not *only* a character trait, it is a method of government': italics added). Later, however, Carlier contrasts the two motives (156).

25 This last quality has received detailed study by Due 1989: 163–170 and Azoulay 2004b: esp. 320–326.

displayed the benevolence of his soul (*philanthrōpian tēs psuchēs*) to them. How could he have done this if he had none?

While a modern reader may feel there is something mercenary or degraded in the self-interested display of virtue, there is no sign here or elsewhere that Xenophon takes such a view. On the contrary he praises Cyrus for displaying his *philanthrōpia* and recommends his practice. The fact that Cyrus benefits from his love of people in no way implies that he does not in fact love them. Xenophon thus attributes to Cyrus a relentless pursuit of self-interest which somehow coexists with a genuine concern for the good of others. He appears to view these as compatible psychological motives. In his speech to his troops concerning Gadatas, Cyrus gives eloquent expression to this idea:

> Now then, men, we would seem to me to be doing something noble if we should enthusiastically give aid to Gadatas, a man who is our benefactor. And we would also be doing what is just by paying back his favour. But it seems to me that we would also be doing what is advantageous for ourselves. (5.3.31)

Here Cyrus encourages his men to assist Gadatas from a variety of motives. From his point of view, there is no contradiction between acting for the sake of the noble and just and acting for one's own interest. Why then would it be impossible to act both benevolently and self-interestedly?

One may wonder why, if it is the *appearance* of benevolence that is useful, Xenophon insists on attributing actual benevolence to Cyrus?[26] The question is made all the stronger by the observation that benevolence is included in a list of qualities which are not merely admirable, but also useful. This is obvious in the case of love of knowledge and the love of honour, and Xenophon even makes a special effort to show how Cyrus' beauty was useful to him in winning his uncle's troops (4.1.22).[27] The fact that Xenophon lists *philanthrōpia* as one of Cyrus' noteworthy traits (1.2.1; see 8.2.1, 8.7.25 and 8.4.7–8) implies that this trait too is useful to him in promoting his political advancement. But why is genuine benevolence necessary? Would not pretence be good enough?

Xenophon never addresses this question directly. But if we take account of what he says about the virtues, we can easily see what he would say. Xenophon often emphasizes the importance of making a good appearance. If a leader appears to be virtuous and wise, people will want to follow him

[26] Herodotus' Deioces provides an example of politically successful insincere beneficence (1.96–101).

[27] The usefulness of beauty is a general theme in Xenophon's work, reflected in most detail in the speeches of Clinias and Socrates in *Symposium* (4.10–18, 5.4–7; see *Mem.* 4.6.9).

(*Mem.* 3.3.9; *Cyr.* 1.6.22, 3.1.20). What is the best way to make this impression? Xenophon consistently says that the best way to appear virtuous is by actually being virtuous (*Mem.* 2.6.36–39, 3.3.9–10, 3.6; *Cyr.* 1.6.22–23). By analogy, the best way to make the impression that one cares about others is by sincerely caring for them.[28] One might arguably be able to accomplish something by mere pretence, but genuine benevolence is more effective. Cyrus was blessed from birth with a sincere love of humanity, and this, together with his other qualities, enabled him to surpass all others in generosity, and as a result to gain more loyal followers than any other man.

Conflict of Interests?

If we substitute justice for benevolence, a similar argument has been made recently on entirely different grounds by Morrison 2008. Basing himself on Socratic materials from *Memorabilia*, he argues that Socrates believed men to be motivated by two seemingly contrary motives simultaneously. According to Xenophon's Socrates, *all* actions are chosen for the sake of self-interest (*Memorabilia* 3.9.4; Morrison 2008: 13–18). But at the same time, everyone always does what appears to them to be just (4.6.6). Put together, this implies that everyone always acts for self-interest and justice simultaneously (Morrison 2008: 15–18).

As a purely psychological claim, this thesis faces no difficulty. All that is required is that all people identify their perceived self-interest with what seems just to them. As long as we assume that individuals may be deluded about one or the other, there is no difficulty in supposing the two motives to be compatible: people may simply assume that whatever they want is just. Of course, this will in no way prevent them from clashing with each other on a daily basis.

[28] The practical value of sincerity is attested in modern times by Dale Carnegie's emphasis on the importance of showing sincere interest in others (*How to win friends and influence people*, part two, chapters one and six). A similar idea appears in a story told about Rabbi Israel ben Eliezer, popularly known as the *Baʿal shem tov*. When asked who is the most benevolent man he ever met, he indicated the owner of a local tavern, explaining that he provides food and lodging to anyone who asks, and always does so with a warm smile. When it was objected that the man does so in view of the profits he hopes to realize from his business, the *Baʿal Shem Tov* replied that, on the contrary, the man chose the business as a convenient pretext for exercising his love of humanity. In the case of Cyrus, one might argue that the desire to manipulate others for his own advantage brings out the best in him: his affection for others might have remained quietly in his heart if it were not useful to him to express it.

But what about those who are not deluded? They can only pursue justice and self-interest if no clash really exists. This means that they would never have to restrain their pursuit of self-interest out of concern for the rights of others. Xenophon affirms an even stronger thesis—the compatibility of beneficence (doing good to others), and not merely justice, with self-interest. This is a stronger thesis because someone engaged in beneficence must avoid causing even justified harm to others—although for Greeks, to whom justice and benefit are always closely related, the gap may not be extremely wide.

Understandably enough, commentators on *Cyropaedia* do not all operate on the assumption that such conflicts do not exist. This is why many commentators would not describe Cyrus' career as a series of just or beneficial acts. Even Tatum (1989: 71), who never says there is anything wrong with Cyrus' pursuit of self-interest, says that Cyrus accomplishes his goals 'at other people's cost rather than at his own'.[29] In itself, this does not imply a criticism, since the world can be viewed as a place of competition in which the pursuit of one's own advantage at the expense of others is a legitimate and proper endeavour. It does not necessarily imply that Cyrus performs injustice: it may be just to cause harm to others. But it does imply a conflict between self-interest and the interests of others, and such a conflict would make beneficence problematic.

To what extent do interests conflict? While Xenophon never attempts to show that no genuine conflict is possible, he does show that many of the common conflicts can be avoided. The ideal leader, represented by Cyrus, is almost always able to assist others while assisting himself.[30] Xenophon says that for Cyrus,

> the functions of a good shepherd and a good king are similar, for he said that just as the shepherd ought to treat his flocks by making them happy (in the happiness of sheep of course) so a king similarly ought to treat cities and human beings by making them happy.[31] (8.2.14)

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29 Cf. Nadon 2001: 179–180.

30 See Gera 1993: 294–295; and Breebaart 1983: 121 ('monarchical planning presupposes that the number of functions is equivalent to the varieties of the human species …'), 127 ('the welfare of the king and that of his subjects is identical'). I do not mean to claim that Cyrus loves or benefits everyone. In addition to the traits Xenophon mentions, Cyrus also seems to possess a keen love of killing, which does not seem reducible to the love of honour.

31 Ambler translates 'just as a shepherd ought to use his flocks while making them happy'. The term 'use' may have a negative connotation in English in such a context. Sometimes *chrēsis* means 'use' in the sense in which we speak of someone who makes use of other people for his own benefit and therefore may also have a negative connotation (see e.g. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 9.5 [1167a18]). I would find nothing problematic if Xenophon means to say here that

This indeed is what Cyrus generally does. But there are occasions on which Cyrus seems to do harm to others. At the very least, he takes good things away from some of his friends and allies, as well as his enemies. This would not contradict sincere benevolence, since the sincere love of others is undoubtedly compatible with the greater love of self.[32] But it might show a conflict of interests, a conflict which Cyrus resolves by favouring his own interest over that of others.

To see why this is not so, we need to recall that taking good things away from others is not the same as doing them harm. This was a commonplace of Greek philosophy. As Aristotle says, not every good thing is good for everyone, and rather than pray for good things, one ought to pray that they be good for oneself (*Nicomachean Ethics* 5.1.9). As Plato says, the same meat is not good for us and for Polydamas (*Republic* 338c). Where a good thing is not good for someone, taking it away from him or her can be in everyone's interest (see *Republic* 331c, 332a–b; *Memorabilia* 4.2.17). In *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon provides an anecdote which expresses this idea perfectly: the anecdote of the big and little boys. As judge, Cyrus approved of the actions of a big boy who took the big tunic of a small boy and gave him his own smaller tunic (1.3.17). While the interpretation of this episode may be open to debate, it does offer a clear illustration of the natural differences between people and their implications for distributive justice. In particular, it shows that it is sometimes better for someone to get less than what they wish. As Cyrus says in explaining his decision, 'it was better for *both* of them that each have the fitting coat' (1.3.17). While his teacher does object to the means used to effect this exchange, he does not object to this obvious point. A small coat is preferable to a big coat for a small boy, even if a small boy will not always recognize this, because *a big coat will not fit him properly*.

This image serves as a key for understanding Cyrus' later acts of redistribution. Cyrus frequently deprives overly-privileged individuals and groups of their excessive privileges. He demotes Sacas, at least temporarily, in his grandfather's court; he eliminates privileges held by the upper classes in Persia; he curtails the freedom and independence of the Armenian king. With the partial exception of the first case,[33] Cyrus' re-distributions are just and advantageous to all concerned. The loss of privileges by the upper class

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Cyrus derived personal benefit while making others happy. But to avoid prejudicing the issue, I prefer to translate *chraomai* as 'treat'.

32 See Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 9.8 (1168a–1169b).

33 Even in the case of Sacas, Cyrus claims that he will perform the task better than his rival does (1.3.4–9).

Persians means genuine competition between all members of society, a greater degree of justice and benefit in the distribution of goods and offices, and the transformation of the commoners into powerful and useful allies. The Armenian king's subjugation is more generous than the treatment he deserves (death) and brings him more benefit than his freedom ever could, as he himself recognizes (3.2.15–16). Like Aristotle's natural slave, he is better off under the rule of another. Cyrus' treatment of the king of Armenia brings benefit to the king, to the people of Armenia and Chaldaea, to uncle Cyaxares, and of course to Cyrus himself. This is the model of good political rule.

Me and My Uncle

The most prominent, complex and problematic example of Cyrus' depriving a friend of good things is his treatment of his uncle Cyaxares. Nadon (2001) has provided the most detailed effort to paint this episode in a negative light.[34] He argues that Cyaxares' initial argument against a follow-up campaign was reasonable (89–90), that in persuading his uncle to lend him troops Cyrus misleads him concerning his ultimate destination (91), that he fails to alert Cyaxares concerning the arrival of the Hyrcanians (92–93, 98), that he takes enormous and unjustified risks with his uncle's troops (93), that he deliberately misinterprets his uncle's angry letter (94), that he ignores his uncle's order to return the cavalry (95), that he abandons his uncle in enemy territory (95), that his offer of additional troops is insulting (95), that the letter he sends his uncle is insulting (95–96), that he takes advantage of the imbalance of power that he has created (96) and refuses to comply with a direct command (96). The letter itself is designed to teach all who hear it to think nothing of Cyaxares (96). In the final reconciliation, Cyrus uses deception to persuade his uncle of his justice. Cyaxares becomes silent not because he recognizes the truth of Cyrus' words but because he is stunned by the audacity of Cyrus' fabrication (97). Cyaxares' complaints

[34] Other commentators also view this episode as an example of Cyrus' pursuit of self-interested and his unjust treatment of others. This is the implication of Carlier's treatment of the incident (1978: 146–147). According to Gera 1993: 285, this is the only incident prior to the conquest of Babylon in which we 'get a glimpse at the darker side of the historical conquests of Cyrus the Great'. She does not mention the treatment of Cyaxares in her list of mutually beneficial deeds that Cyrus performed prior to the conquest of Babylon (294–295; it does belong there in my view). See also Hirsch 1985: 81–82, Tatum 1989: 115–133, Azoulay 2004b: 63–68.

against Cyrus for stealing the esteem of his men are fully justified, as is confirmed by the parallel between him and the Armenian king (98–99). Cyrus' efforts to answer his uncle stem not from any benevolence or honour, but merely from his desire to prevent a rift which might undermine his authority in the eyes of his men (99). Cyrus' failure to answer his uncle's charges (unlike his uncle's silence in the face of Cyrus' explanations) shows that his uncle's charges are justified (99). His ability to reconcile his uncle is based on his ability to deceive him into believing that his troops are as loyal as ever (99–100).

Nadon's interpretation contains three main weaknesses. First, his individual claims are frequently implausible. For example, his suggestion that Cyaxares becomes silent not because he recognizes the truth of Cyrus' words, but because he is stunned by the audacity of Cyrus' fabrication is implausible for several reasons: 1) Silence is not the only, or even the most likely, response to audacious fabrications; 2) Xenophon offers no hint that this is Cyaxares' reason for silence; 3) when Cyaxares does recover his voice he fails to mention the alleged fabrication; and 4) there is no audacious fabrication.[35] Similarly, his claim that Cyrus ignored an order to return the troops is unfounded, since Cyaxares never issued such an order to Cyrus (he merely ordered his own troops to return). Secondly, Nadon relies on his own moral assumptions in passing judgement on Cyrus and fails to show that Xenophon held such assumptions. While insinuating and implying that Cyrus' actions are unjustified he never addresses the serious questions concerning the theory and practice of justice that would make such a judgement valid. Thirdly, he fails to bring the episode into relation with other episodes and anecdotes recorded in *Cyropaedia* and in Xenophon's other writings which would shed light on its interpretation. In responding to Nadon's portrait, I will focus on showing that Cyrus does not harm his uncle but rather combines genuine benevolence with the pursuit of mutual benefit. Since the charge of deception has been raised against Cyrus in this episode, I will also address this tangentially related issue.

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35 Nadon claims that the fabrication is Cyrus' claim that he invited to Cyaxares to join him in taking vengeance on the Assyrians. According to Nadon 2001: 97, citing 4.1.20, he merely requested cavalry in order to chase down stragglers. But Cyrus was referring to his previous words (4.1.12). Although Xenophon does not record those words, Cyaxares' response (4.1.13–18) makes it clear that he thinks Cyrus invited him to participate in a joint attack on the Assyrians. Since he thinks that Cyrus invited him, he could not view Cyrus' claim that he invited him as a fabrication of any kind.

Big and Little Boys

Like other exchanges recorded in *Cyropaedia*, Cyrus' treatment of Cyaxares bears comparison with the anecdote of the big and little boys. The connection is made clearest when Cyaxares arrives at Cyrus' camp and compares his own contingent with that of Cyrus:

> When Cyaxares saw many noble and good men (*pollous te kai kalous kai agathous*) following Cyrus, yet with himself a retinue both small and of little worth (*oligēn te kai axian oligou*), it seemed to him something dishonourable, and he was seized by grief … (5.5.6)

He explains to Cyrus:

> I see myself riding here in this humiliating and unworthy fashion, and I see you present here, great (*megan*) and magnificent, accompanied by my own retinue along with additional power. I think that it is harsh to suffer these things even at the hands of enemies, and much more harsh, by Zeus, at the hands of those from whom I ought least to have suffered them … (5.5.8–9)

Cyaxares is distressed by the greatness and magnificence of Cyrus' retinue in contrast with the smallness and poor quality of his own. He has less than he had previously, while Cyrus has much more; and this change has come by means of an exchange: it is his troops that Cyrus now leads. Like the big boy in the anecdote, Cyrus has redistributed goods by taking the excess goods of a smaller boy for himself.[36]

This episode is perhaps the most prominent example of the exchange of coats in *Cyropaedia*, and it is reasonable to assume that the anecdote of the big and little boys was designed in part to shed light on it. The central issue it raises, ignored by Nadon and others, is the question of the justice or fittingness of the exchange. The young Cyrus believed that goods should be distributed in accordance with some principle of fittingness or desert, not merely in accordance with ownership. According to Nadon, Cyrus gains great power at his uncle's expense; but he does not ask which of the two deserves that power. The answer seems obvious. Cyrus is described throughout as a supremely competent ruler, both benevolent and beneficent to his men, and lacking in personal vices. In contrast with him, Cyaxares is portrayed as an indolent and incompetent leader, more interested in womanizing and drinking than in caring for the interests of his men or even for his

[36] The comparison between apparel and troops is a minor Xenophontic *topos*: Cyrus compares a well-outfitted army to decorative dress, arguing that good troops are the best decoration for their commander (3.3.6; see 2.4.5–6, 8.3.4).

own true interests. Proportional justice demands that the most honourable and demanding positions be accorded to the best men, as do utilitarian considerations. On both of these grounds Cyrus deserves the troops more than Cyaxares, and this alone may well justify whatever steps he takes to acquire them.

Deception?

This is really enough to reply to the 'darker' readings of Cyrus which accuse him of doing wrong to his uncle. The use of deception and even force may well be justified in Xenophon's view for the achievement of a just and beneficial redistribution. But Xenophon has greater ambitions in *Cyropaedia*. He wishes to illustrate a better method for achieving a just redistribution, one which avoids brute force and outright deception.[37] This is reflected already in the anecdote of the big and little boys. While the aim of the big boy may have been justified, the method he used was not the best. One problem was using brute force to accomplish a redistribution while under the coercive authority of others. One may well wonder what alternative he had. It is exceedingly difficult to persuade people to relinquish their excess power and possession willingly. One generally needs coercive power in order to accomplish just redistributions. If the possession of coercive power is a precondition for successfully executing an exchange, how then can a deserving person (Cyrus) who lacks it possibly execute such an exchange? This is the difficulty whose solution Xenophon illustrates through his character Cyrus.

In Xenophon's view, deception is clearly justified when the aim is to accomplish a mutually beneficial distribution against someone's will. Deception is one of the tactics that Cyrus' father recommends, and he even tells

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[37] See Danzig 2007, for a more detailed analysis of Xenophon's views on deception. The strategy of issuing far-reaching leniencies and then portraying a leader who succeeds without relying on them is characteristic of Xenophon. For example, he seems to believe that nothing forbids an unprovoked attack on a neighbouring county: his Cyrus argues at length that one should make use of military virtue just as one makes use of farming skills, and he criticizes his Persian ancestors for not reaping the fruits of their military virtue by using them in practice (1.5.8–11). Unless he means to say that the Persians failed to respond to acts of aggression in the past, such criticism of their military inactivism presumes the legitimacy of unprovoked warfare. Unrestricted military activity of this sort seems to be justified on the grounds that it tends to result in the victory of regimes with greater internal distributive justice (see Danzig 2009; contrast Due 1989: 158–163). Although in practice Xenophon presents Cyrus as avoiding unprovoked aggression, this is because there are advantages to starting in the position of the wronged party (see 1.5.13).

his son that in the olden days there was a teacher who taught the children to use it on friends for a good purpose (1.6.31). Although this is no longer taught publicly in Persia, Cyrus' father does teach Cyrus this lesson on the eve of his departure.[38] Presumably this advice is to be used at some point in the story, but where is it used more conspicuously than in the deception of Cyaxares? It seems reasonable, then, to assume that Cyrus does use deception on his uncle for a good purpose, and that Xenophon warmly approves. But, surprisingly enough, Cyrus does not use it.

Instead, Cyrus persuades his uncle to accept an ambiguous or indefinite exchange whose actual results are determined only by later events. Cyaxares agrees to allow Cyrus to recruit among his troops, but does not set limits to the number of troops or the duration of their service. He would not have agreed to this if he had known that virtually all his troops would enlist with Cyrus. Cyaxares does not become aware of the number of troops that enlist until after the deed is accomplished. This unawareness is dramatized by his engaging in revelry (as do the camp's servants) at the very time that the fatal exchange is taking place (4.5.8). Once the exchange is complete, Cyrus possesses the coercive power to prevent its reversal. This method of exchange is necessary in this case because Cyaxares would not agree to the loss of virtually all his troops, and his possession of the troops would make it impossible to deprive him of them by force.[39] But it does not involve deception.[40]

Withholding Information?

Cyrus might be guilty of some mild form of deception, however, if he concealed a secret plan which he knew would result in the almost universal recruitment of his uncle's troops. It is true that he does not tell his uncle everything he has on his mind. But, interestingly enough, it seems clear that he had no sure-fire plan of recruitment. His success in recruitment must be attributed to three distinct factors. One is the serious effort he puts into

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38 Contrast Gray 2011: 267.

39 In other cases, Cyrus has no need of anything approaching subterfuge. He uses violence to enforce exchanges with enemy leaders. And in confronting friends he relies on ordinary forms of persuasion either because he knows the other party will not regret the redistribution, or because he has the power to enforce it if they should.

40 See the comment of Weathers 1953: 320: 'The trickery of Cyrus is however not so much a falseness as it is a superiority in thinking. It is manipulation rather than actual deception.' We may add that the manipulation is to the advantage of its victim.

it, making use for example of his old admirer for this purpose (4.2.22–23). Another is his reputation and charisma. The soldiers have had experience with his leadership and with the leadership of Cyaxares, and are capable of recognizing the difference. As Cyrus' father has said, the best way to win obedience is by convincing others that it is in their own interest to follow you (1.6.21; see *Memorabilia* 3.9.11). Nothing illustrates this principle better than the decision of Cyaxares' troops to follow him in the mopping-up operations he suggests.

But these are not the only factors at play, and it seems that on their own these would not have led to the astounding results he achieves. Other factors outside of Cyrus' control contribute to the result: 'But when they saw the Hyrcanians … many came out also in order to get something' (4.2.10). Without this motive, it appears, Cyrus would not have recruited these members of his uncle's force, and hence would not have recruited the full number he did.[41]

Even if Cyrus had had a secret plan that he knew would effectively recruit the full complement of his uncle's troops, I see no reason to believe that Xenophon would find him delinquent in not discussing it with his uncle. On the contrary, since such a discussion might have resulted in a reduced measure of mutual success, it would presumably have been wrong to hold such a discussion. But Xenophon prefers to show that Cyrus did not even withhold any such plan. He did not know how well he would succeed, since he did not know that the Hyrcanians would arrive at that moment. This shows both that he did not knowingly trick his uncle out of his entire army and also that a certain degree of luck is very helpful, not to say indispensible, in military affairs (see below, pp. 521–522).

Change of Plan?

When Cyaxares declines the offer to continue the campaign, Cyrus does not attempt to persuade him to change his mind—presumably because he recognizes that his uncle cannot be persuaded (see 4.1.14–18). Most likely, too, he prefers not to share the spoils equally with his uncle, or at least not to do so from a position of equality. He addresses Cyaxares as follows:

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[41] Nadon 2001: 92 raises questions about the meaning of the term providential in this context by pointing out that 'Xenophon goes on to give an account of their providential arrival in purely human terms'. But Xenophon is probably referring to the timing of their arrival.

> But do not compel anyone; rather, grant me those who are willing to follow along.[42] And perhaps we would return bringing you and each of these friends of yours things which you will all enjoy yourselves. We will not even pursue the main body of the enemy, for how would we catch them? But if we catch some part detached from the army, or left behind it, we will bring it back to you. Consider that, when you asked, we travelled a long way to gratify you. So it is just that you now gratify us in return, so that we may go home with something in our possession and that we not look to your treasury. (4.1.19)

Here Cyrus appeals to his uncle's weakness as a leader, his love of gain, his fear of danger, his sense of justice or reciprocity, and his fear of financial loss. These appeals succeed because Cyaxares prefers to be the beneficiary of Cyrus' efforts rather than making efforts himself. As Azoulay (2004b: 60–72) has shown, those who are recipients of benefits rather than benefactors generally lose leadership positions, and rightly so. Cyaxares is not happy with the results at first, but they are the natural results of his own decision to pursue the things that are important to him.

Here again, the question of deception arises. Cyrus is careful not to make any firm commitments he will be unable to fulfil. He does not promise to bring anything back for Cyaxares, although in the event he does do so. The only point where he fails to do what he has said is his claim that he will not pursue the main body of the enemy. Cyrus does go on to pursue, overtake and defeat the main body of the enemy. How then do we explain his saying that he will not do so? Are we to understand that he has deliberately deceived his uncle, promising not to pursue them while intending actually to do so? Nadon implies that he has: 'Yet while he spoke with some bitterness to his captains of how the Persians' lack of cavalry prevents them from pursuing the Assyrian's main force, he assures Cyaxares that if he lends the Persians some horsemen, they will certainly not pursue the main body of the army but will only round up stragglers (4.1.11, 19)' (2001: 91). This paraphrase is not fully disclosive. In the passage referred to, Cyrus does not speak to his captains of attacking the enemy's main force, rather he speaks of the need to pursue those who fled on horseback (4.1.11). Moreover, Cyrus does not assure his uncle unconditionally that he will not pursue the main body of the enemy. He says that that he will not pursue them because it would be impossible to do so. His statement is framed not as an unconditional personal undertaking to Cyaxares but as an unfortunate concession to existing

[42] Incidentally, while this comment seems designed merely to relieve his uncle of the necessity of issuing a command, it also serves to improve the spirit of the soldiers: soldiers who come freely are more enthusiastic than those who are compelled (4.2.11).

circumstances. If circumstances should allow pursuit, Cyrus' words actually imply that he would consider undertaking it. Cyaxares does not object or insist that Cyrus undertake not to pursue the enemy even in such a case.

Unforeseen circumstances do arise which make such pursuit more feasible than Cyrus could have thought. The providential arrival of the Hyrcanians alters the situation completely, for they claim that it is possible to overtake the Assyrian camp swiftly, thus eliminating the very obstacle Cyrus had mentioned to his uncle (4.2.4–6). Without the Hyrcanians, Cyrus would not have been able to pursue the enemy; consequently he would not have done so, and his conquests would never have taken place. When speaking with his uncle, Cyrus had no means of knowing that these troops would arrive. The placement of their arrival—after the discussion with Cyaxares but before the Median troops actually assemble[43]—seems designed to show that Cyrus' pursuit of the main body of the Assyrian camp is a change of plan. But that means that when he spoke with Cyaxares he spoke the truth, even on this point. The most one could say is that Cyrus ought to have gotten permission for the change of plan. But he had no good reason to believe that his uncle would agree.[44] Here we reach the following Xenophontic moral/political principle: a competent military leader may unilaterally alter an agreed plan, when circumstances in the field prove favourable, in order to accomplish an act of mutual benefit, even if the other party to the agreement would probably not have agreed.

The fact that Cyrus' success depends partly on fortune rather than purely on his own arms[45] reflects a conviction that appears not infrequently in Xenophon that fortune plays a significant role in political events and that

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[43] One might argue that Cyrus' promise to the Hyrcanians that he will pursue the Assyrian is a violation of his agreement with Cyaxares if it obligates the Median volunteers and not merely Cyrus' own troops. But the meeting with the Hyrcanians takes place before the Median troops actually join Cyrus' expedition, so the promise that Cyrus made to the Hyrcanians was not made on behalf of any Median soldiers. Apparently, Cyrus is willing to join the Hyrcanians and pursue the Assyrians even if he has no Median troops. One may wonder how he could fulfil his undertaking to the Hyrcanians without any cavalry, but the Hyrcanians do have cavalry of their own.

[44] Further considerations may play a role here as well. Since Cyaxares has declined to participate in the expedition he cannot expect to be consulted on changes of plans. Moreover, he displayed an eagerness to receive the benefits of Cyrus' efforts, so Cyrus may justifiably believe that he is pursuing his uncle's benefit by expanding the scope of the campaign. The charge that Cyrus has neglected to consult with a superior officer concerning this change in plans seems inappropriate since Cyrus is not a member of Cyaxares' army, and hence Cyaxares is not his superior officer.

[45] The contrast is so formulated by Machiavelli, possibly with Xenophon's Cyrus in mind. See *The Prince* chapters 6–7.

not everything is under an individual's control.[46] The intervention of fortune enables Cyrus to gain control of his uncle's forces without being forced to engage in bald deception. Although deception is inherently permissible precisely in these circumstances where a friend stands to gain by it, Cyrus' father has made it clear that there are good reasons to avoid deception if at all possible. If fortune had been malignant, Cyrus might have been forced to act differently, and as a result might not have reached the pinnacle of success.

Lack of Consideration

It may appear, however, that, while avoiding culpability, Cyrus nevertheless displays a lack of consideration for his uncle. Certainly, he does not make sure that his uncle is satisfied at every stage of the action. Cyrus does not voluntarily limit his recruitment effort. He does not inform Cyaxares of the full extent of his success in recruitment. He does not return to his uncle and say, 'Are you sure you want to fulfil your commitment in light of the fact that virtually all of your troops wish to join me?' Nor does he ask if, in light of the event, his uncle does not wish to join them in the campaign. Any of these options would put the continuation of the campaign at risk or be damaging to Cyrus in some other way. So it seems clear that Cyrus is willing to cause his uncle some pain for the sake of his military plans.

Of course we must acknowledge that this is not his aim. Cyrus does not act out of envy and he does not desire to harm his uncle. Even as a youth, Cyrus never displayed envy (see 1.4.4; 1.4.14). At the worst, the pain he causes his uncle is the side-effect of his pursuit of his own gains. As we will see, this pursuit does not entail his uncle's loss and the pain he causes is temporary. Cyrus' ambitions are far greater than outdoing Cyaxares, and he will prove content to leave his uncle with everything he had previously and more. He does not need his uncle's moderate possessions; all he needs is their temporary use as a loan in order to acquire the far more extensive properties of his enemies. He does not need to alienate the troops from Cyaxares, even temporarily, unless that is the only way to gain their use. It would have been sufficient for his purposes if his uncle had agreed from the beginning to continue the campaign against the Assyrian (4.1.12; see

[46] See *Mem.* 1.1.7–9. Xenophon also emphasizes that Cyrus' success is dependent on characteristics he was born with. Had he not been born as the good-looking son of a king, he would not have had the success he had. This may be part of an indirect effort to explain why Socrates, who lacked these two traits, never ruled the world.

5.5.19–20).[47] But once he refuses, Cyrus has no choice but to seek other methods if he wishes to continue. To ask him a second time would be to risk ending the campaign. Here we reach a second Xenophontic moral/political principle: one is not obliged to show special consideration to others when such consideration will result in mutual harm or damage. Or, one may properly offend someone when this is necessary for the accomplishment of significant mutually beneficial actions.

Cyaxares of course does not understand this principle or its relevance to his own situation. When he realizes the extent of his abandonment, he composes an angry letter demanding that the troops return:

> I did not think that you, Cyrus, would deliberate about me in a way so lacking in consideration,[48] or, if Cyrus is of this judgment, that you Medes would be willing to leave me so alone. Now, whether Cyrus wishes it or not, be here as quickly as possible. (4.5.10)

Xenophon tells us that the letter he actually sent contained additional threats, and that his purpose in sending the letter was to strip Cyrus of his troops (4.5.12). But while Cyaxares expresses anger at Cyrus, he does not charge him with deceiving him or violating his promise, claiming only that he has acted without consideration or foresight. I have translated the term *apronoētos* as lack of consideration rather than foresight because in Cyaxares' mouth this is the prominent connotation. While everything Cyrus has done has been in accordance with his agreements, the results are highly offensive at this moment. We may of course dissent from the opinion that Cyrus ought to have been more considerate under the circumstances, but Xenophon's approach is more interesting. By using the ambiguous term *apronoētos*, Xenophon illustrates the central point of the episode. Although Cyaxares is criticizing Cyrus for a lack of consideration, the word he uses primarily refers to foresight, exactly the quality Cyrus has displayed. Cyrus has perhaps displayed a lack of consideration for Cyaxares' foolish short-term wishes, but he has shown genuine consideration and foresight for his uncle's true long-term interests. Cyaxares, for his part, displays neither consideration nor foresight either for himself or his nephew.

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[47] As Tuplin 1997: 85–86 points out, 'Cyaxares had largely brought the circumstances that led to "alienation" of Medes on himself'. Moreover, 'It was Cyaxares' tactical impatience to which Cyrus as a subordinate eventually had to give in (3.3.29, 46, 56) that produced a situation calling for further military action; and it was that action which caused the dispute' (86 n. 10). This is a point that Cyrus tactfully omits to mention in their later conversation.

[48] *Apronoētos*. Here I deviate from Ambler's translation for reasons given below.

Who Violates What?

In the passage quoted above, Cyaxares does not charge Cyrus with any deception or violation of agreements, nor does he charge his own troops with such violations either, since he knows neither charge would be valid. Instead, he limits himself to expressions of anger and dismay, and issues new commands to his troops. His anger and dismay may be explained as resulting from the temporary loss of resources he did not deserve, and hence as an expression of his unjust desire. But while angry at both parties he is intelligent enough to recognize that his real conflict is with his own troops who abandoned him for a better leader, and not with Cyrus. Rather than asking Cyrus to return his troops, he asks his troops to abandon Cyrus. When Cyrus later frames the conflict as a conflict between Cyaxares and his troops (4.5.21), rather than himself, he is following Cyaxares' lead, and is right to do so.

While Cyrus has not violated his agreement with Cyaxares or treated him badly, Cyaxares has behaved badly towards Cyrus and the troops. After all, he gave Cyrus permission to recruit his troops and gave his troops permission to be recruited, setting no limit either on their numbers or on the duration of their service. Even if he believed that Cyrus had undertaken not to pursue the main body of the enemy, he has no way of knowing that he has in fact done so. By what right then does he command the troops to return? By doing so he not only violates his own word both to Cyrus and to the troops themselves, he also risks harming the mutual interests of everyone concerned. If Cyaxares disregards his agreements and threatens their mutual interests in this way, is Cyrus obligated to uphold his agreements or act in his uncle's interest? Although Cyrus does continue to act in his uncle's interest, this continued concern seems attributable more to his *philanthrōpia* than to any remaining obligation.

The Charitable Interpretation

If the anecdote of the big and little boys is applicable, Cyaxares ought to gain by his temporary loss of excessive power and authority just as the small boy would have gained by the loss of his excessive clothing. One can certainly argue on good Xenophontic grounds that this is the case.[49] As Xenophon

[49] In a Socratic sense, Cyrus cannot have taken his kingship from him since he was not a genuine king in the first place. Although he himself claims to be one (5.5.8, 34), Socrates

sometimes says, even being a slave can be beneficial (*Oeconomicus* 1.23). Certainly being a political leader can be disastrous for the incompetent. This is most obvious in the case of the king of Assyria, whose incompetence to rule makes him easy prey for Cyrus. Cyaxares too makes serious mistakes of judgement which do not bode well for his success as an independent leader (2.1.1–10; 2.4.8, 12; 3.3.30, 46). Subordination to Cyrus brings numerous benefits: salvation from the Assyrian threat, protection for life from all other threats to his rule, both internal and external, a life of continued ease and luxury, and more honour than is consistent with his deserts. He can be added to the list of those who are better off playing the part of the woman.[50]

By gaining the supremacy over his uncle, then, Cyrus is performing an act of both justice and benefit. He does not perhaps benefit his uncle as much as he might have done: depriving him completely of his personal freedom to indulge in luxurious living would probably have been even more beneficial. But he does offer significant benefit. Cyrus' efforts to benefit his uncle can be observed throughout their relationship, including in the episode we are considering in which Cyrus takes control of his uncle's troops. Benefiting his uncle does not mean doing what his uncle asks, since his uncle does not know where his own true interests lie. As Socrates says, it is not just (because not beneficial) to return a weapon or other possession to a lunatic (Plato *Republic* 331c, 332a–b) or someone who might do damage with it (*Memorabilia* 4.2.17). Cyrus' own interest, and that of his troops, in continuing the campaign is clear enough. In fact, it is in everyone's interest that the troops remain with Cyrus, for Cyrus can make better use of them than his uncle could. Cyaxares himself recognizes (5.5.3–4) that troops are a damage to him when they are with him, while if they remain with Cyrus, he stands to gain substantially. In the present instance, the return of the troops would be especially damaging: by ordering his troops to return, Cyaxares risks precipitating a harsh confrontation as Cyrus indicates in a later conversation (5.5.11–12; see 4.5.19; 4.5.9). If not inducing open revolt, at the very least such a meeting would reduce the troops' respect for their king and create a situation of ongoing tension and dissatisfaction in Media.

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defines a king not as one who holds the sceptre, but as one who know how to rule (*Mem.* 3.9.10–11; see 3.1.4, 3.2). On the other hand, at several points in the narrative characters comment that Cyrus is truly a king by his nature (e.g. 1.4.9—Cyaxares himself; 5.1.24), and Xenophon himself attributes to him knowledge of how to rule (1.1.3).

50 Croesus: 7.2.26–28; Sacian: 8.3.35–48. See Azoulay 2004b: 66–67. While Cyaxares may be better off in the role of a woman, this is not necessarily to be interpreted as a compliment. Contrast Gray 2011: 275–276.

But Cyrus extends additional benefits to Cyaxares aside from retaining his troops. The very words by which Cyrus deprives his uncle of his authority are themselves an act of kindness and beneficence. The benefit consists not only in stripping him of harmful excess authority, but also in enabling him to retain more authority and prestige than he deserves, and more than he could retain on his own.[51] Here are Cyrus' public words to the troops after receiving his uncle's letter:

> But I do not wonder at all, messenger and Medes, if Cyaxares, having then seen many enemies and not knowing how we are faring, has misgivings both about us and about himself. Yet when he perceives that many of the enemy have been destroyed, and that all have been driven away, he will first of all stop being afraid, and then will recognize that now he is not alone, since his friends have been destroying his enemies. But how can we deserve blame, we who are benefiting him and are not even doing this on our own initiative? For I then persuaded him to allow me to take you and go off, and you, unlike men who might have desired this expedition, did not ask to depart and come here. Rather you—whoever among you was not annoyed to do so—came only after being ordered/bidden to do so by him.[52] His anger, I know clearly, will have been assuaged by these successes and will vanish with the cessation of his fear. So get some rest now, messenger, since you too have laboured; and, Persians, since we are expecting enemies to be present, either to do battle or to obey, let us deploy ourselves as nobly as possible, for it is more likely, if we are seen like this, that we will accomplish what we want. You, ruler of the Hyrcanians, order the leaders of your soldiers to arm their troops and then wait here. (4.5.20–22)

Cyrus' deliberate misinterpretation of his uncle's letter is widely seen as a deceptive act designed to encourage the troops to disobey Cyaxares' orders for Cyrus' advantage and to the disadvantage of Cyaxares. We have already

[51] In reporting Cyrus' reaction to his uncle's letter, Xenophon emphasizes the contrast between the two men. Immediately before receiving the letter, Cyrus has sent to Persia with a request for additional Persian troops. He says that these troops are needed for the purpose of gaining rule over Asia for Persia, the first time he has referred to such a goal (4.5.15–17). His recent success against the Assyrians has given him a new goal. The desire to use military means to gain revenues is not new, for he emphasized that in his first speech to the troops. But only now does he see a clear opportunity for doing so. Immediately after sending this optimistic message, Cyrus receives the messenger from Cyaxares who has come to demand the return of the Median troops. This contrast reminds us of the divergence in leadership aims between the two men.

[52] The word *keleuein* has caused some confusion. Because it can be translated 'order', Nadon 2001: 94 detected a contradiction between Cyrus' description of the event and the event itself. But *keleuein* is a weaker term than 'order' and can be better translated 'bid' or 'direct' (see e.g. Ambler 2001 at 5.1.1). As such it is not an inappropriate way to refer to the permission that Cyaxares gave to his troops.

argued that retaining the troops is of mutual advantage, as Cyrus here points out. We note, moreover, that he does not order the Median troops to ignore Cyaxares' commands; nor does he violate any orders given to himself. Cyaxares does not have the authority to give Cyrus orders and he does not do so.[53] He concludes the letter he sends in reply to his uncle (see below) by saying that he will return to Cyaxares as soon as he has accomplished some things that will be of mutual benefit, presumably referring to military operations. It may appear that in saying this he makes a unilateral decision to violate his uncle's orders or wishes concerning his troops. But in fact his statement does not refer to his uncle's troops. Although he has issued directives to the messenger, to the Persians and to the ruler of the Hyrcanians, he does not issue any directives whatsoever to the Medians. Cyrus is careful not to ask the Median troops to remain with him. And later he frees them from any obligation to do so, promising to reward not only those who stay but also those who return to Cyaxares (5.1.19–23), thus making it easier for the soldiers to leave if they wish.

By the same token, Cyrus does not order the Medes to return to their king, but rather leaves them free to make their own decision. Undoubtedly he encourages the troops to remain with him despite his uncle's expressed wishes by arguing falsely that Cyaxares' anger stems from his concern for the well-being of his troops. Rather than displaying concern for the well-being of his troops, Cyaxares will claim later that he is distressed by their success (5.5.27). But this deception clearly serves a good purpose, since, as we have argued, Cyrus' retention of the troops is in everyone's interest. His words serve also to promote his uncle's interest in another way as well. If his aim were merely to retain the troops for the sake of the mutual benefits that arise from military conquest, Cyrus could simply have argued that Cyaxares has broken his promises, lost his reason and does not deserve further consideration; and he would have been justified in doing so. While beneficial to himself, however, such a course would have been detrimental to his uncle's interests, and Cyrus is still motivated by *philanthrōpia*. Therefore he takes the opposite course. He encourages the troops to remain with him by attributing to Cyaxares reasonable and honourable concerns, especially concern for the well-being of his troops. This is not the truth, and Cyrus may well suspect that it is not, even though he has no real way of knowing. But by describing Cyaxares in this way, Cyrus contrives to maintain

53 Contrast Nadon 2001: 96.

and augment his uncle's honour and authority in the eyes of his troops while retaining the troops.

Cyrus has been charged with seducing his uncle's troops (Carlier 1978: 147; see below, pp. 533–534). But his seduction of them may be compared to the seduction of an estranged and battered woman whose husband has mistreated her. And rather than seeking to end the relationship or stealing the woman, Cyrus aims to enable the couple to reunite in a more harmonious relationship. Like Socrates, he is a kind of intermediary or pimp, defending Cyaxares before the troops, and defending himself and the troops before Cyaxares. By effecting a reconciliation, he serves the interests of all concerned, himself included. Above all, the episode teaches us that true consideration consists in achieving results that are of mutual benefit rather than honouring the unreasonable demands of those who are not fit to make decisions.

Good Advice

Cyrus also helps his uncle by offering him good advice. The letter he sends (4.5.27–33; and see also his words at the reconciliation in 5.5.6–36), offers a useful perspective on Cyaxares' behaviour as leader. Cyrus reminds his uncle of the many good deeds he has done on his uncle's behalf, and of his uncle's lack of reciprocity. He responds to Cyaxares' charge that Cyrus has abandoned him, informing him of his recent victory over their common enemy and arguing that this accomplishment is a mark of friendship. He complains of his uncle's desire to recall his troops, pointing out that he has brought many troops to his uncle's defence, and that he did not ask his uncle to recruit Persian troops himself, as he has had to do with the Median troops, but brought as many as he could (4.5.29). He describes the poor treatment he has received at Cyaxares' hand which nullifies any debt he might have had towards him, but tells him that he will continue to seek his uncle's best interest anyway. He informs him that he has sent to Persia for additional troops which he will put at his uncle's disposal. While this may serve to offset the troops that have followed Cyrus, it is a generous loan which Cyrus was not obligated to make. He concludes by offering his uncle some advice with regard to his treatment of his troops:

> Even though I am younger, I advise you not to take back what you give, lest enmity be owed you instead of gratitude; when you wish someone to come to you quickly, do not send for him with threats; and when you declare that you are alone, do not deliver threats to large numbers, lest you teach them to

> think nothing of you. We will try to be back with you as soon as we accomplish what we believe would, when done, be goods in common for both you and us. Farewell. (4.5.32–33)

While this may sound like a rude reprimand, Cyrus claims he is offering good advice. Indeed he is. Rather than deluding his uncle, Cyrus offers advice which encapsulates the very attitudes that have guided him throughout his own life and have brought him great success. Were it not for the fact that this advice seems to serve Cyrus' own interest, we would have little difficulty recognizing its value. But as we have said, the fact that it serves Cyrus' interest does not imply that it is lacking in benevolence or beneficence. Cyrus suggests that age alone does not confer wisdom. He reminds his uncle of the importance of keeping one's word and extending benefits to others. He points out that a position of leadership is a fragile thing and that Cyaxares' behaviour is detrimental not only to his troops, but also to himself, since it will alienate all his friends. He encourages him to think of political leadership not as an inherited right, but as a position that must be earned. If Cyaxares had adopted this perspective previously he would never have sent such an ill-considered letter in the first place and would never have lost authority over his troops.

I'm a Loser

In addition to describing Cyrus' actions, Xenophon also offers a striking portrait of Cyaxares' mindset. Cyaxares provides the touching perspective of a little boy who has lost his oversized coat and been given one that fits better. As we have noted, a little coat is actually better for a little boy, so why should he be unhappy? While many answers might be offered, Xenophon's description of Cyaxares suggests that the central reason is envy.

Cyaxares' envy is evident everywhere. In his complaints to Cyrus he says he is especially unhappy that a friend rather than an enemy has taken his troops (5.5.9). Earlier, Xenophon has reported that he was especially angry when he learned that the Hyrcanians had joined Cyrus (4.5.12). In both cases, Cyaxares appears pained not by his own loss but by his friend's gain. According to Xenophon, Socrates defined envy (*phthonos*) as follows:

> … a kind of a pain, not concerning the suffering of one's friends or the success of one's enemies, but those are envious who are annoyed at the success of their friends. (*Memorabilia* 3.9.8)

He adds that such people are fools. Cyaxares' claim that he would be less unhappy if his enemies had taken control of his troops is indeed foolish. He

does not reflect that if his enemies had taken his troops he would certainly lose his kingdom, and quite possibly his life.

Xenophon grants Cyaxares an opportunity to express his envy to Cyrus in their great conversation in Book V (5.5). The conversation is reminiscent of some of Xenophon's Socratic dialogues. As Socrates frequently does, Cyrus tries to educate his uncle by offering him a better, more practical perspective, instructing him not to place the blame for his sufferings on external forces, but to examine his own role in creating the situation he is in. The dialogue also recalls Thucydides' famous Melian dialogue which presents a confrontation between two conflicting perspectives on justice: a traditional, religious perspective and a realistic, utilitarian one. As in these other cases, Xenophon uses the dialogue form to allow a successively deeper penetration into the thoughts and assumptions of the conflicting figures.

Although manifestly inferior to Cyrus in every way, Cyaxares nevertheless believes that he deserves his position because of his birth (5.5.8) and as he dwells on it he even comes to the conclusion that he deserves it because of his merits (5.5.34). Either way, he believes that Cyrus has wronged him. Cyrus does not even attempt to show him the difference between their worths. Instead he reduces his uncle to silence by recounting the numerous good deeds he has done for him, all of which went unreciprocated.[54] The conversation thus drives Cyaxares to a remarkable description of how it feels to be deprived of what one does not deserve by the good deeds of one's better:

> But Cyrus, I do not know how one could say that the things you have done are bad. Be well assured, however, that they are good in such a way that the more numerous they appear, the more they oppress me, for I would wish to make your country greater by my power rather than to see mine so enlarged by you, for your deeds are noble to you who do them, but somehow the same deeds bring dishonour to me. And as for valuables and the way you are now giving them to me, I think it would be more pleasant to bestow them upon you than to receive them from you like this, for being enriched in them by you, I perceive even more those ways in which I am becoming impoverished.

[54] The conversation recalls the dispute between Achilles and Agamemnon at *Il.* 1.152–160. While Agamemnon saw himself as the powerful leader of the army, Achilles paints a picture of Agamemnon as a distressed victim who appealed to and received assistance from Achilles, and who lacks gratitude. Similarly, Cyrus brings Cyaxares to realize that he is the helpless and ungrateful recipient of Cyrus' kindness. Of course, he does so in more considerate language than Achilles used, and achieves a result more beneficial for all concerned. Here as often Xenophon provides a non-tragic solution for the problems that stand at the heart of Greek tragedy.

> And I think that if I should see my subordinates unjustly treated by you, at least in small things, it would cause me less pain than seeing now that they have experienced great goods at your hands. (5.5.25–27)

Some readers, sympathizing with Cyaxares' pain, have adopted the perspective he expresses and concluded that Cyrus is to be blamed for inflicting this pain on him.[55] But while Cyaxares does deserve the sympathy that is naturally felt for those in pain, this does not imply that he has been wronged or even harmed. While the speech offers a vivid expression of Cyaxares' feelings, and an honest expression of the thoughts that plague an invidious individual, it does not justify his behaviour.

Rather than providing a condemnation of Cyrus, the speech actually provides an ironic condemnation of Cyaxares himself. Cyaxares claims that he would prefer to be offering benefits to Cyrus rather than receiving them. This is something he never thought of before. Cyaxares has never attempted to benefit anyone, certainly not Cyrus. On the contrary, he always chose to be the recipient of benefits done by others. He preferred the easy path of relaxation and pleasure, never showing either the ability or the inclination to do the hard work necessary to provide good things for others (compare *Memorabilia* 2.1). Why then does he suddenly express, in a hypothetical way, the wish to do good for others? Apparently he is dissatisfied with the results of his policies. But why? If ease and pleasure were really the only important things to him, he should not be troubled in his present circumstances in which neither of these has been taken from him. Unlike the proverbial cicada, forced to eat the bread of his own indolence, Cyaxares does not face any material loss at all. He is distressed because he now realizes that man does not live by bread alone. He also loves honour, and desires to retain his honour even while continuing to live the life of luxury and pleasure he has lived until now. That should not be possible according to Xenophon's theory of leadership (see e.g. *Memorabilia* 2.1). And yet, in the end, Cyaxares will actually be able to do so, but once again only thanks to the good offices of Cyrus.

Cyaxares appears to be struggling with a new insight into political life ('somehow') but he never draws the conclusions that follow from his observations. Rather than blaming himself or undertaking a new path, he continues to blame Cyrus, even while he admits that Cyrus has done him only good. He blames him paradoxically for doing too much good, recognizing that he himself has been reduced to the status of a woman dependent on

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55 Nadon 2001: 98–99; see Carlier 1978: 147.

a man for good treatment (5.5.33). Rather than recognizing his own faults, Cyaxares remains the same person he has always been, caring only for himself and his own losses, not about others, even going so far as to express the wish that his troops would suffer at Cyrus' hands (5.5.27). His continued desire for his own private pleasure is implicit in his assumption that a wife is the dearest possession a man may have (5.5.30; he says this unthinkingly to a man who has no wife and who has rejected the offer of a very beautiful woman out of practical considerations). For Cyaxares, character is destiny. His intellectual recognition that benefiting others is more honourable and useful than being benefited by them does not lead to any repentance or change for the better. But it does provide the dramatic proof of his own error.

Cyaxares is not only distressed at being himself the object of Cyrus' beneficence. He is also distressed that Cyrus has been so good to his troops. In a painful image, Cyaxares compares himself to a cuckold whose wife loves a truly better man. In a scene reminiscent of Priam's grovelling before Achilles, he is compelled to appeal to the very man who caused him all his pain. But how reasonable are his complaints? They rest on the assumption that subordinates are property and that it is wrong for others to compete for their loyalty. Just as one's possession of a wife ought to be guaranteed, no matter how badly one treats her, so too one's possession of one's troops ought to be guaranteed, no matter how badly one treats them. This is the perspective of the little boy with the big coat, a perspective in which ownership rights take precedence over any genuine conception of distributive justice. Cyrus on the other hand seems to think that justice is better served when men and women are free to choose the best leaders they can rather than being treated as the property of the local bully.[56] He remains committed to the kind of redistribution he approved in the case of the big and little boys long ago in Persia, even if he uses superior methods.

[56] Cyaxares also asks Cyrus to put himself in his place: 'What about this, if you—in a friendly way—bid one of your friends to take what he wants, and on hearing this he then takes as much as he is able to get and leaves, and if he then becomes rich with what is yours, while you do not have use of even a moderate amount, would you be able to believe such a person to be a blameless friend?' (5.5.32). Cyrus does not respond to this challenge, or to many of the other points Cyaxares makes, but a response is not difficult to imagine. The loan was not a friendly loan, but was given in view of a possible return. Cyrus' action can be compared to borrowing a loan from a bank, and then, after parlaying the loan into a more substantial sum, using it to purchase the bank itself. Such a manoeuvre might anger the bank president. He might regret ever having given the loan in the first place. He might consider the purchase to demonstrate a lack of gratitude. But it would not. And when he sees that under its new owners the bank is saved from collapse and prospers as never before, and that he is allowed to retain his position as president, he might even welcome the new arrangement.

Cyrus as Seducer

As Carlier (1978: 147) has aptly observed, Cyrus' political skills are the skills of a seducer. In this, he resembles both Socrates and the sophist who seduced the son of the king of Armenia. Comparing these three cases will reinforce the conclusions we have reached.

Nadon (2001: 98) compares the seduction of Cyaxares' troops to the case of the sophist commenting that 'the harm Cyaxares has received from Cyrus is in some ways much worse than what the sophist did to the Armenian'. As the king says, the sophist caused his son Tigranes to love him more than himself (3.1.39), and it is undeniable that Cyrus caused Cyaxares' troops to prefer him to Cyaxares. But did the sophist actually harm the king? Although it may seem hard to imagine how seducing a young man could be beneficial to the father, Xenophon makes it clear that this was the case. In fact, the sophist actually *saved the king's life* by seducing and educating his son. During the trial of the king, Xenophon comments that Cyrus was interested in hearing Tigranes' words since he knew he had spent time with a wise man or sophist (3.1.14). This makes it clear that Tigranes' words, which ultimately save his father's life, were based on the teachings of the hated sophist. Thus, while the sophist's seduction of the king's son may arouse understandable human feelings of resentment and anger, it is nevertheless highly beneficial to the king himself.

Was the king nevertheless right to destroy the sophist in revenge for seducing his son? Nadon (2001: 98) argues that the fact that Cyrus advised forgiving the king implies that he was somehow justified, and hence that Cyaxares too is justified in his resentment against Cyrus. But this does not follow. Cyrus' advocacy of forgiveness and expression of sympathy for the king's emotions do not imply that he condones his actions. On the contrary, forgiveness actually implies the recognition that wrongdoing has been done. Both Cyrus and the sophist himself (3.1.38, 40) say clearly that the king acted wrongly in killing the sophist.

The parallel between this story and the story of Cyaxares redounds therefore to Cyrus' advantage, not that of Cyaxares. In both cases, a good man seduces the subordinate of an inferior man and thereby provides substantial benefits to the inferior man. Just as the sophist expressed understanding of the king's feelings and action, so does Cyrus express sympathy with Cyaxares, actually weeping together with him (5.5.10). Cyrus differs from the sophist (and from Socrates) by the fact that he does not suffer death at the hands of those who feel resentment against him, and in this way he improves on the Socratic narrative. He learned as a young man not to take

justice into his own hands until he has the power to do so with impunity (1.3.15–18). As a result, Cyaxares never has the opportunity to kill him.

The idea that the better man is a better seducer, that seduction by such a man is beneficial even to the cuckold, and that the opposition to seduction arises from envy, is a lesson Xenophon undoubtedly learned from the life of Socrates. The parallel between Socrates and the sophist is well-known.[57] Like Cyrus and the sophist, Socrates was a seducer of young men: he boasts of his knowledge of pimping (*Symposium* 3.10) and is manifestly capable of seducing attractive young men (e.g. *Memorabilia* 4.2). As I have argued elsewhere,[58] the charges against Socrates were in Xenophon's view the charges of jealous and aggrieved parents against someone who seduced their children (see *Memorabilia* 1.2, *Apology* 14, 20). Xenophon does not deny that Socrates did such things; rather he defends and justifies the youth in their preference for Socrates. Socrates deserved their love and respect more than their parents did because he was better and more beneficial than they (*Memorabilia* 1.2.49–54, *Apology* 17, 20–21). The demands of parents to be loved and respected regardless of their demerits are not legitimate demands. Such parents are like little boys who do not deserve to retain their privileged places in the hearts of their children.

If the sophist is designed as an image of Socrates, we should expect that many of its details reflect the life of Socrates. We should infer that Socrates was somehow responsible for the salvation of Athens by means of the teachings he imparted to his students.[59] We should also infer that Socrates was somehow forgiving of Athenian iniquity towards him. But from our point of view, the parallel between the two cases reflects primarily the legitimacy of seduction and the illegitimacy of envy. Justifying the king's resentment against the sophist, or Cyaxares' resentment against Cyrus, would be tantamount to justifying the resentment of the Athenian jurors who voted to condemn Socrates, which is the last thing Xenophon would want to do.[60]

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57 See Gera 2007, 39–41.

58 Danzig 2010: 156–157.

59 One can only speculate about whether or not Socrates' students ever deserved credit for saving the city of Athens. Some of them could possibly be credited with saving Athens by establishing the rule of the Thirty Tyrants. Although highly unpopular later, they could claim to have saved Athens from the wrath of Sparta at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war. But if the analogy is precise, the incident should have occurred after Socrates' death.

60 For a very different interpretation of the parallel, see Huss 1999: 404.

Restoring Honour

We have noted above some of the ways in which Cyrus benefits Cyaxares, especially his efforts to prevent Cyaxares from losing the respect and loyalty of his soldiers. This concern for his uncle is emphasized above all in their meeting of reconciliation. Rather than humiliating his powerless uncle in public, Cyrus takes him aside for a private discussion, and in that discussion displays deep sympathy, breaking down and weeping with him (5.5.10). True, his father has told him that displays of empathy are useful in winning devotion (1.6.24). But Cyrus barely needs Cyaxares' devotion at this point. He may wish to achieve a reconciliation in order to cement the loyalty of the Median troops to himself. But even this is a comparatively weak motive, since the troops have already demonstrated a willingness to humiliate their commander for the sake of Cyrus. But even if some of these motives operate, we have no reason to doubt Cyrus' sincerity, since we have already learned that the pursuit of self-interest does not contradict sincere *philanthrōpia*. The sincerity of this expression of sympathy is confirmed by its similarity to his earlier expression of understanding for the feelings of Tigranes' father, which had no self-interested motive (3.39). While striving for justice and mutual benefit, Cyrus is nevertheless deeply sympathetic to those little boys who lose what they do not really deserve to have.

Nadon (2001: 99) notes that Cyrus does not answer his uncle's final heartfelt complaints, and he infers that they are unanswerable (but contrast his very different treatment of Cyaxares' failure to answer Cyrus: 97). But there are better ways to explain Cyrus' behaviour. He may wish to allow his uncle to save face by not forcing him to admit that he is fully in the wrong.[61] Explaining that the troops remained with him of their own free will, for example, despite his permitting them to return, would only deepen his uncle's grief. He may recognize that his uncle is not capable of adopting a better perspective on their relations at this moment, particularly since he has a mistaken view of Cyrus' motives. Aiming always for a good result, Cyrus seeks to facilitate a mutually beneficial reconciliation by demonstrating that Cyaxares' deepest fear, that he has lost the position of honour he once held, is unfounded.

Instead of answering his uncle, Cyrus asks for one small favour from him in return for all the good things he has done. He asks his uncle to wait and

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[61] See 5.5.11. In some cases, such as his treatment of the king of Armenia, Cyrus does force others to bow to his will openly, but these are exceptions. Gray 2011: 275 offers a similar explanation for Cyrus' silence.

see whether Cyrus has alienated the affections of his troops or not (5.5.35). The one favour he asks, in other words, is the opportunity to do a further favour. Cyrus leaves his uncle's side with a kiss, and orders his uncle's troops to place themselves at his uncle's service. At his advice, they offer voluntary gifts to their king (5.5.37–40). As far as we know, they have never before done any such thing. Why are Cyaxares' troops so willing to honour him at this juncture? Part of the answer is that they have just won a battle. By ignoring Cyaxares' wishes, and instead pursuing his interests, Cyrus has put his troops into a position to offer Cyaxares these honours. Additionally, they are happy to have seen signs of reconciliation between him and Cyrus (5.5.37). Here is the one case in which Cyaxares has acted intelligently. By recognizing when he is beaten and being willing to take the best offer he can get and make do with a life that combines pleasure with a large degree of undeserved honour, he is able to retain the good will of his troops. He retains his kingdom because he is able to perceive where his interest really lies (compare the *homotimoi* who accept the elevation of the commoners: 2.1.12) and to choose it in preference to futile revenge.

But the main reason they honour Cyaxares is that Cyrus has asked them to do so (5.5.37–39). Nadon (2001: 99–100) objects that the honour the troops offer Cyaxares is false honour, derived as it is from Cyrus' command. But what could Cyrus do about that? Genuine honour is earned only by the exercise of virtue. Having had experience of Cyrus' leadership, the troops will naturally be unable to honour their king above him. Should Cyrus have failed to display virtue in defending his uncle from the Assyrian—losing a battle, for example, in order not to make a too good impression on his uncle's troops? Should he have treated his uncle's troops badly in order to preserve their respect for their king? Should he have forced them to return to Cyaxares against their will? Or more strongly encouraged them to do so despite the damages and losses this would entail? The fact that Cyaxares is unable to retain his position by his own powers implies that he will either retain it by the grace of someone else, or that he will not retain it at all. It seems perverse to blame Cyrus for allowing him the former option.

The benefits that Cyrus offers Cyaxares here are similar to those he offered his grandfather and mother in Media. When distributing meats to servants in his grandfather's house, Cyrus offered brief explanations for his small favours: 'This is for you because you teach me to ride with enthusiasm; for you, because you gave me a javelin, for now this is all I have; for you, because you serve my grandfather well; for you, because you honour my mother' (1.3.7). As I have argued, Cyrus should be understood as simultaneously expressing his affection and pursuing his interests. The first

two comments are designed to reward the servants for serving Cyrus and to encourage them to continue to do so. They encourage the servants to view him, Cyrus, as the source of benefits and fitting object of their service, thus serving Cyrus' clear interests. The last two comments, however, encourage them to serve his mother and grandfather. Undoubtedly, these words are the expression of his sincere affection for the servants and for his mother and grandfather. But one would expect that Cyrus would also gain personally.

Cyrus' gain is evident when one considers the danger he creates by alienating the affections of his grandfather's servants. His mother and grandfather may not appreciate it when they find their servants running to serve Cyrus and neglecting themselves, and may be taken by jealousy just like Cyaxares. By using his influence to encourage the servants to serve his mother and grandfather, Cyrus takes steps to counter any such feelings that might arise. Rather than being displeased by his growing influence, his mother and grandfather will be happy with it. By behaving as a benevolent leader, he frees them from the need to engage in household politics while providing them with better servants than they ever had. In this way he protects himself from possible retaliation against his growing power in court.

This is exactly the technique he uses to reconcile his uncle to his new position. It succeeds because in both cases Cyrus' 'victims' can perceive that Cyrus has acted in their interests. But whereas Cyrus has a clear personal interest in reconciling his mother and grandfather to his growing influence, since he remains under their power, his interest in reconciling his uncle is less pressing. Practically speaking, Cyrus has very little to gain from his uncle's good will since he already possesses the complete loyalty of his troops. His action on behalf of his uncle, even more than his earlier action on behalf of his mother and grandfather, is a testimony to the sincerity of his benevolence.

Conclusion

The fact that Cyaxares does not initially recognize the benefit he receives may be attributed to his overestimation of his own abilities, merits and deserts. Like other little boys who have inherited big coats, Cyaxares has a hard time accepting the fact that he must make do with a bit less than he would like, even if this means retaining more than he deserves. His virtue is that he does accept the new reality. As a result of the honour the Medes offer him, Cyaxares changes his opinion (5.5.40). He is so content with his new position that he will now vote in favour of continuing the military campaign

(6.1.19) and will give his daughter and hence the future throne of Media to Cyrus (8.4.5). Should we protest on his behalf that despite his unfitness for office, despite his retention of the undeserved office, despite his receipt of unmerited benefits, and despite his satisfaction with the results, he has been wronged? It is hard to find a principle in Xenophon that would justify such a protest.

We may wonder, however, why some readers have come to the conclusion that Cyrus mistreats Cyaxares and have used this conclusion to validate 'dark' readings of *Cyropaedia*. Presumably such readers do not share the perspective on justice and benefit that Xenophon endorses throughout his writings. Readers naturally sympathize with those who are in distress, sometimes disregarding the fact that such people may well be the victims of their own faulty behaviour. Some readers undoubtedly empathize personally with Cyaxares, perhaps sharing with him the fear of being outdone and the desire to retain undeserved power and authority. Others, looking deeply into their own souls, may find it hard to believe that anyone, even a Cyrus, would not deliberately abuse the power he had acquired. There may be those as well who bear ill-will to anyone who is successful and good. By rejecting a conventional *phthonos*-based morality, and showing that self-interest is compatible with benefiting others—and indeed supported by it—Xenophon charts an original path toward a more rational practice of political leadership. In doing so he challenges beliefs that are as popular today as they were in his own time.

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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

PHERAULAS IS THE ANSWER, WHAT WAS THE QUESTION? (YOU CANNOT BE CYRUS)*

John Henderson

> ... ἡ Ἀσία, ἡ Εὐρώπη γωνίαι τοῦ κοσμοῦ· πᾶν πέλαγος σταγὼν τοῦ κοσμοῦ· Ἄθως βωλάριον τοῦ κοσμοῦ· πᾶν τὸ ἐνεστὼς τοῦ χρόνου στιγμὴ τοῦ αἰῶνος· πάντα μικρά, εὔτρεπτα, ἐναφανιζόμενα ...
>
> ... Asia-Europe: crannies of the universe; all Ocean: a droplet of the universe; Mt. Athos: a clod of the universe; all Present Time: a dot of eternity; all things: small, mutable, evanescent ...
>
> (M. Aurelius, *Meditations* 6.36)

In the course of setting up the elaborate finale for *Cyropaedia*'s charm offensive Xenophon stops the action, and contrives to lob a cosmicomic clod of his own at the reader. A million to one shot, and as such *bound* to hit home, as is any fictional clod picked up to make a story. It relates directly to his grand theme, the virtual impossibility of stable government, in whatever form. At the outset, Xenophon rolled out one of his trademark 'change of mind' proems, first declaring the relative intractability of human as against any other 'herd' ... —but then thought 'Cyrus of Persia', and 'was forced to have second thoughts, a change of mind': 'maybe it's neither an impossibility nor a tough call to rule over people, *if* you handle it "expertly"' (ἐπισταμένως, 1.1.3).[1] 'You see, Cyrus "was so very different from / superior to" other kings ...' (τοσοῦτον διήνεγκεν, 1.1.4, 6)[2] that he had the most triumphant and

* This was a great Liverpool colloquium; not so great that my paper, 'If Pheraulas was the question, what was the answer?', was not quite written at the time: this is the post-circulated version.

[1] Cf. Gray 2011: 287, Tamiolaki (this volume, p. 567). On the human herd: 2.2.26, 2.3.9, 8.3.49. Cyrus' thoughts on keeping vs winning the empire: 7.5.76–85, where 'the system' must fake it that empire spells 'nothing new', even in terms of 'upbringing' παιδεία. *KP* regularly recaps/re-reads *KP*: esp. 5.5.15, 7.5.46. To make (sure) we think, re-think.

[2] Miller's Loeb translation gives 'so very different was he ...' at 1.1.4, but 'he so greatly

enduring reign, by juggling 'shock and awe' with 'ingratiation and imprinting' (τῷ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ φόβῳ ἐπιθυμίαν … τοῦ αὐτῷ χαρίζεσθαι, 1.1.5). The 'miracle' of Cyrus, then, and so the making of Cyrus, 'deserved' to become Xenophon's research project, on *How The East Was Won and Won Over*, because he is the exception that proves you *can* rule (ὡς ἄξιον ὄντα θαυμάζεσθαι, 1.1.6). Nice one, Cyrus.

At 8.3.27, Cyrus is taken at his word when he proudly-cum-smugly employs a proverbial metaphor and is taken literally by a young brave from out in the wilds: it's a dead cert., 'I'll show you where you can't miss a good guy', namely in my entourage, 'even if you shut your eyes and shoot!'[3] The episode starts off riddling, and soon bungs in the symbolic clod,[4] the guy who got hit but isn't here,[5] the one who's 'like *insane*!',[6] the hick who took it on the chin and got a nosebleed[7] for rising so high in court; this story that began with the original 'kingdom for a horse'[8] winds up handing a comrade the chance to pick his own life-style, as if he's won the lottery (and he *has*). A squillion to one shot, here's a prime included paratext of a sidesh(ad)ow interlude that reflects back the condition of subjectivity in the ranks of Cyrus' subjects.

However monarchically monological the imperial narrative has managed to drill and train focus on its man-marvel, it's obvious that any character must be partly knowable through the perceptions of others, including (as we have already noticed) those inculcated in them by the ruler, whether by personal self-profile, as policy, through statecraft, or else unawares, by turn of events, trick of the light. Values, too, are irremediably polynomial affairs,

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excelled …' at 6; cf. 8.2.21. The narrative proper starts with Cyrus having shown himself through his primary education 'different from/superior to all of his peers' (1.3.1, διαφέρων ἐφαίνετο: Miller, 'he showed himself superior …'). An indifferent start. The translations below are by me; the text mainly follows Miller, or OCT, or … .

3 'Can't miss' fish in a barrel, 8.3.27 ~ 1.4.11, cf. 5.2.13 below.

4 For the clod as improper/parody missile, see 2.3.17–20 below (mimed, aetiological: 22–24); Cic. *Caecin.* 60, *non fuisse 'armatos' eos qui saxa iacerent quae de terra ipse tollerent, non esse arma caespites neque glebas*; Ach. Tat. 3.13.2, Egyptian 'clod-chucking' bandit horde of Boukoloi βώλους … ἐβάλλον, their 'bruising stones-cum-wounding arrows' no match for an army. The etymology of προπηλακισμός hitches 'mud-slinging' to Greek invective (dirt as, you'd think, matter out-of-place in a panegyric bio).

5 'Presence' codes 'attendance (on Cyrus, at court)', so loyalty, Pheraulas' régime: esp. 8.1.5–6, 16–27.

6 'Crazy' Cyrus is the other character dubbed μαινόμενος: 1.4.24; cf. 'off on one', ἐνθουσιῶν, 1.4.8.

7 Tribal tradition forbade Persians from spitting and nose-blowing in public, 8.1.42, cf. 1.2.16, 8.8.8, Azoulay 2004: 166–167.

8 I have no idea how *Richard III* came to hijack the phrase, only ideas. Curiouser and Cyriouser …

swarming with comparisons, and differentially diffused across the society of a story. The loyal comrade from the early days makes *the* telling mirror for his commander when it comes to pay-off time, once they've hit the jackpot. Xenophon smuggles this in-your-face aside in to make a point about 'autocracy': it impacts on *self*-rule, as subjects fix their own ?~~autonomic~~? realms, under the sway, naturally, and in the forcefield, of their head of state (his 'clones', rulers as well as ruled, 8.1.4). For better for worse, one thing Cyrus can never quite be (let's simplify) is one of his followers; and yet assessing what he has done to and for them is a necessary component of his own balance-sheet in life, beyond awe or adulation. We shall need to have the meat of the passage before us, both for the riddles it sets (and the riddling narrative it launches) and for the toying tone, or mucker modality, as it chimes with the typically Xenophontean charm that suffuses and *deepens* the great saga. Roll up, every one a winner (8.3.26–31):

> [26] Then, the story goes, Cyrus asked the lad if he'd take a kingdom for his horse. 'A kingdom?', he replied, 'No, I wouldn't take a kingdom. But I *would* take banking a favour with a good guy'. [27] And Cyrus said, 'OK, I'd like to show you where you can't miss a brave man, even if you throw with your eyes shut'. 'All right', said Saces-the-Sakian, 'so show me—and I'll throw this here clod', picking one up as he spoke. [28] And Cyrus showed him where most of his friends were. The guy shut his eyes and let fly with the clod, and there, riding past, Pheraulas was struck; by a stroke of luck, you see, Pheraulas happened to be carrying some message from Cyrus, under orders. The throw got him but he didn't turn around, no, he went after what his orders told him to. [29] Saky opened his eyelids and asked who'd the strike get. 'Nobody, I swear to god, nobody who's here', said Cyrus. 'Well, hold it', the lad said, 'it sure wasn't someone who *ain't* here.' 'Oh god yes', said Cyrus, 'you hit that guy who's riding his horse fast past the chariots.' 'So', he said, 'how come he doesn't even turn around?' [30] 'He's a crazy fella, so it seems', answered Cyrus. On hearing this, the lad went off to find out who it was. And he found Pheraulas with his chin covered with soil and blood. You see bleeding had poured from his nose where the throw got him. When he got there, he asked him if he'd copped the throw. [31] 'That you can see', he answered. 'Well OK', said he, 'I'm giving you this horse'. 'What for?', asked Pheraulas. At which point Saky went through the deal and ended by saying, 'And me, I reckon I *didn't* miss a "good guy"'.[9]

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[9] 26 ἔνθα δὴ λέγεται ὁ Κῦρος ἐρέσθαι τὸν νεανίσκον εἰ δέξαιτ' ἂν βασιλείαν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἵππου. τὸν δ' ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι βασιλείαν μὲν οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην, χάριν δὲ ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ καταθέσθαι δεξαίμην ἄν. **27** καὶ ὁ Κῦρος εἶπε· καὶ μὴν ἐγὼ δεῖξαί σοι θέλω ἔνθα κἂν μύων βάλῃ, οὐκ ἂν ἁμάρτοις ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. πάντως τοίνυν, ὁ Σάκας ἔφη, δεῖξόν μοι· ὡς *βαλῶ* γε ταύτῃ τῇ *βώλῳ*, ἔφη ἀνελόμενος. **28** καὶ ὁ μὲν Κῦρος δείκνυσιν αὐτῷ ὅπου ἦσαν πλεῖστοι τῶν φίλων· ὁ δὲ καταμύων ἵησι τῇ βώλῳ καὶ παρελαύνοντος Φεραύλα *τυγχάνει· ἔτυχε* γὰρ ὁ Φεραύλας παραγγέλλων τι *τακτὸς* παρὰ τοῦ Κύρου· βληθεὶς δὲ οὐδὲ μετεστράφη, ἀλλ ᾤχετο ἐφ' ὅπερ *ἐτάχθη*. **29** ἀναβλέψας δὲ ὁ Σάκας ἐρωτᾷ τίνος *ἔτυχεν*. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δι', ἔφη, οὐδενὸς τῶν παρόντων. ἀλλ οὐ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ νεανίσκος, τῶν γε ἀπόντων. ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Κῦρος, σύγε ἐκείνου τοῦ παρὰ τὰ ἅρματα ταχὺ ἐλαύνοντος τὸν ἵππον. καὶ πῶς,

'Pheraulas' is my ?~~hero~~?.[10] He is the human 'button' that pins the whole saga together at the level of personnel, as book 8 negotiates Xenophon's and Cyrus' attempt to formulate a blueprint to secure what books 1–7 achieved. He *is* the back reference to the epoch-marking shift from the original ideology of equal shares between Persian nobles to competitive valuation of each soldier's contribution as assessed by their leader (8.3.5 ~ 2.3.16).[11] And he is *the* interwoven back-reference from the retrospect set out in 8.1–4 to the interwoven tableau of *συντάξις* and *συσκηνία* dramatized most concentratedly and spectacularly in 2.1–3 (8.1.14 ~ 2.4.1): the 'formation' of the proto-imperial army and its winning over to the cause bonded through bonhomie in the 'mess' (esp. 8.1.14 ~ 3.4.1, e.g. 2.1.22–28). Our 'Pheraulas and Saky the Sakian' bubble in 8.3 interweaves with the Re*a*d Square-style 'King's Parade' organized by the favourite skivvy 'Pher-aulas', or 'Porter-house', the déclassé *σκευο-φόρος* ('camp-follower': 3.1.42–43, 4.2.25).[12] Featuring the ceremonially evocative March Past, precisely 'between the lines', the 'lines' of Persian guards on either side of the avenue, so you can read there loud and clear (*στοῖχοι*, 8.3.9).[13] Before, Pheraulas played his part in the 'march' *to* world supremacy (2.3.7–16), and now he helps change tribal to imperial costume in accustoming the world to the supremacy of Cyrus' army and régime: first the emperor, and then, with Pheraulas as wardrobe, his chorus-line of officers (8.3.2–8),[14] must get used to looking the part pdq. Persians must now

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ἔφη, οὐδὲ μεταστρέφεται; **30** καὶ ὁ Κῦρος ἔφη· μαινόμενος γάρ τίς ἐστιν, ὡς ἔοικεν. ἀκούσας ὁ νεανίσκος ᾤχετο σκεψόμενος τίς εἴη· καὶ εὑρίσκει τὸν Φεραύλαν γῆς τε κατάπλεων τὸ γένειον καὶ αἵματος· ἐρρύη γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐκ τῆς ῥινὸς βληθέντι. **31** ἐπεὶ δὲ προσῆλθεν, ἤρετο αὐτὸν εἰ βληθείη. ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο· ὡς ὁρᾷς. δίδωμι τοίνυν σοι, ἔφη, τοῦτον τὸν ἵππον. ὁ δ' ἐπήρετο· ἀντὶ τοῦ; ἐκ τούτου δὴ διηγεῖτο ὁ Σάκας τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τέλος εἶπε· καὶ οἶμαί γε οὐχ ἡμαρτηκέναι ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ.

10 Gera 1993: 173–183 gives Pheraulas most attention (but see next note for 'commoner' Pheraulas in Gray 2011). Other useful notices of his existence can be found in Johnson 2005: 184 (who scintillates on the military/political mythopoetics), Tatum 1989: 204–206, Due 1989: 73–75, Tuplin 1996: 78, 81–82, Nadon 2001: 71–75, 150–152; he belongs on the roll-call of novellae: Reichel 1995: 15.

11 Cf. 8.4.29, 8.4.3, etc. In Gray 2011: 246–290, 'Readings of *Cyropaedia*', at 286–287, Pheraulas gets to play the effective catalyst of Cyrus' 'equal opportunity' policy for rewarding service (over 'equal outcomes', in Book 2, for shares in booty, in Book 8, in empire) and clinching *exemplum* of friendship as true wealth (so that reciprocality lubricates political obedience). See also n. 41.

12 Our man shelters behind his etymon, takes the ball and runs with it: φέρε λαβών …, ὁ μὲν δὴ ἔφερε λαβὼν … Φεραύλας … συσκευοφορήσω· νῦν γοῦν φέρω …, λαβέ … (8.3.6–7). The name he bears is here to anticipate, as well as all holders of the office of Royal Parade Marshall, all 'Courtiers' who must 'endure' any αὐλή (through the long-established sense of 'Courtyard, Manor', as e.g. Zeus', from Hom. *Od.* 4.74 onwards).

13 The counting of the host brackets 8.3.15 with 2.1.5–6.

14 Pheraulas improvises on the quiet, in private and *à deux*, comically/menacingly sweet-

doll up as Medians, which feels to *them* like Martians, but that's the price victors must pay as they shoehorn into their garish 'New Dawn' slippers as the latest Masters of the Universe, for the 'No, not the Assyrians' show.[15] The troupe performs the choreography scored by Cyrus and Pheraulas, before proceeding to evening 'mess', whether literally 'under canvas' or in their newly established palaces pavilioned in splendour in the take-over HQ of Babylon, capital city in whoever's hands (8.3.1–8 and 9–34; ἐσκήνησαν, 34). At this juncture, Pheraulas hosts his own private party, briefly away from Cyrus' side and aside from the social-communal scenario of the emperor's vicinity. On the quiet, he defines, wins, and secures his own personalized deal for the future, in a ménage we are given to understand as 'lifelong stability' (8.3.35–50, bowing out with καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ οὕτω διῆγον … *and fade*), before we resume the Emperor's own version of hospitality (8.4.1–27, ending with the metanarratival 'clinch for this latest scene' of theatrical συσκηνία ['tenting together'], … καὶ τότε μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔληξεν ἡ σκηνή). No way short of ironically, 'nutter'-*like* Pheraulas fixes it so his tame tearway cossack from the steppes stays home so *he* can never 'be away' but always 'be there' (παρεῖναι) to *fe*tch-and-ca*rry* at court, 'at' Cyrus' palace 'doors' (the phrase will be ἐπὶ θύραις).[16]

The formal pinning of Pheraulas to his function of pinning together the whole composition is marked by the loudly underscored back-reference at 8.3.5 ~ 2.3.7, 16:

> Cyrus reckoned that Pheraulas, the guy from the ranks of the people, was not just smart but keen on what's fine, good with orders, and not averse from taking care to oblige him, who way back when agreed with him about each man being rated in accordance with his worth, and that was who he summoned and …[17] (8.3.5)

talking haughty officers into swallowing the fake choice he offers their egos between two gross robes, while talking himself down from playing 'Mr Big' (Μέγας δὴ σύγε, ὦ Φεραύλα, 8.3.7) while the court must 'big it up' by stepping up on their platform shoes (μείζους … ἢ εἰσί, 8.1.41), and join Cyrus, 'the Great' (μείζων δ' ἐφάνη πολὺ Κῦρος …, μέγαν τε καὶ καλὸν φανῆναι τὸν Κῦρον, 8.3.14); cf. 8.4.10 ~ 2.3.5, with 4.1.3. The rhyme with boy Cyrus' verdict on the two robes that didn't fit their owners should grate unmissably, too: 1.3.17 (and 18): cf. the chapters by Danzig and Tamiolaki in this volume (pp. 499–539, 563–589).

15 Cyrus' parentage links cold ethnic Persia into hot international Media: when Persia affiliates to Media and engulfs Assyria for a Persian Media, it morphs into a Median Assyria that absorbs Persian Persia: this 'Mediation' principle means *there never was* a 'Persian' Empire.

16 *Pace* Gray 2011: 376, see n. 41 below. Cyrus turns image-conscious savvy at the tipping-point, 7.5.37, then gets 'a house to put in order', his court, from 7.5.58 (διοικεῖν). For *KP* as political theory: Higgins 1977: 44–59, Breebaart 1983, Nadon 2001: esp. 61–107, 'Transformation'.

17 ὁ δὲ Κῦρος νομίζων Φεραύλαν τὸν ἐκ τῶν δημοτῶν καὶ συνετὸν εἶναι καὶ φιλόκαλον καὶ

> After him, up stood Pheraulas, a Persian from the ranks of the people, who one way or another had been there with him from back home and was one dude he really liked, in build and spirit resembling somebody not short of nobility, and he made a speech as follows ... So that was how Pheraulas' speech went. Up stood lots of others also agreeing. The idea carried the meeting that each man should be rated in accordance with his worth, and Cyrus be the judge of that. That's how *this* business got somewhere.[18] (2.3.7, 16)

Pheraulas is a special narratological device, a part of the grand montage, but the reward he gets from Cyrus for advocating that each should get what he's worth[19] is that he gets from Xenophon his own episode in which to fix his reward for himself, without imperial approval: so this one-off character gets one-off treatment from the narration. A follower from the start of the 'adventure', he is handed by the new Assyrian ruler his own idiosyncratic reward. Not the mundane trophies of 'the winning horse' or 'the prize cups', but a freak accident, that clod in the face. Because Cyrus cannot know, and is left by Xenophon never finding out, Pheraulas the beneficiary of this sliced 'stroke of luck' (τυγχάνει· ἔτυχε, 8.3.28) gets to bring on *for us* the chance to show what sort of Cyrus—clone, product, prototype, metonym—he can model 'to order', taxedly, tactically, tactfully, syntactically (τακτός ... ἐτάχθη, 8.3.28). At this stage the boss is the Media-show King in the Assyrian palace who will next convoke the old comrades he has picked up between Susa, Ecbatana and Babylon, for one last time. Still trading in his irresistibly 'grace'-full χάρις, obliging Cyrus lets himself get called 'a frigid joker' by pint-sized Chrysantas in the course of the banter of 8.4 (at 23), *as* a joke from HMV,[20] before sending his trusty lieutenants off to be satraps and make like little Cyruses in the future he's doing his damnedest to ordain, the imperial system he's trying to fix.[21] By this point Cyrus, well on the way to Greatness, has caught σεμνότης, and 'His Majesty' has got it bad,[22] so this degree of mateyness is specially telling: now he has paraded before all of them and all of us his imperial myriads in technicolour, this

εὔτακτον καὶ τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι αὐτῷ οὐκ ἀμελῇ, ὅς ποτε καὶ περὶ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἕκαστον κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν συνεῖπε, τοῦτον δὴ καλέσας ...

[18] ἀνέστη δ' ἐπ' αὐτῷ Φεραύλας, Πέρσης τῶν δημοτῶν, Κύρῳ πως ἔτι οἴκοθεν συνήθης καὶ ἀρεστὸς ἀνήρ, καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀγεννεῖ ἀνδρὶ ἐοικώς, καὶ ἔλεξε τοίαδε ... Φεραύλας μὲν δὴ οὕτως εἶπεν. ἀνίσταντο δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ συναγορεύοντες. ἔδοξε κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τιμᾶσθαι ἕκαστον, Κῦρον δὲ τὸν κρίνοντα εἶναι. ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτω προυκεχωρήκει.

[19] 2.3.16 ~ esp. 8.4.29, 3, etc. etc.

[20] This rings with 1.4.4, 'where boy Cyrus laughed loudest at himself when beaten'.

[21] This process of sending lieutenants away to govern starts with the διοικήσις at 7.4.1–2, 8, the 'perestroika' clinched at 8.6.7–9.

[22] 8.1.43, 8.3.1 ~ 6.1.6; Azoulay 2004.

overdeterminedly hyper-legitimate bachelor king will play marriage-broker for comrade Hystaspes, who takes the spare princess off her father's hands, he claims, in order to get his paws on his book of clichés (8.4.25 ~ 15–16), thereby fixing the unspoken/unconscionable future when it will be Darius' and Mardonius' world, the children of the father-in-law and son-in-law here marrying into destiny, not Cyrus' sons; instead he must accept for his own bride the princess of Medialand from his uncle and so come into his inheritance from grandpa, and finally return to his origins, as his father's due successor as King of Persia. But this passes unremarked, and we also hear precisely nothing of the long reign promised ahead,[23] until the first guinea-pig addressees are summoned for the unavailing deathbed attempt to teach his two boys the lessons's of *Cyrus' Education*—before Xenophon can teach *us* (8.7; 8.8). Meantime the plebeian but fully and autochthonously Persian comrade Pheraulas enjoyed his power-packed cryptic moment, when missile 'chanced to hit' horseman riding past chariots without his turning back, spitting, or blowing his nose, no way interrupting his devoted attention to carrying out Cyrus' instructions, doing his dirty work. The sensational shot of τυχή encapsulates—freeze-frame—the entire story-apparatus of *KP*, spot on, as the private episode of συσκηνία, 'rooming together' *à deux* in his very own new palace that same night spells out, when Pheraulas indicts all the draggy downside of his amazing rise to riches in the form of gifts conferred by Cyrus. All the way from working his father's 'real little patch of soil' (μάλα μικρὸν γήδιον, 8.3.38) to support the two of them, just—just barely.[24] As every word he speaks concurs with Cyrus' own *topoi* and values scattered through the narrative, he gets to dump the job of taking custody/care of the home front on the incredulous Saky (8.3.46–47):

> 46 'Ok, by the gods', said Pheraulas, 'why don't you get happy right now and make me happy, too? Take all this', he said, 'own it, and use it any way you want. And me, you just look after me as you would a stranger in town/guest visitor—or, even cheaper than a visitor, since it'll be plenty for me to share whatever you got'. 47 'You're kidding', said Saky. And Pheraulas swore that he really was serious about what he was saying.[25]

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[23] For the World Conquest volumes we shan't read, see the full prelusory/delusory listing at 1.1.4, and the violent elision at 8.6.19. We must take it on the chin.

[24] Pheraulas' clod tracks 'back' to *this* 'wee spot of soil': cf. Juv. 14.166, *saturabat glebula talis* | *patrem ipsum turbamque casae* … | *nunc modus hic agri nostro non sufficit horto*, Livy 4.11.4. Cf. the Libyan magic 'clod' meant to found Cyrene 'for luck' (προτυχὸν ξένιον, Pind. *Pyth.* 4.14–48).

[25] 46 τί οὖν, ἔφη, πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ὁ Φεραύλας, οὐχὶ σύγε αὐτίκα μάλα εὐδαίμων ἐγένου καὶ ἐμὲ εὐδαίμονα ἐποίησας; λαβὼν γάρ, ἔφη, ταῦτα πάντα κέκτησο, καὶ χρῶ ὅπως βούλει αὐτοῖς· ἐμὲ δὲ

For Cyrus' sake, to be able to be present at his side, to serve, whenever, Xenophon's Pheraulas becomes literally a guest and stranger in his own house, so he can go on acquiring, just like Cyrus, acting out the principle synonymous with him/them that worth consists in (continuing) positive rating with the boss, but with the necessary complement of a plan to move the goods on for his nearest and dearest to take care of taking care of—where the boss would pass his accruing benefits on to his band of comrades-turning-courtier, whether deserving or in line for ingratiation. 'So', we saw, 'they settled down to live their lives on these terms' (8.3.50) *Cut, and fade.*

Like many a moment of high drama in the story, and arguably its dominant modality, here is a starred sequence of 'serio-comic' *spoudaiogeloion.* The clod in this ex- and forever semi-clodhopper's face make him a paradigm of cavalier 'cool', *nil admirari,*[26] at the same time as making a mess of him: no satrapy awaits this salt of the earth. Pheraulas has sorted himself out for good, and is not around for the divvy-up of the spoils, of Empire, the celebrity life-swapping, that comes next. *Spoudaiogeloion* certainly held the stage back in book 2 where the suite of episodes of *συντάξις* and *συσκηνία* twined 'togetherness in action stations and barracks' round Pheraulas' first cameo: as the élite agree to admit the other ranks, rank and file, into what had been 'their' ranks and files in bulking up from tribal squadron to eventually cosmopolitan integrated imperial armies, two anecdotes are formally twinned:

(1) First there is Hystaspas holding forth—telling—on some bad-mannered oik of a pleb, in a joke version of the topic of the winning donation (2.2.2–5).
(2) Second comes a certain Captain Anonymous regaling us with the nutty eager-beaver boy and his platoon of keenies (jumping to it, 2.2.6–10).

This sets up the full-scale transformation of the terms from élite sharing to awards on merit, which is played out through:

(3) Another Captain X's comments on a bounder of a cheating pleb (which leads Cyrus to weed out the bad apples and—*nb*—replace with the best 'ponies' available, 'whatever the breed', 2.2.22–28, esp. 26), before:
(4) Cyrus plays at twitting Captain Sambaulas for the ugly 'Greek-style' toyboy he's brought to the mess/party, only to hear that this fright for

μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὥσπερ ξένον τρέφε, καὶ ἔτι εὐτελέστερον ἢ ξένον· ἀρκέσει γάρ μοι ὅ τι ἂν καὶ σὺ ἔχῃς τούτων μετέχειν. 47 *παίζεις*, ἔφη ὁ Σάκας. καὶ ὁ Φεραύλας ὀμόσας εἶπεν ἦ μὴν *σπουδῇ* λέγειν.

[26] For riding straight on past: 3.3.4. For 'ἀμεταστρεπτεί' ('no turning round for a butcher's') and 'no ogling' motifs: 8.1.42 vs 1.4.24; 5.2.12, 17.

> sore thighs also jumps to it, just the way a good soldier should (besides the sandalous joke that kissing *him* amounts to a hard bout of full-on training, 2.2.28–31).[27]

Such is the complex prelude in conclave which primes the spoudogeloious 'sharing' debate ready to go public, and detonate the rhetorical-ideological charge to military-geopolitical revolution, when Cyrus tells it like it is, and Xenophon means business (2.3.1–4):

> [1] This was the mood, from levity through gravity, of both diction and action—speech-acts—in the tent-scene. In the end they made the third libation, said their prayers to the gods for their blessing, the party broke up, and so to bed. Next day, Cyrus called all his troops together and spoke as follows: [2] 'Guys, mates, our match isn't far off now, the enemy are on their way. On the prizes of victory, well, if we win, and that's the talk we should talk, and method-act for real, obviously the enemy and all they got's ours. But if, if we get beat, though, same goes, everything the losers got always lines up as prizes for the winners. [3] So', he said, 'you must dig that when people who are partners in war hold it inside them as individuals that nothing will turn out the way it should unless each man shows willing, then many fine sorties get sorted in no time, because nothing that needs doing goes slack. But when each guy reckons there'll be some one else to do the sorting and the fighting even if he's a softie, know this everybody', said he, 'people like that, each and every man jack, have everything come down on them rough and tough, and it's a right carry-on. [4] And this is pretty well just the way God planned it: guys who won't command themselves to make the effort and make their blessings come true, find God hands them other people to give 'em their marching orders. So now', he said, 'let somebody stand up here and now and speak to this question before us, whether he thinks valour would be more of a routine among us, if the one who shows willing to work hardest and risk most is going to get the biggest awards for honour too, or if we know that being a rotter makes no difference, because we're all going to get equal shares'.[28]

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27 'Jump to it/don't wait to be told' *makes KP*: 8.3.21, 8.4.11 ~ 1.4.2, 2.2.9, 10, 30.

28 1 τοιαῦτα μὲν δὴ καὶ γελοῖα καὶ σπουδαῖα καὶ ἐλέγετο καὶ ἐπράττετο ἐν τῇ σκηνῇ. τέλος δὲ τὰς τρίτας σπονδὰς ποιήσαντες καὶ εὐξάμενοι τοῖς θεοῖς τἀγαθὰ τὴν σκηνὴν εἰς κοίτην διέλυον. τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ ὁ Κῦρος συνέλεξε πάντας τοὺς στρατιώτας καὶ ἔλεξε τοιάδε. 2 ἄνδρες φίλοι, ὁ μὲν ἀγὼν ἐγγὺς ἡμῖν· προσέρχονται γὰρ οἱ πολέμιοι. τὰ δ' ἆθλα τῆς νίκης, ἢν μὲν ἡμεῖς νικῶμεν—τοῦτο γάρ, ἔφη, δεῖ καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν—δῆλον ὅτι οἵ τε πολέμιοι ἡμέτεροι καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἀγαθὰ πάντα· ἢν δὲ ἡμεῖς αὖ νικώμεθα, καὶ οὕτω τὰ τῶν νικωμένων πάντα τοῖς νικῶσιν ἀεὶ ἆθλα πρόκειται. 3 οὕτω δή, ἔφη, δεῖ ὑμᾶς γιγνώσκειν ὡς ὅταν μὲν ἄνθρωποι κοινωνοὶ πολέμου γενόμενοι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἕκαστοι ἔχωσιν, ὡς, εἰ μὴ αὐτός τις προθυμήσεται, οὐδὲν ἐσόμενον τῶν δεόντων, ταχὺ πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ διαπράττονται· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀργεῖται τῶν πράττεσθαι δεομένων· ὅταν δ' ἕκαστος διανοηθῇ ὡς ἄλλος ἔσται ὁ πράττων καὶ μαχόμενος, κἂν αὐτὸς μαλακίζηται, τούτοις, ἔφη, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι πᾶσιν ἅμα πάντα ἥκει τὰ χαλεπὰ φερόμενα. 4 καὶ ὁ θεὸς οὕτω πως ἐποίησε· τοῖς μὴ θέλουσιν ἑαυτοις προστάττειν ἐκπονεῖν τἀγαθὰ ἄλλους αὑτοις ἐπιτακτῆρας δίδωσι. νῦν οὖν τις, ἔφη, λεγέτω ἐνθάδε ἀναστὰς περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου ποτέρως ἂν τὴν ἀρετὴν μᾶλλον οἴεται ἀσκεῖσθαι παρ' ἡμῖν, εἰ μέλλοι ὁ

(5) Whereupon cue 'golden' boy Χρυσ-antas, that blue-blooded toadlet, who as ever leads the way in reading Cyrus' here less than opaque mind and translating his will into fact (2.3.5–6)—'in-ya-face' (-αντίος). Off he goes, winsomely putting himself last in line for big rewards, not fooling us for a moment given the rules of fiction that star modesty for its own reward, so that he can hit the jackpot later on, and in the final countdown (4.1.3; 8.4.11, 8.6.7). Here, though, he's here to be twinned with his opposite number:

(6) Time for 'carry'-on/fetch-and-carry/shoulder-that-load/'endure'-that-pain Fer-aulas, the tough-guy 'farmyard' (-αὐλή) farmhand as was, to pop up for his common touch 'rabble-rouser' turn, where he looks forward, on behalf of the assembled squaddies on parade, to showing those toff nobs a thing or two about training for life, with all the charm of rustic cloddishness that pledges anti-heroic steel with anti-rhetoric self-parody (2.3.7–16).[29]

But, best beloveds, you do *not* stop yet, we're not but just started and nowhere near done: this particular segment in the highly-wrought suite is immediately adjacent to (i.e. runs on *into*) another, continuing, diptych of ethos-soaked anecdotage trained fair and square on the main themes and in the predominant mood (though scholarship has blanked this hook-on, dismally enough):

(7) Right now it's Captain A's turn to regale us with his outfit's fun extra work-out: as story-and-regimen in one, pitching squad (i) equipped with cudgels vs. corps (ii) chucking clods, in a down-and-dirty 'formation exercise' with obvious built-in 'togetherness' lessons earns them dinner with Cyrus, c.o. *and* lads all (2.3.17–20).

(8) But this time Captain B caps this starter with the claim that *his* shower do that (already old hat) routine on the way back out again, post-prandial; which again catches on, becoming another feature of the lasting routine that makes the imperial host and its handbook impe-

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πλεῖστα καὶ πονεῖν καὶ κινδυνεύειν ἐθέλων πλείστης καὶ τιμης τεύξεσθαι, ἢ ἂν εἰδῶμεν ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρει κακὸν εἶναι· ὁμοίως γὰρ πάντες τῶν ἴσων τευξόμεθα.

[29] Given half a chance, lumpen upstart Pheraulas would have turned the other cheek, but the mugging brackets him with degrading hurt, or dis-grace, like the fallen runner's mouth and nose full of/spitting dung, Hom. *Il.* 23.777, 781; the boxer spitting blood, ibid. 23.697; the pratt suitor's spout of blood through the nose, *Od.* 22.18; when beggars collide, should Odysseus should knock Irus' teeth out, kill, or be gentle? blood pours from the mouth, ibid. 18.90–99. For Thersites' teeth knocked out and blood pouring through the mouth: Q. Smyrn. 1.743.

rial, and—twice over—earns the squad dinner with Cyrus, boys and brass hat both (2.3.21–24).

Now the 'clods' lobbed in the first of this double dose of work-out contributions, standing (vs canes) for losers' long-range weaponry, make square-bashing seriously symbolic as well as fun to listen to, to write up graphically, and (so) provide entertainment fit (because) on both counts for a Cyrus' *Education*. But, beyond this juncture and a shadow of a doubt, they are also destined to talk to Pheraulas' 'clod', not just because they are clods getting chucked too (some landing in faces, 2.3.20),[30] but because they prove that the hardware you pack is going to condition your 'worth' in battle, big-time, no less than little Chrysantas' physical size. The evolution of integrated units with an array of escalating 'smart' equipment and crack expertise is going to culminate in the white-hot technology of those war chariots at the centre of the decisive battle with the Assyrians, starring (by that iron law of the lottery in fiction, 6.3.36) the dashingly dead sexy war hero Abradatas with his motorized strike force. These are the *Blitzkrieg* chariots that Pheraulas lines up for the King's Parade, for what proves to be backdrop for his own heroizing 'bolt from the blue', as the ex-Private heads for his privatized break on through to the other side.[31]

Now the importance of this morphing 'Sandhurst vs Roughneck' exchange for the 'gracenote' ἐπιχάρις narration cued by 'His Grace' the ἐπιχάρις prince (1.4.4), who juggles his way to his sway between tubthumping heavyweight disciplinarian calling his braves to fight the good fight or lose their c.-in-c., and ever winsome laughing cavalier, is marked by Xenophon's hobnailed-boots subtle narrator as an instalment in his serialized in-your-face discussion, eventually up-front, of fictionality in relation to moral/e (2.2.11–16):

> [11] That's how Cyrus praised his soldiers, laughing at the same time. But one of his captains, name: Aglaitadas, a character from the sourpuss tendency, happened to be in Cyrus's stage-tent at the same time and he spoke something like this: 'You surely don't think, Cyrus, this stuff these guys are saying is true?' 'Well', said Cyrus, 'what do they want in their lying, then?' 'What else?', he said, 'They just want to get a laugh, that's why they say it, to con us.' [12] 'Sh!', said Cyrus, 'Don't call these blokes cons, for the way I look at it, the name 'con' applies to people who pretend they're richer than they are, or braver, and to

30 With the βάλλω/βῶλος figure: 2.3.17–18 (thrice) ~ 8.3.27–28, cf. Ap.Rhod. 3.1334–1336.

31 *KP*'s shuffle between long-range and hand-to-hand weaponry and expertise is cardinal, from 'clod vs cane' throw or thrust to artillery, armoured cavalry, battle-tanks vs heavy infantry (esp. 2.3.18 ~ 1.2.13, 2.1.7, 16, 3.3.57–58, 8.8.21–23). Cyrus teaches Persia to ride, then to drive, to World Domination (esp. 8.3.29, 8.8.22–23; 6.1.29–30).

people who promise to do what they can't, and that, too, when they're blatantly doing it purely for the sake of getting or gaining something. But folk who concoct stories to amuse their companions, neither for their own gain nor to the cost of their hearers nor with harm to anyone, why should they not more justly be called 'witty' and 'charming', not 'cons'?' 13 That's how Cyrus defended those who had provided the fun, and the captain himself who had told that charmer about his platoon said: 'Hey, Aglaitadas, sure you totally could hold it against us, if we tried to make you cry, the way *some* storytellers feature tearjerkers in their lyrics and stories, trying to turn on the waterworks; whereas now, even though you *know* we want to cheer you up, not do you any harm, still you put us in deep disrespect'. 14 'Yes indeed, by Zeus', said Aglaitadas, 'and just right, too, since the way I see it someone who concocts a laugh for his mates sorts something worth far less than the one that makes them weep. And if you think straight, you, too, will find what I say's the truth. Floods of tears are how fathers cook up self-control in their sons, how teachers lay good lessons on their children, and that's how the laws, too, turn the citizens on to justice. But could you say that people who concoct a laugh either do our bodies any good, or make our minds any better at running the home or the country?' 15 At this point Hystaspas answered somewhat as follows: 'Trust me, Aglaitadas, and you will let go and lavish this high-price commodity upon your enemies, and try to set them crying; but on us and your mates here you splash out this cheap article, laughter. And I know there's lots of it you've got stored up; for you have never spent it for your own use and you sure never willingly make a laugh for your friends or for foreigners / guests. So you have no excuse for not having to give us a laugh'. 'What!' said Aglaitadas, 'You actually think, Hystaspas, to pocket a laugh from me?' 'Hmm, by Zeus', said the other captain, 'he's some idiot, 'cos I reckon somebody could spark fire out of you more easily than extort a laugh.' 16 At this, for sure, the rest laughed; for they knew his character, and Aglaitadas smiled at it. And Cyrus, seeing him sunnyside up said, 'You're wicked, captain, ruining the most serious guy we got by persuading him to laugh, and that', he said, 'when he is so hostile to laughter!'[32]

[32] 11 ὁ μὲν δὴ Κῦρος ἅμα γελῶν οὕτως ἐπῄνεσε τοὺς στρατιώτας. ἐν δὲ τῇ σκηνῇ ἐτύγχανέ τις ὢν τῶν ταξιάρχων Ἀγλαϊτάδας ὄνομα, ἀνὴρ τὸν τρόπον τῶν στρυφνοτέρων ἀνθρώπων, ὃς οὑτωσί πως εἶπεν· ἦ γὰρ οἴει, ἔφη, ὦ Κῦρε, τούτους ἀληθῆ λέγειν ταῦτα; ἀλλὰ τί μὴν βουλόμενοι, ἔφη ὁ Κῦρος, ψεύδονται; τί δ' ἄλλο γ', ἔφη, εἰ μὴ γέλωτα ποιεῖν ἐθέλοντες ὑπὲρ οὗ λέγουσι ταῦτα καὶ ἀλαζονεύονται; 12 καὶ ὁ Κῦρος εὐφήμει, ἔφη, μηδὲ λέγε ἀλαζόνας εἶναι τούτους. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀλαζὼν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὄνομα κεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς προσποιουμένοις καὶ πλουσιωτέροις εἶναι ἢ εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρειοτέροις καὶ ποιήσειν ἃ μὴ ἱκανοί εἰσιν ὑπισχνουμένοις, καὶ ταῦτα φανεροῖς γιγνομένοις ὅτι τοῦ λαβεῖν τι ἕνεκα καὶ κερδᾶναι ποιοῦσιν. οἱ δὲ μηχανώμενοι γέλωτα τοῖς συνοῦσι μήτε ἐπὶ τῷ αὑτῶν κέρδει μήτ' ἐπὶ ζημίᾳ τῶν ἀκουόντων μήτε ἐπὶ βλάβῃ μηδεμιᾷ, πῶς οὐχ οὗτοι ἀστεῖοι ἂν καὶ εὐχάριτες δικαιότερον ὀνομάζοιντο μᾶλλον ἢ ἀλαζόνες; 13 ὁ μὲν δὴ Κῦρος οὕτως ἀπελογήσατο περὶ τῶν τὸν γέλωτα παρασχόντων· αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ λοχαγὸς ὁ τὴν τοῦ λόχου χαριτίαν διηγησάμενος ἔφη· ἦ που ἄν, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀγλαϊτάδα, εἴ γε κλαίειν ἐπειρώμεθά σε ποιεῖν, σφόδρ' ἂν ἡμῖν ἐμέμφου, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι καὶ ἐν ᾠδαις καὶ ἐν λόγοις οἰκτρὰ ἄττα λογοποιοῦντες εἰς δάκρυα πειρῶνται ἄγειν, ὁπότε γε νῦν καὶ αὐτὸς εἰδὼς ὅτι εὐφραίνειν μέν τί σε βουλόμεθα, βλάψαι δ' οὐδέν, ὅμως οὕτως ἐν πολλῇ

To turn this skit on the two-way-street katantiphrasis/traditionalism nicknamed 'Aglaitidas', i.e. 'Life and Soul of the Party/Badge of Honour Brigade', round, this solitary outing for him is a stand-out feature in the novel/treatise's supreme theme, of reflexive self-profile at, and on, the interface between σπουδή and γέλως. For *KP* may, *as* fiction, *because* fiction, achieve real results, O Reader, and not least among these is the melodramatized and emphatic *theorization* of the 'serio-comic' mode, arguably articulated and enacted for the first time here as it is self-styled in, and as, the *Κ*υροῦ—*Π*αιδεία, or 'Where Happenstance meets Mastery' (κυρέω/κυρόω) ~ 'Where Childsplay meets Training for Life' (παίζω/παιδεύω): aka τὸ σπουδαῖον—γελοῖον.[33] Because Xenophon is disporting his charm-school rhetoric in extended narrative paradoxography, he hands himself the 'chance' (racing certainty) of vindicating the chosen jovial-genial mode, bound up indissolubly with his own role as emergent founding father, another, greater Cyrus, in the nascent empire of prose fiction.

Discussion/narration of narrative as dialogical, even proto-dialectical, will be clinched, along with everything else in book 2 that gets sealed in book 8 ready to seep into exchange between reader and text, when the prince turns emperor-in-the-making. Naturally, the process was in fact always already under way, and a halfway house arrived when Cyrus, back in the days before he swapped trooper's tent in the field for paladin's palace in a capital, deflects the offer of that wrong, sideline, princess by telling the father to pick any of his comrades, i.e. he can't miss getting a good 'un, and

ἀτιμίᾳ ἡμᾶς ἔχεις. 14 ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη ὁ Ἀγλαϊτάδας, καὶ δικαίως γε, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κλαίοντας καθίζοντος τοὺς φίλους πολλαχοῦ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἐλάττονος ἄξια διαπράττεσθαι ὁ γέλωτα αὐτοῖς μηχανώμενος. εὑρήσεις δὲ καὶ σύ, ἢν ὀρθως λογίζῃ, ἐμὲ ἀληθῆ λέγοντα. κλαύμασι μέν γε καὶ πατέρες υἱοῖς σωφροσύνην μηχανῶνται καὶ διδάσκαλοι παισὶν ἀγαθὰ μαθήματα, καὶ νόμοι γε πολίτας διὰ τοῦ κλαίοντὰς καθίζειν εἰς δικαιοσύνην προτρέπονται· τοὺς δὲ γέλωτα μηχανωμένους ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν ἢ σώματα ὠφελοῦντας ἢ ψυχὰς οἰκονομικωτέρας τι ποιοῦντας ἢ πολιτικωτέρας; 15 ἐκ τούτου ὁ Ὑστάσπας ὧδέ πως εἶπε· σύ, ἔφη, ὦ Ἀγλαϊτάδα, ἢν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, εἰς μὲν τοὺς πολεμίους θαρρῶν δαπανήσεις τοῦτο τὸ πολλοῦ ἄξιον, καὶ κλαίοντας ἐκείνους πειράσει καθίζειν· ἡμῖν δὲ πάντως, ἔφη, τοῖσδε τοῖς φίλοις τούτου τοῦ ὀλίγου ἀξίου, τοῦ γέλωτος ἐπιδαψιλεύσεις. καὶ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι πολύς σοί ἐστιν ἀποκείμενος· οὔτε γὰρ αὐτὸς χρώμενος ἀνῃσίμωκας αὐτόν, οὐδὲ μὴν φίλοις οὐδὲ ξένοις ἑκὼν εἶναι γέλωτα παρέχεις· ὥστε οὐδεμία σοι πρόφασίς ἐστιν ὡς οὐ παρεκτέον σοι ἡμῖν γέλωτα. καὶ ὁ Ἀγλαϊτάδας εἶπε· καὶ οἴει γε, ὦ Ὑστάσπα, γέλωτα περιποιεῖν ἐξ ἐμοῦ; καὶ ὁ λοχαγὸς εἶπε· ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἀνόητος ἄρ' ἐστίν· ἐπεὶ ἔκ γε σοῦ πῦρ, οἶμαι, ῥᾷον ἄν τις ἐκτρίψειεν ἢ γέλωτα ἐξαγάγοιτο. 16 ἐπὶ τούτῳ μὲν δὴ οἵ τε αλλοι ἐγέλασαν, τὸν τρόπον εἰδότες αὐτοῦ, ὅ τ' Ἀγλαϊτάδας ἐπεμειδίασε. καὶ ὁ Κῦρος ἰδὼν αὐτὸν φαιδρωθέντα, ἀδικεῖς, ἔφη, ὦ λοχαγέ, ὅτι ἄνδρα ἡμῖν τὸν σπουδαιότατον διαφθείρεῖς γελᾶν ἀναπείθων, καὶ ταῦτα, ἔφη, οὕτω πολέμιον ὄντα τῷ γέλωτι.

[33] The compound almost unites at 6.1.6, οἱ μὲν δὴ *ἔπαιζον σπουδῇ* πρὸς ἀλλήλους; see Ar. *Ra.* 391–392 ~ 8.3.47, Giangrande 1989: 17–19, Branham 1989: 27, Plaza 2006: 27–31, and essays in Ercolani 2002 for the Greek (proto-)history of the serio-comic.

that diplo-matic syn-thetic com-pound, the 'Xeno-phontic' ('Talking Aliens-into-Allies') politesse/creed of questioning tossed in with banter (and vice versa), is duly—loudly—flagged up (5.2.12–18):

> [12] 'And as for a husband,' he continued, 'don't worry that you'll be stuck for one worth your daughter; for I have many fine and dandy mates; one of them'll marry her. But whether he will have as much wealth as you're offering or else many times as much, I couldn't say. But, be sure of it, there are some of them who don't admire you any more at all for the money you're offering. No, they're out to beat me now, praying to all the gods that one day it'll happen, they'll get to prove they're no less true to their friends than I am, and so long as they live they'd never give in to their enemies, unless some god zaps them. To their valour and good name they wouldn't prefer all the wealth of the Assyrians and the Syrians plus yours. That's the sort of guys, believe you me, are sitting here'. [13] 'By the gods, Cyrus', said Gobryas with a laugh, 'show me where they are, so I can ask you for one of 'em to be my son-in-law'. 'There'll be no need for you to have my answer to that', answered Cyrus, 'but, if you come along with us, you'll be able to show someone else each one of them yourself'. [14] When he'd said this much, he clasped Gobryas's right hand in his, and stood up and left, leading his gang away *en bloc*. And though Gobryas urged him to come to dinner indoors, he said no and messed in camp, and had Gobryas over to join him for dinner. [15] Reclined upon a straw mat he asked him this one: 'Tell me, Gobryas, do you reckon you have more coverlets than each one of us?' And *he* said, 'Sure I'm sure, by Zeus, you have more coverlets, and couches, and your people have a home much bigger than mine—you lot treat earth and heaven as your home, and you have as many couches as there are places to lie down on the earth/ground. As for coverlets, you count not all the ones that sheep produce, but all those the mountains and plains supply'. [16] On dining with them for the first time, and seeing the simplicity of the food set before them, Gobryas reckoned his own people far more genteel than them. [17] Later on, though, he noticed the moderation of his fellow diners, for no Persian of the educated class would ever let himself get caught getting bowled over by anything to eat or drink, either by ogling, by making a grab for it, or with his brain not watching out for everything he'd be watching out for if he weren't at dinner; no, just as riders through not getting flustered on horseback manage to ride along all the while eyeing, listening, saying what they need to, so too those guys reckon at meal-times they should look sensible and moderate; whereas getting emotional over food or drink is in their book completely boar-ish, and bestial. [18] He noticed about them as well that they'd ask each other the sorts of question that are nicer to be asked than not, and would make fun of each other the sort of way that's nicer to be made fun of than not; and their games they'd play were miles off doing anything foul, miles from roughing each other up.[34]

[34] 12 καὶ ἀνδρὸς δ', ἔφη, τῇ θυγατρὶ μὴ φοβοῦ ὡς ἀπορήσεις ἀξίου ταύτης· πολλοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι εἰσὶν ἐμοί· ὧν τις γαμεῖ ταύτην· εἰ μέντοι χρήμαθ' ἕξει τοσαῦτα ὅσα σὺ δίδως ἢ καὶ ἄλλα

When secure on his throne, the newly self-imposed Emperor of Assyria will wind up running what promises to be an *extremely* (horribly?) well-behaved court, where etiquette has already tightened, stiffened, sobered, up, like crazy (8.1.33–34):

> [33] So it was that Cyrus, by being Cyrus, created at court great orderliness, with inferiors deferring to superiors, great decorum and and polite behaviour towards each another. And there you'd never catch anybody getting noisy when cross, or expressing glee with offensive laughter. No! On sight, you'd decide they truly do live life for the all that's fine. [34] Well, so that's the kind of things they did and saw as they settled to live their lives in attendance at court (… *and fade*)[35]

But this is all capped (crowned) by one last gasp of *bonhomie*, the negotiation of the future that was not meant to be, never going to last, impossibly, when metapoetic discussion of 'questioning' within the 'grace-and-favour' exchange economy of χάρις, i.e. the royal privilege of assigning ranking by merit, takes its bow at curtain-call (8.4.9–11, 12–15):

πολλαπλάσια τούτων, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν· σὺ μέντοι εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι εἰσί τινες αὐτῶν οἳ ὧν μὲν σὺ δίδως χρημάτων οὐδὲ μικρὸν τούτων ἕνεκά σε μᾶλλον θαυμάζουσιν· ἐμὲ δὲ ζηλοῦσι νυνὶ καὶ εὔχονται πᾶσι θεοῖς γενέσθαι ποτὲ ἐπιδείξασθαι ὡς πιστοὶ μέν εἰσιν οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐμοῦ τοῖς φίλοις, τοῖς δὲ πολεμίοις ὡς οὔποτ' ἂν ὑφεῖντο ζῶντες, εἰ μή τις θεὸς βλάπτοι· ἀντὶ δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ δόξης ἀγαθῆς ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν τὰ Σύρων πρὸς τοῖς σοῖς καὶ 'Ασσυρίων πάντα προέλοιντο· τοιούτους ἄνδρας εὖ ἴσθι ἐνταῦθα καθημένους. 13 καὶ ὁ Γωβρύας εἶπε γελάσας· πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ἔφη, ὦ Κῦρε, δεῖξον δή μοι ποῦ οὗτοί εἰσιν, ἵνα σε τούτων τινὰ αἰτήσωμαι παῖδά μοι γενέσθαι. καὶ ὁ Κῦρος εἶπεν· ἀμέλει, ἔφη, οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ σε δεήσει πυνθάνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἂν σὺν ἡμῖν ἕπῃ, αὐτὸς σὺ ἕξεις καὶ ἄλλῳ δεικνύναι αὐτῶν ἕκαστον. 14 τοσαῦτ' εἰπὼν δεξιάν τε λαβὼν τοῦ Γωβρύα καὶ ἀναστὰς ἐξῄει, καὶ τοὺς μεθ' αὐτοῦ ἐξῆγεν ἅπαντας· καὶ πολλὰ δεομένου τοῦ Γωβρύα ἔνδον δειπνεῖν οὐκ ἠθέλησεν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἐδείπνει καὶ τὸν Γωβρύαν σύνδειπνον παρέλαβεν. 15 ἐπὶ στιβάδος δὲ κατακλινεὶς ἤρετο αὐτὸν ὧδε· εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Γωβρύα, πότερον οἴει σοὶ εἶναι πλείω ἢ ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν στρώματα; καὶ ὃς εἶπεν· ὑμῖν νὴ Δί' εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἔφη, καὶ στρώματα πλείω ἐστὶ καὶ κλῖναι, καὶ οἰκία γε πολὺ μείζων ἡ ὑμετέρα τῆς ἐμῆς οἵ γε οἰκίᾳ μὲν χρῆσθε γῇ τε καὶ οὐρανῷ, κλῖναι δ' ὑμῖν εἰσιν ὁπόσαι εὐναὶ γένοιντ' ἂν ἐπὶ γῆς· στρώματα δὲ νομίζετε οὐχ ὅσα πρόβατα φύει, ἀλλ' ὅσα ὄρη τε καὶ πεδία ἀνίησι. 16 τὸ μὲν δὴ πρῶτον συνδειπνῶν αὐτοῖς ὁ Γωβρύας καὶ ὁρῶν τὴν φαυλότητα τῶν παρατιθεμένων βρωμάτων πολὺ σφᾶς ἐνόμιζεν ἐλευθεριωτέρους εἶναι αὐτῶν· 17 ἐπεὶ δὲ κατενόησε τὴν μετριότητα τῶν συσσίτων· ἐπ' οὐδενὶ γὰρ βρώματι οὐδὲ πώματι Πέρσης ἀνὴρ τῶν πεπαιδευμένων οὔτ' ἂν ὄμμασιν ἐκπεπληγμένος καταφανὴς γένοιτο οὔτε ἁρπαγῇ οὔτε τῷ νῷ μὴ οὐχὶ προσκοπεῖν ἅπερ ἂν καὶ μὴ ἐπὶ σίτῳ ὤν· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ ἱππικοὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ ταράττεσθαι ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων δύνανται ἅμα ἱππεύοντες καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ λέγειν τὸ δέον, οὕτω κἀκεῖνοι ἐν τῷ σίτῳ οἴονται δεῖν φρόνιμοι καὶ μέτριοι φαίνεσθαι· τὸ δὲ κεκινῆσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν βρωμάτων καὶ τῆς πόσεως πάνυ αὐτοῖς ὑικὸν καὶ θηριῶδες δοκεῖ εἶναι· 18 ἐνενόησε δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ὡς ἐπηρώτων τε ἀλλήλους τοιαῦτα οἷα ἐρωτηθῆναι ἥδιον ἢ μὴ καὶ ἔσκωπτον οἷα σκωφθῆναι ἥδιον ἢ μή· ἅ τε ἔπαιζον ὡς πολὺ μὲν ὕβρεως ἀπῆν, πολὺ δὲ τοῦ αἰσχρόν τι ποιεῖν, πολὺ δὲ τοῦ χαλεπαίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

[35] 33 τοιγαροῦν τοιοῦτος ὢν ἐποίησεν ἐπὶ ταῖς θύραῖς πολλὴν μὲν τῶν χειρόνων εὐταξίαν, ὑπεικόντων τοῖς ἀμείνοσι, πολλὴν δ' αἰδῶ καὶ εὐκοσμίαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους. ἐπέγνως δ' ἂν ἐκεῖ οὐδένα οὔτε ὀργιζόμενον κραυγῇ οὔτε χαίροντα ὑβριστικῷ γέλωτι, ἀλλὰ ἰδὼν ἂν αὐτοὺς ἡγήσω τῷ ὄντι εἰς κάλλος ζῆν. 34 τοιαῦτα μὲν δὴ ποιοῦντες καὶ ὁρῶντες ἐπὶ θύραις διῆγον.

[9] It was later on, when they were drinking up, when Hystaspas asked Cyrus, 'Umm, Cyrus, would you be cross with me, if I asked you a question I'd like to hear your answer to?' 'No, by the gods, no,' he answered; 'quite the opposite, I'd be cross with you if I spotted you buttoning up something you'd like answered'. 'OK, so tell me, then', he said, 'did I ever once fail to come when you called?' 'Sh!', said Cyrus. 'Well, in heeding your command, was I ever heedless?' 'No, that neither'. 'Did I ever fail to do your bidding in anything you bade?' 'I find no fault', he said. 'Is there anything I've done where you caught me doing it any other way than willingly, or with pleasure?' 'That, least of all', said Cyrus. [10] 'Then by the gods, Cyrus', he said, 'on what score did you stick Chrysantas's name down for a situation carrying higher honour than mine?' 'I should tell you?' asked Cyrus. 'By all means,' said Hystaspas. 'And you, you won't be cross back at me when you hear the truth?' [11] 'Course not', he said, 'in fact I'll be delighted once I know I am not treated wrong'. 'Well', said Cyrus, 'Chrysantas here, number one, never waited to be called, but before he was called was here to look after Our interests; number two, he's always done not just what he was ordered to do but whatever he saw for himself was better done for Us. Plus, whenever it was necessary to tell the allies something, he always advised me what he thought fitting for me to say; and whenever he saw I wanted the allies to know about something, but was blushing to saying talk about myself, he'd speak up and declare it as his own view. So, on these scores anyhow, what's to stop him being better for me than I am? Plus, he always says that what he's got is plenty for him, whereas for *me*, he's always out there looking out for any addition that would be a boon, and he takes much more delight and pleasure in all the fine things I own than I do myself'. [12] Hystaspas said back to this, 'By Hera, I *am* glad anyways I asked you these questions, Cyrus'. 'Why exactly?', asked Cyrus. 'Because I'll try to do the same too,' he said, 'only there's one thing I don't get—how do I show I'm overjoyed at your blessings? Have I got to clap hands, or laugh, or do *what*?' Artabazus said, 'You have to do the Persian dance!' At that, sure there was a laugh. [13] But, as the party went on, Cyrus put this question to Gobryas: 'Tell me, Gobryas', he said, 'would you think it nicer now to give your daughter to one of these guys than when you first came and joined us?' 'Well', answered Gobryas, 'do I tell the truth too?' 'Oh yes, by Zeus', answered Cyrus; 'for sure no question *ever* asks for a lie'. 'OK', he replied, 'be sure that it *would* be nicer now by far'. 'And could you say why?' asked Cyrus. 'I could indeed'. 'Do tell'. [14] 'Because, back then I saw them bear hard work and risk cheerfully, but now I see them wear their blessings sanely. And as I see it, Cyrus, it's a tougher call to find a guy who can wear blessings well than one who bears bad things well—one of 'em implants arrogance in most people, the other implants sanity in everybody'. [15] So Cyrus said, 'Hystaspas, did you hear that mot from Gobryas?' 'Yes, by Zeus', he said, 'and if he has many more like that, he'll find me a suitor for his daughter much more than if he parades many a goblet before me'.[36]

[36] 9 ἐκ τούτου δὴ ἐπεὶ ὑπέπινον, ἤρετο ὁ Ὑστάσπας τὸν Κῦρον· ἆρ' ἄν, ἔφη, ὦ Κῦρε, ἀχθεσθείης μοι, εἴ σε ἐροίμην ὃ βούλομαί σου πυθέσθαι; ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη, τοὐναντίον τούτου ἀχθοίμην

So the answer is The Question (13). ‘No question ever asks for a lie’ is a cliché, the wisdom worth all the wisdom in the book, a textual treasure beyond any trophy, beyond, even, any royal dowry, even if it will bear fruit in eventual succession to the imperial throne of thrones. And this is what Xenophon’s *narration* has been telling us from the outset, from Cyrus’ cradle, *about* narration, the question of narrative (authority). Recall our cue, in Saky the Sakian cupbearer, first victim of ‘Cyrosity’, of the charmer’s propensity for precocious questioning (1.3.8–10, cf. 1.4.3–4):

> [8] ‘Saky the Sakian’, said Astyages, ‘my cupbearer, whom I honour the most—are you giving him none?’ Well now Saky happened to be a fine fella who had the position of honour of introducing people requesting audience with Astyages and of barring those he thought wasn’t the right time to introduce. And Cyrus asked precociously, as a child not yet old enough to cringe, ‘Why, grandfather, do you rate this guy so much?’ And Astyages replied with a joke: ‘Don’t you see’, he said, ‘how fine and chic he pours the wine?’ Now the cupbearers of these kings pour the wine stylishly, pour the wine scrupulously, hand over the goblet, conveying it with three fingers, offer it so as to hand it best for the grasp of the one who’s going to drink. [9] ‘Well’, he said, ‘grandfather, order Saky to give me the cup, so I can pour the wine fine for you to drink

ἄν σοι, εἰ αἰσθοίμην σιωπῶντα ἃ βούλοιο ἐρέσθαι. λέγε δή μοι, ἔφη, ἤδη πώποτε καλέσαντός σου οὐκ ἦλθον; εὐφήμει, ἔφη ὁ Κῦρος. ἀλλ’ ὑπακούων σχολῇ ὑπήκουσα; οὐδὲ τοῦτο. προσταχθὲν δέ τι ἤδη σοι οὐκ ἔπραξα; οὐκ αἰτιῶμαι, ἔφη. ὃ δὲ πράττοιμι, ἔστιν ὅ τι πώποτε οὐ προθύμως ἢ οὐχ ἡδομένως πράττοντά με κατέγνως; τοῦτο δὴ πάντων ἥκιστα, ἔφη ὁ Κῦρος. 10 τίνος μὴν ἕνεκα, ἔφη, πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ὦ Κῦρε, Χρυσάνταν ἔγραψας ὥστε εἰς τὴν τιμιωτέραν ἐμοῦ χώραν ἱδρυθῆναι; ἦ λέγω; ἔφη ὁ Κῦρος. πάντως, ἔφη ὁ Ὑστάσπας. καὶ σὺ αὖ οὐκ ἀχθέσῃ μοι ἀκούων τἀληθῆ; 11 ἡσθήσομαι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἢν εἰδῶ ὅτι οὐκ ἀδικοῦμαι. Χρυσάντας τοίνυν, ἔφη, οὑτοσὶ πρῶτον μὲν οὐ κλῆσιν ἀνέμενεν, ἀλλὰ πρὶν καλεῖσθαι παρῆν τῶν ἡμετέρων ἕνεκα· ἔπειτα δὲ οὐ τὸ κελευόμενον μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅ τι αὐτὸς γνοίη ἄμεινον εἶναι πεπραγμένον ἡμῖν τοῦτο ἔπραττεν. ὁπότε δὲ εἰπεῖν τι δέοι εἰς τοὺς συμμάχους ἃ μὲν ἐμὲ ᾤετο πρέπειν λέγειν ἐμοὶ συνεβούλευεν· ἃ δὲ ἐμὲ αἴσθοιτο βουλόμενον μὲν εἰδέναι τοὺς συμμάχους, αὐτὸν δέ με αἰσχυνόμενον περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ λέγειν, ταῦτα οὗτος λέγων ὡς ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀπεφαίνετο· ὥστ’ ἔν γε τούτοις τί κωλύει αὐτὸν καὶ ἐμοῦ ἐμοὶ κρείττονα εἶναι; καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν ἀεί φησι πάντα τὰ παρόντα ἀρκεῖν, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀεὶ φανερός ἐστι σκοπῶν τί ἂν προσγενόμενον ὀνήσειεν, ἐπί τε τοῖς ἐμοῖς καλοῖς πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐμοῦ ἀγάλλεται καὶ ἥδεται. 12 πρὸς ταῦτα ὁ Ὑστάσπας εἶπε· νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ Κῦρε, ἥδομαί γε ταῦτά σε ἐρωτήσας. τί μάλιστα; ἔφη ὁ Κῦρος. ὅτι κἀγὼ πειράσομαι ταῦτα ποιεῖν· ἓν μόνον, ἔφη, ἀγνοῶ, πῶς ἂν εἴην δῆλος χαίρων ἐπὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἀγαθοῖς· πότερον κροτεῖν δεῖ τὼ χεῖρε ἢ γελᾶν ἢ τί ποιεῖν; καὶ ὁ Ἀρτάβαζος εἶπεν· ὀρχεῖσθαι δεῖ τὸ Περσικόν. ἐπὶ τούτοις μὲν δὴ γέλως ἐγένετο. 13 προϊόντος δὲ τοῦ συμποσίου ὁ Κῦρος τὸν Γωβρύαν ἐπήρετο· εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Γωβρύα, νῦν ἂν δοκεῖς ἥδιον τῶνδέ τῳ τὴν θυγατέρα δοῦναι ἢ ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἡμῖν συνεγένου; οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Γωβρύας, *κἀγὼ τἀληθῆ λέγω*; νὴ Δί’, ἔφη ὁ Κῦρος, *ὡς ψεύδους γε οὐδεμία ἐρώτησις δεῖται*. εὖ τοίνυν, ἔφη, ἴσθι ὅτι νῦν ἂν πολὺ ἥδιον. ἦ καὶ ἔχοις ἄν, ἔφη ὁ Κῦρος, εἰπεῖν διότι; 14 ἔγωγε. λέγε δή. ὅτι τότε μὲν ἑώρων τοὺς πόνους καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους εὐθύμως αὐτοὺς φέροντας, νῦν δὲ ὁρῶ αὐτοὺς τἀγαθὰ σωφρόνως φέροντας. δοκεῖ δέ μοι, ὦ Κῦρε, χαλεπώτερον εἶναι εὑρεῖν ἄνδρα τἀγαθὰ καλῶς φέροντα ἢ τὰ κακά· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὕβριν τοῖς πολλοῖς, τὰ δὲ σωφροσύνην τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐμποιεῖ. 15 καὶ ὁ Κῦρος εἶπεν· ἤκουσας, ὦ Ὑστάσπα, Γωβρύου τὸ ῥῆμα; ναὶ μὰ Δί’, ἔφη· καὶ ἐὰν πολλὰ τοιαῦτά γε λέγῃ, πολὺ μᾶλλόν με τῆς θυγατρὸς μνηστῆρα λήψεται ἢ ἐὰν ἐκπώματα πολλά μοι ἐπιδεικνύῃ.

and win you over, if I can manage it'. So he ordered him to give it over. And Cyrus took the cup and rinsed it out well, the way he'd often seen Saky do, and then he brought and handed the goblet to his grandfather, fixing his face sorta serious and chic, so he made his mother and Astyages laugh bigtime. And Cyrus himself laughed out loud too, leaping onto his grandfather's lap and saying with a kiss kiss, 'Ah, Saky, you've had it; I shall get you sacked from your position of honour, because', he said, 'quite apart from pouring the wine finer than you I shan't drink up the wine myself'. Now, the king's cupbearers, when they hand over the cup, draw off a swig of it with the ladle, pouring it into their left hand, and gulp it down, so that, if they should put poison in, it doesn't do them any good. 10 At which point Astyages made fun of him and said, 'And why, Cyrus, did you mime the rest of Saky's act but didn't gulp any of the wine?' 'Because, by Zeus', he said, 'I was afraid poison had been mixed in the mixing-bowl. And, see, when you feasted your friends on your birthday, I spotted clear as clear that he'd poured poison into all your drinks'. 'And how the heck', said he, 'did you spot that, child?' 'Because, by Zeus,' said he, 'I saw you were all tripping, both mind and body: first off, you kept doing what you forbid us children to do—you all kept yelling, all at the same time, so none of you got anything the others were saying, you were singing, real ridiculous too, though you didn't listen to the singer, you swore he sang the best, though each one of you kept talking of his own strength, then, if you stood up to dance, to say nothing of dancing in time, well, you couldn't even stand upright. And y'all clean forgot, you, that you were king, the rest, that you were their ruler. It was then that I spotted as well, for my first time, that what you were then putting into practice was 'equality in speaking rights'—at any rate, none of you kept silent!'[37]

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[37] 8 Σάκᾳ δέ, φάναι τὸν Ἀστυάγην, τῷ οἰνοχόῳ, ὃν ἐγὼ μάλιστα τιμῶ, οὐδὲν δίδως; ὁ δὲ Σάκας ἄρα καλός τε ὢν ἐτύγχανε καὶ τιμὴν ἔχων προσάγειν τοὺς δεομένους Ἀστυάγους καὶ ἀποκωλύειν οὓς μὴ καιρὸς αὐτῷ δοκοίη εἶναι προσάγειν. καὶ τὸν Κῦρον ἐπερέσθαι προπετῶς ὡς ἂν παῖς μηδέπω ὑποπτήσσων· διὰ τί δή, ὦ πάππε, τοῦτον οὕτω τιμᾷς; καὶ τὸν Ἀστυάγην σκώψαντα εἰπεῖν· οὐχ ὁρᾷς, φάναι, ὡς καλῶς οἰνοχοεῖ καὶ εὐσχημόνως; οἱ δὲ τῶν βασιλέων τούτων οἰνοχόοι κομψῶς τε οἰνοχοοῦσι καὶ καθαρείως ἐγχέουσι καὶ διδόασι τοῖς τρισὶ δακτύλοις ὀχοῦντες τὴν φιάλην καὶ προσφέρουσιν ὡς ἂν ἐνδοῖεν τὸ ἔκπωμα εὐληπτότατα τῷ μέλλοντι πίνειν. 9 κέλευσον δή, φάναι, ὦ πάππε, τὸν Σάκαν καὶ ἐμοὶ δοῦναι τὸ ἔκπωμα, ἵνα κἀγὼ καλῶς σοι πιεῖν ἐγχέας ἀνακτήσωμαι σε, ἢν δύνωμαι. καὶ τὸν κελεῦσαι δοῦναι. λαβόντα δὲ τὸν Κῦρον οὕτω μὲν δὴ εὖ κλύσαι τὸ ἔκπωμα ὥσπερ τὸν Σάκαν ἑώρα, οὕτω δὲ στήσαντα τὸ πρόσωπον σπουδαίως καὶ εὐσχημόνως πως προσενεγκεῖν καὶ ἐνδοῦναι τὴν φιάλην τῷ πάππῳ ὥστε τῇ μητρὶ καὶ τῷ Ἀστυάγει πολὺν γέλωτα παρασχεῖν. καὶ αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν Κῦρον ἐκγελάσαντα ἀναπηδῆσαι πρὸς τὸν πάππον καὶ φιλοῦντα ἅμα εἰπεῖν· ὦ Σάκα, ἀπόλωλας· ἐκβαλῶ σε ἐκ τῆς τιμῆς· τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα, φάναι, σοῦ κάλλιον οἰνοχοήσω καὶ οὐκ ἐκπίομαι αὐτὸς τὸν οἶνον. οἱ δ' ἄρα τῶν βασιλέων οἰνοχόοι, ἐπειδὰν διδῶσι τὴν φιάλην, ἀρύσαντες ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῷ κυάθῳ εἰς τὴν ἀριστερὰν χεῖρα ἐγχεάμενοι καταρροφοῦσι, τοῦ δὴ εἰ φάρμακα ἐγχέοιεν μὴ λυσιτελεῖν αὐτοῖς. 10 ἐκ τούτου δὴ ὁ Ἀστυάγης ἐπισκώπτων, καὶ τί δή, ἔφη, ὦ Κῦρε, τἆλλα μιμούμενος τὸν Σάκαν οὐ κατερρόφησας τοῦ οἴνου; ὅτι, ἔφη, νὴ Δία ἐδεδοίκειν μὴ ἐν τῷ κρατῆρι φάρμακα μεμιγμένα εἴη. καὶ γὰρ ὅτε εἱστίασας σὺ τοὺς φίλους ἐν τοῖς γενεθλίοις, σαφῶς κατέμαθον φάρμακα ὑμῖν αὐτὸν ἐγχέαντα. καὶ πῶς δὴ σὺ τοῦτο, ἔφη, ὦ παῖ, κατέγνως; ὅτι νὴ Δί' ὑμᾶς ἑώρων καὶ ταῖς γνώμαις καὶ τοῖς σώμασι σφαλλομένους· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἃ οὐκ ἐᾶτε ἡμᾶς τοὺς παῖδας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα αὐτοὶ ἐποιεῖτε, πάντες μὲν γὰρ ἅμα ἐκεκράγειτε, ἐμανθάνετε δὲ οὐδὲν ἀλλήλων, ᾔδετε δὲ καὶ μάλα γελοίως, οὐκ

Saky the Sakian makes for the princeling's first scalp on the path towards taking over stepping-stone Media, and we're never to forget him, as his whole tribe joins the new world-conqueror,[38] and his pleb 'name-sakian' winds up winning his race's race before teaming up with his equally and uniquely socially challenged Pheraulas to play contented housekeeper-homemaker, for our homespun 'philosopher' off the range.[39] There was Cyrus doing the original 'imitative training', the παιδεία, while grandpa does the trend-setting jesting, and in two ticks, the boy wonder learns self-repression, becoming 'A Saky to himself', i.e. inhibiting his pushiness, unlearning fun as he makes first base in acquiring manners.[40] Any 'Sakian' worth the name is born to 'shoot', according to the etymology paraded by Catullus the Great in *Sacas sagitti-feros* (11.6) and embodied in Virgil's arrowing brave *uolat ecce … Saces aduersa sagitta | saucius ora* (*Aen.*12.651–652). (A) Saky *really* couldn't miss: bull's-eye.

Not only does this master-narrative perform and celebrate textual modality, textuality, but it practises a rhetorical protocol that presents axiology as product of, and arbiter between, technology and ideology. The product may not deliver Socratic dialectic worth a clod in the face, but the Cyrus/*KP* style of questioning through this riddling narration provokes answers that make a winning team *en route* to cultural deracination/cosmopolitanism, plus simultaneous suppression of adventure and that 'sobering' wind-down of the story: intellectualism/Hellenism.

In the end, Pheraulas' ménage is predicated on personal attendance on Emperor Cyrus the Great (*and fade …*).[41]

ἀκροώμενοι δὲ τοῦ ᾄδοντος ὠμνύετε ἄριστα ᾄδειν, λέγων δὲ ἕκαστος ὑμῶν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ῥώμην, ἔπειτ' εἰ ἀνασταίητε ὀρχησόμενοι, μὴ ὅπως ὀρχεῖσθαι ἐν ῥυθμῷ, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὀρθοῦσθαι ἐδύνασθε. ἐπελέλησθε δὲ παντάπασι σύ τε ὅτι βασιλεὺς ἦσθα, οἵ τε ἄλλοι ὅτι σὺ ἄρχων. τότε γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ πρῶτον κατέμαθον ὅτι τοῦτ' ἄρ' ἦν ἡ ἰσηγορία ὃ ὑμεῖς τότ' ἐποιεῖτε· οὐδέποτε γοῦν ἐσιωπᾶτε.

38 Scythian-Sakians hate godforsaken Assyrians and join Cyrus (5.2.25, 5.3.11, 22–42, 4.13; 6.1.1; cf. 7.5.51); they line up in the Parade (as in every list, at the bottom) and Pheraulas' fellow-commoner of a Sakian wins their horse-race (8.3.18, 25); but the first, 'original', Saky the Sakian was the trailblazing Medianized cupbearer who ran into Cyrus in short trousers (1.3.8–4.5).

39 The home*ly* homilies hook up the thinking in *KP*: on 'workaholism', 8.3.48, 50 ~ 7.5.39, 42, 47, 8.1.14, 1.6.8, φιλοπονεῖν ~ 7.5.47; 'the rich eat ~~more~~', 8.3.40 ~ 8.2.21, 'sleep ~~better~~', 8.3.42–43 ~ 1.6.8; 'must clothe servants', 8.3.40 ~ 1.6.15–16, 'provide medicare', 8.3.40 ~ 8.2.24–25, 'face the hurt of losing it all', 7.5.76, 82: Saky's as happy as Croesus' *wife*, 7.2.28. 'Home' is the challenge for any 'success': 8.3.34, 38 ~ 7.5.56.

40 Cyrus 'afforded himself as paradigm', 8.1.39, cf. 21, 24, 8.6.13; mimicry by Cyrus' own clones: 8.6.10, 13; cf. 2.3.20, 24 for copycat drill.

41 Gray 2011: 376 bows out with the 'mutual *eudaimonia*' arranged between Pheraulas and Saky as 'the result of Cyrus' continual desire, even as king of the world, to assist people

But narratologically speaking, *KP*'s pride and joy are the metatextual figures of reading directives formulated along the way, a systems analysis mimetically installed as military man-oeuvres that double up as the weave of fun and games at table. Once factot*e*m Pheraulas organizes the King's Parade, that's when the king and his text started to get mocked, for telling frigid jokes, for being a joke, and it's getting urgent to call a halt before self-parody sinks this empire on which the sun soon will soon enough set (*and melt-down …*

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into friendships of beneficial use'. || This amounts finally to coopting jokey Xenophon's side-shadow parable as clincher for a particular—particularly single-minded—reading of his multiplex narrative *as* parable, thereby scotching the particular ironies produced by Straussian appropriations but tarring with the same brush the intrinsic irony-mongering of narrativity as such (see next para, and fling clods of dissemination through parody fuzz and feedback in the mix).

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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

VIRTUE AND LEADERSHIP IN XENOPHON: IDEAL LEADERS OR IDEAL LOSERS?*

Melina Tamiolaki

Introduction

In an interesting and highly controversial passage,[1] Plutarch, citing Theopompus, observes about Agesilaus:

> Agesilaus was indeed by general consent the greatest and the most famous man of his time, as Theopompus has noted, but he took more pride in his virtue than in his leadership. (*Agesilaus* 10.10 = Theopompus 115 F321)

This passage clearly points to a combination of virtue and leadership as a guarantee of success, while acknowledging at the same time that this combination is difficult to achieve. Xenophon does not provide in his corpus such an explicit statement about the possible tension between virtue and leadership. Nevertheless, given his interest in the ideal leader and his emphasis on moral qualities, it is likely that the famous connection, central to fourth-century historiographical thought, between virtue and leadership is also evident in Xenophon's works.

This study explores to what extent leaders in Xenophon live up to the ideal of virtue and whether their attachment (or non-attachment) to virtue is connected with their success or failure. Furthermore, since Socrates is considered by Xenophon as the epitome of virtue, the next issue that arises is whether Socrates represents the ideal leader, to whose qualities all other leaders should aspire. To answer this question, a comparison will be undertaken between Socrates and other leaders. The results of this investigation

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* Translations are from the Loeb edition (sometimes adapted), unless otherwise specified. All emphases in italics are mine. I am especially grateful to Sarah B. Ferrario whose suggestions helped improve the language and style of this study, as well as to the editors and anonymous referees for useful comments.

[1] For the controversies surrounding this passage and an excellent discussion, see Schepens 2001.

show that Xenophon's outlook is complex: although he insists on the ideal leader, what finally emerges is a pattern which highlights the imperfections of the leaders and their failures (or at least their limited success). This pattern applies not only to political leaders, but also to Socrates.

My analysis falls into three parts. In the first part, I offer a categorization of leaders in Xenophon according to their virtue and examine the connection of leadership with success: is a virtuous leader always successful? And what are the connotations of this connection for Xenophon's political thought? The second part is devoted to Xenophon's ideal leaders; there, it is argued that although Xenophon admires these leaders, he seems to suggest at the same time that their virtue is ambiguous. The third part focuses on the case of Socrates as an ideal leader. In this section I show that, in his presentation of Socrates, Xenophon was striving to reconcile his political interests with moral ones, a method which proved somewhat detrimental to the overall portrait of Socrates.

The following premises underlie this study:

(a) Xenophon's work is examined as a coherent corpus. Although scholars have recently stressed the importance of this premise,[2] further progress in this direction seems necessary since most studies, despite occasional references to Xenophon's overall work, often maintain this distinction. However, if the rigid demarcation between historical and Socratic works is abandoned, a truly Xenophontic worldview or system of thought can be revealed.

(b) Admitting the first premise affects the way Xenophon's Socratic works are treated. A more fruitful way of examining these works is not to try to discover the historical Socrates, which may prove futile, but rather to compare the ideas expressed there with the ideas recurrent in Xenophon's other works. In this way, what we have is not Socrates, but *Xenophon's Socrates*.[3] Although this may not be entirely satisfactory from a historical

2 See recently, Humble 2004: 226: 'Much of the difficulty in understanding *LP* has arisen because of the general tendency to regard each of Xenophon's works in isolation instead of taking them together as a coherent and ongoing dissemination of his own political and philosophical views.' Compare Pangle 1994: 128 for the connection between the portrait of Cyrus and the portrait of Socrates in Xenophon: 'Only when we have integrated our renewed appreciation of Xenophon's political theory, centred on the figure of Cyrus, into his account of philosophic life, centred on Socrates, will we be in a position truly to comprehend Xenophon's whole account of the human situation.'

3 Waterfield 2004 claims that there is a specific Xenophontic mission, namely to popularize Socrates, distinct from the Platonic mission, which was rather to establish philosophy as a field in its own right.

point of view and contributes little to the solution of the notorious Socratic problem, it may prove valuable for the image of Xenophon as a political thinker.

(c) Another trap I will try to avoid is the (pseudo-)dilemma between ironical and non-ironical reading of Xenophon. Leo Strauss' approach is certainly important for the illumination of 'irony' and has greatly contributed to a deeper understanding of Xenophon.[4] Nevertheless, the various reactions to it have led to a categorization of scholars, who tend to be divided into those who offer ironical readings and those who prefer to take Xenophon more at face value.[5] This dichotomy prevents us from seeing that there might also be a middle way of reading Xenophon: without dismissing his subtlety or even ambiguity, one should not always interpret it as ironical. If we liberate ourselves from the irony obsession, perhaps more interesting perspectives will open up a better understanding of Xenophon's thought and intentions.

Xenophon's Political Leaders: The Different Degrees of Virtue and Success

What do we mean by 'virtue'? The Greek word ἀρετή covers a wide range of meanings: it may point to military courage and valour, but it may also express generally the quality of the noble, moral or wise man.[6] Xenophon uses this word in two ways: on the one hand, in a political/military sense, a usage which can be traced back to his predecessors of the historical tradition, Herodotus and Thucydides; on the other hand, his usage should be linked with the contemporary discussion (initiated by Plato or perhaps Socrates) on the importance of virtue on moral grounds.[7] Although there

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4 For penetrating Straussian analysis of specific passages, see now Johnson (this volume, pp. 131–157).

5 Gray 2011 is a recent reaction to Straussian and ironical readings. See also my review of this book: Tamiolaki (forthcoming).

6 Bailly, *s.v.*, gives the following interpretations: 'I. mérite ou qualité par quoi l'on excelle, d'où I. qualité du corps (force, agilité), beauté, II. qualité de l'intelligence, de l'âme: courage, vertu, considération, honneur' ('I, merit or quality by which one excels, whence I. physical quality (strength, agility), beauty, II. quality of intelligence, of soul: courage, virtue, esteem, honour'). *LSJ* on the contrary do not particularly insist on the moral aspect of virtue, *s.v.*: 'I. goodness, excellence of any kind, II. active merit, III. reward or excellence'.

7 Vlastos 1991: 209–211 speaks of 'the Sovereignty of Virtue', as 'Socrates' supreme principle of practical choice'. For the implications of Vlastos' principle, see Buzzetti 1998: 5–18: the problem that arises is if and to what extent virtue is identified or compatible with the quest for happiness (*eudaimonia*). More recently, Vasiliou 2008: 2 speaks of the 'Supremacy

are occasional references to collective virtue,[8] the word generally refers to individuals. In this case, it may have an absolute or a relative sense, since Socrates either talks generally about virtue or the pursuit of virtue (ἀρετή or ἐπιμέλεια ἀρετῆς) or is interested in analyzing a specific virtue: ἀνδρεία, δικαιοσύνη, ἐγκράτεια, εὐσέβεια, σωφροσύνη, καλοκἀγαθία, φιλανθρωπία.[9] It is no surprise that the first meaning occurs mostly in Xenophon's historical works,[10] whereas the second appears abundantly in the Socratic works,[11] although there is also considerable overlap.[12]

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of Virtue', but he offers a more inclusive definition, thus avoiding the dilemma between virtue and happiness: 'SV (*scil.* Supremacy of Virtue) says that doing the virtuous action trumps any other aim one may have in acting. An aiming principle acts in two ways, as an "explicit aim" and as a "limiting condition". When SV functions as an explicit aim, an agent who adheres to SV will explicitly aim to do the virtuous thing above all. In other situations, however, SV may operate as a limiting condition. When acting for some end other than virtue (for example pleasure, financial gain), SV requires that the agent nevertheless not act in a way that is contrary to virtue.' Needless to say, both these scholars mainly focus on Plato; in Xenophon, on the contrary, these issues are discussed, but not in the same way.

8 *Mem.* 3.5.7, 3.5.14. Both of these passages refer to the ἀρχαῖα ἀρετή, as the virtue/courage of the city as a whole.

9 It is not, however, clear whether there is a hierarchical system in the presentation of these virtues, or if these virtues are considered as sub-categories of something higher. For example, in *Mem.* 3.9.5, it appears that virtue is equated with justice and that all virtues are sub-categories of wisdom (σοφία): 'He said that justice and every other form of virtue is wisdom.' In another passage (*An.* 7.7.41), however, Xenophon seems to distinguish three different virtues: ἀρετή, δικαιοσύνη and γενναιότης. Moreover, ἐγκράτεια is characterized as the foundation of virtue (κρηπῖδα ἀρετῆς: *Mem.* 1.5.4), a statement that leads Buzzetti 1998: 44 to the conclusion that it is not a virtue. See, however, Dorion 2003 for a different evaluation of ἐγκράτεια, and cf. Dorion (this volume, pp. 457, 462, 474–475), for the connection between ἐγκράτεια and σοφία. The discussion of these nuances is out of the scope of this paper. For current purposes it is sufficient to identify the instances in which a leader is characterized as virtuous, independently of the exact content of this virtue (or virtues). But perhaps one should not be so rigid with Xenophon's terminology, which is rather fluid: cf. for another equation, *Ages.* 11.9: 'He seemed to me one of the few men who consider virtue not as endurance but as a source of joy (οὐ καρτερίαν τὴν ἀρετήν, ἀλλ' εὐπάθειαν νομίζειν).' In Pl. *Men.* 74a8, however, the search is for the 'one virtue': 'Once more, Meno, we are in the same plight: again we have found a number of virtues, when we were looking for one …; but the one that runs through them all, this we are not able to find.' Compare Pl. *Prt.* 329d4. See also Pl. *Leg.* 900d7, 900e1: σωφρονεῖν and ἀνδρεία are considered as *a part of* virtue. On the efforts to define virtue in Plato, see Vasiliou 2008: 134–165, 247–281.

10 *Hell.* 1.1.28, 6.1.6 (πολεμικὴ ἀρετή), 7.4.32, 7.5.16, *An.* 2.1.12, 2.1.14, 3.1.24, 4.7.12, *Cyr.* 2.3.8, 2.3.11, 4.1.5, *Lac.*4.2, 9.2, 10.1, 10.4, 10.7, *Cyn.* 1.7, 12.9, 12.18.

11 *Mem.* 1.2.2, 1.2.7, 1.2.8 (ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλεια), 1.2.17, 1.2.20, 1.4.1, 1.6.14, 1.7.1, 2.1.20, 2.1.21, 2.6.12, 2.6.20, 2.6.22, 2.6.35, 3.5.3, 3.5.8, 3.5.10, 3.8.5, 4.1.2, 4.2.9, 4.5.2, 4.8.11, *Oec.* 7.43, 10.1 (ἀρετὴ γυναικός), 11.7, *Symp.* 3.14, 8.27, 8.43, *Ap.* 17.3, 34.4, *An.* 1.4.9, 6.4.8, 7.7.41, *Cyr.* 2.2.24, 2.2.28, 3.1.16, 7.1.18, 7.2.24, *Hier.* 11.9, *Ages.* 1.1, 1.5, 3.1, 10.3, 11.1, 11.9, *Cyn.* 13.1, 13.4, 13.5.

12 For example, in *Mem.* 2.1.28, 3.5.7, the reference is to valour; conversely, ἐγκράτεια, the Socratic virtue par excellence, is also praised at *Hell.* 6.1.16 (Polydamas' speech about Jason's

Xenophon repeatedly stresses that the ideal leader is (or should be) virtuous. Since his theory of leadership is unified and is applied in all fields of human activity (politics, household, the inner world),[13] it follows that all types of leaders should be virtuous. One might object that knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) is the essential prerequisite for the ideal leadership: for example, at the beginning of the *Cyropaedia*, Cyrus is described as a successful leader, not because he was virtuous, but because he *knew* how to rule, and how to gain the affection of his subordinates.[14] And Socrates, in the *Memorabilia*, often insists on the importance of the ἐπιστήμη for the *archōn* in a context independent of virtue.[15] But the two qualities are complementary rather than contradictory: in the course of the narrative of the *Cyropaedia*, it appears that Cyrus managed to gain the affection of his subjects, by exhibiting some important virtues.[16] So, virtue itself presupposes a kind of knowledge (at least the knowledge of its importance or utility), an idea which also has Socratic connotations.[17] It should thus be safer to assume that knowledge is the necessary condition for *successful* leadership, whereas virtue is the condition *sine qua non* for leadership.

Having established this, two issues may now be addressed. The first concerns the virtue of the leaders: what kind of virtue do Xenophon's leaders possess? Are they all equally virtuous or is there in Xenophon a hierarchy

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virtues). Given the framework set above concerning the unity of Xenophon's thought, the distinction made here between historical and Socratic works should not be considered rigid (cf. also n. 74 below).

13 I am not sure, as Wood 1964 claims, that Xenophon's theory of leadership derives from his military preoccupations. This seems too narrow and does not provide a basis for broader interpretations. For example, in the *Anabasis*, the army itself is conceived as a *polis*. Moreover, this approach neglects the portrait of Socrates as an ideal leader, a portrait which does not resemble the military leader in all aspects (see below on this). It seems that there is rather an over-arching political scheme, which Xenophon applies to all professions. See also Brock 2004.

14 Xen. *Cyr.* 1.1.3 (ἐπισταμένως).

15 Xen. *Mem.* 3.9.10–13, 3.4.21–40.

16 For an enumeration of Cyrus' virtues, see Due 1989: 156–184.

17 I say '*presupposes* a kind of knowledge' and not '*is* a kind of knowledge', because Xenophon's Socrates, unlike Plato's, does not make an explicit equation between virtue and knowledge. Rather, according to Xenophon's Socrates, virtue results from training: *Mem.* 1.2.20, 2.6.39, *Symp.* 8.27. See also a revealing passage of the *Cyropaedia* (1.5.5), where the word ἰδιώτης is used to characterize the person who is not trained to virtue: this implies that virtue is a kind of expertise. Compare *Cyr.* 7.5.71, 7.5.77, 7.5.84, and Pl. *Euthd.* 274e2. In *Men.* 70a2, Plato establishes a distinction between ἀρετή as διδακτόν and as ἀσκητόν, a distinction which is however absent in Xenophon. In the *Protagoras*, the central theme is of course whether virtue is teachable (διδακτόν), but it is made clear throughout the dialogue that this query concerns mainly political virtue: 319e2, 323a1, 323a7, 323a8, 324a1.

even among leaders? Does Xenophon proceed to (explicit or implicit) comparisons between his leaders? The second concerns the connection between leadership and virtue: does virtue guarantee success?

Concerning the virtue(s) of the leaders, Xenophon seems indeed to establish a hierarchical system. Schematically, leaders in Xenophon's works could be divided into five categories from the least to the most virtuous:

(a) leaders who are considered to be anti-paradigms of virtue, such as Alcibiades, the Thirty Tyrants and Phoebidas, about whom explicitly negative comments are expressed: Alcibiades is charged with neglect of duty (ἀμέλειαν) and dissolute conduct (ἀκράτειαν).[18] The Thirty Tyrants are accused by Theramenes of acting more unjustly than informers (ἀδικώτερα τῶν συκοφαντῶν ποιεῖν).[19] Phoebidas is characterized by Xenophon as 'a man with a far greater passion for performing some brilliant achievement than for life itself, although, on the other hand, he was not regarded as one who weighed his acts or had prudence (οὐ μέντοι λογιστικός γε οὐδὲ πάνυ φρόνιμος ἐδόκει εἶναι)'.[20]

(b) leaders who fail to reach perfect virtue: to this category belong military leaders such as Thibron, Dercylidas and Teleutias in the *Hellenica*, as well as the leaders of the *Anabasis*, Clearchus, Proxenus, Menon and Xenophon himself.[21] Xenophon's attitude towards these leaders is mixed, since he attributes to them a kind of virtue, but also presents their shortcomings: for the leaders of the *Hellenica*, their virtue is usually linked with their military achievements (or lack of), whereas for the leaders of the *Anabasis*, the important criterion of evaluation is their attitude towards their soldiers and the extent to which they can gain their voluntary submission.[22]

(c) leaders who possess a kind of virtue and thus gain Xenophon's sympathy, but their virtue is rather insufficient, in the sense that it does not merit Xenophon's overall admiration: to this category belong Theramenes,

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18 *Hell.* 1.5.16.

19 *Hell.* 2.3.22.

20 *Hell.* 5.2.28.

21 Xenophon is a special case, though, since he appears to embody the qualities of the ideal leader more than the other leaders of the *Anabasis*. See Ferrario (this volume, pp. 361–371), for Xenophon's self-presentation as a leader.

22 Thibron (*Hell.* 3.1.5–7), Dercylidas (3.1.9–10), Teleutias (5.3.7). Compare. also Clearchus (*An.* 2.3.11, 2.6.6–15), Proxenus (2.6.16–20), Menon (2.6.21–27), Xenophon (3.3.12, 3.4.48–49). For voluntary submission in the *Anabasis* and its connotations, see Tamiolaki 2010, 346–369.

Diphridas, Thrasybulus and Polydamas. All these leaders receive modest comments from Xenophon about their virtue, but the common element among them is that they do not achieve their goals.[23]

(d) ideal leaders who are closer to perfect virtue: to this category belong the leaders whom Xenophon most admires, such as Agesilaus, Jason, Mania, Cyrus the Elder, Cyrus the Younger. These leaders have a more or less predominant role in Xenophon's narrative and are explicitly praised by him. Nevertheless, their virtue often proves ambiguous. Hiero and Ischomachus could be added to this list, for reasons that will be explained below.

(e) Socrates, whose virtue is uncontested and unambiguous.

Xenophon also makes some comparisons among leaders, but only among those who are in the same or neighbouring categories: for example, he compares Dercylidas with Thibron and Thibron with Diphridas.[24] Moreover, he implies a comparison among his ideal leaders of the fourth category, but he never brings closer leaders of distant categories: he never compares, for example, Agesilaus with Alcibiades, not even indirectly.

As for the analogy between virtue and leadership, Xenophon does not venture a straightforward comment, but his narrative seems to suggest that this connection is not so strict: the virtuous leader is not always the most successful and, conversely, the vicious leader is not necessarily condemned to failure. For example, it is true that the Thirty Tyrants are punished for their injustice,[25] but we hear nothing about Alcibiades' final

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[23] Theramenes (*Hell.* 2.3.56: τὸ φρόνιμον καὶ τὸ παιγνιῶδες τῆς ψυχῆς, 'the self-possession and spirit of playfulness of his soul'), Diphridas (4.8.22: ἦν δ' οὗτος ἀνὴρ εὔχαρίς τε οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ Θίβρωνος, μᾶλλόν τε συντεταγμένος καὶ ἐγχειρητικώτερος στρατηγός, 'this was a man no less attractive than Thibron, and as a general he was even more self-controlled and enterprising'), Thrasybulus (4.8.31: Θρασύβουλος μὲν δὴ μάλα δοκῶν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, 'Thrasybulus, who was esteemed a most excellent man'), Polydamas (6.1.2: οὗτος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ Θετταλίᾳ μάλα ηὐδοκίμει, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει οὕτως ἐδόκει καλός τε κἀγαθὸς εἶναι, 'this man was not only held in very high repute throughout all Thessaly, but in his own city was regarded as so honourable a man …'). See also Gray 2011: 71–118 for leaders about whom Xenophon offers an explicit evaluation.

[24] Dercylidas is better than Thibron (*Hell.* 3.1.9–10), but Diphridas is almost equal to Thibron (4.8.22; cf. n. 22).

[25] See Xenophon's comment: ταπεινοὶ καὶ ἐρῆμοι συνεκάθοντο ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ ('utterly dejected and with but few adherents left, held their session in the council-chamber': *Hell.* 2.4.23). Compare also Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.1, the famous passage about the punishment of the Lacedaemonians.

fate,[26] and, as far as Phoebidas is concerned, his actions, thanks to Agesilaus' intervention, are even justified and it is his opponent, Ismenias, who finally receives condemnation.[27] Furthermore, some leaders who are virtuous, such as Jason and Mania, fail: they are assassinated.[28] The same goes for Cyrus the Younger, who, despite his virtue, also fails to complete his mission against Artaxerxes. Most of all, Socrates, the epitome of virtue, is condemned to death by the Athenians, as if his virtue counted for nothing. Is Xenophon's system self-subversive? If vicious leaders finally survive and if Socrates, the incarnation of virtue, is put to death, then what is the point of being virtuous? And what is the purpose of this presentation?

In what follows, I will try to show that this presentation is part of a pattern present in Xenophon, the pattern of the imperfect leader. This will be proved through a close analysis of leaders who belong to categories (d) and (e), since these leaders are closer to Xenophon's ideal. To these categories we now turn.

Ideal Leaders or the Ambiguity of Virtue

A priori, the 'ambiguity of virtue' needs to be clarified: if this means that Xenophon's ideal leaders are not wholly virtuous, then what differentiates them from leaders of the second or third category? The main difference, in my opinion, lies in Xenophon's *intention*: it is one thing to condemn somebody for being vicious or even for not being wholly virtuous, but it is

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26 His last appearance in the *Hellenica* is at 2.1.25–26: shortly before the naval battle of Aegospotami Xenophon describes a disagreement between Alcibiades and the other generals, who finally forced him to leave.

27 *Hell.* 5.2.32–36. For this incident, see Tuplin 1993: 98–99, who concludes that Xenophon intends to make his readers disapprove of Spartan tactics.

28 Mania is not characterized by a specific adjective denoting her virtue, but the fact that she earns Pharnabazus' sympathy and even his acknowledgment that she can rule is an implicit proof of her virtue (*Hell.* 3.1.12). Jason of Pherae, on the other hand, encapsulates all the qualities of the ideal leader and Polydamas enumerates them in detail (6.1.15–16). One might object that these people were tyrants or had tyrannical aspirations, but this is not Xenophon's opinion: for the man who murdered Mania, he notes that he was motivated by other people to commit the crime (ἀναπτερωθεὶς ὑπό τινων: 3.1.14); as for Jason, Xenophon expresses overtly his admiration towards him (note his gradual characterization as μέγας, μείζων, μέγιστος: 6.4.28) and implies that his murder was unjust: Xenophon's attitude towards Jason's murder can be paralleled with his attitude towards Euphron's murder: in both instances, Xenophon's comments suggest that the multitude acts in the wrong way (in the case of Jason, by fearing his tyrannical aspirations, 6.4.32, in the case of Euphron, by honouring him after his death, 7.3.12).

another thing to show (often in an indirect way) that someone's virtue is incomplete. In the second case, ambiguity refers to the overall impression one gets from Xenophon's narrative and not primarily to Xenophon's intention, which we can usually only surmise.

My thesis will be made clearer by some specific examples from Xenophon's works—examples that give substance to what I have called the 'ambiguity of virtue'. I begin with Agesilaus. Leaving aside the encomium in the shorter treatise of the same name,[29] Xenophon's narrative in the *Hellenica* creates some doubts about Agesilaus' portrait as a wholly virtuous leader. Firstly, in the encounter with Pharnabazus, Xenophon stresses the Spartan king's frugality (φαυλότητα).[30] This does not sit easily, however, with the suggestion of Agesilaus to Pharnabazus, which follows immediately after this encounter:

> Yet it is not this that we urge upon you, to be free and poor, but rather by employing us as allies to increase, not the King's empire, but your own, subduing those who are now your fellow-slaves so that they shall be your subjects. And, if being free, you should at the same time become rich, what would you lack of being altogether happy (πάμπαν εὐδαίμων)? (*Hell.* 4.1.36)

Of course, Agesilaus adjusts his rhetoric to fit the interests of the Persian satrap, but *eudaimonia* is a Greek ideal and the Spartan king does not hesitate to link it with wealth, a connection which is obviously incompatible with Spartan virtues.[31] Secondly, there is Agesilaus' temperament: Xenophon often describes Agesilaus' anger; he uses the verb ὀργίζομαι or μαίνομαι.[32] Yet this emotion cannot be easily reconciled with the temperance and control of passions that should characterize the ideal leader. Moreover, Xenophon himself in one of his rare authorial comments in the *Hellenica*, overtly disapproves of the anger of the leaders:

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29 For the divergences between the two narratives, see now Schepens 2005: 43–62, who argues against a critical attitude of Xenophon towards Agesilaus in *Hellenica*. From our perspective, the fact that Xenophon at times presents Agesilaus in a less favourable light does not necessarily reduce his admiration towards him, but certainly points to a kind of ambiguity.

30 *Hell.* 4.1.30.

31 As they are expressed, for example, in the dialogue between Xerxes and Demaratus: Hdt. 7.104.

32 *Hell.* 3.4.4, 3.4.8, 3.4.12 (this is Tissaphernes' impression regarding Agesilaus' anger at him). In these passages, Agesilaus' wrath seems rather justified. But there are also other instances, where his wrath derives from a personal motive and from his dissatisfaction that his political plans meet with some obstacles: 5.3.24, 6.5.5; cf. 3.1.17–18, where Xenophon gives a detailed account of Dercylidas' wrath.

> From such disasters, however, I hold that men are taught the lesson, chiefly, indeed, that they ought not to chastise anyone, even slaves, in anger—for masters in anger have often suffered greater harm than they have inflicted; but especially that, in dealing with enemies, to attack under the influence of anger and not with judgment is an absolute mistake. *For anger is a thing which does not look ahead* (ὀργὴ γὰρ ἀπρονόητον), *while judgment aims no less to escape harm than to inflict it upon the enemy.* (*Hell.* 5.3.7)

This passage refers to Teleutias' wrath, but, by condemning this feeling, Xenophon (perhaps unconsciously?) casts a shadow also on the portrait of Agesilaus as well.[33]

Cyrus the Elder is the leader of whose virtues Xenophon gives the most detailed account.[34] But he is also the leader whose virtue is most called into question by the elements of the narrative of the *Cyropaedia*. Firstly, Cyrus does not hesitate to twist the notion of justice. He does this twice in the course of his discussion with his mother, Mandane. The first time, Mandane asks young Cyrus how he will learn justice in Media. Cyrus replies that he already knows justice and narrates an incident to prove it. He was once flogged by his teacher because he had supported a boy who had acted in a way that in Cyrus' eyes was correct: this boy was big and had a small tunic, so he found a little boy with a big tunic on and exchanged clothing with him. Cyrus decided that the big boy was right, but his teacher punished him, on the grounds of rightful possession (κτῆσις δικαία) and the principle that the lawful is just (νόμιμόν ἐστι δίκαιον).[35]

Cyrus' attitude certainly prefigures the value that he will then attribute to the principle of redistributive justice and geometric equality: one should get what one deserves. But, at the same time, it creates doubts about his attachment to the principle of justice, or at least to the traditional principle of justice as law. Cyrus does not clarify whether his punishment made him change his mind about what justice is. On the contrary, his claim about his knowledge of justice precedes this incident and justifies his appointment by his teacher as a judge: 'My teacher appointed me, on the ground that *I was already thoroughly versed in justice* (ὅς ἤδη ἀκριβοῦντα τὴν δικαιοσύνην) to decide cases for others also'.[36] At the end of the story, Cyrus repeats: 'It is in

33 On doubts about Agesilaus' portrait as wholly virtuous leader, cf. also Harman (this volume, pp. 427–451).

34 For accounts of Cyrus' virtues, see *Cyr.* 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.5, 1.2.6, 1.2.8, 1.3.1, 1.4.1, 1.4.3, 3.1.41, 3.3.4, 6.1.46, 8.1.28–32, 8.2.1. Overall, Cyrus embodies more virtues than even Socrates. But the superiority of Socrates is qualitative rather than quantitative.

35 *Cyr.* 1.3.17.

36 *Cyr.* 1.3.17. This passage is discussed from a different perspective by Danzig (this volume, pp. 513–517).

this way, mother, you see, that I already have a thorough understanding of justice *in all its bearings* (τά γε δίκαια παντάπασι ἤδη ἀκριβῶ)'. This statement does not suggest that Cyrus stuck by his teacher's principles regarding the rightful possession and about justice as law; rather, it treats Cyrus' choice and the teacher's principle as two different (and equally valid) perceptions of justice. In this way, the conflict between these two principles is concealed and the possibility is left open that Cyrus may be transformed into a despot who imposes his will regardless of law.[37]

The second time Cyrus reveals his opinion about justice is when Mandane expresses doubts about the usefulness of Cyrus' stay in Media: she is afraid that Cyrus will acquire in Media a tyrannical rather than a kingly *ēthos* and that he will learn *pleonexia* rather than justice. Cyrus' reply is surprising:

> But your father at least … is more shrewd at teaching people to have less (ἔλαττον ἔχειν) than to have more, mother … Why, do you not see … that he has taught all the Medes to have less than himself? So never fear that your father, at any rate, will turn either me or anybody else out trained under him to have too much. (*Cyropaedia* 1.3.18)

This reply is more alarming than the previous one, since it proves that Mandane's fears are justified. Cyrus pretends that he will learn from his grandfather to be content with less, because Astyages has taught his subjects to feel this way. But Cyrus is not Astyages' subject and will not, of course, be

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[37] Leaving aside the humorous context of this scene (cf. Tatum 1989: 105–106) and focusing on its political implications, it seems at first sight that Xenophon implies that there is no conflict, since both children finally are satisfied. Nevertheless, the principle of justice followed by Cyrus concerns only the *archōn* and has a meaning only if the *archōn* who applies it is sufficiently wise so as to take right decisions (cf. Buzzetti 1998: 70–82, Nadon 2001: 49). Otherwise, if everyone did what seemed right to him regardless of the laws, anarchy would follow. But still, the implications of this principle are dangerous, since it may lead to a replacement of law by the will of the *archōn*: if the ruler is wise and consequently above laws, what is the meaning of choosing between justice as lawful and justice as fitting? And what is the meaning of the existence of laws at all? Cyrus' principle of justice thus not only points to a demolition of the principle of justice as law, but also questions the meaning of the existence of laws *tout court*. At *Mem.* 1.2.40–46, however, Xenophon reports a dialogue between Alcibiades and Pericles, which proves that Cyrus' principle of justice is utopian even for a wise ruler. The topic of this dialogue is law and violence. The two interlocutors conclude that if the law imposed by the rulers (whether these are democratic, oligarchic or despotic) does not have the consent of the people, it is equated with violence and even lawlessness. It is important to note that this discussion *involves the people* and what they consider just and lawful for them; yet people have different perceptions about what just is (the incident between Cyrus and his teacher clearly completes this discussion at this point), so how will the wise ruler be able to gain the consent of *all of them*? The lesson is rather that, from a practical perspective, laws are indeed necessary.

treated as such. The hint is left that Cyrus is very susceptible indeed to acquiring the tyrannical *ēthos*.[38]

The second virtue of Cyrus that presents some disturbing features is his generosity. Already Cyaxares, Cyrus' uncle, had stressed how important it is for the *archōn* to provide material goods for the army: 'if your army does not receive its rations, your authority will soon come to naught (καταλελύσεταί σου ἡ ἀρχή)'.[39] Cyrus surpasses his uncle's expectations: he not only supplies the army with what is needed, but also becomes a benefactor and thus gains his subordinates' affection.[40] Yet this virtue, which is expressed in the *Cyropaedia* by words such as εὐεργεσία, πολυδωρία and φιλανθρωπία, has a clearly utilitarian character.[41] This means two things: on the one hand, Cyrus' virtue, generosity, broadly speaking, entails the offering of material gains or the exhibition of open-heartedness; on the other hand, by making these offers, Cyrus always expects to receive something back: material gains, fidelity, allies, affection.[42] The reciprocal bond between giving and receiving is so strong that one would be tempted to concede that, if Cyrus could gain the affection of his subordinates without being generous, he would simply not be generous.

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38 Mueller-Goldingen 1995: 93–96 observes that 'Der Aufenthalt in Medien wird ... zu einer Bewährungsprobe für den jungen Kyros' (96) ('the stay in Media will be like a practical test for the young Cyrus'), but he does not think that Cyrus will indeed acquire the tyrannical *ēthos*.

39 *Cyr.* 1.6.9–10.

40 *Cyr.* 2.4.8–11.

41 For the idea of the utilitarianism in the *Cyropaedia*, see already Carlier 1978, Nadon 2001. Cf. also, for a more nuanced perspective, Azoulay 2004: 325–326: '... la *philanthrōpia* implique une inégalité fondamentale de tous les hommes face au souverain, quels que soit leur rang ou leur statut ... Par le truchement de la *philanthrōpia*, Cyrus transforme donc son empire en un immense cercle où l'amitié et la dépendance semblent fusionner' ('*philanthrōpia* implies a fundamental inequality for everyone of whatever rank or status in relation to the king ... through the agency of *philanthrōpia*, then, Cyrus transforms his empire into a huge circle in which friendship and dependence seem to fuse').

42 This is also a characteristic of Cyrus the Younger. In a revealing passage of the *Anabasis* (6.4.8), Xenophon seems to suggest that Cyrus' ἀρετή is identified with the Greeks' material gains: 'For most of the soldiers had sailed away from Greece to undertake this service for pay, not because their means were scanty, but because they knew by report the virtue of Cyrus; some brought other men with them, some had even spent money of their own in the enterprise, while still another class had abandoned fathers and mothers, or had left children behind *with the idea of getting money to bring back to them*, all because they heard that the other people who served Cyrus *enjoyed abundant fortune*.' This comment primarily undermines the motives of the mercenaries, but it also places Cyrus' virtue in a less honourable light. Cf. Braun 2004. Needless to say, Cyrus the Younger, is also one of the leaders for whom Xenophon gives a detailed account of virtues (Xen. *An.* 1.9).

Cyrus' generosity in reality perpetuates his subordinates' slavery.[43] The following passage demonstrates this most clearly:

> And so this class (*scil.* those who were trained to be servants) also called him "father", just as nobles did, for he took care so that they spent all their lives as slaves, without a protest (ὅπως ἀναμφιλόγως ἀεὶ ἀνδράποδα διατελοῖεν).[44] (8.1.44)

In a number of other instances, Cyrus presents himself as generous, but his ultimate purpose is his personal profit through others' submission. For example, before liberating the Armenian Tigranes and his family, he asks for significant benefits in return:

> Send with me then ... only half of the army, since your neighbours, the Chaldeans, are at war with you. And of the money, instead of the fifty talents which you used to pay as tribute, *pay Cyaxares double that sum* because you are in arrears with your payments. *And lend me personally a hundred more* ... and I promise that if God prospers me, I will return for your loan ... *but if I cannot*, I may seem insolvent, I suppose, but I should not justly be accounted dishonest. (3.1.31–37)

When he releases the prisoners of the Chaldeans, he disguises his warlike intentions behind a peace offer: 'If you choose war, do not come this way again without weapons, if you are wise; but if you decide that you desire peace, come without arms'.[45] When he decides to liberate his own prisoners, his motive does not allow us to characterize him as *philanthrôpos* either:

> If we should let them go, we should, I think, do what would be itself an advantage (σύμφορον). For, in the first place, we should not have to keep watch against them ...; and, in the second place, if we let them go, *we shall have more prisoners of war* than if we do not. For, if we are masters of the country, all they that dwell therein will be our prisoners of war; and the rest, when they see these alive and set at liberty, will stay at their places and choose *to submit rather than to fight.* (4.4.5–8)

The same goes for his generosity towards the eunuchs, the purpose of which is to assure their constant fidelity and submission.[46] It is no surprise, then, that the *Cyropaedia* contains statements such as '... nothing is more

[43] What follows in this paragraph is based on my analysis of the concept of voluntary submission in the *Cyropaedia*: Tamiolaki 2010: 289–320.

[44] The phrase ὅπως ἀναμφιλόγως ἀεὶ ἀνδράποδα διατελοῖεν is considered by some editors too provocative to be genuine, but it is present in all the manuscripts.

[45] 3.2.12, 17.

[46] 7.5.59.

profitable than virtue (μηδὲν κερδαλεώτερον ἀρετῆς)'.[47] Cyrus' virtue is clearly possessed of political connotations and aims.[48]

These motivations can help account for another problematic quality of virtue in the *Cyropaedia*: virtue is considered as the privilege of the upper classes, and a fundamental trait of the *archontes*. This is made clear in the discussion between Cyrus and his father, Cambyses:

> Cambyses: 'The ruler ought to surpass those under his rule not in self-indulgence, but in taking forethought and willingly undergoing toil …'. Cyrus: 'You mean to say father, that nothing is more effectual toward keeping one's men obedient than to seem to be wiser than they (φρονιμώτερον)?' Cambyses: 'Yes … this is just what I mean …' Cyrus: 'You mean to say, father, that in everything, the general must show more endurance than his men (καρτερώτατον)'. Cambyses: 'Yes, that is just what I mean; however, never fear for that my son; for bear in mind that *the same toils do not affect the general and the private in the same way*, though they have the same sort of bodies; but the honour of the general's position and the very consciousness that nothing he does escapes notice lighten the burdens for him'. (1.6.8, 1.6.21, 25)

Cyaxares, Cyrus's uncle, makes a similar comment which suggests that the superiority of the *archontes* is the wish of the people:

> For I was not made king of Media because I was the most powerful of all, but rather because *they themselves accounted us to be in all things better than themselves*. (5.5.34)

Cyrus, too, at the end of the *Cyropaedia*, after establishing his empire, takes again specific measures in order to stress his superiority: '*he believed that no one had any right to rule who was not better than his subjects*; and it is evident,

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[47] 7.1.18. Here virtue has the sense of valour; cf. 4.2.26, where the word κερδαλέος is used in a context which helps explain why valour is profitable: 'You should realize this also, that nothing is more profitable than victory (οὐδέν ἐστι κερδαλεώτερον τοῦ νικᾶν). For the victor has swept together all the spoil at once, the men and the women, the wealth and all the lands.'

[48] A possible objection to this line of argumentation would be that since Cyrus' behaviour results in a mutual agreement and profit, so it is not problematic: cf. the general thrust of Danzig's chapter in this volume (pp. 499–540). Yet this objection overlooks two factors: a) that freedom is an ideal, elsewhere acknowledged by Xenophon (although with some important nuances; see in detail Tamiolaki 2010: 155–190); so, the decline of this ideal in the *Cyropaedia* and its replacement by the notion of willing submission makes things more complex; b) that the apparent reciprocity between Cyrus and his allies and friends (real or potential) often masks the fact that these relations are mainly based on fear (*Cyr.* 1.1.5). This is further proven if we make a simple assumption: what would happen if Cyrus' allies and friends (potential and real) refused to give him back what he asked? Most probably, Cyrus would forget his philanthropy.

too, that in thus drilling those about him he himself got his own best training both in temperance and in the arts and pursuits of war'.[49]

The superior virtue of the *archōn*, therefore, has a political purpose: it serves to legitimize and perpetuate his authority over his subjects. It is this legitimization that Cyrus ardently defends in his speech to the *homotimos* Chrysantas, when he underlines the superiority of the virtue that *homotimoi* possess in comparison with the inferior virtue of the commoners:

> But I should be surprised, Chrysantas, if a word well spoken would help those wholly untrained in excellence (ἀπαιδεύτους παντάπασιν ἀρετῆς) to the attainment of manly worth any more than a song well sung would help those untrained in music to high attainments of music. (3.3.50–55)

The implication is that the commoners are less inclined to virtue and consequently they are unfit to rule. If this conclusion is accepted, then Cyrus' concern to make his subordinates better can therefore be seen in a new, more realistic, light:[50] the *archomenoi* should become virtuous, but not surpass the virtue of the *archōn*, since this could imply a challenge to his superior authority.

The portrait of the tyrant *Hiero* should be examined in parallel with the portrait of Cyrus, not only because Cyrus shares with him some tyrannical features,[51] but rather because Xenophon, in this dialogue, subverts the classical tradition about the connection of tyranny with vice.[52] He achieves this by presenting Hiero as an individual who has the potential for virtue and who finally deserves our sympathy. Hiero acknowledges his vices, but he maintains that he is *compelled* to act unjustly.[53] This accounts for his

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49 8.1.37. And more explicitly in 8.1.40: 'he held the opinion that a ruler ought to excel his subjects not only in point of being actually better than they, but that he ought also to cast a sort of spell upon them (καταγοητεύειν)'.

50 2.1.11: 'For it is not the whole duty of the ruler to show himself valiant (ἀγαθόν), but he must also take care that his men be as valiant as possible (ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται).'

51 See Gera 1993: 293–294.

52 A characteristic example of this tradition is Socles' speech in Herodotus 5.92a: οὔτε ἀδικώτερόν ἐστι κατ'ἀνθρώπους οὐδὲ μιαιφονώτερον ('a thing more unrighteous and bloodthirsty than anything else on this earth'). But of course this speech represents a general tendency towards tyranny in the fifth century. Gray 1986: 123 argues that Xenophon demolishes the popular view on tyranny in another way, by 'having the wise man ironically argue for it and the tyrant against it'. But the fact that the tyrant enumerates the miseries of tyranny does not mean that he is particularly eager to abandon it; and on this point both Hiero and Simonides agree.

53 It is astonishing how many times derivatives of the word ἀνάγκη appear in this context: *Hier*. 1.28, 2.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 5.3, 6.5, 6.15, 8.9, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 9.10, 10.7, 10.8. Hiero is thus presented as a victim of ἀνάγκη, as somebody who has good motives, but has been caught in a wrong (though enviable) position.

attitude towards upright people, whose virtue he recognizes, but yet he cannot use them:

> Despots are oppressed by yet another trouble, Simonides … They recognize a stout-hearted, a wise or an upright man as private citizens do. But instead of admiring such men, they fear them—the brave, lest they strike a bold stroke for freedom, the wise lest they hatch a plot, the upright, lest the people desire them for leaders. When they get rid of such people through fear, who are left for their use, save only the unrighteous, the vicious and the servile? … This too, then, is a heavy trouble, in my opinion, to see the good in some men, and yet perforce to employ others (ἄλλοις δὲ χρῆσθαι ἀναγκάζεσθαι). (*Hiero* 5.2)

Simonides, for his part, gives detailed advice to Hiero; if Hiero follows it, he will be transformed into a benevolent king and thus enjoy the benefits of his power much more fully than he does now. Overall, then, Hiero's vice is ambiguous, since it is unwilling and can be transformed into virtue. If this ambiguous vice is combined with Cyrus' ambiguous virtue, the distinction between the vicious tyrant and the benevolent king is blurred: the common imperfect virtue they both embody accounts thus for the interchangeability of their regimes.[54]

Finally, Ischomachus is the ideal leader of the household: like the ideal leaders, he must also gain the sympathy of his subordinates, and, again in the manner of ideal leaders, he must perpetuate their submission through *euergesia*.[55] A further unifying thread between the *Oeconomicus* and the other Xenophontic works is provided by the closure of this work, where voluntary submission is praised as an ideal:

> For ruling over willing subjects, in my view, is a gift not wholly human but divine, because it is a gift of the gods: and one that is obviously bestowed on these who have been initiated into self-control. The gods give tyranny over unwilling subjects, I think, to those who they believe deserve to live a life in Hades like Tantalus, who is said to spend the whole of eternity in fear of a second death. (*Oeconomicus* 21.12, tr. Pomeroy)

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54 Xenophon seems to suggest in this dialogue that kingship and tyranny do not have essential differences. This is proven by the fact that when Simonides gives his advice to Hiero, he uses the words ἄρχων (8.2, 8.3, 9.3, 9.4) and τύραννος (8.10, 11.1, 11.6) interchangeably. The function of this is twofold. On the one hand, the word τύραννος is by no means employed neutrally (*pace* Gray 2007: 106). When it is used, negative features are described: the presence of guards (8.10) and the tyrants' spending a lot of money (11.1, 11.6), a trait which recalls Alcibiades' behaviour and the accusations that he was harbouring tyrannical aspirations. On the other hand, Simonides' belief that the tyrant *can* be transformed into a benevolent king contributes to an effacement of the differences between the tyrant and the king. The implication of this is not that tyranny is the negative mirror of kingship, but rather that tyranny and kingship are *inevitably* interchangeable.

55 For the connotations of this connection, see in detail Tamiolaki 2010: 320–345.

Ischomachus embodies the qualities of ideal leaders, but the virtue he is considered to manifest *par excellence* is καλοκἀγαθία.[56] By contrast, however, with Cyrus, the limits of whose virtues Xenophon shows rather indirectly, and Hiero, who is presented as an example of ambiguous vice, Ischomachus' main virtue is called more explicitly into question in the narrative of the *Oeconomicus*. It has already been pointed out that the discussion between Ischomachus and Socrates in the *Oeconomicus* aims at showing that the true καλὸς κἀγαθός is Socrates.[57] More radically, Ischomachus' quality as a teacher has also been called into question.[58] Even if Xenophon's central aim is not to stress Socrates' superior virtue, the dialogue certainly contains elements which cast doubts on Ischomachus' καλοκἀγαθία. Firstly, Socrates seems to doubt Ischomachus' καλοκἀγαθία, which is why he decides to test him (ἐλέγχειν). Secondly, Ischomachus himself, when Socrates asks him why he is called καλὸς κἀγαθός, replies evasively:

> I don't know whether people use this title when they are talking to you about me. Certainly whenever they challenge me to an exchange of property to pay for the maintenance of a trireme or for training choruses for the festivals, no one sets about looking for the "gentleman", but they summon me simply by the name Ischomachus together with that of my father. (7.3, tr. Pomeroy)

This answer is peculiar, since Ischomachus avoids explaining whether he perceives himself to be καλὸς κἀγαθός.[59] Moreover, Socratic irony further serves to undermine Ischomachus' quality:

> But now please tell me about your activities, so that you can have the pleasure of giving a full account of why you have such an excellent reputation, and so that I may be truly grateful to you, as a result of listening attentively and learning from beginning to end, if I can, about the activities of a gentleman (καλοῦ κἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἔργα).[60] (11.1, tr. Pomeroy)

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[56] For this virtue, which also covers a wide range of meanings, see Pomeroy 1994: 259. Cf. also the comprehensive study by Bourriot 1995.

[57] Pangle 1994.

[58] Too 2001.

[59] Pomeroy 1994: 265 comments: 'Ischomachus eschews the moral or abstract connotations of the expression and answers in terms of his wealth alone. Thus he is characterized at the outset as a realist with a particular interest in material goods.' But Ischomachus does not seem to connect even his wealth with καλοκἀγαθία.

[60] Cf. 11.6–7: '(Socrates) "Assume therefore, that it is possible for me to be a good man, and give me a complete account of your occupations, that, so far as my understanding allows me, I may endeavour to follow your example from tomorrow morning" … "You're joking, Socrates (σὺ μὲν παίζεις)", said Ischomachus'; and also 12.2: 'you take the utmost care not to forfeit your right to be called a gentleman!'.

Finally, despite the centrality of καλοκἀγαθία at the beginning of the dialogue, this topic seems to fade away in the course of the discussion and gives way to an inquiry about how Ischomachus taught his wife and slaves to be obedient. Whether this achievement is identified or connected with καλοκἀγαθία, is left unclear. As a result, we finally get no answer to the initial question, why Ischomachus is called καλὸς κἀγαθός and whether he deserves this characterization.[61]

Virtuous Socrates: A Virtual Leader

Socrates apparently has the most enviable position in the pantheon of Xenophon's ideal leaders. Given the apologetic character of Xenophon's Socratic works, it is no wonder that he is presented as possessing virtue in the highest degree,[62] a fact which is also confirmed by Delphi:

> Once upon a time when Chaerephon made inquiry at the Delphic oracle concerning me, in the presence of many people Apollo answered that no man was more free-spirited than I, nor more just nor more prudent (ἐμοῦ μήτε ἐλευθεριώτερον μήτε δικαιότερον μήτε σωφρονέστερον).[63] (*Apology* 14)

The connection between Socrates and other Xenophontic leaders has already attracted attention: scholars point out that Socrates embodies all the virtues of an ideal leader.[64] For the purposes of this study, it is important to note that Socrates not only is considered to epitomize virtue, but also theorizes about it, a fact which compels us to examine his portrait in more detail. The following questions arise: is there an essential difference between Socrates and other leaders as far as virtue is concerned? Is Socrates a superior leader, the paradigm *par excellence* for all leaders, or does he form part of the pattern of leaders who have an ambiguous virtue or enjoy only partial success? My analysis here will focus on two points: firstly, on the unambiguous nature of Socrates' moral virtue; secondly, on Socrates' relationship with politics and subsequently with political virtue. I will argue that

[61] The last occurrence of the phrase καλὸς κἀγαθός in the dialogue is at 14.9, where Ischomachus maintains that he treats his slaves as if they were gentlemen. After this, the word (and the subsequent inquiry about καλοκἀγαθία) vanishes.

[62] *Mem.* 1.2.1, 1.2.14–15, 1.3.5–8, 1.6.1.

[63] Cf. *Ap.* 16.

[64] Due 1989: 198–203, Huss 1999: 25–30, Azoulay 2004: 396–413. See also, more recently, Gera 2007, who notes also some divergences between the portrait of Socrates and that of other leaders. My purpose is to complete Gera's analysis, by placing more emphasis upon these divergences.

there is a tension between Socrates as a political and as a moral character which finally undermines his portrait as an ideal leader. From this perspective, it would thus be more accurate to maintain that Socrates is a virtuous, though virtual leader.

I begin with the first point. Bearing in mind other leaders' ambiguous virtue, the unambiguous character of Socrates' virtue can easily be confirmed if we observe some subtle differences between him and Xenophon's political leaders. First of all, unlike Cyrus and other military leaders, Socrates cannot become a benefactor, because he is poor; his εὐεργεσία is thus limited to moral goods.[65] In this way, he avoids the dangers of utilitarian εὐεργεσία. But Socrates' εὐεργεσία, despite its superior nature, entails risks of another kind: Cyrus is called 'father', whereas Socrates is accused of alienating children from their fathers, a charge that he however does not deny.[66] Secondly, Socrates' task seems easier than that of political leaders: political leaders usually have to deal with a great number of people; even Ischomachus, in his household, is obliged to coordinate a variety of slaves. Socrates, however, maintains that he himself chooses his students, which means that he has to deal with a more limited number of people.[67] Moreover, he chooses the best natures, that is, people who are more likely to attain high virtue.[68] Consequently, Socrates is not obliged to have recourse to tricks or other measures (violence, seduction etc.) to assure their fidelity. Related to this is also a third distinction: like Cyrus, Socrates, too, presents himself as virtuous with the aim of inciting others to virtue: 'To be sure, he never professed to teach virtue; but, by letting his own light shine, he led his disciples to hope that through imitation of him they would attain to such excellence'.[69] The difference, however, lies in the fact that Socrates, in contrast to Cyrus, does not treat others as slaves and his intention is not to perpetuate their submission.[70] On the contrary, he is proud of maintaining an erotic relationship with the students of his *entourage* based on mutual

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[65] *Ap.* 26. See Nikolaidou-Kyrianidou 2008.

[66] *Ap.* 20: 'I admit it ... at least as far as education is concerned'.

[67] *Mem.* 1.2.5–6; Socrates considers this choice as an act of freedom; on this type of freedom, see Tamiolaki 2010: 371–394.

[68] Cf. O'Connor 1994, who maintains that Socrates' students are (unsuccessful) imitators of their master's self-sufficiency.

[69] *Mem.* 1.2.3; cf. 4.8.10–12.

[70] See however, *Mem.* 1.2.49: Socrates claims that the ignorant (ἀμαθής) should be enslaved to the wise (δεδέσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ σοφοῦ). But he does not seem to apply this principle to himself, probably because he does not consider himself σοφός.

friendship.[71] In other words, the fact that Socrates is not a political leader *stricto sensu* mainly accounts significantly for the uncontested nature of his moral virtue.

Given the insistence on Socrates' moral superiority or even expertise, the portrait of him sketched by Xenophon would be less complex if Socrates claimed that he is interested exclusively in the inner world and had no particular interest in politics. Such sentiments would also align him with Plato's Socrates, who openly states his hesitance about participating actively in politics.[72] But Socrates' attitude towards politics in Xenophon seems rather ambivalent. His overall thought is too political and this creates some unresolved contradictions.[73]

Firstly, Xenophon's Socrates does not show *an independent interest* in morality. He thinks highly of politics, which he twice characterizes as a kingly art. In the first instance Xenophon comments:

> … he exhorted them to desire the fairest and noblest virtue (*καλλίστης καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεστάτης ἀρετῆς*), by which men prosper in public life and in their home. (*Memorabilia* 1.2.64)

And in his discussion with Euthydemus, Socrates confirms Xenophon's own judgment:

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[71] *Mem.* 2.6.28–29: ἴσως δ' ἄν τί σοι κἀγὼ συλλαβεῖν εἰς τὴν τῶν καλῶν τε κἀγαθῶν θήραν ἔχοιμι διὰ τὸ ἐρωτικὸς εἶναι· δεινῶς γάρ, ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσω ἀνθρώπων, ὅλος ὥρμημαι ἐπὶ τὸ φιλῶν τε αὐτοὺς ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ ποθῶν ἀντιποθεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν συνεῖναι καὶ ἀντεπιθυμεῖσθαι τῆς συνουσίας. 'Maybe I myself, as an adept in love, can lend you a hand in the pursuit of gentlemen. For when I want to catch anyone it's surprising how I strain every nerve to have my love returned, my longing reciprocated by him, in my eagerness that he shall want me as much as I want him.'

[72] See Pl. *Ap.* 31d4; on this attitude of Socrates, see Macé 2009. Compare Dorion & Bandini 2000: 169: 'Alors que Platon prête à Socrate une activité politique d'une nature telle qu'elle ne peut pas l'exposer à l'accusation d'avoir été le mauvais génie de certains dirigeants politiques, Xénophon confie à Socrate un rôle politique qui le rend très vulnérable à ce type d'accusation' ('whereas Plato assigns Socrates political activity of a sort that cannot expose him to the accusation of having been the evil genius of certain political leaders, Xenophon gives Socrates a political role that makes him very vulnerable to this type of accusation').

[73] It is astonishing how Socrates' ideas in the *Memorabilia* match Cyrus' words in the *Cyropaedia*: like Cyrus, Socrates defends the utilitarian aspect of virtue (*Mem.* 1.2.48), he places emphasis on the virtues of the leaders (see below, n. 89), he claims that people trust leaders whom they consider superior (3.3.8–9), he stresses the leader's ἐπιστήμη (3.9.10–13) and he underlines the fact that the leader's task is the εὐδαιμονία of his subjects (3.2.4). However, this convergence of ideas should not always be interpreted as a confirmation of Cyrus' portrait as an ideal leader: rather it should be treated as a proof that Xenophon's leaders are somewhat overwhelmed by Xenophon's ideas. For the political import of Xenophon's moral teachings/leadership, cf. also Waterfield (this volume, pp. 296–297).

> It is the noblest kind of excellence, the greatest of arts that you covet (τῆς καλλίστης ἀρετῆς καὶ μεγίστης ἐφίεσαι τέχνης), for it belongs to kings and is dubbed 'kingly' (καλεῖται βασιλική).[74] (4.2.11)

In a blatant departure from the Platonic portrayal of Socrates, Xenophon even presents Socrates encouraging young Charmides to engage in politics and not to be afraid of the multitude, a fear, however, that the Platonic Socrates does experience.[75]

It is no wonder, then, that in Xenophon's Socratic dialogues morality is intimately connected with politics: every time the issue of morality is raised, it refers to the virtues of the leaders.[76] The radical expression of this connection is found at the beginning of Socrates' discussion with Aristippus. Socrates asks:

> Tell me, Aristippus, if you were required to take charge of two youths and educate them so that the one would be fit to rule (ἱκανός ἔσται ἄρχειν) and the other would never think of putting himself forward (μηδ' ἀντιποιήσεται τῆς ἀρχῆς), how would you educate them? (2.1.1)

Socrates presupposes such a close connection between virtue and leadership that he implies that people who are not prepared to rule are not supposed or expected to be virtuous (or at least *highly* virtuous). And despite their fundamental divergences of approach, Aristippus agrees with Socrates on this point. According to Xenophon's Socrates then, the moral aspect of virtue is subject to its political usefulness.[77]

Having appropriated a highly political profile and having embodied all the virtues of the ideal leader, however, Xenophon's Socrates can give no satisfactory answer as to why he does not himself engage in politics. Xenophon reports that Socrates was once asked by Antiphon to answer this question. One might expect that Socrates would stress the shortcomings of political life and the superiority of the life of the philosopher, or that he would appeal to the authority of his *daimonion*, as Plato's Socrates does.[78] His reply, however, is very different:

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74 The fact that Xenophon uses in these occurrences the word ἀρετή on these occasions further serves to obscure the distinction between the political and the moral aspect of virtue.

75 3.7.5–9.

76 1.5.1, 1.7.1–5, 2.1.1–7, 4.5.1–12.

77 This discussion, since it concerns mainly people of the aristocratic class, can hardly contribute (*pace* Waterfield 2004) to a popularization of the Socratic morality.

78 Pl. *Ap.* 31d1. I thank Robin Waterfield for drawing my attention to the parallels between Xenophon and Plato. It would be tempting to read these divergences as a reaction to Plato, provided of course that we consider, following Stokes (this volume, pp. 248–249), that the Platonic *Apology* precedes Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (cf. below, n. 107).

> How now, Antiphon … should I play a more important part in politics, by engaging in them alone or by taking pains to turn out as many competent politicians as possible?[79] (*Memorabilia* 1.6.15)

This statement, which suggests that Socrates conceives of his activity as highly political, still evades the question and indeed creates further questions: if Xenophon's Socrates considers political activity as twofold (participating in politics on the one hand and preparing people to engage in it, on the other), he still leaves unanswered why he considers himself more suitable for the second branch of it rather than for the first.

Finally, the connection of morality with politics advocated by Xenophon's Socrates is contradicted by the historical reality: Socrates had students (or better companions) who either denied absolutely political life (the Cynics for example), or denied morality altogether (such as Critias and Alcibiades). This invites two conclusions: that Socrates indeed possessed an interest in morality outside politics and that his engagement with politics (or with potential politicians) was not entirely successful.[80] Xenophon, not surprisingly, does not comment upon this historical reality, but rather adapts it to fit the political portrait of Socrates and the general purposes of his works. Nevertheless, this adaptation is not entirely successful.

Aristippus represents the first category of Socrates' students outlined above, since he maintains that he wants to be liberated completely from the burdens of political life. Xenophon devotes the first chapter of the second book of the *Memorabilia* to Aristippus' discussion with Socrates on this topic: Socrates strives to convince Aristippus that political life is inevitable and that morality (in this case, ἐγκράτεια) is necessary in politics and even contributes to pleasure.[81] Yet, at the end of this long discussion, we do not learn either that Aristippus decided to engage in politics or that he endorsed the ideal of ἐγκράτεια.[82]

Critias and Alcibiades represent the second category of Socrates' students. For these individuals, Xenophon maintains that they became vicious after abandoning Socrates;[83] that when they were younger, under Socrates'

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79 A comic version of this statement appears in *Symp.* 3.10, 4.56–60, 8.42–43, when Socrates says that he is μαστρωπός of the *polis* because he presents to the *polis* the best persons.

80 See on this second aspect Morrison 1994, O'Connor 1998.

81 For a detailed analysis of this dialogue and the relevant bibliography, see Johnson 2009, Tamiolaki 2009, and now Dorion 2011: ad loc.

82 *Mem.* 2.1.34. On Socrates as a problematic giver of advice, cf. Rood 2006.

83 Xenophon follows a similar line of argumentation concerning Agesilaus (*Ages.* 2.23): 'Up to this time he and his city enjoyed unbroken success; and though the following years brought a series of troubles, *it cannot be said that they were incurred under the leadership of Agesilaus*.'

influence, they were trained to virtue; and that Socrates, like parents and teachers, who are not to be blamed for their children's or students' moral deficiencies, is not to be blamed for his students' immorality.[84] This interpretation is, however, far from satisfactory.[85] It is not compatible either with Socrates' choice of the best natures or with his principle that the ἀκρατεῖς do not deserve to be trained to virtue.[86] Furthermore, the fact that when these students abandoned Socrates they were transformed into monsters also suggests that their education near Socrates may not have been so reliable. The parallel drawn between Socrates and parents or teachers is also misleading: Socrates was only nine years older than Critias, which does not suggest the scale of a parent/child relationship; and it is difficult to imagine an Alcibiades who was virtuous at the age of twenty and vicious at the age of thirty, an age at which he was still considered young.[87] More importantly, in the cases of both Critias and Alcibiades, there is no evidence of an earlier virtuous life. Overall then, Xenophon's comments on the practical effects of Socrates' training to virtue are not sufficient to defend him, since Xenophon does not try to investigate what went wrong, but is rather interested in highlighting Socrates' *intention* not to do wrong.[88] Nevertheless, Socrates was accused of the practical effects of his training and not of his intention. And these effects either are not commented upon by Xenophon or receive only vague treatment.[89]

In sum, the image of Socrates as it emerges from Xenophon's works is somewhat paradoxical: Socrates appears as someone who embodies all

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84 *Mem.* 1.2.24–29.

85 Nevertheless, one must admit that Xenophon undertakes a difficult task here, when he chooses to address this specific issue regarding Critias and Alcibiades. It is perhaps no coincidence that Plato's Socrates avoids this trap: he claims that he is teacher of nobody and then he assumes that if he had corrupted somebody, while he was young, this corrupted person or his relatives should have come to the court and accused him, which has not happened (Pl. *Ap.* 33a5–d9).

86 *Mem.* 4.1; *Oec.* 12.11.

87 Thuc. 5.43.2.

88 Compare Gray 1998: 45: 'Xenophon's reply to this first charge of making the youth politically violent turns on the premise that no person who 'practises wisdom' *could believe* (my emphasis) violence better than persuasion as a means to a political end.'

89 Apart from the example of Aristippus, mentioned above, there is also another example, Socrates' promptings to Charmides about public life: Xenophon does not comment as to whether they were successful, presumably because they were not. See Davies 1971: 331: 'his (*scil.* Charmides') only known incursion into public life was at the age of about 45 as one of the Ten in Piraeus in 404/3 in which capacity he met his death in 403 (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.19).' For Xenophon's vagueness see *Mem.* 4.3.18, 4.4.25: Xenophon reports vaguely that Socrates made people around him more just or more pious.

the political virtues and gives detailed advice about politics, but without engaging in politics and without explaining why he does not do so; further, as somebody who gives equally abundant advice about the importance of morality in politics without being able to convince people of the value of this morality. This image probably reflects the fact that Socrates may have indeed been a complex personality, but Xenophon's touch on this picture has to be stressed too. It seems that in his portrayal of Socrates Xenophon was striving to reconcile the apologetic purpose of these works with his primarily political preoccupations. The result was that the political purposes finally prevailed over the apologetic or, to put it another way, that the apology ultimately served to enhance Xenophon's ideas about politics. This is shown most explicitly by a revealing passage of the *Memorabilia* where Socrates is compared with Lichas (!):

> Socrates ... showed himself to be one of the people (δημοτικὸς) and a friend of mankind (φιλάνθρωπος). For although he had many eager disciples among citizens and strangers, yet he never exacted a fee for his society from one of them ... *But Socrates did far more to win respect for the State in the world at large than Lichas, whose services to Sparta have made his name immortal.* For Lichas used to entertain the strangers staying at Sparta during the Feast of the Dancing Boys; but Socrates spent his life in lavishing his gifts and rendering the greatest services to all who cared to receive them. For he always made his associates better men before he parted with them. (1.2.60–61)

This comparison, which confirms most clearly Socrates' position atop Xenophon's hierarchy of leaders, highlights at the same time its problematic character: it accounts for the failure of Xenophon's Socrates to stress morality outside politics and, subsequently, for the failure of Xenophon to defend Socrates in a more satisfactory manner.[90]

Conclusion: Virtue and Leadership *vs.* Leadership without Virtue and Virtue without Leadership

The analysis presented above suggests that the connection between leadership and virtue belongs mainly to the realm of the ideal. Xenophon's works show that the two concepts can perfectly be dissociated: there are leaders who are not virtuous and virtuous people, such as Socrates, who do not

[90] From this perspective, Plato's portrait of Socrates seems more consistent: despite occasional lacunas in his argumentation, Plato's Socrates does not oscillate between a moral and a political profile, but defends openly his voluntary abstention from politics (Pl. *Ap.* 32a3–e1).

become political leaders. Even the utility of virtue is ultimately undermined by Xenophon's narratives, since vicious people do not always fail and, conversely, virtue does not always guarantee success.

If the pieces of the Xenophontic puzzle are reassembled, we must conclude that the image of the imperfect leader forms a pattern in Xenophon's work: reflection upon the ideal leader can easily degenerate into reflection upon the weaknesses of leaders and finally upon the leader who fails. This perspective also has broader connotations. Given the interrelation between *polis* and individual and in general between the public and the private sphere in Xenophon's thought,[91] it is no wonder that Xenophon applies the same insight equally to his leaders and to his cities: there is thus a potential analogy to be observed between the "failings of empire" (to borrow Christopher Tuplin's expression) and the pattern of the imperfect leader. The purpose of this pattern, is not, however, a kind of criticism or ironic portrayal of good leaders. Xenophon rather intends us to learn that perfect virtue is difficult to attain and that when political considerations interfere, things cannot simply be black or white. This further explains the function of the ambiguity of virtue: it shows that there is a tension between political and moral considerations which is usually resolved at the expense of morality.

Plato's ideal in the *Republic* was that kings should become philosophers and philosophers kings.[92] Xenophon, too, certainly reflected on this topic. But perhaps he realized earlier than Plato its limited feasibility. His presentation thus amounts to a down-to-earth admission that this ideal is unattainable: his philosopher, Socrates, possesses virtue, but has an ambivalent relationship with politics, and his kings have power, but without perfect virtue. In this way, Xenophon, without dismissing morality entirely, offers a more realistic alternative and a pragmatic guide to the complexities of political life.

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[91] For this interrelation, see Azoulay 2009.

[92] Pl. *Resp.* 473c11–e5.

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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

DOES PRIDE GO BEFORE A FALL? XENOPHON ON ARROGANT PRIDE[*]

Lisa Irene Hau

A feeling of superiority to other human beings is generally discouraged in modern Western society. Not so in ancient Greece. From epic through tragedy to oratory and historiography, the Greeks generally show themselves quite happy to blow their own trumpet,[1] and pride is not generally a sentiment to be criticized in great achievers.[2] When such pride tips over into arrogance and hubristic disregard for others, however, it becomes a negative trait, associated with tyrants and punishable by Athenian law.[3] The line between self-confident pride and hurtful arrogance can be very fine, but is very rarely explored by ancient authors. This paper will argue that Xenophon was more interested in, and troubled by, this ambiguity in Greek thought than most other ancient writers, and that his stance on the issue both ties in closely with the overall moral-didactic purpose of his writing and points towards his Hellenistic successors in the historiographical genre. We shall explore Xenophon's use of words from the root *phron-* denoting a proud state of mind, often with corollaries of arrogance, overconfidence and, in a military context, contempt for the enemy. More specifically, we shall investigate his use of the nouns *phronēma* and *kataphronēsis*, the verb

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1 See e.g. Hom. *Il.* 254–273, Thuc. 2.60.5–7, Eur. *IA* 919–974, Dem. 18.108–110. Cf. Dover 1974: 234–235.

2 See e.g. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1124a–b, to be discussed below.

3 See e.g. Dem. 21 *passim*. Compare Fisher 1992: 36–85.

kataphronein, the adverb *kataphronikōs*, and the phrase *mega phronein*,[4] all of which are frequent across his corpus.[5]

Phron-Words Used in a Purely Negative Sense

Let us begin with *phronēma*. This word, in Xenophon, can most often best be translated 'insolent pride'.[6] Such pride very often leads to negative results, as in *Spartan Constitution* 15.8 where Lycurgus wants to avoid *phronēma* in the Spartan kings because this will lead to envy in the people, and *Hellenica* 7.1.23 and 7.1.32 where first the Arcadians and then other Greek peoples become inspired with *phronēma* under the influence of Lycomedes of Mantinea, a *phronēma* which leads them to engage the Spartans and be defeated soundly in the 'Tearless Battle'. Even in *Hellenica* 5.2.18, where the *phronēma* of the Olynthians is described by Cligenes of Acanthus in a speech, and 5.3.8, where it seems to be warranted by the Olynthians' recent defeat of Spartans under Teleutias, this state of mind eventually (5.3.26) leads to disaster when they are reduced to starvation by a Spartan siege and end up having to capitulate.

[4] The concept of self-confident arrogance can be expressed by several semantically distinct groups of words, in Xenophon and in Greek more generally. Some are verbs which express the action of thinking oneself better than someone else, such as ὑπερoράω, literally 'to overlook', which is used only rarely by Xenophon, but when used always denotes a negative type of behaviour (*Hell.* 7.3.6, 7.3.7, *Mem.* 1.2.9, 1.4.10, *Symp.* 8.3, 8.22; *Ages.* 8.4.). Another is καταγιγνώσκω, to 'think down on', which is only used twice by Xenophon in this sense and otherwise means 'accuse/bring to trial' or simply 'realise/believe something bad'. Another group of verbs express the state of overconfident arrogance with more focus on its cause than on the person or persons towards whom it is directed. These verbs have meanings such as 'lift up', 'puff up', and 'blow up' and regularly denote a state of arrogance and overconfidence when used in the aorist or perfect passive participle. They are verbs such as ἀναφυσάομαι and μετεωρίζομαι. However, ἀναφυσάομαι is used only twice by Xenophon, and though he uses μετεωρίζομαι and its cognate adjective μετέωρος (both very common in Hellenistic historiography in their metaphysical sense) frequently, they always carry their literal, physical sense of being lifted off the ground. Rather than all of these expressions, common in Greek literature, Xenophon favours the *phron*-words, which denote a state of mind.

[5] I do not include the *Apology* as none of the *phron*- words appear in it. The words that are usually interpreted as commenting on Socrates' arrogance in court are the verb *megalēgorein* and its noun *megalēgoria*. More precisely, however, as has been shown by Dorion 2005, *megalēgorein* and *megalēgoria* mean 'boast' and 'boastfulness', something which is usually negative in Xenophon, but can be warranted at critical moments if the achievements of which the speaker boasts are true (see n. 26, below).

[6] See *Hell.* 5.2.18, 5.3.8, 7.1.23, 7.1.32, 7.1.44, *Mem.* 3.5.4, *Cyr.* 1.46.4, *Lac.* 3.2.2, 15.8.4.

A similar situation exists for *mega phronein*. This phrase, literally 'to think big', covers a range of meanings from 'to be high-spirited or independent-minded' over 'to be justly proud of something and therefore confident' to the one that overlaps with *phronēma*, 'to be insolently arrogant'. (I leave out the two instances in Xenophon's corpus where *mega phronein* is used in the sense of thinking highly of someone else.[7]) In fact, Xenophon most often uses the phrase in this last, negative sense. Out of the 23 instances of *mega phronein* in his various works (not counting the numerous instances in the *Symposium* which will be discussed separately below),[8] only one seems to mean 'to be high-spirited/independent-minded' (*Cyropaedia* 7.5.62 of high-spirited bulls and eunuchs), and only two appear to carry the positive sense of 'to be justly proud/confident' (*Anabasis* 5.6.8 on the Paphlagonians, providing a reason why the Greeks should make them their allies; and *Hiero* 1.28 on women whose attention is pleasing to a man.) The remaining 20 instances all carry the negative sense 'to be insolently arrogant', and most of them lead directly to disaster for the arrogant party. Thus, in *Hellenica* 3.4.11 and *Agesilaus* 1.13 Tissaphernes becomes arrogant on the arrival of the army from the King, but proceeds to be defeated by Agesilaus and later executed for incompetence on the King's orders; at *Hellenica* 4.3.9 and *Agesilaus* 2.5 the Thessalians, who have previously been *megiston phronountas* of their cavalry, are defeated by the new cavalry contingent of Agesilaus; at *Hellenica* 5.4.45 the Thespians, who used to pride themselves on being able to stand up to the Thebans, are routed in the actual battle; and at *Hellenica* 7.1.27 the peoples of the Theban alliance (influenced by Arkadian *phronēma*) all become *mega phronountōn*, leading (as we have already seen) to defeat by Archidamus in the 'Tearless Battle'.[9] Moreover, two speeches delivered by two authoritative characters in two different works denounce *mega phronein* as something intrinsically bad: in the *Anabasis* 6.3.18 the character Xenophon (below referred to as 'Xenophon' in order to distinguish him from the author Xenophon) argues that the Greeks will be victorious over the Persians because the latter are *mega phronountes* and such a state of mind leads to punishment from the gods. Similarly, in *Cyropaedia* 8.7.7 the dying Cyrus gives thanks to the gods that they have never, despite all his successes,

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[7] *Cyr.* 4.2.6 and *Ages.* 8.4.

[8] *Hell.* 2.3.34, 2.4.27, 2.4.29, 2.4.40–41, 3.4.11, 3.5.21, 4.3.9, 5.4.45, 7.1.27, *Mem.* 1.1.13, 4.1.5, 4.2.1, *An.* 3.1.27, 5.6.8, 6.3.18, *Cyr.* 2.3.13, 3.1.26, 4.2.6, 4.6.3, 7.5.62, 8.7.3, 8.7.7, *Hiero* 1.28, *Ages.* 1.13, 2.5.

[9] Further instances of *mega phronein* denoting a negative and dangerous state of mind: *Hell.* 2.3.34, 2.4.29, 2.4.40–41, *An.* 3.1.27, *Cyr.* 3.1.26, 4.6.3. In a negative, but not immediately dangerous sense: *Hell.* 2.4.27, 3.5.21–22, *Cyr.* 2.3.13, *Mem.* 1.1.13, 4.1.5, 4.2.1.

allowed him to *mega phronein*. Both speakers clearly associate the ability to stay modest and moderate in success with piety: 'Xenophon' explicitly ascribes punishment of the *pleon phronountas* to *ho theos*; Cyrus includes his thanksgiving for avoiding such a state of mind in a pious prayer. Moreover, Cyrus connects the ability to avoid *mega phronein* with the Herodotean maxim of expecting misfortune to follow good fortune and not counting anyone happy before he has died well, an important feature of popular Greek religiosity and morality.[10] Thus, by aligning the moderate avoidance of *mega phronein* with piety and morality, the state of mind denoted by the expression implicitly becomes aligned with impiety and immorality.

The situation is even clearer for *kataphronēsis* and its cognates. The connotations of *kataphronein* are different from those of *mega phronein*. While they can both mean 'be arrogant/overconfident', the negative prefix *kata-* ensures that *kataphronein* never carries any of the positive connotations that can occasionally be attached to *mega phronein*. Thus *kataphronēsis* can best be translated 'arrogant contempt' and as a general rule in Xenophon leads to disaster for the commander or army who gets into this state of mind. This is most obviously the case in the *Hellenica*. The first example is 2.1.27 where the Athenians' contempt for Lysander makes them sail out carelessly, giving him the opportunity to lead them into a trap at Aegospotami. This sets the tone for the rest of that work: it is the arrogant contempt felt by the unnamed Spartan polemarch for Iphicrates' peltasts that leads to the Spartan defeat at Lechaeum at 4.4.17 and 4.5.12, just as it is Anaxibius' arrogant contempt for Iphicrates, combined with his impious disregard of unfavourable sacrifices, that leads to his disastrous defeat at 4.8.36. At 4.4.10, the united Argives and Corinthians feel contempt for the attacking Sicyonians, only to discover to their dismay that they are not really Sicyonians, but Spartans who have taken up the shields of their fallen allies and proceed to inflict a resounding defeat on the Argives and Corinthians. Beside these major defeats, a number of foraging parties from various armies come to grief as they forage *kataphronountes* or *kataphronikōs*, i.e. without taking the proper precautions against the enemy.[11]

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10 See e.g. Harrison 2000 and Fisher 2002. For the connection between this theme in Xenophon and in Herodotus see below.

11 4.1.17: the Greeks under Agesilaus forage overconfidently and are scattered by Pharnabazus; 4.8.18: Thibron's Greeks make the same mistake and are cut down by Struthas; 5.3.1: Olynthians forage contemptuously and are defeated by the troops of Derdas, who are said to be 'in good order', always a positive quality in an army and one that often leads to victory in Xenophon as well as later historiographers.

The type of arrogant contempt for the enemy expressed by *kataphronēsis* is as dangerous in Xenophon's other writings, even though it occurs less often here than in the *Hellenica*. In the *Anabasis* 3.4.2, Mithradates and his army become careless because of being *kataphronountes* of the Greeks, who then ambush and defeat them. In *Cyropaedia* 2.4.12 and 22, the Armenian king despises Cyaxares and stops sending him tribute. This makes Cyrus move against him and bring him to trial while keeping his female relatives hostage; the Armenian king is saved only by the intervention of his son, Tigranes, a one-time hunting companion of Cyrus. Even when used outside of a military context, *kataphronēsis* is a dangerous thing. In the *Memorabilia* 3.5.15–16, Socrates criticises the Athenians for despising authority, both their own elders and rulers in general, something which he—and Xenophon—clearly regard as stupid and dangerous. Later on (3.12.3), he admonishes Epigenes to take more care of his body by telling him that it is stupid to *kataphronein* both the ills that arise from being in bad physical shape and the benefits you get from being in good physical shape. Clearly, then, *kataphronēsis* is used by Xenophon to denote the display of overconfident and stupid contempt for something that is likely to be dangerous, or, at least, of significance to oneself.

The consistency of these passages is clear evidence that Xenophon believed that the proud state of mind expressed by *phronēma, mega phronein*, and *kataphronēsis* was a negative one, which more often that not would endanger a man, as well as his subjects or subordinates if he was in a position of leadership, and which his readers should be admonished to avoid. This makes the few passages where these words are, at first glance, used in a positive sense extremely interesting.

Phron-Words Used in a Positive Sense, Apparent or Real

Let us, again, begin with *phronēma*. In *Anabasis* 3.1.22 the character 'Xenophon' in the course of his first speech to his fellow-officers encourages them by stating that they are justified in having more *phronēma* than the Persians. A little later, in 3.2.16, in his first speech to the assembled troops, 'Xenophon' commends them for having acquitted themselves against the Persians with τῷ πατρῴῳ φρονήματι ('the confidence of our fathers'). This clearly makes *phronēma* a positive asset rather than a dangerous flaw, 'self-confidence' rather than 'insolent pride'. The key to explaining the discrepancy is no doubt the reasons 'Xenophon' gives for why the officers and troops should be confident: in the former instance their observance of correct religious

practice opposed to Persian impiety ensures them divine support and so should give them *phronēma*. In the latter, the expression τῷ πατρῴῳ φρονήματι places the Ten Thousand in the position of heirs to the Greeks who fought and defeated Xerxes[12] and so, implicitly, to the divine support they enjoyed. *Phronēma* in these instances is then *justified* self-confidence, and it is the grounds on which the confidence is based that makes it differ from harmful, self-deluding arrogance. This is likely also to be the case in the three other instances in the Xenophontic corpus where *phronēma* is used in a positive sense as a desirable virtue in battle-ready troops, although the justification is there not made explicit.[13]

It now remains to be seen whether this positive sense can also be found for the other *phron*-words in Xenophon. And so we turn to apparently positive uses of the most negative of our three expressions, *kataphron*-. In three passages in the Xenophontic corpus the verb *kataphronein* is used in a context where it seems to denote a positive feeling of self-confidence which is both justified and beneficial. In the light of the otherwise universal negative use of this verb and its cognates demonstrated above, these passages are problematic. We shall examine them one by one.

The first of these passages is *Cyropaedia* 3.3.9. Here, Cyrus has completed the training of his troops and is inspecting them. This is the account of what he sees:

> κατανοῶν δὲ ὁ Κῦρος ὡς εὖ μὲν αὐτῷ εἶχον τὰ σώματα οἱ στρατιῶται πρὸς τὸ δύνασθαι στρατιωτικοὺς πόνους φέρειν, εὖ δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς πρὸς τὸ καταφρονεῖν τῶν πολεμίων, ἐπιστήμονες δ' ἦσαν τὰ προσήκοντα τῇ ἑαυτῶν ἕκαστοι ὁπλίσει, καὶ πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἑώρα πάντας εὖ παρεσκευασμένους, ἐκ τούτων οὖν ἐπεθύμει τι ἤδη τῶν πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους πράττειν, γιγνώσκων ὅτι ἐν τῷ μέλλειν πολλάκις τοῖς ἄρχουσι καὶ τῆς καλῆς παρασκευῆς ἀλλοιοῦταί τι.

> When Cyrus perceived that his soldiers were in a good physical condition to be able to endure military hardship and in a good mental condition to *regard the enemy with contempt*, and that each was well trained in the right kind of exercise for the way he was armed, and when he saw that all were also well prepared to obey their officers, this made him desire to move immediately

[12] I thank the anonymous referee for attracting my attention to this.

[13] These instances are *Cyr*. 2.1.13 (speech of some unknown Persian and so not necessarily vouched for by Xenophon), 5.2.33 and 34 (Cyrus advising Gobryas on readying troops), *Ages*. 2.8 (the narrator on the effects Agesilaus had on his army). Bearzot's 2004: 52–56 argument that *phronēma* was an ideological word in fourth-century parlance, used to denote expansionist ambition in a city-state, and that the very fact that it also has a positive use is typical of polemical Greek thought, may also be relevant to the ambiguity of Xenophon's usage.

> against the enemy because he knew that, for generals, delay often changes some detail in even the best laid plans for the worse.

Strikingly, it is the very fact that Cyrus' men are so confident that they despise their enemy which makes him decide to lead them out. The contempt is listed as just one of several good qualities which make his army ready for action: their good physical shape, their level of training, their discipline.

The impression that being *kataphronōn* of the enemy is a good thing is strengthened a bit further on in the narrative of Cyrus' campaign (3.3.31–32). He and Cyaxares are now facing the Assyrians, who are entrenched in their camp and refuse to engage in open battle. Cyaxares suggests that they lead their army up to the enemy camp in order to inspire their soldiers with confidence when they see that the Assyrians dare not come out against them; but Cyrus argues against it on the grounds that the enemy will then see that the Persians are numerically inferior and *will despise them*. Surely, if contempt for the enemy always leads to overconfident action, this would be exactly the situation the Persians would want: the Assyrians would see that they are few in number, would attack them carelessly and in disorder, and they would defeat them easily. Clearly, Cyrus thinks differently. Just as he thought of the *kataphronēsis* in his own men as something good and useful, he does not want his enemy to be imbued with this contemptuously confident state of mind.

Where does Xenophon stand in this question? On the one hand, his use of *kataphronein* and *kataphronēsis* is entirely consistent and one hundred percent negative up until this point. On the other hand, Cyrus is an idealised ruler and commander and is never shown to be wrong.[14] I can imagine two different solutions.

One possible solution rests on a comparison of *Cyropaedia* 3.3.9 and 3.3.31–32 with contemporary and near-contemporary texts on military tactics. Keeping out of sight of the enemy in order to hide one's numerical inferiority—as well as other facts about one's army—with the purpose of avoiding their contempt is attributed by Thucydides to no fewer than three of the key military leaders of the Peloponnesian War: Brasidas (Thucydides 5.8.4), Lamachus (6.49.2) and Nicias (6.11.5).[15] The same tactic of

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14 At least not before late in the work (Gera 1993: 286–299), and even there an argument can be made for the fact that he is still supposed to represent Xenophon's ideal ruler (Gray 2011: 276–290).

15 Nicias is here, as so often in Thucydides, being ambiguous and self-contradictory. On the one hand he states that contempt for the enemy arises when one discovers that he can

hiding from the enemy is advocated by Aeneas Tacticus—who was probably exactly contemporary with Xenophon—but with the opposite purpose, namely that of deliberately making the enemy overconfident and contemptuous (θαρσῆσαι καὶ καταφρονήσαντάς: 16.5) and so careless. The difference is clearly due to different circumstances: while the three Thucydidean generals all belong to an attacking and siege-laying force, Aeneas Tacticus is advising the besieged on how to deal with the besiegers (who are assumed to have an abundance of food and drink and become more drunk and careless as time passes). The arousal of *kataphronēsis* in the enemy by either showing or not showing oneself at a certain time thus seems to be a *topos* in military and historical writing. Used by Cyrus it shows his awareness of a common military problem and its usual solution, a positive trait in a leader of men. Xenophon's use of his normally negative *kataphronēsis* here as a state of mind conducive to victory is puzzling, but probably reflects common military usage when discussing this particular tactic, as evidenced by Thucydides and Aeneas Tacticus. Perhaps it was a slip-up—the concept was so familiar to him in this context that he did not notice the words he was using and so did not think to aim for consistency with his terminology more generally—or perhaps he had not yet made his mind up that *kataphronēsis* invariably leads to disaster when he was writing this early part of the *Cyropaedia*.[16] This solution is very human and common-sense, but—perhaps for this very reason—not very intellectually satisfying.

The second solution focuses on a comparison of the Cyrus of *Cyropaedia* with the Agesilaus of *Hellenica*. Throughout *Cyropaedia* Cyrus is shown to regard morale as an all-important factor in battle (e.g. 2.1.11, 3.3.19, 5.2.31–34), and his desire in 3.3.9–10 to make his troops contemptuous of the enemy is the action that follows logically from this conviction. This chain of reasoning he shares with Agesilaus as demonstrated by the famous 'workshop of war passage' at *Hellenica* 3.4.16–19. The passage describes Agesilaus' training of his army at Ephesus before embarking on his Sardis campaign. In 3.4.16–18 the narrator has been all enthusiasm in his praise of Agesilaus' care for the

be beaten and that, consequently, those who stay out of sight are feared the more. On the other hand he warns his troops against becoming contemptuous in return, reminding them that it is dangerous to be 'puffed up' by success. In Thucydides generally, contempt for the enemy can have either positive (4.34.1, 6.63.2) or negative (3.83.4, 6.33.3 with 6.35.1, 8.8.4 with 8.10, 8.25.3) consequences.

[16] The date and, indeed, order of composition of Xenophon's works is a notoriously tricky question. I am not here arguing that the *Cyropaedia* was composed earlier than most of Xenophon's other works, but only suggesting one possible solution to the problem of the apparently positive use of *kataphronēsis* in this particular passage.

physical and technical training of his army as well as their discipline—i.e. the exact same qualities that Cyrus was praised for fostering in his men—as well as their piety. The praise is rounded off with the statement that Agesilaus 'had made the whole city where he was a spectacle ... so that one might think that the city was a workshop of war' (ἀξίαν δὲ καὶ ὅλην τὴν πόλιν ἐν ᾗ ἦν θέας ἐποίησεν ... ὥστε τὴν πόλιν ὄντως οἴεσθαι πολέμου ἐργαστήριον εἶναι: 3.4.17) and the rhetorical question 'for where men honour the gods, engage in military training, and are eager to obey when given orders, how can everything not be full of good hopes?' (ὅπου γὰρ ἄνδρες θεοὺς μὲν σέβοιντο, τὰ δὲ πολεμικὰ ἀσκοῖεν, πειθαρχεῖν δὲ μελετῷεν, πῶς οὐκ εἰκὸς ἐνταῦθα πάντα μεστὰ ἐλπίδων ἀγαθῶν εἶναι; 3.4.18).[17] Then, in 3.4.19, follows the surprising statement (the subject is still Agesilaus):

> ἡγούμενος δὲ καὶ τὸ καταφρονεῖν τῶν πολεμίων ῥώμην τινὰ ἐμβάλλειν πρὸς τὸ μάχεσθαι, προεῖπε τοῖς κήρυξι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν λῃστῶν ἁλισκομένους βαρβάρους γυμνοὺς πωλεῖν. ὁρῶντες οὖν οἱ στρατιῶται λευκοὺς μὲν διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ἐκδύεσθαι, μαλακοὺς δὲ καὶ ἀπόνους διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ἐπ' ὀχημάτων εἶναι, ἐνόμισαν οὐδὲν διοίσειν τὸν πόλεμον ἢ εἰ γυναιξὶ δέοι μάχεσθαι.
>
> Believing that *contempt for the enemy* imbues soldiers with a certain strength for battle he ordered the herald to sell the barbarians that had been captured by raiders naked. And so when the soldiers saw that they were white because they never undressed and soft because they were not used to exercise as they always rode in carriages, they thought that the campaign would be no different than if they had had to fight women.

This has seemed to most scholars to be a continuation of the praise for the training techniques of Agesilaus, and they have consequently understood contempt for the enemy in this particular passage as a positive quality.[18] However, the fact that *kataphronēsis* is not just negative in the rest of the *Hellenica*, but actually amounts to a certain prediction of destruction makes it unlikely that the word is supposed to be understood in a positive sense here. It is surely significant that Xenophon does not praise this aspect of Agesilaus' training programme—in fact, he is very careful to place his enthusiastically moralising conclusion (quoted above) *before* the description of the Spartan king's attempt to imbue his men with contempt for the enemy. If one believes 3.4.19 to be part of the positive description, one needs to explain why it falls outside the rhetorical unit introduced by the scene setting 'Then, when spring had come, he assembled

17 See Harman (this volume, pp. 437–440) for a detailed analysis of the visual aspect of this passage (as it appears in *Agesilaus*).

18 Breitenbach 1950: 76–77, Anderson 1974: 154, Gray 1979: 189 and 1981: 189. Krentz 1995 ad loc., however, also interprets καταφρονεῖν as negative in this instance.

his whole army in Ephesus' (ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἐπειδὴ ἔαρ ὑπέφαινε, συνήγαγε μὲν ἅπαν τὸ στράτευμα εἰς Ἔφεσον: 3.4.16) and rounded off by the moral-didactic conclusion of 3.4.18, quoted above. There is no conclusion of any kind to 3.4.19; it is followed abruptly by a brief summary of the departure of one set of Spartiate advisers and the arrival of another. The unspoken conclusion must be that Xenophon believed Agesilaus to have been wrong in attempting to make his men contemptuous of the enemy, but that he was too loyal a friend to point this out in so many words.[19] In this particular case, the overconfident contempt does not bring disaster upon the Greeks immediately, but a little later they do suffer a defeat as a direct consequence: at 4.1.17–19 they scatter *kataphronētikōs* in order to forage and are routed by Pharnabazus' cavalry and chariots. Scholars have long discussed Xenophon's reasons for leaving out the potentially glorious aspects of Agesilaus' Sardis campaign while relating in great detail such militarily insignificant events as this skirmish and defeat,[20] and perhaps part of the reason is that he wanted to comment, subtly but negatively, on this particular aspect of Agesilaus' training programme:[21] Xenophon was trying to teach a moral lesson, and part of that lesson was that overconfident arrogance never pays.

Returning now to the *Cyropaedia*, we note that Cyrus and Agesilaus, two Xenophontic heroes, show the same grasp of military tactics, but also the same character weakness, namely arrogance. In Agesilaus, this trait is shown to be dangerous and self-destructive, both in the workshop-of-war passage and elsewhere, most noticeably in *Hellenica* 4.5.7 where, in the aftermath of a military victory, he treats envoys of the defeated arrogantly (μάλα μεγαλοφρόνως), only to have his bubble burst the next moment by the dramatically narrated arrival of a messenger bearing the news that a

19 It might be asked why, if this sentence is supposed to reflect negatively on Agesilaus, it is also included in the encomiastic *Agesilaus* (1.28). The answer is probably that Xenophon in the encomium was working hard to turn Agesilaus into a panhellenic, anti-Persian hero, and that he decided to sacrifice his more philosophical message about the negative consequences of arrogance in order to reinforce this theme. For Xenophon's ability to be critical of Agesilaus see Tamiolaki (this volume, pp. 571–572); for the *Agesilaus* as ambiguous and partly subversive see Harman (this volume, pp. 427–453).

20 See, e.g., Anderson 1974: 155–161, Cawkwell 1979, Gray 1979, Dillery 1995: 110–114, Pownall 2004: 83–84. Krentz 1995 ad loc. calls it 'a lesson about plundering' and briefly connects it with the contempt for the enemy installed by Agesilaus in the 'workshop of war' passage.

21 Another reason is surely, as Dillery 1995: 110–114 argues, that Xenophon was disappointed by the modest results of Agesilaus' campaign after the magnificent preparations in Ephesus.

whole contingent of the Spartan army has been destroyed at Lechaeum.[22] In Cyrus, the arrogance is present from the beginning, as seen in the passage just discussed, but it runs wild towards the end of the *Cyropaedia* where Cyrus adopts Median clothes and manners in order to isolate himself not only from his people, but even from his closest friends, in an effort to stay aloof and untouchable.[23]

Interestingly, Cyrus and Agesilaus also share a desire to foster a competitive spirit among their soldiers (*Cyropaedia* 3.3.9–10 and *Hellenica* 3.4.16). This behaviour is explicitly shown to backfire in *Cyropaedia* 3.3.10, which follows directly upon the inspection passage quoted above. Here the Persians are becoming factious because of Cyrus' frequent competitions, and he has to lead them out quickly in order to prevent in-fighting.[24] The negative result of this element of Cyrus' training of his troops, like the negative result of Agesilaus' installing in his men of contempt for the Persians, carries a subtle message to the reader: that of *moderation*, in morale-building as in everything else. Whereas self-confident courage (usually called θάρρος in Xenophon)[25] is good and useful, contempt for the enemy is taking it too far—just as a spirit of competitiveness is good, but when it turns into dissension and rivalry, it has gone too far.

Further light can be thrown on this theory by bringing in Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*, a text which often shares the moral outlook of Xenophon's writings. Interesting in the context of pride and arrogant contempt is this passage (1124a–b):

> ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ ῥᾴδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήματα· οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ' ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι πράττουσιν. μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν

22 For good analyses of this passage see Gray 1989: 157–160 and Tuplin 1993: 71.

23 See Gera 1993: 280–299, *contra* Higgins 1977: 44–59 and Gray 2011: 276–277 and 281–282, who argues that Xenophon in these chapters was trying to make historical realities depend on his theory of ideal leadership represented by Cyrus.

24 The negative result of Cyrus' attempt to make his men competitive is also noted by Nadon 2001: 41.

25 Θάρρος and its cognates are generally used positively in Xenophon about the courage to face the enemy: *Hell.* 2.4.9, 3.5.10, 7.1.31, 7.3.6, *Mem.* 2.1.15, 2.6.28, 2.6.32, 2.6.33, 4.3.17, *Oec.* 2.1, *Symp.* 1.16, 2.9, 2.11, 4.29, *An.* 1.3.8, 1.7.3, 3.2.20, 3.4.4, 4.5.28, 4.6.9, 5.7.33, 5.8.19, 6.5.2, 6.5.17, 7.4.12, *Cyr.* 1.3.18, 1.4.7, 1.4.28, 1.5.13, 1.5.14, 1.6.25, 2.2.15, 2.4.32, 3.1.35, 3.3.30, 3.3.39–40, 3.3.59, 4.2.15, 5.1.6, 5.1.17, 5.1.26, 5.2.32–36 (7 instances), 5.3.47, 5.4.36, 6.2.15, 6.2.22, 6.4.11, 7.1.17, 7.3.13, 7.5.20, 8.8.7, *Hiero* 2.11, 2.18, 10.5, 11.13, *Ages.* 1.12, 6.8, 11.2, *Vect.* 4.11, 4.22, *Eq.* 1.17, 8.6, 10.13. Three times, however, it is used negatively to mean 'overconfident courage/rashness': *Hell.* 4.6.6, *Cyr.* 1.6.37, *Eq. mag.* 4.17.

> ἄλλων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ (δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως.
>
> Without virtue it is not easy to bear success properly; and because they are unable to bear it properly and because they think that they are superior, they *despise other people*, but in fact they themselves act illogically. For they imitate the great-souled man without being truly like him, and they do this in everything they can; and so they do not manage to imitate his excellence, but only his *contempt for other people*. For the great-souled man is *justly contemptuous* (for he judges in accordance with truth), but the majority of people are contemptuous for no good reason.

If Xenophon wanted to present Cyrus as the ultimate flawless ruler and therefore *megalopsuchos* ('great-souled') in the extreme, he may well have believed that such a man would be justified in feeling contempt, not just for his enemies, but for most other people. This would bring his use of *kataphronein* in line with his use of *phronēma*, which was shown above occasionally to be employed in the sense 'justified self-confidence', except that the justification for being *kataphronein* is much more exclusive.[26] However, as Cyrus' soldiers cannot all be *megalopsuchoi*, and such military contempt has been shown elsewhere to be a deadly mistake, it is hard to see how Cyrus, even if he is *megalopsuchia* personified, would be justified in imbuing his troops with arrogant contempt for the enemy they are about to face. This is even more true of Agesilaus, who, although undoubtedly portrayed by Xenophon as a good leader, can hardly be said to be shown to be flawless.[27] By juxtaposing the deliberate encouragement by Cyrus and Agesilaus of arrogance and contempt for the enemy in their troops with the numerous narratives of how such *kataphronēsis* leads to disaster Xenophon is showing his interest in this type of military morale-building, but is also questioning its value: while it might work in the utopia of the *Cyropaedia* (and even here it is problematic), it is apparently a double-edged sword in the real world.

When we turn to the third of the expressions under investigation, *mega phronein*, things become even more interesting. The problem case here is the *Symposium*, which uses *mega phronein* no fewer than 20 times, in every instance in order to denote the pride the individual banqueters feel for what

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[26] It would also create a parallel situation to the one which Dorion 2005 has shown exists for the verb *megalēgorein* and its noun *megalēgoria* ('to boast' and 'boastfulness') in Xenophon's works. These words are usually negative in Xenophon, but boasting can be warranted at certain critical moments if the boaster has really achieved what he claims. 'Talking big' is thus parallel to 'thinking big' and is probably a sub-category of it. On Socrates' *megalēgoria* see also Waterfield (this volume, pp. 273–276).

[27] See above (p. 599 with n. 19) on his arrogance.

each considers his most admirable skill, ability, or character trait.[28] Since the party-goers all use the expression casually about themselves and each other, it is unlikely that they consider it to have any negative connotations (even allowing for the joking tone of their exchanges), so here it must be intended to mean 'take justified pride in' rather than 'be arrogant because of'. It is, however, a legitimate question why Xenophon has chosen to use *mega phronein* over and over again in this passage rather than a combination of different expressions.[29] Clearly he did not want variety in the *Symposium* in this respect, and, just as clearly, the expression he wanted to imprint upon the reader's mind was *mega phronein* with its heavy load of moral ambiguity leaning towards the negative spectrum. What might his reasons be for this choice?

In order to answer this question, it is necessary to separate Xenophon the author from the characters of his works, in this case the *Symposium* (which Huss is surely right to classify as a purely literary rather than historical work).[30] *They* may not regard *mega phronein* as a negative state of mind and may well believe that there are certain character traits and abilities that justify a person—particularly, perhaps, an Athenian of the social elite—in *mega phronein*. Xenophon, however, has shown in his other works that such a state of mind is not only morally questionable, but usually leads to danger, and even to defeat on the battlefield, and so it seems likely that he is here criticising this particular elite mindset.[31]

This hypothesis is strengthened when we look at the traits and abilities in which the characters of the *Symposium* claim to take pride. In the order in which they appear in the text they are: teaching people justice by giving them money so that they do not have to commit injustice (Callias); having memorised all of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* (Niceratus);

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[28] Xen. *Symp.* 3.4 (Callias), 3.5 (Niceratus), 3.7 (Critobulus), 3.8 (Antisthenes), 3.9 (Charmides), 3.10 (Socrates), 3.11 (Philip the jester), 3.12 (Lycon), 4.10 and 4.13 (Critobulus), 4.15 (Callias), 4.29 (Charmides), 4.34 (Antisthenes), 4.47 (Hermogenes), 4.50 and 51 (Philip the jester), 4.52 and 55 (the Syracusan), 4.56 (Socrates), 4.61 (a hypothetical master procurer).

[29] One might think of ἀγάλλομαι, which is indeed used in this sense in the *Symposium*, but only once (3.14), or (ἐπι)χαίρειν or (ἐφ)ήδεσθαι or εὐφραίνεσθαι, none of which appears in the appropriate sense. The gods 'take pleasure' (ἥδονται) in *kalokagathia* at 4.49, but none of the human participants is said to do anything similar.

[30] Huss 1999 *passim*, but stated in so many words at 25. See also Gray 1992 on the possible literary origins of the work.

[31] For interpretations of the *Symposium* which argue that it presents most of its characters in a negative light, see Higgins 1977: 15–20 and Hobden 2005. Gray 2011: 337–339 argues that the arrogance invited by the question 'what are you most proud of?' is defused by the ironic answers.

physical beauty (Critobulus); being content with the little wealth he has (Antisthenes); being poor (Charmides); the 'art' of procuring (Socrates); the ability to make people laugh (Philip the jester); one's son (Lycon); one's father (Autolycus); and being beloved by the gods (Hermogenes). All of these claims to pride are advanced by the characters in a joking manner to fit the light-hearted occasion and are not meant to be taken entirely seriously; indeed Antisthenes and Socrates in particular get a lot of comic mileage out of arguing their cases for, respectively, limited wealth/poverty conceived as wealth and procuring/assisting friends in their networking efforts; and the counter-arguments advanced against Callias, Niceratus, and Critobulus clearly show that, whatever the level of seriousness intended by these speakers, the reader should not let himself be convinced by them.[32]

The claims of Lycon, Autolycus, and Hermogenes, however, are not so easily brushed aside. Hermogenes, like several of the other speakers, presumably gets a laugh by the discrepancy between the brief version of his source of pride advanced at the beginning of the discussion (*Symposium* 3.14), where he claims to take pride in his friends, and the longer version offered later (4.47–49) where it turns out that these friends are the gods. But his setting out of the *do ut des* piety of Greek religion in this later passage reads as an entirely serious, though brief, exposition of the traditional piety elsewhere favoured by Xenophon, and at the end of it, the narrator declares: οὗτος μὲν δὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως ἐσπουδαιολογήθη ('in this way this conversation turned serious'). As for the pride that Lycon and Autolycus take in one another, this is only mentioned in the first round of questioning (3.12–13) and never argued at length like the claims of the other characters. It is presented in a positive, emotional light, with the sweet touch of Autolycus snuggling up against his father in this slightly intimidating environment of older and more experienced men, some of whom obviously desire him, who talk freely about such topics as love and beauty. I do not wish to suggest that Xenophon intended the reader to scoff at such filial and paternal love, nor at the kind of piety displayed by Hermogenes. (It may well be significant that none of these three characters uses the expression *mega phronein*

[32] See Tuplin 1993: 177–178 on the techniques used by Xenophon to make Callias seem ridiculous in the *Symposium* (and 104–105 for the corresponding portrait offered by the *Hellenica*). Huss 1999: 40 argues that the picture of Callias drawn in the *Symposium* is more positive that the one presented in the *Hellenica*; but he agrees that we are not meant to take the claims to pride seriously and shows (175) how the seriousness is undermined by the fact that every character's claim to pride in fact fits one of the other characters better. To his argument (25) that the intertextual elegance would have been obvious to Xenophon's contemporary readers I would add that the same goes for the humour.

about himself, but only offers his answer in response to the question 'ἐπὶ τίνι μεγὰ φρονεῖς;' posed by his fellow-banqueters.) Even the generosity of Callias, the contentedness of Charmides and Antisthenes, and the version of friendship expounded by Socrates are character traits which are in themselves positive and are shown to be such elsewhere in the Xenophontic corpus. Rather than criticizing these claims to pride Xenophon is criticizing pride itself: one should never *mega phronein* because it leads to complacency, arrogance, overconfidence, and impiety, if not to defeat or similar disaster. This conclusion is strengthened by a comparison with three passages in the *Memorabilia* where *mega phronein* is used of men who pride themselves on worthless things such as wealth (4.1.5) or on knowledge or wisdom which they do not in fact possess (1.1.13 and 4.2.1).

Xenophon's reason for repeatedly using *mega phronein* in the *Symposium* thus seems to be a desire to draw the reader's attention to a particular arrogant mindset that distinguished a certain type, or class, of people. Xenophon obviously did not consider any of the characters in the work—apart, probably, from Socrates, who is playfully participating in a silly game[33]—to be of the same moral stature as Cyrus or even Agesilaus. Rather, they all fall into the Aristotelian category of those who because of insufficient virtue mistakenly think themselves superior to other people (see above). Interestingly, the closest parallel in Xenophon's corpus to the phrase repeatedly used in the *Symposium*, ἐπὶ τίνι μέγα φρονεῖς, is found in Thrasybulus' castigation of the defeated Athenian oligarchs after the battle at Munychia (*Hellenica* 2.4.41), who are scathingly asked if the reason they feel superior to the *dēmos* is that they pride themselves on their courage.[34] Perhaps the phrase *mega phronein* was regularly used in everyday parlance by the kind of elite Athenians who felt themselves to be better than their fellow-citizens and entitled to rule over them, and Xenophon was here parodying it, looking back with the benefit of hindsight at some of those men who were to become involved in the civil war of 404–403.[35] It is worth noting that the expression is used

[33] I prefer 'playfully' to 'ironically' because it does not carry any connotations of malice. Socrates seems to be having fun in the *Symposium* and to make fun of his fellow-guests and host in a playful, non-malignant way but with flashes of seriousness. See Gray 2011: 330–345. For parallels (and differences) between Xenophon's Socrates, Cyrus, and Agesilaus see Higgins 1977: 56–57 and 82, Huss 1999: 25–30, and Gera 2007: 26–131, as well as Danzig (this volume, pp. 502–511, 528–534) and Tamiolaki (this volume, pp. 563–589).

[34] *Hell.* 2.4.41: ἐπει δὲ δικαιοσύνης οὐδὲν ὑμῖν προσήκει, σκέψασθε εἰ ἄρα ἐπ' ἀνδρείᾳ ὑμῖν μέγα φρονητέον. The parallel is noted by Huss 1999: 181, who, however, does not discuss it, but simply notes that it is 'interessante'.

[35] As Charmides was one of the oligarchs who died in the Battle of Munychia, it would

only once in Thucydides—by Alcibiades, of the pride he takes in his horse racing, the aristocratic pursuit *par excellence* (Thucydides 6.16.4). It seems that by letting the elite characters (and Philip the jester and the Syracusan entertainer, for comic effect) of the *Symposium* openly admit that they take arrogant pride in some of their character traits and abilities and expect their peers to do the same, and by making them use an expression for this pride which quite possibly has specifically elite and perhaps even oligarchic connotations, Xenophon is showing up the deluded self-overevaluation of this particular class of people. It is perhaps not too far-fetched to suggest that Xenophon is hinting that this arrogant pride had been the cause not only of the uprising of the Thirty Tyrants, but also of the failure of the more moderate elite citizens, such as Niceratus, to either prevent it or come up with an acceptable—i.e. moderately oligarchic—alternative to it. On that hypothesis, even in the case of the *Symposium*, arrogant pride led to disaster in the end.

Conclusion

The short version of my conclusion can be stated very briefly: pride, arrogance, and contempt are always bad characteristics in Xenophon. This statement can, however, be nuanced to an extent.

In most of his works Xenophon is mainly interested in the manifestations of arrogance and contempt in a military context. He is aware both that such a sentiment often arises naturally from military success and that some commanders deliberately attempt to awaken it in their soldiers, and he shows repeatedly how it leads to carelessness, danger, and often defeat. Here there is a distinction in vocabulary: *mega phronein* is only used in a negative sense, *phronēma* can be used both negative and positively (of justified self-confidence based on divine support), and *kataphronēsis*, while negative in the vast majority of instances, is used in a few passages where a commander whom the reader is otherwise encouraged to admire (Agesilaus and Cyrus) deliberately instils contempt for the enemy in his troops. The

be tempting to argue that Xenophon is here simply laying into the now deceased oligarchs of a previous generation, but the case is more complicated: Niceratus was murdered by the Thirty Tyrants (*Hell.* 2.3.39), and the political affiliation of several of the other characters is unclear. See Bowen 1998: 11–14 for an overview of the historical lives of the *dramatis personae* of the *Symposium*. For the overall identification of Socrates and his circle as anti-democrats (though not necessarily supporters of the Thirty) see Hansen 1996 and Waterfield 2000 and in this volume, pp. 288–297.

purpose of these passages, I have argued, is to puzzle the reader and raise questions not just about the behaviour of this particular commander at this particular moment, but about the wisdom in any circumstances of this, probably common, military behaviour.

In civilian life the moral condemnation of these sentiments is more prominent than the practical warning, but the danger is still present, as evidenced by Socrates' criticisms of the Athenians in the *Memorabilia* and by the epilogue to the *Cyropaedia*. The *Symposium* has been discussed in some detail in order to argue that the repeated use of *mega phronein* in an extended passage of this work is intended to show up the arrogant self-delusion of a certain type of upper-class Athenian. I have tentatively suggested that this carries not just a social/moral message, but also a political one: such devaluation of one's fellow-citizens led to the rise of the Thirty Tyrants and was also the obstacle that hindered their fellow-elite citizens from preventing their rise or coming up with an acceptable (for anti-democrats) alternative to their rule. Even if we do not accept this political message, however, we are left with a powerful moral message that the arrogant pride brought on by success, social or military, is wrong, silly, and potentially dangerous.

This is certainly a didactic message, which advises Xenophon's readers to avoid such thought-patterns and behaviour and keep a level head in success. The message fits neatly into Xenophon's overarching moral interpretation of history: as Tuplin and Dillery have shown,[36] success in the *Hellenica* springs from piety and traditional morality, failure from their opposites; and this is the case in Xenophon's other works as well—most obviously in the historiographical *Anabasis* and pseudo-historiographical *Cyropaedia*, but also, more subtly, in the dialogues and technical treatises. The mechanism of 'success leads to arrogance, which leads to disaster' is, in fact, a smaller-scale version of the grand-scale mechanism of historical causality whereby great (military) success and power lead to arrogance, overconfidence, cruelty and impiety, which in turn lead to a great downfall, which seems to be one overarching message of the *Hellenica*.[37]

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[36] Tuplin 1993, Dillery 1995, *passim*, but esp. 236–237 and 241–242.

[37] Seen especially in Xenophon's linking of the Spartan capture of the Cadmea with their defeat at Leuctra (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.1: see Tuplin 1993: 96–100 and 125–140, Dillery 1995: 221–249) as well as in his narrative of the assassination of Jason of Pherae, an extraordinary sequence which stresses Jason's power and his abuse of it before culminating in his ignominious murder (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.28–32: see Gray 1989: 163–165, Tuplin 1993, 117–121, Dillery 1995: 173–174). For individuals and states repeating similar patterns in Xenophon see Dillery 1995: 249–251.

Xenophon is not alone among ancient Greek historiographers in propounding this moral world-view; in fact it is quite traditional in the genre. (It was, of course, common in other genres too, most obviously in tragedy). In Herodotus the pattern is established by Croesus in book I and then repeated not only by the Persian kings, but also by various other characters such as the Egyptian king Apries and the Samian tyrant Polycrates.[38] It also runs through the work of Thucydides where the Athenians arrogantly abuse their great success and power and become so arrogant that they refuse a Spartan peace offer only to suffer spectacular defeat in Sicily.[39] Interestingly, the theme persists into Hellenistic historiography. Moreover, in Polybius and Diodorus, our two best preserved Hellenistic historiographers, it takes on a form much closer to its incarnation in Xenophon than to what is seen in his two famous predecessors: rather than a repeated structural pattern of rulers and peoples rising to power, becoming arrogant, overconfident, cruel, and impious and then being brought low by disaster, as in Herodotus, or a supremely detailed case study of one such fall from grace as in Thucydides, the reader is presented with a variety of historical characters, significant and insignificant, achieving various types of success and handling it more or less moderately, with disaster often following lack of moderation.[40]

The difference between Xenophon's approach and that of Polybius and Diodorus is that while the Classical historiographer is notorious for leaving any didactic conclusions entirely up to the reader, thus often imbuing

[38] Croesus: Hdt. 1.29–56 and 1.75–91, especially 1.34.1; see Harrison 2000: 31–40, Fisher 2002, Raaflaub 2002. The Persian kings: Hdt. 1.203–214, especially 1.204.2 and 1.207.2 (Cyrus, see Harrison 2000: 44–45), 3.61–64 (Cambyses), 4.83–142, especially 4.83–84 and 134–142 (Darius), 7.32–36, 8.54, 8.115–120 (Xerxes: see Georges 1994: 200–203). Apries: Hdt. 2.161–163 and 169. Polycrates: 3.39–43 and 3.120–125, and see Fisher 2002: 211–214. The causation of all of these downfalls is more complex than the simple maxim 'success brings arrogance, which brings disaster', but in all of them this is part of the pattern. I shall argue the case further in a forthcoming monograph.

[39] Athenian arrogance/overconfidence: Thuc. 1.70, 1.73–78; shown in rejection of peace offer 4.17–21 (see Stahl 2003: 142–149, Hunter 1973: 74–77 and 133–135) and in the Melian Dialogue 5.84–111 (see Cornford 1907: 174–187, Macleod 1974, Finley 1947: 209–212). The consequent defeat: 7.1–86, especially 7.75.7 (see Cornford 1907: 185–187 and 198, Wassermann 1947, Connor 1984: 158–163). As in Herodotus, the causation is more complex than this brief comparison allows for, but when seen in relation to Herodotus and to the rest of Greek historiography, the pattern is clear. See again my forthcoming monograph.

[40] E.g. Polyb. 1.35.1–3, 8.20.9–10, 8.21.10–11, 15.17.4, 29.20.1–2, 38.21; Diod. 1.60.3, 2.26.4, 4.74.2, 9.33.3, 10.13, 10.14.1–2, 10.23, 10.74.3, 11.26, 13.19–20, 14.105, 15.17.5, 17.38.4–7, 19.11.6–7, 19.95.6–7, 23.12, 27.6, 28.1, and 31.4. The kind of good fortune most often achieved is a military victory, and one of the most common ways to abuse it (apart from maltreatment of the defeated and/or prisoners) is an overconfident contempt for the enemy which leads to lack of caution and so to defeat.

his work with a moral ambiguity which keeps modern scholars arguing about even his basic messages, the two Hellenistic historiographers usually comment unambiguously on the narrated situations and set out the moral explicitly for the reader. Thus, human inability to handle great good fortune becomes a major and explicit didactic theme.[41] This theme was present in Greek historiography from the very beginning, but it was Xenophon's approach—his interest in success-induced contempt for the enemy and consequent disaster, his insistence on the immorality of arrogant pride even in non-military situations, and even his use of *phronēma*, *mega phronein* and *kataphronēsis*—that was picked up by the Hellenistic historiographers and carried on in their massive works.[42] Thus, the least famous of the three famous Classical historians made his permanent mark on the moral-didactic tradition of historiography.

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[41] The theme is so common in Polybius that Walbank 1957: 19 terms it 'the same trite homily' repeated with 'monotonous regularity'.

[42] It would be interesting to know if the theme was carried on unbrokenly between Xenophon and Polybius, but the most that can be said with certainty is that two passages among the fragments of Theopompos (115 FF253, 344) and one among those of Timaeus of Tauromenium (566 F121) may imply that *kataphronēsis* leads to disaster.

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CHAPTER NINETEEN

XENOPHON AND THE PERSIAN KISS*

Pierre Pontier

Xenophon accords a unique importance to self-restraint or self-mastery (*enkrateia*). It is one of the 'pillars' of virtue in the *Memorabilia*.[1] Above all, it is one of the qualities indispensable in a ruler. While it is essential in several areas, such as eating, drinking, fatigue and sleep, Xenophon undoubtedly devotes most attention to mastery of sexual desire. For example, the first actual dialogue of the *Memorabilia* deals with this issue (1.3.8–14): Socrates faults the conduct of Critobulus, who has kissed the son of Alcibiades, and on this occasion he compares the youths' kiss to a tarantula's bite. The *Symposium* develops the same theme, when Socrates comments on the attraction Critobulus feels towards Clinias: the kiss, still a biting into the soul, is defined as 'an insatiable thing, and it produces a kind of delicious anticipation'. Socrates concludes with the necessity to refrain from kissing youths, if one wishes to 'be temperate' (σωφρονεῖν).[2] The kiss represents a formidable danger for the *enkrateia* of anyone who surrenders himself to it.

Xenophon, in various works, creates scenes of avoided kissing[3] that seem focused on this same moral issue, one which seemingly tends to blur the differences among his heroes, from Socrates to Agesilaus. Yet, upon closer examination, reflections on kissing vary with the narrative contexts. Xenophon notably emphasizes the custom of the Persian kiss in several scenes that bring together a Persian and a non-Persian. Thus, in the *Agesilaus*, a passage praising the Spartan king's *enkrateia* provides the narrative framework for a troubling scene of a kiss declined. Agesilaus' exemplary conduct towards the young Megabates can, to be sure, seem like a practical application of Socrates' warnings in the *Memorabilia* or the *Symposium*. But the two protagonists' reactions are only fully comprehensible if account is taken

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[1] Cf. *Mem*. 1.5.4 and Dorion & Bandini 2000: ccxvi, as well as Dorion 2003. Cf. also *Mem*. 1.6.9, 2.1.19, 2.6.1, 4.2.11, 4.5.3–6, 4.5.10, *Oec*. 9.11. On *enkrateia* in the *Cyropaedia*, cf. Due 1989: 170–181.

[2] *Symp*. 4.25–26 (tr. Tredennick). On the kiss in the *Symp*., cf. Huß 1999: 238–239.

[3] Kissing scenes are in some ways the narrative pendant of erotic images on numerous

of the Persian custom of the courteous kiss. A gesture's meaning can be equivocal or misunderstood, especially between individuals of high rank: depending on how it is perceived, it can have considerable consequences.[4] That is what differentiates this scene from the Socratic discussions. The *Agesilaus* anecdote, therefore, does not have as its only purpose highlighting the Spartan king's *enkrateia*: it is part of a more general reflection, developed further in the *Cyropaedia*, and, indeed, by Arrian, on the equivocal meaning of a gesture or a custom, and even on the ways of deflecting it or putting it to other uses.

The Kiss of Megabates

The scene in the *Agesilaus* belongs to a quite specific political and diplomatic context, the recruiting of the Persian noble Spithridates[5] to Agesilaus' expedition in Phrygia during the autumn of 395. Only a little is known of this individual: prior to his appearance in the *Anabasis* as a subordinate of Pharnabazus who fights against the Ten Thousand when they appear in Bithynia, he seems to play the role of an officer of Darius II and puts down the revolt of Pissuthnes alongside Tissaphernes and Parmises.[6] A few years later, we learn from Xenophon that Pharnabazus apparently wanted to take the daughter of Spithridates as a concubine, while marrying the Great King's daughter; thereupon Spithridates went over to the Spartan side through the intervention of Lysander, something the *Agesilaus* does not mention. Accompanied by his son, Spithridates meets Agesilaus at Ephesus.[7] This young son, Megabates, is only mentioned three times in the *Hellenica*. When he meets the king, Xenophon notes in an apparently neutral way the Spartan king's satisfaction: 'When Agesilaus saw them, he was pleased (ἥσθη) with what Lysander had done' (3.4.10, tr. Marincola). Later, in Paphlagonia, when Agesilaus acts as a go-between for King Otys, with the objective of get-

vases. As Lear 2008: 59–62 has noted, citing especially a famous *kylix* of the Briseis Painter (Paris, Musée du Louvre G278), the kiss is part and parcel of 'courtship' scenes.

4 Cf. Frijhoff 1991: 230 on this point.

5 Or Spithradates, according to Ctesias 688 F15.53. On the name, cf. Schmitt 2002: 69–70.

6 Bithynia: Xen. *An.* 6.5.7. Pissuthnes: Ctesias 688 F15.53 with Lenfant 2003: 273 n. 613, following Lewis 1977: 81 n. 200. It is sometimes thought that the Spithradates mentioned by Ctesias is the ancestor of the subordinate of Pharnabazus, cf. Debord 1999: 120 n. 37, 184.

7 *Hell.* 3.4.10, *Ages.* 3.3, *Hell. Oxy.* 24.4 (Chambers 1993), Plut. *Ages.* 8.3, *Lys.* 24.1. See Due 1989: 197–198 on the Megabates episode and 192–198 on the comparison between Cyrus and Agesilaus.

ting him to marry Spithridates' daughter,[8] he points out the beauty of the young man, who was present on the expedition and whose beauty the king might take as a harbinger of the beauty of the young daughter, left behind at Cyzicus (4.1.6). Lastly, in one final passage, Xenophon observes that the defection of Spithridates, Megabates and the Paphlagonians was one of the biggest reversals of the expedition for Agesilaus (4.1.27–28).[9] The *Hellenica* does not mention explicitly Agesilaus' feelings towards Megabates, although the second passage (4.1.6) shows that the king was apparently aware of the youth's beauty.

In contrast, the Oxyrhynchus Historian does not miss the opportunity to highlight Agesilaus' inclinations toward Megabates:[10] this attraction could even be in his eyes the principal reason for Agesilaus' welcoming of Spithridates' recruitment.[11] The inference takes direct aim at the *enkrateia* of Agesilaus, and it is precisely on this point that Xenophon seeks to defend the king, by giving *enkrateia* an essential place in the second part of the work devoted to the 'virtue' of Agesilaus (τὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτοῦ ἀρετὴν: *Ages.* 3.1). From the opening lines of this section, dealing with the piety of Agesilaus, he cites the recruiting of Spithridates and Cotys and the trust of Pharnabazus as well known proofs of the king's reliable word (*Ages.* 3.3–5). The three men are characterized as 'very illustrious' (ἐπιφανεστάτους: *Ages.* 3.2), which puts Spithridates at the top of the Persian social hierarchy and agrees with what Agesilaus and Otys say of him in the *Hellenica*. When Agesilaus asks Otys, 'What kind of family does Spithridates come from?', Otys replies, 'He is not inferior to any of the Persians' (Περσῶν οὐδενὸς ἐνδεέστερος); Agesilaus himself vouches that 'he is extremely well-born' (εὐγενεστάτου:[12] *Hell.* 4.1.6–7). This insistence on Spithridates' noble blood, which the *Agesilaus* and the *Hellenica* noticeably share, is critical: it reinforces the apologetic dimension of the episode, and it also permits a better understanding of the kiss gesture.

Recall, briefly, the scene: Agesilaus has 'fallen in love' (ἐρασθέντα) with the son of Spithridates, and the son approaches him to kiss him on the

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[8] See Gray 1989: 49–52 on the reasons motivating Xenophon to include this conversation between Otys and Agesilaus in the *Hellenica*, rather than Krentz 1995: 203, who thinks that Xenophon presents an ambivalent image of Agesilaus here.

[9] Tuplin 1993: 58–60.

[10] *Hell. Oxy.* 24.4: 'for he was said to be quite smitten with him' (λέγεται γὰρ ἐπιθυμητικῶς αὐτοῦ σφόδρα σχεῖν).

[11] Compare the quite apposite remarks of Schepens 2005: 35 n. 10, 40–41 on this episode: it is the only passage in the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* to deal with Agesilaus' private life.

[12] *Hapax* in the corpus of Xenophon: the adjective employed in the *Hellenica* is related to the noun *eugeneia*, used just once, apropos of Agesilaus himself, in the encomium (*Ages.* 1.2), which indirectly sanctions their linking. On this adjective, cf. Briant 1990: 76–77.

mouth, because, as Xenophon observes, 'it is the custom among the Persians to bestow a kiss on those whom they honour' (ἐπιχωρίου ὄντος τοῖς Πέρσαις φιλεῖν οὓς ἂν τιμῶσιν: *Ages.* 5.4, tr. Marchant). The turn of phrase, relatively vague, establishes *timē* as the principal criterion. Among other, more detailed evidence for this custom, one might cite a passage in the *Cyropaedia* (1.4.27: cf. below) and another in Herodotus:

> When Persians meet in the streets one can always tell by their mode of gathering whether or not they are of the same rank (ὅμοιοί); for they do not speak but kiss—their equals upon the mouth (ἀλλήλους φιλέουσι τοῖσι στόμασι), those somewhat superior on the cheeks. A man of greatly inferior rank (ἀγεννέστερος) prostrates himself (προσκυνέει) in profound reverence. After their own nation they hold their nearest neighbours most in honour (τιμῶσι), then the nearest but one—and so on, their respect decreasing as the distance grows, and the most remote being the most despised. Themselves they consider in every way superior to everyone else in the world, and allow other nations a share of good qualities decreasing according to distance, the furthest off being in their view the worst. (Hdt. 1.134, tr. de Selincourt)

Herodotus' evidence parallels the *Agesilaus* passage. He connects this gesture in the same way to recognition of 'good birth' (εὐγένεια). Through the kiss, two individuals show that they think of themselves as similar in rank. The 'couples' mark their membership in an identical social class thanks to this symbolic form of honour (*timē*). According to Pierre Briant, the kiss on the mouth therefore characterizes the 'higher nobility'.[13] Since Agesilaus does not come from a noble Persian family, however, the gesture is not self-explanatory. The conduct of Megabates is a privilege all the more strange, indeed incongruous, because Agesilaus is a foreigner. It seems to find its justification in the *timē* that makes Agesilaus an individual 'of the same rank' (ὅμοιος) as those noble Persians by virtue of his birth and status. Yet Agesilaus' refusal might show that the Spartan does not share this point of view.

It is telling that the text, after the king declines the kiss of Megabates, continues to focus on the concept of *timē*. Thus, the young man subsequently holds himself aloof from Agesilaus, 'as though feeling himself dishonoured' (ὥσπερ ἀτιμασθῆναι νομίσας: *Ages.* 5.5). It is essential to take account of the word ὥσπερ generally glossed over in modern translations:[14] its use when

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13 Note also the term ἰσότιμος in Strabo 15.3.20 (who likewise describes the various Persian ways of greeting as a function of social rank), perhaps to be connected with the *homotimoi* ('peers') of Xenophon: cf. Briant 1996: 346 and Demont 2006: 280. In addition, Flower 2006: 280–281 questions a little the precision of the Herodotean treatment of Persian customs. Compare also Munson 2001: 150–156 on the strict ethnocentrism of the Persians.

14 Marchant (Loeb) 1925: 'feeling himself slighted'; Chambry 1968: 'se croyant méprisé';

followed by a participle adds a nuance of conditional comparison to the statement.[15] The nuance is important, because it marks a distancing by the narrator regarding the actual feelings and motivations of Megabates. The text no longer reflects objectively the young Persian's sentiments. It is content to characterize the external attitude of Megabates while leaving open the possibility of other explanations.

The reaction of Agesilaus, who then resorts to an intermediary, assumes precisely this interpretation of the young man's attitude: the Spartan king thinks that he has offended his honour. Indeed, he calls upon a companion in an effort to persuade Megabates 'to show him honour once more' (πάλιν τιμᾶν: 5.5). The wording of his request may appear ambiguous, if not because the king's feelings are unclear, then at least because different gestures would convey this mark of honour, depending upon whether one was a Spartan or a Persian. Moreover, the intermediary, perhaps after having spoken to Megabates, tries to find out if a second kiss would be acceptable. So he is trying to clarify this ambiguity, asking Agesilaus if he will yield to the Persian ritual. Upon reflection, the king concludes by saying no.

The interpretation of this episode is tricky. To be sure, one may emphasize the anecdote's moral dimension whose aim is to highlight especially the sexual *enkrateia* of Agesilaus. Plutarch, whom this scene so impressed that he used it three times in the *Moralia* in addition to the narrative he devotes to it in his *Agesilaus*,[16] stressed the internal testing of the king, the struggle between amorous desire and the need to demonstrate self-mastery. For this purpose, he introduces into his account feelings that do

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Guntiñas Tuñon 1984: 'se consideraba ofendido'; Luppino Manes 1992: 'avendo Megabate creduto di essere stato disprezzato'; Waterfield 1997: 'because he felt insulted'; Vlachakos 2003: 'σχημάτισε την εντύπωση ότι τον πρόσβαλε'; Casevitz 2008: 'pensant avoir été méprisé'. Finally, the translation of Lear in Hubbard 2003: 67–68 is close to Marchant's ('since Megabates took it as a slight').

15 The Latin translation of Dübner 1838 ad loc., for example, captures the nuance: 'quasi qui despectum se putaret', close to that of Gail 1804–1811; in contrast, the latter's French translation completely ignores ὥσπερ. Compare also Watson 1857: 'as if thinking himself to be dishonoured'. This construction of ὥσπερ followed by a participle is quite well attested in Xenophon, particularly, as is the case here, to interpret a gesture, an action, a tone of voice, indeed a feeling: cf. esp. *Cyr.* 1.4.8: ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιῶν; 6.4.7: ὥσπερ ἀδελφοῦ γυναῖκα λαβών; *Symp.* 4.28: ὥσπερ ὑπὸ θηρίου τινὸς δεδηγμένος; 5.6: ὥσπερ ἐπηρεάζουσα; *Mem.* 4.4.6: ὥσπερ ἐπισκώπτων αὐτόν; *Hell.* 7.5.25: ὥσπερ δὲ ἡττώμενοι. This list is not exhaustive. (On this point, and for other examples, cf. Kühner 1966: 97.) Further, another comparison with ὥσπερ (ὥσπερ ἂν τοῦ καλλίστου ἡ σφροδροτάτη φύσις ἐρασθείη, 'even as the most ardent nature would fall in love with the most beautiful being': *Ages.* 5.4), referring to Agesilaus, a few lines above, by creating a parallel between the two individuals, invites construing 5.5 as we suggest.

16 See Stadter (this volume, pp. 43–62) on how Plutarch read Xenophon.

not appear in Xenophon's text. Similarly, he alters the tenor of the dialogue between Agesilaus and his intermediary. Thus, the king is conflicted; he immediately regrets having rejected the kiss, so much so that he subsequently feigns astonishment at Megabates' conduct and the latter's refusal to greet him with another one.[17] Agesilaus' request thus demonstrates the limits of his *enkrateia* rather than his virtue; even if his final response is close to Xenophon's version, the king does not emerge from this episode truly heroic. Another telling difference: the response of the companions is much less laconic and more forthright than in the encomium; they fault the conduct of Agesilaus by saying he acted as if out of fear, and they advise him in the future to accept the young man's kiss, if they succeed in persuading him to a second try.[18]

Plutarch is completely silent about the political and ritual dimension of the gesture for a Persian. Indeed, if, by his refusal, Agesilaus offends his allies and risks creating a minor diplomatic incident, by his intervention, which in Xenophon seems motivated by the apparent conduct of Megabates, he may also be aiming to settle it. This more political interpretation of the episode, which Hindley has developed,[19] squares relatively well with the construction of the scene and convergences between the *Hellenica* and the *Agesilaus*. A further argument in support of Hindley: the expression προσφέρειν λόγους describing Agesilaus' intervention (*Agesilaus* 5.5) often denotes in the historians negotiations carried on with another party.[20]

When Agesilaus seeks to convince Megabates to 'show him honour once again' (πάλιν τιμᾶν: *Ages.* 5.5), his vague expression says nothing about

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17 Plut. *Ages.* 11.7: προσεποιεῖτο θαυμάζειν ὅ τι δὴ παθὼν αὐτὸν ὁ Μεγαβάτης ἀπὸ στόματος οὐ φιλοφρονοῖτο. Compare 11.5–7 for the entire incident, as well as *How the Young Man Should Study Poetry* 31c, *Progress in Virtue* 81a, *Spartan Sayings* 209d–e.

18 On the differences between Plutarch's version and Xenophon's, cf. Shipley 1997: 175–180.

19 Hindley 1994: 361–366; more briefly, Hindley 1999: 75–76 and 2004: 126.

20 Hdt. 5.30, 5.40, 8.52, Thuc. 1.57.5, 2.70.1, 3.4.2, 3.109.1, and *LSJ*, s.v. Perhaps this use of the phrase prompted Chambry (1968) to think that the intermediary sought by Agesilaus was 'one of the companions of Megabates'. That is, moreover, what the majority of French translators have assumed since the translation of Simon Goulart in the 1613 edition of Xenophon's complete works by Pyramus de Candole. Other translators have definitely not taken a clear stand on the identity of this intermediary, translating generally 'one of his companions', implying one of the companions of Agesilaus, in agreement with Plutarch's interpretation and with what the ambiguous Greek can suggest. If so, one may possibly understand that the interlocutor's or interpreter's question anticipates or reflects, after a parley, what Megabates requests in exchange for this reconciliation. On interpreters between Greeks and Persians, cf. Miller 1997: 130–133 and, in the context of Agesilaus' Asiatic expedition, the case of Apollophanes of Cyzicus (*Hell.* 4.1.29–30), a region from which Spithridates also hailed.

kissing, while leaving the door open to other forms of honour. But since his interlocutor upon his return only has in mind the ritual of the Persian kiss, the king's response, even after mature reflection, can only be negative and end the negotiation. In addition, Agesilaus undoubtedly refuses to submit himself to the Persian ritual in order to avoid having rumours of a pederastic relationship with a young Persian besmirch his reputation publicly, since the kiss would not carry the same symbolic meaning in his own camp.

Moreover, if one compares with this passage an anecdote from the *Hellenica* that reports the relations between the young son of Pharnabazus and Agesilaus during the same period, it is easy to observe that the young man, approaching Agesilaus, scrupulously followed Greek practices, with an exchange of gifts that seal a bond of hospitality (*Hellenica* 4.1.39–40). The same cannot be said for the gesture of Megabates, who also approaches Agesilaus, but who imposes on him a Persian ritual in a way that can seem doubly shocking for Greeks: they may have difficulty with their king's adopting a local custom, even for political reasons, and with considering this kiss merely as a mark of honour;[21] further, if the kiss suggests in their view a homosexual relation, it is generally the lover (*erastēs*) who chooses the beloved (*erōmenos*) rather than the reverse. In this instance, Megabates is the one taking the initiative in kissing Agesilaus, reversing roles. The scene may recall how Alcibiades approaches Socrates in the *Symposium* of Plato. The outcome of the two scenes is identical: Socrates and Agesilaus display perfect sexual continence. Following the *Agesilaus* anecdote, Xenophon praises the irreproachable public conduct of Agesilaus, who even considered it a point of honour to sleep only in publicly visible spaces during this expedition.[22]

When all is said and done, it is perfectly possible that the Persian allies themselves play on the ambiguity of the gesture and knowingly test the king's *enkrateia*. This political manoeuvre would seek to make Megabates Agesilaus' *erōmenos*: Spithridates would press his political advantage even further, after Agesilaus arranged the marriage between his daughter and king Otys. By declining the kiss of Megabates and then negotiating a different mark of honour, Agesilaus would aim simultaneously to control a

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21 Carlier 1984: 292–301 speaks especially of the sacral character of Spartan kings: there is 'a magical connection between the legitimacy and the integrity of the kings on the one hand, the welfare of the city and world order on the other' (294). On royal *timē*, cf. also 244 and 255, Xen. *Lac.* 13.1, 15.8–9 and Cartledge 1987: 100–110.

22 Cf. Buffière 1980: 78–80, 637–638 (for a parallel between this scene and that in Plato's *Symposium*), Dover 1982: 84, Davidson 2007: 341–342 (with some reservations about the author's glib turns of phrase).

susceptible ally and to impose his authority as military and political commander, something, according to Xenophon, his intermediary role between Spithridates and Otys shows. In any case, the narrative of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* suggests that the king's attachment to the young man is what largely motivated the alliance between Spithridates and Agesilaus. Xenophon, for his part, cannot lie about this infatuation, which, he says, was completely overcome; and so he advertizes the constant public visibility of Agesilaus' good conduct, in order to reply to possible insinuations (*Agesilaus* 5.6–7).[23]

Two difficulties remain. Interpreting the episode only as a Persian political manoeuvre, while attractive, is fragile: it would require 'reading between the lines', as Hindley has elsewhere recognized,[24] indeed, going beyond what is clearly mentioned in the text, namely, the encomium of the *enkrateia* of Agesilaus.[25] According to this interpretation, Agesilaus demonstrates sexual continence only because the pederastic liaison with Megabates is blameworthy in the eyes of his peers, owing to the youth's Persian origin. That may be so,[26] but that is not in any case the image of the king Xenophon wants to leave in the *Agesilaus*. In line with the overall portrait of Agesilaus to which he pointedly opposes the character of Artaxerxes, he depicts the king as a Spartan of the strictest morals, who would never indulge a Persian ritual.

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23 Xenophon presents Agesilaus' amorous desire as a natural drive (cf. Dover 1974: 213–214): in his eyes, the king is not culpable to the extent that he demonstrates his *enkrateia*. See also Hirsch 1985: 54, on the apologetic character of this passage in the *Agesilaus*: 'Xenophon's protestations here are excessive, and the reader may plausibly suspect that some rumour of scandal underlies his impassioned appeal.' See also Ludwig 2002: 234 n. 34. The strategy of Xenophon, who is capturing the attention and understanding of the Greek reader, consists of stressing the king's constant 'visibility' as guarantor of his self-mastery: cf. Harman (this volume pp. 427–453) on the importance of visibility in the *Agesilaus* and pp. 442–443 for this particular passage.

24 Hindley 1994: 365: 'this analysis requires some reading between the lines'.

25 According to Hindley 2004: 126 this episode implies that carrying on a relationship with Megabates would have endangered Agesilaus' reputation and his city's honour; in fact, 'it would not have been objectionable on moral grounds'. This conclusion flies in the face of two passages in the *Agesilaus*, one found in this very chapter (5.4), the other in a summary chapter (11.10) that records how 'fair deeds appealed more to [Agesilaus'] heart than fair faces'. The latter passage, so carefully worded, does not seem to us to contradict the anecdote with Megabates (contrary to the view of Luppino Manes 1992: 174).

26 On Spartan pederasty, cf. Cartledge 2001: esp. 106 n. 12 on Xenophon's veiled allusions to Agesilaus' homosexual inclinations, and 94 on Xenophon's lack of objectivity.

From Agesilaus to Cyrus

The second difficulty arises at the start of the *Cyropaedia*, where Xenophon presents the Persian custom of the kiss on the mouth differently. In the *Agesilaus*, Persians kiss 'those whom they honour' (οὓς ἂν τιμῶσιν, 5.4); in the *Cyropaedia*, it is a practice explicitly reserved to 'relatives' or 'kinsmen' (συγγενεῖς): 'his kinsmen bade him goodbye, after the Persian custom, with a kiss upon his lips. And that custom has survived, for so the Persians do even to this day' (λέγεται [...] τοὺς συγγενεῖς φιλοῦντας τῷ στόματι ἀποπέμπεσθαι αὐτὸν νόμῳ Περσικῷ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ποιοῦσι Πέρσαι: *Cyropaedia* 1.4.27, tr. Miller).

The two works' different presentation of the same custom is sometimes justified by the apologetic character of the *Agesilaus*, which allegedly led Xenophon to alter the factual truth.[27] In addition to the text of Herodotus already cited (1.134), and in view of other evidence in Strabo and Arrian that deals with a Persian social category corresponding to the συγγενεῖς, the *Cyropaedia* passage generally receives a little more weight, with note sometimes taken of its limiting character.[28] Upon close observation of Persian kissing in the *Cyropaedia*, however, the two versions of this practice emerge as not incompatible or really contradictory.

The first scene of kissing in the *Cyropaedia* is a family setting with a grandfather and his grandson. When, aged twelve, Cyrus arrives at the court of Astyages, he meets his grandfather, a Mede, and displays his affection by kissing him as if he had always known him; Astyages reciprocates his affectionate gesture.[29]

The second scene is one closely connected to the declined kiss of Megabates. Xenophon sets it apart in his narrative by giving it a particular character: he presents it as a *paidikos logos*.[30] From age twelve to sixteen, Cyrus stayed with his grandfather in Media, but he had to return to Persia to

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[27] Hindley 1994: 365 n. 79: 'Xenophon might have understandably glossed over the full implication of the proffered kiss, by substituting 'honour' for 'kinship' as the motivating principle.'

[28] Strab. 15.3.20, Arr., *Anab*. 7.11.1. On the συγγενεῖς: Briant 1996: 321–322. On the *Cyr*. passage's limiting character compared to the Herodotus text: Tuplin 1990: 23 and Mueller-Goldingen 1995: 100.

[29] The verbs ἀσπάζεσθαι and ἀντασπάζεσθαι used in this passage (*Cyr*. 1.3.2–3) can have the sense 'to kiss', even if the meaning is perhaps less specific than φιλεῖν: cf., for example, *Symp*. 9.4. Besides, Astyages kisses back his grandson more for his compliment on his handsomeness than in response to his previous kiss.

[30] *Cyr*. 1.4.27–28. On the *paidikos logos* in Xenophon see also *Hell*. 5.3.20, *Ages*. 8.2 (Agesilaus) and Gray 2011: 203–211.

complete his education. In this farewell scene, the 'relatives' (συγγενεῖς) of Cyrus kiss him on the mouth. The ritual is portrayed as exclusively Persian (νόμῳ Περσικῷ), although the Medes apparently at least partly share it, according to Xenophon, judging by the question the Mede Artabazus asks Cyrus: 'Really, is it a custom as well in Persia to kiss one's kinsfolk?' 'Certainly', Cyrus replies, 'at least when they see one another after a time of separation, or when they part from one another' (Ἦ καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις νόμος ἐστὶν οὗτος συγγενεῖς φιλεῖν;—Μάλιστα, φάναι, ὅταν γε ἴδωσιν ἀλλήλους διὰ χρόνου ἢ ἀπίωσί ποι ἀπ'ἀλλήλων: 1.4.28). The ritual kiss, known, perhaps, equally to Persians and Medes, would thus in Persia be reserved for certain occasions and would occur within a family context of reunion or separation over rather lengthy periods.[31]

Artabazus, whom Xenophon presents as a Mede and a 'gentleman' (μάλα καλὸν κἀγαθὸν ὄντα, 1.4.27), has therefore so fallen in love with Cyrus that he fancies himself a member of his family in order to be able to kiss him. Cyrus accepts twice, the first as a kiss of familial recognition, the second, after Artabazus' inquiry about the Persian custom, more as a goodbye kiss. The description of Artabazus' amorous infatuation with the young Cyrus closely resembles the scene in the *Symposium* that depicts the attraction of Critobulus for the young Clinias (4.25), even to the shared usage in both scenes of the rare word σκαρδαμύττειν ('to bat one's eyes', 'to blink').[32] Yet, after this second kiss and Cyrus's departure, when the Mede catches up with him on horseback, Cyrus refuses to kiss him a third time, as if he were henceforth maintaining a distance towards one whom he addresses ironically by the word 'relative' (σύγγενες).[33]

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[31] This contextual nuance, little noticed by commentators, and which the first scene already cited between Astyages and Cyrus confirms (*Cyr.* 1.3.2–3), adds another condition to the ritual that is already limited to a small number of individuals. It is quite clear what distinguishes the *Cyropaedia* text from the evidence of Herodotus cited above (1.134), which deals with persons of the same rank who come across each other. Additionally, Xenophon may also be playing on the ambiguity of the term συγγενεῖς, which seems in this passage to refer to the 'relatives' of Cyrus in a rather narrow way, while later on (cf. below) this category may designate an expanded social group (cf. Mueller-Goldingen 1995: 100 n. 123).

[32] The word σκαρδαμύττειν becomes the object of similar jokes in the *Cyropaedia* and the *Symposium*. In the former, Artabazus says that even the time it takes to bat an eye seems long since during this time he cannot see his beloved. In the latter, Socrates waxes ironic about the effects of his teaching concerning temperance on Critobulus: previously, Critobulus was unable to take his eyes off Clinias and stood immobile like a stone, as if he had seen a Gorgon; now, at least he is able to blink. See Gray 2011: 206, and concerning the conduct of Artabazus and possible parallels between the *Symposium* and *Cyropaedia*, Gera 1993: 189–191.

[33] *Cyr.* 1.4.28.

The scene is chiefly interesting for the way it reproduces characteristic features of the scene in the *Agesilaus*: a public, even formal context, a 'gentleman's' affection for a youth, an exchange of kisses (two realized, the third shunned) between two individuals who are strangers, and the repetitive character of the scene, which in both cases ends in refusal of a kiss. And yet, as we have seen, the two episodes do not present the ritual kiss identically. In an inversion of roles, Artabazus, the man soliciting the kiss, is no longer the younger, but the elder of the two participants. He also twists to personal ends a ritual he could not participate in as a Mede; as for Agesilaus, he refuses, on the contrary, to participate in a permitted ritual, so as to avoid sullying his reputation and especially out of concern for *enkrateia*, a virtue in which the Medes of the *Cyropaedia* are singularly lacking.[34] It is quite evident what distinguishes Agesilaus from Artabazus, but also what connects the two scenes—an effect that resembles the interplay of distorting mirrors.

Elsewhere in the *Cyropaedia*, a banqueting scene (2.2.28–31) allusively resumes the motif of the Persian kiss. It portrays two men, members of a military unit, Sambaulas and an extremely ugly youth. The Persian Peers joke about the closeness of the two, asking Sambaulas if they both live in 'the Greek fashion' (κατὰ τὸν Ἑλληνικὸν τρόπον: 2.2.28). Sambaulas contradicts this innuendo of a possible homosexual relationship by insisting that it is the young man's zeal that alone inspires his attachment.[35] They also jokingly ask Sambaulas why, in view of the young man's qualities, he does not kiss him 'as you do your relatives' (ὥσπερ τοὺς συγγενεῖς: 2.2.31). The ugly youth then responds himself that this would be a task more daunting than boot camp. This scene produces a slight shift. The kiss is still considered a mark of belonging to a group of 'relatives' (συγγενεῖς); nevertheless, even in a joking tone, it is equally considered a possible sign of social recognition for services rendered. If the gesture were to occur, the young man would then belong to the 'relatives'. But at this point in the conquest, this type of social distinction is hard to imagine; so the two men do not kiss each other.

Some years later, Cyrus finds Artabazus in the army of his uncle Cyaxares and then decides to use the Median soldier's love to assess how genuine his

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[34] *Cyr.* 1.2.15 as opposed to 1.3.2–3, and more generally on the contrast between Persians and Medes in the *Cyropaedia*, see Tuplin 2003: 354–358.

[35] Sergent 1986: 195–196 sees in this anecdote evidence of homosexuality between the two Persians, something Sambaulas' disavowal makes difficult to accept unconditionally. The narrative stresses that the attachment between the two men is purely utilitarian. See Gera 1993: 165–167.

charismatic leadership is:[36] he personally chooses Artabazus as a volunteer to accompany him in his pursuit of the Assyrian army, and he uses him to win over to his side the Medes of Cyaxares, in order to incorporate them into his army (cf. 4.1.22–24; 5.1.24–26).[37] This massive recruitment of Medes is the principal reason for another scene of shunned kissing between Cyrus and his uncle. From a political point of view the passage is critically important. When Cyrus and Cyaxares separate, and Cyrus succeeds in enlisting Median volunteers into his own army, his uncle is angry about being deserted by his men; he publicly displays his resentment by sending an emissary. Cyrus does not give in at this time to his uncle's pressure. When the uncle and nephew meet up a little later, the two leaders approach each other surrounded by their soldiers, but the balance of power is now so unfavourable to Cyaxares that before this display he feels himself dishonoured (ἄτιμόν τι αὐτῷ ἔδοξεν εἶναι: 5.5.6).[38] When Cyrus draws near 'to kiss him according to custom' (ὡς φιλήσων αὐτὸν κατὰ νόμον: 5.5.6), Cyaxares publicly turns from him, giving him offence. Cyrus then takes him by the right hand for a private conversation, at the end of which Cyaxares winds up accepting his nephew's kiss, to the great relief of the reunited troops (5.5.36–37).

The expression κατὰ νόμον ('according to custom') harks back to the presentation of the custom in Book I; the moment, moreover, well suits family encounters after a lengthy separation. Yet, without reciprocal esteem, no exchange of kisses is possible, even between relatives. Xenophon emphasizes Cyaxares' feeling of dishonour, revealing for the first time in the *Cyropaedia* that exchange of kisses cannot be dissociated from the notion of τιμή, whose importance was evident in the scene from the *Agesilaus*. What is at stake in this scene is as much moral as it is political. If Cyaxares feels personally dishonoured, it is because he feels he is getting less than what he thinks he deserves from his nephew; despite that, and notwithstanding the strength of feeling Cyrus's uncle expresses, the division of these 'honours' corresponds well to an ideal of justice based on merit that accords with Xenophon's own ideas.[39] Moreover, the conversation that resolves the rift between uncle and nephew has a critical political dimension, for at least two reasons. Among Cyaxares' arguments, the strongest is his asking Cyrus

36 According to Azoulay 2004: 410–413, Artabazus, 'paradigm of the amorous subject', and Cyrus form at this moment a couple consisting of an *erōmenos* and an *erastēs*. Cf. also Due 1989: 65.

37 Later (*Cyr.* 5.3.38), he is put in charge of Persian peltasts and archers.

38 The ensuing conversation (5.5.8–36) explains at length the reasons for this feeling of dishonour.

39 See Danzig (this volume, pp. 514–538).

if he himself would consider a friend someone who siphoned off Cyrus' soldiers to his own entourage (5.5.31). The ethnic hostility between Persians and Medes, so palpable in this passage, is meant to show how the Mede forces wind up passing from Mede command to Persian. Indeed, it alters the relation between Cyaxares and Cyrus: the familial bond, while still present, seems to take a back seat. Henceforth the relationship comes close to being an acknowledgment of political subordination,[40] since Cyaxares finally ratifies Cyrus's actions. The public reconciliation enshrines an exchange of kisses that can be seen as respecting the Persian custom as it was presented in Book I, with now a reciprocal τιμή for which the conversation has provided the basis: thus the kiss incarnates in the eyes of all the reestablishment of the family relationship but also the fulfilment of a new political arrangement where each occupies the rank he merits.

After the conquest of Babylon, the last kiss of the *Cyropaedia* expresses a similar balancing act, during a banquet with Cyrus and his closest friends.[41] Cyrus repays them in varied ways: thus, Artabazus receives a golden cup, Hystaspes the daughter of Gobryas the Assyrian. But the king reserves a kiss for the friend judged to be most faithful and devoted. This friend, who is not, strictly speaking, a συγγενής, is the man who serves him best by doing even more than he is ordered, the Persian Chrysantas, and he also gets the place of honour at the banquet. These two privileges win for him the jealousy of two men, Hystaspes the Persian and Artabazus the Mede. Hystaspes, the future father of Darius, has been presented as a Persian, one of the Peers (4.2.46–47). Assuming that he has always shown the greatest devotion to Cyrus, he is astounded to see Chrysantas, not himself, occupying 'a more honourable place' (εἰς τὴν τιμιωτέραν [...] χώραν),[42] but he does not take offence over the kiss. Artabazus, on the other hand, if he is jealous of Chrysantas, is so only because of the kiss. The two roles are well delineated, both from an ethnic standpoint and from the type of τιμή.

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[40] We prefer 'political subordination' to 'vassalage', unless the latter is taken in a broad sense with no analogies made to the Middle Ages. On Achaemenid 'vassalage', cf. Petit 2004, who dismisses, furthermore, any connection between the Persian kiss and the medieval *osculum* that established a relation of fealty between sovereign and vassal (184 n. 8). No complete identification between the two gestures is, in fact, possible, even if a partial connection of the two rituals seems seductive at first glance. On the dangers in historical analogy, cf. also Tuplin 2010.

[41] Cf. *Cyr.* 8.4.26–27. One could also mention the purely formal kiss that marks the reunion of Cyrus and Cyaxares, his future father-in-law (8.5.17: ἐπεὶ δὲ ἠσπάσαντο ἀλλήλους), a kiss Xenophon merely notes.

[42] *Cyr.* 8.4.10–12.

The system of recompense Cyrus puts in place suits the conduct of each; the golden cup is a gift that suits the obvious taste of the Medes in the *Cyropaedia* for beautiful objects and beautiful finery;[43] the marriage of the Persian Hystaspes and the daughter of the Assyrian Gobryas, by bringing together two key individuals of different ethnic background, may recall the scene in the *Hellenica* where Agesilaus plays the go-between for Spithridates and Otys, the king of Paphlagonia.[44] In the *Cyropaedia*, the origins of the two individuals explain the favours, different in kind, which Hystaspes and Artabazus receive. Artabazus is assumed to be more partial to precious objects than Hystaspes, who is more attached to less material marks of honour. But it is especially his jealous remark that reveals how Artabazus has remained so in thrall to the same erotic logic as in Book I: 'By Zeus, Cyrus, the cup which you have given me is not of the same gold as the present you have given to Chrysantas' (Μὰ Δί', ἔφη, ὦ Κῦρε, οὐχ ὁμοίου γε χρυσοῦ ἐμοί τε τὸ ἔκπωμα δέδωκας καὶ Χρυσάντᾳ τὸ δῶρον: 8.4.27), he reproaches Cyrus, who jokingly promises to kiss him in thirty years. By contrast, bearing in mind the uncomely appearance of Chrysantas and Cyrus's promise to find him a suitable wife, the kiss Chrysantas receives is devoid of any erotic suggestion;[45] it is the mark of a new, and henceforth well-established, political power.

The comparison of Artabazus, which plays in Greek upon the name Chrysantas and the adjective χρυσοῦς ('gold'), may recall the curious response of Agesilaus to his interlocutor, who asked him if he would accept the kiss of Megabates: 'By the twin gods, no, not if I were straightway to be the fairest and strongest and fleetest man on earth! By all the gods, I swear that I would rather fight that same battle over again than that everything I see should turn into gold' (*Agesilaus* 5.5). Agesilaus prefers his royal honour and his *enkrateia* to gold and kissing. Physical qualities (strength and fleetness), despite their importance for a Spartan (who happened to be lame), and material advantages are secondary compared to the moral rectitude he owes his city.[46]

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43 See *Cyr.* 1.3.2–10, for example, on the Medes' habits in Xenophon.

44 The connection between the two episodes seems all the more justified to us since Spithridates and Gobryas have both distanced themselves from their respective normal rulers, Pharnabazus and the king of Assyria, after harmful acts committed against their children: cf. *Cyr.* 4.6.1–10. In both cases, marriage allows two different peoples to come together to the benefit of a larger political project, even if the expedition of Agesilaus is aborted.

45 On this episode, cf. Gera 1993: 134–135.

46 See also Pl. *Symp.* 218e, when Socrates rejects the advances of Alcibiades, stressing how

In the *Cyropaedia*, the banquet scene closes with Cyrus declining a new kiss from Artabazus. Compared to the beginning of the narrative, the gesture has changed in definition and import. Initially presented as a practice reserved to relatives, it becomes the highest recompense granted by the leader to the best of his friends in return for services rendered. In some way, by kissing Chrysantas Cyrus has succeeded in doing what Sambaulas did not accomplish in Book II.[47] The initial horizontality of the ritual that marked the mutual recognition between persons of the same family or social class is transformed into a more vertical relation where the best of subordinates is certainly brought closer to the leader (by the place of honour he occupies and by the kiss) but is set apart from his own by the privilege he has received.[48] The gesture is also, perhaps, a way of showing how Cyrus thus reinforces his political power by modifying the nature of the ties that could unite different families of Persian nobles. This reinvention of the kissing ritual is not a thorough revolution or a denaturing of the custom, since Chrysantas, the happy recipient, is a Persian Peer.[49] But the gesture does seem exploited for political and moral purposes, owing to the *timē* of which Cyrus is the arbiter and kissing is a symbol.

Consequently, while the two passages presenting the custom of the Persian kiss in the *Agesilaus* and the *Cyropaedia* differ, they do not actually contradict each other, if account is taken of the ritual's evolution during Cyrus's conquest: the kiss indicated recognition between relatives; it symbolizes by the end of the conquest the mark of highest honour, while still preserving its original Persian aspect. Furthermore, in view of the multiple overlaps and echoes between the two works, it is worth considering that the incident Agesilaus experienced in 395 had a decisive influence on Xenophon when he chose to elaborate the subtleties of this ritual in the *Cyropaedia*.

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the proposed exchange would amount to swapping 'brass for gold'.

47 The parallel between the two cases is all the more evident since both are banquet scenes. In addition, Sambaulas and the ugly young man are merely characters invented for the needs of the scene: they are a Persian adaptation of the '*Liebespaar*' *topos*, cf. Martin 1931: 113–116, and Gera 1993: 166.

48 See also *Cyr*. 8.2.26–28, Pontier 2006: 384–391 and Gruen 2011: 57: 'Cyrus contrived contests and prizes that would [...] assure that all who prevailed would be more attached to him than to one another'.

49 It is noteworthy that at no time does Xenophon's Cyrus consider kissing two allies, despite their extraordinary loyalty and merit, the Assyrians Gobryas and Gadatas. (In *Cyr*. 7.5.32, after the victory, they kiss Cyrus's hands and feet.) Perhaps he thinks of them as culturally too far removed from Persian practices, unlike Chrysantas: cf. *Cyr*. 5.2.14–21, when at the time of their first meal together, Gobryas himself observes the contrast between the moderation of the Persians and the excesses of those like him, and Gera 1993: 245–264.

Conclusion: From Agesilaus to Alexander

Whether dealing with Artabazus and Cyrus or Megabates and Agesilaus, the emphasis falls on the meeting of two men involving a rite that is foreign (at least partly) to one of them. Alexander the Great found himself in the same situation when, anxious to establish his rule's legitimacy, he tried to adopt certain rituals of the conquered peoples without alienating his companions. *Proskunēsis* symbolizes this political effort; but kissing on the mouth is also one of the customs Alexander apparently wanted to introduce.[50]

The episode that brings him into conflict with Callisthenes also belongs to a more general discussion on *enkrateia* that, unlike Xenophon's Agesilaus, Alexander evidently may lack. The anecdote has several versions, in Arrian and Plutarch notably, with perhaps a common source in Chares of Mytilene.[51] In Arrian the story of Alexander's refusal of a kiss follows the narrative of the murder of Clitus and is part of the debate on *proskunēsis* that Alexander is trying to get his companions to adopt. Against this troubled backdrop, Alexander has a golden cup circulate among his companions; each is supposed to drink, then rise, prostrate himself, and finally receive a kiss from the king. Callisthenes, balking at *proskunēsis*, does not prostrate himself and comes up to Alexander who, in a deep conversation with Hephaestion, has not noticed him. Someone else mentions to him Callisthenes' omission; Alexander refuses to be kissed and Callisthenes walks off saying, 'I'll go away one kiss poorer' (τὸν δὲ Καλλισθένην, φιλήματι, φάναι, ἔλαττον ἔχων ἄπειμι: *Anab*. 4.12.3–5, tr. Mensch).

The clumsy adoption of Persian custom, including both the kiss and *proskunēsis*, is a failure for several reasons. First, the kiss seems to be perceived as a recompense for *proskunēsis*: prostration before Alexander is tantamount to conferring on him a superior, even divine, dimension, while Alexander's kiss rewards the one prostrating himself by symbolically drawing him closer to the king.[52] Second, according to the logic of the Persian ritual, the refusal of the kiss tends to exclude Callisthenes from the company of

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50 Attempts have been made to show that Alexander knew the author of the *Cyropaedia*, cf. Due 1993. It is, however, easier to show what the narratives of Plutarch and Arrian owe to Xenophon.

51 Plut. *Alex*. 54.4, with Hammond 1993: 97.

52 The understanding of the scene is all the more complicated since the act of *proskunēsis* seems sometimes to involve a kiss, even if the ritual is not reducible to it: Persian reliefs show individuals who bow and throw a kiss to the king with their hand: Briant 1996: 235. Cf. Bickerman 1963: 263–264, Bosworth 1995: 87–90, Sisti 2004: 410.

Alexander's intimates.[53] There is, moreover, a poorly defined juxtaposition of the two ritual acts whose meaning shocks certain of Alexander's companions, when it does not escape them: the conduct and remark of Callisthenes thus radically contrast with those of Artabazus in the *Cyropaedia*. As for the stress on Alexander's distractedness on this occasion, its narrative function is to emphasize the type of relationship the king and Hephaestion had. So it seems difficult to analyze this scene, especially in the version of Arrian, that keen appreciator of Xenophon, without thinking of the perfect *enkrateia* of Cyrus throughout the *Cyropaedia* as a counterpoint, Cyrus who knows so well the dangers of love that he knows how to keep his distance from beautiful individuals (5.1.16). The moral contrast between Cyrus and Alexander is even evident in their choice of 'favourites', Chrysantas and Hephaestion. Finally, to all appearances, and different from the *Cyropaedia*, Alexander's kiss is not meant in this passage to reward an individual's specific merit. It is a means of repaying, without distinguishing them by their deserts, all those who willingly allow themselves to perform a gesture particularly opposed to their ancestral customs, which further explains Alexander's failure.

In contrast, shortly before his death, when Alexander has to confront the protests of his Greek soldiers and he angrily taunts them to go home and abandon him, he then assembles members of the Persian elite, assigns them some important posts and lets himself be kissed only by those he declared his 'relatives' (συγγενεῖς). His companions then protest that he has bestowed upon Persians 'marks of honour' to which even they, Greeks, were not entitled. One of the last scenes of Arrian's *Anabasis* then concludes with embraces between any of the soldiers 'who wished to kiss him' (Arr. *Anab*. 7.11.1–5) and Alexander, who recognizes them all as kinsmen. So, on the Greek side, there is no prior selection for being a relative of Alexander, contrary to his practice with the Persians; but the kiss thereby loses the solemn aspect that it had at the time of the *proskunēsis* debate. Thus, the ritual has been adapted to suit the circumstances, at the risk of losing its original symbolic and ritual meaning.

These last two scenes only confirm the difficulties Greeks encountered in learning the custom of the Persian kiss, from Agesilaus to Alexander.[54] In the case of the Spartan king, the situation becomes even more complicated when feelings similar to those Agesilaus apparently had for Megabates

53 Bosworth 1995: 90, Whitby 2004: 37–40.

54 We omit two other interesting kissing scenes connected with Alexander, the public kiss given in full view of a theatre audience to the eunuch Bagoas (Athen. 13.603a–b, Plut. *Alex*. 67.8), and the kiss denied to the son of Charon of Chalcis (Athen. 13.603b).

are included. It is surely essential to bear in mind the specifically Greek subtext of these scenes of *logoi paidikoi* that undergo multiple changes and elaborations in all of Xenophon's works. In any event, if he did not completely invent the scene in the *Agesilaus*, Xenophon must have had this incident in mind at the time he was planning the *Cyropaedia*, for the relationships among Artabazus, Cyrus, and Cyaxares seem to be variations that develop reflections of the same sort about the *enkrateia* of the good commander. This very evocative type of kissing scene also allows him to stress the relative character of a *nomos*, in the manner of Herodotus.[55] The ritual kiss thus changes meaning and form in proportion with Cyrus's rise to power. To the Persian kiss of greeting within the family (in the broadest sense), Xenophon adds an element of honour bestowed by the king, who, without upsetting it, transcends the logic of social hierarchy founded on birth alone. The kissing gesture thereby acquires a political dimension; it becomes the mark of the ideal ruler, guarantor of justice, able to master his desires, indeed, to have none, in accord with the Socratic message that Xenophon transmits in his own fashion.[56]

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[55] Esp. Hdt 1.134 and 3.38.1.
[56] Cantarella 1991: 99–102, Hubbard 2003: 56, Demont (forthcoming).

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CHAPTER TWENTY

THE WONDER OF FREEDOM: XENOPHON ON SLAVERY*

Emily Baragwanath

'Wonder is the Only Beginning of Philosophy'

Wonder (τὸ θαυμάζειν) is the characteristic sensation of a philosopher (so Plato's Socrates famously told Theaetetus), 'for there is no other beginning of philosophy' (οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη: *Theaetetus*. 155d). Aristotle concurred.[1] But wonder as a stimulant of deeper reflection had earlier roots. Wonders in Herodotus' *Histories* provide, as Rosaria Munson has observed, 'a rich reservoir of symbolic forms' (240) that promotes deeper reflection on meaning and cause. They supply 'an impulse to mental inquiry ... [—] an inquiry, however, that the text declines to actualize but implicitly identifies as the task of the recipient'.[2] It may be that Herodotus transformed an earlier conventional code of ethnographic wonders—descriptions of indiscriminate wonders that induced mere 'wondering at' the paradoxical—by enhancing the role of wonders in his text and expanding their application to historical events. Or it may be that Hecataeus and other early inquirers, their writings now only fragments, had to some extent paved the way.[3]

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1 'It is because of wonder (διὰ ... τὸ θαυμάζειν) that men both now begin and originally began to philosophize; wondering at first at obvious perplexities, and then gradually advancing to raising questions about greater matters too' (Arist. *Metaph.* 982b). See further Llewelyn 1988.

2 Munson 2001: 234. Compare Armstrong's observations (1990: 67–88) on the function and effects of metaphor, which 'begins as an anomaly that refuses to fit into its context'; and this incongruity 'is what sets the reader hunting for an extension of meaning to restore consistency and, with it, sense' (69).

3 Jacoby 1913: 331–332 regards wonder as a conventional category of ancient ethnography, cf. Munson 2001: 234–235 for Herodotus' awareness of a previous ethnographic wonder tradition.

In this paper I explore the possibility that Xenophon, too—perhaps even inspired by Herodotus' model[4]—exploits the discourse of wonders with a view to activating readers' reflection, using it in promoting audience engagement with ideas that were quite controversial and unsettling. My focus is Xenophon's treatment of slavery, a topic that was subject to deeply rooted and rigid assumptions. His challenging ideas on this matter surface across various works of his corpus, but appear in especially interesting guise in the *Symposium*, a Socratic dialogue whose dramatic setting is a party in 422 at the house of the immensely wealthy Athenian Callias. In eliciting from readers intellectual engagement and critique, Xenophon's strategy of staging wonders parallels and complements his broader practice in this work of harnessing the deliberative and competitive spirit of real *symposia* to (as Fiona Hobden has expressed it) 'create … a discursive text through which issues of contemporary concern could be raised, reflected upon, and critiqued', for the benefit of readers.[5]

The dialogue form of Xenophon's Socratic works allows him to go beyond the Herodotean 'telling' of wonders (to borrow the title of Munson's book) to staging and remarking upon the *responses* to wonders on the part of spectators—responses that invite readers likewise, as their own responses are informed by those of individuals in the text, to engage in deeper reflection.[6] The *Symposium* is framed by Xenophon's imagining of a hypothetical viewer who is reflecting upon and drawing judgments from the responses of the spectators in the text, that is, from the astonishing responses (which Xenophon immediately goes on to describe) of Callias and the other symposiasts as they gaze upon gorgeous Autolycus (the recent victor in the boy's *pankration*):

> εὐθὺς μὲν οὖν <u>ἐννοήσας τις</u> τὰ γιγνόμενα <u>ἡγήσατ' ἂν</u> φύσει βασιλικόν τι κάλλος εἶναι. (1.8)
>
> At once <u>anyone who considered</u> the course of events <u>would have reckoned</u> that beauty is something naturally regal.

[4] For Xenophon's use and adaptation of Herodotus see Gray 1989, Gray 2011: 144–157, Baragwanath 2012.

[5] Hobden 2005: 94. Hobden points to wealth, education, beauty and desire as issues of contemporary concern subjected to critique in the *Symposium*.

[6] Herodotus occasionally stages responses to wonders, and this conveys all the more vividly their remarkable and thought-provoking nature: e.g. in describing Darius' astonishment (θωμάσας, 3.119.5) at Intaphrenes' wife's surprising choice to save her brother rather than her husband, which provokes the king's further questioning and decision to spare the life of another family member (3.119).

Indefinite τις here encompasses—and invokes—Xenophon's readers, positioning them as judges of the significance of the responses of internal viewers to what they see.[7]

The staging of in-text responses is an effective means of constructing persuasive perspectives, which may counter other perspectives given voice in the text. The strategy contributes to a dialogism that goes beyond that represented by the range of competing voices of participants, to embrace other perspectives implied by the text as well. This is a salient characteristic of Xenophon's *Symposium* that recent scholarship has revealed.[8] Elsewhere Herodotus was an important influence on the eclectic Xenophon, with his cross-genre repertoire. The historian's distinctive and deliberate use of *thauma* terminology may well have informed this aspect of Xenophon's presentation, and can sensitize us to an extra layer of significance (and seriousness) of the *thaumata* of the *Symposium*. In turning to Xenophon we shall bear in mind Munson's observation in relation to the *Histories* that a wonder is 'often … a small item that the discourse retrieves from the side or magnifies on the way because of its potential to illuminate larger issues' (251).

In Xenophon the notion of *thauma* typically occurs in the context of *sights* that provide food for thought and engender deeper reflection,[9] such as the sight of Autolycus just mentioned. The connection between seeing sights and philosophical reflection is a traditional one, and latent in the very range of meanings of σκοπέω—'see', but also 'reflect, consider'. Herodotus' Solon toured the world to see the sights and acquire wisdom (*Histories* 1.30). The historical inquiries set forth in the *Histories* are heavily reliant on Herodotus' autopsy. There can equally be a gap, of course, between sights and truth. Herodotus has Solon urge Croesus to substitute

7 See Harman (this volume, p. 450) on the effects of the self-conscious invocation of the reader in Xenophon's *Agesilaus*.

8 Hindley 1999 and 2004 discuss the contrasting views the *Symposium* sets forth on physical love, with Xenophon's authorial endorsement of *sophrōn erōs* (a middle road that allows *philia* to include physical love) working against Socrates' advocating of celibacy, cf. Hobden 2004: 133–134 (contrary to what Socrates states and implies, 'the performances of the symposiasts indicate that beauty and desire *can* bring enjoyment and benefit to their audience', 133), Gilhuly 2009: 98–139: Xenophon's apologetic strategy in this text entails positioning Socrates as just one among other Athenians (rather than dominant in the narrative). Hobden 2005 exposes more broadly the way in which the different perspectives that surface in the *Symposium*, deriving from speeches and performances (and even the narrator's remarks, which may equally be brought into question, cf. 130), generate a deliberative interpretative environment for the reader.

9 For Xenophon on sights see Harman (this volume, pp. 437–438), and cf. n. 13 below.

his *theōria* of his riches with *theōria* in a deeper sense.[10] Thucydides was keenly interested in the way perceptions may be mistaken.[11] The philosophers and sophists exposed the incapacity of human sensory perceptions to grasp reality. Xenophon's Socrates suggests that perceptions can fail to capture philosophical truth: they can fail to register for example the true beauty that resides in his bulging eyes and squashed-down nose (that are all the better for seeing with) (*Symposium* 5). But Xenophon's presentation of *thaumata* insists on the more 'common sense' link between watching and wisdom. At the same time, the idea in the background here—that what one sees can profoundly influence one's views and assumptions—is closely in keeping with what we find in Herodotus and Thucydides, who stage the role of perceptions in influencing behaviour.[12]

The cognitive stimulation of wondrous sights is just one facet of the powers (and dangers) of the visual. Physical appearance can for example reverse conventional power dynamics, as in the case of the courtesan Theodote *vis-à-vis* her suitors; and it can cement support for the ideal ruler: Cyrus the Elder's mascara, makeup, Median dress and high heels will bewitch his followers and thus enhance his authority (*Cyropaedia* 8.1.40–41, 8.3.13). The description of the extraordinary effect on viewers of Autolycus' beauty dominates the opening pages of the *Symposium*, and there is much discussion subsequently of the effects of the sight of the beautiful Clinias, with whom another guest, Critobulus, is infatuated (4.21–22). Socrates' joke that Critobulus once used to gaze at Clinias with a stony stare, like someone gazing at a Gorgon, but that now at least he is willing to permit an occasional blink (4.24), articulates the extraordinary power of such a sight.[13]

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10 Hdt. 1.30–32 with Long 1987: 66–67.

11 See Kallet 2001: 21–84, esp. 21–23, on the relationship of perceptions and knowledge in Thucydides.

12 Herodotus: Dewald 1993, Baragwanath 2008: 160–239, esp. 168–170; Thucydides: Rood 1998, Kallet 2001: 21–84.

13 Goldhill 1998 discusses Xenophon's analysis, in the civic context, of the uses and manipulations of (esp. erotic) viewing in *Mem.* 3.11. My paper is concerned particularly with the intellectual effects of viewing, but the power dynamics of spectatorship exposed in Socrates' conversation with Theodote are suggestive for my argument below about the viewing of the slaves in *Symp.* 9. Baragwanath 2002: 131–132 considers more generally the dangers of spectatorship in Xenophon. Garelli-François 2002 and Gilhuly 2009: 98–139 discuss the *Symposium* as spectacle. Gray 2011: 187–193 brings out the emphasis on visualization in Xenophon's depictions of ideal leadership, with the leader's achievement presented as a visual spectacle from which the reader can learn. Harman (this volume, pp. 427–453) discusses the problematics of spectatorship in the *Agesilaus*. On the Clinias episode see also Pontier (this volume, pp. 611, 620.

The *Symposium*'s most obvious example of *thaumata* providing food for thought is the juggling and sword-leaping feats of the slave-girl. Socrates' commentary transforms her *thaumata* or 'acrobatic performances' into *thaumata*, 'wonders', that ought to stimulate the symposiasts to deeper cognitive reflection. In this work, as elsewhere, Xenophon does not employ slave terminology where more specific, descriptive terminology is available,[14] but there can be little doubt that the Syracusan's entertainers are readable to an audience as slaves.[15] Physical (as well as moral) slavery also crops up several times in conversation, as symposiasts draw upon the contrast between slave and citizen/free man.[16] Even as the citizen/slave binary is not the *focus* of the dialogue (which interrogates a range of other binaries as well),[17] it would seem to represent a further area of contemporary concern that is subjected to critique in this work, with Xenophon exploiting the discourse of wonders in ways designed to unsettle readers' assumptions. The picture that emerges appears indeed to be in keeping with the more direct theorizing on slaves and slavishness presented in *Oeconomicus*. Beyond giving us an insight into the processes of his texts, Xenophon's portrayal of slavery will allow us a glimpse of how his theory of leadership extends right down the social ladder. The picture that emerges, when we bear in mind his wider oeuvre, is a consequence of his various literary and philosophical concerns in any particular context, but testimony also to tensions in his reflections on this controversial topic.

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14 In discussing actual slaves Xenophon frequently uses such terms as διάκονος, οἰκέτης, ἐπίτροπος (cf. Pomeroy 1994: 316–317 for the slave-status implied by these three terms in *Oeconomicus*), θεράπων, etc., rather than δοῦλος (which only occasionally denotes an actual slave [cf. *Symp*. 2.4, *Oec*. 5.16], rather than a slave in a moral or metaphorical sense).

15 See Reinsberg 1993: 91–104 on the usual *hetaira* function of female musicians and dancers at symposia, cf. Pellizer 1990: 181–182. Wilson 1999: 75, 82–85, discussing the female *aulos* players who performed at symposia, observes that 'the female "professional", the *aulētris*, was surely of servile status' (75); he knows of no firm case of a female *aulos* player who (like male *aulos* players who performed at festivals) is a free foreigner. See also n. 32 below. Lewis 2002: 95–97 contests the assumption that female *aulos* players were inevitably prostitutes and emphasizes that they could at times be respected professionals (using Xenophon's *Symposium* as part of her evidence); but she accepts the usual designation of the Syracusan of Xenophon's *Symposium* as a 'slave-master'.

16 Socrates remarks that the trouble with wearing perfume is that it does not distinguish between slave and free: καὶ δοῦλος καὶ ἐλεύθερος εὐθὺς ἅπας ὅμοιον ὄζει (2.4). Critobulous employs the notion of slavery as the most effective way of making the point that doing *anything* for Clinias would be pleasurable: ἥδιον δ'ἂν δουλεύοιμι ἢ ἐλεύθερος εἴην, εἴ μου Κλεινίας ἄρχειν ἐθέλοι; (4.14). Callias' 'wealth'—his poverty—allows him to escape being treated by the city as a slave (4.45). Compare Socrates' use of 'unfree' in a moral sense at 8.23.

17 For example, that of learned *vs*. innate virtue; of rich *vs*. poor; etc.

We begin with discussion of the *Symposium*, and then broaden the picture by comparing (more briefly) Xenophon's portrayal of slavery in the *Oeconomicus*, where the discourse of wonders is again present, but in a different way. The examples from the *Oeconomicus* supply a more direct commentary, strengthening the case for our reading of slavery in the *Symposium*, and allowing us to set Xenophon's treatment of slavery against the backdrop of his broader conception of human relations. Finally some consideration of Classical Athenian attitudes to slavery supplies a foil against which we may better appreciate the remarkable character of Xenophon's treatment.

Symposiac Spectacles

After dinner, and a libation and hymn, the evening's entertainment at Callias' house begins with the arrival of the Syracusan slave-master and his entertainers, whose musical, acrobatic, and dance performances he exhibits as a money-making spectacle (2.2). The dancing slave-girl skilled at performing τὰ θαύματα (2.1)—'acrobatic tricks' in this context, but equally suggestive, as it turns out, of metaphorical 'wonders', which surface as a motif of the *Symposium*[18]—soon embarks upon what is to be a sensational show. The guests watch as she juggles twelve hoops at once: 'as she danced she kept throwing them up whirling, calculating how high they had to be thrown so as to catch them in rhythm' (ἅμα τε ὠρχεῖτο καὶ ἀνερρίπτει δονουμένους συντεκμαιρομένη ὅσον ἔδει ῥιπτεῖν ὕψος ὡς ἐν ῥυθμῷ δέχεσθαι αὐτούς: 2.8). With careful detail Xenophon illuminates her extraordinary skill: the juggling of so many hoops reveals remarkable concentration, with the ἅμα construction pointing to her expertise in executing the two activities at once, imperfect verb forms highlighting the sustained duration of the performance, and the calculation of her throw and catch attesting to fine judgment. The acro-

[18] While (pl.) θαύματα in such a context denotes a theatrical act or feat (cf. LSJ 'mountebank-gambols') (elsewhere θαύματα more often denotes 'wonders'), the singular θαῦμα at *Symp.* 7.3 (LSJ I.2) bridges the two meanings: it denotes the 'feat' of a stuntwoman's writing/reading on a whirling potters' wheel, but must also allow the usual sense of the singular noun, i.e. 'wonder'. Θαυματουργήσειν ('to work wonders'; the variant MS reading θαυμασιουργήσειν would be a *hapax* in Greek literature) of the dancing-girl's feats on the potter's wheel (7.2) also insists on semantic overlap. At 7.1 and 7.4 Socrates glosses as θαυμάσια ('wonders') such acrobatic tricks as the girl's, observing that one can wonder (θαυμάζειν: 7.4) at many phenomena at hand, e.g. the question of why a lamp supplies light because of its 'bright' flame, while a mirror, though 'bright', supplies only reflections. Other occurrences in *Symposium* of the θαυμ- root: θαυμαστόν/θαυμαστά: 4.3, 4.4, 8.22, 8.33, θαυμάζω: 4.44, 8.24, 8.41.

batic feat is next translated to the realm of the metaphorically wondrous, with Socrates' commentary that provokes fellow symposiasts to ponder the deeper significance of the spectacle:

> Ἐν πολλοῖς μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ ἄλλοις δῆλον καὶ ἐν οἷς δ' ἡ παῖς ποιεῖ ὅτι ἡ γυναικεία φύσις οὐδὲν χείρων τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς οὖσα τυγχάνει, γνώμης δὲ καὶ ἰσχύος δεῖται. (2.9)
>
> In many things, gentleman, both in what the girl is accomplishing and in many others, it is clear that the nature of women is no worse than that of men—except in judgment and physical strength.

Socrates concludes that each man should therefore confidently teach (θαρρῶν διδασκέτω) his wife whatever he would have her know (2.9).

In its negative presentation (οὐδὲν χείρων, 'no worse') Socrates' remark is framed as countering common assumptions. His emphatic initial phrasing of his generalisation (Ἐν πολλοῖς μέν ... καὶ ἄλλοις ... καὶ ἐν ...) stands in surprising contrast to its ultimate qualifications, regarding *gnomē* and *ischus*—which together (cf. Richards 1896) cover almost all areas in which a woman could be inferior! Many a modern scholar has therefore charged textual corruption.[19] However, a key motif of the *Symposium* is the *combination* of playfulness with seriousness,[20] and it may be that Socrates is using a touch of humour to underline his serious point.[21] His joke would lay emphasis on the fact that the girl's ability confounds the assumptions of the men, and therefore press them to think harder about the fact that she *does* possess these qualities.[22] (Socrates' teasing persists in his claim that he married Xanthippe for practice in dealing with people, just as horse-trainers like to buy difficult horses—a witty analogy in view of her 'horsy' name.)[23] The charge

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19 See Huss 1999a ad loc.

20 Huss 1999a *passim* and 1999b, Gray 2011: 337–345 (and more generally 330–371), cf. Pangle 2010 (with 140 n. 2: 'It has only recently begun to dawn on conventional scholarship that Xenophon's writing must be interpreted as permeated with a deliciously subtle comic wit').

21 An alternative possible interpretation, that the nature of woman lacks *gnomē* and *iskhus* but the slave-girl's performance proves that such things can at least be taught to women, would seem to strain '*phusis*' too much.

22 Martin 2007: 62–73 supplies an overview of modern scholarship on incongruity theories of humour, with discussion at 101–103 of the effects of humour on cognition (cf. 101: 'both humor and creativity involve a switch of perspective, a new way of looking at things').

23 The notion that women, like horses, thus exist in Socrates' view merely to be *used* by men (Gilhuly 2009: 116) overlooks the fact that Xenophon conceives *all* relationships in terms of their capacity to be useful to/ used by others—a positive attribute. His conception extends well beyond that of modern philosophical utilitarianism. See Gray 2011: 291–329, esp. 298–300 (on χρῆσθαι).

of woman's deficiency in judgment has in fact been challenged by the qualities the slave-girl has displayed in her dextrous juggling, which involved judging (συντεκμαιρομένη) height and timing; while even the charge of deficiency in strength is soon confounded by the sheer physicality of her next performance.

This time, a ring is brought in, set all around with upright swords (2.11), and

> εἰς οὖν ταῦτα ἡ ὀρχηστρὶς ἐκυβίστα τε καὶ ἐξεκυβίστα ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. ὥστε οἱ μὲν θεώμενοι ἐφοβοῦντο μή τι πάθῃ, ἡ δὲ θαρρούντως τε καὶ ἀσφαλῶς ταῦτα διεπράττετο. (2.11)
>
> the dancing-girl began tumbling in over these and tumbling out over them again. The result was that those watching were scared she might get hurt, but she continued her performance confidently and safely.

Xenophon's description of the spectators' response to the spectacle again highlights its surprising character, presenting it as a marvel that supplies food for thought. The syntactical balance (οἱ μὲν θ-... ἡ δὲ θ-..., with accompanying imperfects) brings into focus an ironic contrast between the men fearing as they merely watch, and the woman confident as she actually performs; the disparity between the men's negative expectations and the woman's real ability is thus highlighted. The remarkable vigour of her feat and its significant duration (felt in the imperfect verb forms and repeated root, ἐκυβίστα ... ἐξεκυβίστα) would seem to preclude any lack of strength. Socrates is prompted by what he is witnessing to draw a radical conclusion:

> οὔτοι τούς γε θεωμένους τάδε ἀντιλέξειν ἔτι οἴομαι, ὡς οὐχὶ καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία διδακτόν, ὁπότε αὕτη καίπερ γυνὴ οὖσα οὕτω τολμηρῶς εἰς τὰ ξίφη ἵεται. (2.12)
>
> Surely at least the people watching this will never again deny that even courage is teachable, when she despite being a woman keeps hurling herself so bravely in among the swords.

The idea that women can learn virtue is thus raised in opposition to those who make allegations to the contrary (ἀντιλέξειν). Socrates alleges emphatically[24] that *andreia* itself (manliness, courage) is teachable and able to be learned by females, even by this female slave—a figure who was the polar opposite, on two counts, of the Athenian citizen male.[25]

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24 E.g., Οὔτοι ..., 'not indeed'; ἀντιλέξειν ἔτι οἴομαι, 'never again declare in opposition'; οὐχὶ καὶ; ὁπότε; οὕτω τολμηρῶς; ἵεται, 'hurls herself'.

25 Compare e.g. Just 1989: 187: in Athenian ideology slaves and women 'both lacked those characteristics of self-control, restraint, indeed of moral integrity, which were the mark of a free man'. On the actual and conceptual symbiosis between patriarchy and slavery in

Catching on to the military metaphor suggested by the swords, Antisthenes, another dinner guest, proposes that the Syracusan exhibit his dancing-girl to the men of Athens so as to make them, too, 'dare (τολμᾶν) to go among spears' (2.13). In a turn of phrase that closely follows Socrates',[26] he thus equates the τόλμα shown by the girl to that required by soldiers in hoplite warfare.[27] The comedian Philip then chimes in with his wish that a contemporary politician, who avoids campaigning with the army because of his inability to face spears, would likewise learn 'to turn somersaults among the knives', thus rearticulating the same equation in more direct and comical terms. With a measure of both seriousness and humour, Xenophon thus stages the extraordinary notion that in this chief domain of male virtue the slave-girl outclasses the men of Athens, who fall short of courage and could do with her example. Contrary to expectation, then—for Socrates seemed to change the subject at 2.7—the slave-girl's feats sustain and contribute a further perspective to the earlier debate about the teachability of virtue.

Now, the concept of the 'manly woman' is paradoxical, but paradox is of the essence of *thaumata*, and need not undermine the serious point—just as Herodotus' Artemisia (quintessential 'manly woman' among 'womanly men')[28] is a paradoxical figure who nonetheless embodies serious truths and provokes readers to deeper reflection.[29] In Xenophon, the account of Mania of Dardanus (*Hellenica* 3.1.10–16) offers the serious presentation of a woman who proves superior to all male counterparts, in this case in the male domain of satrapal rule. For a manly woman who makes her appearance in a jovial symposium atmosphere, we may think of the female dancer of the *Anabasis*, whose expert performance of the pyrrhic dance—light shield in hand—amazes the Paphlagonian spectators and prompts them to ask whether the Greeks' women also fought by their side (*Anabasis* 6.1.12–13). (The Greeks reply that these were precisely the people who put the King to flight from his camp.)

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the Greco-Roman world more generally see the papers collected in Joshel and Murnaghan 1998, and the introduction of that volume (4–9) for the female slave. For the considerable differences between a free Athenian woman and a slave of either sex, see Schaps 1998.

[26] τολμηρῶς εἰς τὰ ξίφη ἵεται~τολμᾶν ὁμόσε ταῖς λόγχαις ἰέναι.

[27] There appears to be a pointed reference here to the historical situation of the *Symposium*'s dramatic setting: the Athenian peace party had won ground in this final phase of the Archidamian war: Huss 1999a ad loc. with references.

[28] Compare Xerxes' reputed comment during the battle of Salamis: οἱ μὲν ἄνδρες γεγόνασί μοι γυναῖκες, αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες ἄνδρες (Hdt. 8.88).

[29] See Munson 1988.

Xenophon's strategy of staging the unexpected and exposing the confounding of spectators' assumptions is conspicuous again in the *Symposium*'s final pages, when the Syracusan answers Socrates' appeal for a different sort of entertainment. Socrates has complained about the spectacles, pronouncing that 'it is of course no rare thing to come across wonders' (7.4); and he has advocated a less dangerous and more pleasurable display: *aulos* accompaniment, say, to a dance like those which Charites, Horai and Nymphai are depicted dancing (7.5). Since Socrates' observations up to now have brought out how the symposiac spectacles thus far provided spur the discovery of meaning, this change of tack in now explicitly denigrating wonders (7.2–5) is startling and provocative—a wonder in itself. But beyond being a suitably confrontational way of urging the offensive Syracusan to vary the entertainment (Socrates prefaces his remarks with a reference to the Syracusan's derogatory comments at 6.6 ff.), the assertion may well be designed to prod symposiasts and readers to reflect more consciously on how very fruitful these *thaumata* have been. After all, Socrates frames his remark in terms of the failure of such wonders to provide adequate *pleasure* (7.3):[30] one might expect the philosopher to deem intellectual stimulations a *more* valuable commodity.

The Syracusan therefore directs his young slaves to enact the bridal scene of Ariadne and Dionysus. The mime performance that ensues is on a first level wondrous not for sensational paradox, but for its unexpectedly moving and natural display, and the atmosphere it engenders (in parallel to that of the Autolycus scene: cf. below) of religious awe.[31] But connected with this, and wondrous in a stronger sense, is the capacity it reveals on the part of these slaves, probably imagined as prostitutes,[32] to detach themselves from that reality, and from the sordid carnality of their Syracusan master.

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30 Gilhuly 2009: 98 remarks that Socrates 'criticizes the marvelous yet meaningless feats of the performers', but the criticism was about supplying less *pleasure* rather than less meaning. I am suggesting on the contrary that Xenophon appropriates the Herodotean notion that wonders are *conducive* to meaning. Hobden 2004: 126 observes that while Socrates earlier praised the performances and made use of them to spur reflective conversation, he takes a different line here in order to develop his point about the beneficial qualities of wine.

31 Compare Hindley 2004: 131: 'one ... wonders whether we should not pay more attention than is customary to the religious element in the dialogue's closing mime, where Dionysus appears as a key player'. Garelli-François 2002: 180–182 addresses its evocation of the ritual marriage at the Anthesteria festival of Dionysus—god of wine and weddings—and the wife of the *archon basileus*.

32 Davidson 1998: 96, Wohl 2004: 352, Gilhuly 2009: esp. 110–119, and n. 15 above. Gilula 2002 offers a detailed discussion the Syracusan and his artists from a historical perspective.

The slave-girl playing Ariadne enters and sits down, and the Bacchic music announces the arrival of Dionysus (9.3). Despite her obvious delight (and in implied contrast to viewer expectations), the girl 'neither goes to meet him nor even stands up'—comportment that demonstrates her σωφροσύνη. The god dances up to her in very friendly fashion, sits upon her lap and embraces and kisses her, and she—though again she looks like a modest girl (ἡ δ' αἰδουμένῃ μὲν ἐῴκει)[33]—responds in kind (9.4). The likeness of the language that describes their respective actions mirrors their shared feelings.[34] Dionysus then stands up and raises Ariadne up with him (ὡς δὲ ὁ Διόνυσος ἀνιστάμενος συνανέστησε μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ τὴν Ἀριάδνην, 9.5: the repeated verb together with συν- and μετά again point to the harmony of their conduct); and Xenophon observes that one could then see poses of the two exchanging endearments (φιλούντων τε καὶ ἀσπαζομένων ἀλλήλους σχήματα παρῆν θεάσασθαι: 9.5).

Xenophon conveys the extraordinary realism of the performance by including the audience's response in the scope of his account. At hearing Dionysus' music Ariadne's reaction was such that 'everyone would have perceived (πᾶς ἂν ἔγνω)' that she was delighted as she heard it (9.3). But at this point there occurs a shift from the idea of a convincing performance, to the sense that the *mimesis* is so very realistic that it must actually be reflecting *reality*:[35] that they must be off-stage paramours. Contrary to the viewers' expectations (as ὄντως and the presentation by negation implies), they see that the slave couple are truly (ὄντως) beautiful, and not jesting (οὐ σκώπτοντας) but truly (ἀληθινῶς) kissing with their lips. The spectators are all (πάντες) incited to a physical response, stirred into a state of excitement (ἀνεπτερωμένοι). They kept hearing (ἤκουον) Dionysus asking Ariadne if she

[33] As Schaps 1998: 173 observes, Greek men deemed modesty the hallmark of a free woman, promiscuity the sign of a slave. Compare Dem. 19.198–198 (pairing of freedom and modesty: ἐλευθέραν … καὶ σώφρονα), and Plut. *Art.* 26.5: Cyrus declared Aspasia alone of his concubines 'free and uncorrupted' (ἐλευθέραν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον), since she refused his advances. Differently, Wohl 2004: 358–359, who here discerns a salient contrast between seeming and reality, the girl's likeness of modesty 'merely an imitation' that might even reflect back negatively on the earlier scene, suggesting that 'for Autolykos, too, αἰδώς is an act that hides baser feelings' (359).

[34] She ἐκαθέζετο ἐπὶ τοῦ θρόνου, while he ἐκαθέζετο ἐπὶ τῶν γονάτων; his friendly (φιλικώτατα) approach and embrace (περιλαβὼν) finds a parallel when she 'embraced him in friendly fashion in turn' (φιλικῶς ἀντιπεριελάμβανεν), the ἀντι- prefix underlining the fact that her action mirrors his. For Garelli-François 2002 the emphasis on mutual *philia* imbues what she views as an erotic scene with moral beauty.

[35] Wohl 2004: 357–358 observes this shift from performance to reality.

loved him, and heard her vowing that she did (with syntax here again underlining the mutuality of their actions)[36] so earnestly that

> μὴ μόνον τὸν Διόνυσον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς παρόντας ἅπαντας συνομόσαι ἂν ἦ μὴν τὸν παῖδα καὶ τὴν παῖδα ὑπ' ἀλλήλων φιλεῖσθαι. καὶ γὰρ ἐῴκεσαν γὰρ οὐ δεδιδαγμένοις τὰ σχήματα ἀλλ' ἐφειμένοις πράττειν ἃ πάλαι ἐπεθύμουν. (9.6)
>
> not only Dionysus, but everyone there, would have sworn an oath together that the girl and the boy surely felt a mutual affection (lit. 'were loved by one another'). For they appeared not like people who had been taught the moves, but like people at last allowed to do what they had been desiring for a long time.

Xenophon thus focalizes the description through the gaze of the men (whose close involvement in the scene will soon be translated into even more dramatic action); and he underscores their confounded expectations. In the course of these lines the performance names are discarded as the viewers become convinced that the love between the young slaves (now identified instead in their real-life capacity as τὸν παῖδα and τὴν παῖδα) is genuine. The unanimity of the viewers' response is emphasized ('not only … but quite all', μὴ μόνον … ἀλλὰ καὶ … ἅπαντας; 'sworn together', συνομόσαι); even the god Dionysus seems to share in the audience's conviction. The spectators' conviction of the mutuality of the slaves' *philia*, which has been implicit throughout the description of the scene, is stated explicitly and climactically (ὑπ' ἀλλήλων φιλεῖσθαι).

Finally the couple depart 'as if to bed' (ὡς εἰς εὐνήν); and the symposiasts become so aroused with desire by the authenticity of the scene they are witnessing that 'those who were unmarried vowed to marry, whereas those who were married jumped on their horses and rode away'—and they ride *not* out to a brothel, but 'home to enjoy their wives' (9.7): an unexpected destination that is a kind of wonder in itself.[37] These factors tell against the characterization of the scene as 'a quasi-pornographic staging'.[38] Socrates and the bachelors (presumably) who remain for their part head outside to join Lycon and Autolycus in their walk—prompted by spectacle to the

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[36] τοῦ Διονύσου μὲν ἐπερωτῶντος αὐτὴν εἰ φιλεῖ αὐτόν, τῆς δὲ οὕτως ἐπομνυούσης. Cf. Gilhuly 2009: 132 for the emphasis on mutuality.

[37] Thomas Figuiera alerted me to the significance to my argument of this point. Wohl 2004: 356 remarks that they neither form a drunken and potentially destructive κῶμος nor turn to prostitutes, but rather return to the 'proper and legitimate pleasures' of the marriage bed.

[38] Wohl 2004: 346 (quotation), 354–360.

even higher response of further conversation and philosophizing.[39] The men thus abandon the party (presumably relinquishing the raunchier final stage of symposiac indulgence—which also belies a pornographic view of their response);[40] and the symposium draws to its close.

So: the symposiasts expected a lighthearted 'show'—the Syracusan earlier described his slaves as 'marionettes' (τὰ νευρόσπαστα: 4.55), and introduced the performance with the announcement that Dionysus and Ariadne 'will make play (παιξοῦνται) with one another' (9.2)—but they have instead been treated to a remarkably realistic and serious spectacle. The slaves' act was initially described as a show contrived for an audience (σχήματα παρῆν θεάσασθαι: 9.5), but subsequently the pair seem *not* to have been taught their poses (ἐῴκεσαν γὰρ οὐ δεδιδαγμένοις τὰ σχήματα) but rather to be experiencing genuine desire; the viewers' wonder at the skill of the teacher (ἠγάσθησαν τὸν ὀρχηστοδιδάσκαλον: 9.3) has been replaced by their evident wonder at the untaught naturalness of this scene. The successive 'vowing' of slave girl and symposiasts (ἐπομνυούσης~συνομόσαι: 9.6, and soon again when the unmarried vow that they will marry, ἐπώμνυσαν: 9.7) lends further solemnity. The slaves' love is ennobled by the absence of reference to *eros*, and by the marital context of the narrative,[41] which invites the equation of the slaves' love to that of the mythical husband and wife. As well as an endorsement of married love[42] that balances the earlier depictions of homosexual love, the scene offers a further, serious perspective on the possibility of a 'way of moderation' in love (in Hindley's expression, 2004: 128): as a spectacle of a mutual and *sophrōn erōs* that combines love of body and of spirit, it recalls the portrait of the relationship of Autolycus and Callias (*Symposium* 1),[43] presenting

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39 Thus Xenophon brings out the effectiveness of the slaves' show in eliciting audience response on various levels, *vis-à-vis* both more and less philosophically inclined symposiasts.

40 I owe this point to Sarah Ferrario.

41 The scene is Naxos, where the mythical couple met and married, and accordingly the slave-girl is bedecked as a bride, and the couple depart for the bridal bed: cf. Bowen 1998: 125 *ad* 9.2.

42 Thesleff 1978: 168 observes that the mime defends married love, cf. Garelli-François 2002, 180: 'Xénophon rappellerait … la beauté du lien de φιλότης unissant mari et femme, négligé par le *Banquet* de Platon', e.g. through reference to the Anthesteria (see n. 31 above).

43 Garelli-François 2002 observes that the notion (and term) σχήματα points to a connection between the two scenes, with those of the closing scene constituting 'un spectacle equivalent en beauté à celui de Callias amoureux d'Autolycos' (179–180). Compare Hindley 2004: 131: 'Is this apparently detached heterosexual episode intended to balance the opening (homosexual) scene with Autolycus? Such an interpretation would provide a frame for the whole dialogue, romantically enfolding both types of sexual experience in quasi-religious feeling'. Hindley 1999 and 2004 discuss the 'middle road' of (homosexual) *sophrōn erōs* (cf. n. 8 above), including particularly in the context of the relationship of Autolycus and Callias.

a further challenge to Socrates' assertion (8) that physical love is incompatible with love of *psuchē*. The sensitive portrayal of the slave lovers indeed suggests that they possess several qualities Socrates had listed (8.16–18) as characteristic of 'love of soul'. The significance, again, of the emphasis on mutual *philia* may be grasped against the backdrop of Xenophon's theory of human relations, in which the ability to experience reciprocal *philia* is key (a point we return to below: pp. 646–647).

The trajectory of the scene from παιδιά to σπουδή mirrors the important interplay of these themes in the dialogue as a whole (Huss 1999a *passim* and 1999b): what the slave-master had described as *paidia* (9.2: παιξοῦνται) has turned out to be a scene of *spoudē*, its atmosphere one of divine reverence that in elegant ring composition recalls the opening portrayal of the love of Autolycus and Callias.[44] There, Xenophon dwelt on the beauty of Autolycus, and its effect on Callias and the others present. Autolycus' beauty 'drew to him the eyes of all; and then every one of those watching was somehow struck in the soul by it' (1.8), some of them growing silent, others taking up poses (σχήματα); while Callias, under the influence of *sophrōn erōs*, was quite miraculously affected in look, voice and gesture.

The very capacity to draw gazes, which bestows a certain power over those who watch,[45] can on Xenophon's model reflect on a person's inner qualities. Beauty is something naturally regal (βασιλικόν), but it is especially so when combined with αἰδώς and σωφροσύνη, as in Autolycus' case (1.9)—and also (as the structural connection invites us to reflect) in the case of the slave girl. In a different context, physical appearance cements support of the ideal ruler, but excellent rulership in turn also *contributes* to his 'god-like' appearance in the eyes of his subjects, and to their desire to gaze upon him (cf. p. 634 above and p. 649 below). Being *inspired* by love in turn has a substantial effect: in the context of Callias' love for Autolycus Xenophon observed that those inspired by *sophrōn erōs* 'assume a bearing that is more free/more like that of free men' (εἰς τὸ ἐλευθεριώτερον ἄγουσιν: 1.10). Over the course of this scene the slave couple have displayed a capacity truly to experience the same human emotions and genuinely mutual love as did Callias and Autolycus—and presumably, then, they have come to appear 'more free'. Through this spectacle—this wonder of freedom—they have come to be viewed by the men not simply as *bodies* but as possessors of *souls*. They have inspired such a sense of identity and recognition in those watching as to precipitate their emotional response and (in some cases)

44 See Hindley 2004: 129–133 on the atmosphere of divine reverence of *Symp*. 1.

45 Compare Theodote's power over her suitors (*Mem*. 3.11), with n. 13 above.

precipitate departure. The men's enthralment in and appreciation of the spectacle—reverential rather than erotic—may even be said to invert the power dynamic between citizen viewers and slave performers.[46]

The symposiasts' huge delight at the scene, shown in their applause, exhilaration, and ultimate departure, leaves the impression that the slaves have supplied far greater pleasure than did any of their own number. This striking circumstance recalls Socrates' observation (3.1) of the incongruity between the men's assumption that they are far better than the slaves (ὅτι πολὺ βελτίονες οἰόμεθα εἶναι) even though the slaves have proved capable of giving them pleasure, and his consequent suggestion that each symposiast try to provide some service or delight. The surprising close of the symposium might well prompt reflection on this final confounding of assumptions. Beyond supplying pleasurable entertainment (the basic material utility to be expected of such paid performers), the slaves have proved useful in a nobler sense: for they have enabled the symposiasts to experience heightened emotions, and (with Socrates' guidance) to learn something about the nature of virtue. Nor is the slave performers' usefulness to Socrates easily dismissed as merely a matter of his 'using' them as tools for thinking with, to supply a frame on which to model purely abstract ideas about moral freedom and slavery. Xenophon's Socratic writings (in stark contrast to Plato's) emphasize practical application, and the strategy of staging wonders and audience response seems *designed* to bridge theory and practice: to aid readers, in parallel to the in-text audience, to apply philosophy to life.[47]

Menial Marvels

It is not only in the *Symposium* that Xenophon has occasion to present some rather startling ideas about slavery. Over the course of his treatment in the *Oeconomicus* of a variety of slave-master and slave-slave relationships,[48] two key notions again surface: that slaves are teachable—able to learn specific skills, as well as all the important abstract virtues—and that they are capable of demonstrating *philia*; and further (and consequently), a point to which we return later, that they may be morally free. What these examples allow us to see more clearly is how Xenophon's views on slavery map

[46] See previous note.

[47] Cf. e.g. Socrates' comment (discussed above, p. 637) that the spectacle should prompt viewers to set about teaching their own wives. Moreover the capacity to be useful (ὠφέλιμος) to others is highly prized in Xenophontic thinking; cf. n. 23 above.

[48] On these see Pomeroy 1989 and 1994: 65–67 with notes.

on to his wider philosophy of ideal human relations—with remarkable ramifications, as I hope to show next.

In the *Oeconomicus* the discourse of wonders is muted, but manifested from time to time in Socrates' surprise and disbelief as he listens to the ideal gentleman Ischomachus talk about his household. The wonderment that was experienced by the symposiasts in the *Symposium* is thus concentrated on the single figure of the philosopher, whose persuasion supplies a model for readers.[49]

Startling, to begin with, are some remarks that Ischomachus reports his wife as having made. A *tabula rasa*, she arrived in his household knowing absolutely nothing aside from her mother's instruction that a woman's duty is to practice self-control (σωφρονεῖν: 7.14). In the course of detailing her responsibilities, Ischomachus assumes that she will find one task in particular rather thankless (ἀχαριστότερον): the obligation to care for (θεραπεύηται) any slaves who become ill. Instead she exclaims, 'Oh no, by Zeus, it will be *most* gratifying (ἐπιχαριτώτατον) if those well cared for will prove thankful (χάριν εἴσεσθαι) and more loyal (εὐνούστεροι) than before' (Νὴ Δί' … ἐπιχαριτώτατον μὲν οὖν, ἂν μέλλωσί γε οἱ καλῶς θεραπευθέντες καὶ ἢ πρόσθεν ἔσεσθαι: 7.37—the vigour of her disagreement underlined in her countering his alpha privative comparative with its superlative antonym);[50] and she goes on to describe the mutually beneficial relationship she envisages developing between herself and her slaves. Her sense of the reciprocal relationship that exists between the two parties is underscored by the syntactic balance produced by the *charis* words, which initially describe the mistress's view on the situation, then are picked up in the χάριν at the end, which is felt by the slaves. Latent in the range of meanings of the repeated verb θεραπεύω (to take care of; to be an attendant, to serve)[51] is the remarkable notion that in caring for the sick slaves she (in truly mutual fashion) becomes their servant. Delighted with his wife's response, Ischomachus compares how a

[49] From another perspective, the elaborate layered framing of the conversation with Ischomachus imbues it with an imagined quality, and thus perhaps translates the dialogue wholesale into the realm of the wondrous, from the point of view of readers: Xenophon was not present, as he claims to have been at the *Symposium* (1.1), but heard about it at several removes: he says (*Oec.* 1.1) that he once heard Socrates reporting to Critobulus a conversation he had had with the Athenian gentleman Ischomachus, in which Ischomachus recounted how he instructed his young wife in the duties she would be expected to perform as mistress of the household.

[50] Thus here as elsewhere Xenophon 'fait … glisser la signification du terme [*charis*] en passant du champ sémantique de l'agrément à celui de la gratitude' (Azoulay 2004: 110) ('lets the term's sense shift as he passes from the semantic field of pleasure to that of gratitude').

[51] See Gauthier 1976: 177–178 *ad* 4.42, Azoulay 2004: 108–109.

queen bee's thoughtful actions make the bees so loyal that when she abandons the hive, every one of them follows (7.38). The analogy strengthens the impression of close-knit, productive, and symbiotic relations between mistress and slaves.[52]

In speaking of the slaves' gratitude (χάρις) and good will (εὔνοια) in return for her attentions, Ischomachus' wife—*tabula rasa* though she is[53]—in fact touches upon principles central to Xenophon's theory of ideal relations. Willingness on the part of the one who grants benefits is for Xenophon the most important aspect of any relationship. In the context of master-slave relations the elder Cyrus declares:

> I think that I at least would unwillingly use such servants as I knew to be serving out of necessity (ἀνάγκῃ ὑπηρετοῦντας). Whereas in the case of those I thought I recognized were assisting with what was needed out of good will and friendship towards me (εὐνοίᾳ καὶ φιλίᾳ τῇ ἐμῇ τὸν δέον συλλαμβάνοιεν), I think that even if they made mistakes I would bear them more easily than I would those who hated me yet out of necessity (ἀνάγκῃ) worked hard at all their tasks.[54] (*Cyropaedia* 3.1.28)

The dynamic envisaged in both situations—service out of feelings of good will and friendship—is of exactly the same kind as Xenophon deems ideal in any leadership context.[55] Like any other human relationship, an ideal

52 Artabazus applies the same analogy to Cyrus, extending its leadership application as he explains the bees' behaviour: every single bee remains if she remains and follows her if she leaves, 'so great a desire for being ruled by her is instilled in them' (οὕτω δεινός τις ἔρως αὐταῖς τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπ' ἐκείνου ἐγγίγνεται, *Cyr.* 5.1.24). He considers Cyrus' men to be drawn to him in similar fashion (5.1.25). In *Oeconomicus* the bee analogy also evokes Semonides' virtuous bee woman.

53 Gini 1993: 483–484 remarks upon the extraordinary speed at which her intelligence matures.

54 In *Cyropaedia* we also find the stronger idea that *willing* obedience is a key aspect of moral freedom (8.1.4, cited at n. 89 below), and inhabitants of a captured city who demonstrate the ability to serve willingly, wanting to please Cyrus, are allowed to retain a measure of freedom (7.4.15). See pp. 650–658 below.

55 For Xenophon's interest in ideal leadership, which informs all his works, see Luccioni 1948, Breitenbach 1950, Wood 1964: 147–206, Krafft 1967, Due 1989, Dillery 1995: 123–178, Giraud 2001, Wilms 1995, Gray 2000: 146–151 and 2011, and the chapters by Danzig, Ferrario, Hau, Henderson, Pontier and Tamiolaki elsewhere in this volume. For its basis in *philia* (being helpful and useful to those one rules) see Wood 1964: 52–54, 66, Gray 2000: 146–151, 2007: 7–8, 2011: 291–329. For the leader's expertise in human relations, cf. e.g. Luccioni 1948: 55: 'il faut ... que le chef ... soit un psychologue' ('the leader must ... be a psychologist'), Wood 1964: 51 (with Xenophon 'begins ... the psychology of human relations'), Wilms 1995: 194–207 (§5 entitled 'Kyros als virtuoser Fachmann im Umgang mit Menschen' ['Kyros as virtuous expert in contact with people']). Demonstrating *philia* towards others entails one's own self-mastery and self-knowledge (cf. e.g. Luccioni 1948: 57 n. 29 with text), which is a further key factor.

master-slave relationship (as Xenophon states explicitly in the *Oeconomicus*)[56] requires friendship, good will, attentiveness, and trust. In fact, Hiero complains, 'the services that do not come from people loving in return' (αἱ μὴ ἐξ ἀντιφιλούντων ὑπουργίαι) are not delightful, nor are sexual pleasures obtained by compulsion (τὰ ἀφροδίσια τὰ βίαια) pleasurable (*Hiero* 7.6). When Hiero bemoans the lack of trust enjoyed by a tyrant, he includes the association of master and slave along with other human associations: 'For what sort of companionship is pleasurable without mutual trust, what relationship between husband and wife is delightful without trust, what servant/slave (θεράπων)[57] is pleasant if he is distrusted?' (*Hiero* 4.1) The triple anaphora, with slight variation (ἄνευ πίστεως … ἄνευ πίστεως … ἀπιστούμενος), positions the slave climactically: it is in a relationship with such a slave, who has intimate contact with a man's body day after day—and is well-placed, then, to lace his food with poison or slit his throat—that in Hiero's view trust is especially essential.[58] Here, as with Ischomachus' wife, Xenophon thus highlights a slave's capacity for virtue and *philia*,[59] even as he conveys the asymmetry of the slave relationship (Hiero mentions no need, in this case, for *reciprocal* trust).

It is in the account of Panthea in the *Cyropaedia*, however, that we see most clearly the possibility of inspiring deep loyalty in one's slaves. Panthea's maids mirror her every move (5.1.4–6), and it is to her nurse (probably a slave or a freed-woman) that she entrusts her final wishes—her closest companion and confidante, who weeps at the prospect of her mistress's suicide (7.3.14). In this instance the *philia* that bonds mistress and servant transcends that required by the code of reciprocal benefit (such as exists, for example, between Abradatas and Cyrus) and consists of profound affection as well. The loyalty of Panthea's eunuchs is such that they (like Cyrus the Younger's servant Artapates: *Anabasis* 1.28) follow their mistress in death (7.3.15). But Panthea is not simply a mistress in her own right: she makes her first appearance in the *Cyropaedia* as Cyrus' newly enslaved, spear-won (potential) concubine. Like the slave-girl of the *Symposium*, she

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[56] See, for example, the account of the foreman, 12.5–14.3.

[57] See Sturz 1801/1804 *s.v.* § 2.

[58] *Mem.* 1.5.1–3 presents a similar sequence of relationships with one's commander, guardian, *epitropos*, and *diakonos*—cases arranged 'in descending order of glory' (Gray 1998: 54), but in ascending order of intimacy. In *Symp.* 2.9 we found this same association of the relationship of husband and wife with that of master and slave, when Socrates interpreted the dancing-girl's performance as proof that his companions should (like the girl's master) confidently set about teaching their wives.

[59] Cf. *Oec.* 9.11–12 on the housekeeper.

is herself a wonder: confounding the expectations of the men around her and especially Cyrus, she proves an extremely valuable friend, and Cyrus in turn treats her 'with piety, *sōphrosunē*, and compassion' (as she tells her husband: 6.1.46).[60]

In the *Oeconomicus*, the very existence of a capable slave foreman is introduced as a wonder, beyond the scope of the philosopher's imagination: Socrates cannot imagine how Ischomachus can possibly hang about in the agora for such long stretches of time, neglecting his estate (12.2–3). 'But Socrates', Ischomachus retorts, 'I am not neglecting the matters you mention (οὐδ' ἐκεῖνά μοι ἀμελεῖται ἃ σὺ λέγεις): for I have foremen (ἐπιτρόπους) in the fields'. This sparks off Ischomachus' account of how he trains his foremen in loyalty, concern, the techniques of farm work, and so forth. At Socrates' inquiry as to whether this represents the sum total of what the foreman must learn, Ischomachus adds that he must also learn to govern (ἄρχειν) his fellow workers. Socrates is amazed: 'How on earth (καὶ πῶς δὴ … πρὸς τῶν θεῶν …) do you teach them to have the skills required to govern men?' (13.4) The foreman expects that Socrates will laugh at his very simple methods (which entail gratifying the slaves' desires, and bestowing praise and rewards), but the philosopher instead presses the concept to a serious and far-reaching conclusion:

> ὅστις … τοι ἀρχικοὺς ἀνθρώπων δύναται ποιεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι οὗτος καὶ δεσποτικοὺς ἀνθρώπων δύναται διδάσκειν, ὅστις δὲ δεσποτικοὺς δύναται ποιεῖν, καὶ βασιλικούς. (13.5)
>
> It is clear that whoever is capable of making men fit to govern is also capable of making men fit to be masters, and whoever is capable of producing men who are fit to be masters is capable also of producing men who are fit to be kings.

In view of the usual opinion of slaves as naturally inferior (see further in the next section of this chapter), the idea expressed here of a topsy-turvy world in which slaves may learn the art not merely of mastery, but even of kingship, is startling. It gains further significance in light of Xenophon's theory of rulership. Not only does a person who intends to rule require education and great natural gifts, but he must also be somehow superhuman; for, as Ischomachus observes in the *Oeconomicus*' closing lines, 'the ability to rule over willing subjects (τὸ ἐθελόντων ἄρχειν) seems to me to be a gift not wholly human, but divine (θεῖον)' (21.12).

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60 See Baragwanath 2002: 153–154 and p. 640 above.

Ideal Leadership, Moral Freedom

A glimpse at Classical Athenian attitudes towards slavery will allow us to see more clearly what is remarkable about Xenophon's views. The slave/free distinction was a central structuring antithesis of (élite)[61] Athenian ideology. 'Almost from the first', Todd observes, 'the chattel slave [came] to be the antitype of the citizen in what was to become a democracy: the absolute outsider whose function is to define full membership of the citizen group'.[62] In classical Athenian law the pervasive ambiguity about the legal status of a slave 'made him both a chattel and something more than a mere chattel'.[63] This notion in law reflected, as well as helping to constitute, the notion in life. Slaves could be regarded as animate property rather than as full people capable of virtue or friendship, and thus as incapable of living in a *polis* or having meaningful human relationships. Of course, much as the prices of slaves greatly varied,[64] and their statuses varied—owned or leased, public or private, and so forth (indeed the startling variety of Greek terms for slavery itself 'implies the numerous forms or shades of unfreedom'),[65] so individual circumstances certainly varied. A slave in the mines at Laurium can only have looked forward to a short and ghastly life, whereas a trusted domestic slave may have come to feel almost part of the master's family (the loyal elderly retainer, for example, is sympathetically handled on the Athenian stage). The considerable evidence for systematically cruel handling and ruthless exploitation of slaves, judicial torture, physical abuse, theft, sabotage and flight warns, however, against too much idealism about the extent to which positive relationships developed between masters and slaves.[66] Manumission was also uncommon, limited to those in well-paid professions or well connected,[67] and came with strings attached.[68] Thus even as the identities of certain categories of slave could at times be blurred with

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[61] Cf. Vassopoulos 2007, highlighting how in 'free spaces' like the Athenian agora a blurring of the identities of slaves and working-class citizens could occur.

[62] Todd 1993: 172, cf. Cartledge 1993: 118–151, Fisher 1993. Each of these concepts was nonetheless fluid and relative: Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 32–39, cf. Vlassopoulos 2010, which critiques the conception in modern scholarship of categorical status distinctions in Classical Athens.

[63] See Harrison 1968: 163–180, quote at 163, and Todd 1993: 184–194.

[64] See e.g. Jones 1960: 5–6.

[65] Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 27. Jansen (this volume, pp. 727–730) discusses the distinct circumstances of the category e.g. of *chōris oikountes* (slaves 'living aside from their masters').

[66] See esp. Finley 1980: 93–122.

[67] See e.g. Wrenhaven 2009: 368–369 (with further references).

[68] Manumission was conditional (a slave remained in a state of servile dependence in

the identities of others of the Athenian non-élite (metics and citizens),[69] a slave alone was starkly defined by his or her lack of freedom.

Fundamental to the distinction between free citizen and slave was the fact that slaves, unlike citizens, were regularly subject to force.[70] Viewed as lacking the virtue or reason necessary to respond to less blatant chastisement than corporal punishment, or to tell the truth in court unless subjected to torture, they were answerable to their bodies.[71] Such treatment at the same time served as a public 'moral-degradation ceremony': as a spectacle 'laden with ideological overtones' that performed and cemented the slave's inferiority.[72] Regarded as mere bodies and property, slaves—ἀνδράποδα, 'man-footed things'—could easily be paired with cattle and other work animals.[73] Accordingly, sexual relationships between slaves were commonly viewed in terms of the breeding of children, without consideration of any emotional aspect. Not only were such relationships often prevented (cf. *Oeconomicus* 9.5), they were always vulnerable to being fractured, particularly if a slave was sold. Indeed, a slave had no family relationship that was valid in law. A deracinated outsider, 'forcibly ripped from his or her original

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certain respects to the former master), it bestowed not citizen but 'freed' status, and that freedom was quite precarious: Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 184–272 and 292–300.

69 Vlassopoulos 2007 emphasizes such blurring of statuses and identities, cf. Vlassopoulos 2010 (most attested Athenian slaves bore names that did not distinguish them from Athenian citizens), Wrenhaven 2009. Jansen (this volume, pp. 725–760) discusses the blurring of various identities that is entailed in Xenophon's *Poroi*.

70 Compare Dem. 22.55: 'If you (the jury) wished to look into what makes the difference between a slave and a free man, you would find that the greatest distinction was that in the case of slaves (τοῖς μὲν δούλοις) it is the body which is liable for all their offences, whereas it is possible for free men (τοῖς δ' ἐλευθέροις), however great their misfortunes, to protect their bodies'.

71 For βία inflicted on slaves and its role in constructing the citizen's identity, see Finley 1980: 93–96 (underlining a further facet of the answerability of the body in slaves' sexual availability: 95), Winkler 1990: 48–49 ('inviolability of the person is a marker separating slaves from citizens: slaves may be manhandled in any way, citizens are literally untouchable': 48), Hunter 1992 and 1994: 154–184. Compare Fisher 1993: 56: the 'natural sense of a citizen's honour and value was heightened by the fact that one did regularly beat slaves'. Strikingly σώματα can denote both 'bodies'/ 'persons' and 'slaves': Steph. Byz. s.v. σῶμα, cf. Kamen 2009: 45.

72 Hunter 1994: 183 and 2000: 14, borrowing 'moral-degradation ceremony' from J.M. Beattie on one function of corporal punishment in eighteenth century England. Compare Finley 1980: 95: corporal punishment and torture constitute a procedure that serves to 'degrade and undermine [a slave's] humanity and so distinguish him from human beings who are not property'; Todd 1993: 172 (accounting for the 'institutionalized humiliation of slaves').

73 For the ramifications of the slave's status as property see *inter alia* Finley 1980: 73–75. ἀνδράποδα: perhaps coined, suggests Finley 1980: 99, on the model of τετράποδα (quadrupeds); cf. Cartledge 1993: 136.

ties of kin and community', the Classical Athenian slave might well suffer (as Patterson has expressed it) social death.[74]

The depiction of slavery in Xenophon's works presents a markedly different picture. Most notably, as we have seen, Xenophon portrays slaves engaging in a variety of social interactions and relationships (including relationships characterized by mutuality, between slaves, but even between masters and slaves) and exhibiting a range of human emotions. He stages the possibility that slaves are capable of virtue, and so of friendship; and he promotes the view that *bia* in master-slave relations ought therefore to be replaced with *philia*, the threat or actuality of force replaced with the slave's willing service.[75] Socrates introduced the startling notion to Critobulus as a principle of estate management worth examining, and indeed it turned out to be central in the ensuing account of Ischomachus' ideal household:

> 'What if I also show you', he said, 'something about slaves: in some households they are almost all chained up, and yet run away again and again; whereas in others, they are unchained and are willing to stay and to work'.
>
> (*Oeconomicus* 3.4)

Socrates' words express the basic principle common to Xenophon's theories of human relations, that those who serve willingly (friends or slaves) are most useful. The notion that the master-slave relationship, like other human relationships, is most pleasant and useful when characterized by mutual *philia* surfaces in its most radical form when Xenophon has Cyrus transform potential slaves into friends instead, as with Panthea, his spear-won booty (*Cyropaedia* 6.4.7), and the Armenian King, whom rather than enslaving after his revolt Cyrus makes 'more of a friend than before' (3.1.31).[76] In both cases the usefulness of a loyal friendship is the motivating factor: it was in case she should prove 'very opportune for us' (5.1.17) that Cyrus advised Abradatas to take care of Panthea (as Tatum 1989: 188 observes, it is useful for a prince to have someone prepared to die for him!), and likewise

[74] Quotation at Cartledge 1993: 119; cf. Finley 1980: 75 (observing that beyond the dispersal of families through sale, the very possibility of having a family could be withdrawn by castration), Todd 1993: 186. Slavery as 'social death': Patterson 1982.

[75] Another way of looking at the slave-free distinction, expressed in the slave's words in the opening lines of Aristophanes' *Plutus* (1–7), is that a buyer (ἑωνημένον) controlled one, a *kurios* the other; cf. Schaps 1998. Xenophon's depiction of the master-slave relationship could be envisaged as involving a degree of transformation of a slave-master into his slave's *kurios*.—Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 39–60 discusses ancient understanding of *philia* as a potential component even of the (vertical) master-slave relationship.

[76] Cf. *Cyr.* 4.4.12: Cyrus offers prisoners of war the possibility of becoming his friends and benefactors rather than slaves.

he makes the Armenian his friend only once he has been convinced by Tigranes (3.1.30) of the usefulness of such a move. Beyond the possibility that conquered subjects may be more useful as friends than slaves, we also find in the *Cyropaedia* the idea that it may be more profitable to refrain from enslaving inhabitants of a conquered city who seem morally free (4.5.56, 7.4.15), or even to avoid attacking (and enslaving) other cities at all (1.6.45).

But Xenophon's model does not generally go so far as to endorse refraining from enslaving others in the first place. In the *Anabasis* he describes the Greeks' several slaving operations in neutral terms (cf. Hunt 1998: 155 n. 53 with text), and Socrates in *Memorabilia* speaks of the enslavement of cities as just.[77] Rather—in line with his broader notions of ideal human relations—Xenophon explores the potential for the master-slave relationship to be characterized by enlightened rule and a degree of mutual *philia*,[78] and (as in the *Symposium*) for slaves to demonstrate mutual *philia* in their relationships with one another. Again, though his attitude towards slaves assumes their humanity, his enlightened stance (as Socrates' comment above implies) stems from utility rather than humane concern, even as this utility at times extends beyond mere material utility (as we saw in the *Symposium*).[79]

Xenophon's slaves display a range of virtues, including those characteristic of his ideal leaders—and therefore the capacity to rule others. But Xenophon does not go so far as to imagine that all slaves are equally capable of achieving virtue. Some of those, for example, whom Ischomachus attempts to train as foremen—those who 'despite good treatment still try to act unjustly' (*Oeconomicus* 14.8)—are so incorrigibly greedy that he refuses to have anything more to do with them. The slavish among slaves respond best to the training thought suitable for wild animals (13.9).[80] The elder

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[77] *Mem.* 4.2.15, cf. Schorn (this volume, p. 710 n. 84).

[78] Even in the case of Athens' mine slaves: cf. Schorn (this volume, p. 711), and my n. 88 below. Schorn observes more generally the innovative quality of Xenophon's approach to slaves: pp. 710–711.

[79] Fisher 1995: 55–56 takes *Oeconomicus* as a work that reveals how '(t)he practical needs of slave management in an economy of growing complexity, coupled with ideals of humanity or paternalism that cost little to express' (68), countered the more thoroughly negative, dehumanizing fifth- and fourth-century views justifying slavery.

[80] When he speaks here of τοῖς δούλοις it seems to me that Ischomachus is not generalising about the treatment appropriate for slaves, as the conventional translation, e.g., Marchant & Todd 1923, Pomeroy 1994, assumes, but rather referring to slavish people (a sub-group considered in the discussion of how best to render human beings obedient). The next category of which Ischomachus speaks—those who respond better to praise—can also include slaves. In the *Oeconomicus*, Xenophon uses δοῦλος as readily in speaking of slaves

Cyrus deprives of arms and treats like slaves those of the conquered Lydians who follow him unthankfully (ἀχαρίτως: *Cyropaedia* 7.4.14) and all of the Babylonians (7.5.34, 36), on the grounds that they are incapable of friendship. Indeed, according to Socrates it is only those who are *kaloi kai agathoi* (apparently whether free or slave)[81] whom *philia*, slipping through the hostile elements in men, is able to bond together (*Memorabilia* 2.6.22).

But for Xenophon a distinction more profound than that between slave and free was the philosophical distinction between the morally slavish and the morally free. His depictions reveal that the latter category by no means inevitably overlaps the former, as for example in the opening scene of the *Oeconomicus*, where again he conveys a surprising point more effectively by staging the confounding of assumptions. When Critobulus mentions men who have the knowledge and resources to increase their estates if they work, but are not willing to do so (1.16), Socrates assumes he is speaking of slaves (δούλων). Critobulus says he actually means men—including some of the noblest birth—who are skilled in the arts of war or peace but unwilling to practice them, because they have no masters (1.17). Socrates then demonstrates that such men are indeed slaves in a metaphorical sense,[82] ruled by such vicious masters as idleness, moral weakness and carelessness (1.19), and by such guileful mistresses as gambling and bad company (1.20). Those, again, who work and yet squander their estates are slaves to extremely cruel masters such as gluttony, lechery and alcoholism (1.22). Socrates counsels vehemently:

> ἀλλὰ δεῖ, ὦ Κριτόβουλε, πρὸς ταῦτα οὐκ ἧττον διαμάχεσθαι περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἢ πρὸς τοὺς σὺν ὅπλοις πειρωμένους καταδουλοῦσθαι. (1.23)
>
> But Critobulus, one must fight for freedom against these things no less than against people trying to enslave us with weapons.

The philosopher thus expresses the equivalence, to his mind, of the two sorts of slavery, tying the abstract notion of moral slavery to the tangible and frightening image of armed men in the process of trying to enslave citizens (πρὸς ταῦτα … ~ πρὸς τοὺς …, with the present participle lending a sense of immediacy and actuality). The key notion of freedom (τῆς ἐλευθερίας), placed centrally between the two parts of the comparison, contrasts starkly

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in a metaphorical sense (e.g., 1.22 *bis*) as of actual slaves (5.16). To denote the latter he more frequently uses οἰκέτης (3.2, 3.4, 7.37 etc.) and occasionally θεράπων (7.42) or διάκονος (11.12).

[81] See further below, pp. 656–657 for the possibility that slaves may be *kaloi kagathoi*.

[82] Pomeroy 1994 assumes that at 1.17 Socrates is thinking of actual slaves, but the dialogue is more trenchant if he is already considering metaphorical slavery (and then expands upon the idea).

with the idea of enslavement (καταδουλοῦσθαι) at the very end of the sentence, as if to bring the prospect more vividly before Critobulus' eyes.

Socrates goes on to explain:

> πολέμιοι μὲν οὖν ἤδη ὅταν καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ὄντες καταδουλώσωνταί τινας, πολλοὺς δὴ βελτίους ἠνάγκασαν εἶναι σωφρονίσαντες, καὶ ῥᾷον βιοτεύειν τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἐποίησαν· αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται δέσποιναι αἰκιζόμεναι τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ τοὺς οἴκους οὔποτε λήγουσιν, ἔστ' ἂν ἄρχωσιν αὐτῶν. (1.23)

> Whenever enemies, if they are gentlemen, enslave people, by acting with *sōphrosunē* they compel most of them to be better, and they make them live less strenuously in future. But such mistresses as these never cease from plaguing the bodies and souls of men and their households, for as long as they rule them.

Here the comparison changes into a contrast of absolutely different character: the armed men are transformed into potential gentlemen who could bestow philosophical enlightenment, whereas vice is said to cause not only moral depravity, by attacking the souls of men, but also tangible and concrete disaster, by attacking their bodies and estates. The striking notion is thus presented that some free citizens are in a more slavish condition than actual slaves, and that they would in fact be better off as slaves, for a virtuous human ruler might be able to force them to become more virtuous (βελτίους) and to live morally easier (ῥᾷον) lives, presumably as slaves.

Xenophon plays with the same idea elsewhere. At *Memorabilia* 3.13.6 a man complains that he is worn out after a long journey, and at Socrates' questioning it turns out that a slave carried his load and yet was in a better condition at the end of the trip than he was: 'he seemed to be better than me', βέλτιον ἐμοῦ, the man declares. Again being prompted, he admits that he would have been quite unable to carry the load himself. Socrates' response—'how then does it seem to you to be the mark of a man, to be so much less capable of work than a trained slave?' (τὸ οὖν τοσούτῳ ἧττον τοῦ παιδὸς δύνασθαι πονεῖν πῶς ἠσκημένου δοκεῖ σοι ἀνδρὸς εἶναι;)—calls attention to the irony that a slave should show himself more capable of exercise than his free master, though a mark of a free man (Socrates elsewhere remarked) is the fact of having exercised in the gymnasium over many years.[83] The rhetorical question works to the same effect as the wonders of the *Symposium* and *Oeconomicus*: it stimulates further reflection, on the part of the lazy man in the text, but also on the part of Xenophon's readers.

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[83] Cf. *Symp.* 2.4: the odour of olive oil used in the gymnasium is particularly delightful, for αἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἐλευθερίων μόχθων ὀσμαὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων τε πρῶτον χρηστῶν καὶ χρόνου πολλοῦ δέονται, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡδεῖαί τε καὶ ἐλευθέριοι ἔσεσθαι.

With the description of the slave as βέλτιον—'better'—this anecdote gestures fleetingly at the reverse conception: at a slave's potential physical and moral superiority. The *Oeconomicus* stages the same shift more explicitly, in the move from Socrates' comments to Critoboulus on the slavish quality of some free men (discussed above), to Ischomachus' subsequent remarks on the free quality of some of his slaves. Of those who are honest not only because they profit from seeming so, but also through their desire for his praise (τοῦ ἐπαινεῖσθαι ἐπιθυμοῦντας ὑπ' ἐμοῦ), he says:

> τούτοις ὥσπερ ἐλευθέροις ἤδη χρῶμαι, οὐ μόνον πλουτίζων ἀλλὰ καὶ τιμῶν ὡς καλούς τε κἀγαθούς. (14.9)
>
> these I treat like free men, not only making them rich, but even honouring them as gentlemen (*kaloi kagathoi*).[84]

Scholars have at times sought to diminish this striking formulation. Thus De Ste. Croix (1972: 372) in a classic discussion of the term *kalokagathia*:

> Xen. *Oecon.* XIV 9 is unique in referring to certain specially worthy slave (or ex-slave) bailiffs as being honoured by Ischomachus ὡς καλούς τε κἀγαθούς; but Ischomachus has just said that he will have made these men rich … Wealth must always have been an essential factor in *kalokagathia*, at least before the development of a primarily moral use of the term.

But the moral inflection of *kaloi kagathoi* in this context is unmistakable.[85] Πλουτίζων is more easily taken as confirming the opposite of what De Ste. Croix took it to: Ischomachus is careful to clarify that his slaves' being honoured as *kaloi kagathoi* is a separate—and more important (cf. ἀλλὰ καὶ)—matter from their becoming rich. As well as conforming to a common connotation of the word elsewhere in Xenophon,[86] the moral interpretation

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84 Compare *Cyr.* 7.4.12: Cyrus grants actual freedom to slaves who display morally free natures (cf. n. 87 below).

85 Too 2001: 76 thus observes two possibilities: either Ischomachus respects the humanity of slaves or (the interpretation she favours) he 'inadvertently permits the term "gentleman" to be debased': by extending the term to non-citizens Ischomachus (a figure who in other ways as well destabilizes the meaning of καλὸς κἀγαθός: 77) 'blatantly disregards the connotations of élite social class which are the *sine qua non* of καλὸς κἀγαθός and also interrogates the principle of political τάξις' (76–77). On *Oec.* 14.9 see Klees 1975: 82–83, Fisher 1995: nn. 47–48. Bourriot 1995: 332–334 accepts the moral sense but awkwardly seeks to limit it: '[Ischomachos] décerne un titre honorifique (timôn) qui est l'éloge (épainos), un titre qualifiant de "kalos kagathos". Le serviteur ainsi récompensé pourra "être appelé" kalos kagathos … [I]l sera le kalos kagathos du personnel d'Ischomachos' ('[Ischomachos] bestows an honorific title [timôn] which is the eulogy [épainos], a title characterizing the recipient as kalos kagathos. The servant thus rewarded will be able "to be called" kalos kagathos … He will be the kalos kagathos of Ischomachus' staff').

86 See Pomeroy 1994: 259 *ad* 6.2.12. De Ste. Croix 1972: 374 reviews the fourth-century usage of *kalos kagathos* and *kalokagathia* 'with a purely or primarily moral connotation'. The com-

has been prepared for by Socrates' comments (1.16–23), and is assumed in Ischomachus' immediately ensuing remarks on the difference between a φιλοκερδής man and a man who is φιλότιμος (14.10): the willingness of the latter to work hard, to hazard perils, and to shun dishonest gains, 'for the sake of praise and honour' (ἐπαίνου καὶ τιμῆς ἕνεκα). As Klees has recognized, the shift here into a reflection on the general importance of τιμή for ethical worth is telling: it reflects back on and elevates the praise of the slave at 14.9. It becomes clear that striving for praise has been starkly emphasized because 'in der xenophontischen Anthropologie die Grenze darstellt, an der ein volles Menschsein beginnt'.[87] The fact that Socrates prefaced his conversation with Ischomachus (*Oeconomicus* 6.16–17) by saying he had gone in search of someone renowned as *kalos kagathos* gives the slaves' possession of the quality even more prominence.[88]

The *Cyropaedia*, further removed as it is into a fictional world, contains material that complements what we have noticed already. We find the suggestive idea that willing obedience is a quality of the morally free man.[89] We find Cyrus granting actual freedom to some slaves, and would-be slaves, who display morally free natures; and the noble would-be slave Panthea is the focus of a drawn-out narrative. We also find the reverse conception: the notion that a ruler can be worse (πονηρότερον) than the ruled, and the advice that rulers ought to avoid being slavish and instead cultivate virtue (7.5.83–84).[90]

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prehensive study of Bourriot 1995 includes an account of modern scholarly understandings of the term and its transformations.

87 Klees 1975: 82–83 ('because in the Xenophontic theory of humankind it represents the border at which full humanity begins'). One may compare Cyrus' recognition of the morally free *vs*. slavish in allowing those citizens of captured Sardis whom he sees displaying pride in their appearance and 'trying to do everything that they thought would please him (πειρωμένους ποιεῖν ὅ τι ᾤοντο αὐτῷ χαριεῖσθαι)' to keep their arms, while allowing those following ἀχαρίτως to carry only the most slavish (δουλικώτατον) of weapons, the sling (*Cyr*. 7.4.12).

88 To the picture of positive master-slaves relations described in *Oec*. Schorn (this volume, pp. 710–711) compares *Poroi*'s (utopian) vision of Athens' mine slaves fighting willingly for the city, in the absence of an expectation of manumission, thanks to their good relationship with their masters.

89 See esp. 8.1.4 (Chrysantas, speaking after Cyrus in addressing the chief nobles and those worthy of a share in the Persian empire): 'Just as you will claim to rule over those under your command, so let us also be obedient to those to whom it is our duty to be. And we must distinguish ourselves from slaves in this way, that while slaves serve their masters unwillingly (οἱ μὲν δοῦλοι ἄκοντες τοῖς δεσπόταις ὑπηρετοῦσιν), we—if we do indeed claim to be free—must willingly do what seems to be most worthwhile (ἡμᾶς δ', εἴπερ ἀξιοῦμεν ἐλεύθεροι εἶναι, ἑκόντας δεῖ ποιεῖν ὃ πλείστου ἄξιον φαίνεται εἶναι)'. Xenophon's theory of leadership involves ruling and being ruled (by others as well as one's own powers of self-control) in turn.

90 Note also the sketch of Araspas, guard of Panthea, who lacks the self-control she manifestly possesses. Cyrus, by contrast, avoids being 'enslaved' to the sight of her (5.1.12).

The *Cyropaedia* as a whole may indeed be regarded as a wonder for Greek readers to muse on, one that prompts their reconsideration among other things of the Greek conception of Persians as slavish. In pitching the world of Persia as source of paradigms, the work is a further example of Xenophon's willingness to find sources of reflection in improbable places, and of his use of a discourse of wonders to draw readers to think more deeply about possibilities that at first sight appear dubious. In the case of Xenophon's other wonders of freedom, however, what makes them especially wondrous is their presence in his readers' immediate environs of Classical Athens.

Conclusion

The fact that the distinction between the slavish and the morally free does not overlap entirely with that of slaves and free citizens (or rulers) implies a radical, even liberating, challenge to traditional assumptions. And yet, of course, Xenophon refrains from abolishing the slave/free distinction. The community of slaves, as depicted in his works, remains largely separate from the *polis*: the housekeeper of the *Oeconomicus* rules fellow slaves; the slave-girl of the *Symposium* loves her fellow slave performer; slaves are mentioned in passing, in the *Spartan Constitution*, as a group that poses a threat to the citizen encampment (12.4), and in the *Hiero*, as a group that has often killed its masters (10.4). In *Poroi* Xenophon endorses a state programme of slavery, with three slaves per citizen, so that Athens may profit from the silver mines and solve her economic difficulties. In no way, then, does Xenophon advocate the abolition of slavery, or even question the institution, and in this he is keeping with the attitudes of his time.[91]

[91] Cf. Fisher 1993: 108: 'slavery was felt by Athenians to be so essential to the functioning of their society that the only—even imagined—alternatives to it seem to be fantastic suppositions of a Golden Age where all the work did itself … or of work done by robot-like tools that obeyed orders … No serious attempt was apparently ever made to propose the abolition of so obviously worrying an institution, and even the best thinkers of the time accepted very poor arguments to justify it'. The presence of slaves appears to be assumed in Plato's ideal Republic: Vlastos 1968. For a cogent discussion of why ancient thinkers found it so difficult to imagine a system without slaves, see Williams 1993: 103–129, who concludes: 'the main feature of the Greek attitude to slavery … was not a morally primitive belief in its justice, but the fact that considerations of justice and injustice were immobilised by the demands of what was seen as social and economic necessity' (125). Just occasionally the institution of slavery is questioned, by Alcidamas ('the divinity left everyone free, nature made no one a slave': schol. on Arist. *Rhet.*) and certain other fourth-century thinkers (cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1253b20–

Xenophon takes his liberating theory on slavery only so far as he takes its metaphorical version in the *Hiero*. In that work, Simonides is not so foolish as to suggest that Hiero abolish his tyranny altogether. Rather, his rule is to be transformed into that of a beneficent master, adored by his subjects (11.11), although some of his subjects (like some of Ischomachus' slaves) will still inevitably require chastisement (10.4). Xenophon, like the poet he portrays, seems to take the theory as far as he considers feasible without offending slave-masters (himself included) or compromising their property rights. To propose the abolition of so fundamental an institution would for Xenophon—or perhaps for any other citizen of the slave-societies of Athens or Sparta, perhaps for any thinker of antiquity[92]—simply have been going too far. But he follows the lead of some fifth- and fourth-century intellectuals in at least inviting his audience to think deeply about the issue. For this he should be given credit.[93]

Xenophon himself thus anticipates the on-going debate about how to read him—about how we should go about grappling with apparent tensions or inconsistencies—in occasionally startling readers with what may seem wondrous at first, but comes to seem less so on further reflection, especially against the backdrop of the broader theory of ideal human relations that his works lay out. Wonders—even in the fictional world of Xenophon's

23: 'others however maintain that for one man to be another man's master is contrary to nature, because it is only convention that makes the one a slave and the other a free man, and there is no difference between them by nature, and that therefore it is unjust, for it is based on force'); cf. Antiphon *On Truth*, 22a: *P.Oxy*. XI 1364 (which implies criticism of slavery as an institution), and several comments by characters in Euripidean tragedy (e.g. *Hel.* 730, *Melanippe* 511, *Phrixus* 831). See *inter alia* Schlaifer 1960: 199–201, Garnsey 1996: 75–77, Tuplin 2007.

92 See e.g. Hopkins 1978: 99, Finley 1980: 79–80, Garlan 1988: 201–203, and Garnsey 1996: 2–3 for definitions of a 'slave-society'. An honorary Spartan himself, Xenophon would certainly have recognized the crucial role played by Sparta's 'community slaves', the helots. Garnsey 1996 observes that the abolition of slavery was not contemplated in antiquity, even as 'some voiced opinions that might have led to a campaign against the institution in a different historical context' (64); he discusses ''progressive' utterances' (from 5th c. BC to 3rd c. AD) at 64–74, criticisms of slavery at 75–86.

93 For such fifth- and fourth-century thinkers, see n. 91 above. Deserving credit: modern scholarship on ancient slavery by and large overlooks Xenophon's probing of the binary of slave/free (including his emphasis on the possibility that moral slavery is not coextensive with legal slavery). Xenophon makes no appearance e.g. in Garnsey's category of those ancients who utter 'Fair words' (1996: 64–74, cf. above n.). About forms of punishment, Hunter 1994: 163 remarks, 'Ischomachus is remarkably silent, *assuming in his listener some knowledge of the means available*' (my italics): but the significance lies in this very silence. Acknowledgment of Xenophon's recognition of slaves' moral capacities: Fisher 1995: 56–57 and esp. Klees 1975: 64–97.

Persian *novella*—prove to be a site of (at times uneasy) truth. Thus Xenophon enticed his readers to rethink some of their, and his, deeply-rooted assumptions.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND ECONOMIC FACT IN THE WORKS OF XENOPHON

Thomas J. Figueira

It is my intention in this chapter to use Xenophon to explore our appreciation of classical Greek economic phenomena. The title of the original conference paper noted an emphasis on the *Poroi* or *Ways and Means*, but it proves impossible to investigate Greek economic conditions in practical isolation, as though illustrated by any single Xenophontic work. I shall employ as an initial point of departure another study of mine entitled 'Xenophon and the Spartan Economy', which was presented at a conference in Lyon in 2006,[1] and will appear in a written version in due course.[2] Naturally, throughout my discussion both of the data on Spartan subsistence that were provided by Xenophon and of Xenophon's appreciation of this material, the counter-example, or, perhaps, the counter-image, of Athens had to be continually present. Hence, Spartan economic conditions and the *Spartan Constitution* perforce led back to the *Poroi* and to the *Oeconomicus* as well. As a means of approaching here some more general issues concerning economic phenomena in Xenophon, a useful line of ingress is provided by the works of Moses Finley, the most eminent historian of economies of classical antiquity during the later twentieth century.

Introduction

The opening section of my earlier paper was wryly entitled 'Xenophon the Economist', although, as I hastened to observe, Xenophon and his fifth- and fourth-century contemporaries did not demonstrably possess the concept of an economy.[3] I defined this 'economy' as transcending ancient *oikonomia* or 'household management': it conveyed 'an awareness of a productive

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[1] *Xénophon et Sparte: Colloque international.* L'École Normale Supérieure, Lettres et Sciences Humaines, Lyon, July 2006.

[2] Figueira (forthcoming).

[3] In general, see Luccioni 1947: 69–107; Mossé 1975; Pomeroy 1994: 41–67.

apparatus, comprising a resource base and material assets and subsuming certain processes for conducting transactions between individuals'. For my purposes, mere comprehension of economic conditions and practical intelligence about how one's livelihood was to be managed or achieved was not enough to demonstrate control of the concept of 'economy'. We were looking for 'an intellectually separable sphere of human interaction that could be described in detail', possibly even measured. I placed emphasis here on the presence of an understanding by contemporaries of 'autonomy' in the *polis* economy, where the configuration of subsistence-related activities is perceived to change organically under the impact of many separate decisions. While not quite a recognition of the 'invisible hand' of Adam Smith, I would still require some comprehension on the part of an ancient observer of a social space, separable both from governmental enactment, for example, an Attic *psēphisma*, and from the sort of decisions about the household on the micro-economic level that appear in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*. Even there, Xenophon does not transcend individual insights on opportunistic behaviour to achieve full consciousness of this 'autonomy' in its emergent differentiation from other social processes, and does not consolidate an understanding of the way in which individual decisions about subsistence thereby became interwoven.

It will also help to consider the phenomenon of self-equilibrium. The economically minded observer senses economic conditions evolving under the effect of many individual agents and influenced by self-equilibrating forces, so that the aggregate impact of decisions fashions an adaptive framework for the subsistence of the inhabitants of an entire *polis*. That framework would be envisaged as continuously interacting both with the political structure and with the purposive decision-making of individuals. Yet, even when we suspect that the concept of the 'economy' has not emerged, we need, nevertheless, to look for the seeds of such awareness, *indicia* that are sensitive to autonomy and self-equilibrium.[4] Under the aforesaid terms, I have deliberately set a high standard for 'economic' understanding because I anticipate that any fine-grained portrayal of Xenophon's appreciation of classical economic phenomena will be subject to a charge of modernism; it will arouse all the customary objections about the formal versus the substantivist approaches.[5]

I shall use the work of Moses Finley—my distinguished predecessor and fellow victim at Rutgers—as a lens to focus our discussion. Finley has dom-

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[4] See below, especially on Xen. *Cyr.* 8.2.5–6; *Oec.* 20.27–29; *Por.* 4.3–6.

[5] See Figueira 1984.

inated much of the consensus that now forms our appraisal of ancient economic thinking.[6] One may grant some allowance to his minimization of the sophistication of ancient commentary on the ground that he was confronting some fairly outrageously modernizing scholarship. Ostensibly, Finley was bringing to bear the insights of Joseph Schumpeter.[7] Yet Schumpeter, while working from obsolete and derivative scholarly material, did, nonetheless, achieve a certain real engagement with the economic observations of, for instance, Aristotle, about whose discussion he was not quite so dismissive as Finley implies. Indeed, Finley tended to simplify Schumpeter's insights.[8] The judgment of the recent historians of economic thought who followed Schumpeter's lead has been kinder to ancient economic thinking.[9] This is true even if we separate the contributions of those whom I term the 'reconcilers' rather than modernizers, figures such as S. Todd Lowry, Morris Silver, Edward Cohen, and Anastassios Karayiannis (sometimes in collaboration with G.C. Bitros).[10] These are economists who are sensitive to traces of economic thinking in ancient authors and to the record of business practices of considerable subtlety scattered among our sources. They believe that the methodology of economic analysis is not so truly ill matched to our ancient evidence.

Let us then consider specifically Finley's minimizing appreciation of Xenophon.[11] On its face, there seems to be more discussion of Xenophon in Finley's work than in fact there was because of a considerable degree of repetition. I am not the first to challenge Finley's dismissal of Xenophon, as Lowry and Pomeroy have gone before me.[12] Finley's shading toward 'primitivism' is striking. Note first these general remarks: 'In Xenophon, however, there is not one sentence that expresses an economic principle or offers any economic analysis, nothing on efficiency of production, "rational"

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6 On Finley, with caution see Shaw & Saller's introduction (ix–xxvi) in Finley 1982. Nafissi 2005: 191–283 is useful despite its somewhat uncertain grasp of recent work in ancient social history.

7 See Finley 1970: esp. 22–23 on Schumpeter 1954, for which see also Finley 1970: 2–5; 1973/1999: 20, 132, 143.

8 Vegetti 1982: 583–585 adopted a similar approach, while Lowry 1979: 66–68 has been quite critical of Schumpeter.

9 Rothbard 1995: I.3–23; also Spiegel 1971: 6–39; Perlman & McCann 1998: 1–16.

10 E.g., Lowry 1979; 1987a; 1998; Silver 1995, 2006, 2009; Cohen 1992, 2002; Karayiannis 1988, 1990, 2003; Bitros & Karayiannis 2008, 2010.

11 In addition to the passages discussed below in detail, see Finley 1951: 53, with 236 n. 14, 246 n. 2, 245–246 n. 1, 250 n. 38; 1970: 3–4; 1973/1999: 163–164, cf. 72.

12 Lowry 1987a: 10; 1987b: 69–70, 72; cf. 48–49; 1998: 17–21; Pomeroy 1994: 42–44.

choice, the marketing of crops.'[13] Sometimes this tone of confident assertion from Finley reaches a point of self-sabotaging bluster, as here: 'Neither Pericles nor his disgruntled sons revealed any more interest in farming as a profession than did Xenophon when he wrote the *Oikonomikos*.'[14] I suppose the escape clause here might be the anachronistic concept of a profession. It is, however, a red herring to invoke the 'lifestyle' of the elite as an inhibition against practical opportunizing thought.[15] Naturally, men of affairs engaged in purposive behaviour in accordance with their values; that did not exclude their simultaneous possession of the conceptual apparatus to analyze economic situations. And what would one of the purposes of the *Oeconomicus* have been other than advice on farming, unless we take it as thoroughly ironical?[16]

I emphasize that an investigation of the *Oeconomicus* or *Poroi* in their totalities is not what is intended here; rather I shall be adducing Finley's work to exemplify the use of these treatises in the study of economic history. One might object that passages from the *Oeconomicus* are highlighted by historians in a way that does not convey the tenor of this work because it fails to foreground its fundamentally normative character. The treatment of agriculture in *Oeconomicus* 4–5 is particularly strongly couched in this vein. Yet this observation merely expresses from a converse perspective my previous insight concerning the imperfect development in Xenophon of a concept of the 'economy'. What interests us below are Xenophon's observations of purposive, opportunizing behaviour and his advice revealing an appreciation of the operation of economic factors. Investigating these observations entails disentangling them from a composite matrix characteristic of classical thinking about subsistence. Rather like a rare element in an ore bed, such material is interveined in the *Oeconomicus* and even the *Poroi* to a degree that is not always appreciated. While I consider here the main passages of relevance to economic historians, my notes on pertinent terminology,[17] or on Xenophon's reflections of marginal utility[18] and of value addition[19] draw on these less concentrated economic insights.

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13 Finley 1973/1999: 19.

14 Finley 1973/1999: 45.

15 Finley 1973/1999: 76.

16 For discussion of the issue of ironic critique in the *Oeconomicus*, see, most recently, Kronenberg 2009: 37–72, who also offers help on the work's normative contents.

17 See my discussions on ἐξεργάζομαι (with n. 27), and on clusters of the terminology of *oikonomia* in nn. 47–49, 55–58, 61 below.

18 See below pp. 678 (with n. 62), 679–680.

19 On *Cyr.* 8.2.5–6, below pp. 670–671; on the *Oeconomicus*, pp. 677–678.

Specific Cases

Several Xenophontic passages receive closer scrutiny from Finley. He covers the use of the term *ergastērion* in various fourth-century sources, including the famous colloquy between Aristarchus and Socrates leading to the establishment of a clothing workshop among Aristarchus' female relations (*Mem.* 2.7.1–14).[20] Finley makes somewhat heavy going out of the conclusion that *ergastēria* were not separate workplaces or specialized premises. While doubtless correct, the unspoken parallel is rather more specialized modern industrial operations. Yet it is worth recalling how flexible even contemporary utilization of spaces for craftsmanship and light manufacturing are. This insight formed an important theme in the writings of no less an authority on urbanism than Jane Jacobs.[21] Finley does astutely observe how the value of an *ergastērion* can be equated with the value of its slaves, citing *Poroi* 4.4–5, about which more will come below.[22] Since the slave labour system of Attica capitalized the cost of labour, it is unsurprising that business enterprises had large proportions of capital sunk in skilled slaves. Finley understood the significance of this point, although he did not advance from it to a discussion of its negative effects on the accumulation and deployment of capital in the classical economy. A slave craft must apply greater assets to add new production than a technologically equivalent free labour craft, although the owner of the slave workshop may (I stress) have lower subsequent labour costs.

In another reference to the same passage, Finley asserts that Aristarchus illustrates the non-productive mentality of the elite.[23] Fair enough—Aristarchus does exhibit some features of a *rentier* mentality, but, to do him justice, he has been cut off from extensive properties in the Attic countryside that, for all we know, he may have aggressively managed previously. The construction of the episode requires that Aristarchus be at a loss until instructed by Socrates. Socrates does hold before him the example of Ceramon, from his name a likely immigrant freedman, who employs his own family and slaves. The *déclassé* individual is indeed more likely to be free of class prejudice in confronting subsistence crises. Moreover, Socrates mentions four other successful workshop owners, at least one of whom is recognizable as a citizen from his demotic, and another of whom was sufficiently affluent

20 Finley 1951: 66–68, with 257–258 n. 94.
21 Jacobs 1965: 202–212; cf. 1972: 55–102.
22 Finley 1951: 68, with 258 n. 97; cf. 259–260 n. 110.
23 Finley 1951: 272 n. 55, citing F. Heichelheim with approval!

to contribute liturgies. However, that Socrates' advice is implemented by Aristarchus successfully speaks volumes about opportunistic entrepreneurship in an elite individual under stress.

Moreover, I would underline four features here that reflect relatively advanced managerial ideation. First, Socrates puts the onus of blame on Aristarchus for not acting to provide support for his kinswomen, while endeavouring to exclude cultural prejudices about the status of various occupations. Second, Aristarchus has two levels of willingness to borrow: he is reluctant to borrow for subsistence without the reasonable expectation of being able to repay, but does indeed borrow for the raw material to supply his business. Third, Socrates upholds the value of the managerial function, calling Aristarchus a φύλαξ, 'guard', and ἐπιμελητής, 'manager', against Aristarchus' feeling of guilt over his apparent physical inactivity.[24] Fourth, Socrates describes a business model, and Aristarchus puts it into practice, in order to exploit the adventitious appearance in Aristarchus' household of an unusual extended family in comparison to the nuclear families of ordinary Athenian *oikoi*.

Next, in the *Cyropaedia*, there appears in 8.2.5–6 what Finley considers 'the most important ancient text on division of labour'.[25] He pairs this passage with *Poroi* 4.4–6, to which I shall return momentarily. For Finley, the lesson is the low level and inelasticity of demand, and the threat of over-production. And Xenophon is thinking only of local production. One might immediately protest that this interpretation reads a good deal into a relatively straightforward commentary on specialization of labour. One cannot really tell on which level demand has been set, nor whether it changes over time, be it elastically or not. The insights of this passage are typical of the way economic information can be imparted by Xenophon as incidental 'colour', in this case in a description of the excellence of the kitchen of the Persian king. The king's palace is like a large city, in which a high level of demand through a multitude of customers enables task specialization. Of this phenomenon, Xenophon provides as an example the division of shoemaking into production of men's and women's shoes or its separation into stages of production. *Pace* Finley, the geographical range over which the sale of production is anticipated is not made precise by Xenophon.

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24 Xen. *Mem.* 2.7.12–14.

25 Finley 1973/1999: 135–136, cf. 146. This text is usually treated as the first item in dossier of explorations on division of labour, as seen in Sun 2005: 5, 37–38, although a fragment of

In several works, Finley returns to question the way in which Xenophon has summarized the effect of this specialization, which is πάντα καλῶς ποιεῖν, 'to do everything finely'. He suggests that Xenophon has only recognized the improvement in quality in specialization and not its enhanced productivity.[26] Even on its face, this might be a rather cramped reading of Xenophon's final comments: ἀνάγκη οὖν τὸν ἐν βραχυτάτῳ διατρίβοντα ἔργῳ τοῦτον καὶ ἄριστα δὴ ἠναγκάσθαι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, 'it is necessary then that the one spending time on the narrowest task is also bound to accomplish it best' (*Cyropaedia* 8.2.5).

That the improvement envisioned here might encompass something more multi-dimensional than enhancement of quality can be understood by paying closer attention to the semantics. Xenophon is employing ring composition. He speaks first in 8.2.5 about the status of the crafts in large *poleis*: ὥσπερ γὰρ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι διαφερόντως ἐν ταῖς μεγάλαις πόλεσιν ἐξειργασμέναι εἰσί …, 'For just as the other crafts have been brought to a finished state with extraordinary excellence in the large cities …'. In 8.2.6, he concludes his comparison by speaking similarly about the task specialization in the royal kitchen: … ἀνάγκη οἶμαι καὶ ταῦτα οὕτω ποιούμενα πολὺ διαφερόντως ἐξειργάσθαι ἕκαστον, 'I think that it is necessary that each [staff member] also *accomplish* those things produced [in the king's kitchen] with extraordinary excellence'. Please observe what I have emphasized by underline. The verb ἐξεργάζομαι is paired with the adverb διαφερόντως in both passages, and its appearance is probative. In the *Oeconomicus* and elsewhere in the Xenophontic corpus, ἐξεργάζομαι is used to refer to the process by which an entrepreneur can add material inputs or managerial expertise to an underexploited landed property in order to realize greater output and thereby increased profit and value.[27] Therefore, task specialization in the *Cyropaedia* is parallel to the estate improvement undertaken by Xenophon's exemplary investor in land. Craft specialization is more productive and is thus more efficient in our terms. Moreover, the way in which the scale of the market conditions the nature of productive activity consciously reflects autonomous social coordination of the relevant crafts.

Democritus B154D–K indicates earlier sensitivity to its important issues (note Karayiannis 1988: 384). See below for the significance of this passage for Adam Smith.

26 See Finley 1970: 3–4; 1982 [1965]: 186–187, 190–191; followed by Mossé 1975: 171–172. Cf. Tozzi 1961: 42–43; Lowry 1979: 73–75; 1987a: 16–18; 1987b: 68–73; 1998: 19; Pomeroy 1994: 43. In contrast, Nafissi 2005: 216 reads Finley as demonstrating that this passage is the exact opposite of 'an anticipation of Smith's division of labour'.

27 *Oec.* 15.2; 20.22, 23, 26; cf. *Hier.* 9.7; *Hell.* 6.2.6; also *Symp.* 4.61. *Cyr.* 3.2.17–20 has a discussion of misallocated assets.

As to the *Poroi* specifically, let us again consider Finley's contribution. First I must share some background observations. In 1957 Karl Polanyi published a paper entitled 'Aristotle Discovers the Economy'.[28] Polanyi saw early economies as operating by their own rules, which were resistant to the analysis of classical economics. This was because economic relations were embedded within other social functions. Such embeddedness meant that productive behaviour was so thoroughly contingent on other political and social processes that modern economic analysis had nothing to examine. Aristotle marked the line of demarcation because it was in reflection of contemporary economic developments that he described the 'economy' for the first time. Polanyi would partially exempt Xenophon from this judgment of irrelevance for prior Greek texts regarding the market economy, granting him status as a forerunner of Aristotle, the 'discoverer' of the economy. Polanyi's discussion was not only problematical in detail, but it also posited an unproven economic and conceptual transformation in the fourth century. Finley eventually answered with 'Aristotle and Economic Analysis,' in *Past & Present* 1970, an article that I mine throughout this paper for its examination of Xenophon. One must be sympathetic to the basic thrust of Finley's rejoinder. I concede that some of the formulations of Polanyi have a certain metaphorical, impressionistic value for the purposes of the defamiliarization that is necessary in teaching Greek history.[29] However, I remain dubious that Polanyi has much to offer in the way of analysis of the Greek economy. My article 'Karl Polanyi and Greek Trade' of 1984 tried to counter a generous, albeit fanciful, appreciation of his work by Humphreys.[30] While my study has doubtless annoyed Polanyi's many admirers, its conclusions are essentially unrefuted. Unfortunately Finley, in his desire to refute the excesses of Polanyi, adopted a reductionist perspective on the *Poroi* and the *Oeconomicus*.

Before proceeding, however, there must be few words about the *Poroi* in order to provide context. The endemic, pervasive warfare of the late fifth and fourth centuries had made crucial the acquisition of *trophē* for a militarized and hyper-politicized citizen body. For Xenophon, the customary reaction of Attic leadership was to resort to policies of question-

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[28] Reprinted in Polanyi 1968; see esp. 103–104.

[29] Compare North 1981 for an ambitious application of neoclassical economic theory to the entire sweep of Near Eastern and European economic history. Although this effort is marred for the classical world by its neo-Malthusian demography, factual errors, and its unsurprising generality, its criticisms of Polanyi are creditable (42, 106, 120; cf. 180–182).

[30] See Humphreys 1978.

able *dikē* (1.1). His plan for remediation starts with an emphasis on the natural advantages of Attica (1.2–8). Xenophon wants to enhance the status of the metics through improving their conditions of military service, permitting house building, and establishing *metoikophulakes* (2.1–7). Next, noting the commercial advantages of Athens (3.1–2), he would encourage *emporoi* and *nauklēroi* by providing honours and improved adjudication (3.3–5). Further measures would need an investment fund (*aphormē*) raised from capital levies (*eisphorai*) and donations for building lodgings, commercial facilities, and merchant vessels (3.6–14). After explaining the potential for more intensive exploitation of the silver deposits at Laurium, offering manpower shortage as an impediment, and recounting that the demand for silver can never be satisfied (4.1–12), Xenophon boldly proposes a publicly owned slave corps to be leased out for mining (4.13–27). The existence of this workforce would also permit more energetic public exploration for fresh ore beds (4.28–32). Then the *Poroi* deal with hypothetical objections to these public investment plans, first over difficulties of raising capital and of implementation (4.33–40) and, second, over its vulnerability to wartime disruption (4.41–48). Benefits would flow from this proposal in the demographic build-up at Laurium and the moral improvement of the ensuing recipients of *trophē* (4.49–52). Xenophon then argues that strong revenues necessitate peace which is more likely than war to lead to Attic hegemony (5.1–13). The *Poroi* close with a summary, coupled with an exhortation to proceed by consulting Dodona and Delphi (6.1–3).

Let us return to Finley's 'Aristotle and Economic Analysis', where, in his conclusion, he highlights his interpretation of Aristotle by juxtaposing the *Poroi* of Xenophon.[31] He points out that the measures recommended by Xenophon, which he has just summarized, deal with metics and slaves.

> We need not waste time examining the practicality of these schemes. Many harsh things have been said about them by modern scholars—all from the wrong point of view, that of modern economic institutions and ideas. What matters is the mentality revealed in this unique document, a mentality which pushed to the extreme the notion that what we call the economy was properly the exclusive business of outsiders. (Finley 1970: 25)

The conclusion that the observation of economic phenomena was exclusively applied to matters that were engaged in by non-Athenians is incorrect. We have already recounted several examples of Xenophon's

[31] Finley 1970: 23–25.

elucidation of principles of management. The air of dismissal of Xenophon's suggestions is tendentious, as will emerge in detail later.[32]

Xenophon's emphasis on metics and slave labour is an unavoidable outcome of his goal. To increase revenue for *trophē*, he must increase the yield of indirect taxes. In the Athens of the mid-fourth century, it was hardly practical to increase state income by raising the chief direct taxes, the *eisphora* and the liturgies. With a much reduced population and smaller economy, fourth-century Athens had permitted a considerably broadened incidence of such levies.[33] Whether or not one may find his suggestions in the *Poroi* feasible, Xenophon was limited to the sectors of the economy about which one could legislate in the expectation of near-term gains. If every Attic landowner could have been induced to adopt the best farming practices, the agricultural production and the wealth of Athens would have grown appreciably.[34] Yet, outside of exhortation, there were no means to effect such a transformation, although the *Oeconomicus* represents just this sort of espousal of better applications. The silver mining industry was probably the second largest sector of the Athenian economy.[35] Mining fed the treasury through leases, taxes on production, minting fees, and commercial taxes.[36] Xenophon may or may not have been right about a shortage of labour[37] being the main impediment in the way of a recovery by silver mining of its fifth-century levels,[38] but, at all events, his interest in the industry was grounded in common sense and not on *polis* or class ideology. And if he was correct that insufficiency of labour was the chief deficiency, augmenting the availability of slave workers was an appropriate remedy, although a conservative one.[39] Because of their small size, Greek *poleis* had great diffi-

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32 For a sympathetic portrayal of Xenophon's scheme for the purchase of public slaves, see Lauffer 1975.

33 The emphasis is on provision of *trophē* that promotes the right type of political and military activity. Note Xen. *Poroi* 1.1, 6.1, cf. 5.1–2, 6–7. See Gauthier 1984; Schütrumpf 1995: 293–300, Schorn (this volume pp. 689–723).

34 Gauthier 1976: 131–132.

35 Figueira 1998: 220–231.

36 Figueira 1998: 184, 225–227.

37 *Poroi* 4.3–5, 11–12. See Gauthier 1976: 116–120, 129–130.

38 Note also Finley 1973/1999: 72.

39 Like many participants in democratic discourse, Xenophon downplays his plan's onerous aspects (such as its capital possibly raised through an *eisphora*) and minimizes the considerable lag in the returns from the project to its contributors and the Athenians in general. The goal of providing three obols *per diem* to each citizen could not be fully realized until the full complement of three slaves for each citizen was reached. Xenophon is understandably evasive over what return the contributors to the plan for purchasing slaves could expect in the meantime, with the impression given that any early returns be reinvested. Nor does

culty concentrating manpower to undertake augmented economic activity. Agricultural productivity did not advance sufficiently to free labourers from rural employment. The hinterlands of the classical *poleis* were too small in any case to offer many potential recruits for relocation/redeployment.

Athenian finances were heavily dependent on commercial taxes. The commercial sector of the Attic economy was not entirely an autonomous, organic development of the local economy. Late archaic Attica depended on agriculture, extractive industries (especially silver mining, but including quarrying), and craft industries. Through the success of these sectors of its economy and by virtue of its status as the centre of hegemonic power in the Aegean, early classical Attica had become the largest market for goods in the eastern Mediterranean. Consequently, a large commercial sector was grafted onto the Athenian economy in order to exploit the economies of scale and favoured position of this Attic marketplace. Because of restrictions on naturalization, epitomized by the Periclean citizenship law of 451/0, this trade, along with an increased industrial sector, was in the hands of *metoikoi* and *xenoi*. Such persons, those who had merged their economic fates with the Athenians, were entangled in the collapse of the *arkhē*, although the metics and, more so, the *xenoi*, had some ability to extricate themselves, either during the Ionian War or after the Athenian surrender. Thereafter, a diasporic pattern of metic economic activity, disseminated through the Aegean, superseded the previous, more exclusive dominance of the Atheno-local metic economy. In this light, the Xenophontic interest in reviving the commercial and industrial activity that was conducted by metics and foreigners is hardly surprising. It was adaptive and not ideological.[40]

The same reservations also present themselves when we turn to consider Finley's treatment of particular passages in the *Poroi*. Since we have been discussing the metics, it is appropriate to continue with some specific comments of his regarding them.[41] In reviewing his remarks in *The Ancient Economy*, it was uncertain to me what precisely Finley's objections were. His criticism does not appear to pertain to the economic ramifications of Xenophon's reform programme. He seems to be blaming the Athenians for not addressing 'the basic economic cleavage' in their society, as he

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Xenophon factor in attrition to the mining manpower through death, incapacitation, or manumission. Consider *Poroi* 3.6–10; 4.17–18, 23–24. See Cataudella 1985; Neri 1986.

40 His context for writing was either the immediate aftermath of the Social War or the period of the Peace of Philocrates. See Cataudella 1986; Bloch 2004; Schorn 2006 (the latter two are also valuable for their summary of earlier scholarship). On the earlier context, also see Bodei Giglioni 1970: vii–xxix; Dillery 1993; Vannier 1993.

41 Finley 1973/1999: 163–164; cf. 1951: 60, with 252 n. 46.

portrays it elsewhere.[42] As we have seen already, however, that notion both confuses variable participation by different social groups with impermeable compartmentalization, and exaggerates the differentials between the norms and practices of different spheres of the Attic economy. A deeper problem here is Finley's tendency to over-emphasize status (in Weberian terms) as precluding both adaptation to economic conditions or adoption of more advantageous (perhaps more differentiated) behaviours. While such legal or ideological preemption can be significant, it is mistaken to view the statuses themselves in detachment from their emergence from earlier social and economic circumstances.

Finley sees the proposal to offer metics building lots as bold because it breached conventional limits on the acquisition of real estate by non-citizens.[43] Yet he also adduces Xenophon's failure to argue for altering the *metoikion*, the *per capita* tax on resident aliens. That criticism, however, is better directed at Attic reluctance to naturalize immigrants. Yet more than unreasoning tradition was at work in any failure to propose more liberal measures to attract immigrants in the fourth century. Athens had absorbed in the early fourth century thousands of its former colonists and other democratic refugees, like the enfranchised Samians.[44] Can we then be surprised at the formulation that Xenophon adopted to espouse the acceptance of even highly qualified immigrants who brought a capacity to support themselves along with them? He reached the judgment that any newcomers ought to be content with metic status.

Finley's notion of cleavage between a civic-economy and a non-civic economy of metics and *xenoi* deserves a little more discussion, even if it will take us away momentarily from the *Poroi* in order to consider the *Oeconomicus*. To downplay the advice of the *Oeconomicus* as ideological, conventional, or unreal serves to cement the appearance of primitivism in the civic economy of the Athenians. As early as his *Land and Credit*, Finley had idiosyncratically denied the historicity of the land-improvement activities described in the dialogue by Ischomachus.[45] In his rejoinder to Polanyi, 'Aristotle and the Economy', Finley dismisses Xenophontic *oikonomia* as divorced from *khrēmatistikē*, relegating it to an insignificant category

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42 Finley 1951: 77–78, with 264 nn. 14, 16. Cf. 1970: 21–22.
43 For further discussion, see Jansen (this volume, pp. 746–753).
44 Figueira 1991: 241–249.
45 Finley 1951: 270 n. 46. See also Mossé 1975: 170. Contrast Pomeroy 1994: 340 with n. 321.

of *Hausvaterliteratur*.[46] Finley is reflecting the tendency toward moralizing in Xenophon that is coupled with his and his contemporaries' inability to elevate their pragmatic intuitions into interpretative systems. An insightful observation is often juxtaposed with a remark revealing stock moralizing or cultural prejudice. Nevertheless, the thrust of much of the *Oeconomicus* is to apply purposive, opportunizing behaviour to increase the *oikos* 'household' or 'estate'.[47] This behaviour-pattern is dramatized by a terminology based on the root αὐξ-.[48] A linked concept is περιουσία, which connotes a balance brought forward or an amount applicable to other endeavours, approximating, but not quite equivalent to, our idea of gross profits.[49]

Early in the *Oeconomicus* Socrates describes to Critobulus the dependence of success on knowledge, on what might be termed purposive subsistence strategies.[50] The agricultural entrepreneur seeks assets that are not intensively exploited.[51] As I have already noted, that intensification of cultivation or managerial attention is often expressed by the verb ἐξεργάζομαι.[52] The entrepreneur looks for property where applications of experience, managerial expertise, and material investment yield a greater increment (ἐπίδοσις).[53] Earlier, Xenophon had stressed the point of managerial supervision: if one ensures attention and commitment to tasks, important differences in output are produced.[54] Xenophon is presenting a characteristic terminology that embodied a managerial awareness, in which there

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[46] Finley 1970: 20–21. This audacious label is naturally a metaphor of which the very anachronism betrays an insecurity of judgment.

[47] *Oec.* 1.5–15 establishes an οἰκία, 'estate', as constituted from κτήματα, 'possessions', or χρήματα, 'wealth'/'property' which are utilizable by their owner. Cf. *Mem.* 3.8.7–8. See Lowry 1987b: 76–79; 1998: 19; also Tozzi 1961: 37–40.

[48] *Oec.* 1.4, 16; 2.1; 3.10, 15; 5.1; 6.4; 7.16; 9.12; 11.8, 12; cf. 1.6; 7.43. See Pomeroy 1994: 52.

[49] *Oec.* 1.4, 2.10 *bis*, 11.13, 20.21, 21.9; cf. 7.15 (προσγενήσεται, 'shall receive addition'). The concept is significant and well established both in Thucydides, especially in book 1, where it describes the growth in early Greek prosperity and military power (1.2.2, 7.1, 8.3–4, 11.1–2, 141.5; 2.13.2; cf. 5.71.3) and in contemporary Attic administration (Figueira 1998: 363–364).

[50] *Oec.* 2.17–18; compare *Cyr.* 1.6.18 on the ἐργάτην στρατηγόν. Cf. Lowry 1987b: 50–54.

[51] *Oec* 20.22–23. Note *Cyr.* 3.2.17–20 for another description of intensification of the use of idle or under-utilized assets: Lowry 1987b: 64–66.

[52] See n. 27 above.

[53] *Oec.* 20.23 *ter*; cf. *Hier.* 1.18. The value-adding aspect of this entrepreneurship is made clear by the comparison with adding onto a building or bringing it to completion for sale (*Oec.* 20.29: ἐξοικοδομοῦντες).

[54] *Oec.* 20.16–22. See also the passages discussed in Lowry 1987a: 11–14 (e.g., *Oec.* 21.3, 21.9). Note Luccioni 1947: 85–86; also Figueira et al. 2001: 92, 131–132, 134–135, 185, 187.

appear λυσιτελεῖν, 'to profit',[55] ἐπιμέλεια, 'supervision',[56] γνώμη, 'judgment',[57] and ἀκρίβεια, 'exactitude'.[58] Thus, Ischomachus describes his father, a man who exemplified these practices, as φιλογεωργότατος, 'most enamoured of farming'.[59] In answer, Socrates provides a jocular analogy, serving up grain merchants' love for wheat, which leads them to convey it wherever it is most esteemed, i.e., its price is highest.[60] Also demonstrated here is Xenophon's grasp of the effects of supply and demand as an autonomous process on the international movement of grain cargoes, but observe how the essential function of price data collection and comparison is given packaging as personal predilection.[61] Indeed, the *Oeconomicus* illustrates an intuitive approach on the part of the head of an *oikos* toward making changes at the margins of economic behaviour, so that the prosperity of his household is increased. That incremental changes, yielding marginal gains,[62] are prominent in Xenophontic managerial intuition undermines Finley's reductionist appraisal.

The same discussion about the house lots to be afforded to prospective metics in Xenophon's proposal yielded another distinctly questionable argument by Finley.[63] In *Poroi* 2.6,[64] Xenophon observes that there were many places empty of buildings within the walls that might be used to attract metics. He proposes granting suitable applicants the right of *enktēsis* of these sites as an inducement to immigrate. Finley is led to conclude that urban real estate had little monetary value. However, the existence of such

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55 Note the appearance here of λυσιτελέω (*Oec.* 20.16 *bis*, 21). Cf. *Oec.* 6.11; 14.2, 5 for the converse specification and avoidance of disadvantageous behaviours or practices.

56 The term ἐπιμέλεια as managerial supervision anchors a critical thematic complex in the *Oeconomicus*, where semantically related words connected with the stem ἐπιμέλ- appear 101 times. See Descat 1988: 110–111.

57 *Oec.* 2.18; 20.6; 21.2, 3 (ἀγνώμονές εἰσι), 8 *bis*. See Faraguna 1994: 563.

58 With related terminology: *Oec.* 2.3; 8.10, 11, 17; 16.1, 14; 20.10. See Faraguna 1994: 567–572.

59 *Oec.* 20.26.

60 *Oec.* 20.27–29. See also Figueira et al. 2001: 132–133.

61 See Figueira 1985: 167. The terminology of economic demand, expressed by (προσ)δέομαι, is represented in the *Oeconomicus* (3.5, 6.11, 8.2) and *Poroi* (1.4, 3.2, 4.8, 4.9), but, characteristically of ancient economic semantics, its usage is not differentiated from other connotations.

62 *Oec.* 8.11–23 (expert stowage of equipment on a Phoenician merchant ship), 9.11–17 (a wife's preservation of domestic goods), 11.16 (supervision of agricultural chores), 12.19–20 (detailed supervision of workers), 18.1–10 (close observation and adjustment in farming), 20.10–24 (progression from idle to expertly cultivated lands; cf. Lowry 1987b: 63). In this vein, Lowry also notes *Hiero* 9.6–11 (1987a: 14; 1987b: 63–67). *Symposium* 7.1–5 also seems to portray a calculus of risks and marginal gains (Lowry 1998: 20).

63 Finley 1951: 61 with n. 50.

64 Gauthier 1976: 66–68. On *Poroi* 2.1–7, note Gauthier 1976: 56–74.

vacant lots is hardly a surprise. While Athens of the early years of the Archidamian War was thronged with evacuees from the countryside, who were even camping in sacred precincts,[65] the reduced population of the city in the period of the Social War had no need for many sites on which buildings may once have stood. Land values may well have been depressed, as they have become in some American cities whose economies were hollowed out by the departure of industry and the flight of their taxpaying classes. Whether one would choose to assert the lack of value of building sites so categorically is another matter. Moreover, to proceed to question on this basis Xenophon's anticipation that land values at Laurium might rise constitutes a rash leap in reasoning.[66] Xenophon suggests that the importation of additional slave workers there and the general revival of the silver mining industry would create *poluanthrōpia*, 'high population', at Laurium. A corollary of this growth in numbers would be an increase of the value of land there, making it comparable with suburban lots. His price comparison may be mere surmise, lacking any basis in data actually in his possession, but there is no reason to think that there was anything counterintuitive about it, and it does embody a 'developer's' economic rationalization.

I have already noted Finley's reference to *Poroi* 4.3–6, a passage that he connected with the previously discussed remarks on labour specialization in the *Cyropaedia*. Here Xenophon is noting that the silver mining industry at Laurium in Attica is always in need of labourers. Hence there is no φθόνος, 'spite' or 'grudge', against competitive entries into this business sector, which is denoted by the participle ἐπικατασκευαζομένοις,[67] as there are not only in the other craft industries—copper-smiths and blacksmiths are the stated parallels—but also in farming. This is the language of competition going back to Hesiod.[68] For Finley, this passage proves that demand will not stand up to pressure. Moreover, Xenophon is thinking only of the local market. Finley's comments are not only erroneous in their own terms, but also wrong-headed about the import of this passage.

Those workshop owners who were hesitant about adding additional workers were in fact concerned about the marginal utility of such a decision. This sort of calculation is a relatively sophisticated prudential judgment. The balancing of the risks of losses against marginal gains is present not only here in Xenophon, but also in a number of other passages,

65 Thuc. 2.17.1–4; cf. Arist. *Eq*. 792–793.
66 Xen. *Poroi* 4.50; cf. Gauthier 1976: 188–189.
67 Gauthier 1976: 118–119.
68 Hes. *Op*. 24–26.

especially in a group of attestations from the *Oeconomicus* (as has already been noted). Finley might well have noted here that the anxiety surrounding this decision-making was necessarily sharpened in a context dominated by servile labour. The necessity to purchase slave workers converted increases in labour inputs into capital expenditures, just like tools, premises, and raw materials. Thus, those who contemplated expanding production could face greater risks than their counterparts in an economy where wage labour prevailed. Xenophon intended to shift that burden of risk to the *polis* through his corps of leased mine slaves.

To be sure, Finley correctly noted that the focus of these metal workshops was on the local market. They produced relatively uniform goods, and it is unlikely that foreign manufacturers, serving much smaller home markets, could achieve gains in productivity sufficient to offset the costs of transportation, particularly in competition with producers who were serving the large Attic market for such goods. Such gains would naturally arise only for exceptional products of international viability, whether on utilitarian grounds or out of aesthetic cachet (such as very large vessels or those exhibiting sophisticated welding). Nonetheless, the market for the production of silver is clearly international, as Xenophon envisages silver coinage as a default export from Attica for foreign merchants.[69] Moreover, the market for foodstuffs is also treated as regional in scope elsewhere in Xenophon, notably in the passage about grain merchants in the *Oeconomicus* that has been described above.[70]

Finley missed two important features of the Athenian economy illustrated by this passage, both of which indicate a comparatively mature market economy. Xenophon is contrasting the supply and demand mechanism for iron and bronze products with the supply and demand for silver. The two former follow a pattern in which glutting of their market with products leads to a collapse of individual businesses, an outcome that would constitute no surprise for classical economic thinking. An increase, however, in the output of silver does not reduce the demand for silver, and producers find customers for new production. That Xenophon exempts silver from the supply and demand mechanism established for other products is a by-product of his failure to generalize his observation (an aspect of his deficient appreciation of the 'economy' as a distinct sphere of human activity in social organization). Therefore, he cannot be expected to discover its particular rules. Empirically, his error is understandable inasmuch as the demand for

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69 *Poroi* 3.1–2 with Figueira 1998: 234–235.
70 *Oec.* 20.27–29. See also Figueira et al. 2001: 132–133.

silver may well have seemed infinite to an observer without a theory of supply and demand or without control of a large set of data.[71] The Attic silver mining industry was both highly productive and bonded to a democratic political order that ensured that coins were produced without manipulation of metallic content to the highest contemporary standard of purity. During the classical period, Athenian coins provided the main component for the monetization of the Aegean economy and served as an accepted medium for transaction in Egypt and farther afield. Pre-modern economies that do not depend on token or fiduciary money are notable for difficulties in maintaining an adequate money supply. Accordingly, the raw material, silver, was used to fabricate a product, Attic silver coins, the market for which had actually never been satisfied, let alone satiated. Thus, the demand for Attic silver might reasonably have seemed infinite to a commentator in the second quarter of the fourth century. Additionally, Finley fails to highlight Xenophon's more dubious extrapolation in which he proceeds to the psychological observation that individuals can never acquire enough silver, being content to bury their surplus. Here Xenophon draws less empirically on a persistent archaic tradition about the insatiability of man's appetite for *khrēmata*.[72] His remarks have predictably melded the normative with the pragmatic.

The second point to notice is the way in which Xenophon describes the reaction to gluts in the market for food. When there is much wheat or wine, they become cheaply priced. Then *geōrgiai* 'farming establishments' become unprofitable. Throughout the economic commentary of Xenophon, the status of activities as profitable or non-profitable is unsurprisingly a prominent theme, as already noted.[73] What happens next is less predictable: Xenophon says that many give up developing land and turn to commerce, retail activity, and lending (4.6: πολλοὶ ἀφιέμενοι τοῦ τὴν γῆν ἐργάζεσθαι ἐπ' ἐμπορίας καὶ καπηλείας καὶ τοκισμοὺς τρέπονται). The alternative of *tokismos* 'money-lending' is revealing. This comment certainly does not mean that farmers working for subsistence turned to other gainful activities, but that those with resources turned away from investment in agriculture toward other economic sectors in which to put their capital to work. This passage then becomes an important testimony on fourth-century

71 Compare Figueira 1998: 230–231.

72 Folk socio-pathology stigmatized this insatiability: Solon 13.71–73 ~ Thgn. 227–232; Thgn. 595–602; 1157–1158; cf. Bacchyl. 1.160; Pind. *Nem.* 11.47–48; and the cultural predominance of such views influenced Arist. *Pol.* 1256b26–1258a14. See Figueira 1995: esp. 49–51.

73 See, e.g., *Oec.* 6.11, 20.16, 21.

entrepreneurial initiative, in which choices were governed by differential returns. These observations thus also reflect perceptions of autonomy and self-equilibration, which I noted in my introduction.

Legacies

The influence of the perspective of Finley on classical economic conditions can be profitably judged if we take up a recent reference work that is ostensibly inspired by his analysis, *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World* of 2007. The editors (Scheidel, Morris and Saller) discuss the transformative character of Moses Finley's work in their introduction.[74] Yet our subject Xenophon does just manage to edge Finley with twenty-one to eighteen 'call-outs' in their respective entries in the index. Assessing the real impact of Finley's views on Xenophon turns out to be a more frustrating exercise. There is considerable deference to the influence of his perspective or paradigms, where he is sometimes coupled with Max Weber—not without a hint of grandiosity.[75] Other authors, however, categorically reject Finley's basic appraisal when they investigate aspects of classical economic history.[76] On Xenophon, this bifurcated appreciation can even reach the level of cognitive dissonance. Richard Saller, in his contribution 'Household and Gender' forgets the 'Finleyan' principles of the introduction, concedes the *Oeconomicus* is not modern economics (an unnecessary reassurance), and proceeds to quarry the treatise on 'the gendered division of labour'.[77] His subsequent references happily utilize Xenophon in complete innocence of the strictures of Finley as outlined in the 'Introduction' in a positivistic mode of description that would not be out of place in the work of Franz Heichelheim or Alfred French.

Fortunately, the chapter on production in classical Greece was placed in the hands of John Davies. Here we receive an immediate declaration of an intention to draw on Xenophon.[78] We find a series of comments that treat Xenophon as a source on a wide variety of topics.[79] Strikingly, Davies returns

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[74] Scheidel et al. 2007: 3–4.

[75] Scheidel 2007: 7, 11, but contrast 8 on Finley's views on the Near Eastern economic phenomena; Bennet 2007: 190; Morris 2007: 213, 219; Jongman 2007: 602.

[76] Schneider 2007: 145 (on technological innovation); Möller 2007: 368–369 (the sophistication of archaic trade); von Reden 2007: 387 (the consumer city); Harris 2007: 523 (late Roman Republican finance).

[77] Saller 2007: 87.

[78] Davies 2007: 333.

[79] Davies 2007: 340, 343–344, 345, 347–348.

to Ischomachus and the *Oeconomicus* at the end of his contribution, with a generous appreciation of the value of its treatment of the household, detecting a strong hint of the Protestant work ethic. Such a comment implicitly rebukes Max Weber, along with Moses Finley. A questionable division of the material among production, distribution, and consumption causes a parallel chapter to become 'Classical Greece: Distribution', written by Astrid Möller. Here Xenophon is a mere source of 'facts'.[80] Thus, the editors of *The Cambridge Economic History* briefly make obeisance toward Finley's interpretation of Xenophon, and then the volume gets down to the business of utilizing Xenophontic evidence as though Finley had never written.

Conclusion

To summarize: I have upheld the judgment that Xenophon and his contemporaries lacked a concept of the 'economy', although I think that it would have been rather astounding had he and they done so. Their conceptual boundaries were to an extent circumscribed by their limited abilities to count, measure, record, and calculate. Nevertheless, I have also argued on behalf of Xenophon's sensitivity to economic phenomena, with particular emphasis on his adoption of an early psychology of purposive, opportunistic decision-making. Moses Finley's many contributions ought never to be gainsaid, among which stand his critiques of unselfconscious modernizing, his adduction and blending of different evidentiary assets, his sensitivity to the influence of ideology and paradigms, and his attention to large social and cultural complexes. Here I have critiqued the views of Finley on Xenophon which, frankly, I found quite minimizing and tendentious. He has failed to do justice to the very awareness of the intermediate character of ancient economic life that he promulgated, one where features of subsistence agrarian economies were mixed with processes that seem to belong to more differentiated structures.

It appears that Adam Smith reached his crucial insight that the division of labour is determined by the extent of the market from reading Xenophon *Cyropaedia* 8.2.5–6,[81] one of the very passages about which it is necessary to defend Xenophon against the criticisms of Finley. Therefore, while I am uncomfortable hypothesizing Xenophon as the discoverer of the 'economy'

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80 Möller 2007: 363, 364, 373, 375, 377, 382. A scatter of other references completes the dossier: Scheidel et al. 2007: 31, 395, 466, 477.

81 Lowry has emphasized this point (1979: 73–75; 1987a: 16–18; 1987b: 68–73; 1998: 19), extrapolating from the fundamental study of Meek & Skinner 1973.

in a Polanyian spirit, we may be warranted in viewing him as the earliest extant management consultant or managerial *guru*, as the cliché would have them. To appreciate this suggestion, it is worth remembering how largely moral exhortation and elicitation of leadership qualities looms in such literature. Actual management even today is seldom viewed as the implementation of insights of a technological and economic nature, but as the embodiment of a value system. The ancient Adam Smith seems out of Xenophon's reach, but the ancient Peter Drucker might just work.[82]

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[82] Drucker is considered the leading figure in studies of management in the second half of the twentieth century. Note the following works, some of which have appeared in multiple printings and editions, and which are a small selection: Drucker 1946, 1954, 1974, 1999. His extraordinary influence is also attested by the compendia collecting or summarizing his insights: Beatty 1998; Drucker 2001; Edersheim 2007.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF XENOPHON'S *POROI*[*]

Stefan Schorn

The *Poroi* (*Ways and Means*) is probably the most puzzling among Xenophon's works.[1] In older scholarship, the proposals it contains for increasing the revenues of Athens have often been criticized and dismissed as unrealistic. Verdicts like 'nothing is unclear in the whole account, but almost everything is ill-founded'[2] or 'it does not contain one single idea that could be put into practice'[3] can be found in great number. For a long time in the past, students of economic history regarded the *Poroi*, as the other works of Xenophon, as irrelevant for the history of economic theory.[4] It is only in more recent years that one sometimes comes across more positive appraisals.[5] Today the *Poroi* is studied almost exclusively by students

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[1] See most recently also Dillery 1993: 1.

[2] Böckh in Böckh-Fränkel 1886: I.703: 'Unklares ist in dieser ganzen Darstellung nichts, aber unbegründet beinahe alles'.

[3] Beloch 1923: 452: 'sie enthält keinen einzigen Gedanken, der praktisch zu verwirklichen gewesen wäre'; for further statements on the value of the *Poroi*, see von der Lieck 1933: 1–4 and Breitenbach 1967: 1760–1761.

[4] For references, see Lowry 1987: 48–49; see also Lauffer 1975: 171 with further negative statements which Lauffer, however, does not endorse. Lowry 1987: 46–81 offers an appraisal of Xenophon from an economic point of view; a positive evaluation of the *Poroi* can be also found in Lama 1954 and Samuel 1983: 21–25; a review of scholarship is provided by Jansen 2007: 8–16.

[5] Breitenbach 1967: 1760–1761; Lauffer 1975: 189 in his concluding remarks on Xenophon's mining programme: 'Wenn wir es abschliessend würdigen wollen, können wir soviel sagen, dass es die Richtung weist, in die sich die Poliswirtschaft im 4. Jahrhundert entwickelt hat oder sich hätte weiter entwickeln können und müssen. Deshalb konnte auch Xenophon selbst mit gutem Recht darüber sagen: "der Plan ist keineswegs unmöglich und auch nicht

of antiquity who have a special interest in economic, social and intellectual history whose aim is to locate Xenophon's proposals within the context of economic activity in the fourth century and to look for analogies with ideas found in Isocrates (*De Pace*, *Areopagiticus*) or in the policies of Eubulus and Lycurgus.[6] In this regard, Eckhart Schütrumpf's introduction to his edition of the text, in which he contextualizes Xenophon's proposals within the framework of fourth century political theory, and Joseph Jansen's dissertation, in which the author, among other things, discusses the economic measures within their historical context and within the framework of the history of economic theory, especially deserve to be mentioned.[7] After the nineteenth century debate about the work's authenticity had come to an end, philologists undertook almost no research on the *Poroi* for a long time. This does not come as a surprise given its somewhat drab topic. In more recent times, however, Vincent Azoulay and Pierre Pontier have made important contributions to a better understanding of the position of the *Poroi* within Xenophon's political philosophy.[8] Meanwhile the authenticity of the text is uncontested among philologists,[9] although from time to

schwierig"' ('if we wish to make a concluding assessment, we can say this much, that it shows the direction in which the *polis* economy had developed in the fourth century—or could and should have developed. So Xenophon himself could also say with good justification: "the plan is in no way impossible and is even not difficult"'). Compare Dillery 1993: 1–2.

[6] See esp. the important commentary by Gauthier 1976; the extensive introduction in the edition of Bodei Giglioni 1970 is equally instructive; cf. also Mossé 1975; Cataudella 1985; Neri 1986 [1988]; Vannier 1993; Lowry 1998; Frolov 1973 wrote under the influence of socialist economic theory; for a bibliography on the *Poroi*, see Vela Tejada 1998: 45–47; 202 (index, s.v.); on the relationship between the *Poroi* and the politics of Eubulus, see Böckh in Böckh-Fränkel 1886: I.698 n.d; Herzog 1914: 478–480; Thiel 1922: XXIII–XXV; Lama 1954: 130; Sealey 1955; Cawkwell 1963: 64–66; Lauffer 1975: 192 n. 14 (further literature); Bodei Giglioni 1970: XXXV–XLVI; Näf 1997; Doty 2003: 5; Pontier 2006: 391 with n. 1; Jansen 2007: 9–10 (see there, n. 27, for further literature); 253; 260; on the relationship between Isocrates and the *Poroi*, see Kanitz 1873: 9–16 (*inter alia* with a table listing parallels); Delebecque 1957: 471; Breitenbach 1967: 1754; Bodei Giglioni 1970: XIX–XXIX; Vannier 1993; Sealey 1993: 112–116; Dillery 1993: 1 n. 4 (further literature); Näf 1997: 331–339; Jansen 2007: 8–10, 46 n. 49 (further literature).

[7] Schütrumpf 1982; cf. also Schütrumpf 1995; Jansen 2007. Interesting remarks can also be found in Dillery 1993, Figueira 1998: 231–236 and Azoulay 2004: esp. 76–90; 221–230. Jansen presented some of the results of his dissertation at the Liverpool conference: see his chapter in this volume, pp. 725–760.

[8] Azoulay 2004 and Pontier 2006; on their contributions see below n. 15.

[9] Against authenticity e.g. Oncken 1862: 96–101; Hagen 1866; Kanitz 1873: 17–21; Pöhlmann in Pöhlmann & Oertel 1925: I.240 (Oertel in: Pöhlmann & Oertel 1925: II.514, 532 leaves the question of authorship undecided); Schwahn 1931: esp. 258–259; von der Lieck 1933: 1 with n. 1; doubts regarding authenticity also in Beloch 1923: 452. For arguments against inauthenticity, see Zurborg 1874; Gleininger 1874; Thiel 1922: XIII–XXIII; Momigliano 1932: 252 n. 1 (against Schwahn). The arguments put forward by the advocates of both authenticity and inauthen-

time it is still challenged by ancient historians.[10] In this chapter, authenticity is taken for granted, and the interpretation of the text which follows will confirm that there is no reason for doubt.[11] Its aim is to contribute to the understanding of the *Poroi* by analysing Xenophon's proposals in the context of his views on leadership, a topic which he discusses in theoretical form in (especially) the *Memorabilia* and in the *Oeconomicus* and which he illustrates by means of historical examples in the works in which he deals with monarchic rule, i.e. the *Cyropaedia*, the *Hiero* and the *Agesilaus*. It will emerge that our understanding of the programme Xenophon presents in the *Poroi* is enhanced by viewing it as the author's attempt to transfer to the Athenian democracy the basic ideas of leadership which he first developed by studying relations between individuals and then applied to the context of monarchic rule. This approach can already be found in a number of passages in Azoulay's dissertation where he analyzes the proposals contained in the *Poroi* in the framework of Xenophon's 'charismatic theory'. The following remarks may therefore be considered a systematization, continuation and (sometimes) modification of Azoulay's work. At the same time they also pay special attention to Xenophon's argumentative strategies.

The objective of Xenophon's proposals, presented as a speech addressed to the Athenians,[12] is to remedy a serious problem: some of the leading Athenian politicians (προεστηκότων ... τινες) claim that the only way to alleviate the poverty of Athenian citizens is to act unjustly towards 'the cities', that is Athenian allies.[13] Xenophon's aim is to show how the Athenians can

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ticity are not merely important regarding the history of scholarship: to the first group we owe many references to analogous conceptions in other works by Xenophon, while the second group informs us about conceptual differences. The latter are not, of course, indications of spuriousness, but rather show that Xenophon argues differently in different works, viz. according to the respective addressee. It is therefore not always advisable to use such differences and 'contradictions' for the purpose of dating Xenophon's works.

10 As most recently Cataudella 1986.

11 I have shown in Schorn 2006 that there are no chronological grounds for regarding the *Poroi* as inauthentic; cf. also Bloch 2004 and Jansen 2007: 30–56.

12 So Thiel 1922: XXVIII with references to the relevant passages, e.g. εἴ γε μὴν ταῦτα δόξειεν ὑμῖν πράττειν, συμβουλεύσαιμ' ἂν ἔγωγε, 6.2. Thiel regards the *Poroi* as a fictitious speech addressed to the *ekklēsia*, Näf 1997: 331 to the *boulē*; Delebecque 1957: 475 leaves it open. Jansen 2007: 56–104 also argues that the *boulē* was the main addressee, but at the same time emphasizes that the work was a political pamphlet. In the following paraphrase of the *Poroi* and throughout my paper I am drawing freely on Marchant 1968. In the same way I have made use of other printed translations: for the *Cyropaedia* Ambler 2001, for the *Anabasis* Brownson 1998 and for the *Memorabilia* and the *Symposium* Tredennick & Waterfield 1990.

13 On Athens' policy in the time of the Second League, see Thiel 1922: 40–42 and Jansen 2007: 141–206. In his comprehensive study of the League, Dreyer 1995: esp. 281–287 opposes

use their own resources to make a living (1.1). Having first pointed out that nature has endowed Athens with all the necessary prerequisites (1.2–8), he presents his economic proposals. The *polis*, he argues, should try to encourage as many metics as possible to take up residence in Athens because they are self-supporting, do not receive pay and indeed (on the contrary) are liable to a metic tax (2). Furthermore, incentives should be provided for foreign merchants to trade in Athens, a measure which is expected to yield higher revenues in the form of rental fees and taxes (3.1–6). While an increase of the revenues in these sectors can be achieved without start-up financing by the *polis*—I will come back later on to the details of the programme—other measures aimed at raising public revenue will require investment on the part of the state. He proposes that the *polis* use the money collected by a special tax (εἰσφορά) for operations in the private sector such as the construction of lodgings for foreign ship-owners near the harbours and for merchants near the market-places, of boarding houses for other visitors, and of lodgings and shops for merchants in the Piraeus and in the city, thus making a profit for the *polis* (presumably by leasing the facilities in question).[14] He also proposes that the *polis* should build a fleet of public merchant vessels for lease (3.6–14). But Xenophon's most elaborate proposals are those regarding the exploitation of the Laurium silver mines. He suggests that the state should buy, over many years, a sufficient number of public slaves for there to be three of them per citizen. These slaves should be hired out to the private tenants of the mines at a price of one obol a day. As a consequence, Athens will eventually be able to provide every Athenian citizen with a daily allowance of three obols to cover his basic requirements (4). A further benefit is that a small town with a local market will develop in the mining district. From this market, as well as from the construction of state-owned buildings and furnaces, additional revenues can be expected (4.49–50). In order to obtain revenues from all these sources and to apply them to the purposes suggested, the *polis* must be at peace. Therefore Athens must pursue a policy of peace. This in turn will make the city even more attractive to visitors, induce other cities to accept subordination under Athenian hegemony out of their own free will (5) and lead to general prosperity and *eudaimonia* in Athens (6).

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the view that the League turned into an empire (*archē*) from the 360s onwards; however, he does not deny individual Athenian interventions in the internal affairs of her allies, and he concludes that the reality was 'between empire and free alliance' (287). Xenophon thus adopts a much more critical attitude towards the Athenian behaviour against her allies.

[14] Thus Gauthier 1976: 105; Gauthier is also right in referring δημόσια at the end of the sentence to all the lodging-houses mentioned before.

In order to demonstrate the extent to which the proposals in the *Poroi* are dependent on Xenophon's philosophical doctrine, I shall compare them with the views of the xenophontic Socrates as found (especially) in the *Memorabilia* and the *Oeconomicus*, because it is precisely through the words of his Socrates that Xenophon presents a coherent concept of leadership. That Xenophon himself largely endorsed this concept becomes clear from certian passages in his works in which he speaks for himself. These will also be taken into account in my interpretation of the *Poroi*.[15]

The *Poroi* begins with the following statement:

> Ἐγὼ μὲν τοῦτο ἀεί ποτε νομίζω, ὁποῖοί τινες ἂν οἱ προστάται ὦσι, τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν Ἀθήνησι προεστηκότων ἔλεγόν τινες ὡς γιγνώσκουσι μὲν τὸ δίκαιον οὐδενὸς ἧττον τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, διὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ πλήθους πενίαν ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἔφασαν ἀδικώτεροι εἶναι περὶ τὰς πόλεις, ἐκ τούτου ἐπεχείρησα σκοπεῖν εἴ πῃ δύναιντ' ἂν οἱ πολῖται διατρέφεσθαι ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν, ὅθενπερ καὶ δικαιότατον, νομίζων, εἰ τοῦτο γένοιτο, ἅμα τῇ τε πενίᾳ αὐτῶν ἐπικεκουρῆσθαι ἂν καὶ τῷ ὑπόπτους τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εἶναι. (1.1)

> My view has always been that the *politeia* of a city reflects the character of its leaders. But some of the leading men at Athens keep saying that, while they recognize justice no less well than other men, the poverty of the masses

[15] For reasons of space the majority of these references will be placed in the footnotes. At this point, I have to point to a methodological problem that characterizes scholarship on Xenophon. Scholars usually collect statements from different works, put into the mouth of different persons by Xenophon, in order to reconstruct 'Xenophon's concept of leadership'. See e.g. Scharr 1919: esp. 169–315: 'Xenophons Stellung zur Monarchie'; Heintzeler 1927: 34–42; Wood 1964; Hutchinson 2000: 180–223: 'The ideal commander'. An exception is Wolf 1954: 102–183: in his fundamental study *Griechisches Rechtsdenken* he analyzes every work of Xenophon separately. There are indeed many correspondences between the views that Xenophon holds himself and those he puts into the mouth of his 'positive figures', but caution is recommended since there are also differences in the detail. On the differences between Socrates' teaching and that of Simonides in the *Hiero* and on their consequences for the interpretation of the *Hiero*, see Schorn 2008. The parallels between the *Poroi* on the one side and the Socratic and the monarchic works on the other have, of course, been recorded in the commentaries, esp. by Gauthier 1976. A similar approach to that proposed here can now be found in Pontier 2006: 391–397, who sees a conceptual congruence between the *Poroi* and the *Cyropaedia* and concludes: 'L'ordre instauré dans les *Poroi* repose sur quelques principes présents dans la *Cyropédie*: la prise en compte concrète de l'espace (χώρα), l'émulation, l'attention (récompenses et surveillance)' ('the order established in the *Poroi* rests on certain principles that are present in the *Cyropaedia*: a solid appreciation of space [χώρα], competition, attention [rewards and monitoring]'). Important observations on the 'charismatic concept' that forms the basis of the *Poroi* as well as of the other works of Xenophon can now be found in Azoulay 2004. He is right in emphasizing that the *Poroi* must not be interpreted without taking Xenophon's other works into consideration. His interpretation is largely in agreement with mine. As the *Cyropaedia* can be seen as an application of the theory of the Socratic works in a monarchical state, so the *Poroi* can be regarded as such an application within the context of Athenian democracy.

> means that they are compelled to be somewhat unjust in their dealings with the cities. So I began to wonder whether there was any way the citizens might be entirely supported from their own land—which would certainly be the fairest source. For I felt that, if this were the situation, they would be relieved at once both of their poverty and of being regarded with suspicion by the Greek world (tr. Tuplin)

Xenophon expresses himself here in a way that does not make his meaning instantly clear. To begin with, the meaning of πολιτεία is problematic. Scharr and others interpreted it as 'state': ('wie der Herrscher, so der Staat'),[16] while Schütrumpf translates: 'Ich vertrete immer schon die Auffassung, daß die Verhältnisse in den Staaten so sind wie die Qualität ihrer Führer'.[17] Gauthier, however, rightly points out that a πολιτεία is, above all, an association of πολῖται, and refers to a revealing analogy in the last chapter of the *Cyropaedia* (8.8.5). Here Xenophon discusses the reason for the decline of the Persian Empire and degeneration of the Persians, and he finds it in their προστάται. In this context, he affirms in general terms: ὁποῖοί τινες γὰρ ἂν οἱ προστάται ὦσι, τοιοῦτοι καὶ οἱ ὑπ' αὐτοὺς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίγνονται ('for whatever the rulers are like, that is by and large what those under them become'). Thus, to the kings and subjects in Persia correspond the leading politicians and the citizens of democratic Athens. Gauthier is therefore right to deduce that the meaning of πολιτεῖαι in the *Poroi* passage is 'les communautés civiques en tant qu'ensembles politiquement souverains'.[18] Xenophon is using the *abstractum* instead of the *concretum*, and πολιτεία under discussion at the start of the *Poroi* has to be interpreted as 'citizenry, citizens'.[19]

Leading politicians act unjustly and, in doing so, serve as a role model to Athenian citizens, with the result that they become (γίγνεσθαι, 1.1) unjust too. It is significant that the *Cyropaedia* passage also deals with this kind of imitation: Persian subjects imitate the impious and unjust behaviour of their kings, and this leads to their degeneration. But the idea of subjects adapting to the behaviour of their superiors is not only to be found in this

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16 Scharr 1919: 207 ('as the ruler, so the state'); for other supporters of that interpretation, see Gauthier 1976: 35.

17 Schütrumpf 1982: 79 ('I have always taken the view that relationships in states reflect the character of their leaders'). Pontier 2006: 70: 'J'ai toujours pensé que tels sont les dirigeants (προστάται), tels deviennent aussi les régimes (πολιτείας)' ('I have always thought that the character of rulers [προστάται] dictates how regimes [πολιτείας] turn out').

18 Gauthier 1976: 35 ('civic communities in their character as politically sovereign groups').

19 Gauthier 1976: 35 in addition refers to *Mem.* 2.1.13 where πολιτεία also means 'citizens'.

passage;[20] on the contrary it forms the basis of Socrates' whole theory of leadership in the *Memorabilia*.[21] The message is: A good ruler like Agamemnon also makes his subjects good,[22] while the Thirty make their subjects bad and consequently have to be regarded as bad rulers.[23] The same idea also appears in the demand that Socrates makes of the good ruler, viz. to make his subjects 'happy' (εὐδαίμων). Since *eudaimonia* is understood by Xenophon's Socrates not only as a material but also an ethical concept,[24] this demand amounts to the obligation to improve one's subjects morally.[25] By emphasizing that he 'has always held that opinion', Xenophon wants to remind his readers of these texts. He thus makes it clear right from the start that the *Poroi* has to be read against the background of his earlier statements on the topic of leadership.[26]

At the beginning of the *Poroi* Xenophon formulates his critique in a cautious way. This is only to be expected considering that in the final analysis the persons criticized are identical with those whom he wants to convince. He blames the προστάται for the city's plight, passing over in silence the fact that the προστάται here differ from those in the *Cyropaedia* and the *Memorabilia*. For in those texts the προστάται are mostly rulers or, at least, persons in a position to issue orders, whereas the politicians blamed in the *Poroi* have no such authority.[27] They have to convince the Athenians in

[20] See also *Cyr*. 8.1.8: 'As it is with the other things, so it is with these: When the person in control is better, the lawful things are observed with greater purity. When he is worse, they are observed in an inferior way'. (tr. Ambler) (as a personal statement of Xenophon). Compare Mueller-Goldingen (1995) 224–225.

[21] See also Dorion (2001) 91–92.

[22] *Mem*. 3.2: Agamemnon was called by Homer 'both a good king and a stout warrior' not only because he fought bravely with the enemy, but also because he caused the whole army to do so; the cavalry officer has to improve the horsemen and the horses (*Mem*. 3.3). *Ex negativo* it becomes clear from these passages that the opposite is the case with a bad superior.

[23] *Mem*. 1.2.32.

[24] Dorion 2004a: 57–59 emphasizes the material aspect of *eudaimonia* as far as the subjects are concerned. But if the good leader is able to make his subjects happy and if they adapt to him, it is obvious that they also will be improved morally. Even if they obey the good leader merely out of self-interest, they act, as a consequence, justly and reasonably. Thus, their *eudaimonia* also has both ethical and material components; cf. below, n. 25 and pp. [9–10].

[25] Xenophon's Socrates even goes a step further. Depending on the persons with whom one associates, one will become good or bad, and any single virtue can be learned and forgotten (*Mem*. 1.2.19–23). This also makes it clear that the superior is of crucial importance for the development of his subjects' character.

[26] The *Poroi* date to May/June 354; cf. Schorn 2006. Jansen 2007: 50–56 now argues for late summer/early fall 355/4. In any event the *Poroi* was probably Xenophon's last work.

[27] That προστάται refers here to the political orators has been shown by Gauthier 1976: 36–37.

the Assembly, and it is the Athenians, as citizens, who make the decisions. By his 'self-citation', however, Xenophon places the Athenians on a par with the subjects in his other works, glossing over the ambiguity of the term προστάτης. Use of the abstract term πολιτεία also softens the critique a bit, but ultimately the allegation remains that the Athenians act unjustly by conforming themselves to their leading politicians. The discussion that follows will make it clear that Xenophon aims not only at providing all Athenians with the necessary means to make a living, but also at improving them morally and making them act justly.

It has been suggested that the idea of προστάται who realize that they do wrong, but feel compelled to do so by reasons of state, is Socratic.[28] This view is not correct. Schütrumpf has already pointed out that for Xenophon's Socrates justice is knowledge (σοφία), and that nobody acts against their better judgment.[29] Thus the politicians described here only *believe* that they know what is just, but do not possess philosophical knowledge in the Socratic sense. As a consequence, they act unjustly and make mistakes. They correspond to those persons who are described in the *Memorabilia* (4.5) as being incontinent and lacking in self-control (ἐγκράτεια). As they lack this capacity, they are not free in their decisions. They are not able to control their desires and wrong others out of greed. Elsewhere in the *Memorabilia*, Socrates describes the tyrant, the ἀκρατής *par excellence*, as a person who is like the poor, constrained to commit crimes out of necessity (*Memorabilia* 4.2.38). In the *Hiero*, a fictitious dialogue between the poet Simonides and the tyrant Hiero, this idea is again set out at length (e.g. 4.7–5.4).[30] By applying it to the politicians of democratic Athens and, implicitly, also to the *dēmos*, Xenophon tacitly resorts to the old anti-democratic idea of a *dēmos turannos* that lives at the expense of its allies.[31] This interpretation is confirmed by Charmides in Xenophon's *Symposium* (4.32), who presents himself as a representative of this group when he declares: 'Now I am like a tyrant (τυράννῳ ἐοικώς), but then I was clearly a slave; then I used to hand over money regularly to the people, but now the State supports me out of its revenue' (tr. Tredennick & Waterfield, slightly modified). Since he has become poor, Charmides has adopted the attitude of the indigent mass, and enjoys his 'tyrannical' life at the expense of others.

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28 Thus Gauthier 1976: 37–38; 43–44.

29 Schütrumpf 1982: 79 n. 1.

30 Schütrumpf 1995: 296 who refers to the parallels quoted above.

31 On that see Raaflaub 2003: 81–82; Kallet 2003 (also on the positive aspects of that concept against which Raaflaub takes a stand).

Another point of special interest is the concept of law underlying Xenophon's argument in the first chapter of the *Poroi*. Starting from G.E.M. de Ste. Croix's thesis that for the Greeks, until the fourth century, the concept of law existed only with regard to intrastate affairs, whereas interstate relations were dominated by the law of the stronger,[32] Gauthier points out that in this text Xenophon is undoubtedly applying the concept of law to international relations, just as Isocrates does in *De Pace*. But at the same time Gauthier qualifies this conclusion by adding: 'Neither Xenophon nor Isocrates are great thinkers. They express what is generally thought and felt.'[33] However, it is wrong to suppose that Xenophon opposes Athenian imperialism out of a naïve and ingenuous sense of justice. In fact, his position is firmly based on the statements about justice which he puts into the mouth of his Socrates and which appear elsewhere as his own convictions (*Memorabilia* 4.4; cf. 4.2.12 and 4.6.5–6):[34] For Xenophon's Socrates, justice constitutes an indispensable quality of every 'leader', 'leader' being understood in a very broad sense as any person who has the right in a specific situation to give orders to others. Socrates defines justice as obeying the laws of one's own *polis*, and thus pleads for a strict legal positivism (4.4.12).[35] Although his definition of justice refers to intrastate relations, Socrates believes that at the same time justice will put an end to legal disputes between states and and to wars.[36] The key to a proper understanding of this assumption is provided by Socrates' theory of unwritten laws, which are in force in all countries because of their divine origin (4.4.19–25).[37] Whereas violations of

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32 De Ste. Croix 1972: 16–23.

33 'Ni X[énophon] ni Isocrate ne sont de puissants penseurs. Ils exprimes le sens commun': Gauthier 1976: 42–44, at 43. I do not understand why Gauthier assumes that Xenophon approved of the exploitation of the Athenian allies in the past as historically necessary. He does not say so, and it is not probable either; see also von der Lieck 1933: 6–13 who asserts at 11: 'Isokrates und der Autor der *Poroi* verlangen Verzicht auf die Ungerechtigkeit, weil die Ohnmacht Athens keinen anderen Weg offen läßt als den einer friedlichen Politik' ('Isocrates and the author of the *Poroi* demand renunciation of injustice, because the weakness of Athens leaves no other way open except a peace policy'). But the normal situation, following von der Lieck, is that espoused by Thucydides for whom in foreign politics the just is identical with the useful.

34 In the *Agesilaus* 2.16; 4.2–3; 7.2 Xenophon praises Agesilaus' justice as something that becomes visible in his obedience to the laws; also Cyrus the Elder advocates a strictly legalistic concept of justice: *Cyr.* 1.3.17.

35 On this interpretation, see Morrison 1995. The identification of δίκαιον with νόμιμον also 4.5.5–6; cf. *Cyr.* 1.3.17; with modifications Gray 2004: 144–154. See also Dorion 2001: 95–115, who defends the concept of law of the Xenophontic Socrates as being legalistic against Leo Strauss's interpretation, and David Johnson's chapter in this volume (pp. 123–159).

36 *Mem.* 4.4.8: παύσονται δ' αἱ πόλεις διαφερόμεναι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ πολεμοῦσαι.

37 The link between Xenophon's theory of unwritten laws and his concept of international law has been shown by Morrison 1995: 343–344.

human legislation often remain without negative consequences, violations of divine laws, he argues, inevitably carry a penalty. Among those unwritten laws Socrates lists the duty of honouring gods and parents, the prohibition of incest between parents and children, and the obligation of repaying received benefits (τοὺς εὖ ποιοῦντας ἀντευεργετεῖν: 4.4.24). Those who violate the last of these unwritten laws will be punished by losing of good friends and being regarded with distaste because of their behaviour. And yet they are, of course, forced to try to regain the affection of others, being well aware that it is from friends that the greatest profit is to be gained. Xenophon's Socrates does not say that these three unwritten laws are the only ones, so he may assume that others exist. But the idea that benefits have to be repaid already provides a sufficient basis for a system of international law. It means that states are also obliged to repay benefits to other states. Such εὖ ποιεῖν may consist simply in not attacking other states without a legitimate reason or in treating allies according to the provisions of a treaty of alliance. And this is where we can see clearly how the theory is connected with the situation of Athens in 354 as described in the *Poroi*.[38] Respect for reciprocal autonomy had been one of the stipulations in the treaties between Athens and her allies, as well as in the King's Peace, which Athens and the other states of Greece had sworn to uphold. The allies had fulfilled their obligations and had thus been εὖ ποιοῦντες in Xenophontic terms. Athens however, had not reciprocated and had instead engaged in injustice towards them. This is plainly the idea that guides Xenophon's reflections at the beginning of the *Poroi*: leading politicians (and by consequence the *dēmos* too) do wrong to the Athenian allies and, by doing so, violate divine law, and this will inevitably lead, or has already led, to punishment, i.e. to harm to the city. In the *Poroi*, then, Athens is placed in exactly the situation predicted in the *Memorabilia* for those who do not repay benefits: hated by her former friends, the city is forced to win them back (ἀνακτᾶσθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας, 5.8; cf. 5.5–7) because she is aware of the necessity of having friends. In what follows Xenophon therefore aims to demonstrate how Athens will be able to pursue a foreign policy without ἀδικία. We shall find further confirmation for the view that Xenophon is here applying the theoretical concept of justice of the *Memorabilia* when discussing the chapter in which he dwells on the positive consequences of a foreign policy based on justice.[39]

38 On the date of the *Poroi* see n. 26.
39 See below, pp. 712–714.

But let us first examine some of the basic features of the theory of leadership that Xenophon's Socrates develops in the *Memorabilia*.[40] According to this theory, the ideal of any form of leadership is the voluntary subordination of the subordinate to the leader. This goal is to be pursued regardless of the specific kind of leadership involved, whether it be that of a king over subjects, of a magistrate and military-officer over fellow citizens, or of a master over slaves. Since the mechanisms of leadership are always identical, Xenophon assumes the existence of a fundamental capacity for exercising leadership. That is why a good leader in one field will, in principle, also be successful in another.[41] It is the fundamental duty of every leader to know what has to be done.[42] To be able to do so, he is in need of self-knowledge that enables him to know his own ability (δύναμις). He has to be aware of what he can and cannot do.[43] Furthermore, only a person who has self-knowledge is able to assess others correctly. In order to be free in his decisions and not to be prevented from doing what he considers to be right, the leader has to be as self-disciplined (ἐγκρατής) as possible.[44] Without self-discipline friendships cannot exist, because the self-indulgent (ἀκρατής) will sooner or later wrong even his friends out of greed.[45] Since a man can benefit the state for better or for worse according to the degree of ἐγκράτεια that he possesses, the leading politician is in need of this virtue to an especially high degree. For it is his duty to make the state prosperous (εὐδαίμων). At the same time, on a smaller scale, it is the duty of every superior to take care

40 Here I have only sketched the theory of leadership of Xenophon's Socrates and limited myself mainly to those aspects that are relevant for interpreting the *Poroi*. I have dealt with this topic more elaborately in Schorn 2008. Many aspects of the theory of leadership dealt with in what follows are also treated by Azoulay 2004 *passim*, but I shall not refer to his discussion in detail.

41 *Mem.* 3.4, esp. 3.4.6–12.; 3.4.12: ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλεια πλήθει μόνον διαφέρει τῆς τῶν κοινῶν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα παραπλήσια ἔχει, τὸ ⟨δὲ⟩ μέγιστον, ὅτι οὔτε ἄνευ ἀνθρώπων οὐδετέρα γίγνεται οὔτε δι' ἄλλων μὲν ἀνθρώπων τὰ ἴδια πράττεται, δι' ἄλλων δὲ τὰ κοινά. οὐ γὰρ ἄλλοις τισὶν ἀνθρώποις οἱ τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελόμενοι χρῶνται ἢ οἷσπερ τὰ ἴδια οἰκονομοῦντες· οἷς οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι χρῆσθαι καὶ τὰ ἴδια καὶ τὰ κοινὰ καλῶς πράττουσιν, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι ἀμφοτέρωθι πλημμελοῦσι ('the difference between the care of private and the care of public affairs is only one of degree; in all other respects they are closely similar, especially in that neither can dispense with human agency, and the human agents are the same in both cases. Those who look after public affairs employ just the same agents as in managing their private properties; and if people understand how to use these agents, they carry out their duties successfully, whether public or private, but if they do not, then they come to grief in either case'). Compare 2.1.19; 4.1.2; 4.5.10; *Oec.* 13.5.

42 Compare the definition of 'king' in *Mem.* 3.9.10.

43 *Mem.* 4.2.24–30.

44 *Mem.* 4.5.

45 *Mem.* 2.1.7. 19; 2.6.

of his subordinates.[46] Moreover, the leader observes the laws, so he is just in the Xenophontic sense, and confers benefactions on the people without having received benefit from them in the first place. To leaders of this sort, who know what has to be done, people subordinate themselves voluntarily as they are aware of their superiority and expect advantages from obeying them. Accordingly, they regard them with sympathy and 'love' them (ἀγαπῶσιν: 4.2.28).[47] Whereas the leader is thus obliged to limit his needs to a minimum, gaining not only a maximum of independence and stamina, but even *eudaimonia* from his total frugality, the *eudaimonia* he provides for the common people is material as well as moral.[48] Socrates would not agree with Callias' statement in the *Symposium* that money makes one just, but he does think that a certain amount of wealth helps people to behave justly. So it is the duty of the leader to provide his people with material wealth.[49]

Another typical feature of this theory is that the leader encourages his subordinates to commit themselves to the state, and to act in a morally correct manner (for example, justly and bravely) by promising honours and rewards. This procedure proves to be successful since it is one of the fundamental characteristics of every man that he wants to be honoured by those whom he holds in high regard. The procedure can involve competitions with awards for the best in various fields, and it leads not only to moral improvement of the people, but also to an increase in the leader's popularity and to willing subordination to his authority.[50]

Xenophon's ethics are thus quite utilitarian: citizens obey the good leader voluntarily, because they acknowledge his superiority and expect—and

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[46] *Mem.* 1.6.9–10; 3.2.1–4; 3.3.2. See especially Xenophon's fundamental statement on Socrates in *Mem.* 3.2.4: καὶ οὕτως ἐπισκοπῶν τίς εἴη ἀγαθοῦ ἡγεμόνος ἀρετὴ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα περιῄρει, κατέλιπε δὲ τὸ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ἡγῆται ('by investigating in this way what is the ideal of a good general he eliminated all other considerations and left the quality of securing the happiness of his followers').

[47] Compare *Mem.* 3.3.9: ἐκεῖνο μὲν δήπου οἶσθα, ὅτι ἐν παντὶ πράγματι οἱ ἄνθρωποι τούτοις μάλιστα ἐθέλουσι πείθεσθαι οὓς ἂν ἡγῶνται βελτίστους εἶναι ('you know I'm sure, that in every situation people are readiest to obey those whom they consider to be best'). On the central aspect of Xenophon's thought that is termed best by the keyword χάρις, see the seminal treatment of Azoulay 2004.

[48] *Mem.* 3.2.1–4 (Agamemnon). The cavalry commander also has to make horses and horsemen better: *Mem.* 3.3.5.

[49] Higgins 1977: 139.

[50] Socrates states this e.g. *Mem.* 3.3.14; 3.4.8; *Oec.* 14.10; see also Socrates' account of the reign of Cyrus: *Oec.* 4.7–16; in *Hiero*: esp. 9.5–11. Xenophon on Agesilaus: *Ages.* 1.25; Xenophon in the *Hipparchicus*: 1.26; Cyrus in the *Cyropaedia*: 1.6.18. 20; 2.1.22–24; 6.2.38 etc.; on that principle, see (with more references) Gleininger 1874: 43; Thiel 1922: XVI; Breitenbach 1950: 82–85; Scharr 1919: 208–209; 221–222; on the role of the *Cyropaedia*, see Pontier 2006: 394. This aspect of the theory of leadership is dealt with in many passages of Azoulay 2004.

also receive—prosperity by doing so. That is why they adapt to him (cf. 1.1). They respect the laws and thus act justly,[51] and they restrain their desires and thus behave temperately. In this way, a good leader brings about the moral improvement of his subordinates, while a bad one corrupts them. The whole mechanism just described is deemed by Xenophon to function in a way similar to a natural law.[52]

Justice and—as a consequence—friendships play an important role for the internal and foreign policy of the good ruler also in another respect. When talking to the sophist Hippias, Socrates defends his concept of justice and explains the consequences of just behaviour for individuals and *poleis* (4.4.15–17): *poleis* in which law-abiding (i.e. just) people live are the happiest in times of peace and the least easily conquered in times of war. Crucial for the happiness of a *polis* is concord (ὁμόνοια, 4.4.16) which is the common conviction of all citizens that everyone has to obey the laws because that it is what makes *poleis* strongest and happiest (ἰσχυρόταταί τε καὶ εὐδαιμονέσταται, 4.4.16). In the following passage, Socrates talks about further positive consequences of justice, detailing the advantages for private individuals and for rulers in the strict sense. I will list specifically those that are relevant for interpreting the *Poroi* (4.4.17): the just man incurs least punishment and is honoured most (τιμῷτο); he is trusted most and it is he whom even enemies trust most readily when making truces and treaties of peace. To him people are most willing to ally themselves (σύμμαχος); to him the allies entrust most readily supreme command (ἡγεμονίαν) and the defence of fortresses or cities; him they are most inclined to benefit (εὐεργετήσας … εὐεργετήσειεν), since they expect that their favours will be returned (χάριν ἀπολήψεσθαι); people want to be his friend (φίλος) and avoid having him as an enemy, and whoever has the most friends and allies also has the fewest enemies.

In another passage, Socrates dwells on the question what it means to be a friend and to have friends (*Memorabilia* 2.6.1–39). It has already been mentioned above that real friendship is only possible between men who are self-disciplined (ἐγκρατής), and thus able to deal justly. Friendship is even possible between political rivals, provided that they are truly good (καλοὶ

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[51] On Xenophon's legalistic standpoint, valid under monarchical as well as democratic rule, see above, p. 697.

[52] Xenophon was, of course, enough of a realist not to expect total approval by everybody in every respect; he is looking for a general voluntary obedience. He was also well aware of the fact that obedience could not be expected from criminals or maniacs. They were supposed to be punished; cf. Morrison 2004: 188.

κἀκγαθοί, 2.6.22), since on account of their moral goodness (ἀρετή) they prefer to enjoy moderate possessions instead of wanting to 'gain absolute power by means of war' (διὰ πολέμου πάντων κυριεύειν, 2.6.22), and they also prefer to act lawfully (νομίμως, 2.6.23). They are not envious, and share their possessions with their friends (2.6.23). The greater the number of politicians working together and the closer their cooperation for the benefit of the state (εὐεργετεῖν, 2.6.26), the better, just as it is better to have as many allies as possible in war (συμμάχων, 2.6.27), especially if the adversaries are truly good men. Whoever expects commitment from his allies has to benefit them (εὖ ποιεῖν, 2.6.27) first, without having received any benefits from them beforehand (2.6.33–35). He has to care about them (ἐπιμελὴς τῶν φίλων, 2.6.35) and delight in them, rejoice in their good fortune and try to outdo them in acts of kindness.

Thus, the same mechanisms that characterize relations between individuals and the conduct of domestic politics, also apply to relations between states: if the ruler of a state is just, and acts towards other rulers or states in the same way as towards his fellow citizens, this will lead to analogous results: friendships, alliances and voluntary subordination.

In the *Poroi* we find these theoretical reflections on leadership applied on a large scale. At first sight, the work seems to be merely a speech on fiscal and economic policy highlighting possible ways of increasing the wealth of Athenian citizens. This kind of presentation is cleverly chosen: for it is these same citizens who will have to approve the proposals, and the reform programme has to be presented to them in an appealing way. Something similar happens in the *Hiero*: Xenophon has the poet Simonides advise the tyrant Hiero on how to transform his tyranny into the exercise of rule over willing subjects and, here too, the speaker dwells at length on questions of finance and profit maximization.[53] Both speakers thus argue *ad hominem*, in order to convince their addressees as easily as possible. But in reality both reform programmes aim at nothing less than a fundamental transformation of the state along the precepts of the Socratic-Xenophontic philosophy.[54]

Before Xenophon sets out his proposals in the *Poroi* for the consolidation of Athens' position as a centre of commerce and the optimal exploitation

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53 *Hier.* 8.9–10; 9.4–11; 11.1–5; 11.13.

54 As far as the *Hiero* is concerned, it is to be noted that the advice that Simonides gives to Hiero shows many points of agreement with Socrates' doctrine, but also some differences. By means of inconsistencies and intertextual references to his Socratic works, Xenophon makes clear that Hiero ultimately has to meet the demands Socrates makes on the ruler, if he wants to turn from a tyrant into a king; that proves to be a problem, because the character of the tyrant is deficient: see Schorn 2008.

of the Laurium silver mines, he gives a detailed account of the excellent natural conditions the city offers for realizing his plans.[55] This is in line with Socrates' instruction always to start by checking one's own ability (δύναμις) and then to decide, on the basis of the result, on the further course of action.[56]

Xenophon's initial and seemingly primary concern is with how to improve the material welfare of the Athenian citizens. But he also takes into consideration other groups of the population within the city, and presents the steps to be taken to improve their situation as measures that will result in increasing the wealth of Athenians too. Concerning the treatment of metics already living in Attica he recommends ἐπιμέλεια (2.1, 2; cf. 4.40: θεραπεύεσθαι μετοίκους). With ἐπιμέλεια we encounter one of the central terms of the Socratic theory of leadership and friendship. It describes the precautionary and therefore correct behaviour of the superior towards his subordinates, and of all men who want to win the friendship of others.[57] Such prudent behaviour towards metics is advisable, Xenophon claims, since they do not incur costs to the state but rather contribute to its revenues by paying the metic tax. He proposes to relieve them of certain duties that are considered dishonourable by them and that do not confer any benefit on the *polis*,[58] as well as of the dangerous obligation to go to war as hoplites together with the Athenians.[59] Instead he proposes to offer them incentives such as the possibility to serve in the cavalry, which was regarded as an honour, and the right to acquire land and real estate—the latter, however, being restricted to 'approved applicants'.[60] By these means he aims to win the loyalty (εὐνουστέρους: 2.5, 7) of those metics already living in Athens, and to attract more and 'better' ones (βελτίους: 2.6).[61] As a consequence,

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55 1.2–2.1; 3.1–2; 4.1–4.

56 E.g. *Mem.* 1.7; 4.2.25–29; on that concept, see Dorion 2004b, with further references.

57 *Mem.* 2.2.12; 2.3.12; 2.4.1–4.7; 2.6.29. 35; 2.7.14; 2.10; 3.2.1 etc.; the link between this passage on the one hand and the concept of ἐπιμέλεια and the idea that good deeds done in advance lead to gratefulness and sympathy on the other was already made by Azoulay 2004: 106–107; cf. Pontier 2006: 394.

58 εἰ ἀφέλοιμεν μὲν ὅσα μηδὲν ὠφελοῦντα τὴν πόλιν ἀτιμίας δοκεῖ τοῖς μετοίκοις παρέχειν (2.2). Xenophon does not say which particular measures he has in mind; the context shows that it is not the abolition of the obligation to serve as hoplites that is mentioned later; cf. Thiel 1922: 45–46; Whitehead 1977: 127; Schütrumpf 1982: 4 n. 11.

59 On that see Pontier 2006: 393–394, who has noted the parallel in *Mem.* 3.5.16.

60 Here, too, Xenophon is quite vague and leaves open what the 'various other privileges' are which he wants to bestow on the metics: cf. Whitehead 1977: 126–128. Already in the *Hipparchicus* 9.6 Xenophon proposed to grant the metics access to the cavalry.

61 For Whitehead 1977: 126, 135, referring to 2.7, the 'better' metics are Greeks as against the Lydians, Phrygians and Syrians mentioned in 2.3; likewise Gauthier 1972: 123–125; but

Athens will become a place where all stateless Greeks want to assemble, which will make her stronger and bigger. In addition metics serving in the cavalry will increase Athens' military strength.[62] The treatment of metics recommended by Xenophon accords with the suggestions addressed by Socrates to those who want to win the sympathy and the voluntary subordination of their inferiors: they have to do something for their inferiors first. It has been suggested that the reforms proposed by Xenophon would have led to an erosion of the boundaries between citizens and metics.[63] I do not believe this to be the case. Xenophon's only aim is to offer *some* incentives. The fundamental separation of both groups, which manifests itself especially in the total exclusion of the metics from politics and in the continuing existence of the *metoikion*, will be preserved. In addition Xenophon proposes the creation of the office of Guardians of the Metics (μετοικοφύλακας: 2.7) and of rewards to those among them who are in charge of a maximum number of metics.[64] This proposal translates another element of Socrates' theory of leadership into policy: the leader has to motivate his subordinates by promising rewards to the best among them. In the *Hiero*, this concept of 'incentive—achievement—reward' actually forms the fundamental element of the organization of the state as recommended by Simonides.[65]

It is not only metics who will benefit from these changes in treatment but citizens as well. Metics will hold Athens in high esteem and settle there

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Schütrumpf 1982: 5–6 is probably right in suggesting wealthier metics. See also Jansen (this volume, p. 749 n. 95).

62 Schütrumpf 1982: 7.

63 Thus Jansen 2007: 316–317 and in this volume (pp. 754–756); but see already Wolf 1954: 169: 'So macht er den Vorschlag, den Metoiken gleiches Bürgerrecht wie den Altfreien zu geben' ('he thus proposes to give the metics the same citizen rights as the old citizens'). I think that Azoulay 2004: 339 goes too far when he states that Xenophon wants to 'intégrer symboliquement à la cité … sans pour autant devoir les intégrer statutairement à la communauté des citoyens' ('integrate [the metics] in the city symbolically without for all that having to integrate them legally in the citizen community'). The metics remain excluded, like the merchants and slaves. They are nevertheless satisfied with their situation and regard Athens with affection.

64 It does not become clear what kind of office the *metoikophulakes* would hold, as next to nothing is known about the office of the Guardians of the Orphans (ὀρφανοφύλακες) on which that of the *metoikophulakes* is supposed to be modelled; cf. Gauthier 1976: 68–71; Whitehead 1977: 127; a few suggestions in Bodei Giglioni 1970: LXIV. Xenophon holds the opinion that he among the *metoikophulakes* is the best who is in charge of the greatest number of metics. This implies that metics could choose their *metoikophulax* freely, which means they would choose the one who looked after their interests best.

65 See *Hier.* 9.5–1; on this principle in other works of Xenophon, see the references and literature in n. 50.

gladly and in great numbers; this in turn will improve the city's reputation abroad and, at the same time, lead to higher revenues—and that will then enable Athens to pursue a foreign policy without doing wrong to others. So, in the final analysis, these measures will not only increase the wealth of the Athenians, but will also improve them morally.

Xenophon's proposals regarding the promotion of trade are on entirely similar lines. Here too, he recommends 'benevolent legislation and attentive behaviour' (ψηφίσματά τε φιλάνθρωπα καὶ ἐπιμελείας: 3.6), which again aim at bringing more people, specifically merchants, into the city (3.3).[66] Consonant with the Socratic theory of leadership, the *polis* is again well advised to set the example by doing good deeds to others before having received any itself: those magistrates of the market who are most efficient and expedient in settling disputes should receive a prize (3.3). Here we encounter once again the principle of 'incentive-achievement-reward', described above, and it again becomes apparent how great an importance Xenophon attributes to justice for the success of the *polis*. These magistrates are the figureheads of the city and their behaviour towards the foreign merchants is crucial for the image of the city among them. Xenophon's further demand of a prize for merchants who have rendered outstanding services to the city, so that 'they would look on us as friends and hasten to visit us to win the honour as well as the profit', completes the Socratic system of good leadership: justice and good deeds in advance on the part of the city and hope for honours and profit on the part of the merchants will lead to commitment, sympathy and friendship (φίλους, 3.4). Again, both parties will benefit from the measures, and the better treatment of the merchants by the city will lead to an increase in popularity and higher revenues.

While these incentives can be put into effect without cost to the state, a special tax (εἰσφορά) is needed to raise money for the construction of the lodging-houses and the market-places, and for other measures by which Xenophon expects a still greater promotion of trade and, by consequence, an additional increase of the state's revenues. This tax should be graded as follows: when eventually there are three public slaves per citizen and the citizens receive three obols a day each for their basic requirements, citizens of the highest census-class will be refunded almost a fifth of the money they paid, those of the second class more than a third and those of the third will receive even more money than they have contributed.[67] This

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[66] See also Azoulay 2004: 205–206. That Xenophon regards the merchants as an evil, as Azoulay thinks, does not follow from the text.

[67] Here the first three Solonian census-classes are meant; as usual, the fourth class of the

is why Xenophon assumes that citizens will readily agree to pay the tax. Once more we observe how Xenophon strives to motivate the single groups by offering them incentives and to make clear to them that his plans will improve the financial situation of every citizen. For even citizens of the two highest property-classes, who as we have seen will not directly benefit from the *eisphora*, will be better off in the end because in the future the *polis* will no longer be forced to raise such onerous special taxes.[68] Xenophon's closing words of this section sound almost utopian:

> I think, too, that if their names were to be recorded in the roll of benefactors (εὐεργέται) for all time, many foreigners also would subscribe, and a certain number of states would be attracted by the prospect of enrolment. I believe that even kings and despots and satraps would desire to share in this reward (χάριτος). (3.11, tr. Marchant [modified])

This is surely not a realistic prospect: why should these men and these cities be interested in improving the position of Athens as a centre of commerce and so weaken their own position? However, seen as the logical implementation of his principles of leadership as they are propounded by Socrates in the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon's reasoning becomes intelligible: according to these principles, the desire to be honoured by those whom one holds in high regard is a core human characteristic, and justice automatically leads to winning friends who are willing to do good.[69]

Before Xenophon discusses the further implications of his programme for Athenian foreign policy and explains how it will fundamentally and permanently change her reputation, he describes in detail the core of his reform programme: the systematic and large-scale exploitation of the Laurium silver mines (4). I will leave aside the details of the project since they have been studied repeatedly in the past,[70] and instead confine myself to analysing its general principles and to demonstrating how Xenophon's proposals reveal the philosophical background of the *Poroi*.

I have already outlined the most important elements of the programme. Over many years the Athenian state will buy public slaves until eventually there are three slaves per citizen. The slaves will be hired out to entrepreneurs exploiting the Laurium silver mines. Xenophon regards the capacity

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Thetes does not contribute to the *eisphora*; cf. Herzog 1914: 473; Lauffer 1975: 178. It is of course problematic, and thus passed over in silence by Xenophon, that years would have to pass before there would be a reimbursement in form of the *triōbelia*; see Schütrumpf 1982: 14.

[68] See Schütrumpf 1982: 15–16.

[69] On the importance of honours as a means of winning sympathy in this passage, see Azoulay 2004: 105; on that concept of Xenophon's, see also below, p. 714.

[70] See e.g. Momigliano 1932; Lauffer 1955–1956; 1975; cf. also Kalcyk 1982.

of the mines as virtually unlimited. As a result he has no fear that one day there might be too many of them working in the mines. Nor does he expect the price of silver to decrease as a consequence of a surplus supply. Out of the receipts from the leases every Athenian citizen will receive an allowance of three obols a day as means of subsistence (τροφή). This does not mean that Xenophon intends to create some kind of system of 'state pensioners' ('Staatsrentnertum') enabling citizens to live without working and to dedicate themselves to politics, as has been suggested.[71] Schütrumpf and others have rightly objected to this interpretation stating that the *triōbelia* was merely sufficient to safeguard the basic requirements of a citizen who had no further sources of income.[72] But at the same time, Xenophon apparently wants to abolish the daily allowances for participants in the Assembly and for judges in the law courts, because in 6.1 he only mentions compensation payments for priests, *bouleutai*, magistrates and horsemen. He is however, very cautious regarding this sensitive topic, so it may have escaped many an Athenian that the above-mentioned two groups are absent from the list of persons for whom allowances will be provided in the future. The replacement of the daily allowances by a general payment to all citizens would (as Schütrumpf has demonstrated) result in the Assembly and the law courts losing their attraction for unemployed people, which means that these two institutions would no longer be dominated by the lower classes. This interpretation is also highly persuasive when we consider the philosophical dimension that can be detected behind this measure. According to Xenophon's Socrates, it is the task of every politician to provide *eudaimonia* for the people, which also means material wealth.[73] The plan to guarantee the minimal living income by paying the *triōbelia* is a revolutionary idea unheard of in Greek antiquity. But it can very well be explained as a means to establish the material basis of the *eudaimonia* of the citizens that is necessary according to Socrates' teaching. If in the future the Assembly is no longer dominated by the class of population that has been specifically responsible in the past for the city's imperialistic policy, because its members could only be supported by using the contributions of the allies to pay their daily allowances,[74] it is to be hoped that the Athenians will no longer,

[71] Thus Schwahn 1931: 257; 278; also Pöhlmann in Pöhlmann & Oertel 1925: I.242, 244 speaks of 'Staatsrentnern'; cf. also von der Lieck 1933: 13–18; 22–23.

[72] See Schütrumpf 1982: 15–45, also on the following; cf. Näf 1997: 332 and already Wilhelm 1934: 37–38.

[73] See above, pp. 700–701.

[74] On the role of the Assembly in Athenian imperialism, see Schütrumpf 1982: 24 n. 108.

against better judgment and out of necessity, act unjustly against their allies. And even if these citizens do continue to participate in the Assembly, they will no longer be induced by necessity to act unjustly. So in both eventualities the consequence will be a total change in Athenian policy. Moreover, since the *triōbelia* will only provide for a minimal living income and since, at the same time, additional income in the form of allowances for *ekklēsiastai* and judges will be abolished, the lower classes will be forced to hold down a job and, by consequence, will hardly be able to participate in the meetings of the Assembly and the law courts anymore.[75] In addition, the fact that these people will now have to work has an educational effect, since, according to the teaching of Xenophon's Socrates, work (in contrast to inactivity) leads to temperance and justice (*Memorabilia* 2.7.8), and will thus contribute to the control and moral betterment of the boisterous masses. In the final analysis, then, the intention of the *triōbelia* is not only to increase the material prosperity of citizens, but also to make them obedient[76] and morally better[77] in the sense of Xenophon's political theory. But as usual Xenophon does not make this final goal explicit, which is not surprising in view of the fact that the persons who are to be reformed are identical with those who will be deciding on his proposals.

But there is *one* aspect of the moral improvement which will result from the *triōbelia* that Xenophon does mention at the end of his chapter on the mining programme: if his plans are carried out, he says, the *polis* will not only be wealthier (χρήμασιν εὐπορωτέραν, 4.51), but also 'more obedient, better disciplined, and more efficient in war' (εὐπειθεστέραν καὶ εὐτακτοτέραν καὶ εὐπολεμωτέραν, ibid.). He thus insinuates that the *triōbelia* will have consequences on the moral situation of the city, but in what follows he only talks about the ephebes:[78] he expects them to exercise more eagerly and

[75] This has been recognized by Schütrumpf 1982: 30–35; Azoulay 2004: 223. The *Poroi* does not contain a radically democratic programme that is supposed to make a life without work possible for the citizens, as Schwahn 1931: 257, 278 thinks. Gauthier 1976: 20–32, 241–253 holds the view that the *triōbelia* should be paid in addition to the allowances for judges and participants in the Assembly. That view has been criticized by Schütrumpf loc. cit. Gauthier 1984 has remained largely unimpressed by Schütrumpf's arguments, and Schütrumpf has, on his part, responded to Gauthier's polemics: see Schütrumpf 1995, and similarly Doty 2003: 5–7 and Azoulay 2004: 222–223; Gauthier has now found a follower in Pontier 2006: 392.

[76] Azoulay 2004: 224–225; 229–230 is right to point out that the *triōbelia* would make the citizens grateful and obedient according to Xenophon's charismatic theory.

[77] On that aspect, see also the reflections on the promotion of agriculture at *Hier*. 9.8. Agriculture is considered there an ideal activity for making people temperate; differently Bodei Giglioni 1970: XXV; Luccioni 1948: e.g. 282; 285–286; 289.

[78] The ephebes are not named explicitly, but the tasks mentioned show beyond doubt

to be on guard more willingly if their minimal living is guaranteed (4.52). Once more we can detect behind his reasoning the well-known maxim of Xenophon's Socrates that people feel more attached to the state if they have benefited from it, and that they obey its orders spontaneously and commit themselves readily if they are convinced that it acts correctly and in their best interest.

It may seem surprising that Xenophon does not mention explicitly the great number of adult Athenians liable to military service.[79] They also receive the *triōbelia*, so he must assume that they, too, will show more commitment in the future. One might suspect that he wants to avoid finding fault with his addressees in this respect.[80] But more probably he specifically discusses the ephebes because they are in charge of guarding the territory of Attica. The future peace policy of Athens will make military campaigns an exception. Accordingly the ephebes will be the ones who bear the brunt of the military action in future.

Xenophon's programme aims at improving the situation of all free persons living in Attica: rich and poor citizens, metics and temporary foreign visitors. But, in addition to this, the slaves should also benefit from the generally improved quality of life in Athens, as Xenophon indicates in one passage. Dealing with the possible objection that his mining programme may be wrecked by war, he declares:

> For what instrument is more serviceable for war than men? We should have enough of them [i.e. slaves in the mines] to supply crews to many ships of the

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that they are meant; cf. Gauthier 1976: 192–195; Schütrumpf 1982: 109 n. 42; Azoulay 2004: 228–229; Pontier 2006: 393, with the interesting remark: 'Enfin, l'idéal de discipline exposé dans les *Poroi* rappelle la *paideia* des jeunes Perses présentée au début de la *Cyropédia*' ('finally, the ideal of discipline laid out in the *Poroi* recalls the *paideia* of the young Persians described at the start of the *Cyropaedia*'). I am following Schütrumpf's interpretation of this passage. He assumes that from now on the ephebes, like the citizens, will be in receipt of the *triōbelia*. Azoulay 2004: 228–229, following Gauthier, holds that only those ephebes will receive τροφή who exercise and patrol, and he sees in the measure another example of the principle of 'incentive—achievement—reward'. The use of the definite article in τὴν τροφήν, however, suggests that the τροφή mentioned before is meant, i.e. that in form of the *triōbelia*. Breitenbach 1967: 1760, following Thiel 1922: 55, sees here a state salary in addition to the *triōbelia*. Pontier 2006: 392–393 thinks of an allusion to Sparta. That does not contradict the assumption that we have here a principle characteristic of the political philosophy of Xenophon's Socrates. Xenophon presents as the doctrine of this man elements and ideas of very different (sometimes even Spartan) provenance; see also n. 111 on the influence of Philistus of Syracuse on Xenophon.

79 At least he says that the *polis* would be 'more obedient, better disciplined, and more efficient in war' (4.51).

80 In the *Hipparchicus* 9.5 he complains about the tendency among Athenians to buy themselves free from the obligation to serve as cavalrymen.

> state; and many men available for service in the ranks as infantry could press the enemy hard, if they were treated well.[81]
>
> (4.42; tr. Marchant, slightly modified)

Xenophon demands a specific stipulation in the lease contracts that the lessees will be liable for the loss of a slave,[82] which ensures that exploiting slaves ruthlessly is financially inadvisable. But he does not say much about such matters, because it has to be the aim of his exposition to present his reform programme with a focus on the advantages for Athenian citizens.[83] We are not, therefore, given any details about the supposed good treatment of public slaves. At all events, the fear of financial loss and the possibility of benefitting from the slaves in future wars, are expected to lead to a basically good treatment of the mine slaves.[84] According to Socrates' theory of leadership, the relationship between master and slave is characterized by the same principles as all other forms of leadership. Consequently, the exercise of leadership over slaves also aims at voluntary subordination and φιλία.[85] In the *Oeconomicus*, Socrates' interlocutor Ischomachus explains in detail how a master can win the 'love' of his slaves by treating them well and using incentives. His behaviour towards his slaves corresponds, with some modifications,[86] to the suggestions made in the *Memorabilia* regarding the treatment of inferiors by superiors, and it is exactly this concept that forms the basis of the proposals for the treatment of public slaves in the *Poroi*.

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[81] τί γὰρ δὴ εἰς πόλεμον κτῆμα χρησιμώτερον ἀνθρώπων; πολλὰς μὲν γὰρ ναῦς πληροῦν ἱκανοὶ ἂν εἶεν δημοσίᾳ· πολλοὶ δ' ἂν καὶ πεζοὶ [δημοσίᾳ] δύναιντ' ἂν βαρεῖς εἶναι τοῖς πολεμίοις, εἴ τις αὐτοὺς θεραπεύοι. I understand θεραπεύω with Gauthier 1976: 177 as 'to treat well' ('soigner'). Schütrumpf 1982: 105 with n. 35, following Lauffer 1955–1956: II.225 with n. 3, interprets it as 'to reward' ('belohnen'). Analogous to this passage is the wording in 4.40: διὰ τὸ θεραπεύεσθαι μετοίκους καὶ ἐμπόρους which refers to the measures discussed above. θεραπεύειν may, of course, also involve rewards, but it is more and denotes generally good treatment. So Xenophon does not want to say that slaves should, in case of war, be motivated to fight for Athens by promising them rewards, i.e. most probably manumission afterwards. He rather expects them to engage voluntarily in a war for the Athenian cause as a consequence of good treatment in the time before. Gauthier's 1976: 177 reference to *Mem.* 1.4.18 is very instructive. It shows that θεραπεύειν leads to ἀντιθεραπεύειν.

[82] On that see Herzog 1914: 476; Lauffer 1955–1956: I.56–58.

[83] The intention to win over all citizens to his plans may be the reason that they will all be in receipt of the *triōbelia*, even those who are not in need of it. For the rich it is a compensation for the payments made for the initial funding of the programme; see the discussion following Schütrumpf's lecture: Schütrumpf 1995: 300.

[84] Xenophon takes for granted the use of slaves for safeguarding Athens' wealth. Nor does his Socrates ever call slavery into question. He takes for granted e.g. that the population of conquered cities is enslaved, labelling this procedure as just; see *Mem.* 4.2.15.

[85] See above, p. 699.

[86] On those modifications see most recently the remarks of Danzig 2003.

Although there is other evidence for the deployment of slaves in military service in Greece,[87] the particular point in Xenophon's conception is that the mine slaves will fight for Athens with great commitment without expecting manumission as a reward.[88] That slaves working in the Athenian mines would build a positive *rapport* with their masters and would be willing to go to war for them on account of good treatment is, no doubt, consonant with Xenophon's theory of leadership, but it could have been hardly realized in practice. One only has to bear in mind the extremely unhealthy working conditions in the mines and resulting the low life-expectancy. We should also not forget that the number of public slaves working in Laurium would have been between 60,000 and 90,000. It is difficult to imagine how living and housing conditions for these slaves could be devised that would make them accept their situation readily—for that is what Xenophon's theory of leadership requires—instead of posing a permanent threat of mass flight or revolt.[89] Here again Xenophon's vision appears utopian, and again it can be explained as a projection of his philosophical ideas.

According to various modern calculations, it would have taken between 30 and 100 years for Athens to purchase the necessary number of slaves.[90] Understandably, Xenophon does not make this explicit, and not many of his addressees will have calculated how much time would have passed before the *triōbelia* could have been put into practice. In this respect too his project proves to be utopian. For as long as the basic requirements of the citizens are not secured by the *triōbelia*, the problem of subsistence for the lower classes is not solved, and the daily allowance for participants in the Assembly and the law courts cannot be abolished, so that the danger of Athens pursuing an imperialistic policy at the cost of her allies is still there. The result of this would be that the reputation of Athens in the Greek world would also not change and that the novel foreign policy described later in the treatise could only be realized after the time mentioned above had elapsed. For decades Athens would be forced to invest enormous sums in a project from which it would—perhaps—derive advantage at a much later date.

In the beginning, Xenophon had announced it as his intention to show how Athens would be able to feed her poor in a just manner, to deal justly

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87 On Athens, see the discussion by Welwei 1974: 8–107; 175–181.

88 See n. 81.

89 Jansen 2007: 359 n. 225 is too optimistic with respect to the working conditions of the mine slaves.

90 According to Schwahn 1931: 257, the necessary number of slaves would have been reached after one hundred years; cf. Schütrumpf 1982: 14 n. 66; following Jansen's 2007: 372 n. 269 calculation, it would have taken only thirty years to buy 90,000 slaves.

with her allies and to dispel the mistrust amongst them or, to put it positively, to win their friendship. The domestic political measures necessary to secure this result were then discussed at length (until the end of § 4), with some allusions to the consequences for foreign policy. The new foreign policy of Athens, which is described in the last part of the *Poroi* (5–6), is again, as Azoulay has rightly recognized, nothing but an adaptation of his theoretical views on justice, friendship and leadership in the form of practical guidelines for particular action. Xenophon transfers his insights about the relationship between individuals to the setting of relationships between states, and assumes that if Athens deals justly and confers benefits proactively, she will experience the same positive results as an individual who behaves in that way.[91] The man-state analogy is already common in the *Memorabilia*,[92] and can also be found elsewhere in political theory.[93]

Since the domestic programme can only lead to the expected revenues if Athens is not at war, Xenophon delineates the principles of a new foreign policy (5). He suggests that Athens set up a board of Guardians of Peace which will help increase the popularity of the city and attract more visitors (προσφιλεστέραν καὶ πυκνοτέραν εἰσαφικνεῖσθαι, 5.1).[94] Here, once again, we encounter the idea that good deeds done in anticipation lead to sym-

[91] With a different interpretation: Dillery 1993: 6–9. He holds that Xenophon wants Athens to behave like an 'individual *apragmōn*' (9); on that see below, pp. 713–716. Azoulay 2004: 444 already proposed the correct interpretation: 'Tout comme le chef charismatique, la cité peut, par ses bienfaits, se métamorphoser en object d'amour pour tous les Grecs' ('just like the charismatic leader, the city can, by its benefactions, transform itself into an object of love for all Greeks').

[92] See Dorion 2001: 91 n. 20; Azoulay 2004: 444.

[93] See Wehrli 1968: esp. 218–220 (I owe the reference to Wehrli's article to one of the anonymous referees of *Historia*).

[94] I regard the εἰρηνοφύλακες as magistrates who take care of the maintenance of peace between states; for Gauthier 1976: 196–198 and Näf 1997: 334–335 they are responsible for the maintenance of inner peace in Athens. But in the *Poroi* εἰρήνη always means peace between states. In the following sentence, the content of which is connected with that of the preceding one, as is shown by the use of δέ, Xenophon discusses the restoration of hegemony by war (i.e. a topic in interstate relations). It is only after refuting the arguments of potental advocates of a war policy that he gets to talking about Athens' international peace policy at 5.8. εἰρηνοφύλακες must refer to Athenians who are active in this regard. Thiel 1922: 33 thinks of arbiters in conflicts between Athens and other cities, but Gauthier 1976: 196–197 rightly points to their lack of impartiality in this regard. Xenophon's point is that the reputation of the εἰρηνοφύλακες as being just will make sure that men from all over Greece will want to come to Athens as to a city of just men. A similar 'proleptic' argument can be found in 3.9–10 where the calculation presupposes the *triōbelia* that is not mentioned explicitly before 4.17. That has induced Bodei Giglioni 1970: LXXXVI with n. 76, followed by Cataudella 1985, to think that there were two payments; against that assumption, correctly, Schütrumpf 1982: 72–74; cf. Neri 1986 [1988].

pathy. He emphasizes that those cities are the happiest that enjoy peace (εὐδαιμονέσταται, 5.2) and he speaks out against the idea of regaining hegemony (τὴν δ' ἡγεμονίαν ... ἀναλαβεῖν, 5.5) by war. His mention of hegemony in this specific place is slightly surprising, since up to this point it had seemed as though his proposals were only aimed at peaceful relations between Athens and the other cities. But, by adducing historical examples, he argues that hegemony will be given to Athens spontaneously by those other cities, if she acts according to his proposals, renders services to them in advance and excels in justice. This is what happened after the Persian Wars, but Athens lost her hegemony again through acting unjustly. After she stopped acting unjustly, hegemony was once again conceded to her voluntarily.[95] And even the Thebans[96] and the Spartans[97] conferred hegemony on Athens not long ago in return for good deeds. It is once again the same keywords known from the discussions in the *Memorabilia* that we encounter here: εὐεργετοῦντες ... ἡγεμονίας ... ἐτύχομεν (5.6); ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν ἀπεσχόμεθα ... ἑκόντων προστάται ... ἐγενόμεθα (5.6); Θηβαῖοι ... εὖ πραχθέντες ἐπέτρεψαν Ἀθηναίοις περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας θέσθαι ὅπως βούλοιντο (5.7). We find here some stress is laid upon gratitude as an incentive to action (a Socratic idea), but the idea is also presented that states are willing to accept subordination to another state, provided they are convinced that 'it knows what has to be done' and provided they acknowledge its superiority, because they hope to obtain some advantages from doing so. For Xenophon the superiority of Athens consists in the justice of her foreign policy and her capacity to provide for international peace, which he regards as the precondition for the *eudaimonia* of all states.

Xenophon goes on to suggest that Athens should act as a conciliator in wars and civil strife in Greece. In doing so he takes for granted that Athens enjoys a reputation for being just. If, moreover, Athens proves able to settle the dispute about the autonomy of Delphi by diplomacy and not by war, he would not be surprised if, in case of any future attempt to violate the independence of Delphi, the 'Greeks all of one mind, banded together by oath and united in alliance' would fight against the aggressor together with the Athenians (5.9). If Athens, furthermore, strives for peace on land and sea in general, 'all men will put the safety of Athens first in their prayers' next to

95 This alludes to the leading position in the Second League that was offered Athens in 377; cf. Gauthier 1976: 207; Schütrumpf 1982: 111 n. 45.

96 This alludes to the Athenian support for Thebes against the Spartan garrison on the Cadmeia in 379/8 and to the alliance of 378; cf. Gauthier 1976: 207; Schütrumpf 1982: 111 n. 46.

97 This alludes to the alliance of 369; cf. Gauthier 1976: 207–208; Schütrumpf 1982: 111 n. 47.

their own (5.10). Such a reaction corresponds exactly to what is stated in theoretical terms about the effects of justice and the behaviour of friends in the *Memorabilia*. What makes Xenophon's proposal especially interesting is the fact that the concept of concord (ὁμόνοια), known from the sphere of domestic policy where it is understood as the common conviction that everybody has to obey the laws, is transferred to Greece as a whole. To Xenophon, Athens not only represents the geographical and the economic centre of the Greek world,[98] but the freely recognized political centre as well.[99] The other Greeks will range themselves under Athens as their προστάτης, since they have realized that they will draw profit from doing so, and since they 'love' (προσφιλεστέραν, 5.1; 6.1; cf. [ἀν]υπόπτους, 1.1) the city as citizens 'love' a good ruler. This probably also explains why Xenophon expects voluntary support for financing his domestic policy:[100] the fact that Athens is just and beneficial for everybody will prompt the other states to do their utmost to be honoured by her as benefactors.

Xenophon, it has to be noted, does not expect that there will be no wars in the future. They may break out if the city is wronged (ἀδικῇ, 5.13). But the initial situation of Athens in such a war is identical with that of the just man in the *Memorabilia*: she will be able to take vengeance upon the evil-doer more quickly because, since she has not wronged anybody in the past, the enemy will not be able to find allies. The idea that underlies Xenophon's reasoning is once more that only the just are able to have friends, and so allies.

The goal of Xenophon's programme, therefore, is an economic, cultural[101] and political hegemony for Athens.[102] But he wants this hegemony to be

98 1.2–8.

99 Delebecque 1957: 475–476: '… même si elles ne doivent prendre corps que vint-cinq siècles après lui: c'est dans les *Revenus* qu'il faut chercher le premier schéma des nationalisations et de l'organisation des nations unies' ('even if they were not destined to take shape until twenty-five centuries after his time: it is in the *Revenues* that one should seek the first model for nationalization and the UN'). The peace envisaged in the *Poroi* does not only mean peace for Athens and the remaining members of the League, as Dieckhoff 1972: 24–26 wants it, but peace for as many cities as possible.

100 See above, p. 706.

101 That aspect has not been mentioned so far; cf. 5.4.

102 Differently Dillery 1993 and already Thiel 1922: XXVII: 'hoc tantum optat, opinor, ut concordis Graeciae caput atque centrum Athenae fiant, tam quod ad commercium quam quod ad animi culturam attinet (5.3.4), neque imperio potentiaque opus esse censet ad hanc concordiam obtinendam servandamque' ('he just wants this, I think, that Athens should become the capital and centre of a Greece in concord, in both commercial and cultural respects, and he does not believe that empire or power is needed to secure and preserve this concord'). Breitenbach 1967: 1754 speaks of 'eine Art Friedenshegemonie' ('a sort of

realized by peaceful means, and to be the result of voluntary subordination on the part of the other states, which, basing himself on his philosophical theory, he expects to come about spontaneously. But the tradition in which he sees the future Athenian hegemony is that of the First and Second Leagues (5.5–6), and more precisely the respective initial phases when Athens' hegemony had been, as he assumes, accepted freely by all her allies, and had not yet degenerated into tyranny as a result of lust for power.[103] Xenophon thus does not transfer the behaviour of the ἀπράγμων to the Athenian state, as has been assumed.[104] He rather wants Athens to be the international arbitral authority *par excellence* and, most importantly, wants her to implement her arbitral verdicts and whatever she regards as just, if necessary by war. Hence the leading role that Athens will play is not only a consequence of her being the economic and cultural centre of the Greek world, but also of her being the *hegemōn* of a major system of alliances.[105]

One may wonder whether Xenophon had further objectives in mind with this 'unification' of Greece under Athenian hegemony. It is true that according to his plans the new coalition under Athenian leadership includes only Greek states, but he also cherishes hopes that even 'kings, tyrants and satraps' will supply funds for the reform programme, i.e. feel friendly

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peace hegemony'), but means a hegemony in which Athens has only 'eine geistige und wirtschaftliche, aber nicht eine politisch-militärische Führerrolle' ('a role as intellectual and economic, but not politico-military, leader'); Pöhlmann in Pöhlmann & Oertel 1925: I.240: 'Verzicht auf jede politische Machtentfaltung nach außen' ('renunciation of any outward extension of political power'); that interpretation is inconsistent with the idea of Athens being the centre of a system of alliances. The interpretation suggested above can already be found in Zurborg 1874: 41: 'Non enim Graecorum principatum tenere Athenienses vetantur (immo iubentur potius), sed bello tantum recuperare' ('the Athenians are not forbidden to be the leaders of Greece—indeed they are rather urged to do so—but only to recover their leadership by war'). Compare Andreades 1931: 408: Athens aims at 'Vorrang durch moralische Mittel' ('primacy by moral means'), not 'Hegemonie mit Gewalt' ('hegemony by force'). But what would be the difference between 'Vorrang' and 'Hegemonie'? The objections of Gauthier 1976: 212–213 against a 'pacifist hegemony' are justified if one interprets the *Poroi* against its historical background only. But Xenophon starts from philosophical theory and applies it to real life. Compare also Pontier 2006: 70, who emphasizes that Xenophon's project is of political and economic character.

[103] This idea of a development of Athenian power in the time of the Leagues is frequent in the literature of the fifth and fourth centuries; see Wehrli 1968: esp. 216–217.

[104] Dillery 1993; against him, see also Jansen 2007: 262–270 with slightly different conclusions than proposed here.

[105] Differently Dillery 1993: 5–6, followed by Jansen 2007: 231; against the view of Xenophon as a pacifist, cf. also Pontier 2006: 71. Azoulay 2004: 445 n. 56 is somewhat too cautious in this regard: 'Notons toutefois que Xénophon ne prône nullement un pacifisme effréné: cf. *Poroi*, V, 13' ('let us note all the same that Xenophon certainly does not advocate unbridled pacificism').

towards the 'new Athens'.[106] I would not exclude that he conceived his united Greece under Athenian leadership as a powerful factor against Macedon and Persia.[107] Nevertheless, we have to bear in mind that Xenophon thinks that the domestic reform programme can only be realized in times of peace. So he cannot have regarded the new alliance as a united front in a crusade against Persia, as, for example, in Isocrates' Panhellenic programme.[108] Apparently, Xenophon had in mind an Athenian hegemony that would cause foreign powers to seek friendly relations with Athens and all Greece.

In a *makarismos* Xenophon sums up briefly the effects of the new policy for the city (6.1). It is comparable to a similar passage at the end of the *Hiero* where he praises the happiness of the good ruler (11.13–15). As may be expected, it is in agreement with what is said about the *eudaimonia* of a city in the *Memorabilia*:[109] 'we shall be regarded with more affection by the Greeks, shall live in greater security and shall be more glorious'. The *dēmos* 'will be maintained in comfort and the rich no longer burdened with the expenses of war', festivals and buildings will be more splendid, and, in short, 'we may come to see our city secure and prosperous' (μετ' ἀσφαλείας εὐδαιμονοῦσαν, 6.1).

Xenophon closes his text with a remarkable self-quotation (6.2–3): if the Athenians approve his plans, they should send envoys to Dodona and Delphi and inquire of the gods whether the realization of the project is beneficial for the *polis*. If the gods consent to it, they should ask 'which of the gods we must propitiate in order that we may prosper in our handiwork'. Right down to the choice of words, this is an adaptation of the account to be found in the *Anabasis* (3.1.5–8) of Xenophon's consultation of the Delphic oracle before taking part in the expedition of Cyrus.[110] But one difference stands out: the young Xenophon had not asked whether he should join the expedition in the first place, but had asked right away 'to

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106 Xenophon speaks of Ἕλληνες in this context in 5.9. Cataudella 1985: 39, following Bodei Giglioni, assumes that the payment in 3.9 differs from the *triōbelia* (see above, n. 75). He therefore sees in the possible yield the reason for non-Athenians to contribute to the financing of the project.

107 Delebecque 1957: 475 also points to the Panhellenic character of the project.

108 Thus also Bodei Giglioni 1970: XXIX–XXXV.

109 Somewhat different but similar is the end of the *Oeconomicus* (21); cf. Zurborg 1874: 23–24.

110 This has, of course, been observed by the commentaries; cf. Thiel 1922: XV–XVI; Gauthier 1976: 218–222, esp. 220; Schütrumpf 1982: 115 n. 51; see also Gleininger 1874: 40–41: 'Et videtur aliquid a magistro didicisse' (40) ('he seems to have learned something from his teacher').

what one of the gods he should sacrifice and pray in order to best and most successfully … return home in safety' (tr. Brownson). This precipitate behaviour had been sharply criticized by Socrates. So at the end of the *Poroi*, Xenophon shows that, as an old man, he has learnt his lesson from Socrates' criticism, and probably also that he owes him a great deal, and not only with regard to consulting oracles correctly. The *Poroi* thus begin and end 'in a Socratic manner', which is probably to be seen as a hint for readers who are familiar with Xenophon's Socratic works.[111] It looks as if Xenophon wants to draw attention to the person who taught him the guiding principles for political actions and showed him how Athens can be made *eudaimōn*.

Those who regard the *Poroi* merely as a work on fiscal policy miss its central point.[112] Nor is it only concerned with economics. It is true that in its first part it seems to deal merely with questions of public revenues, and even the peace policy propagated in the second part is presented as a necessary precondition for realizing the fiscal project described in the first. But if we take into consideration the consequences of a consistent implementation of the programme, it becomes clear that Xenophon's aim is to put into practice in Athens the ideal of governance espoused by Socrates in the *Memorabilia* and described or demanded by Xenophon himself in the works on monarchic rule. In a very similar way, the advice given by Simonides to the tyrant Hiero in the *Hiero* has a strong focus on problems of finance and, on the surface, aims at making the tyrant wealthy and happy (εὐδαίμων). There the tyrant is confronted with the problem that he must commit crimes in order to remain in power, whereas here the Athenian politicians are forced to mistreat their allies in order to be able to feed the *dēmos*. In the final analysis, the proposals contained in the *Hiero* also come down to a state of *eudaimonia* for the whole population of the city. But again, this general *eudaimonia* is presented and made attractive to the ruler as a precondition for his personal *eudaimonia*. And again, the tyrant will eventually be loved by his subjects and by other states and they will

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111 This has been noted by Grote 1865: III.593; but he declares subsequently: 'But almost everything in the discourse, between the first and the last sentences, is in a vein not at all Sokratic'. That the opposite is true, I have tried to show above. Needless to say that Socratic is to be understood as Xenophontic-Socratic. Probably, Xenophon's political theory does not have much to do with the teaching of the historical Socrates. He seems to have been influenced deeply by Philistus' idealistic portrayal of Dionysius I as a model ruler; on that see Schorn 2010.

112 Thus e.g. von der Lieck 1933: esp. 20–21; 37; Lama 1954: esp. 130; 139–140.

all subordinate themselves voluntarily to his rule and hegemony. In both cases, the speaker does not try to convince his addressee of philosophical concepts. Xenophon and Simonides both argue *ad hominem* and skilfully try to communicate theoretical concepts in the form of practical advice that aims, on the surface, only at improving the material situation of the addressee. Neither of them makes explicit that they intend to better the political decision-makers (namely the tyrant in the *Hiero* and the *dēmos* in the *Poroi*) in accordance with Xenophon's theory of leadership. In the *Hiero*, Xenophon insinuates that Simonides' proposals are not yet sufficient to make the ruler and the subjects happy because the character of the tyrant is still deficient, so he cannot become a good ruler. In the case of the *Poroi* Xenophon takes over the role of both Simonides and Hiero: if the Athenians approve his proposals, he will be their *prostatēs*. So he is the wise counsellor and the future leader rolled into one.[113] In the light of a literary *oeuvre* that is almost exclusively dedicated to the topic of good leadership in the various areas of life, it may readily be assumed that he was convinced that he possessed the knowledge of how to exercise power. So he may have believed that his programme would fall on sympathetic ears, in accordance with his theory that a person who knows what has to be done is also able to communicate it and to convince his audience, and will therefore be followed voluntarily. Why he only came forward with his proposals as an old man, in the early summer of 354,[114] is a matter for conjecture. Maybe it took some time before Xenophon, having returned home from exile (an event which may be inferred from the *Poroi*),[115] had attained a position in Athens that made this step advisable. Besides that, it was only after the

[113] On the interpretation of the *Hiero*, see above, pp. 702–703, 704, 716, and Schorn 2008. Somewhat different is Azoulay's interpretation (2004: 229). He is right in emphasizing the role of the *dēmos* as subjects in the *Poroi*, but in addition he accentuates more than I do the position of the 'élites civiques' that will receive a remuneration for their services. However, they too are part of the people who subordinate themselves to the new προστάτης and act according to his will. At 443–444 Azoulay speaks of a break in Xenophon's political thought: from now on it is no longer a 'chef charismatique' ('charismatic leader') but a *polis*, Athens, who guarantees order. Against this view it may be noted that it is still a politician 'who knows what has to be done' that stands behind the *polis*. In the *Poroi* this is Xenophon himself. I thus do not see any fundamental break in Xenophon's thought.

[114] On the date of the *Poroi*, see above n. 26.

[115] In a recent study of Xenophon's biography, Dreher 2004 leaves open whether the Athenian was rehabilitated and returned home. In the same volume, Badian 2004 pleads for a return: 'The detailed information on conditions in Athens that we find in *Poroi* does not seem to have been acquired entirely from traveller's reports' (42). According to Jansen 2007: 32–50, the *Poroi* was written in Athens where Xenophon was allowed to return shortly after the battle of Mantinea in 362.

Social War that the political situation of Athens became so desperate that he could have expected to get his proposals through.[116]

This interpretation has shown that the *Poroi* is much more than its title may suggest. It is an attempt totally to transform Athens according to the ideas of Xenophontic-Socratic philosophy.[117] It is indicative that the word democracy does not appear in that work.[118] As Azoulay has rightly highlighted, the ideal propagated here is, in the final analysis, that of the man who possesses knowledge in the Socratic-Xenophontic sense, to whom the people subordinate themselves spontaneously and who in turn makes them *eudaimones*: wealthy and morally good.[119]

If we ask about the feasibility of the reform programme, the answer has to be largely negative as will already have become apparent in what has been said above. Although some of Xenophon's proposals could have been put into practice and might have helped improve Athens' reputation abroad to some extent, the overall idea of the *Poroi*, from a modern point of view, belongs to the domain of political utopia, as Azoulay was right to emphasize.[120] For the precondition for the moral re-orientation of Athenian politics, the new world of international peace and the hegemony entrusted to Athens voluntarily by the other cities, is the correctness of Xenophon's political philosophy and, ultimately, of the idea of man that he puts into the mouth of Socrates, or, as Azoulay says, of his charismatic concept. Xenophon takes it for granted that someone who is able to lead in the philosophical sense of the term, will be recognized as such by others, and will be accepted without envy. Everybody, he assumes, is ready to subordinate himself freely to a man or state if he expects advantages from doing so. Xenophon therefore believed that the *dēmos* could be tamed by the measures he suggested, that all non-citizens in Athens, even the slaves in the mines, would act for the benefit of the Athenian state and that the economic

116 On the state of the League after the Social War, see now Dreher 1995: 287–292.

117 Differently Bodei Giglioni 1970: XXVI: 'i *Poroi* non propongono alcuna riforma politica' ('the *Poroi* do not propose any political reform').

118 That has been noted by Schütrumpf 1995: 296.

119 See Azoulay 2004: 224–225 who stresses the aspect of obedience and passiveness of the citizens, but not their moral improvement.

120 See Azoulay 2004: 445 on the utopian character of the *Poroi*: 'Ce chapitre récapitulatif des *Poroi* dévoile toute la charge utopique de l'œuvre. En imaginant une hégémonie fondée sur la pure *charis*, Xénophon fait état d'un rêve bien plus qu'il n'esquisse un véritable bilan' ('this recapitulatory chapter of the *Poroi* fully unveils the utopian significance of the work. Imagining a hegemony founded on pure *charis*, Xenophon is reporting a dream rather than drafting a balance-sheet').

and political superiority of the city would be accepted and supported readily. Believing in his philosophical doctrine, he was hoping to convince his fellow citizens of a programme that would have taken decades to realize and that would have gobbled up enormous sums of money. The *Poroi* is thus on a par with Plato's *Republic*. There too, realization of the project depends on the correctness of the philosophical premises, i.e. the Theory of Ideas. But while Plato was fairly cautious with regard to feasibility, Xenophon does not seem to have questioned the practicability of his plans.[121]

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[121] This difference has been indicated to me by one of the anonymous referees of *Historia*; for Plato's cautiousness, see *Resp*. 473c, for Xenophon's optimism, see 4.18; 6.1.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

STRANGERS INCORPORATED: OUTSIDERS IN XENOPHON'S *POROI*[*]

Joseph Jansen

This paper examines Xenophon's treatment of three important outsider groups in the *Ways and Means* (*Poroi*): slaves, foreigners, and metics.[1] The topic merits attention for the light it sheds not only on his political economy but also his ethical philosophy, which often pushes the boundaries of traditional Greek morality and values. On the one hand, much of the *Poroi* is conventional in its scope: the goals of providing each citizen with sufficient alimony (*trophē*) and of augmenting *polis* revenues were taken for granted by most Athenians.[2] Yet, what is completely innovative about Xenophon's political economy are the means by which he attempts to achieve these ends: he recommends the exploitation of financial resources derived not from empire but rather from peaceful economic activities, which he judges to be the 'most just' solution to the problem of feeding the people (1.1).[3] To maximize this peace dividend, I suggest, Xenophon aims to integrate into Athenian society slaves (*douloi*), resident aliens (metics), and foreigners (*xenoi*) much further than anything previously attempted or conceived. His progressive attitude, simply put, is that non-citizen outsiders who promote the welfare of all Athenians should partake in many of the same honours and privileges that citizens enjoy. In particular, I demonstrate that he attempts to augment the size of intervening status categories, which, had his

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[1] For a comprehensive bibliography on the *Poroi*, see Gauthier 1977; see also Schütrumpf 1982, Dillery 1993, Doty 2003, Jansen 2007, Lewis 2009, and the chapters by Figueira and Schorn in this volume, pp. 665–723.

[2] Schütrumpf 1982: 1–44 and 1995 and Jansen 2007: 120–135 (contra Gauthier 1976: 20–32, 238–253, 242–245 and 1984) interpret *trophē* in economic terms, that is, as a subsistence grant to alleviate the poverty of the masses resulting from the Social War.

[3] Polanyi 1977: 196 and Dillery 1993.

proposals been fully implemented, would have contributed significantly to the erosion of the status divide separating citizen from non-citizen outsider.

Outsiders in Athens

It is often said that societies are judged by the way they treat marginalized groups within their communities, such as prisoners, foreigners, the poor, the very young and old, the disabled—in fact, any group that lacks *de jure* or *de facto* the same rights and privileges accorded to the powerful. When this principle has been applied to classical Athens, the verdict has generally been unfavourable, in spite of the Athenians' professed belief in the democratic values of liberty, equality, and openness. While a few scholars still cling to the notion of an open, liberal Athens, the *communis opinio* is that the Athenians treated marginalized groups rather poorly because they denied them the most valued legal, political, and economic rights and privileges accorded to citizens.[4] Slaves, metics, and foreigners, especially those who came to Athens for trade and other economic pursuits, comprised the subaltern 'other', outsiders whose values and way of life served to define full membership of the citizen insider group: the slave's servitude was anathema to the citizen's most cherished values of freedom and autonomy: the individualism of the foreigner, which was born of and fostered in the market, challenged his sense of communalism and friendship (*philia*); and the metic, who in his social and economic life was most like the citizen, by virtue of his exclusion from participating in politics was the anti-citizen.[5] In short, these three groups comprised the '*demi-monde*' of Athens: a distinct world segregated from the exclusive, if not xenophobic and chauvinistic, political club of adult male citizens.[6]

[4] For recent attempts to defend Athens as an open, liberal society—the thesis most famously associated with the first volume of Karl Popper's *Open Society and Its Enemies* (1945)—see Cohen 1992 and 2000, Ober 2005: 92–127 and 2008, and Vlassopoulos 2007.

[5] For the slave/free dichotomy, see Todd 1993: 172 and Raaflaub 2004; for discussions of how the values of traders and those comprising the 'world of the emporion' conflicted with those of citizens, see Vélissaropoulos 1977, Mossé 1983, Rahe 1992: 81–82, Morris 1994, and Von Reden 1985a; that the metic was the 'anti-citizen' is the view of Whitehead 1977: 70, who challenges Wilamowitz's notion of the metic as a 'quasi-citizen'.

[6] McKechnie 1989: 152–154, 179. The Athenians' xenophobia and chauvinism is well documented in Hall 1991: 160–200 and Isaac 2006: 109–133, who also treats the controversial topic of racism. Much of the evidence comes from funeral orations and tragedies, especially those that touch upon the theme of autochthony, the idea that the Athenians were born directly from Attic soil and thus not descended from outsiders; see, e.g., Eur. *Med.* 222–223 and *Ion* 585–647, 1059 with Saxonhouse 1986: 256 who argues that the *Ion* is a critique of

But the picture is much more complex than this. The Athenians recognized well that without these outsiders life as they knew it could not exist, for they provided many of the economic and social services in the city that allowed citizens to occupy themselves with war, politics, and other communal activities.[7] While it is true that citizens pursued many of the same occupations as metics, foreigners, and even slaves, outsiders were undoubtedly overrepresented in practically every area of the Athenian economy: agriculture, mining, quarrying, manufacture, banking, trade, and all the so-called banausic occupations.[8] Athenian attitudes toward outsiders were therefore necessarily ambiguous: every sentiment of xenophobia and chauvinism we find in the historical record can be counterbalanced with examples of openness and friendliness to outsiders.[9] And more importantly for my discussion here, the Athenians did not always conceive of these outsiders as forming a distinct homogenous group: some outsiders were valued more than others, whereas others seemed to have had more in common with members of another status group than with their own.[10] Finley argues famously that 'social status could be viewed as a continuum or spectrum'.[11] We find evidence for statuses which could be defined not only as 'between slavery and freedom', as he suggests, but also between free and citizen.[12] For example, there were privileged slaves, such as public slaves (*dēmosioi*) and

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Athenian xenophobia and the exclusiveness of the autochthony myth (see also Ober 1989: 261–263). For a short but useful survey of Athenian opposition to enfranchising outsiders, see Ostwald 1992: 367.

7 Aristotle *Pol.* 1278a2–3 deems slaves, foreigners, and metics (and freedmen) as '[those] without whom there could be no *polis*' (ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις). See also Pecírka 1967: 23–26 and Austin & Vidal-Naquet 1977: 101.

8 Perhaps the most controversial subject in this regard has been the citizen's involvement in trade and finance, which traditionally has been thought to be the sole domain of *xenoi* and metics (e.g., Hasebroek 1967 and Reed 2003). Cohen 1991: 26–40 has seriously questioned this notion. Harris 2000: 70 estimates that about 10,000 citizens were involved in trade and manufacture. The comment of Morris 1994: 60 is well taken: 'it is not necessary to argue that all, or even most, trade was in non-Athenian hands; just that non-citizens were heavily over-represented' (cf. Whitehead 1977: 117).

9 See, e.g., Thuc. 2.39.1; Soph. *OC* 258–291; Ar. *Ach.* 507–508; Isoc. *Paneg.* 43. Figueira (this volume, p. 676) also notes the large numbers of democratic refugees that the Athenians received in the early fourth century, especially the Samians whom they enfranchised.

10 For example, in Aristophanes' grain metaphor (see previous note), citizens correspond to pure grain, which is valued for the fine flour its makes; metics to the bran, which can be sifted away, but with difficulty and at some cost; and foreigners to the chaff, which is easily discarded by the wind.

11 Finley 1982: 116.

12 In some states (see Arist. *Pol.* 1275a1–25, 1277b33–1278b5) there were even different status categories of citizenship based on political participation levels, which one could categorize, albeit crudely, as 'active' and 'passive'.

those living and working apart from their masters (*chōris oikountes*),[13] whose freedom of movement and autonomy distinguished them from common chattel; metics who had privileges, such as equality of taxation (*isoteleia*), exemption from taxation (*ateleia*), special superintendence of the Council (*epimeleia*), the right of owning real estate (*enktēsis*), and/or the special status of benefactor (*eueregtēs*) or public guest (*proxenos*);[14] and others like disenfranchised citizens (*atimoi*), freedmen (*apeleutheroi*), bastards (*nothoi*), who seem to be more than just 'free'.[15] These 'intervening' status categories necessarily contributed to the blurring of distinctions between citizen, slave, and metic.[16] But more significantly, these special status categories also facilitated the upward movement from each of the main status categories to the next, which in theory led all the way to citizenship.

The evidence is not overwhelming but suggestive nonetheless. First, *chōris oikountes* had better chances of being manumitted because they were allowed to keep some proceeds from their labour, which could be accu-

[13] For public slaves, see Jacob 1928. Perotti 1974, Cohen 2000: 130–132, 145–154, and Kazakévich 2008 are the best treatments of *chōris oikountes*, though many unresolved issues persist. The view that *chōris oikountes* were freedmen, based on the confused account of Harpocration *s.v.*, is thoroughly refuted by Kazakévich 2008. However, her conclusion that *chōris oikountes* were not slaves but non-metic foreigners living in Athens is unpersuasive. Most scholars (e.g., Westerman 1955: 16–17, Ste. Croix 1981: 142 with 563, n. 9; Todd 1993: 192–194; Harrison 1998: 167–168; and Cohen 1992: 97–98) agree that *chōris oikountes* should be indentified with those slaves who produced income (*apophora*) for and/or brought in rent (*andrapoda misthophorounta*) to their masters. Whoever the *chōris oikountes* actually were, there is no denying that privileged slaves existed as a category—a notion which Kazakévich 2008: 356, 377 herself endorses. The group was certainly not monolithic, for those who paid *apophora* directly to their masters seem to have organized their own labour and/or worked for themselves and not for a third party, as was the case with *andrapoda misthophorounta* who, by virtue of being leased out by their master, took on a new, *de facto* master (Perotti 1976, Ste. Croix 1981: 563, n. 9, Ducat 2002: 203, Zelnik-Abramowitz 2006: 216, n. 67, and Kazakévich 2008: 352). What all privileged slaves seem to have shared was a greater than usual amount of independence in their daily lives, especially at work, which allowed them to possess and accumulate personal fortunes, some of which could be quite high: consider, e.g., the slaves Menecles and Stratocles, whose estates were valued at 7,000 dr. and 5 ½ talents respectively (Isae. 2.29, 35; 11.42), and compare Aristarchus in the Attic Stelai, VI, ll. 33–46, whose many possessions are listed, although their values are lost.

[14] For a good discussion of these honours, see Henry 1983 and MacDowell 1986: 78–79. Osborne 1981–1983: II. 84 claims metics with these privileges had 'a status close to that of citizens'.

[15] *Nothoi* are often assumed to be *de facto* metics but without any evidence (see Ogden 1996: 156 with literature cited). I find it hard to believe that an Athenian born out of wedlock from two Athenian parents or even one born from a foreign woman, who in some circumstances could inherit his father's estate (Harrison 1968: 66–68), would have been required to take on a *prostatēs* and pay the *metoikion*.

[16] Todd 1993: 172–173; cf. Austin & Vidal-Naquet 1977: 103–105 and Hansen 1999: 86–88.

mulated for the eventual purchase of their freedom, so long as they paid their masters a regular fixed portion (*apophora*) of their earnings. The Old Oligarch attests to this very phenomenon, when he bemoans the high status of some Athenian slaves: 'wherever power is based on the navy, it is necessary for slaves to serve for hire in order that we take the proceeds from their work, and so we have to set them free' (ὅπου γὰρ ναυτικὴ δύναμίς ἐστιν, ἀπὸ χρημάτων ἀνάγκη τοῖς ἀνδραπόδοις δουλεύειν, ἵνα λαμβάνωμεν ὧν πράττῃ τὰς ἀποφοράς, καὶ ἐλευθέρους ἀφιέναι).[17] The so-called *phialai exeleutherikai* inscriptions of the late fourth century provide some additional evidence. Generally believed to be manumission records, they list the dedications of 100-drachma silver bowls (*phialai*) by ex-slaves who were victorious in 'desertion suits' (*dikai apostasiou*) brought by their former masters.[18] Although nothing is explicitly said about who paid for these dedications, it is highly unlikely that former masters purchased the bowls. Cohen argues persuasively that the slaves themselves were responsible, and among these, 'we might expect this process of manumission to involve a disproportionate number of slaves *khōris oikountes* ... These were the *douloi* who would have been able to accumulate funds necessary for such dedications, or to induce lenders (who appear in the inscriptions) to advance the cost of the dedication'.[19] That many of these slaves contracted loans from lenders operating as clubs (*eranistai*) underscores the fact that they were not ordinary slaves but slaves whose autonomy allowed them to form *philia* ties with wealthy Athenian citizens and metics.[20] Moreover, the occupations of the slaves attested in the inscriptions are largely commercial in nature, which are the very kind of pursuits in which *chōris oikountes* were known to be active.[21] Consequently, we can reasonably assert that because *chōris oikountes* had more opportunities to make money than other slaves, they also

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[17] [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.11, with Frisch 1942: 208.

[18] See now Meyer 2010, who introduces and collects all the relevant epigraphic documents. Contrary to the scholarly consensus, Meyer interprets these records as 'inventory lists of *phialai* dedicated as tithes from the unsuccessful prosecutions of metics through the *graphē aprostasiou* (not *apostasiou*, but *aprostasiou*, traditionally defined only as prosecution of a metic for not having a *prostatēs*, but including) ... failure to pay the *metoikion* or metic-tax' (28). Provocative as this thesis is a number of interpretive challenges remain (see the review of Vlassopoulos 2011). It should be noted, however, that Meyer's interpretation does not preclude the notion that a number of the defendants in these cases would have been 'freedpeople', that is, former slaves, among whom *chōris oikountes* would have been a significant portion, living as metics (see note 23 below) at the time of their trials (71).

[19] Cohen 2000: 153; cf. Vlassopoulos 2011.

[20] For *eranistai* lenders, see Cohen 2000: 153, n. 118; see Millet 1991: 153–159 for an overview of *eranos* loans within the context of *philia* networks.

[21] Cohen 2000: 153.

had a greater chance of being manumitted. Their status was like a 'halfway house' to freedom.[22]

Once freed, a slave became a *de facto* metic.[23] Most freedmen undoubtedly retained this status for the duration of their lives, but for the ambitious, further movement up the status hierarchy remained open, especially if they could garner special privileges, such as *isoteleia* and *enktēsis*, and/or honorary titles like *euergetēs*. These metics gained citizenship more easily than other metics because such privileges made wealth accumulation easier, which in turn allowed them to contribute more generously to liturgies and to fulfil other financial obligations of the city, such as war taxes (*eisphorai*) and public subscriptions (*epidoseis*).[24] In fact, a naturalization law, perhaps dating to the fifth century, prescribes the pathway to citizenship in this way: 'it is impossible for someone to be made an Athenian unless he be deemed worthy of citizenship on account of his good service (*andragathia*) to the people of Athens'.[25] For the orator Apollodorus, such *andragathia* necessarily entailed significant financial expenditure on the city's behalf.[26] Osborne, who has exhaustively researched the evidence for this practice, sums it up this way: 'with the odd exception, wealth, as well as benefaction, will have been the *sine qua non* of naturalization'.[27] Much like *chōris oikountes*, then, metics and other casual residents of Athens had to, in a sense, 'pay' for the privilege to progress up the status ladder. Interestingly, of all the known individual cases of metics naturalized for their generosity to the *polis*, the vast majority were successful businessmen, traders, and artisans.[28] The late fourth-century Acarnanian doctor Evenor evidences well

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22 Cohen 2000: 152.

23 MacDowell 1986: 82.

24 Beyond the obvious financial benefits of *isoteleia* and *ateleia*, other privileges, especially *enktēsis*, brought with them important economic advantages (see section on metics below). Although honorary titles like *euergetēs* and *proxenos* do not seem to have had any special privilege or right attached to it, they did raise the recipient's profile in the city to such a degree that we often find these men receiving additional honours and privileges of an economic import in the same and/or subsequent decrees (see MacDowell 1986: 79 and Osborne 1983: 148 with e.g., D8, 22, 24, 50, T9, 27).

25 μὴ ἐξεῖναι ποιήσασθαι Ἀθηναῖον, ὃν ἂν μὴ δι' ἀνδραγαθίαν εἰς τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων ἄξιον ᾖ γενέσθαι πολίτην ([Dem.] 59.89, with Osborne 1983: 141–150).

26 [Dem.] 59.13 with Osborne 1983: 147–148 and notes.

27 Osborne 1983: 149.

28 The evidence is collected in Osborne 1980–1983. There are a total of nine cases, excluding mass grants (D1, D4–5, D6, T18), in which known metics were naturalized (T5, T9, T30–31, T48–50, T80–81) and at least eight others for which the evidence is inadequate for determining the status of the grantees but sufficient enough for establishing residency in Athens (T2, T19, T75–78, T85, D50). If we exclude the sons of the grantees, three individuals were given

this status mobility by means of economic benefaction.[29] Originally, he was a *xenos* residing in Athens for short periods of time, but time in which he acted 'eagerly' (πρόθυμος) in the Athenians' interests (*IG* II[2] 373, 4–6). For his service to the city, the Athenians in 322/1 granted him and his descendants the honorary titles of *proxenos* and *euergetēs* (ll. 6–8). Not much later, the Athenians decreed that he and his descendants receive the privileges of *epimeleia* and *gēs kai oikias enktēsis* (*IG* II[2] 373, 29–32). Evenor probably took up permanent residence in Athens sometime between these two grants, thus becoming a metic.[30] The Athenians then passed yet another decree sometime after 319/8 (perhaps 307–303/2) in which Evenor and his descendants were awarded citizenship (*IG* II[2] 374, 14–17).[31] The reasons given for his naturalization were that he practiced his craft well for the Athenians and the other residents of the city and that he contributed a talent of silver to an *epidosis* (ll. 5–10).

The conclusion this evidence points to is that intervening status categories greatly facilitated status mobility, and that the common denominator in this movement was economic benefaction. Admittedly, individual grants of citizenship were extremely rare in the fifth and fourth centuries. The total attested number amounts to less than two hundred people, and of these, nine were of metic status and only two were known to be former slaves. Some would take these low numbers as evidence of an inherent conservatism on the part of the Athenians, who jealously defended their rights and privileges against outsiders whose naturalization would bastardize the integrity of the citizen club. The Old Oligarch, for instance, viewed the presence of privileged slaves and metics in the city as a real threat to the status divide separating citizen from non-citizen.[32] More practical factors, how-

citizenship for some kind of political benefaction (T5, T19, and T85) versus eight for economic contributions (D50, T2, T9, T30, T48, T75, T80–81). The contributions of Evenor (D50), Phanosthenes (T9), Pasion (T30), and Phormion (T48) are directly attested, whereas those of Chaerephilus (T75), Epigenes (T80), and Conon (T81) are inferred from the evidence (see Dinarchus 1.43 with Osborne 1983: 196–197 and Engen 1996: 394–395).

29 See Osborne 1980: 123–124 (D 50), 1982: 129–131 and 1983: 197, Osborne & Byrne 1996: XXVII–VIII, and Pecírka 1966: 72–74.

30 Osborne & Byrne 1996: xxviii: 'The context makes it clear Evenor is a resident of Athens and it seems that his first award of the *proxenia* came during this residency'.

31 For the date of his naturalization, see Osborne 1982: 129–131.

32 The money slaves acquired from their status as *chōris oikountes* (1.11: τὰ χρήματα … τὰ ἑαυτοῦ) allowed them not only to dress better than most citizens, he remarks, but also to speak openly to the free as if one of them: 'for this reason we made freedom of speech (ἰσηγορίαν) applicable even to slaves vis-à-vis the free'. He then goes on to note how this freedom of speech (*isēgoria*) also exists for metics in relation to citizens because of their important contribution to the trades and the fleet (διά τε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ διὰ τὸ

ever, contributed to the Athenians' illiberal naturalization record. One of the main reasons stemmed from a desire to safeguard future benefactions from those who had already received honours from the *polis*: '[t]he purpose underlying the granting of honours generally in Athens … was to reward benefactions with a view to securing others'.[33] Citizenship was atop the ladder of honours, and thus a liberal naturalization policy would have necessarily disrupted this system of reciprocity by liquidating the incentive for future euergetism once citizenship was attained. Irrespective of the total number of citizenship grants, what needs to be underscored is that status mobility occurred and was a phenomenon that the Athenians could encourage or discourage, depending on the mood and financial needs of the day. Accordingly, the progression up the status ladder was not merely a theoretical prospect but a real pathway open to all who were willing to play the benefaction game.[34] It is within this context of intervening status categories and economic benefaction that we must examine Xenophon's proposals.

Outsiders in the *Poroi*

The Athens of the *Poroi* is a remarkably open and cosmopolitan city, one that embodies many of the liberal qualities emphasized by Pericles in the Funeral Oration but notably lacking the militaristic and imperial character of that speech.[35] In fact, the Athens that most closely approximates the

ναυτικόν) (see Frisch 1942: 211 and Whitehead 1977: 85 who argue righty that τὸ ναυτικόν here does not mean commerce or navigation but the 'naval fleet'). The Old Oligarch's word choice is telling: *isēgoria* is technically the 'freedom to address public assemblies' (Hansen 1999: 81). Because no evidence exists to suggest that slaves and metics ever had this right (cf. Dem. 9.3), we must view his remarks as a rhetorical exaggeration (Frisch 1942) to highlight the basic truth that socio-economic advancement blurred the status divide between citizen from non-citizen.

33 Osborne 1983: 146 citing Dem. 20 *passim*, 23.123–134, 196–201, and 59.13, 89–107.

34 The case of the banker Pasion should also be considered. Not only was he a former slave but he also appears to have become a citizen after first passing through each intermediate status category. As an independent operator of his masters' bank, Pasion was certainly a *chōris oikōn* (Cohen 1992: 74–75), and when he became a metic after manumission, his possession of some twenty talents worth of real estate (Dem. 35.6) suggests that he became a privileged metic with the right of *enktēsis oikias kai gēs* sometime before he was granted citizenship. Millett 1991: 224–229 and Cohen 1992: 131–136 argue that Pasion accumulated and possessed real estate by employing citizen agents; this idea cannot be ruled out, but the large amount of money involved to my mind would have put Pasion in an extremely risky financial position.

35 See Samons 2007: 282–285, who highlights the un-modern, militaristic aspects of the Funeral Oration.

modern, open society is not the Athens idealized in martial encomium, as Grote and others believe, but the peaceful commercial city Xenophon wishes to see come into being as a result of his proposals.[36] Many of these can be implemented, he assures us, without any additional expenditure; all that is required is '*benevolent* legislation' (ψηφίσματα φιλάνθρωπα) (3.6). *Philanthrōpos*, which is perhaps best kept in its most literal sense of 'humanity loving', calls immediate attention to Xenophon's openness to outsiders in the *Poroi*. To attract all comers to Athens' shores, the city must, above all else, endeavour to satisfy their 'needs'. The satisfaction of outsider needs is a largely unrecognized *Leitmotiv* of the work. First, Athens will have to maintain peace. 'For if the city lives in peace', asks Xenophon, 'who will not *need* (προσδέοιντο) her?' The city will once again be thronged not only with traders and shipowners, but also with investors, artisans, sophists, philosophers, poets, and spectators (5.3–4).[37] He even mentions establishing a special board of 'peace guardians' (εἰρηνοφύλακες) in order to 'make the city much more friendly and densely thronged with visitors from *all* over the world' (πολὺ γὰρ ἂν ... προσφιλεστέραν καὶ οἰκειοτέραν εἰσαφικνεῖσθαι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ποιήσειε τὴν πόλιν: 5.1).[38] In brief, the Athenians should strive to make 'peace in every land and on every sea', reconciling warring states, ending civil wars, and guaranteeing *poleis* their autonomy, until 'everyone in the world', in a spirit of friendship and thanksgiving, puts Athens' safety foremost in their prayers after their own cities (5.8–10).

Xenophon also hopes to increase the number of foreign residents and visitors by keeping Athens 'the most pleasurable and profitable place to do business' (ἐμπορεύεσθαι ἡδίστη τε καὶ κερδαλεωτάτη ἡ πόλις: 3.1). The city has great infrastructure for trade, for example, 'the safest and finest places for mooring ships', and a market that makes for speedy transactions: 'Where will those who are in *need* (οἱ δεόμενοι) of making a quick sale or purchase gain these things more easily than in Athens?' (5.4). Yet, the city could

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36 Dillery 1993: 6: 'Xenophon's Athens is not the military focal point of an empire but an international or truly cosmopolitan cultural center'. It must be remembered that Pericles' remarks about Athens as an 'open resort' to the world (Thuc. 2.39.1) are predicated on its naval power. Moreover, Athens does not exclude by alien acts those foreigners who wish to come to Athens 'to learn and observe' Athenian '*military practices*'.

37 See also 3.11 and 4.12 on the participation of foreigners in the capital fund.

38 There is debate among scholars about the specific functions of this board, whose very name evokes such Athenian imperial institutions as 'the garrison' (οἱ φύλακες) and the 'guardians of the Hellespont' (ἑλλησποντοφύλακες). The view of Cawkwell 1963: 56 (endorsed by Gauthier 1976: 198) is the most plausible, namely, that the *eirēnophulakes* are to have the charge of promoting trade. Jansen 2007: 260–261 argues that a diplomatic role cannot be ruled out.

do much more to promote foreign trade. He advocates constructing 'inns around the harbour for shipowners', 'convenient places for traders to buy and sell', 'public inns for visitors', and 'shops and houses for retailers in both the city and Piraeus' (3.12–13). Furthermore, Xenophon aims to exploit Athens' natural resources to the fullest extent to satisfy foreign demand for Athenian products: both 'Greeks and barbarians *need*' (προσδέονται) Athens' 'imperishable stone' (1.4); 'people' (ἄνθρωποι) generally 'have *need*' (δέωνται) of Athenian goods (3.2); and 'whenever states are doing well, people *need* (δέονται) silver' (4.8). He even guarantees foreign traders who exchange their goods for Athenian silver a profit from their transactions (3.2). For Xenophon, commerce is not zero-sum—a view often held in antiquity—but rather an opportunity for strengthening the bonds of friendship between peoples.[39]

But attracting foreign visitors is not enough for Xenophon. If Athens is going to secure a permanent increase in revenues and put the economy on a more solid footing, it has to make sure that foreign immigrants and those outsiders already in residence desire not only to make the city their home but also to work hard for its welfare. To this end, Xenophon attempts to augment the size of intervening status categories by offering a remarkable number of incentives, honours, and privileges to foreign traders, metics and slaves as a means of integrating these outsiders into Athenian society. As argued above, attaining an intervening status brought with it no guarantee of upward mobility, especially when it came to citizenship; rather, those with special statuses were far more likely to move up than those without because honours and privileges created greater opportunities of increasing personal wealth, which slaves needed to purchase their freedom and metics and foreigners to benefit the city—the necessary condition for naturalization.

Slaves

Xenophon's views on slavery are quite unconventional.[40] Contrary to many of his Greek contemporaries, he does not think a natural hierarchy exists among human beings. He is also radically out of step with his fellow Athe-

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[39] See 3.11 with my discussion of foreign traders below. The idea that commercial exchange was zero-sum for the Greeks is evidenced from the age of Homer (Tandy 1997: 137) down to Aristotle (Schofield 2000: 337); cf. Runciman 1990: 351.

[40] For Xenophon's ideas on slavery, see the analysis of Pomeroy 1994: 65–67 and Baragwanath (this volume, pp. 631–663).

nians, who truly believe that only male citizens can act virtuously and form friendships with each other. Rather, as Emily Baragwanath demonstrates elsewhere in this volume (pp. 631–663), Xenophon assumes that all people (slave or free, man or woman, Greek or foreigner) have the same capacity for virtue. For this reason, masters should treat slaves humanly and even as friends so that they serve, not under compulsion, but voluntarily. His enlightened attitude stems not so much from humane concern as from utility, for those who serve willingly (in his opinion)—no matter in what domain of human relations—are the most useful to masters, leaders, the state, etc. Of all three outsider groups treated here, slaves are without question the most useful to Xenophon's plan for recovery, inasmuch as any fiscal and economic improvement hinges upon the effective exploitation of the silver mines at Laurium, which, historically speaking, required a myriad of slaves to operate. From the outset of the *Poroi*, one can see the vital importance of the mining industry in the contention that 'the earth … when mined feeds many times more people than if the same land produced grain' (1.5). His rationale is simply that the Athenians can buy food grown abroad with the income produced from the mines. Later, he fleshes out the details: the *polis* should acquire a large corps of mining slaves to lease out at an obol a day to those operating the mines until there are three for every citizen, a number which will generate enough income for each citizen to collect three obols a day for the purchase of food and other necessities (4.13, 17, 33, 48).[41] Three obols for every Athenian citizen yields slave numbers somewhere between 60,000 and 90,000, figures which astonish modern readers but seem not to give Xenophon pause.[42] Such a large body of slaves, then, living and working at Laurium (some 40 km from Athens), 'apart' from their citizen 'masters', who are to receive the proceeds of their labour, recommends strongly that we view these slaves as *chōris oikountes*.[43] Unfortunately, Xenophon does not offer any specifics about how and where these slaves are to live, but based on what we know about

[41] At 4.49 Xenophon refers to these proceeds as 'income from the slaves' (ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνδραπόδων εἰσφορά). Schneider's emendation to ἀποφορά, adopted by Marchant in the OCT, is attractive but should be rejected. The payment is made to the state not by the slave but by the citizen qua renter. Thus, his payment cannot be called ἀποφορά, which is appropriate only for a slave's payment to his master (see texts A1–5 collected by Kazakévich 2008: 379–380). The grammarian Herennius Philo, in fact, cautions against conflating the two terms (*De diversis verborum significationibus*, *s.v.*; cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1264a33–35).

[42] For fourth-century population numbers, which seem to have vacillated between 20,000 and 30,000, see Hansen 1985.

[43] Giglioni 1970: cxxii.

how private entrepreneurs leased slaves we can make a few reasonable assumptions.

First, as Xenophon himself states, three well-known entrepreneurs of the past, Nicias, Hipponicus, and Philemonides, and many of his own time, rented out their slaves to concessionaires of mines and to proprietors of workshops 'on the condition they pay an obol a day net (ἀτελῆ) per man and maintain an equal number of slaves [*viz.* replace lost slaves]' (4.14–15).[44] The earnings given for these men indicate that the contract was for 360 days, and since the word *atelē* must mean 'net' or 'without deduction', the lessee could not tack on extra charges or make demands on the sums due in compensation for unforeseen circumstances, such as sickness, injury, and death.[45] It seems certain too that the lessee also had to support the slaves by feeding, clothing, and lodging them. In regard to housing, Xenophon mentions 'publicly-owned houses around the mines' (4.49).[46] Scholars assume that these houses, just like the private dwellings mentioned in the mining leases, were rented by mining concessionaires.[47] Some of these houses have been excavated in the mining district, most notably at Thoricus, but identifying slave quarters is extremely difficult.[48] Recently, two scholars have argued that the towers which dot the Laurium landscape were used to house, or rather, to lock up, slaves, but this is rather speculative, and other interpretations exist.[49] What we do know is that the houses at Thoricus were not very different from those found elsewhere in Attica and the Greek world.[50] Interestingly, several of the silver washeries had large courtyard houses attached to them. One next to the west diazoma of the theatre had a banquet room

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44 Gauthier 1976: 113, 134, 151, following Hopper 1968: 320 (cf. Osborne 1985: 117–118), argues that Xenophon's distinction between *kataskeuazomenoi* and *ergazomenoi* (cf. 4.11, 22, 28) reflects a general division in the mining industry between concessionaires who worked the mines (*ergazomenoi*) and proprietors of the land (*kataskeuazomenoi*), who built and owned washeries, *ergastēria*, furnaces, etc. on their land for processing the ore.

45 For the inner workings of this system, see Gauthier 1976: 138–143.

46 Unlike his recommendation for constructing new public inns (δημόσια καταγώγια) and dwellings (οἰκήσεις) in the Piraeus to accommodate the expected uptick in visitors (3.12), these houses already exist and seem to Xenophon to be adequate for the expected increase in slave numbers, but it cannot be ruled out that more houses will need to be built. Compare 4.19 on leasing *oikia* from the state.

47 Gauthier 1976: 187.

48 See Morris 1998 on the invisibility of the 'excluded' in the archaeological record.

49 Morris & Papadopoulos 2005. See Jones 1975: 121–122 who contends (rightly in my opinion) that the towers would have been used to store silver. The fact remains that there simply would not have been enough towers in the mining district to accommodate the number of slaves that Xenophon envisions.

50 Morris 1998: 208.

(*andrōn*) with five couches; another had baths; and in a house with an *andrōn* near Thoricus, a kitchen and bathroom.[51] In light of the fact that no other kinds of dwellings exist in the area besides these, we may reasonably assume that some of these houses domiciled both mine leasers and their slaves. If Xenophon had such living arrangements in mind, slaves and citizens would have occupied what one scholar calls 'free spaces', that is, common areas where status and identity were blurred by citizens, metics, slaves interacting with each other in socially meaningful ways.[52] A likelier prospect still would have been the one that Xenophon alludes to several times in the text: slaves working and living under the direction of non-citizen managers, some of whom would have been foreigners (4.22; cf. 4.12) and even slaves themselves, such as Nicias' bailiff, Sosias the Thracian. (4.14).[53] Given these arrangements, many of the mining slaves under Xenophon's plan would have been subject to no direct domination and thus would have enjoyed a degree of freedom and autonomy in their daily lives greater than most common chattel slaves, whom Xenophon says elsewhere were often bound in chains (*Oeconomicus* 3.4).

In regard to the larger surroundings, Xenophon is more forthcoming. The concentration of so many slaves in Laurium, he promises, will occasion the birth of a new *polis* itself, one that 'would become exceedingly populous' (ἰσχυρῶς γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ πολυάνθρωπος ἂν γένοιτο πόλις) (4.49–50). This *doulopolis*, as Gauthier deems it, will have many of the features of a classical Greek *polis*: an urban centre (*astu*) with an agora (4.49); fortifications (4.44); and a hinterland with estates (4.50).[54] What is so remarkable about this settlement is that Xenophon uses the word '*polis*' to describe it, in spite of the fact that it presumably will have no political identity of its own. This is the only source that 'flatly contradicts' the *Lex Hafniensis*—the claim of the researchers of *Copenhagen Polis Centre* that 'in Archaic and Classical sources the term *polis* used in the sense of town to denote a named urban centre is not applied to just any urban centre, but only to a town which was also the political centre of a *polis* [*viz.* a state]'.[55] Why then does Xenophon use this term? Perhaps he is being flippant, but this

51 See the overview of Salliora-Oikonomakou 2007: 15–25 and Morris 1998: 208–209.

52 Vlassopoulos 2007: 38.

53 For Sosias' status, see Plut. *Nic.* 4.2 and Xen. *Mem.* 2.5.2 with Gauthier 1976: 140–142.

54 Gauthier 1976: 182–183. For the importance of a walled urban centre with a hinterland for the Greek *polis*, see Hansen 2000: 152–156. It is noteworthy that Xenophon uses the noun *poluanthrōpia* and the adjective *poluanthrōpos* only in regard to *poleis* (*Hell.* 2.3.24; 5.2.16; *An.* 2.4.13).

55 Hansen 2000: 158 with Hansen & Nielsen 2004: 34.

is unlikely considering his penchant for finding the right word.[56] A better explanation is that he is using the word metaphorically, if not hyperbolically, to underscore the special status of a community comprised largely of *chōris oikountes*, who, on account of their greater likelihood of being freed, occupied a space somewhere between the chattel slave and the free Athenian resident. A few surviving lines from the comic poet Anaxandrides, who was a younger contemporary of Xenophon, corroborate this interpretation: 'Nowhere is there a *polis* of slaves, my good man, yet Fortune changes the condition of all human beings. *Many* who are not free today will be citizens from Sunium tomorrow, and on the day after that will have full access to the agora.'[57] Given the lack of context for these remarks, we cannot say anything with too much certainty; but whatever the intent of the poet, the fact that Anaxandrides selects slaves from Sunium—the most important town in the Laurium mining district—to exemplify upward status mobility at Athens cannot be a coincidence. Again, only among privileged slaves, especially *chōris oikountes*, would freedom be a more or less expected outcome.

So how does Xenophon's treatment of slaves in the *Poroi* square with his enlightened attitude evidenced elsewhere in his works? At first glance, he does not seem too intent at integrating members of the *doulopolis* within the larger *polis* social network. While these slaves would have had freedom of movement and independence from direct domination, the fact remains that they would not have been permitted to work for themselves, organize their own labour, or even collect wages (since these would have been paid directly by the mine lessees to the state), without which freedom could not have been attained. In this important respect, Xenophon's slaves would not have been as privileged as other *chōris oikountes* who were allowed to retain part of their wages and/or income after paying *apophora* to their masters. Nothing in principle, however, would have prevented them from possessing and accumulating wealth in the first place. The only thing that would have stood in the way were the opportunities for making money, and these, it should be noted, would not have been entirely lacking to them. In spite of Xenophon's assurances that redundancies in the mines can be avoided (4.22, 39), it easy to imagine scenarios in which some slaves would have been idle for a part of the year, during which time they could have hired themselves out on other jobs. More significantly, many slaves could have earned money by serving in the military, for he suggests offering members of the

56 Higgins 1977: 3–4.

57 F4 K-A: οὐκ ἔστι δούλων, ὦγάθ', οὐδαμοῦ πόλις, τύχη δὲ πάντα μεταφέρει τὰ σώματα. πολλοὶ δὲ νῦν μέν εἰσιν οὐκ ἐλεύθεροι, εἰς αὔριον δὲ Σουνιεῖς, εἶτ' εἰς τρίτην ἀγορᾷ κέχρηνται.

doulopolis the right to fight alongside the rest of the citizenry, both in the fleet and in the infantry ranks (4.42).[58] Though he does not call explicit attention to it, displaying *andragathia* in battle was one of the most expeditious ways *chōris oikountes* could gain their freedom at Athens.[59] It is with this recommendation, then, that Xenophon shows his true feelings towards the slaves, because military service can be secured only 'if someone treats them with care' (εἴ τις αὐτοὺς θεραπεύοι). The verb *therapeuein* can have a pejorative meaning (e.g., as in 'to flatter'), but more often in Xenophon denotes the sense of diligent 'care' which one should display towards those to whom respect and honour are due: most notably, the gods (*Memorabilia* 1.4.18), but subjects (*Cyropaedia* 8.8.1) and friends (*Anabasis* 1.9.20) as well.[60] For it is by 'serving' (θεραπεύων) others, he believes, that people become 'willing to serve others in return' (ἀντιθεραπεύειν ἐθέλοντας) (*Memorabilia* 1.4.18). Interestingly, Xenophon deploys this very same word in the *Poroi* when he urges the Athenians 'to treat metics and foreign traders with *care*' (τὸ θεραπεύεσθαι μετοίκους καὶ ἐμπόρους: 4.40). Both groups, as we shall see, Xenophon wants to secure as 'friends', because, like the slaves of Laurium, they too are to

[58] See Graham 1992: 262–263 and Hunt 1998: 94. That these slaves would have been paid *trophē* at least is certainly implied in the twice-repeated words, δημοσίᾳ, 'at public expense' (see Gauthier 1976: 177–178).

[59] For manumission grants, see Paus. 1.32.3; 7.15.7; 10.20.2 (Marathon); Lycurg. 1.41 (cf. 16) (Chaeronea); Ar. *Ran.* 33 with schol. (Arginusae); for mass grants in general, see Osborne 1983: 181–183. It is the opinion among those who think slaves served regularly in the Athenian fleet (e.g., Graham 1992 and Hunt 1998) that these were chattel slaves. This view is mistaken in my view. This is not the place to address this question fully, but a couple things can be said against it. First, none of the sources attesting to slaves in the fleet specifically mention chattel slaves. The existence of many slaves and masters serving on the same trireme, recorded in a naval catalogue of the late fifth century (*IG* I^3 1032 with Laing 1965: 126–130 and Graham 1992: 266–267), does not necessarily suggest chattel slaves, as strong social bonds often existed between many slaves and masters, even in cases when the former had been long emancipated (see Zelnick-Abramovitz 2005: 15–60). In fact, what the evidence ([Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.11; Dem. 4.36) strongly enjoins is that only privileged slaves served in the fleet. Second, the conventional interpretation of mass grants of freedom or enfranchisement as incentives to gain loyalty among slaves (Osborne 1983: 36; Graham 1992: 268; and Hunt 1998: 94) makes little to no sense for chattel slaves, whose service in the fleet could have been garnered simply by coercion. 'In naval battle', argues Hunt (2007: 139), 'a ship's crew survived or perished together, so slaves would have had ample motivation for rowing hard and well'; thus, freedom and/or enfranchisement would have been expensive and drastic solutions to a problem that had far easier solutions (cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1327b8–11 on the use of marines to control the crew). Such incentives to bolster numbers in the fleet make better sense for privileged slaves, who more or less had the freedom of choice to accept or refuse military service. Xenophon's language concerning his mining slaves serving in the fleet (4.42) suggests a voluntary choice, not coercion.

[60] See Gauthier 1976: 177–178, who adduces other instances of *therapeuein* from Xenophon's oeuvre.

play an important role in the city's recovery efforts. Thus, the master/slave relationship envisioned here appears to be based on the kind of mutuality befitting of friends, where kindnesses, favours, and gifts come with the expectation that the recipient will one day requite all past benefactions out of a sense of gratitude (*charis*). In short, it looks like Xenophon is trying to incorporate these slaves into the city's economy of *charis* by treating them as quasi-*euergetai*: in exchange for their willing and active support, both in the mines and the military, the possibility of manumission and further status mobility are to remain open.[61]

Foreigners

Xenophon distinguishes two types of *xenoi*: visitors and permanent residents (*viz.* metics) (3.5).[62] In this section, I would like to focus on two important subgroups of the former category: those who come to Athens for the purpose of commerce, shipowners and traders (3.1–4; 5.3–4), and those who come for investment opportunities (3.11; 4.12; 5.3). Xenophon anticipates needing investors because many of his schemes, especially the purchase of mining slaves, will require large amounts of capital (3.6). Much of this he hopes to raise through *epidoseis* from the Athenians themselves, but foreign participation is also essential: 'I think also that if they were to be enrolled as *benefactors for all time*, many foreigners would contribute … And I hope that kings, tyrants, and satraps too would desire to share in this kind of mutual friendship (*charis*)' (οἶμαι δὲ ἔγωγε, εἰ μέλλοιεν ἀναγραφήσεσθαι εὐεργέται εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, καὶ ξένους ἂν πολλοὺς εἰσενεγκεῖν, ἐλπίζω δὲ καὶ βασιλέας ἄν τινας καὶ τυράννους καὶ σατράπας ἐπιθυμῆσαι μετασχεῖν ταύτης τῆς χάριτος)

[61] It must be remembered that *euergesia* could be voluntary or involuntary in nature (Veyne 1991: 10–11). What was essential to the concept was that all benefactions be made to the whole civic community, not just to a few individuals or groups; they 'were collective benefits' (ibid. 11). The term 'economy of *charis*' is shorthand for conceptualizing the whole range of non-market based transactions and exchanges that commonly but not exclusively take place in pre-modern economies (e.g., guest-friendship and redistribution). The bibliography is large; see Herman 1987: 73–115, Millett 1991: esp. 116–126, and Von Reden 1995a.

[62] Naturally, some overlap existed between the two categories (Giglioni 1970: lxxviii–lxxxii, Gauthier 1976: 86, and Whitehead 1977: 126). For example, some foreigners may have spent significant amounts of time in Athens but not long enough to be required to be enrolled as metics, while others stayed for longer stints but only intermittently, perhaps falling in and out of metic status as circumstances changed. The length of the grace period in which a *xenos* was not required to register as a metic is unknown, but a month seems likely (Whitehead 1977: 9 and Hansen 1991: 117).

(3.11).[63] Two features of this proposal stand out. First, while participation of foreigners in *epidoseis* was encouraged and often brought great honour to the donor in the form of public recognition, Xenophon seems to go one step further by proposing to bestow on participants the honorary title of 'benefactors (*euergetai*) for all time'.[64] The title *euergetēs*, as we have seen, was not merely symbolic but brought with it the opportunity to enter into the city's economy of *charis*, which not only raised the recipient's profile but also increased his chances of garnering additional honours and privileges in the future. Again, the case of the doctor Evenor is instructive, as he was first granted the title of *euergetēs* before receiving *gēs kai oikias enktēsis* and ultimately citizenship for his participation in one of the city's *epidoseis*. Such an eventuality would have become even likelier under Xenophon's plan because all prospective benefactors who settle permanently in Athens and perform some *euergesia* for the city are to receive *enktēsis* (2.6) (see below). Second, Xenophon intimates that those foreigners who subscribe to the *epidosis* will receive the same proceeds from the capital fund as citizens (3.9–10). If such is his intention, he is indeed proposing something revolutionary in that the profits derived from the capital fund are later identified with the three-obol payment which all citizens are to receive as their *trophē*. While citizens, metics, foreigners, and slaves could collect wages (*misthoi*) from the city for various services, only citizens were the recipients of alimony and other welfare entitlements. By partaking in one of the most cherished of citizen prerogatives, the status divide separating foreigners from citizens would not have been so stark in Xenophon's Athens.

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[63] It is disputed whether these contributions are to be voluntary or obligatory. Gauthier 1976: 88–101 (cf. Schütrumpf 1982: 89) has argued spiritedly in defence of the latter, but there are many problems with this interpretation (see Jansen 2007: 343–346; cf. Ste Croix 1953: 52 and Pritchett 1991: 474–475 who think the contributions Xenophon envisions were more like *epidoseis*). For the *epidosis* in general, see Andreades 1933: 349, Veyne 1990: 90–100, Pritchett 1991: 473–485, and above all Migeotte 1992. Hommel in Pritchett 1991: 473–474 offers a nice succinct definition: 'A collection of voluntary contributions, which are ordered by a decree of the assembly, in which an individual who lives in Athens, whether a citizen or foreigner, is invited, if he is willing and able, to contribute a sum of money for the purpose determined by the people, which is either an amount as big as the contributor pleases or varying in amount within fixed limits.' The procedure is summarized by Pritchett 1991: 475.

[64] 'For all time' probably refers to the children of the benefactor (Thiel 1922: 14). For foreign participation in *epidoseis*, see Migeotte 1992: 358–363. Those who promised to contribute had their names and pledges written on tablets, which were placed in front of the statues of the Eponymous Heroes. Sometimes we even find the names and pledge amounts of subscribers inscribed on ornate stelai, most notably, *IG* II^2 791 with Meritt, *Hesp*. 11 (1941), 287–292, which includes over 130 names; cf. also plates I–V in Migeotte 1992.

Turning to foreign merchants and shipowners, Xenophon proceeds in a similar fashion by trying to ingratiate them with incentives but, as we shall see, with one notable exception:

> It would be fine and good to reward merchants and shipowners with honorific seats in the theatre and to occasionally invite them to partake in public hospitality, whenever they benefit the state because of the high quality of their ships and merchandise. For when they are honoured with these things, they would be eager to make us friends not only for the sake of profit but also for honour.
>
> προεδρίαις τιμᾶσθαι ἐμπόρους καὶ ναυκλήρους, καὶ ἐπὶ ξένιά γ᾽ ἔστιν ὅτε καλεῖσθαι, οἳ ἂν δοκῶσιν ἀξιολόγοις καὶ πλοίοις καὶ ἐμπορεύμασιν ὠφελεῖν τὴν πόλιν. ταῦτα γὰρ τιμώμενοι οὐ μόνον τοῦ κέρδους ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς τιμῆς ἕνεκεν ὡς πρὸς φίλους ἐπισπεύδοιεν ἄν. (3.4)

Austin & Vidal-Naquet note well the import of this passage: '[t]hese proposals are … deeply subversive: honorific seats in the theatre were normally reserved for magistrates and for the highest priests. Xenophon is in fact suggesting that one should invite traders to the prytaneum—an exceptional honour—simply in relation to the importance of their cargo'.[65] These authors contend that such an invitation of public hospitality (*xenia*) 'based on strictly commercial criteria' was unprecedented. One example has since surfaced but this postdates the *Poroi* by at least two decades, so Xenophon's recommendation is, in fact, innovative.[66] At any rate, *xenia* at the Prytaneum was one of the highest honours the city could bestow upon a foreigner because it afforded him the rare opportunity to dine and be entertained alongside the most illustrious citizens, such as distinguished politicians, athletic victors, and benefactors of the *polis*.[67] Though outsiders, foreign

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[65] Austin & Vidal-Naquet 1977: 367.

[66] *Hesperia* 43 (1974): no. 3, ll. 9–12, 24–29. This decree was published after the first French edition (1973) of Austin & Vidal-Naquet and thus was not taken into consideration in their analysis. The study of Engen 2010 on the honours and privileges bestowed on individuals for trade-related services in the period 415–307 substantiates this interpretation: there is only 'one example of an Athenian invitation for *xenia* or *deipnon* in the Prytaneion before the end of the fourth century that we can be certain was motivated solely by trading interests, namely no. 17 [= *Hesp.* 43 (1974): 322]' (171).

[67] Schmitt-Pantel 1985: 155: '*Xenia* is […] the invitation to a sacrificial feast where the stranger eats the sacrificial meat in equal parts with citizens, with those at least who were invited to partake in so great an honor'. There is a common misconception in the literature that *xenia* was an inferior honour—a reception only—because in some honorary inscriptions (e.g., *GHI*^{2} 2, 54–55; 31, 33; 70, 28–33) citizens are said to be invited specifically to a 'feast' (*deipnon*) at the *prytaneum*, which is thought to have been closed to foreigners (see, e.g., Miller 1978: 6, Osborne 1981: 155, Henry 1983: 271, and Engen 2010: 169). The contrast between *xenia* and *deipnon* in the sources is notional and thus reflects no real difference in the quality

traders are to be treated as part of the group, sharing equally in the meats of the communal sacrifice at the hearth of the city, the place where, I may add, many other important rituals of incorporation took place.[68] We see a similar dynamic at work in Xenophon's novel recommendation of granting these traders honorific seats in the theatre (*prohedria*).[69] *Prohedria* was a very special honour because like *xenia* it gave pride of place to *polis* benefactors and other luminaries, in fact, the very same people who would have dined at the prytaneum. Those honoured may also have been given a special ceremonial entrance as a way to publicly recognize their service to the state.[70] However, unlike *xenia*, which was a one-time event, *prohedria* was for life and could be exercised at any of the city's contests.[71] The significance of this honour is not lost on one historian:

> by granting a seat for the Dionysia at state expense, Athens was at least providing the non-citizen honorand with a unique opportunity to receive the equivalent of the *theoricon*, a state subsidy originally intended to cover the cost of theatre tickets, which otherwise was an exclusive privilege of Athenian citizens ... In order to ensure trade-related services from foreigners, Athens was willing to chip away, even if only for a little, at the barriers between citizens and noncitizens, to include a foreign trader in some of the citizens' formerly exclusive rights.[72]

This unprecedented attempt to integrate foreign traders into the social and religious fabric of the city is made all the more remarkable by the fact that these individuals are to receive these honours not for their euergetism *per se*, as we would expect, but rather for 'the high quality of their merchandise and ships'. These professional traders, who convey their goods to Athens and sell them at the market price, Xenophon explicitly remarks, are motivated by considerations of 'profit' (τοῦ κέρδους ... ἕνεκεν).[73] Their *modus operandi* contrasts starkly with trading partners like the Spartocids

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of the reception for both groups (see Schmitt-Pantel 1985: 150–155 and 1992: 147–177). However, *equality* was not maintained throughout the feast: hierarchical relationships existed in the order in which the honorands received their portions (see e.g., *IG* I³ 131).

68 For the city hearth as a place of incorporation, see Cole 2004: 81–82, who cites the rituals of the initial ephebic sacrifice and the introduction of new gods into the city.

69 As far as we can tell, *prohedria* was never given to individuals for trade-related services (see Engen 2010: 175 with Appendix One).

70 Chaniotis 2007: 61.

71 The most common phrase used in honorary inscriptions granting this privilege is προεδρίαν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγῶσιν οἷς ἡ πόλις τίθησιν (*IG* II² 385, 450, 500, 510, 512, etc.).

72 Engen 2010: 175.

73 See Engen 1996: 178 citing *IG* II² 342+, 409, 407; *Hesp*. 43 (1974), no. 3; *Hesp*. 9 (1940), no. 39; Athen. 3.119f–120a, for real-life foreign traders who received honours for simply selling goods at market prices.

of Bosporus, whose trade-related services were based on more traditional modes of exchange, such as the gift.[74] In other words, these traders would have been the very members of the 'world of the *emporion*' whose market-oriented existence was supposedly anathema to the political community of the citizenry.[75] But these individuals are not to live in a 'world apart' from Athenian citizens but are to associate with them, if even for a short time, in meaningful and intimate ways, for Xenophon contends that 'for the sake of honour they would be eager to make us *friends*' (τῆς τιμῆς ἕνεκεν ὡς πρὸς φίλους ἐπισπεύδοιεν ἄν).[76] What has escaped the attention of commentators is that with this thought Xenophon aims to bring foreign traders into the realm of 'ritualized friendship'—that 'bond of solidarity manifesting itself in an exchange of goods and services between individuals originating from separate social units'.[77] But by inviting *traders* to become friends with the city, he makes a radical modification of the custom. According to Herman, exchanges of goods within the context of ritualized friendship are diametrically opposed to those that take place in the market:

> [I]n trading relationships, the exchange is a short-term, self-liquidating transaction. Once the benefits are obtained, the social relationship is terminated. The transaction does not create moral involvement. By contrast, within the framework of amiable relations (kinship, friendship, ritualized friendship), exchanges have a long-term expectancy. Gifts beg counter gifts, and fulfil at one and the same time a number of purposes: they repay past services, incur new obligations, and act as continuous reminders of the validity of the bond.[78]

Upon closer inspection the transactions Xenophon envisages taking place between foreign traders and the city are mixed. Grants like *xenia* and *prohedria* were conceived of as 'gifts', remuneration for an individual's *euergesia* to the state, which were similarly viewed as gifts. But Xenophon's traders

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[74] The Athenians received the 'gifts' (δωρειαί) of tax-exemption, grain, and priority in loading grain, whereas the Spartocids were bestowed with the 'gifts' of statues, gold crowns, honorary citizenship, and tax-exemption in Athens (Dem. 20.29–40, esp. 20.33; Din. 1.43; *GHI*[2] 64, esp. ll. 20–23). For a good analysis of Athens' relationship with the Spartocids in terms of ritualized friendship, see Rosivach 2000: 40–43.

[75] The phrase 'world of the *emporion*' is that of Gernet 1955: 185: n. 5 and 'has become scholarly shorthand for the physical, financial, and ideological sphere encompassing businessmen involved in maritime trade and finance' (Cohen 1992: 39, n. 38; cf. Vélissaropoulos 1977: 61–85). For the supposedly hostile attitude of Athenians to the market, see Morris 1994.

[76] The phrase 'world apart' is taken from the title of von Reden 1995b.

[77] Herman 1987: 10.

[78] Herman 1987: 80. Compare Veyne 1990: 13: 'the market, by which I mean the activity of isolated economic agents, acting selfishly and freely, cannot provide collective benefits [*viz. euergesia*] in a satisfactory way'.

need not benefit the city in this way; they are expected to engage only in short-term market exchanges, albeit with goods and ships of remarkable worth. The problem with such transactions to the Greeks, as Herman rightly notes, is they do not 'create moral involvement', which could lead to potentially disastrous consequences, especially for a city like Athens which was not self-sufficient in grain.[79] Lysias' description of the citizen businessman Philon is *a fortiori* apropos of the foreign trader: 'those who … adopt the view that any country in which they have their business is their fatherland, are evidently men who would even abandon the public interest of their city to seek their private gain, because they regard their fortune, not the city, as their fatherland'.[80] By offering traders honours for traditionally dishonourable activities, Xenophon hopes to attract those who conduct short-term, market exchanges into the orbit of traditional long-term friendship relationships. In a sense, he is trying to 'moralize' amoral market behaviour. What is so subversive about his recommendation, then, is not so much that he tries to insinuate a connection between two transactional orders that the Athenians thought of as functionally and ideologically separate, but rather that he attempts to engender amiable relationships between Athenians and foreigners analogous to the ones existing between citizens, which were based on equality and a commitment to the communal values of the city.[81]

[79] For instance, when market prices fluctuated because of droughts or manipulation, merchants sometimes disposed of their cargos in countries where prices were the highest, even though this meant breaking their legal contracts with the Athenians (Dem. 56.3, 8–10). Cf. Xen. *Oec.* 20.28: 'whenever merchants need money, they do not unload their cargos of grain anywhere they happen to be, but wherever they hear that the price of grain is the highest and the people value it the most, to these places they deliver their shipments'.

[80] Lys. 31.6 (Lamb tr.). Cf. Lycurgus' negative portrayal of Leocrates when he left Athens to become a trader at Megara (*Leoc.* 21–27).

[81] For civic friendship, see Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1167b2 (cf. *Eth. Eud.* 1242b22). The comments of Cooper 1977: 646 are insightful: 'In a community animated by civic friendship, each citizen assumes that all the others, even those hardly not known at all to him, are willing supporters of their common institutions and willing contributors to the common social product, from which he, together with all the citizens, benefits. So they will approach one another for business or other purposes in a spirit of mutual goodwill and with willingness to sacrifice their own immediate interests to those of another, as friendship demands.' I think it would be a stretch to assume that Xenophon expects all *xenoi* to subordinate their individualistic drive for profit to the common good of the city to the same extent as Athenian citizens. Yet, individualistic and communal values were not necessarily thought to be mutually exclusive. Such was the view of the Stoic philosopher Diogenes of Babylonia (Cic. *Off.* 3.50–53), whose views about disclosure in commercial transactions invoked the ire of Antipater and Cicero. Xenophon's view is no different in this respect from Aristotle's, who argues that in moral (ἡ ἠθικὴ) friendship, 'one gives a gift, or does whatever he does, as to a friend (ὡς φίλῳ

Metics

Metics were a vital economic resource to the city, a point Xenophon underscores at the beginning of his discussion of them: 'this revenue is one of the finest in my opinion because, while they support themselves and render many benefits to cities (πολλὰ ὠφελοῦντες τὰς πόλεις), they do not receive state wages but pay a resident tax' (2.1).[82] It is important to stress from the outset that Xenophon is talking not simply about metics' revenue-generating potential. The phrase πολλὰ ὠφελοῦντες τὰς πόλεις refers to the fact that metics made many other important economic contributions to the state, such as performing liturgies, paying *eisphorai*, and contributing to *epidoseis*.[83] In an effort, therefore, to get foreigners to settle permanently in Athens and to retain those foreign residents already living in the city, Xenophon makes five recommendations that promote their 'care' (*epimeleia*). Of these, the grant of *enktēsis* is the most pertinent to our discussion here, for it is the contention of one historian that it represents 'a very serious—and I should say very enlightened—attempt to change, though very partially, the legal situation of the metic population according to their real economic role in Athens'.[84] Here are the specifics of his proposal:

> Then again, since there are many vacant sites and building plots within the walls, if the city were to grant the right of possession to those who have already built houses and who upon petition are deemed worthy, I think that for this reason many more and better metics would strive to live in Athens.

δωρεῖται); but one expects to receive as much *or more*, as having not given but lent' (*Eth. Nic.* 1162b31–32). In other words, just because a transaction entails a moral commitment does not mean that it has to be unprofitable. The foreign traders whom Xenophon is trying to entice may occasionally have to reduce their profit margins in order to remain friends with the Athenians, but they still will profit from the relationship.

[82] Compare 2.7, where he again notes the fiscal potential of the metics with the phrase τὰς προσόδους ἂν αὔξοιεν, 'they would increase our revenues'. It is noteworthy that he also employs the verb ὠφελεῖν, 'to benefit' or 'to profit', three times in this chapter. Whitehead 1977 is still the best study of Athenian metics.

[83] Whitehead 1977: 126 notes well that Xenophon is considering 'metic revenues in the widest sense, arising from both metic-status itself (*metoikion*, *eisphorai*, liturgies) and metics' economic activities such as the *xenika telē*, and not least the harbour dues from a revitalized Piraeus' (cf. Giglioni 1970: lxii who also notes the metics' role as investors). Thus, the view of Hasebroek 1965: 26 and Gauthier 1976: 73 that Xenophon is interested only in augmenting revenues through increasing the numbers of metics who pay the metic tax cannot be maintained. For a fuller discussion, see Jansen 2007: 291–305.

[84] Pecírka 1967: 24–25; cf. Wolf 1954: 169.

εἶτα ἐπειδὴ καὶ πολλὰ οἰκιῶν ἔρημά ἐστιν ἐντὸς τῶν τειχῶν καὶ οἰκόπεδα, εἰ ἡ πόλις διδοίη οἰκοδομησαμένοις ἐγκεκτῆσθαι οἳ ἂν αἰτούμενοι ἄξιοι δοκῶσιν εἶναι, πολὺ ἂν οἴομαι καὶ διὰ ταῦτα πλείους τε καὶ βελτίους ὀρέγεσθαι τῆς Ἀθήνησιν οἰκήσεως.[85] (2.6)

The passage presents a number of interpretive problems. The consensus among commentators is that Xenophon is advocating specifically the grant of *oikias enktēsis* (the right of owning a house) and not *gēs kai oikias enktēsis* (the right of owning both land and house), which is presumed to be greater privilege.[86] If so, the recommendation cannot be novel, since the *polis* periodically granted *enktēsis* of both varieties to *polis*' benefactors well before Xenophon wrote the *Poroi*.[87] In the words of Finley, 'Xenophon's ideas, bold in some respects, never really broke through the conventional limits'.[88] Yet, the grammar and tenor of the passage advise that we, in fact, view the proposal as something new. The phrase εἰ ἡ πόλις διδοίη οἰκοδομησαμένοις ἐγκεκτῆσθαι ('if the city were to grant the right of possession to those who have already built houses') begins an unreal condition, which suggests that the recommendation differs in some way from normal practice. Everything we know about such grants from the epigraphic record indicates that it was standard procedure for individuals first to petition the people for *enktēsis*, who then judged whether they were 'worthy' or not of the grant.[89] The novelty therefore is not in the petition itself, and we must look elsewhere. One important clue lies in the aorist participle οἰκοδομησαμένοις, 'to those who have already built',[90] which strongly enjoins the interpretation that

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[85] There is a dispute about the punctuation of this sentence, as some want to place a comma after τῶν τειχῶν (Thiel 1922, Marchant 1925, Gauthier 1976: 67, and Audring 1992). As this does not affect my interpretation, I have followed the text of the OCT.

[86] Thiel 1922: 10, Gauthier 1976: 68, Austin & Vidal-Naquet 1977: 96, Whitehead 1977: 127, Schütrumpf 1982: 83, n. 5, and Finley 1999: 163. For *enktēsis* in general, see Pecírka 1966 and Henry 1983: 204–240.

[87] See the chronological table in Pecírka 1966: 152–156.

[88] Finley 1999: 163; cf. Whitehead 1977: 129 who approvingly quotes this line at the end of his discussion on Xenophon's contribution to *metoikia* in political thought.

[89] The petition for a grant of land is evidenced in the famous inscription concerning the Citian merchants from Cyprus in 333 (*IG* II^2 337), who wished to build a sanctuary to Aphrodite for *xenoi* and metics alike: Tod 1948: 250. For such petitions, see Rhodes 1997: 29.

[90] οἰκοδομησαμένοις is the reading of all the manuscripts, though most translators do not translate it as an aorist. Some editors have followed Hertlein's emendation by turning the aorist into the future οἰκοδομησομένοις: Marchant 1961 in the OCT (though he prints the aorist in the Loeb edition), Giglioni 1970, and Schütrumpf 1982. Thiel 1922: 9 adduces 4.38 as a *comparandum*, arguing that the aorist 'takes the place of the future' (cf. Zurborg 1876: 23). While the aorist can stand for the future, it refers to the future only in cases where 'a future event is vividly represented as having actually occurred' (Smyth 1920: 432), which is certainly not the case here. The manuscript reading must be right.

Xenophon is offering *enktēsis* to metics who have already built and occupied houses in the city—a statement from which we must infer that metics in his day did not own the land connected to their domiciles, even if they had been granted *oikias enktēsis*.[91] In other words, what Xenophon is specifically proposing here is not the right of possession of a house *per se* but of the land connected with the house, that is, *gēs enktēsis*. It is his hope then that by improving the lot of metics already living in the city, would-be metics will be enticed to emigrate and build houses in many of the city's specifically designated 'vacant sites' and 'building plots'. The qualification ἐντὸς τῶν τειχῶν signals to Xenophon's audience that the only land in question is urban and not productive agricultural land in the *chōra*, which is presumably to remain the concern of citizens alone. Nevertheless, we should not underestimate the major advancement in metic rights this proposal would have produced, for without *gēs enktēsis*, metics would have had to pay rent to the landowners and even worse, to suffer possible eviction from their homes in the event landlords wished to sell the land.

Another commonly held view is that the grant of *enktēsis* is targeted at a small minority of metics because the city must first deem them 'worthy' upon petition (οἳ ἂν αἰτούμενοι ἄξιοι δοκῶσιν εἶναι). The adjective *axios* is a pervasive category of evaluation in Xenophon's works, which in the context of human relations usually denotes a person's worth based on his/her usefulness. For example, in the *Memorabilia* Socrates defines a worthy friend largely on utilitarian grounds: 'one who is eager not to fail in his duty to do well to his benefactors so that he be a source of profit to his friends (φιλόνικος πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐλλείπεσθαι εὖ ποιῶν τοὺς εὐεργετοῦντας αὐτόν, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖν τοῖς χρωμένοις)' (2.6.5).[92] Whitehead is thus certainly correct in taking this clause to refer to metics who will have performed some 'substantial *euergesia*' for the city.[93] Considering that these metics will have to ask for the privilege—a stipulation that likely refers to a vote by the people in the assembly—the beneficiaries will not be the metic population as a whole but 'a veritable

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91 MacDowell 1978: 134–135 (cf. Todd 1993: 199) argues that a grant of *oikias enktēsis* would have most likely included the land upon which the house was built but adduces no evidence to support this claim.

92 See Gray 1998 who emphasizes the theme of usefulness in the *Memorabilia*, especially as it pertains to Xenophon's apologetic aims. She argues convincingly that Xenophon constructs an image of Socrates that conforms to the traditional wise man *topos*—that is, one who both honours the gods for their usefulness to humankind and benefits his friends and city by dispensing useful, practical advice—to vindicate him of the charges of impiety and corrupting the young.

93 Whitehead 1977: 127, invoking Clerc 1893: 440.

metic aristocracy'.[94] However, Xenophon is also adamant that his proposal will attract '*more* and better metics to settle in Athens' (πλείους τε καὶ βελτίους ὀρέγεσθαι τῆς Ἀθήνησιν οἰκήσεως: 2.6). So it would appear that he does intend to enlarge, and not restrict, the potential pool of *polis* benefactors with this grant. Some scholars take βελτίους, 'better', as a veiled racial comment about the need for attracting more Greek, not barbarian, metics to Athens. But such a view distorts the logic of the sentence and has little evidence to support it.[95] Again, to Xenophon usefulness, and not race, sex, or social status, is the overriding factor in evaluating a person's worth.

More problematic still is the persistent notion that grants of *enktēsis* would have yielded imperceptible economic advantages to metics and the city alike.[96] In the first place, this viewpoint misses completely the purpose of bestowing such privileges in the first place, which, as we have seen, 'was to reward benefactions with a view to securing others'.[97] Though these exchanges between city and metic belong to the *charis* economy,

94 Whitehead 1977: 127. Gauthier 1976: 68 notes the likelihood of a decree needing to be passed for the recipients of *enktēsis*.

95 Gauthier 1976: 63–64, 72–73 and Whitehead 1977: 126 both cite Xenophon's comments at 2.3 about metic barbarians serving in the infantry ranks (ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἡ πόλις γ' ἂν ὠφεληθείη, εἰ οἱ πολῖται μετ' ἀλλήλων στρατεύοιντο μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ συντάττοιντο αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ νῦν, Λυδοὶ καὶ Φρύγες καὶ Σύροι καὶ ἄλλοι παντοδαποὶ βάρβαροι). Isager and Hansen 1975: 35, 69 argue soundly that Xenophon is specifically referring to metics who were freedmen because the 'Athenians recruited her slaves from these districts'. What is left unexplained, however, is that if Xenophon is playing the racial card with his audience, why would he then turn around and advocate opening up the 'infantry ranks' (πεζοί) to slaves in 4.42, among whom would likely be the same Phrygians, Syrians, and Lydians that he wishes to exclude in 2.3 (cf. Morris 1998: 201–202 whose material evidence supports this claim)? Gauthier's reasonable suggestion that πεζοί means 'foot soldiers' and not 'hoplites' only goes so far in explaining away this contradiction. As Arist. *Pol.* 1321a13–15 reminds us, 'a light-armed force is entirely the concern of the common people' (ἡ δὲ ψιλὴ δύναμις ... δημοτικὴ πάμπαν), which in his day comprised a large part of the citizen army (νῦν μὲν οὖν ὅπου τοιοῦτον πολὺ πλῆθος ἔστιν). To complicate the matter further, Xenophon also suggests that metics should be allowed entry into the cavalry (2.5; cf. *Eq. mag.* 9.6). If the number of non-Greek metics who served in the infantry seemed high to an observer like Xenophon, the number of Lydians, Phrygians et al. eligible to serve in the cavalry would have been proportionally just as high. In the *Hipparchicus*, Xenophon even advocates establishing a foreign contingent of 200 riders (διακοσίους ἱππέας ξένους: 9.3–4). Here *xenoi* could refer to just Greek *hippeis*, but he goes on to say that the fame of the Spartan cavalry dates to the inception of foreign riders, which Bugh 1988: 156 argues refers to Agesilaus' use of barbarian riders (including Phrygians!) in 395 during his campaign in Asia (*Hell.* 3.4.15; 4.1.3, 21; *Ages.* 1.23–24; cf. *An.* 1.8.5). In my estimation, then, we should not read too much Greek chauvinism into Xenophon's comments. Schorn (this volume, p. 703 n. 61) takes a similar view.

96 Whitehead 1977: 127, Finley 1952: 77–78 and 1999: 163–164, Gauthier 1976: 68, 73–74, and Schütrumpf 1982: 4–5.

97 Osborne 1983: 146.

they nonetheless have income maximization as their goal, as Xenophon repeatedly notes how his proposals will not only increase revenues, but also contribute to improving the overall economic welfare of the city.[98] In his estimation, such improvement cannot take place without bettering the economic condition and status of a significant number of metics, who were at a serious disadvantage vis-à-vis citizens in the ownership of real estate. Nonetheless, some have argued that if this was indeed his goal, he did not take it too seriously, for he could have eroded the status divide between metics and citizens more directly and thoroughly by granting the supposedly more privileged honour of *gēs kai oikias enktēsis*. Only agricultural land, it is believed, constitutes real estate, and the metic's separation from the land was therefore a major 'economic disability'.[99] This interpretation, based on a model of the ancient economy that tends to overemphasize the importance of agriculture, while downplaying the parts played by commerce, industry, and mining, obscures a great deal of Xenophon's programme. The fact of the matter is that while some metics farmed as renters, the vast majority were involved in non-agricultural occupations, such as the various trades, manufacture, and banking.[100] Thus, rather than focus on what this measure would not have done for a *few* metics, it makes more sense to explain how it would have benefited the great *many* of metics involved in these occupations.

In Athens, as elsewhere in the ancient world, houses were centres of production.[101] *Oikiai* were not just family residences but places of business: retail shops, brothels, banks, and workplaces (*ergastēria*).[102] In fact, busi-

98 Substantivist economic historians like Finley and Gauthier tend to overlook the great economic potential of social capital: Ober 2008: 253, n. 53.

99 Finley 1952: 77, 264 n. 17; cf. Whitehead 1977: 129 and Cartledge 1997: 222. The comment of Hansen 1999: 119 is overly optimistic: 'the only limitation on the economic position of metics, as far as we know, was they had to pay a special fee, the *xenikon telos*, to set up a small stall in the market: apart from that they could compete on equal terms with citizens'.

100 For metics in farming, see, for example, *IG* II^2 10, 2, 5, 9 and *IG* II^2 1553, 24–25 with Cohen 2000: 122, n. 104. According to Gerhardt, cited in Davies 1981: 50, the percentage of metics involved in agriculture was very small, something like 8.5%. According to Harris 2002: 70, most metics were occupied in urban trades, which is supported by Reed 2003: 55–59, who argues rightly, that metic participation in overseas trade was minimal.

101 Davies 1992: 289 and Cahill 2002: 223–288, esp. 236–238. I am not arguing, however, that all household production was geared towards generating surplus for the market; only among the wealthy did this phenomenon occur (see Gallant 1991: 98–101, Osborne 1991 and Moreno 2008: 37–76).

102 According to Aeschines, whenever one person rents and occupies a dwelling, the Athenians called it an *oikia*; when he plies a trade and occupies one of the *ergastēria* on the streets, the dwelling takes the name of the person's trade (e.g., where a 'smith' (χαλκεύς) works is called a 'smithy' (χαλκεῖον) (1.123–124)). Cf. Men. *Sam.* 234–236; Poll. 1.80; Dem. 27.9,

nesses and private residences were practically indistinguishable.[103] Some of these could be very profitable, especially the workshops that produced goods for the domestic and foreign market.[104] For example, in the *Memorabilia*, Socrates recommends to his friend Aristarchus, whose household was reduced to poverty because of the Peloponnesian War, that he turn his *oikia* into a unit of production by employing artisanal slaves on the model of five named Athenians who produce enough goods not only to feed their families but also to live luxuriously and pay for liturgies (2.7.3–6).[105] Such a household that employs craftsmen is later described as 'a house bringing in revenue' (οἰκία προσόδους ἔχουσα) (3.11.4). The sources do not always identify the status of the proprietors of these businesses but a few mention metics specifically.[106] It is no wonder that when metics are on campaign, 'it is a great thing for them to leave their trades and homes' (μέγα δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν οἰκιῶν ἀπιέναι: 2.2), for their *oikiai* were the bases of their livelihoods![107] Seen in this light, Xenophon's proposal to grant *enktēsis* is being directed at these metic entrepreneurs, for the qualification 'inside the walls', as we have noted, denotes the urban sector of Athens, where there was the highest concentration not just of workplaces but metics as well.[108]

11, 25, 32, where the word *ergastērion* signifies not only the slaves but also the dwelling (*oikia*) where they worked, and 48.12; 49.22; 52.8,14. See Cohen 2000: 42–43 and 1992: 61–110 for banks operating out of the household.

103 Finley 1952: 1967–1968 and 1981: 69 and Harris 2002: 81–83. However Finley 1952: 66 perhaps underestimates the number of *ergastēria* that were separate from *oikiai*, because he bases his claim largely on the documentary evidence from the *horoi* inscriptions: 'Eight [*sic* 'ten'; Lalonde 1991: 46 = *Agora* XIX: H112 and *SEG* 21.655] out of a total of 154 [sc. *horoi* mentioning *ergastēria*] is a small proportion and the ratio sinks even further when the mining and quarrying operations are eliminated' (66). Lysias' *oikia* clearly included a separate *ergastērion* (12.8–12); cf. *IG* II^2 2496, 9–11 and Plut. *Pel.* 12.1.

104 On the market orientation of some of these *ergastēria*, see Harris 2002.

105 See Figueira (this volume, p. 669), who discusses the economic significance of this passage.

106 For example, Demosthenes calls the *oikia* of Neaera, an Athenian metic and courtesan, an *ergastērion* (59.67) and Hyperides describes the metic perfumer Athenogenes' place of work as an *ergastērion*, which the orator intimates was his *oikia* (*Against Athenogenes* 6, 10 with Finley 1952: 68–69).

107 Thiel 1922: 8 notes rightly in connection with this passage that *oikia* may indicate a dwelling, a family, and/or workshop ('the very place of a manufacture' = *ergastērion*; cf. Lauffer 1955–1956: 83, n. 4 and Schütrumpf 1982: 122). Compare Clerc 1893: 312–313, who interprets this passages as referrring to metics leaving 'their industry'. There is a problem with the text: see Jansen 2007: 297–304 for a defence of the OCT (Marchant 1962) given here.

108 Three of five metics lived in urban/suburban demes; one of five in Piraeus; and the rest elsewhere in Attica (Whitehead 1986: 82–85 and Sinclair 1988: 29–30). It has been suggested (Thiel 1922: 9 citing *Aeschin.* 1.81–84; cf. Gauthier 1976: 67–68 and Cartledge 1997: 222) that Xenophon is thinking particularly of the *astu*, which, less populated than the Piraeus, seems

How then would the grant of *enktēsis* have promoted the welfare of metics? Most importantly, the status of many metics living in the urban parts of the city would have improved significantly vis-à-vis citizens. As Finley reminds us, 'citizenship entailed a nexus of privileges and obligations in *many* spheres of activity, juridically defined and jealously protected'.[109] One of the most important of these prerogatives was the citizen monopoly on the ownership of land.[110] While the possession of house and the land under it would have yielded no tangible political benefits to these metics, two very important economic advantages would have followed. First, metics would have been able to contract loans on the security of real estate for the first time.[111] Such a right would have been indispensible not only for running and expanding a business but also for fulfilling civic obligations, such as liturgies and *eisphorai*.[112] Even to participate in the leasing of public merchant vessels (3.14) or the renting of mining slaves (4.19–20) would have required securities. As renters, metics had to raise money by other means, such as collateralizing their movable property and slaves, but instances of this kind of hypothecation seem to be restricted to maritime finance, and thus it is unknown whether it was a widespread phenomenon.[113] Second, *enktēsis* would have allowed metics to enjoy inheritance rights (*anchisteia*), which was 'effectuated exclusively through the *oikos*'.[114] Lack of this privilege goes a long way in explaining why metics rarely remained in Athens past the first generation.[115] For Aristotle, to be secure in one's property is a condition of prosperity (*eudaimonia*).[116] The right to bequeath one's household, which

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to have had more vacant sites than the rest of the city. If so, it would seem that he is aiming to advance metic industry and crafts rather than those involved in the 'world of the *emporion*'—bankers, traders, etc. I am not too sanguine about this interpretation.

109 Finley 1999: 47 (emphasis mine).

110 A 'universal rule' in the Greek world: Finley 1999: 48; cf. Austin & Vidal-Naquet 1977: 95–96.

111 Rightly pointed out by Austin & Vidal-Naquet 1977: 100, but they are rather unimaginative about the negative consequences of this deficiency for metics.

112 For the phenomena of borrowing money for such social and political obligations, see Finley 1952: esp. 55–56, 60–65 for *oikia* used as security for loans, and Millett 1991. For productive loans in particular, see Cohen 1992: 30–36, who provides a useful critique of the aforementioned authors, who claim that most loans were taken out for non-productive ends. See also 129–136, 145–146 for a more in-depth discussion of how the prohibition of owning real estate hampered metic banking operations, though there were ways to get around it by employing citizen agents (see n. 117 below).

113 Cohen 1992: 167.

114 Cohen 2000: 41.

115 See the excellent analysis of Patterson 2000: 98–102.

116 *Rh.*1361a11–16 (tr. Freese, slightly modified).

included both human and non-human property, would have been a tremendous boon to metics whose businesses were attached to the household, as it would have ensured the long-term integrity and survival of both.[117] Metics under Xenophon's plan may have had even more economic advantages than citizens.[118] In the final analysis, then, I find it hard not to agree with Pecírka's contention that the grant of *enktēsis* is a very 'serious' and 'enlightened' 'attempt to change, though very partially, the legal situation of the metic population according to their real economic role in Athens'.[119] *Enktēsis* would have lent a greater permanency and legitimacy to the status of many resident aliens and not unimportantly, to their businesses as well. From the perspective of the *polis*, prosperous metic households yield more revenues; from the perspective of the metics, *enktēsis* offered improved chances of augmenting personal wealth and with it more opportunities to benefit the state, without which citizenship could never be gained.[120]

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117 See the short but fascinating study of Leiwo & Remes 1999, which examines the will of Epicurus. They demonstrate well that metic intellectuals who wished to establish permanent schools in Athens or Athenian philosophers who aspired to bequeath schools to metics (as was the case with Epicurus) were severely handicapped by the law forbidding metics from owning property. A convoluted solution to this problem was discovered involving citizen agents, but there was always the danger that these *de jure* custodians of the school would not carry out the stipulations of the will, which might lead to the dissolution of the institution altogether. Xenophon's plan to grant *enktēsis* probably would have been extended to these intellectuals and philosophers, whom he explicitly says he wishes to attract to Athens (5.4).

118 For example, Ehrenberg 1962: 163 contends that the citizen who had to close his shop occasionally to fulfil his political (and military) duties would have lost 'customers to the man whose shop was always open'.

119 Pecírka 1967: 24–25.

120 This point must be kept in mind by those who feel Xenophon's reforms do not go far enough in eroding the status divide between metics and citizens, primarily because he retains the metic tax and does not offer metics any political rights (e.g., Hasebroek 1965: 26–27, 100–103, Whitehead 1977: 127, Finley 1982: 53–54 and 1999: 164, Azoulay 2004: 339, and Schorn [this volume, p. 704]). Again, it is my contention that Xenophon aims only to expand intervening status categories as a means to attract and secure economically important and status-seeking outsiders and therefore to boost revenues, as a result of both their economic activities and benefactions. The *Poroi* is not a work of political philosophy (*pace* Schütrumpf 1982 and Schorn [this volume, pp. 689–723]), though philosophical themes are, of course, present (see Jansen 2007: 105–114). It is therefore a mistake, in my opinion, to impugn him for not offering more radical prescriptions for social and political change (see below).

Conclusion

The preceding discussion brings into clear focus an important aspect of Xenophon's political philosophy: while he often conforms to the social, economic, and political conventions of the *polis*, working comfortably within its traditional value system, he is also wont to push the boundaries well beyond the normal limits of thought and practice. Indeed, all the proposals examined here are firmly rooted within the conventions of the Athenian democracy, which allowed ambitious outsiders to exploit the *charis* economy to its fullest in order to improve their status. Citizenship was the ultimate goal for many, but in reality only a few were able obtain it. In the *Poroi*, Xenophon does two notable things to improve drastically the lot of outsiders. First, he is willing to grant honours and privileges to them more freely than the Athenians ever did, with the result that, had his programme been adopted, he would have expanded significantly the size of intervening status categories to the accommodation of greater numbers of outsiders. Second, he wishes to bestow honours and privileges that are particularly well suited to afford outsiders, especially slaves and metics, greater opportunities to increase and retain personal wealth and thus to move up the status hierarchy. Under Xenophon's plan, the boundaries separating citizens and outsiders are to be eroded but not completely dismantled. His proposals are not prescriptions for social and political change, but rather for financial and economic growth. While the crisis at the end of the Social War was not as acute as the one after Chaeronea, it was certainly serious enough to have advocated something like Hyperides' radical proposal of enfranchising metics and emancipating slaves.[121] But such a critique misses the point of Xenophon's programme to improve *polis* finances. As argued above, a liberal naturalization policy would have curtailed future benefactions from the beneficiaries of such a policy, because the purpose of bestowing honours and privileges in the first place is to safeguard future benefactions.

On the other hand, it would be a mistake to think that all the proposals treated here were simply a means to an end. Though establishing intentionality is always risky, two factors suggest strongly that Xenophon was comfortable with the prospect of breaking down status boundaries between citizens and outsiders. First, Xenophon spent much of his life as an outsider, one of those without a *polis* (*apolides*) who could not share in the social and political life of their native city due to the loss of citi-

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[121] Lycurg. *Leoc.* 41; Hyp. Fg. 18; Dem. 26.11.

zen rights (*atimia*). To compensate, he cultivated relationships with powerful foreigners, such as Cyrus and Agesilaus, who served as his advocates and helped him obtain the good things in life that otherwise would be lost to *apolides*: friendship, wealth, and honour. Consequently, when we find him advocating the constitution of a board of magistrates to protect metics, the so-called *metoikophulakes*, as means of attracting '*apolides*' to Athens (2.7), we must be cautious to chalk this up purely to fiscal opportunism; rather, such an idea, perhaps stemming from a feeling of empathy, reveals a strong moral commitment to improving the social condition of outsiders.

Secondly, we have in the *Cyropaedia*, which was written shortly before the *Poroi* and perhaps even for an Athenian audience, a theoretical justification for some of these measures Xenophon wants to implement in Athens.[122] There, it will be remembered, Cyrus makes radical changes to the Persian republic by implementing a series of reforms, most notably, instituting a meritocracy, which allows the Persian commoners, who have no equal share in the political life of the state, to advance to the level of citizens, the so-called 'peers' (*homotimoi*).[123] These commoners live like slaves, toiling on behalf of the peers, who are forbidden to engage in any productive or commercial occupations. Yet, as Cyrus comes to realize, the commoners are no less capable warriors than the peers of furthering his military ambitions, and so he makes it his policy to grant the same rewards and honours for all who toil on behalf of the Persian Empire (2.1.15, 19). Interestingly, Cyrus even urges his officers to fill the ranks with worthy individuals from all over the world (2.2.26)! Naturally, the reforms and policies Xenophon explores in the *Cyropaedia* do not speak to all the political and economic problems he was trying to solve in the *Poroi*, least of all Cyrus' ambitious imperialistic undertakings, which becomes necessary after the commoners are released from their economic support roles. As he says elsewhere, when men are deprived of their *trophē*, 'they must work for themselves or eat the fruits of other men's labour: otherwise it is no easy thing to have a livelihood and to obtain peace' (*Hipparchicus* 8.8). In the *Poroi*, Xenophon aims to end the injustice of Athenian imperialism by finding ways 'to feed the citizens from their own resources' (1.1). The only way he can achieve this goal is by 'shift-

122 For date and audience, Delebecque 1957: 387, 406–407. It is also not insignificant that according to Gauthier 1912: 135, n. 2 the diction of the *Poroi* corresponds closely to *Anabasis* and *Cyropaedia*, which, he contends, represent the 'true written language of Xenophon'.

123 2.1.9–19 with Newell 1981: 121–150 and Nadon 2001: 39–42, 71–74.

ing the exploitative tendencies from outside to within the state'.[124] This is undoubtedly the glaring contradiction of the *Poroi*, because Xenophon (and most of his audience, I presume) was unwilling to embrace the flipside of the coin that he so lucidly articulates in the *Hipparchicus*: the notion that the Athenians themselves work for their own living. However, he tries to find middle ground by suggesting (perhaps with Cyrus in mind) that those outsiders whose labour and money promote the welfare of the city should share at least in some of the same honours and privileges belonging to citizens. The pathway to a higher status, especially to citizenship, is still a steep road under Xenophon's programme, but it is a course that is more open and accessible and to a greater number of people than it had been for much of the classical period.

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[124] Rightly noted by Schütrumpf 1982: 39–40; cf. Dillery 1993: 2, n. 6.

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THEMATIC INDEX

This index makes few claims to completeness or to analytical or intellectual subtlety. Its value will therefore depend more than averagely on the reader's imaginative use of it. Still the Chestertonian principle that 'if a job is worth doing it is worth doing badly' does have some force. Users should note that lemma-terms include their opposites (those interested in impiety should look up 'piety') and, when they denote types of activity, may include their practitioners.

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